Boundaries and Networks

Boundaries and Networks

 

Boundaries precede Networks.

It is the difference which makes the difference.

Boundaries in

  • Regionalism, Globalization, Multinational Firms (Trade/Economics)
  • Social Networks Theory/Relational Sociology (Sociology)
  • Complex Systems Theory – Micro/Macro Links (System Sciences)
  • Autocatalysis, Autopoiesis and Relational Biology (Biology)
  • System and Its Environment (Strategic Planning/Management)
  • Functional Silos (Supply Chain Management/Operations Management)
  • Individual and the Collective (Philosophy)
  • Self, Nature, Culture (Meta Integral Theories – Ken Wilber/Roy Bhaskar)
  • Fractal/Recursive/Holographic Paradigm (Cosmology)

 

 

Key Terms:

  • Order
  • Class
  • Identity
  • Culture
  • Meaning
  • Difference
  • Boundaries
  • Networks
  • Hierarchies
  • Heterarchy
  • Control
  • Power
  • System/Environment
  • Inside/Outside
  • Interior/Exterior
  • Included/Excluded
  • Multi-Level
  • Fractals
  • Scale
  • Multiplex
  • Ties
  • Chains
  • Silos
  • Connections
  • Links
  • Netchains
  • Operational Closure
  • Inequality
  • Information Asymmetry
  • Categories
  • Domain
  • Social Structure
  • Interaction
  • Interlocks
  • Institutions
  • Memory
  • Agency
  • Limits
  • Relational
  • Intra/Inter
  • Process
  • Subjective/Objective

 

Chapter 2
The Relational Turn in Social Sciences

Recent times have witnessed relational sociology, as arguably the major form of relational scholarship, gain considerable scholarly momentum. There is a forthcoming major handbook (Dépelteau, 2018), significant edited collections such as Conceptualizing relational sociology (Powell & Dépelteau, 2013), Applying relational sociology (Dépelteau & Powell, 2013), and in the broader leadership literatures Advancing relational leadership research (Uhl-Bien & Ospina, 2012).  In addition, there have been key texts from Crossley (2011), the work of Donati (1983, 1991, 2011) has become more accessible in English (to which he thanks Margaret Archer for, stating she “greatly encouraged and assisted me in presenting my theory to an international audience (Donati, 2011, p. xvii)), and – although less engaged with by English-speaking audiences—Bajoit’s (1992) Pour une sociologie relationnelle.

The Canadian Sociological Association has established a research cluster for relational sociology, with regular symposia, meetings, and events. Significantly, in 2015 the International Review of Sociology/ Revue Internationale de Sociolgie published a special section on relational sociology. Edited by Prandini (2015) and with contributions from Crossley (2015), Dépelteau (2015), Donati (2015), and Fuhse (2015), this special section sought to ascertain whether an original and international sociological paradigm entitled “relational sociology” could be identified. Prandini (2015) argues:

A new and original social paradigm is recognizable only if it accedes to the world stage of the global scientific system constituted and structured by networks of scientific scholars, scientific contributions published in scientific journals, books, internet sites, etc., fueled by a vast array of international meetings, seminars, conferences, and so on. It is only at this global level that we can decide if a new paradigm is gaining a global stage or not. Put in other words: are we really witnessing a new and emergent sociological ‘school’, or are we observing only a sort of ‘esprit du temp’ which is able to catalyse similar intuitions and sociological insights? (pp. 1–2)

At the end of his paper, Prandini (2015) contends that there is less a paradigm (in its precise Kuhnian meaning) and instead it is better to speak of a “relational turn” in sociology. Built on a strong and clear convergence toward a common critique of classic sociological theories, it is possibly the early stages of an emerging paradigm but such a label is currently premature. The real breakthrough of this turn is in forcing social scientists to specify “accurately the ontology of society and social relation and to discover new methods and research techniques well suited to study it” (Prandini, 2015, p. 13).

Relational theory is, as Emirbayer (1997) declares, beyond any one disciplinary background, national tradition, or analytic and empirical point of view. Outside of the major centers of Europe and the USA, Yanjie Bian hosted the International Conference on Relational Sociology at the Institute for Empirical Social Science of Xi’an Jiaotong University, and Jan Fuhse hosted the international symposium Relational Sociology: Transatlantic Impulses for the Social Sciences at Humboldt University of Berlin. Donati (2011) claims that interest in social relations can be found in philosophy (from the metaphysical point of view), psychology (from the psychic point of view), economics (from the resource perspective), law (control by rule), and even biology (bioethics). The interest is also not limited to the social sciences, with Bradbury and Lichtenstein (2000) noting:

The interdependent, interrelated nature of the world has also been discovered by physicists in their study of quantum reality. In their quest to identify the basic building blocks of the natural world, quantum physicists found that atomic particles appeared more as relations than as discrete objects (Capra 1975; Wolf 1980), and that space itself is not empty but is filled with potential (Bohm 1988). Heisenberg’s discovery early this century that every observation irrevocably changes the object being observed, further fueled the recognition that human consciousness plays an irreversible role in our understanding of reality (Bachelard, 1934/1984; Wilber 1982; Jahn & Dunne 1987). (p. 552)

Apart from its widespread contemporary appeal, relational thinking has a long history. The North American stream arguably finds its roots in the New York School, European scholars such as Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, Gabriel Tarde, Norbert Elias, Niklas Luhmann, Pierre Bourdieu, Bruno Latour, among others, have long argued for various relational approaches (even if not using that label), and Emirbayer traces the tradition of privileging relations rather than substances to pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus. What is consistently germane across these various scholars is a critique of substantialism in classic sociological accounts. This also arguably speaks to the proliferation of relational scholarship in the past few decades as globalized forces are causing a rethink of spatio-temporal conditions (e.g., the nation state and geographic borders). In breaking down the substantialist approaches, and their underlying analytical dualisms, relational scholarship asks questions of the ontological and epistemological as much as the empirical.

Contemporary thought and analysis in social theory is overrun with “turns.” In this chapter, rather than be seduced by contemporary attention to a relational turn in the social sciences, I seek to highlight some major events, trajectories, or streams of relational thought. In doing so, I am critically aware of the difficulty of arguing for relational understanding and then constructing significant events as though they are entities in and of their own right. Within the confines of a single chapter, and mindful of the role that this chapter is playing the book (e.g., setting some context/trajectory for developing my argument), my goal is to cite key developments and how they relate to one another and my argument. Given my particular interest in organizing activity, my focus is on the Human Relations Movement of the early twentieth century, the New York School of relational sociology, and then contemporary developments in sociology, leadership, and to a lesser extent, the natural sciences. While I concede that there is increasing interest in what has come to be known as “relational sociology” (see also the following chapter), relational scholarship has a long and diverse intellectual history. Importantly though, as Powell and Dépelteau (2013) note, relational sociology is not a heterogeneous label and as a collection of scholars, is still quite some way from achieving any form of  consensus. Whether consensus is required, or even desirable, for relational scholarship is questionable. The diversity of ontological and methodological starting points allows scholars to investigate a wide range of phenomena. This diversity, complexity, depth, and vitality enable dialogue and debate without requiring consensus. What binds them together is their scholarly focus on relations rather than alignment with a specific empirical object and/or method of inquiry

 

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Relational Turn in Sociology: Implications for the Study of Society, Culture, and Persons

Special issue of the academic journal Stan Rzeczy [State of Affairs]

The relational approach, which has a long tradition, has re-emerged and strengthened, forming a new, vital movement of divergent variants in sociology. Initiated and systematically developed by Pierpaolo Donati, it has grown into what is called the Italian relational turn, later followed by a proliferation of relational sociologies of various origins, including the works of Harrison C. White, Charles Tilly, Mustafa Emirbayer, Pierre Bourdieu and others. After the postmodern diffusion and beyond the stagnation of interpretative against normative conceptualizations of social life, relational sociology offers new conceptual tools and plays a leading role in reconstructing sociology both on theoretical and applied planes.

Modern sciences are founded on the study of relations, rather than essences or substances. From the outset, the relational approach has had to pave its way in sociology against holistic (“science of society”) and nominalistic (“science of individuals”) orientations. Social relations are among the key sociological concepts and have been studied as constitutive for social bonding. On the micro-level, interpersonal relations have been in the center of attention in the area where sociology and social psychology overlap. The relational turn consists not only of focusing on social relations; it also involves introducing relational categories of analysis.

The category of social relations is certainly not new in social theory. What is new is the way of looking at them. Contemporary relational thinking assumes radical changes in the ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological status of social relations. Refocusing on social relations, on their constitution and emergent effects leads us to a new way of describing, understanding and explaining social and cultural phenomena as relational facts.

A particularly significant feature of relational sociology resides in its capacity to broaden the theory of the human subject not only as a self, agent, and actor, but also through the development of the concept of the person; more precisely, through deeper research on the relational constitution of the human person as a social subject emerging from relational reflexivity (dialogue between ‘I’, ‘Me’, ‘We’, ‘You’ in a situated social context) – in other words, a view of the human person as homo relatus. Analyzing these processes leads to a sui generis relational theory of agency.

Various or divergent theories of contemporary social and cultural processes evoke relationality, but relational analysis differs from “relationistic” positions. Most existing approaches, both historical and modern, cannot be considered relational sociology in a true sense unless the social relation is conceived as a reality sui generis and society is conceptualized as a network of social relations.

“Turn” refers to a gradual transformation of the field of scientific theories, rather than to a scientific revolution. Several characteristic features of a “turn” appear to correspond well with significant traits of the relational turn: an epistemological rupture, which is brought about by introducing an innovative vocabulary that opens up new analytic perspectives;  an attempt to reconstruct the scientific domains of knowledge under conditions of their growing fragmentation; introduction of a novel perspective that shows existing knowledge in a new light; moving on from the research object to the category of analysis. These are the features of a genuine new intellectual movement that enters into debates and polemics, particularly as regards various ways of understanding relations and relationality.

The synergetic effect of a creative exchange of ideas between the founders of theories that have been independently pursued – the relational theory of society developed by Pierpaolo Donati and the theory of morphogenic society, developed on the basis of critical realism by Margaret S. Archer – proves particularly fruitful for the study of the after-modern and the new possibilities of a morphogenic society, in which the challenge of re-articulating social relations remains of central importance.

The aim of this special issue is to reflect upon the innovative potential of contemporary relational theorizing of society, culture, and persons and to go beyond superficial statements on relational sociology by addressing these issues through in-depth investigations. We invite authors to take on problems of relational sociology by discussing its main assumptions, by conceptual clarifications, by re-articulating the concepts pertinent to understanding social phenomena in relational terms, and by empirical studies guided by methodological rules of relational analysis.

http://www.stanrzeczy.edu.pl

 

 

Please see my related posts:

Boundary Spanning in Multinational and Transnational Corporations

Relational Turn in Economic Geography

Networks and Hierarchies

Boundaries and Relational Sociology

Autocatalysis, Autopoiesis and Relational Biology

Society as Communication: Social Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann

Art of Long View: Future, Uncertainty and Scenario Planning

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

BOUNDARIES/NETWORKS

Chapter of Book ME++

Click to access 9780262633130_sch_0001.pdf

 

 


Relational Sociology: Transatlantic Impulses for the Social Sciences

International Symposium, Berlin, September 25/26, 2008

http://www.relational-sociology.de

 

 

 

Symposium on Relational Sociology

https://sozlog.wordpress.com/2008/09/29/symposion-on-relational-sociology/

 

Relational sociology

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_sociology

 

 

 

Networks and Boundaries

Athanasios Karafillidis

RWTH Aachen University
Correspondence: atha@karafillidis.com

Paper presented at the International Symposium
„Relational Sociology: Transatlantic Impulses for the Social Sciences“,
Berlin,

September 25-26, 2008

Click to access Netbound.pdf

 

 

Theorising Borders as Mechanisms of Connection

Anthony Cooper

Click to access 2013cooperaphd.pdf

 

 

Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex Systems

PAUL CILLIERS

2001

Click to access Cilliers-2001-Boundaries-Hierarchies-and-Networks.pdf

 

Fractal Boundaries of Complex Networks

Jia Shao, Sergey V. Buldyrev, Reuven Cohen
Maksim Kitsak1, Shlomo Havlin, and H. Eugene Stanley

Click to access boundaries.pdf

 

Rethinking the Financial Network

Speech given by
Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England

At the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam

28 April 2009

Click to access speech386.pdf

 

 

 

Knowledge, limits and boundaries

Paul Cilliers

Click to access cilliers%202005%20knowledge%20limits.pdf

 

 

On the Status of Boundaries, both Natural and Organizational: A Complex Systems Perspective

Kurt A. Richardson & Michael R. Lissack

Click to access 6b5711dc6782e451ad32078b799cd487cb3b.pdf

Exploring System Boundaries: Complexity Theory and Legal Autopoiesis

Thomas Edward Webb

Click to access T.E._Webb_Exploring_System_Boundaries_accepted_version_.pdf

 

 

The Role of Leaders in Managing Organisation Boundaries

Click to access v10286-012-0001-0.pdf

 

 

 

Managing Boundary Spanning Elements: An Introduction

Sunil Sahadev, Keyoor Purani, and Neeru Malhotra

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michel_Rod/publication/272733714_Sahadev_S_Purani_K_and_Malhotra_N_eds_Boundary_Spanning_Elements_and_the_Marketing_Function_in_Organizations_Springer/links/5566139008aec22682ff167f/Sahadev-S-Purani-K-and-Malhotra-N-eds-Boundary-Spanning-Elements-and-the-Marketing-Function-in-Organizations-Springer.pdf#page=8

 

 

 

 

Boundary-Spanning in Organizations: Network, Influence and Conflict

Edited by Janice Langan Fox, Cary Cooper

 

https://www.routledge.com/Boundary-Spanning-in-Organizations-Network-Influence-and-Conflict/Langan-Fox-Cooper/p/book/9780415628839

A Borderless World and Nationless Firms?

Click to access prism_chapter.pdf

 

 

 

 

ADAPTATION AND THE BOUNDARY OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

Arnaud Costinot
Lindsay Oldenski
James E. Rauch

January 2009

Click to access w14668.pdf

http://economics.mit.edu/files/6456

 

The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade

James R. Markusen

http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.9.2.169

 

Incomplete Contracts and the Boundaries of the Multinational Firm

Nathan Nunn

Daniel Trefler§

June 2008

Click to access NunnTreflerPaper.pdf

 

 

Complexity and Philosophy

Francis HEYLIGHEN

Paul CILLIERS,

Carlos GERSHENSON

Click to access 0604072.pdf

 

 

 

Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism

Paul Cilliers

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.466.6144&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Click to access The_importance_of_a_certain_slowness.pdf

 

 

Towards an Economy of Complexity: Derrida, Morin and Bataille

Oliver Human

Stellenbosch University, South Africa

Paul Cilliers

Click to access Human_Complexity.pdf

 

 

 

The architecture of complexity

Herbert Simon

Click to access Thearchitectureofcomplexity.pdf

 

 

 

 

Complexity and postmodernism

Understanding complex systems

Paul Cilliers

Click to access Paul-Cilliers-Complexity-and-Postmodernism-Understanding-Complex-Systems-1998.pdf

 

 

Complexity, Difference and Identity
An Ethical Perspective

Paul Cilliers, Rika Preiser (Eds.)

http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789048191864

 

Introduction to Critical Complexity. Collected Essays by Paul Cilliers

Click to access Introduction-to-Critical-Complexity-Collected-Essays-by-Paul-Cilliers.pdf

 

 

Chapter 2
The Relational Turn in Social Sciences

Beyond Leadership
A Relational Approach to Organizational Theory in Education

Authors: Eacott, Scott

http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789811065675

http://scotteacott.com/reading-list/

 

 

Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences

By Pierpaolo Donati

 

 

 

Conceptualizing Relational Sociology: Ontological and Theoretical Issues

edited by C. Powell, F. Dépelteau

 

Applying Relational Sociology: Relations, Networks, and Society,

edited by Francçois Depélteau and Christopher Powell.
Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,

 

 

 

Birth and development of the relational theory of society:
a journey looking for a deep ‘relational sociology

Click to access donati_birth_and_development_of_the_relational_theory_of_society.pdf

 

 

 

Beyond the Manifesto: Mustafa Emirbayer and Relational Sociology

Lily Liang Sida Liu

Click to access Working-Paper-2017-02.pdf

 

 

 

 

Towards Relational Sociology

By Nick Crossley

 

 

 

 

Manifesto for a Relational Sociology

Mustafa Emirbayer

The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103, No. 2. (Sep., 1997), pp. 281-317

Click to access Mustafa%20Emirbayer_Manifesto%20for%20a%20Relational%20Sociology.pdf

 

 

 

TOWARDS A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF BORDER: THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

by Josef Langer (Klagenfurt)

Click to access JLanger3.pdf

 

 

 

 

THE STUDY OF BOUNDARIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Michele Lamont and Vira ́g Molnar

Click to access m.lamont-v.molnar-the_study_of_boundaries.pdf

 

 

 

Beyond “the relationship between the individual and society”: broadening and deepening relational thinking in group analysis

Sasha Roseneil

Click to access 11305548.pdf

 

 

 

The Relational Turn in Sociology: Implications for the Study of Society, Culture, and Persons

Special issue of the academic journal Stan Rzeczy [State of Affairs]

https://calenda.org/385129?file=1

Click to access relational_turn_speakers.pdf

 

 

NETWORKS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: COMPARING ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

LILLA VICSEK1 – GÁBOR KIRÁLY – HANNA KÓNYA

Regional Trading Blocs and Economic Integration

Regional Trading Blocs and Economic Integration

 

 

From Asia’s Rise in the New World Trade Order

Asia Rising

RTA5

 

 

From What is Regional Trade Blocs or Free Trade Agreements?

As trade integration across countries is intensifying, we hear more and more about Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Regional Trade Blocs (RTBs). As their name suggests these RTBs/FTAs are arrangements aimed for faster trade liberalisation at regional levels.

Countries are convinced that trade is an engine of growth and they are searching for arrangements that promote trade.

The WTO that contains 162 countries is the most popular one; a truly multilateral forum for trade liberalisation. But the history of WTO led trade liberalisation shows that the organisation is facing difficulty in bringing further trade liberalisation because of conflicting interest among large number of countries.

This has led to interest in trade liberalisation within a limited number of countries that may be regionally close together. These regional trade promoting arrangements advocate more tariff cuts and removal of other restrictions within the group while maintaining restrictions against the rest of the world.

Though many regional trade agreements like the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN were established before or around the time of WTO’s formation, there is mushrooming of RTBs in recent years. Recently formed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) shows this increasing affinity towards RTBs. Many RTBs like the TPP would like to make advanced level trade liberalisation and hence they are not satisfied with the slow pace of trade liberalisation within the WTO.

What are Regional Trade Blocs (RTBs)?

Regional Trade Blocs or Regional Trade Agreements (or Free Trade Agreements) are a type of regional intergovernmental arrangement, where the participating countries agree to reduce or eliminate barriers to trade like tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  The RTBs are thus historically known for promoting trade within a region by reducing or eliminating tariff among the member countries.

Over the last few decades, international trade liberalisations are taking place in a serious manner through the formation of RTBs. They are getting wide attention because of many important international developments. First, now the world is trying hard to escape from the ongoing great recession phase. Second is the failure of the WTO to take further liberalisation measures on the trade liberalisation front.

The EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, SAFTA etc are all examples for regional integration. The triad of North America, Western Europe, and Asia Pacific have the most successful trade blocs. Recently signed Trans Pacific Partnership is a powerful RTB. Similarly, another one called RCEP is in negotiation round. India has signed an FTA with the ASEAN in 2009. Simultaneously, the country has signed many bilateral FTAs.

Different types of RTBs

All regional trade blocs don’t have the same degree of trade liberalisation. They may differ in terms of the extent of tariff cutting, coverage of goods and services, treatment of cross border investment among them, agreement on movement of labour etc.

The simple form of regional trade bloc is the Free Trade Area. The Free Trade Area is a type of trade bloc, a designated group of countries that have agreed to eliminate tariffs, quotas and preferences on most (if not all)goods and services traded between them.

From the lowest to the highest, regional trade integration may vary from just tariff reduction arrangement to adoption of a single currency. The most common type of regional trade bloc is the free trade agreement where the members abolish tariffs within the region. Following are the main types of regional economic integrations.

Classification of RTBs

Preferential trading union: Here, two or more countries form a trading club or a union and reduce tariffs on imports of each other ie, when they exchange tariff preferences and concessions.

Free trade union or association: Member countries abolish all tariffs within the union, but maintain their individual tariffs against the rest of the world.

Customs union: countries abolish all tariffs within and adopt a common external tariff against the rest of the world.

Common market: in addition to the customs union, unrestricted movement of all factors of production including labour between the member countries. In the case of European Common Market, once a visa is obtained one can get employed in France or Germany or in any other member country with limited restrictions.

Economic union: The Economic Union is the highest form of economic co-operation. In addition to the common market, there is common currency, common fiscal and monetary policies and exchange rate policies etc. European Union is the example for an Economic Union. Under the European Monetary Union, there is only one currency- the Euro.

At present, out of the total regional trade arrangements FTAs are the most common, accounting for nearly 90 per cent.

 

From Regionalism in a globalizing world: an Asia-Pacific perspective

RTA7

From Asia’s Rise in the New World Trade Order

RTA4

 

From The world’s free trade areas – and all you need to know about them

International trade is a driving force behind economic growth, and two so-called “mega-regional” trade deals are dominating public debate on the issue: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

But there are around 420 regional trade agreements already in force around the world, according to the World Trade Organization. Although not all are free trade agreements (FTAs), they still shape global trade as we know it.

 Global exports and trade agreements

Image: The Economist

 

What exactly are free trade areas?

The OECD defines a free trade area as a group of “countries within which tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between the members are generally abolished but with no common trade policy toward non-members”.

The free movement of goods and services, both in the sense of geography and price, is the foundation of these trading agreements. However, tariffs are not necessarily completely abolished for all products.

 

Which are the world’s major free trade areas?

 

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

 

Free trade between the three member nations, Canada, the US and Mexico, has been in place since January 1994. Although tariffs weren’t fully abolished until 2008, by 2014 total trilateral merchandise trade exceeded US$1.12 trillion.

According to the US government, trade with Canada and Mexico supports more than 140,000 small and medium-size businesses and over 3 million jobs in the US. Gains in Canada are reportedly even higher, with 4.7 million new jobs added since 1993. The country is also the largest exporter of goods to the US.

 US Trade with NAFTA Partner 1993-2012

Image: Congressional Research Service

 

However, the Council on Foreign Relations suggests that the impact on Mexico is harder to assess. Per capita income has not risen as fast as expected; nor has it slowed Mexican emigration to the US. However, farm exports to the US have tripled since 1994, and the cost of goods in Mexico has declined. The cost of basic household goods has halved since NAFTA came into force, according to estimates by GEA, a Mexican economic consulting firm.

 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA)

 

The AFTA was signed in January 1992 in Singapore. The original members were Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Four countries have subsequently joined: Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.

The bloc has largely removed all export and import duties on items traded between the nations. It has also entered into agreements with a number of other nations, including China, eliminating tariffs on around 90% of imported goods.

 The ASEAN AFTA

Image: ASEAN Briefing

 

The AFTA nations had a combined GDP of US$2.3 trillion in 2012, and they’re home to 600 million people. The agreement has therefore helped to dramatically reduce the cost of trade for a huge number of businesses and people.

 

Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)

 

Although MERCOSUR was envisaged as a Latin American single market, enabling the free movement of people, goods, capitals and services, this vision is yet to become reality. Internal disputes have slowed progress towards removing tariffs and the free movement of people and goods.

But MERCOSUR is still one of the world’s leading economic blocs, and has a major influence on South American trade and the global economy.

 

Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

 

Formed in December 1994, the organization aims to develop natural and human resources to benefit the region’s population. Its primary focus, according to the United Nations, is to establish a large economic and unit to overcome barriers to trade.

With 19 member states, and an annual export bill in excess of $80 billion, the organization is a significant market place, both within Africa and globally.

 COMESA Member States

Image: United Nations

 

COMESA utlimately aims to remove all barriers to intra-regional trade, starting with preferential tariffs and working towards a tariff-free common market and economic union.

 

What about the European Union?

 

The EU is a single market, which is similar to a free trade area in that it has no tariffs, quotas or taxes on trade; but a single market allows the free movement of goods, services, capital and people.

The EU strives to remove non-tariff barriers to trade by applying the same rules and regulations to all of its member states. The region-wide regulations on everything from working hours to packaging are an attempt to create a level playing field. This is not necessarily the case in a free trade area.

 The European Union

Image: BBC

 

The creation of the single market was a slow process. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market. However, it was not until 1986 that the Single European Act was signed. This treaty formed the basis of the single market as we know it, as it aimed to establish the free-flow of trade across EU borders. By 1993 this process was largely complete, although work on a single market for services is still ongoing.

Today, the EU is the world’s largest economy, and the biggest exporter and importer. The EU itself has free trade agreements with other nations, including South Korea, Mexico and South Africa.

 The State of EU Trade

Image: European Union

 

What about the TPP and TTIP?

 

Once fully ratified, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is set to become the world’s largest trade agreement. The TPP already covers 40% of global GDP, and trade between member nations is already significant.

However, by removing tariffs and other barriers to trade, the agreement hopes to further develop economic ties and boost economic growth.

 The Trans-Pacific Trade Deal

Image: Reuters

 

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is a deal currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. If reached, it would itself become the world’s largest trade agreement – covering 45% of global GDP.

Like the TPP, it aims to cut tariffs and regulatory barriers to trade. Among these is the removal of customs duties, according to the EU’s negotiation factsheet.

The Center for Economic Policy Research has estimated that the deal would be worth $134 billion a year for the EU and $107 billion for the US – although opponents have disputed these figures.

 Transatlantic Negotiations

Image: Brookings

As the World Economic Forum’s E15 Initiative has highlighted, effective global trade is central to economic growth and development. Trade agreements are an integral part of making this a reality.

From Regional Trade Agreements and the Multi-polar Global Order:
Implications for South Korea’s Economy

RTA2RTA3

From Regional Trade Agreements and the Multi-polar Global Order:
Implications for South Korea’s Economy

RTA

From Regional Trade Agreements: Promoting conflict or building peace?

RTA8

Key Terms:

  • Rising Powers
  • Global Economic Governance
  • Mega-Regionals
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)
  • Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
  • Transpacific Trade and Investment Partnership (TPP)
  • MFN (Most Favored Nation)
  • PTA (Preferred Trading Agreement)
  • FTA (Free Trade Agreement)
  • RTA (Regional Trade Agreement)
  • MTS (Multi Lateral Trade System)
  • BTA (Bilateral Trade Agreement)
  • Belt and Road Initiative
  • Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
  • ASEAN
  • AEC
  • APEC
  • BRICS
  • EU
  • SAARC
  • MERCOSUR
  • Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)
  • NAFTA
  • ASEAN+3
  • ASEAN+6
  • Custom Unions
  • Common Markets
  • Economic Unions
  • GATT
  • WTO
  • SADC
  • COMESA
  • ECOWAS
  • ECCAS/CEEAC
  • SACU
  • AFTA
  • SAPTA/SAFTA

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

What is Regional Trade Blocs or Free Trade Agreements?

http://www.indianeconomy.net/splclassroom/107/what-is-regional-trade-blocs-or-free-trade-agreements/

 

 

 

The world’s free trade areas – and all you need to know about them

2016

WEF

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/world-free-trade-areas-everything-you-need-to-know/

 

Regional trade agreements: Blessing or burden?

Caroline Freund, Emanuel Ornelas

02 June 2010

http://voxeu.org/article/regional-trade-agreements-blessing-or-burden

 

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements: Promoting conflict or building peace?

Oli Brown
Faisal Haq Shaheen
Shaheen Rafi Khan
Moeed Yusuf

October 2005

Click to access security_rta_conflict.pdf

 

 

 

Regional trade agreements

WTO

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm

 

A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC

WRITTEN BY TIM MARTYN
MARCH 2001

Click to access martyn.pdf

 

 

 

Globalization and the Growth in Free Trade Agreements

SHUJIRO URATA

2002

Click to access Globalization_and_FTA.pdf

 

 

 

Regional trade agreements: blessing or burden?

 

Click to access cp313.pdf

 

 

 

Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements

M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

April 25, 2017

Click to access R40784.pdf

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements in a Multilateral Trade Regime: An Overview

Parthapratim Pal

Click to access survey_paper_RTA.pdf

 

 

 

REGIONAL TRADE INTEGRATIONS: A Comparative Study of African RTAs

Sannassee R., Boopendra S and Tandrayen Verena

Click to access 15.pdf

 

 

 

Trade Blocks and the Gravity Model: A Study of Economic Integration among Asian
Developing Countries

E. M. Ekanayake

Amit Mukherjee

Bala Veeramacheneni

Click to access 9180KU76078V3656.pdf

 

 

Free Trade Agreements, the World Trade Organization and Open Trade

Michael SUTTON

Click to access 04sutton.pdf

 

 

 

REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS THE WAY TO THE FUTURE?

ALEJANDRO FOXLEY

Click to access regional_trade_blocs.pdf

 

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO

Ildikó Virág-Neumann

2009

Click to access 32_Neumann-Virag.pdf

 

 

 

PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO: IMPETUS OR IMPEDIMENT?

Committee on International Trade

Principal Drafters:
Helena Sullivan, Chair
Stuart Shroff
Mark Du
Albert Bloomsbury

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
42 WEST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10036

Click to access 20071935-PreferentialTradeAgreementsandtheWTO.pdf

 

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements and the Multi-polar Global Order:
Implications for South Korea’s Economy

Dr. Mi Park

Click to access 84.full.pdf

 

 

 

Rising Powers in the Global Trading System – China and Mega-Regional Trade Negotiations

Clara Brandi

2016

Click to access vol1.1.Clara-Brandi.pdf

 

Asia’s Rise in the New World Trade Order

The Effects of Mega-Regional Trade Agreements on Asian Countries

Part 2 of the GED Study Series:

Effects of Mega-Regional Trade Agreements

Click to access NW_Asia_s_Rise_in_the_New_World_Trade_Order.pdf

 

 

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements: Development Challenges and Policy Options

By Antoni Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen, Christian Volpe Martinicus,
December 2013

 

http://e15initiative.org/publications/regional-trade-agreements-development-challenges-and-policy-options/

http://e15initiative.org/themes/regional-trade-agreements/

 

 

 

Regional Trade Agreements

https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-issues/regional-trade-agreements

 

 

 

What are mega-regional trade agreements?

WEF

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/07/trade-what-are-megaregionals/

 

Regional trade agreements, integration and development

2017

 

Click to access ser_rp2017d1_en.pdf

 

Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO

Chad Brown
PIIE

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12391/epdf

https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/mega-regional-trade-agreements-and-future-wto

 

 

CHINA’S NEW REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Agata Antkiewicz

John Whalley

December 2004

 

Click to access w10992.pdf

 

 

CHINA’S REGIONAL AND BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Chunding Li Jing

Wang John Whalley

January 2014

 

Click to access pt.pdf

 

 

Currency Unions and Regional Trade Agreements: EMU and EU Effects on Trade

Reuven Glick

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

October 2016

Click to access wp2016-27.pdf

 

Regionalism in a globalizing world: an Asia-Pacific perspective

Dilip Das

2001

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2038/

 

Global Liquidity and Cross Border Capital Flows

Global Liquidity and Cross Border Capital Flows

 

Types of Cross Border Capital Flows

  • Intra Bank Flows (Intra Firm Transfers)
  • Inter Bank Flows (wholesale Money Markets)
  • International Shadow Banking
  • Euro Dollar Market
  • International Bond and Equity Portfolio Flows

Growth of Capital Flows and FX Reserves

From INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Capitalflows

 

From INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Capital Flows 2

From Stitching together the global financial safety net

Cap Flows 6

 

Decline in Global Trade and Cross Border Capital Flows since 2008

 

From Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows

Cap Flows 7

 

US DOLLAR FLOWS – Inter regional Flows

  • Not all dollar flows are from USA.
  • Through Eurodollar Market, firms in many countries are engaged in US Dollar transactions.
  • US Dollar dominates cross border capital flows.

 

From External dimension of monetary policy

Cap Flows 4

 

 

From Economic resilience: a financial perspective

 

Cap Flow 15

 

 

ALL CURRENCIES

From Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

Cap Flows 10

 

Who is Involved in Cross Border Capital Flows

From The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Cap Flows 8

 

Recent Trends in Capital Flows

 

From The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Cap Flows 9

 

Problem of Boundaries

From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Capital Flows 3

Cross Border (International) Capital Flows (Networks) for

  • Intra Bank Flows
  • Inter-bank Lending
  • Debt and Securities Flows
  • International Shadow Banking

Capital Flows are not confined to National Boundaries.

Boundaries for

  • Monetary Policy
  • National Income Accounting
  • National Currencies

Types of Flows

From From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 11

 

A. Round tripping of Capital Flows

From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 12

B. International Debt Issuance by Non Financial Corporates in Emerging Markets

 

From From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 13

From Global dollar credit: links to US monetary policy and leverage

Cap flow 14

 

From  What does the new face of international financial intermediation mean for emerging market economies?

capflows 16

 

 

From Economic resilience: a financial perspective

 

Cap Flow 16

Please see my other related posts:

The Dollar Shortage, Again! in International Wholesale Money Markets

Currency Credit Networks of International Banks

Low Interest Rates and International Capital Flows

Low Interest Rates and International Investment Position of USA

Economics of Trade Finance

External Balance sheets of Nations

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements
Keynote speech at seventh conference of
Irving Fisher Committee on Central Bank Statistics

Basel, 5 September 2014

Click to access ifcb39_keynote-rh.pdf

 

 

Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

Hyun Song Shin, BIS

Eighth IFC Conference on “Statistical implications of the new financial landscape”
Basel, 8–9 September 2016

Click to access ifcb43_zp_rh.pdf

 

 

 

Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

by Stefan Avdjiev, Robert N McCauley and Hyun Song Shin

Monetary and Economic Department

BIS

October 2015

Click to access work524.pdf

 

 

 

Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows

Eugenio Cerutti (International Monetary Fund)
Stijn Claessens (Federal Reserve Board)
Lev Ratnovski (International Monetary Fund)

Economic Policy
63rd Panel Meeting
Hosted by the De Nederlandsche Bank

Amsterdam, 22-23 April 2016

Click to access Global-liquidity-and-cross-border-bank-flows.pdf

 

 

 

Stitching together the global financial safety net

Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò

Financial Stability Paper No. 36 – February 2016

BOE

Click to access fs_paper36.pdf

 

 

 

Gross Capital Inflows to Banks, Corporates and Sovereigns

Stefan Advjiev

Bryan Hardy

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

Luis Serven

January 2017

Click to access GrossFlows_jan17_final.pdf

 

 

External dimension of monetary policy

Hyun Song Shin

Remarks at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conference
“Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the post-crisis period”

Washington DC, Friday 13 November 2015

Click to access sp151113.pdf

 

 

 

 

Financial deglobalisation in banking?

Robert N McCauley, Agustín S Bénétrix,
Patrick M McGuire and Goetz von Peter

TEP Working Paper No. 1717

July 2017

Click to access tep1717.pdf

 

 

Monetary policy spillovers and currency networks in cross-border bank lending

by Stefan Avdjiev and Előd Takáts
Monetary and Economic Department

March 2016

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749311

 

 

 

Accounting for global liquidity: reloading the matrix

Hyun Song Shin
Economic Adviser and Head of Research

IMF-IBRN Joint Conference “Transmission of macroprudential and monetary policies across borders”

Washington DC, 19 April 2017

Click to access sp170419.pdf

 

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Maurice Obstfeld
Alan M. Taylor
May 2017

Click to access w23440.pdf

 

 

 

The Currency Dimension of the Bank Lending Channel in International Monetary Transmission

BIS Working Paper No. 600

Posted: 2 Jan 2017

Előd Takáts

Judit Temesvary

 

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891530

Click to access The-Currency-Dimension-of-the-Bank-Lending-Channel-in-International-Monetary-Transmission.pdf

 

 

 

The Second Phase of Global Liquidity and Its Impact on Emerging Economies

Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University

November 7, 2013

 

Click to access The-Second-Phase-of-Global-Liquidity-and-Its-Impact-on-Emerging-Economies.pdf

 

 

 

 

BIS Quarterly Review

September 2017

International banking and financial market developments

 

Click to access r_qt1709.pdf

 

 

 

 

The Three Phases of Global Liquidity

https://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9789812872838-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1490720-p177066168

 

 

 

 

The Shifting Drivers of Global Liquidity

Stefan Avdjiev
Leonardo Gambacorta
Linda S. Goldberg
Stefano Schiaffi

Staff Report No. 819
June 2017

https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr819.pdf?la=en

 

 

 

How Do Global Liquidity Phases Manifest Themselves in Asia?

Iwan J. Azis
Asian Development Bank and Cornell University
Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University
August 2013

Click to access Iwan-Azis-Paper-Shin-Global-Liquidity2013.pdf

 

 

 

 

GLOBAL LIQUIDITY—ISSUES FOR SURVEILLANCE

2014

IMF

Click to access 031114.pdf

 

 

 

 

The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Stefan Avdjiev, Leonardo Gambacorta, Linda S. Goldberg and Stefano Schiaffi

May 2017

FED NY

 

Click to access linda-goldberg.pdf

 

 

 

CAPITAL FLOWS AND GLOBAL LIQUIDITY

IMF Note for G20 IFA WG
February 2016

 

Click to access P020160811536051676178.pdf

 

 

 

 

Capital Flows, Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity∗

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

March 15, 2012

Click to access capital_flows_global_liquidity.pdf

 

 

Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

August 28, 2014

 

Click to access work458.pdf

 

 

The international monetary and financial system: a capital account historical perspective

by Claudio Borio, Harold James and Hyun Song Shin

2014

 

Click to access work457.pdf

 

 

Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses

 

Click to access CIEPR_banking_capital_flows_report_Sept12.pdf

 

 

 

Global dollar credit and carry trades: a firm-level analysis

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

August 2015

 

Click to access work510.pdf

 

 

Global dollar credit: links to US monetary policy and leverage

by Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko

2015

 

Click to access work483.pdf

 

 

 

Global liquidity and procyclicality

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements

“The State of Economics, The State of the World” World Bank conference,

8 June 2016

 

Click to access Shin-Son-Shin-Presentation.pdf

 

 

 

 

Economic resilience: a financial perspective

Note submitted to the G20 on 7 November 2016

December 2016

 

Click to access 2017-Germany-BIS-economic-resilience.pdf

 

 

Emerging Market Nonfinancial Corporate Debt: How Concerned Should We Be?,

Beltran, Daniel, Keshav Garud, and Aaron Rosenblum (2017).

IFDP Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 2017.

 

Click to access emerging-market-nonfinancial-corporate-debt-how-concerned-should-we-be-20170601.pdf

 

 

 

 

International capital flows and financial vulnerabilities in emerging market economies: analysis and data gaps

By Nikola Tarashev, Stefan Avdjiev and Ben Cohen

Note submitted to the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group

August 2016

 

Click to access othp25.pdf

 

 

 

Recent trends in EME government debt volume and composition

Corporate Debt in Emerging Economies: Threat to Financial Stability

Viral Acharya et al
2015

 

 

 

 

 Dollar credit to emerging market economies

Robert N McCauley Patrick McGuire Vladyslav Sushko

2015

 

Click to access r_qt1512e.pdf

 

 

 

 

What does the new face of international financial intermediation mean
for emerging market economies?

Hyun song shin and PhiliP Turner, Bank for International Settlements

2015

 

Click to access financial-stability-review-19_2015-04.pdf

Production Chain Length and Boundary Crossings in Global Value Chains

Production Chain Length and Boundary Crossings in Global Value Chains

 

From Structure and length of value chains

In a value chain, value is added in sequential production stages and is carried forward from one producer to the next in the form of intermediate inputs. Value chains driven by the fragmentation of production are not an entirely new economic phenomenon, but the increasing reliance on imported intermediate inputs makes value chains global.

According to a 2013 report by the OECD, WTO and UNCTAD for the G-20 Leaders Summit, “Value chains have become a dominant feature of the world economy” (OECD et al., 2013).

Obviously, this dominant feature of the world economy needs measuring and analyzing. Policy-relevant questions include, but are not limited to:

  • what is the contribution of global value chains to economy GDP and employment? how long and complex are value chains?
  • what is the involvement and position of individual industries in global value chains? do multiple border crossings in global value chains really matter?

These and related questions generated a considerable amount of investigations proposing new measures of exports and production to account for global value chains. Some of those were designed to re-calculate trade  flows in value added terms, whereas other provided an approximation of the average length of production process.

A relatively new stream of research focuses on a deep decomposition of value added or final demand ( rather than exports or imports ) into components with varied paths along global value chains and measurements of the length of the related production processes. Consider, for example, a petrochemical plant that generates some value added equal to its output less all intermediate inputs used. We would be interested to know which part of this value added, embodied in the petrochemicals, is used entirely within the domestic economy and which part is exported.

We would also inquire how much of the latter satisfies final demand in partner countries and how much is further used in production and, perhaps, in exports to third countries and so on. We would be interested, in particular, in counting the number of production stages the value added in these petrochemicals passes along the chain before reaching its final user.

 

From Structure and length of value chains

APL

 

 

From Structure and length of value chains

A natural question is whether this method can be applied to the real economy with myriads of products, industries and dozens of partner countries? It can surely be applied if the data on inter-industry transactions are organized in the form of input-output accounts, and the computations are performed in block matrix environment. In fact, the measurement of the number of production stages or the length of production chains has attracted the interest of many input-output economists. The idea of simultaneously counting and weighting the number of inter-industry transactions was formalized by Dietzenbacher et al. (2005). Their “average propagation length” (APL) is the average number of steps it takes an exogenous change in one industry to affect the value of production in another industry. It is the APL concept on which we build the count of the number of production stages from the petrochemical plant to its consumers in our simplified example above. The only difference is that Dietzenbacher et al. (2005), and many authors in the follow-up studies, neglect the completion stage. First applications of the APL concept to measure the length of cross-border production chains appear in Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007) and Inomata (2008), though Oosterhaven and Bouwmeester (2013) warn that the APL should only be used to compare pure interindustry linkages and not to compare different economies or different industries.

Fally (2011, 2012) proposes the recursive definitions of two indices that quantify the “average number of embodied production stages” and the “distance to final demand”.  Miller and Temurshoev (2015), by analogy with Antras et al. (2012), use the logic of the APL and derive the measures of “output upstreamness” and “input downstreamness” that indicate industry relative position with respect to the nal users of outputs and initial producers of inputs. They show that their measures are mathematically equivalent to those of Fally and the well known indicators of, respectively, total forward linkages and total backward linkages. Fally (2012) indicates that the average number of embodied production stages may be split to account for the stages taking place within the domestic economy and abroad. This approach was implemented in OECD (2012), De Backer and Miroudot (2013) and elaborated in Miroudot and Nordstrom (2015).

Ye et al. (2015) generalize previous length and distance indices and propose a consistent accounting system to measure the distance in production networks between producers and consumers at the country, industry and product levels from different economic perspectives. Their “value added propagation length” may be shown to be equal to Fally’s embodied production stages and Miller & Temurshoev’s input downstreamness when aggregated across producing industries.

Finally, Wang et al. (2016) develop a technique of additive decomposition of the average production length. Therefore, they are able to break the value chain into various components and measure the length of production along each component. Their production length index system includes indicators of the average number of domestic, cross-border and foreign production stages. They also propose new participation and production line position indices to clearly identify where a country or industry is in global value chains. Importantly, Wang et al. (2016) clearly distinguish between average production length and average propagation length, and between shallow and deep global value chains.

This paper builds on the technique and ideas of Wang et al. (2016) and the derivation of the weighted average number of border crossings by Muradov (2016). It re-invents a holistic system of analytical indicators of structure and length of value chains. As in Wang et al. (2016), global value chains are treated here within a wider economy context and are juxtaposed with domestic value chains. This enables developing new indices of orientation towards global value chains. The novel deliverables of this paper are believed to include the following. First, all measurements are developed with respect to output rather than value added or final product  flows. This is superior for interpretation and visualization purposes because a directly observable economic variable ( output ) is decomposed in both directions, forwards to the destination and backwards to the origin of value chain. It is also shown that at a disaggregate country-industry level, the measurement of production length is equivalent with respect to value added and output. Second, the decomposition of output builds on a factorization of the Leontief and Ghosh inverse matrices that allows for an explicit count of production stages within each detailed component. Third, the system builds on a refined classication of production stages, including final and primary production stages that are often neglected in similar studies. Fourth, the paper re-designs the average production line position index and proposes new indices of orientation towards global value chains that, hopefully, avoid overemphasizing the length of some unimportant cross-border value chains. Fifth, a new chart is proposed for the visualization of both structure and length of value chains. The chart provides an intuitive graphical interpretation of the GVC participation, orientation and position indices.

It is also worth noting that both Wang et al. (2016) and this paper propose similar methods to estimate the intensity of GVC-related production in partner countries and across borders. This is not possible with previous decomposition systems without explicitly counting the average number of production stages and border crossings.

 

 Key Terms:

  • Average Propagation Length
  • National Boundaries
  • Networks
  • Value Chains
  • Supply Chains
  • Upstreamness
  • Downstreamness
  • Structure of Chains
  • Smile Curves
  • Vertical Specialization
  • Fragmentation of Production
  • Shock Amplifiers
  • Shock Absorbers
  • Production Sharing
  • World Input Output Chains
  • WIOD
  • Counting Boundary Crossings
  • Production Staging
  • Slicing Up Value Chains
  • Mapping Value Chains
  • Geography of Value Chains
  • Spatial Economy

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

Characterizing Global Value Chains

Zhi Wang

Shang-Jin Wei

Xinding Yu and Kunfu Zhu

GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016
Background Paper Conference

Beijing, 17-18 March 2016

Click to access Characterizing_Global_Value_Chains.pdf

 

 

The Great Trade Collapse: Shock Amplifiers and Absorbers in Global Value Chains

Zhengqi Pan

2016

Click to access Zhengqi%20Pan_GPN2016_008.pdf

 

 

CHARACTERIZING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:PRODUCTION LENGTH AND UPSTREAMNESS

Zhi Wang
Shang-Jin Wei
Xinding Yu
Kunfu Zhu
March 2017

Click to access w23261.pdf

 

 

 

Characterizing Global Value Chains

Zhi Wang
Shang-Jin Wei,
Xinding Yu and Kunfu Zhu

September 2016

Click to access Wang,%20Zhi.pdf

Click to access 8178.pdf

 

 

MEASURING AND ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF GVCs ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
2017

Click to access tcgp-17-01-china-gvcs-complete-for-web-0707.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains

Click to access Lecture%20Global%20Value%20Chains.pdf

 

 

MAPPING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS

4-5 December 2012
The OECD Conference Centre, Paris

Click to access MappingGlobalValueChains_web_usb.pdf

 

 

 

Structure and length of value chains

Kirill Muradov

Click to access IO-Workshop-2017_Muradov_abstract.pdf

Click to access IO-Workshop-2017_Muradov_ppt.pdf

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054155

 

Production Staging: Measurement and Facts

Thibault Fally

August 2012

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.717.7092&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

 

TRACING VALUE-ADDED AND DOUBLE COUNTING IN GROSS EXPORTS

Robert Koopman
Zhi Wang
Shang-Jin Wei

November 2012

Click to access w18579.pdf

 

 

 

GIVE CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: TRACING VALUE ADDED IN GLOBAL PRODUCTION CHAINS

Robert Koopman
William Powers
Zhi Wang
Shang-Jin Wei

September 2010

Click to access NBER%20working%20paper_1.pdf

 

 

 

Measuring the Upstreamness of Production and Trade Flows

By Pol Antràs, Davin Chor, Thibault Fally, and Russell Hillberry

2012

Click to access acfh_published.pdf

Click to access w17819.pdf

 

 

 

Using Average Propagation Lengths to Identify Production Chains in the Andalusian Economy

 

https://idus.us.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11441/17372/file_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

 

 

Production Chains in an Interregional Framework: Identification by Means of Average Propagation Lengths

 2007

 

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0160017607305366

 

 

 

Vertical Integration and Input Flows

Enghin Atalay

Ali Hortaçsu

Chad Syverson

2013

Click to access verticalownership.pdf

 

 

 

The Rise of Vertical Specialization Trade

Benjamin Bridgman

January 2010

Click to access the_rise_of_vertical_specialization_trade_bridgman_benjamin.pdf

 

 

 

THE NATURE AND GROWTH OF VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION IN WORLD TRADE

David Hummels
Jun Ishii
Kei-Mu Yi*

March 1999

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.475.3874&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Accounting for Intermediates: Production Sharing and Trade in Value Added

Robert C. Johnson

Guillermo Noguera

First Draft: July 2008
This Draft: June 2009

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.211.9707&rep=rep1&type=pdf

First Draft: July 2008
This Draft: May 2011

Click to access PAPER_4_Johnson_Noguera.pdf

 

 

 

FRAGMENTATION AND TRADE IN VALUE ADDED OVER FOUR DECADES

Robert C. Johnson
Guillermo Noguera

June 2012

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.679.6227&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

 

Can Vertical Specialization Explain The Growth of World Trade

Kei-Mu Yi

1999

Click to access sr96.pdf

 

 

CAN MULTI-STAGE PRODUCTION EXPLAIN THE HOME BIAS IN TRADE?

Kei-Mu Yi

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
June 2008
This revision: November 2008

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-12r.pdf?la=en

 

 

 

Global Value Chains: New Evidence for North Africa

D. Del Prete, G. Giovannetti, E. Marvasi

2016

Click to access wp07_2016.pdf

 

 

 

Slicing Up Global Value Chains

Marcel Timmera Abdul Erumbana Bart Losa
Robert Stehrerb Gaaitzen de Vriesa

Presentation at International Conference on Global Value Chains and
Structural Adjustments,

Tsinghua University, June 25, 2013

Click to access session4_timmer.pdf

 

 

 

On the Geography of Global Value Chains

Pol Antràs

Alonso de Gortari

May 24, 2017

Click to access gvc_ag_latest_draft.pdf

 

 

Counting Borders in Global Value Chains

Posted: 12 Jul 2016

Last revised: 29 Aug 2016

Kirill Muradov

 

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808130

 

 

Determinants of country positioning in global value chains

Kirill Muradov

May 2017

Click to access 2932_20170627121_Muradov2017_countrypositioninGVC_1.1.pdf

 

 

THE CONSTRUCTION OF WORLD INPUT–OUTPUT TABLES IN THE WIOD PROJECT

ERIK DIETZENBACHERa*, BART LOSa, ROBERT STEHRERb, MARCEL TIMMERa and GAAITZEN DE VRIES

2013

 

Click to access WIOD%20construction.pdf

 

 

 

 

On the fragmentation of production in the us

Thibault Fally

July 2011

Click to access Fally.pdf

http://voxeu.org/article/has-production-become-more-fragmented-international-vs-domestic-perspectives

A New Measurement for International Fragmentation of the Production Process: An International Input-Output Approach

Inomata, Satoshi

http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/175.html

Output Upstreamness and Input Downstreamness of Industries/Countries in World Production

Ronald E. Miller

Umed Temurshoev

 

Date Written: July 9, 2015

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700845

Input-Output Calculus of International Trade

Kirill Muradov

 

Date Written: June 1, 2015

Posted: 9 Sep 2015 Last revised: 5 Oct 2015

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2643098

 

 

 

 Made in the World?

S. Miroudot

Hakan Nordstrom

Date Written: September 2015

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658562

 

 

 

The Average Propagation Length Conflicting Macro, Intra-industry, and Interindustry Conclusions

October 2013
Jan Oosterhaven

Maaike C. Bouwmeester

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258142955_The_Average_Propagation_Length_Conflicting_Macro_Intra-industry_and_Interindustry_Conclusions

 

 

 

Accounting Relations in Bilateral Value Added Trade

Robert Stehrer

May 2013

Click to access accounting-relations-in-bilateral-value-added-trade-dlp-3021.pdf

Whither Panama? Constructing a Consistent and Balanced World SUT System including International Trade and Transport Margins

Robert Stehrer

Click to access whither-panama-constructing-a-consistent-and-balanced-world-sut-system-including-international-trade-and-transport-margins-dlp-2905.pdf


https://wiiw.ac.at/p-2905.html

Quantifying International Production Sharing at the Bilateral and Sector Levels

Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, Kunfu Zhu

NBER Working Paper No. 19677
Issued in November 2013, Revised in March 2014

http://www.nber.org/papers/w19677

Measuring Smile Curves in Global Value Chains

Ming YE, Bo MENG , and Shang-jin WEI

August 2015

http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/530.html

 

 

 

 FOLLOW THE VALUE ADDED: BILATERAL GROSS EXPORT ACCOUNTING

by Alessandro Borin and Michele Mancini

2015

 

Click to access en_tema_1026.pdf

Intra Industry Trade and International Production and Distribution Networks

Intra Industry Trade and International Production and Distribution Networks

 

Inter Industry Trade is known as One way Trade.

Intra Industry Trade is known as Two way Trade.

 

Intra Industry Trade (IIT)

  • Can be Intra Firm or Inter Firm (Arms’ Length)
  • Can be Vertical or Horizontal (VIIT and HIIT)

Intra Industry Trade is measured using G-L Index among other indices.

Import and Export of Parts and Components (Intermediate Goods) causes measurement issues of IIT.

 

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

Intra-industry trade is defined as the simultaneous export and import of products, which belong to the same statistical product category. According to Kol and Rayment (1989), three types of bilateral trade flows may occur between countries: inter-industry trade, horizontal IIT and vertical IIT. Historically, the international trade between countries has been inter-industry form, which is described as the exchange of products belonging to different industries. Traditional trade models, such as Heckscher-Ohlin model or Ricardian model, have tried to explain this type of trade based on comparative advantage in relative technology and factor endowments. However, a significant portion of the world trade over the last three decades took the form of the intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry trade. As a result, the traditional trade models has been considered to be inadequate in explaining this new trade pattern because in these models there is no reason for developed countries to trade in similar but slightly differentiated goods.

 

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

Horizontal IIT has been defined as the exchange of similar goods that are similar in terms of quality but have different characteristics or attributes. The models developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Lancaster (1980), Krugman (1980, 1981), Helpman (1981), and Helpman and Krugman (1985) explain horizontal IIT by emphasizing the importance of economies of scale, product differentiation, and demand for variety within the setting of monopolistic competition type markets. In these models, IIT in horizontally differentiated goods should be greater, the greater the difference in income differences and relative factor endowments between the trading partners.

 

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

In contrast, vertical IIT represents trade in similar products of different qualities but they are no longer the same in terms unit production costs and factor intensities.5 Falvey (1981) and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) have shown that the IIT in vertically differentiated goods occurs because of factor endowment differences across countries. In particular, Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) suggest that the amount of capital relative to labor used in the production of vertically differentiated good indicates the quality of good. As a consequence, in an open economy, higher- quality products are produced in capital abundant countries whereas lower-quality products are produced in labor abundant countries. This will give rise to intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated goods: the capital abundant country exports higher-quality varieties and labor abundant country exports lower-quality products. The models of vertical IIT predict that the share of vertical IIT will increase as countries’ income and factor endowments diverge.

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

Various ways of calculating intra-industry trade have been proposed in the empirical literature, including the Balassa Index, the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index, the Aquino index. The most widely used method for computing the IIT is developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1971). However, beside aggregation bias, the traditional G-L index has one major problem often cited in the empirical literature. The unadjusted G-L index is negatively correlated with a large overall trade imbalance. With national trade balances, the level of IIT in a country will be clearly underestimated. To avoid this problem, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) proposed another method to adjust the index by using the relative size of exports and imports of a particular good within an industry as weights.

 

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

iit

 

From Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

IIT2IIT3IIT4

 

From:  World Trade Flows Characterization: Unit Values, Trade Types and Price Ranges

 

IIT5

 

 

Key Terms:

  • Intra Industry Trade
  • Inter Industry Trade
  • Horizontal IIT
  • Vertical IIT
  • Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage
  • Factor Inputs
  • Factor Endowments
  • Factor Prices
  • Heckscher-Ohlin Model of Trade
  • Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
  • Grubel – Lloyd Index
  • Fontagné and Freudenberg index (FF)
  • New Economic Geography (NEG)
  • Spatial Economy
  • UN COMTRADE
  • SITC Codes
  • Balassa Index
  • Acquino Index
  • Bilateral Trade Flows

 

Please see my related posts:

Understanding Trade in Intermediate Goods

Trends in Intra Firm Trade of USA

FDI vs Outsourcing: Extending Boundaries or Extending Network Chains of Firms

Relational Turn in Economic Geography

Understanding Global Value Chains – G20/OECD/WB Initiative

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia:  Eighteen Facts, Mechanics, and Policy Implications

Fukunari Kimura

2006

Click to access e2007-11b.pdf

 

 

 

The Formation of International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia

 

Mitsuyo Ando and Fukunari Kimura

 

Click to access c0194.pdf

 

 

“The mechanics of production networks in Southeast Asia: the fragmentation theory approach”

Fukunari Kimura

July 2007

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.600.7481&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

 

“Fragmentation in East Asia: Further Evidence”

May 2006

Mitsuyo Ando

Fukunari Kimura

Click to access Articolo%204.pdf

 

 

 

Modern International Production and Distribution Networks: the Role of Global Value Chains

Fukunari Kimura

2016

Click to access presentation_fukunari_kimura.pdf

 

 

 

Two-dimensional Fragmentation in East Asia: Conceptual Framework and Empirics

Fukunari Kimura and Mitsuyo Ando

Click to access 046.pdf

 

 

 

Deepening and Widening of Production Networks in ASEAN

Ayako Obashi

Fukunari Kimura

2016

Click to access ERIA-DP-2016-09.pdf

 

Global production sharing and trade patterns in East Asia

Prema-chandra Athukorala

June 2013

Click to access TU_VIROT,%20Ali_Reading2_Global%20Production%20Sharing%20and%20Trade%20Patterns%20in%20East%20Asia.pdf

 

 

 

PRODUCTION SHARING IN EAST ASIA: CHINA’S POSITION, TRADE PATTERN AND TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING

Laike Yang

Click to access gdsmdp20152yang_en.pdf

 

 

 

 

International Production Networks:  Contributions of Economics to Policy Making

Fukunari Kimura

2016

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/internationaleconomy/19/0/19_ie2016.03.fk/_pdf

 

 

 

 

Production networks in East Asia: What we know so far

Fukunari Kimura and Ayako Obashi

No. 320
November 2011

Click to access 67543923X.pdf

 

Structure and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in the U.S. Auto-Industry

Kemal Turkcan and Aysegul Ates

2010

 

Click to access JIGES%20DECEMBER%202009%20TURKCAN%203-10-2010%20Turkcan_Ates_JIGES.pdf

 

 

 

Vertical Intra-Industry Trade: An Empirical Examination of the U.S. Auto-Parts Industry

Kemal TÜRKCAN and Ayşegül ATEŞ

(This version October 2008)

 

Click to access Turkcan.pdf

 

 

 

Intra-industry trade, fragmentation and export margins: An empirical examination of sub-regional international trade

Yushi Yoshida

 

https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/aquila/getFile.do?method=getFile&fileId=501284

 

 

A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis

WTO

Click to access wto_unctad12_e.pdf

 

 

 

Intra-Industry Trade between Japan and European Countries: a Closer Look at the Quality Gap in VIIT

Yushi Yoshida, Nuno Carlos Leitão and Horácio Faustino

Click to access wp532008.pdf

 

 

Evolving pattern of intra-industry trade specialization of the new Member States (NMS) of the EU: the case of automotive industry

Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska

2008

 

Click to access publication14289_en.pdf

 

 

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NAFTA PARTNERS

2009

 

Click to access art02.pdf

 

 

 

Globalizing Production Structure and Intra-Industry Trade: The Case of Turkey

Emine Kılavuz

Hatice Erkekoğlu

Betül Altay Topcu

2013

https://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/viewFile/563/pdf

 

 

 

On the Measurement of Vertical and Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade: A Geometric Exposition

A.K.M. Azhar Robert J.R. Elliott

http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/On_the_Measurement_of_Vertical_and_Horizontal_Int.pdf?paperid=1018522

 

 

 

 Determinants of United States’ Vertical and Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade

2013

 

https://espace.curtin.edu.au/bitstream/handle/20.500.11937/41590/197560_110710_GEJ_2013.pdf?sequence=2

 

 

 

World Trade Flows Characterization: Unit Values, Trade Types and Price Ranges

Charlotte Emlinger & Sophie Piton

2014

Click to access wp2014-26.pdf

Cash and Investments: Corporate Savings Glut in USA

Cash and Investments: Corporate Savings Glut in USA

 

Profits/Retained Earnings of a firm can be used in number of ways:

  • Capital Investments
  • Debt Repayment
  • Dividends
  • Cash and Short Term Investments
  • Long Term Investments
  • Share Buybacks
  • M&A Investments

Please see three quarterly reports from FACTSET on trends in

  • Dividents
  • Buybacks
  • Cash and Investments

Share buybacks are very common for several years.

Please see my related posts

Why do Firms buyback their Shares? Causes and Consequences.

Low Interest Rates and Business Investments : Update August 2017

Short term Thinking in Investment Decisions of Businesses and Financial Markets

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

 

From The Corporate Saving Glut in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

cash

From Why Are Corporations Holding So Much Cash?

cash 2cash3

 

From FACTSET Cash and Investment Quarterly

cash4

Companies are holding on to the large sum of cash.  Rather than capital investments (CAPEX), cash is being used for share buybacks, dividend payouts, mergers and acquisitions, and cash investments (short and long term).

 

From FACTSET Cash and Investment Quarterly

cash5

Key Sources of Research:

 

The Corporate Saving Glut in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

Joseph W. Gruber
Steven B. Kamin

This Draft: June 2015

Click to access Gruber.pdf

 

The global corporate saving glut: Long-term evidence

Peter Chen, Loukas Karabarbounis, Brent Neiman

05 April 2017

http://voxeu.org/article/global-corporate-saving-glut

 

 

 

Declining Labor Shares and the Global Rise of Corporate Saving

Loukas Karabarbounis

Brent Neiman

October 2012

Click to access labshare.pdf

 

The Global Rise of Corporate Saving

Peter Chen

Loukas Karabarbounis

Brent Neiman

March 2017

Click to access CKN.pdf

Click to access w23133.pdf

 

FACTSET Dividend Quarterly

https://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/dividend

 

FACTSET Buyback Quarterly

https://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/buyback

FACTSET Cash and Investment Quarterly

https://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/cashinvestment

Click to access Cash%20and%20Investment%20Quarterly%20Q3%202016_12.21.16_v2.pdf

 

 

 

Why Are Corporations Holding So Much Cash?

By Juan M. Sanchez and Emircan Yurdagul

2013

 

Click to access RE_Jan_2013.pdf

 

 

Why Do Companies Hold Cash?

Gianni La Cava and Callan Windsor

RDP 2016-03

 

Click to access rdp2016-03.pdf

 

 

MULTINATIONALS AND THE HIGH CASH HOLDINGS PUZZLE

Lee Pinkowitz

René M. Stulz Rohan Williamson

June 2012

 

http://www.nber.org/papers/w18120.pdf?new_window=1

 

 

 

The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings

Tim Opler, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene Stulz, Rohan Williamson

Issued in October 1997

Click to access w6234.pdf

 

 

WHY DO U.S. FIRMS HOLD SO MUCH MORE CASH THAN THEY USED TO?

Thomas W. Bates Kathleen M. Kahle Rene M. Stulz

September 2006

 

Click to access w12534.pdf

 

 

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

C. Fritz Foley, Jay C. Hartzell, Sheridan Titman, and Garry Twite

October 2006

 

Click to access w12649.pdf

 

 

It’s Alive! Corporate Cash and Business Investment

Finn Poschmann

 

Click to access e-brief_181.pdf

 

 

Dead money

There are good reasons for hoarding cash.

John Lorinc

 

http://www.canadianbusiness.com/economy/dead-money/

 

 

IS “DEAD” MONEY ALIVE? A FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN NON-FINANCIAL LISTED CORPORATIONS CASH HOLDING AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BEHAVIOR

2014

IMF

 

Click to access cr1428.pdf

Why do Firms buyback their Shares? Causes and Consequences.

Why do Firms buyback their Shares? Causes and Consequences.

 

From Stock buybacks: From retain-and reinvest to downsize-and-distribute

Since the late 1980s, in the name of “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV), U.S. corporate distributions to shareholders have exploded. Dividends are the traditional mode of providing a stream of income to shareholders who, as the name says, hold on to a company’s stock, thus supporting stock-price stability. In contrast, stock repurchases, in which a company buys back its own shares from the marketplace, thus reducing the number of outstanding shares, provide short-term boosts to a company’s stock price, thus contributing to stock-price volatility. Until the mid-1980s dividends were the overwhelmingly predominant form of distributing cash to shareholders. Since then, however, even with dividends on the rise, stock buybacks have added substantially to distributions to shareholders.

Over the decade 2004-2013, 454 companies in S&P 500 Index in March 2014 that were publicly listed over the ten years did $3.4 trillion in stock buybacks, representing 51 percent of net income. These companies expended an additional 35 percent of net income on dividends.5 And buybacks remain in vogue: According to data compiled by Factset, for the 12-month period ending December 2014, S&P 500 companies spent $565 billion on buybacks, up 18 percent from the previous 12-month period.6

Stock buybacks are an important part of the explanation for both the concentration of income among the richest households and the disappearance of middle-class employment opportunities in the United States over the past three decades.7 Over that period the resource-allocation regime at many, if not most, major U.S. business corporations has transitioned from “retain-and-reinvest” to “downsize-and-distribute.” Under retain-and-reinvest, the corporation retains earnings and reinvests them in the productive capabilities embodied in its labor force. Under downsize-and-distribute, the corporation lays off experienced, and often more expensive, workers, and distributes corporate cash to shareholders.8 My research suggests that, with its downsize-and-distribute resource-allocation regime, the “buyback corporation” is in large part responsible for a national economy characterized by income inequity, employment instability, and diminished innovative capability – or the opposite of what I have called “sustainable prosperity.”9

 

 From Buyback Quarterly – Factset/December 2016

buyback2

 

From Stock buybacks: From retain-and reinvest to downsize-and-distribute

buyback

Profits Without Prosperity

 

Five years after the official end of the Great Recession, corporate profits are high, and the stock market is booming. Yet most Americans are not sharing in the recovery. While the top 0.1% of income recipients—which include most of the highest-ranking corporate executives—reap almost all the income gains, good jobs keep disappearing, and new employment opportunities tend to be insecure and underpaid. Corporate profitability is not translating into widespread economic prosperity.

The allocation of corporate profits to stock buybacks deserves much of the blame. Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period those companies used 54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their earnings. That left very little for investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for employees.

The buyback wave has gotten so big, in fact, that even shareholders—the presumed beneficiaries of all this corporate largesse—are getting worried. “It concerns us that, in the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away from investing in the future growth of their companies,” Laurence Fink, the chairman and CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, wrote in an open letter to corporate America in March. “Too many companies have cut capital expenditure and even increased debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks.”

Why are such massive resources being devoted to stock repurchases? Corporate executives give several reasons, which I will discuss later. But none of them has close to the explanatory power of this simple truth: Stock-based instruments make up the majority of their pay, and in the short term buybacks drive up stock prices. In 2012 the 500 highest-paid executives named in proxy statements of U.S. public companies received, on average, $30.3 million each; 42% of their compensation came from stock options and 41% from stock awards. By increasing the demand for a company’s shares, open-market buybacks automatically lift its stock price, even if only temporarily, and can enable the company to hit quarterly earnings per share (EPS) targets.

As a result, the very people we rely on to make investments in the productive capabilities that will increase our shared prosperity are instead devoting most of their companies’ profits to uses that will increase their own prosperity—with unsurprising results. Even when adjusted for inflation, the compensation of top U.S. executives has doubled or tripled since the first half of the 1990s, when it was already widely viewed as excessive. Meanwhile, overall U.S. economic performance has faltered.

If the U.S. is to achieve growth that distributes income equitably and provides stable employment, government and business leaders must take steps to bring both stock buybacks and executive pay under control. The nation’s economic health depends on it.

From Value Creation to Value Extraction

For three decades I’ve been studying how the resource allocation decisions of major U.S. corporations influence the relationship between value creation and value extraction, and how that relationship affects the U.S. economy. From the end of World War II until the late 1970s, a retain-and-reinvest approach to resource allocation prevailed at major U.S. corporations. They retained earnings and reinvested them in increasing their capabilities, first and foremost in the employees who helped make firms more competitive. They provided workers with higher incomes and greater job security, thus contributing to equitable, stable economic growth—what I call “sustainable prosperity.”

This pattern began to break down in the late 1970s, giving way to a downsize-and-distribute regime of reducing costs and then distributing the freed-up cash to financial interests, particularly shareholders. By favoring value extraction over value creation, this approach has contributed to employment instability and income inequality.

As documented by the economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, the richest 0.1% of U.S. households collected a record 12.3% of all U.S. income in 2007, surpassing their 11.5% share in 1928, on the eve of the Great Depression. In the financial crisis of 2008–2009, their share fell sharply, but it has since rebounded, hitting 11.3% in 2012.

Since the late 1980s, the largest component of the income of the top 0.1% has been compensation, driven by stock-based pay. Meanwhile, the growth of workers’ wages has been slow and sporadic, except during the internet boom of 1998–2000, the only time in the past 46 years when real wages rose by 2% or more for three years running. Since the late 1970s, average growth in real wages has increasingly lagged productivity growth. (See the exhibit “When Productivity and Wages Parted Ways.”)

When Productivity and Wages Parted Ways

From 1948 to the mid-1970s, increases in productivity and wages went hand in hand. Then a gap opened between the two.

Not coincidentally, U.S. employment relations have undergone a transformation in the past three decades. Mass plant closings eliminated millions of unionized blue-collar jobs. The norm of a white-collar worker’s spending his or her entire career with one company disappeared. And the seismic shift toward offshoring left all members of the U.S. labor force—even those with advanced education and substantial work experience—vulnerable to displacement.

To some extent these structural changes could be justified initially as necessary responses to changes in technology and competition. In the early 1980s permanent plant closings were triggered by the inroads superior Japanese manufacturers had made in consumer-durable and capital-goods industries. In the early 1990s one-company careers fell by the wayside in the IT sector because the open-systems architecture of the microelectronics revolution devalued the skills of older employees versed in proprietary technologies. And in the early 2000s the offshoring of more-routine tasks, such as writing unsophisticated software and manning customer call centers, sped up as a capable labor force emerged in low-wage developing economies and communications costs plunged, allowing U.S. companies to focus their domestic employees on higher-value-added work.

These practices chipped away at the loyalty and dampened the spending power of American workers, and often gave away key competitive capabilities of U.S. companies. Attracted by the quick financial gains they produced, many executives ignored the long-term effects and kept pursuing them well past the time they could be justified.

A turning point was the wave of hostile takeovers that swept the country in the 1980s. Corporate raiders often claimed that the complacent leaders of the targeted companies were failing to maximize returns to shareholders. That criticism prompted boards of directors to try to align the interests of management and shareholders by making stock-based pay a much bigger component of executive compensation.

Given incentives to maximize shareholder value and meet Wall Street’s expectations for ever higher quarterly EPS, top executives turned to massive stock repurchases, which helped them “manage” stock prices. The result: Trillions of dollars that could have been spent on innovation and job creation in the U.S. economy over the past three decades have instead been used to buy back shares for what is effectively stock-price manipulation.

Good Buybacks and Bad

Not all buybacks undermine shared prosperity. There are two major types: tender offers and open-market repurchases. With the former, a company contacts shareholders and offers to buy back their shares at a stipulated price by a certain near-term date, and then shareholders who find the price agreeable tender their shares to the company. Tender offers can be a way for executives who have substantial ownership stakes and care about a company’s long-term competitiveness to take advantage of a low stock price and concentrate ownership in their own hands. This can, among other things, free them from Wall Street’s pressure to maximize short-term profits and allow them to invest in the business. Henry Singleton was known for using tender offers in this way at Teledyne in the 1970s, and Warren Buffett for using them at GEICO in the 1980s. (GEICO became wholly owned by Buffett’s holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, in 1996.) As Buffett has noted, this kind of tender offer should be made when the share price is below the intrinsic value of the productive capabilities of the company and the company is profitable enough to repurchase the shares without impeding its real investment plans.

But tender offers constitute only a small portion of modern buybacks. Most are now done on the open market, and my research shows that they often come at the expense of investment in productive capabilities and, consequently, aren’t great for long-term shareholders.

Companies have been allowed to repurchase their shares on the open market with virtually no regulatory limits since 1982, when the SEC instituted Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange Act. Under the rule, a corporation’s board of directors can authorize senior executives to repurchase up to a certain dollar amount of stock over a specified or open-ended period of time, and the company must publicly announce the buyback program. After that, management can buy a large number of the company’s shares on any given business day without fear that the SEC will charge it with stock-price manipulation—provided, among other things, that the amount does not exceed a “safe harbor” of 25% of the previous four weeks’ average daily trading volume. The SEC requires companies to report total quarterly repurchases but not daily ones, meaning that it cannot determine whether a company has breached the 25% limit without a special investigation.

Despite the escalation in buybacks over the past three decades, the SEC has only rarely launched proceedings against a company for using them to manipulate its stock price. And even within the 25% limit, companies can still make huge purchases: Exxon Mobil, by far the biggest stock repurchaser from 2003 to 2012, can buy back about $300 million worth of shares a day, and Apple up to $1.5 billion a day. In essence, Rule 10b-18 legalized stock market manipulation through open-market repurchases.

The rule was a major departure from the agency’s original mandate, laid out in the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. The act was a reaction to a host of unscrupulous activities that had fueled speculation in the Roaring ’20s, leading to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. To prevent such shenanigans, the act gave the SEC broad powers to issue rules and regulations.

During the Reagan years, the SEC began to roll back those rules. The commission’s chairman from 1981 to 1987 was John Shad, a former vice chairman of E.F. Hutton and the first Wall Street insider to lead the commission in 50 years. He believed that the deregulation of securities markets would channel savings into economic investments more efficiently and that the isolated cases of fraud and manipulation that might go undetected did not justify onerous disclosure requirements for companies. The SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b-18 reflected that point of view.

Debunking the Justifications for Buybacks

Executives give three main justifications for open-market repurchases. Let’s examine them one by one:

1. Buybacks are investments in our undervalued shares that signal our confidence in the company’s future.

This makes some sense. But the reality is that over the past two decades major U.S. companies have tended to do buybacks in bull markets and cut back on them, often sharply, in bear markets. (See the exhibit “Where Did the Money from Productivity Increases Go?”) They buy high and, if they sell at all, sell low. Research by the Academic-Industry Research Network, a nonprofit I cofounded and lead, shows that companies that do buybacks never resell the shares at higher prices.

Where Did the Money from Productivity Increases Go?

Buybacks—as well as dividends—have skyrocketed in the past 20 years. (Note that these data are for the 251 companies that were in the S&P 500 in January 2013 and were public from 1981 through 2012. Inclusion of firms that went public after 1981, such as Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, and Dell, would make the increase in buybacks even more marked.) Though executives say they repurchase only undervalued stocks, buybacks increased when the stock market boomed, casting doubt on that claim.

Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database; the Academic-Industry Research Network.
Note: Mean repurchase and dividend amounts are in 2012 dollars.

 

Once in a while a company that bought high in a boom has been forced to sell low in a bust to alleviate financial distress. GE, for example, spent $3.2 billion on buybacks in the first three quarters of 2008, paying an average price of $31.84 per share. Then, in the last quarter, as the financial crisis brought about losses at GE Capital, the company did a $12 billion stock issue at an average share price of $22.25, in a failed attempt to protect its triple-A credit rating.

In general, when a company buys back shares at what turn out to be high prices, it eventually reduces the value of the stock held by continuing shareholders. “The continuing shareholder is penalized by repurchases above intrinsic value,” Warren Buffett wrote in his 1999 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders. “Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not good business for those who stick around.”

2. Buybacks are necessary to offset the dilution of earnings per share when employees exercise stock options.

Calculations that I have done for high-tech companies with broad-based stock option programs reveal that the volume of open-market repurchases is generally a multiple of the volume of options that employees exercise. In any case, there’s no logical economic rationale for doing repurchases to offset dilution from the exercise of employee stock options. Options are meant to motivate employees to work harder now to produce higher future returns for the company. Therefore, rather than using corporate cash to boost EPS immediately, executives should be willing to wait for the incentive to work. If the company generates higher earnings, employees can exercise their options at higher stock prices, and the company can allocate the increased earnings to investment in the next round of innovation.

3. Our company is mature and has run out of profitable investment opportunities; therefore, we should return its unneeded cash to shareholders.

Some people used to argue that buybacks were a more tax-efficient means of distributing money to shareholders than dividends. But that has not been the case since 2003, when the tax rates on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends were made the same. Much more important issues remain, however: What is the CEO’s main role and his or her responsibility to shareholders?

Companies that have built up productive capabilities over long periods typically have huge organizational and financial advantages when they enter related markets. One of the chief functions of top executives is to discover new opportunities for those capabilities. When they opt to do large open-market repurchases instead, it raises the question of whether these executives are doing their jobs.

A related issue is the notion that the CEO’s main obligation is to shareholders. It’s based on a misconception of the shareholders’ role in the modern corporation. The philosophical justification for giving them all excess corporate profits is that they are best positioned to allocate resources because they have the most interest in ensuring that capital generates the highest returns. This proposition is central to the “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV) arguments espoused over the years, most notably by Michael C. Jensen. The MSV school also posits that companies’ so-called free cash flow should be distributed to shareholders because only they make investments without a guaranteed return—and hence bear risk.

Why Money for Reinvestment Has Dried Up

Since the early 1980s, when restrictions on open-market buybacks were greatly eased, distributions to shareholders have absorbed a huge portion of net income, leaving much less for reinvestment in companies.

Note: Data are for the 251 companies that were in the S&P 500 Index in January 2013 and were publicly listed from 1981 through 2012. If the companies that went public after 1981, such as Microsoft, Cisco, Amgen, Oracle, and Dell, were included, repurchases as a percentage of net income would be even higher.

But the MSV school ignores other participants in the economy who bear risk by investing without a guaranteed return. Taxpayers take on such risk through government agencies that invest in infrastructure and knowledge creation. And workers take it on by investing in the development of their capabilities at the firms that employ them. As risk bearers, taxpayers, whose dollars support business enterprises, and workers, whose efforts generate productivity improvements, have claims on profits that are at least as strong as the shareholders’.

The irony of MSV is that public-company shareholders typically never invest in the value-creating capabilities of the company at all. Rather, they invest in outstanding shares in the hope that the stock price will rise. And a prime way in which corporate executives fuel that hope is by doing buybacks to manipulate the market. The only money that Apple ever raised from public shareholders was $97 million at its IPO in 1980. Yet in recent years, hedge fund activists such as David Einhorn and Carl Icahn—who played absolutely no role in the company’s success over the decades—have purchased large amounts of Apple stock and then pressured the company to announce some of the largest buyback programs in history.

The past decade’s huge increase in repurchases, in addition to high levels of dividends, have come at a time when U.S. industrial companies face new competitive challenges. This raises questions about how much of corporate cash flow is really “free” to be distributed to shareholders. Many academics—for example, Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih of Harvard Business School, in their 2009 HBR article “Restoring American Competitiveness” and their book Producing Prosperity—have warned that if U.S. companies don’t start investing much more in research and manufacturing capabilities, they cannot expect to remain competitive in a range of advanced technology industries.

Retained earnings have always been the foundation for investments in innovation. Executives who subscribe to MSV are thus copping out of their responsibility to invest broadly and deeply in the productive capabilities their organizations need to continually innovate. MSV as commonly understood is a theory of value extraction, not value creation.

Executives Are Serving Their Own Interests

As I noted earlier, there is a simple, much more plausible explanation for the increase in open-market repurchases: the rise of stock-based pay. Combined with pressure from Wall Street, stock-based incentives make senior executives extremely motivated to do buybacks on a colossal and systemic scale.

Consider the 10 largest repurchasers, which spent a combined $859 billion on buybacks, an amount equal to 68% of their combined net income, from 2003 through 2012. (See the exhibit “The Top 10 Stock Repurchasers.”) During the same decade, their CEOs received, on average, a total of $168 million each in compensation. On average, 34% of their compensation was in the form of stock options and 24% in stock awards. At these companies the next four highest-paid senior executives each received, on average, $77 million in compensation during the 10 years—27% of it in stock options and 29% in stock awards. Yet since 2003 only three of the 10 largest repurchasers—Exxon Mobil, IBM, and Procter & Gamble—have outperformed the S&P 500 Index.

The Top 10 Stock Repurchasers 2003–2012

At most of the leading U.S. companies below, distributions to shareholders were well in excess of net income. These distributions came at great cost to innovation, employment, and—in cases such as oil refining and pharmaceuticals—customers who had to pay higher prices for products.

Sources: Standard & Poor’s Compustat database; Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database; the Academic-Industry Research Network.
Note: The percentages of stock-based pay include gains realized from exercising stock options for all years plus, for 2003–2005, the fair value of restricted stock grants or, for 2006–2012, gains realized on vesting of stock awards. Rounding to the nearest billion may affect total distributions and percentages of net income. *Steven Ballmer, Microsoft’s CEO from January 2000 to February 2014, did not receive any stock-based pay. He does, however, own about 4% of Microsoft’s shares, valued at more than $13 billion.

Reforming the System

Buybacks have become an unhealthy corporate obsession. Shifting corporations back to a retain-and-reinvest regime that promotes stable and equitable growth will take bold action. Here are three proposals:

Put an end to open-market buybacks.

In a 2003 update to Rule 10b-18, the SEC explained: “It is not appropriate for the safe harbor to be available when the issuer has a heightened incentive to manipulate its share price.” In practice, though, the stock-based pay of the executives who decide to do repurchases provides just this “heightened incentive.” To correct this glaring problem, the SEC should rescind the safe harbor.

A good first step toward that goal would be an extensive SEC study of the possible damage that open-market repurchases have done to capital formation, industrial corporations, and the U.S. economy over the past three decades. For example, during that period the amount of stock taken out of the market has exceeded the amount issued in almost every year; from 2004 through 2013 this net withdrawal averaged $316 billion a year. In aggregate, the stock market is not functioning as a source of funds for corporate investment. As I’ve already noted, retained earnings have always provided the base for such investment. I believe that the practice of tying executive compensation to stock price is undermining the formation of physical and human capital.

Rein in stock-based pay.

Many studies have shown that large companies tend to use the same set of consultants to benchmark executive compensation, and that each consultant recommends that the client pay its CEO well above average. As a result, compensation inevitably ratchets up over time. The studies also show that even declines in stock price increase executive pay: When a company’s stock price falls, the board stuffs even more options and stock awards into top executives’ packages, claiming that it must ensure that they won’t jump ship and will do whatever is necessary to get the stock price back up.

In 1991 the SEC began allowing top executives to keep the gains from immediately selling stock acquired from options. Previously, they had to hold the stock for six months or give up any “short-swing” gains. That decision has only served to reinforce top executives’ overriding personal interest in boosting stock prices. And because corporations aren’t required to disclose daily buyback activity, it gives executives the opportunity to trade, undetected, on inside information about when buybacks are being done. At the very least, the SEC should stop allowing executives to sell stock immediately after options are exercised. Such a rule could help launch a much-needed discussion of meaningful reform that goes beyond the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s “Say on Pay”—an ineffectual law that gives shareholders the right to make nonbinding recommendations to the board on compensation issues.

But overall the use of stock-based pay should be severely limited. Incentive compensation should be subject to performance criteria that reflect investment in innovative capabilities, not stock performance.

Transform the boards that determine executive compensation.

Boards are currently dominated by other CEOs, who have a strong bias toward ratifying higher pay packages for their peers. When approving enormous distributions to shareholders and stock-based pay for top executives, these directors believe they’re acting in the interests of shareholders.

That’s a big part of the problem. The vast majority of shareholders are simply investors in outstanding shares who can easily sell their stock when they want to lock in gains or minimize losses. As I argued earlier, the people who truly invest in the productive capabilities of corporations are taxpayers and workers. Taxpayers have an interest in whether a corporation that uses government investments can generate profits that allow it to pay taxes, which constitute the taxpayers’ returns on those investments. Workers have an interest in whether the company will be able to generate profits with which it can provide pay increases and stable career opportunities.

It’s time for the U.S. corporate governance system to enter the 21st century: Taxpayers and workers should have seats on boards. Their representatives would have the insights and incentives to ensure that executives allocate resources to investments in capabilities most likely to generate innovations and value.

Courage in Washington

After the Harvard Law School dean Erwin Griswold published “Are Stock Options Getting out of Hand?” in this magazine in 1960, Senator Albert Gore launched a campaign that persuaded Congress to whittle away special tax advantages for executive stock options. After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the compensation expert Graef Crystal declared that stock options that qualified for the capital-gains tax rate, “once the most popular of all executive compensation devices…have been given the last rites by Congress.” It also happens that during the 1970s the share of all U.S. income that the top 0.1% of households got was at its lowest point in the past century.

The members of the U.S. Congress should show the courage and independence of their predecessors and go beyond “Say on Pay” to do something about excessive executive compensation. In addition, Congress should fix a broken tax regime that frequently rewards value extractors as if they were value creators and ignores the critical role of government investment in the infrastructure and knowledge that are so crucial to the competitiveness of U.S. business.

Instead, what we have now are corporations that lobby—often successfully—for federal subsidies for research, development, and exploration, while devoting far greater resources to stock buybacks. Here are three examples of such hypocrisy:

Alternative energy.

Exxon Mobil, while receiving about $600 million a year in U.S. government subsidies for oil exploration (according to the Center for American Progress), spends about $21 billion a year on buybacks. It spends virtually no money on alternative energy research.

Meanwhile, through the American Energy Innovation Council, top executives of Microsoft, GE, and other companies have lobbied the U.S. government to triple its investment in alternative energy research and subsidies, to $16 billion a year. Yet these companies had plenty of funds they could have invested in alternative energy on their own. Over the past decade Microsoft and GE, combined, have spent about that amount annually on buybacks.

Nanotechnology.

Intel executives have long lobbied the U.S. government to increase spending on nanotechnology research. In 2005, Intel’s then-CEO, Craig R. Barrett, argued that “it will take a massive, coordinated U.S. research effort involving academia, industry, and state and federal governments to ensure that America continues to be the world leader in information technology.” Yet from 2001, when the U.S. government launched the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), through 2013 Intel’s expenditures on buybacks were almost four times the total NNI budget.

Pharmaceutical drugs.

In response to complaints that U.S. drug prices are at least twice those in any other country, Pfizer and other U.S. pharmaceutical companies have argued that the profits from these high prices—enabled by a generous intellectual-property regime and lax price regulation—permit more R&D to be done in the United States than elsewhere. Yet from 2003 through 2012, Pfizer funneled an amount equal to 71% of its profits into buybacks, and an amount equal to 75% of its profits into dividends. In other words, it spent more on buybacks and dividends than it earned and tapped its capital reserves to help fund them. The reality is, Americans pay high drug prices so that major pharmaceutical companies can boost their stock prices and pad executive pay.Given the importance of the stock market and corporations to the economy and society, U.S. regulators must step in to check the behavior of those who are unable or unwilling to control themselves. “The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,” the SEC’s website explains, “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Yet, as we have seen, in its rulings on and monitoring of stock buybacks and executive pay over three decades, the SEC has taken a course of action contrary to those objectives. It has enabled the wealthiest 0.1% of society, including top executives, to capture the lion’s share of the gains of U.S. productivity growth while the vast majority of Americans have been left behind. Rule 10b-18, in particular, has facilitated a rigged stock market that, by permitting the massive distribution of corporate cash to shareholders, has undermined capital formation, including human capital formation.

The corporate resource allocation process is America’s source of economic security or insecurity, as the case may be. If Americans want an economy in which corporate profits result in shared prosperity, the buyback and executive compensation binges will have to end. As with any addiction, there will be withdrawal pains. But the best executives may actually get satisfaction out of being paid a reasonable salary for allocating resources in ways that sustain the enterprise, provide higher standards of living to the workers who make it succeed, and generate tax revenues for the governments that provide it with crucial inputs.

A version of this article appeared in the September 2014 issue of Harvard Business Review.

Key Sources of Research:

Buybacks Around the World
Market Timing, Governance and Regulation

Alberto Manconi Urs Peyer Theo Vermaelen
September 2015

Click to access 1bb_around_the_world_revised_-_september_8_2015-2.pdf

 

 

EXPLOITING EXCESS RETURNS FROM SHARE BUYBACK ANNOUNCEMENTS

White Paper by Catalyst Capital Advisors

Click to access Catalyst_Buyback_Strategy_White_Paper_2013-12-31.pdf

 

 

BUYBACKS: FROM BASICS TO POLITICS

WILLIAM LAZONICK
The Academic-Industry Research Network

August 19, 2015

Click to access Lazonick-Buybacks-Basics-to-Politics-20150819.pdf

 

Investment Opportunities and Share Repurchases

Walter I. Boudry*
Jarl G. Kallberg
Crocker H. Liu

Current Version: 08 September 2009

http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1503&context=articles

 

The savvy executive’s guide to buying back shares

By Bin Jiang and Tim Koller
Mckinsey
2011

https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-savvy-executives-guide-to-buying-back-shares

 

 

The Real Effects of Share Repurchases

Heitor Almeida, Vyacheslav Fos, and Mathias Kronlund
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

October 22, 2014

Click to access repo.pdf

 

Buybacks and the board: Director perspectives on the share repurchase revolution

Richard Fields, Tapestry Networks
August 2016

Click to access FINAL-Buybacks-Report-Aug-22-2016.pdf

 

 

 

The Cannibalized Company Part 2

How the cult of shareholder value has reshaped corporate America

By Karen Brettell, David Gaffen and David Rohde

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-buybacks-pay/

 

 

The Cannibalized Company Part 1

How the cult of shareholder value has reshaped corporate America

By Karen Brettell, David Gaffen and David Rohde

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-buybacks-cannibalized/

 

 

Corporate Buybacks and Capital Investment: An International Perspective

Joseph W. Gruber and Steven B. Kamin

20017

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/ifdp-notes/corporate-buybacks-and-capital-investment-an-international-perspective-20170411.htm

 

 

The Case for Stock Buybacks

SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-stock-buybacks

 

 

Profits Without Prosperity

FROM THE SEPTEMBER 2014 ISSUE

https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity

 

 

Stock buybacks: From retain-and- reinvest to downsize-and-distribute

By William Lazonick

2015

 

Click to access lazonick.pdf

Stock Market Indicators: S&P 500 Buybacks & Dividends

 

Click to access buybackdiv.pdf

 

 

 

 Buyback Quarterly

FACTSET
20016

Click to access Buyback%20Quarterly%20Q3%202016_12.19.pdf

https://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/buyback

 

The Ugly Truth Behind Stock Buybacks

https://www.forbes.com/sites/aalsin/2017/02/28/shareholders-should-be-required-to-vote-on-stock-buybacks/#13b556ce6b1e

Understanding Trade in Intermediate Goods

Understanding Trade in Intermediate Goods

 

One of the key source of International Trade statistics is a document published by the UNCTAD since 2013:

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade

Please see references below to access reports for 2015 and 2016.

 

In 2014, out of USD 18.5 trillion in global trade, about USD 8 trillion was in intermediate goods.

 

From TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND SERVICES

Introduction: the international dimension of the exchange of intermediate inputs

1. Trade in intermediate inputs has been steadily growing over the last decade. However, despite the internationalisation of production and the increasing importance of outsourcing and foreign investment, some studies have found little rise in intermediate goods trade as a share of total trade1. More than half of goods trade is however made up of intermediate inputs and trade in services is even more of an intermediate type with about three quarters of trade flows being comprised of intermediate services. Trade in intermediate goods and services thus deserves special attention from trade policymakers and so far few studies have investigated how it differs from trade in consumption goods or services.

2. An intermediate good can be defined as an input to the production process that has itself been produced and, unlike capital, is used up in production3. The difference between intermediate and capital goods lies in the latter entering as a fixed asset in the production process. Like any primary factor (such as labour, land, or natural resources) capital is used but not used up in the production process4. On the contrary, an intermediate good is used, often transformed, and incorporated in the final output. As an input, an intermediate good has itself been produced and is hence defined in contrast to a primary input. As an output, an intermediate good is used to produce other goods (or services) contrary to a final good which is consumed and can be referred to as a “consumption good”.

3. Intermediate inputs are not restricted to material goods; they can also consist of services. Thelatter can be potentially used as an input to any sector of the economy; that is for the production of the same, or other services, as well as manufacturing goods. Symmetrically, manufacturing goods can be potentially used to produce the same, or other manufacturing goods, as well as services.

4. An important question we can ask is how to identify inputs among all goods and services produced in an economy. Many types of goods can be easily distinguished as inputs, when their use excludes them from final consumption. Notable examples include chemical substances, construction materials, or business services. The exact same type of good used as an input to some production process can however be destined to consumption. For instance, oranges can be sold to households as a final good, as well as to a factory as an input for food preparation. Telecommunication services can be sold to individuals or to business services firms as an intermediate input for their output. The United Nations distinguish commodities in each basic heading on the basis of the main end-use (United Nations, 2007). It is however recognized that many commodities that are traded internationally may be put to a variety of uses. Other methodologies involve the use of input-output (I-O) tables to distinguish between intermediate and consumption goods.

5. The importance of intermediate goods and services in the economy and trade is associated with a number of developments in the last decades. Growth and increased sophistication of production has given birth to strategies involving fragmentation and reorganisation of firm’s activities, both in terms of ownership boundaries, as in terms of the location for production. In what follows, the international dimension of the exchange of intermediate goods and services is explored by clarifying terms and concepts as well as the links between trade in intermediate inputs and FDI.

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter8

 

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter2

 From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter3

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter4

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter5

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter6

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

inter7

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

Trade networks relating to global value chains have evolved during the last 10 years. In 2004, the East Asian production network was still in its infancy. Most trade flows of parts and components concerned the USA and the European Union, with a number of other countries loosely connected with these two main hubs. As of 2014 trade of parts and components was much more developed. The current state is characterized not only by the prominent role of China, but also by a much more tightly integrated network with a much larger number of countries many of which have multiple connections to different hubs.

From Mapping Global Value Chains: Intermediate Goods Trade and Structural Change in the World Economy

inter10inter11inter12

Key sources of Research:

 

TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND SERVICES

OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 93
by Sébastien Miroudot, Rainer Lanz and Alexandros Ragoussis

2009

Click to access 44056524.pdf

 

 

An Essay on Intra-Industry Trade in Intermediate Goods

Rosanna Pittiglio

2014

Click to access ME_2014051916452646.pdf

 

 

The Rise of International Supply Chains: Implications for Global Trade

Click to access GETR_Chapter1.2.pdf

 

 

 

Growing Trade in Intermediate Goods: Outsourcing, Global Sourcing or Increasing
Importance of MNE Networks?

by
Jörn Kleinert
October 2000

Click to access kap1006.pdf

 

 

 

Imported Inputs and the Gains from Trade

Ananth Ramanarayanan
University of Western Ontario
September, 2014

https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/index.php/index/research/downloadSeminarPaper/49816

 

 

 

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Click to access ditctab2015d1_en.pdf

 

 

 

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2016

Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Click to access ditctab2016d3_en.pdf

 

 

Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy

Robert C. Feenstra
Revised, April 1998

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.39.7178&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

OECD, WTO and World Bank Group
Report prepared for submission to the G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Sydney, Australia, 19 July 2014

Click to access gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf

 

 

Trade in Value Added: Concepts, Estimation and Analysis

Marko Javorsek* and Ignacio Camacho

20015

Click to access AWP150Trade%20in%20Value%20Added.pdf

 

 

The Similarities and Differences among Three Major Inter-Country Input-Output Databases and their Implications for Trade in Value-Added Estimates

Lin Jones and Zhi Wang, United States International Trade Commission Li Xin, Beijing Normal University and Peking University Christophe Degain, World Trade Organization

December, 2014

Click to access ec201412b.pdf

 

 

Advanced Topics in Trade
Lecture 9 – Multinational Firms and Foreign Direct Investment

Heiwai Tang – SAIS
April 8, 2015

Click to access lecture_8_new.pdf

 

 

Efforts to Measure Trade in Value-Added and Map Global Value Chains: A Guide

Andrew Reamer

May 29, 2014

Click to access Reamer_ISA_Trade_in_Value_Added_05-29-2014.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains for Value Added and Intermediate Goods in Asia

N Shrestha

20015

Click to access CESSA%20WP%202015-07.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains: The New Reality of International Trade

Sherry Stephenson
December 2013

Click to access E15-GVCs-Stephenson-Final.pdf

 

 

Asia and Global Production Networks Implications for Trade, Incomes and Economic Vulnerability

Benno Ferrarini

David Hummels

20014

Click to access asia-and-global-production-networks.pdf

 

 

Participation of Developing Countries in Global Value Chains:
Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policies

by
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Alexandros Ragoussis
and Cristian Ugarte

Click to access OECD_Trade_Policy_Papers_179.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: SURVEYING DRIVERS, MEASURES AND IMPACTS

João Amador
Sónia Cabral

2014

Click to access wp20143.pdf

 

World Intermediate goods Exports By Country and Region

2014

WITS World International Trade Statistics

http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/WLD/Year/2014/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/all/Product/UNCTAD-SoP2

 

 

Trade in global value chains

2013

WTO

Click to access its13_highlights4_e.pdf

 

 

The Rise of Trade in Intermediates: Policy Implications

  • February 10, 2011

http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/02/10/rise-of-trade-in-intermediates-policy-implications-pub-42578

 

 

International trade with intermediate and final goods under economic crisis

Elżbieta Czarny, Warsaw School of Economics
Paweł Folfas, Warsaw School of Economics
Katarzyna Śledziewska, Warsaw University

Click to access 375.pdf

 

 

 

Trade in Intermediate Goods: Implications for Productivity and Welfare in Korea

Young Gui Kim

Hak K. PYO

Date Written: December 30, 2016

 

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929118

 

 

Growing Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico

BY CHRISTOPHER WILSON

Click to access growing_together_economic_ties_between_the_united_states_and_mexico.pdf

 

 

Mapping Global Value Chains: Intermediate Goods Trade and Structural Change in the World Economy

Timothy J. Sturgeon
Olga Memedovic

Click to access WP%2005%20Mapping%20Glocal%20Value%20Chains.pdf

 

India’s Intermediate Goods Trade in the Inter Regional Value Chain:
An examination based on Trade data and Input Output Analysis

Simi Thambi

Click to access 10_2%20fp.pdf

 

Global Supply Chains

Click to access pub4253_2.pdf

 

 

Global value chains in a changing world

Edited by Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low

Click to access aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf

 

Production and Distribution Planning : Strategic, Global, and Integrated

Production and Distribution Planning : Strategic, Global, and Integrated

 

Multiple Perspectives on production and distribution planning

  • Plant and Distribution Center Location problem – Strategic – Structural and Design
  • Procurement problem – where to source from – Tactical – Allocation, Assignment
  • Production and Distribution Scheduling – Operational  – Managing Flows
  • Multi Echelon Inventory Management- Operational – Managing Stocks
  • Supply Chain Integration, Collaboration, Coordination – Hierarchical Planning

Normally, production and distribution planning are handled separately in firms.  Integrated planning of production and distribution can add significant value to a company, particularly, in strategic decisions.

 

From Facility Location and Supply Chain Management – A comprehensive review

Since, in the literature, model objectives change as a function of the planning horizon length, we consider it opportune to define the features of each horizon in order to contextualize the parameters chosen for the models’ comparison. According to [14], the planning horizons of the supply chain can be clustered as follows:
Strategic planning: this level refers to a long-term horizon (3-5 years) and has the objective of identifying strategic decisions for a production network and defining the optimal configuration of a supply chain. The decisions involved in this kind of
planning include vertical integration policies, capacity sizing, technology selection, sourcing, facility location, production allocation and transfer pricing policies.
Tactical planning: this level refers to a mid-term horizon (1-2 years) and has the objective of fulfilling demand and managing material flows, with a strong focus on the trade-off between the service level and cost reduction. The main aspects considered in tactical planning include production allocation, supply chain coordination, transportation policies, inventory policies, safety stock sizing and supply chain lead time reduction.
Operational planning: this level refers to a short term period (1 day to 1 year) and has the objective of determining material/logistic requirement planning. The decisions involved in programming include the allocation of customer demands, vehicle routing, and plant and warehouse scheduling.

 

From

pdp2

 

 

From  Integrated Location-Production-Distribution Planning in a
Multi products Supply Chain Network Design Model

pdp

 

Key words:

  • ‘supply chain strategic design’,
  • ‘supply chain planning’,
  • ‘supply chain optimization’,
  • ‘supply chain network design’,
  • ‘supply chain production planning’,
  • ‘supply chain delocalization’,
  • ‘logistic network design’,
  • ‘facility location’,
  • ‘distribution network design’,
  • ‘production-distribution systems’,
  • ‘location-allocation problem’,
  • ‘supply chain linear programming’
  • ‘supply chain mixed-integer programming’.

From  From Manufacturing to Distribution: The Evolution of ERP in Our New Global Economy

Over the past fifty years, manufacturing has changed from individual companies producing and distributing their own products, to a global network of suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors. Efficiency, price, and quality are being scrutinized in the production of each product. Because of this global network, manufacturers are competing on a worldwide scale, and they have moved their production to countries where the costs of labor and capital are low in order to gain the advantages they need to compete.

Today, the complex manufacturing environment faces many challenges. Many products are manufactured in environments where supplies come from different parts of the world. The components to be used in supply chain manufacturing are transported across the globe to different manufacturers, distributors, and third party logistics (3PL) providers. The challenges for many manufacturers have become how to track supply chain costs and how to deal with manufacturing costs throughout the production of goods. Software vendors, however, are now addressing these manufacturing challenges by developing new applications.

Global competition has played a key role in industrialized countries shifting from being production-oriented economies to service-based economies. Manufacturers in North America, Western Europe, and other industrialized nations have adapted to the shift by redesigning their manufacturing production into a distribution and logistics industry, and the skills of the labor force have changed to reflect this transition. Developing countries have similarly changed their manufacturing production environments to reflect current demands; they are accommodating the production of goods in industries where manufacturers have chosen to move their production offshore–the textile industry being a prime example of this move.

A report from the US Census Bureau titled Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries: 2005 and another from Statistics Canada titled Wholesale Trade: The Year 2006 in Review indicate that wholesalers are changing their business models to become distributors as opposed to manufacturers. Between 2002 and 2005, overall labor and capital in the manufacturing sectors decreased substantially. US industry data (from about 10 years ago) indicates that the North American manufacturing industry was engaged in 80 percent manufacturing processes and only 20 percent distribution activities. Today, however, these percentages have changed dramatically; the current trend is in the opposite direction. Manufacturing processes account for around 30 percent of the industry processes, and wholesale and distribution activities, approximately 70 percent.

In addition, a report from the National Association of Manufacturers indicates that the US economy imports $1.3 trillion (USD) worth of manufactured goods, but exports only $806 billion (USD) worth of goods manufactured in the US. This negative trade balance is a clear indication of the changing economic trend toward the manufacturing of goods in low-cost labor nations.

The main reason for this huge manufacturing shift is the increasing operating costs of production in industrialized countries. These rising costs are forcing manufacturers to move their production to developing nations because of the low cost of labor in these countries. This includes Asian countries (such as China and Indonesia) as well as Eastern European countries (such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia).

The number of workers (in percentages) in specified industries in G7 countries, and uses 1980 as the base year with 100 percent full employment in each industry. The industries with relatively constant rates of employment are the food and drink and the tobacco industries. Since 1995, all other industries have been maintaining less and less manufacturing employees, as indicated by the declining slopes in the graph. The shift in the textiles and leather, metals, and other manufacturing industries is moving toward production of goods in low-wage, developing countries.

Manufacturing is a global industry, and although a manufacturing company may be based in an industrialized country, it may have the bulk of its manufacturing facilities in a developing country. Producing goods in such a country reduces wage and capital costs for the manufacturer; however, some manufacturing control is lost in offshore production. Shipping, distribution, and rental costs, for example, are often difficult to track and manage, and quality control can be compromised in a production environment that is not local.

Two main outcomes can be seen within the manufacturing industry because of this manufacturing shift: manufacturers have a sense of having relinquished control of their production to low-cost labor nations, and supply chain management (SCM) has now become the answer to manufacturing within industrialized nations.

Suppliers that provide components to manufacturers often have issues with quality. Being part of a large network of suppliers, each supplier tries to offer the lowest prices for its products when bidding to manufacturers. Although a supplier may win the bid, its products may not be up to standard, and this can lead to the production of faulty goods. Therefore, when using offshore suppliers, quality issues, product auditing, and supplier auditing become extremely important.

Because the manufacturing model is changing, manufacturing has become more of a service-based industry than a pure manufacturing industry. Even though the physical process of manufacturing hasn’t changed, the actual locations of where the goods are being produced have. This fact is now compelling industrialized countries to engage in more assembly driven activities–a service-based model. The manufacturing process has transformed into obtaining parts and reassembling them into the final product. The final product is then redistributed throughout the appropriate channel or to the consumer. SCM methods are now reacting to this change as well; they are taking into account final assembly needs, and they are distributing particular products to consumers or manufacturers.

SCM is becoming the norm for manufacturers in the industrialized world. Offshoring is now standard practice, and methods such as SCM have been set up to deal with these economic and logistical business realities.

The economic shift happening in both industrialized and developing countries is dramatic. As the level of management knowledge increases, better methods of constructing offshore products are available in SCM solutions. In both types of economies, the changes in the labor force skill sets and manufacturing environments have consequently led to new software solutions being developed in order to manage this dramatic change.

Within the software industry, many SCM and enterprise resource-planning (ERP) vendors are following the economic shift. They are developing new functionality–ERP-distribution software–to meet the recent demands and needs of the changing manufacturing and distribution industries.

SCM and ERP software are converging to better address these new demands in the manufacturing industry. In the enterprise software market, ERP software vendors have reached a point of saturation; their installs are slowing down and they are seeing a reduction in sales. Therefore, ERP providers are developing new functionality in order to remain competitive with other ERP vendors, in addition to looking for new opportunities. ERP vendors are trying to adapt to the changing market in order to increase their revenues. They are integrating SCM functionality into their ERP offerings, creating ERP-distribution software that can span the entire production process across many continents (if necessary), and that is able to track final goods, components, and materials.

Traditional ERP solutions included some SCM functionality, which was needed to distribute the companies’ produced goods. These systems also allowed components and parts to be imported in order to assemble these goods. But offshore manufacturing and expansion into new markets has required SCM functionality in ERP software to be extended. Some larger vendors have acquired other companies in order to meet these changing demands. For example, Oracle acquired G-Log, a transportation management systems (TMS) vendor, and Agile, a product lifecycle management (PLM) vendor; and Activant acquired Intuit Eclipse.

SCM software vendors, in contrast, have felt encroached upon by ERP vendors. The situation has posed a real threat to SCM providers in the market, forcing them to extend their ERP functionality to compete with ERP vendors and to try to gain new clients in the distribution and logistics industry.

ERP-distribution software has integrated SCM functionality into its existing functionality to navigate through the complex global manufacturing environment. SCM software maps five processes into one solution: planning, sourcing (obtaining materials), producing, delivering, and returning final products if defective. These processes help to track and manage the goods throughout their entire life cycles. In addition, ERP solutions are used to manage the entire operations of an organization, not only a product’s life cycle. This gives users the broad capability to manage operations and use the SCM functionality to manage the movement of goods, whether components or finished product.

With the ability to gain accurate inventory visibility and SCM production, ERP-distribution software is able to see the whole chain of manufacturing and distribution events, from supplier to manufacturer, all the way to the final consumer.

There are three business models.

  • The first is the SCM model, which includes the manufacturing process.
  • The second is the retail model, which is the distribution of final products to the consumer, business, or retailer.
  • The third model is a combination of the first two business models, joined by the ERP-distribution software solution into one seamless process.

Within the SCM process, goods can either be brought in (imported) through foreign manufacturers, or acquired locally. The goods are then given to a distributor, 3PL provider, or wholesaler in order to reach the final client.

Within the retail model, the products are taken from a distributor, 3PL provider, or wholesaler, and are distributed to the appropriate person. Note that there is a “shift” for the consumer. This is to indicate that through the Internet or other forms of technology, consumers are now able to buy directly from distributors. The power of the consumer has changed; where manufacturers once provided products to consumers, consumers are now creating demand, and manufacturers have to meet that demand.

SCM solutions focus on the relationship between the supplier and manufacturer. However, ERP- distribution software has taken functionality from SCM software and combined it with retail software (such as point-of-sale and e-commerce solutions); it is now able to span across the entire supply chain and to track goods along the complete manufacturing process.

This is a simplified view of the complexities of today’s manufacturing processes. These complexities have made it crucial for trading partners to unite with manufacturers in order to help alleviate the frustrations that can occur within this global network. Specifically, trading partners are coming together with manufacturers to unite services, products, and customer experience so that business processes (such as manufacturing and distribution) become more efficient and that goods can move through these processes with minimal problems.

SCM can be thought of as the management of “warehousing processes,” in which the movement of goods occurs through multiple warehouses or manufacturing facilities. Tracking the costs of moving products and components through the maze of warehousing and manufacturing facilities is a tricky process, and many organizations lose money at each warehousing step.

Within the flow of goods in the manufacturing sector, the warehouse is a crucial part of the supply chain. Traditionally, the warehouse has been a source of frustration because the manufacturer or supplier pays for the use of the warehouse (whether owned or rented by the company). This leads to two possible scenarios: 1) the costs of the warehouse are incurred by a 3PL or manufacturing company, or 2) the costs are passed from one warehouse to another warehouse, and the original warehouse charges for these costs.

The typical warehouse process includes the following steps: receiving, put away, picking, kitting, packing, repacking, cross-docking, and shipping. ERP-distribution software is able to track costs across the entire organization and to aid companies in reducing costs that were previously tough to track.

ERP-distribution system encompasses the entire production of the final good. The ERP- distribution system is able to include inventory visibility from points “A to Z” (start to finish) and to track each warehouse cost from supplier to manufacturer to user, whether consumer, business, or retailer.

The Final Word: ERP-distribution software has been developed to meet the growing needs of the manufacturing and distribution industries. The capabilities incorporated into the software work across entire organizations, and even across continents.

Because of the economic shift in the manufacturing industry, the emergence of new software has been vital for businesses to stay competitive, meet the industry demands and emerging shift, and to keep business processes efficient to gain better profit margins.

ERP-distribution software is able to track the processes of manufacturing goods and distributing components, even if the manufacturer has facilities in North America and the Far East. With the SCM component in ERP software, manufacturing and tracking goods becomes manageable. Distributors and manufacturers can now work together in order to better meet customer requirements.

In addition of factors for domestic location selection analysis, other factors in international location selection are:

  • Exchange Rates
  • Taxes and Tariffs
  • Transfer Prices

How do companies in Computers, Automotive, Apparel, Electronics, Consumer Goods, Machinery manage their supply chain planning functions?  What software do they use for forecasting, planning, and scheduling?

I know of these software solutions for Network Design and Optimization:

Key Sources of Research:

 

Combined Strategic and Operational Planning – An MILP Success Story in Chemical Industry

Josef Kallrath

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.506.4194&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Planning in the Process Industry

Josef Kallrath

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Solving Planning and Design Problems in the Process Industry Using Mixed Integer and Global Optimization

Josef Kallrath

Click to access kallr05a.pdf

 

 

Mathematical Programming Models and Formulations for Deterministic Production
Planning Problems

Yves Pochet

Click to access Pochet.pdf

 

Supply Network Planning and Plant Scheduling in the Chemical-Pharmaceutical Industry – A Case Study Investigation

Gang Yang, Martin Grunow and Hans-Otto Guenther

Click to access SNPandPSinCPI2003.pdf

 

 

Advanced Planning and Scheduling Solutions in Process Industry

Editors: Günther, Hans-Otto, van Beek, Paul (Eds.)

http://www.springer.com/la/book/9783540002222

 

Advanced Planning and Scheduling in Manufacturing and Supply Chains

Authors: Mauergauz, Yuri

http://www.springer.com/la/book/9783319275215

 

 

Centralised supply chain master planning employing advanced planning systems

Martin Rudberga* and Jim Thulin

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.177.7313&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Planning and Scheduling in Supply Chains: An Overview of Issues in Practice

Stephan Kreipl • Michael Pinedo

Click to access 2004-01-Kreipl.pdf

 

 

Sales and operations planning in the process industry

Sayeh Noroozi

Joakim Wikner

Click to access Salesandoperationsplanningintheprocessindustry.pdf

 

 

Optimal planning in large multi-site production networks

Christian H. Timpe, Josef Kallrath

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.565.6621&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Mixed Integer Optimization in the Chemical Process Industry –
Experience, Potential and Future Perspectives

Josef Kallrath

Click to access kall00c.pdf

 

Planning and scheduling in the process industry

Josef Kallrath

2002

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/79f2/bba952f67315ccfd639ce874f966b02d1c18.pdf?_ga=2.18515577.1763587969.1506656275-754417939.1465928807

 

Modeling and design of global logistics systems: A review of integrated strategic and tactical models and design algorithms

Marc Goetschalckx  Carlos J.Vidal, Koray Dogan

Click to access 09e4150b3dc45e40ef000000.pdf

 

 

Strategic Analysis of Integrated Production- Distribution Systems: Models and Methods

Morris Cohen and H Lee

1988

Click to access 554578ab0cf23ff71686afbc.pdf

 

 

Integrated production/distribution planning in supply chains: An invited review

Sß. Selcßuk Erengucß a, N.C. Simpson b, Asoo J. Vakharia

1999

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A Review of Integrated Analysis of Production-Distribution Systems

Ana Maria Sarmiento, Rakesh Nagi

1999

Click to access ana.pdf

 

Managing Perishability in Production-Distribution Planning: a discussion and review

P. Amorim H. Meyr C. Almeder
B. Almada-Lobo

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.475.3138&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Input-Output Analysis For Multi-location Supply Chain Management Control:
A Theoretic Model

Wang Lu, Tong Rencheng

Click to access Wang-274.pdf

 

 

Using Operational Research for Supply Chain Planning in the Forest
Products Industry

Sophie D’Amours

Mikael Ro¨nnqvist

Andres Weintraub

http://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/125029/DâAmours_Sophie.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

Mathematical programming models for supply chain production and
transport planning

Josefa Mula *, David Peidro, Manuel Díaz-Madroñero, Eduardo Vicens

2010

Click to access 83f7e2405a9539c86dd593f5bb064f2695d5.pdf

 

 

Formation of a strategic manufacturing and distribution network
with transfer prices

Renato de Mattaa, Tan Millerb

Click to access 28a955be33b7a19b2077402d5b3b9cca1151.pdf

 

 

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING ON THE CONFIGURATION
AND PROFIT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN: PERSPECTIVES FROM
TWO REAL CASES

Marc Goetschalckx, Carlos J. Vidal and Javier I. Hernández

Click to access arq0310.pdf

 

 

Integrated Strategic Planning of Global Production Networks and Financial Hedging
under Uncertain Demands and Exchange Rates

Achim Koberstein,
Elmar Lukas,
Marc Naumann

Click to access 10.1007%2FBF03342750.pdf

 

 

 

The Design of Robust Value Creating Supply Chain Networks:  A Critical Review

Click to access CIRRELT-2008-36.pdf

 

 

 

 

Global supply chain design: A literature review and critique.

Meixell, M. J. and Gargeya, V. B.

(2005).

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 41(6): 531-550.

Click to access V_Gargeya_Global_2005.pdf

 

 

 

A strategic model for exact supply chain network design and its application to a global manufacturer

C. Arampantzi, I. Minis, G. Dikas

Click to access DeOPSys_Lab_Report_SSCND_2016-5.pdf

 

 

Sequential Vs Integrated Optimization:  Production, Location, Inventory Control and Distribution

July 2017

Click to access CIRRELT-2017-39.pdf

 

 

Measuring Cost Efficiency in an Integrated Model of Production
and Distribution: A Nonparametric Approach

Subhash C. Ray

2011

Click to access 2011-04.pdf

 

 

Optimization/simulation modeling of the integrated production- distribution plan: an innovative survey

BEHNAM FAHIMNIA, LEE LUONG, ROMEO MARIAN

2008

 

Click to access 30-587.pdf

Click to access Optimization-simulation-modeling-of-the-integrated-production-distribution-plan-An-innovative-survey.pdf

 

 

Strategic Planning and Design of Supply Chains: a Literature Review

Alessandro Lambiase, Ernesto Mastrocinque, Salvatore Miranda and Alfredo Lambiase

2013

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.5772/56858

 

 

The design of production-distribution networks: A mathematical programming approach

Alain Martel

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226891333_The_Design_of_Production-Distribution_Networks_A_Mathematical_Programming_Approach

 

 

Process industry supply chains: Advances and challenges

Nilay Shah

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.114.4553&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Strategic, Tactical and Operational Decisions in Multi-national Logistics Networks:
A Review and Discussion of Modeling Issues

Gunter Schmidt
and
Wilbert E. Wilhelm

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=5BA6B353BBCA48D0859B902AC3F2610D?doi=10.1.1.25.4951&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Strategic production-distribution models: A critical review with emphasis on global supply chain models

 

 

Dynamics of Global Supply Chain Supernetworks

A. NAGURNEY, J. CRUZ AND D. MATSYPURA

(Received and accepted November 2002)

 

https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0895717703001122/1-s2.0-S0895717703001122-main.pdf?_tid=f781c478-a79f-11e7-b471-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1506969295_6d30c9e8a854b9cc1ec23a57d00143d0

 

 

Integrated production/distribution planning in the supply chain: the Febal case study

Fabio Nonino

 

 

Integrated supply chain planning under uncertainty using an improved stochastic approach

Hadi Mohammadi Bidhandi a,⇑, Rosnah Mohd Yusuff

 

https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0307904X1000452X/1-s2.0-S0307904X1000452X-main.pdf?_tid=49ede574-a7a1-11e7-87fa-00000aacb360&acdnat=1506969863_699a0bd5cc6d414ed2f1caebcdda820f

 

 

Optimizing the Supply Chain of a Petrochemical Company under Uncertain Operating and Economic Conditions

Haitham M. S. Lababidi,*,† Mohamed A. Ahmed,‡ Imad M. Alatiqi,† and Adel F. Al-Enzi§

Click to access 5620c42208ae93a5c9244ea5.pdf

 

 

A strategic model for exact supply chain network design and its application to a global manufacturer

C. Arampantzi, I. Minis, G. Dikas

Click to access DeOPSys_Lab_Report_SSCND_2016-5.pdf

 

 

Sequential versus Integrated Optimization: Lot Sizing, Inventory Control and Distribution

Maryam Darvish*, Leandro C. Coelho

Click to access CIRRELT-2017-39.pdf

 

 

A MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATION

Samuel H. Huang, Ge Wang

John P. Dismukes

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.41.1852&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

A review and critique on integrated production–distribution planning models and techniques