Scenarios: Frames of Possibilities and Plausibilities

Scenarios: Frames of Possibilities and Plausibilities

Key Terms

  • Scenarios
  • Scenario Planning
  • Futures
  • Intuitive Logics method
  • Shell
  • GBN
  • Oxford Scenarios Program
  • Predetermined Elements
  • Critical Uncertainty
  • Weak Signals
  • SRI International (Stanford Research Institute)
  • RAND Corporation
  • Hudson Institute
  • DNI US MoD
  • UK MoD
  • Scenario Quadrant
  • Multiple Scenarios
  • Bounded Rationality
  • Cognitive Biases
  • Frames
  • Availability Bias
  • Overconfidence
  • Anchoring
  • Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA)

Key Concepts

Source: UNDP FORESIGHT: THE MANUAL Page 11

Black swans

Rare and discontinuous events that are unprecedented, unexpected and have major effects. They are often inappropriately rationalised after the fact with the benefit of hindsight, but this tendency to see coherence can obscure future threats.

Cognitive bias

A pattern of deviation in judgment that influences the way information is received, processed, retained or called. Cognitive biases influence how inferences, judgements and predictions are drawn.

Cognitive dissonance

The mental stress or discomfort one experiences when confronted with new information or views that contradicts existing values or beliefs. Because humans strive for internal consistency, individuals tend to reduce cognitive dissonance by denying or devaluing new information and views, or rationalising their own values and beliefs.

Complexity

Complex systems are non-linear and diverse networks made up of multiple interconnected elements. Cause and effect relationships within the system are not easily discernable or predictable. Historical extrapolation is futile for predicting emergence (new patterns and behaviours) in complex systems.

Cross-‐cutting issues

Issues or challenges that affect more than a single interest area, institution or stakeholder, and that need to be addressed from all points of view. A Whole-of-Government or Networked approach is useful for addressing cross-cutting issues.

Design thinking

An end-user centred approach to problem-solving that places the final experience at the heart of developing solutions. Following an iterative approach, the rapid prototyping component of design thinking allows for quick adaptation in uncertain environments and continual improvement.

Experimentation and prototyping

Experimentation is a process that seeks to test and validate competing hypotheses. Prototyping refers to creating models or sketches to test ideas and spot problems. Experimentation and prototyping are effective ways to navigate and test hypotheses and ideas in complex or rapidly changing environments.

Interdependence

A relationship of mutual reliance between two or more factors within a system such that changes in one area affect the other(s). 

Path dependency

Describes the inclination to stick to past practice despite the availability of newer, more efficient practices as a result of cognitive biases such as risk aversion, or concerns over sunk costs. Designing contingency plans with ample space for flexibility can reduce the constraints of path dependency.

Resilience

A system’s ability to cope with and recover from shocks or disruptions, either by returning to the status quo or by transforming itself to adapt to the new reality. Resilient systems view change as inevitable and failure as opportunities to learn from. Social cohesion, trust in government and national pride can be indicators of resilience.

Retrospective coherence

The act of assigning coherence in hindsight in order to make sense of what is happening. Practicing retrospective coherence presents the danger of making decisions for the future based on the lessons of history that may not apply in similar situations.

Signposts

Milestone markers between a given future and the present day that aid visualisation by breaking up the path to the future into manageable blocks of time. They can help to gauge the extent to which a particular scenario has materialised, and can be events, thresholds or trends and patterns.

Systems thinking

An analytical problem solving approach that looks at a system as a whole rather than in isolation, and that considers the interactions between various elements. The big-picture overview helps decision makers see linkages across different sections within the system and can foster collaboration and shared understanding within an organisation. Systems thinking also helps policymakers identify cause-effect relationships and how they might manifest in the larger system.

Unknown unknowns

Issues and situations in organisations that have yet to surface and which are blind spots for planners who are unaware that they do not know about them.

Whole-‐of-‐Government (WG)

A ‘joined-up’ or networked approach to governance that represents a shift from vertical to horizontal decision-making, and which is built on inter-agency collaboration and collective problem-solving. Whole-of-government involves a process of identifying, analysing and managing wide-ranging and cross-cutting issues.

Wicked problems

Large and intractable issues and challenges that have no immediate or obvious solutions and whose causes and influencing factors are not easily determined. Wicked problems are characterised by many agents interacting with each other in often mystifying ways, and involve multiple stakeholders operating with different perspectives and goals. 

Purpose of Scenarios

Source: Does the intuitive logics method – and its recent enhancements – produce “effective” scenarios?

Van der Heijden [15] argues that there is a confusing assortment of reasons as to why one should engage in scenarios. He advocates the importance of clearly identifying the purpose of undertaking scenario work — in order to make the appropriate selection of scenario methodology. Van der Heijden argues that “purpose” can be divided along two dimensions; the first dimension is to establish the extent of the scenario work i.e. whether the scenario work is to be a one-off project, or part of on an on-going scenario-based planning process. The second dimension is that of the primary aim of the scenario work, this being either to raise questions, or to answer them — and thus aid decision making.

The combination of these two dimensions results in four purposes of scenario work, namely:

• Sense-making: a one-off ‘exploratory question-raising scenario project’;
• Developing strategy: a one-off ‘decision-making scenario project’;
• Anticipation: an ‘on-going exploratory scenario activity’; and
• Action-based organizational learning: an ‘on-going decision-making activity’.

Van der Heijden continues by suggesting that these four purposes represent a hierarchy of interconnected aims serving the ultimate goal of “strategic success” in which organizational learning is the “overarching broad organisational skill” achieved when the scenario work is an on-going decision-making activity [15, page 162].

Benefits of Scenarios

Source: Does the intuitive logics method – and its recent enhancements – produce “effective” scenarios?

The (mainly practitioner-based) literature contains many testimonials as to the use and organizational benefits of scenarios, which we group under the following headings:

3.1. Enhanced perception


Scenario techniques reportedly enhance corporate and individual perception as they provide a framework for managers to understand and evaluate trends and events as they happen [16], and managers involved in scenario exercises supposedly become better observers of the business environment, more attuned to discerning changes [17]. Porter [18] suggests that scenarios help managers to make explicit their implicit assumptions about the future, and to think beyond the confines of conventional wisdom. This, combined with the fact that scenarios often challenge conventional wisdom and complacency by shifting the “perceptual anchors” from which people view the future, reduces the likelihood of managers and organizations making big mistakes in the future and/or of being caught unaware [19,20].


3.2. A structure for dealing with uncertainty


Scenarios provide a structure for thinking aimed at attacking complexity by allowing managers to deal more openly and explicitly with acknowledged uncertainty [21,16], to arrive at a deeper understanding of what is significant, and to identify what needs to be dealt with – and what is transient and can be ignored [11,22]. Bunn and Salo [23] suggest that, by emphasizing that there are a range of possible futures rather than a single-point future, scenarios reduce the bias for underestimating uncertainties. This is echoed by Docherty and McKiernan [24] who state that “the greatest contribution of scenario planning lies in its active engagement of actors in its process and its power to enable them to think about complexity and uncertainty in external contexts, and then how they might shape the external environment to their own strategic ends” (p. 10).


3.3. Integration of corporate planning functions


Scenario techniques provide a good middle ground between relying on informal and intuitive techniques, and being bound by the methodological constraints of more formal, quantitative techniques. As a result, a greater variety of information and wider company participation can be incorporated into the forecasting and planning process when scenario planning is used [16]. Other authors [25,26] add that scenarios are also able to combine topical intelligence and structure seemingly disparate environmental factors into a useful framework for decision making in a way that no other planning models can.


3.4. A communications tool


According to Allen [21], the communications qualities of scenarios are overwhelming as they provide a rational and non-threatening framework for discussion, even with those outside of the organization [27]. Durance and Godet [28] state that scenarios are also an effective means of rallying employees and communicating strategy across the organization. Bezhold [29] suggests that the scenarios can be used as a marketing and educational campaign throughout the organization. Ringland [25] adds that, by sharing its scenarios with the outside world, an organization can provide the context for dialog with its stakeholders — enabling it to influence its external environment. An added benefit [30] is that the collegiality which usually emerges in a scenario planning exercise does not evaporate once the scenario exercise is complete. Van der Heijden [15,31] reports that Royal Dutch Shell’s scenarios emerged as a powerful management tool by which senior management was able to influence decision-making at all levels throughout the organization, without becoming directly involved in the process or minutiae of the subsequent, scenario-based, evaluation of decisions. This was achieved by making the scenarios the context for key strategic decisions — thus uniting the geographically dispersed, disparate, and decentralized business units in developing a common strategy [28].


3.5. Organizational learning


Although scenario planning was initially understood as a tool for “thinking the unthinkable” [32], a body of literature has subsequently developed around the value of scenarios in terms of individual and organizational learning [11]. This is because scenario exercises ostensibly provide a politically-safe team learning environment and a rich learning process that stimulates creativity [11,15,33–37]. As models of future business environments, scenarios provide a vehicle for pseudo-experimentation in terms of formulating strategic options and then examining the consequences of these options in a range of future environments [15,30,31,38]. By having to articulate their assumptions in a scenario exercise, managers can identify inconsistencies in their own thinking and that of their colleagues in a non-threatening environment [25,37]. At the same time, the necessity in scenario work to undertake detailed analysis of environmental driving forces and their causal relationships, forces individuals to examine their perceptions, stretch their mental models and to develop a shared view of uncertainty [15,31]. All of the foregoing leads to an increased confidence in decision-making [16] and moves the organization towards becoming, what has been termed, a “learning organization” [15].

Based upon our consideration of the above purposes and benefits of the use of scenario methods, we distil from the literature three main objectives of the application of scenario approaches, as follows:


1) Enhancing understanding: of the causal processes, connections and logical sequences underlying events — thus uncovering how a future state of the world may unfold;


2) Challenging conventional thinking: to reframe perceptions and change the mindsets of those within organizations; and


3) Improving decision making: to inform strategy development.

Support for this conclusion also comes from the work of Varum and Melo who, after undertaking a comprehensive bibliometric analysis of the literature on scenario planning, argued that there is a consensus in the literature on three benefits of using scenarios, namely an “improvement of the learning process, improvement of the decision-making process, and identification of new issues and problems” [2, page.362].


Our three objectives are interlinked in that: firstly, understanding the connections, causal processes and logical sequences which determine how events may unfold to create different futures, will challenge conventional thinking and will also prove of benefit in improving organizational decision making and strategy; secondly, challenging conventional thinking, reframing perceptions and changing mind-sets should result in collective organizational learning; and, thirdly, collective organization learning should enhance organizational decision making and strategy — which in turn should enhance collective organizational learning.

Types of Scenarios

Source: An uncertain future, deep uncertainty, scenarios, robustness and adaptation: How do they fit together?

  • Predictive
    • Trend
    • Whatif
  • Explorative
    • Framed
    • Unframed
  • Normative
    • Preserving
    • Transformational

Types of Uncertainty

Source: Nine lives of uncertainty in decision-making: strategies for dealing with uncertainty in environmental governance

Source: A Scenario-based Approach to Strategic Planning – Integrating Planning and Process Perspective of Strategy

Multiple Frames of Changes in Contextual Environment on the Transcational Environment

Source: Using Scenario Planning to Reshape Strategy

Source: Multiple Scenario Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation

Source: Multiple Scenario Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation

Source: Multiple Scenario Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation

Institutions and Methods of Scenario Planning

  • Shell/GBN Intuitive Logics Method
  • Oxford Scenario Planning Approach
  • La Prospective / M Godet
  • Rand Corporation
  • SRI International
  • GBN/Monitor/Deloitte/Center for Long View/Market Sensing and Scenario Planning

Source: Plausibility and probability in scenario planning

Source: The current state of scenario development: an overview of techniques

Research Journals and Authors on Scenario Planning

Source: SCENARIOS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT: THE CURRENT STOCK AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Source: SCENARIOS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT: THE CURRENT STOCK AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Source: SCENARIOS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT: THE CURRENT STOCK AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Source: SCENARIOS IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT: THE CURRENT STOCK AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Scenarios Application

  • Business
  • Non Profit Org
  • Philanthropic
  • Public Sector
  • Arts and Culture
  • Governance
  • National Security
  • Transnational Issues

My Related Posts

Shell Oil’s Scenarios: Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning for the Future

Water | Food | Energy | Nexus: Mega Trends and Scenarios for the Future

Global Trends, Scenarios, and Futures: For Foresight and Strategic Management

On Anticipation: Going Beyond Forecasts and Scenarios

Art of Long View: Future, Uncertainty and Scenario Planning

Narrative, Rhetoric and Possible Worlds

What are Problem Structuring Methods?

Drama Theory: Acting Strategically

Frames in Interaction

Frames, Communication, and Public Policymaking

Frames, Framing and Reframing

Dialogs and Dialectics

Strategy | Strategic Management | Strategic Planning | Strategic Thinking

Key Sources of Research:

Augmenting the intuitive logics scenario planning method for a more comprehensive analysis of causation

James Derbyshire a,∗, George Wright b

a Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development Research, Middlesex University, UK 

b Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, UK

International Journal of Forecasting 33 (2017) 254–266

Does the intuitive logics method – and its recent enhancements – produce “effective” scenarios?

GeorgeWrighta

RonBradfieldb

GeorgeCairnsca

Warwick Business School, Scarman Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

bStrathclyde Business School, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

cSchool of Management, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia

Received 30 August 2012, Accepted 2 September 2012, Available online 29 September 2012.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 80, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 631-642

The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning

RonBradfielda

GeorgeWrightb1

GeorgeBurta2

GeorgeCairnsb3

KeesVan Der Heijdena4

aUniversity of Strathclyde, Graduate School of Business, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow G4 0QU, UK

bUniversity of Durham, Durham Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, UK

Available online 24 May 2005.

Futures
Volume 37, Issue 8, October 2005, Pages 795-812

How plausibility-based scenario practices are grappling with complexity to appreciate and address 21st century challenges

AngelaWilkinsona

RolandKupersbc

DianaMangalagiude

aFutures Programme, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, Hayes House, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, UK

bTHNK, Haarlemmerweg 8a, 1014 BE Amsterdam, The Netherlands

cSmith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, UK

dReims Management School, Reims, France

eSmith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, Hayes House, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, UK

Received 19 December 2011, Revised 28 September 2012, Accepted 1 October 2012, Available online 27 December 2012.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 80, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 699-710

Scenarios and early warnings as dynamic capabilities to frame managerial attention

RafaelRamírezac

RikuÖstermanb

DanielGrönquistc

aSaïd Business School, University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, UK

bItäpaja Ltd., Urakkatie 10-12 A 2, 00680 Helsinki, Finland

cNormannPartners AB, Engelbrektsgatan 9-11, SE-114 32 Stockholm, Sweden

Received 4 November 2011, Revised 21 October 2012, Accepted 24 October 2012, Available online 19 November 2012.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 80, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 825-838

Rethinking the 2 × 2 scenario method: Grid or frames?

RafaelRamireza1

AngelaWilkinsonab1

aSaid Business School, Oxford, UK

bSmith School of Enterprise and Environment, Oxford, UK

Received 19 March 2013, Revised 9 October 2013, Accepted 17 October 2013, Available online 22 November 2013.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 254-264

Integrating organizational networks, weak signals, strategic radars and scenario planning

Paul J.H.Schoemaker

George S.Day

Scott A.Snyder

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Received 18 December 2011, Revised 7 October 2012, Accepted 9 October 2012, Available online 20 December 2012.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 80, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 815-824

Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunctive fallacy in probability judgment.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983).

Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.

Scenarios and Forecasting: Two Perspectives

KeesVan Der Heijden

Received 1 December 1998, Accepted 1 January 1999, Available online 6 October 2000.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change
Volume 65, Issue 1, September 2000, Pages 31-36

Directions in scenario planning literature – A review of the past decades

Celeste Amorim

VarumCarlaMelo

Department of Economics, Management and Industrial Engineering, University of Aveiro, Campus Universitário de Santiago, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal

Available online 18 November 2009.

Futures
Volume 42, Issue 4, May 2010, Pages 355-369

Decision making and planning under low levels of predictability: Enhancing the scenario method

GeorgeWrighta

PaulGoodwinb1

aDurham Business School, University of Durham, Mill Hill lane, Durham City, DH1 3lB, United Kingdom

bSchool of Management, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom

Available online 5 June 2009.

International Journal of Forecasting
Volume 25, Issue 4, October–December 2009, Pages 813-825

Living in the Futures

Harvard Business Review May 2013

https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures

Strategic reframing : the Oxford scenario planning approach

Rafael RamírezAngela Wilkinson

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Strategic Foresight Primer

Angela Wilkinson

Evolving practices in environmental scenarios: a new scenario typology

Angela Wilkinson and Esther Eidinow

James Martin Institute, Said Business School, University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK

Received 10 March 2008
Accepted for publication 20 August 2008 Published 15 December 2008
Online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/3/045017

2008 Environ. Res. Lett. 045017

https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/3/4/045017/pdf

HOW SCENARIOS BECAME CORPORATE STRATEGIES: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES AND UNCERTAINTY
IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Bretton Fosbrook

A Dissertation submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Science and Technology Studies York University
Toronto, Ontario

December 2017

Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making: A Manifesto for a Research Agenda.

David Tucket, Antoine Mandel, Diana Mangalagiu, Allen Abramson, Jochen Hinkel, et al..

Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, Taylor and Francis 2015, 27 (2), pp.213 – 242.

10.1080/08913811.2015.1037078 . hal-02057279

Scenarios Practices: In Search of Theory

Angela Wilkinson University of Oxford UK

Journal of Futures Studies, February 2009, 13(3): 107 – 114

Towards a relational concept of uncertainty: Incorporating the human dimension

Brugnach, M.1; A. Dewulf 2; C. Pahl-Wostl 1 and T. Taillieu 3

1. Universität Osnabrück, Germany
2. Wageningen University, The Netherlands
3. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Contact author: Marcela Brugnach, mbrugnac@usf.uos.de

Ambiguity: the challenge of knowing and deciding together

M. Brugnach a,*, H. Ingram b,c

a Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands 

b Southwest Center, University of Arizona, United States
c School of Social Ecology, University of California Irvine, United States

environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 60–71

Toward a relational concept of uncertainty: about knowing too little, knowing too differently, and accepting not to know. 

Brugnach, M., A. Dewulf, C. Pahl-Wostl, and T. Taillieu.

2008.

Ecology and Society13(2): 30. [online]

URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art30/

http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art30/

Policy Analysis: A Systematic Approach to Supporting Policymaking in the Public Sector

WARREN E. WALKERa,b,*
a RAND Europe, Leiden, Netherlands
b Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands

JOURNAL OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS

 JMultiCritDecisAnal9: 11–27 (2000)

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.201.3202&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Integrated management of natural resources: dealing with ambiguous issues, multiple actors and diverging frames

A. Dewulf*, M. Craps*, R. Bouwen*, T. Taillieu* and C. Pahl-Wostl**

*Center for Organizational and Personnel Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, 3000 Leuven, Belgium (E-mail: art.dewulf@psy.kuleuven.ac.be, marc.craps@psy.kuleuven.ac.be,rene.bouwen@psy.kuleuven.ac.be, tharsi.taillieu@psy.kuleuven.ac.be)
**Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabru ̈ck, Albrechtstrasse 28, Osnabru ̈ck, Germany (E-mail: pahl@usf.uni-osnabrueck.de)

More is not always better: Coping with ambiguity in natural resources management

M. Brugnach a, b, *, A. Dewulf c, H.J. Henriksen d, P. van der Keur d

a Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands
b Institute for Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany c Public Administration and Policy Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands d Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Denmark

Journal of Environmental Management xxx (2010) 1e7

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND MANAGERIAL SENSEMAKING: WORKING THROUGH PARADOX

LOTTE S. LU ̈ SCHER Clavis Consultancy

MARIANNE W. LEWIS University of Cincinnati

Academy of Management Journal 2008, Vol. 51, No. 2, 221–240.

Sustainable Development: Mapping Different Approaches

Bill Hopwood, Mary Mellor, Geoff O’Brien Sustainable Cities Research Institute
6 North Street East,
University of Northumbria,

Newcastle on Tyne, NE1 8ST
Tel: 0191 227-3500 Fax: 0191 227-3066

E-mails:
Bill Hopwood: william.hopwood@unn.ac.uk

Sustainable Development, 13. pp. 38-52. ISSN 0968-0802

Published by: Wiley-Blackwell
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sd.244 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sd.244&gt;

Click to access Mapping_Sustainable_Development.pdf

The Environmental Goffman: Toward an Environmental Sociology of Everyday Life

BRADLEY H. BREWSTER

Gaylord Nelson Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, USA

MICHAEL MAYERFELD BELL

Department of Community & Environmental Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, USA

Society and Natural Resources, 23:45–57 Copyright # 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 online
DOI: 10.1080/08941920802653505

An uncertain future, deep uncertainty, scenarios, robustness and adaptation: How do they fit together?

H.R. Maier a, *, J.H.A. Guillaume b, H. van Delden a, c, G.A. Riddell a, M. Haasnoot d, e, J.H. Kwakkel e

a School of Civil, Environmental and Mining Engineering, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide SA 5005, Australia b Water & Development Research Group (WDRG), Aalto University, Tietotie 1E, Espoo 02150, Finland
c Research Institute for Knowledge Systems, Hertogsingel 11B, 6211 NC Maastricht, The Netherlands
d Deltares, Fresh Water Department, Delft, The Netherlands

e Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management, Delft, The Netherlands

Environmental Modelling & Software

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2016.03.014

https://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/design/article/viewFile/1723/1324

Towards a user’s guide to scenarios – a report on scenario types and scenario techniques

Lena Borjeson1, Mattias Hojer1, Karl-Henrik Dreborg1,3, Tomas Ekvall2, Goran Finnveden1,3

Environmental strategies research – fms, Department of Urban studies, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Department of Energy and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg.

Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm

https://www.osti.gov/etdeweb/servlets/purl/20688312

The current state of scenario development: an overview of techniques

Peter Bishop, Andy Hines and Terry Collins

foresight, Vol. 9 Iss: 1 pp. 5 – 25 2007

Identification and classification of uncertainties in the application of environmental models

J.J. Warmink a, *, J.A.E.B. Janssen a, b, M.J. Booij a, M.S. Krol a

a Department of Water Engineering and Management, Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, the Netherlands b Waterboard Rijn and IJssel, P.O. Box 148, 7000 AC Doetinchem, the Netherlands

Environmental Modelling & Software 25 (2010) 1518e1527

Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management

Brian W. Head1 and John Alford2,3

Administration & Society 2015, Vol. 47(6) 711–739

DOI: 10.1177/0095399713481601

ORGANIZATIONS AS RHETORIC: KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE FIRMS AND THE STRUGGLE WITH AMBIGUITY

MATSALVESSON Universityof Gothenburg

Journal of Management Studies: 30:6 November 1993 0022-2380

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1993.tb00476.x

Forty years of wicked problems literature: forging closer links to policy studies,

Brian W. Head (2019)

Policy and Society, 38:2, 180-197, DOI: 10.1080/14494035.2018.1488797

https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2018.1488797

Uncovering the origin of ambiguity in nature-inclusive flood infrastructure projects

Ronald E. van den Hoek 1Marcela Brugnach 1Jan P. M. Mulder 1,2 and Arjen Y. Hoekstra 1

Ecology and Society 19(2): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06416-190251

Coping with Complexity, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Risk Governance: A Synthesis

Ortwin Renn, Andreas Klinke, Marjolein van Asselt

AMBIO (2011) 40:231–246
DOI 10.1007/s13280-010-0134-0

Risk frames and multiple ways of knowing: Coping with ambiguity in oil spill risk governance in the Norwegian Barents Sea

Tuuli Parviainena,⁎, Annukka Lehikoinenb, Sakari Kuikkaa, P.ivi Haapasaaria

a University of Helsinki, Finland, Ecosystems and Environment Research Programme, Faculty of Biological and Environmental Sciences, P.O Box 65, Viikinkaari 1, FI-

00014 Helsinki Finland

b University of Helsinki, Finland, Ecosystems and Environment Research Programme, Faculty of Biological and Environmental Sciences, Kotka Maritime Research Center,

Keskuskatu 10, FI-48100 Kotka, Finland

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.04.009

Environmental Science & Policy

Volume 98, August 2019, Pages 95-111

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S146290111930022X

Nine lives of uncertainty in decision-making: strategies for dealing with uncertainty in environmental governance

Art Dewulf and Robbert Biesbroek

Public Administration and Policy group, Wageningen University and Research, Netherlands

POLICY AND SOCIETY
2018, VOL. 37, NO. 4, 441–458 https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2018.1504484

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14494035.2018.1504484

Coping with Uncertainty in River Management: Challenges and Ways Forward

J. J. Warmink1 & M. Brugnach1 & J. Vinke-de Kruijf2 & R. M. J. Schielen1,3 & D. C. M. Augustijn1

Received: 1 March 2017 / Accepted: 21 June 2017 /

Water Resour Manage (2017) 31:4587–4600 DOI 10.1007/s11269-017-1767-6

The Implications of Complexity for Integrated Resources Management

C. Pahl-Wostl

Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany

Click to access Keynote_Pahl.pdf

A relational approach to deal with ambiguity in multi-actor governance for sustainability

M. Craps1 & M. F. Brugnach2

1Centre for Economics and Corporate Sustainability,
KU Leuven, Belgium
2Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands

WIT Transactions on Ecology and The Environment, Vol 199, © 2015 WIT Press www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3541 (on-line)
doi:10.2495/RAV150201

Futures Studies: Theories and Methods

Sohail Inayatullah

https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/futures-studies-theories-and-methods/

Scenario thinking and usage among development actors

William Robert Avis

University of Birmingham 18 October 2017

Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis

Overview, assessment, and selection criteria

Hannah Kosow Robert Gaßner

DIE Research Project “Development Policy: Questions for the Future”

Bonn 2008

German Development Institute

SCENARIO PLANNING FOR STRATEGIC REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

Christopher Zegras1, Joseph Sussman2, Christopher Conklin3 Forthcoming (March 2004) in

ASCE Journal of Urban Planning and Development

How Scenario Planning Influences Strategic Decisions

A recent study sheds light on how the use of scenario planning affects executives’ strategic choices.

Shardul Phadnis, Chris Caplice, and Yossi Sheffi

May 27, 2016 MIT Sloan Management Review

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-scenario-planning-influences-strategic-decisions/

How to Make Sense of Weak Signals

There’s no sense in denying it: interpreting weak signals into useful decision making takes time and focus. These three stages can help you see the periphery—and act on it—much more clearly.

Paul J.H. Schoemaker and George S. Day

April 01, 2009

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/how-to-make-sense-of-weak-signals/

A Review of Scenario Planning Literature

T Chermack et al

Using Scenario Planning to Reshape Strategy

Rather than trying to predict the future, organizations need to strengthen their abilities to cope with uncertainty. A new approach to scenario planning can help companies reframe their long-term strategies by developing several plausible scenarios.

Rafael Ramírez, Steve Churchhouse, Alejandra Palermo, and Jonas Hoffmann

June 13, 2017

Sloan Management Review

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/using-scenario-planning-to-reshape-strategy/

Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking

Paul J.H. Schoemaker

SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW/WINTER 1995

Chapter 10
The Learning Dimension of Adaptive Capacity: Untangling the Multi-level Connections

Alan Diduck

Adaptive Capacity and Environmental Governance

Derek Armitage l Ryan Plummer Editors

Using Trends and Scenarios as Tools for Strategy Development

Shaping the Future of Your Enterprise

by Ulf Pillkahn

ISBN 978-3-89578-304-3

Risk frames and multiple ways of knowing: Coping with ambiguity in oil spill risk governance in the Norwegian Barents Sea

Tuuli Parviainena,⁎, Annukka Lehikoinenb, Sakari Kuikkaa, P.ivi Haapasaaria

a University of Helsinki, Finland, Ecosystems and Environment Research Programme, Faculty of Biological and Environmental Sciences, P.O Box 65, Viikinkaari 1, FI-00014 Helsinki Finland

b University of Helsinki, Finland, Ecosystems and Environment Research Programme, Faculty of Biological and Environmental Sciences, Kotka Maritime Research Center, Keskuskatu 10, FI-48100 Kotka, Finland

Environmental Science and Policy 98 (2019) 95–111

How Issues Get Framed and Reframed When Different Communities Meet: A Multi-level Analysis of a Collaborative Soil Conservation Initiative in the Ecuadorian Andes

ART DEWULF1*, MARC CRAPS1 and GERD DERCON2

1Centre for Organizational and Personnel Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium

2International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), Ibidan, Nigeria

Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology

J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol., 14: 177–192 (2004)

Defining Uncertainty

A Conceptual Basis for Uncertainty Management in Model-Based Decision Support

W.E. WALKER1, P. HARREMO€EES2, J. ROTMANS3, J.P. VAN DER SLUIJS5, M.B.A. VAN ASSELT4, P. JANSSEN6 AND M.P. KRAYER VON KRAUSS2

1Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands,

2Environment & Resources DTU, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark,

3International Centre for Integrative Studies (ICIS), Maastricht University, The Netherlands,

4Faculty of Arts and Culture, Maastricht University, The Netherlands,

5Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovations, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, and

6Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), The Netherlands

Integrated Assessment

2003, Vol. 00, No. 0, pp. 000–000

1389-5176/03/0000-000

A Structured Approach to Strategic Decisions

Reducing errors in judgment requires a disciplined process.

Daniel Kahneman, Dan Lovallo, and Olivier Sibony

MIT Sloan Management Review

March 04, 2019

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/a-structured-approach-to-strategic-decisions/

A move toward scenario analysis

William R.Huss

Chronotopes of foresight: Models of time‐space in probabilistic, possibilistic and constructivist futures

Ilkka Tuomi

1Meaning Processing Ltd, Helsinki, Finland

2Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS), Wallenberg Research Centre at Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa

Received:21November2018 |  Revised:15January2019 |  Accepted:15January2019

DOI: 10.1002/ffo2.11

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/ffo2.11

A Scenario-based Approach to Strategic Planning
– Integrating Planning and Process Perspective of Strategy

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf, Philip Meißner and Dr. Stephan Stubner

2010

Click to access ap-no-6-scenario-based-approach-to-strategic-planning.pdf

The 4 Whys of Scenario Thinking

M Brain

About the Kearney-Oxford Scenarios Programme

AT Kearney

https://www.kearney.com/web/atkearney-oxford-scenarios-programme/scenarios-programme

Scenarios in the strategy process: a framework of affordances and constraints

Victor Tiberius

Tiberius European Journal of Futures Research (2019) 7:7 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40309-019-0160-5

Objectivity and a comparison of methodological scenario approaches for climate change research

Elisabeth A. Lloyd · Vanessa J. Schweizer

Synthese (2014) 191:2049–2088 DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0353-6

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0353-6

Cross-impact balances:
A system-theoretical approach to cross-impact analysis

Wolfgang Weimer-Jehle T,1
University of Stuttgart, Institute for Social Sciences V, Research Unit Risk and Sustainability, Seidenstr. 36,

70174 Stuttgart, Germany

Technological Forecasting & Social Change 73 (2006) 334–361

ScenarioWizard 4.3. Constructing Consistent Scenarios Using Cross-Impact Balance Analysis.

Manual.

Wolfgang Weimer-Jehle

https://docplayer.net/81069764-Scenariowizard-4-3-constructing-consistent-scenarios-using-cross-impact-balance-analysis-manual-wolfgang-weimer-jehle.html

Improving environmental change research with systematic techniques for qualitative scenarios

Vanessa Jine Schweizer and Elmar Kriegler

2012 Environ. Res. Lett. 044011

https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/044011/meta

Systematic construction of global socioeconomic pathways using internally consistent element combinations

DOI:10.1007/s10584-013-0908-z

Vanessa Jine Schweizer

Brian C. O’Neill

The current state of scenario development: An overview of techniques

DOI:10.1108/14636680710727516

Peter Bishop

Andy Hines

Terry Collins

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228623754_The_current_state_of_scenario_development_An_overview_of_techniques

Should Probabilities Be Used with Scenarios?

Stephen M. Millett Futuring Associates LLC USA

Plausibility and probability in scenario planning

DOI:10.1108/FS-08-2012-0061

Rafael Ramirez

Cynthia Selin

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263366784_Plausibility_and_probability_in_scenario_planning

Click to access ACCEPTED_Plausibility_and_Probability_in_Scenario_Planning_March_24_2013.pdf

Scenario development without probabilities — focusing on the most important scenario

Volker Grienitz & Michael Hausicke & André-Marcel Schmidt

Eur J Futures Res (2014) 15:27

DOI 10.1007/s40309-013-0027-0

Foundations of Scenario Planning: The Story of Pierre Wack

By Thomas J Chermack

2017

ROLE OF SCENARIO PLANNING AND PROBABILITIES
IN ECONOMIC DECISION PROBLEMS – LITERATURE REVIEW AND NEW CONCLUSIONS

Helena GASPARS-WIELOCH page1image38230256*

Department of Operations Research, Faculty of Informatics and Electronic Economy, Poznan University of Economics and Business, Al. Niepodleglosci 10, 61-875, Poznań, Poland

*E-mail: helena.gaspars@ue.poznan.pl

https://doi.org/10.3846/cibmee.2019.011

http://cibmee.vgtu.lt/index.php/verslas/2019/paper/viewFile/422/123

Overcoming obstacles to effective scenario planning

McKinsey on Finance Number 55, Summer 2015

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Corporate%20Finance/MoF/Issue%2055/MoF55_Overcoming_obstacles_to_effective_scenario_planning.ashx

Increasing the effectiveness of participatory scenario development through codesign

Marissa F. McBride 1Kathleen F. Lambert 2Emily S. Huff 3Kathleen A. Theoharides 4Patrick Field 5 and Jonathan R. Thompson 1

1Harvard Forest, Harvard University, Petersham, Massachusetts, 2Harvard Forest, Harvard University and Science Policy Exchange, Petersham, Massachusetts, 3Michigan State University, Department of Forestry, East Lansing, Michigan, 4Climate and Global Warming Solutions, Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Boston, Massachusetts, 5Consensus Building Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts

 E&S HOME > VOL. 22, NO. 3 > Art. 16

https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss3/art16/

Scenarios in business and management: The current stock and research opportunities

Victor Tiberius a,⁎, Caroline Siglow a, Javier Sendra-García b

a University of Potsdam, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Potsdam, Germany

b Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7467075/

Plotting Your Scenarios

Jay Ogilvy and Peter Schwartz

GBN

PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES: SCENARIO ANALYSIS, DECISION TREES AND SIMULATIONS

Click to access probabilistic.pdf

Navigating Uncertain Times
A Scenario Planning Toolkit for the Arts & Culture Sector

Literature Review

Multiple Scenario Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250140304

Paul Schoemaker

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220041993_Multiple_Scenario_Development_Its_Conceptual_and_Behavioral_Foundation

FORESIGHT: THE MANUAL

UNDP

UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE) 

Foresight as a Strategic Long-Term Planning Tool for Developing Countries

UNDP

UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE) 

https://www.undp.org/publications/foresight-strategic-long-term-planning-tool-developing-countries

Plausibility indications in future scenarios

Wiek, A., Withycombe Keeler, L., Schweizer, V. and Lang, D.J. (2013)

Int. J. Foresight and Innovation Policy, Vol. 9, Nos. 2/3/4, 2013

Plausibility and probability in scenario planning

Rafael Ramirez and Cynthia Selin

Foresight · March 2014

DOI: 10.1108/FS-08-2012-0061

Integrating organizational networks, weak signals, strategic radars and scenario planning

Paul J.H. Schoemaker ⁎, George S. Day, Scott A. Snyder Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Technological Forecasting & Social Change 80 (2013) 815–824

The current state of scenario development: an overview of techniques

Peter Bishop, Andy Hines and Terry Collins

Foresight · February 2007

DOI: 10.1108/14636680710727516

Chronotopes of foresight: Models of time‐space in probabilistic, possibilistic and constructivist futures

Ilkka Tuomi1,2

Futures Foresight Sci. 2019;1:e11.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ffo2.11

Using Trends and Scenarios as Tools for Strategy Development

Shaping the Future of Your Enterprise

by Ulf Pillkahn

Book

An Analysis and Categorization of Scenario Planning Scholarship from 1995-2016

Thomas J. Chermack Colorado State University USA

DOI:10.6531/JFS.201806.22(4).0004

Journal of Futures Studies, June 2018, 22(4): 45–60

https://jfsdigital.org/articles-and-essays/2018-2/vol-22-no-4-june-2018/an-analysis-and-categorization-of-scenario-planning-scholarship-from-1995-2016/

A review of scenario planning

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-review-of-scenario-planning-Amer-Daim/ad450aaf200096756634e84549da77c20963ae6a

Scenario analysis to support decision making in addressing wicked problems: pitfalls and potential

Innovation, Dynamic Capabilities and Leadership

Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Sohvi Leih, David J. Teece March 23, 2018

Scenario planning with a sociological eye: Augmenting the intuitive logics approach to understanding the Future of Scotland and the UK

Professor R. Bradley MacKay a,⁎, Dr. Veselina Stoyanova b

a The Gateway, North Haugh, School of Management, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland KY16 9RJ, UK

b Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow, Scotland G4 0QU, UK

Technological Forecasting & Social Change 124 (2017) 88–100

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162516302451

Scenarios in business and management: The current stock and research opportunities

Victor Tiberius a,⁎, Caroline Siglow a, Javier Sendra-García b 

University of Potsdam, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Potsdam, Germany

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Journal of Business Research 121 (2020) 235–242

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7467075/

How plausibility-based scenario practices are grappling with complexity to appreciate and address 21st century challenges

AngelaWilkinsona

RolandKupersbc

DianaMangalagiude

aFutures Programme, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, Hayes House, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, UK

bTHNK, Haarlemmerweg 8a, 1014 BE Amsterdam, The Netherlands

cSmith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, UK

dReims Management School, Reims, France

eSmith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, Hayes House, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, UK

Technological Forecasting and Social Change

Volume 80, Issue 4, May 2013, Pages 699-710

Special Issue: Scenario Method: Current developments in theory and practice

Edited by George Wright, George Cairns, Ron Bradfield

Volume 80, Issue 4, 

Pages 561-838 (May 2013)

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162512002971

Scenario methodology: New developments in theory and practice Introduction to the Special Issue

George Wright a,⁎, George Cairns b, Ron Bradfield c

a Warwick Business School, Coventry, UK
b RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
c Strathclyde Business School, Glasgow, UK

Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx

Scanning the Periphery

by 

HBR 2005

Scenario Planning Literature

Recent Articles

Bouhalleb, Arafet and Ali Smida, “Scenario Planning: An investigation of the construct and its measurements,” Wiley Online Library, February 9, 2018

Favato, Giampiero, “Embedding real options in scenario planning: A new methodological approach,” June 17, 2016

Gray, Jane, “Ofgem targets “flexible” scenario planning,” Network, October 12, 2016

Gray, Michael, “Scottish business scenario planning’ for independence over Brexit, minister confirms,” October 14, 2016

Hartung, Adam “The No. 1 Lesson from Hurricane Matthew and Brexit: Scenario Planning is Crucial,” October 7, 2016

Lang, Trudi, and Rafael Ramirez, “Building new social capital with scenario planning,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Science Direct, July 8, 2017

Phadnis, Shardul, “How Scenario Planning Influences Strategic Decisions,” MIT Sloan Management Review, Summer 2016

Powch, Andrew, “Overcoming Uncertainty with the Aid of Scenario Planning,” Industry Week, October 17, 2017

Raford, Noah, “Online foresight platforms: Evidence for their impact on scenario planning and strategic foresight,” Elsevier, August 2015

Ramírez, R., & Selin, C., “Plausibility and probability in scenario planning,” Foresight, 16(1), 54-74, March 4, 2014

Ramirez, Rafael, Sheve Churchhouse, Alejandra Palermo, and Jonas Hoffman, Using Scenario Planning to Reshape StrategyMIT Sloan Management Review, June 13, 2017

Ramirez, Rafael, “How scenario planning makes strategy more robust,” Oxford Answers, January 28, 2020

Schoemaker, PJH, Scenario planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking, MIT Sloan Management Review, 1995

Schwarze, Margaret and Lauren J. Taylor, “Managing Uncertainty—Harnessing the Power of Scenario Planning,” The New England Journal of Medicine, July 20, 2017  

Wilkinson, A. and Kupers, R. “Living in the Futures,” Harvard Business Review, May 2013

Wilkinson, A. and Ramirez, R. “2010 Canaries in the Mind,” Journal of Future Studies

Books

Cairns, George and George Wright, Scenario Thinking: Preparing Your Organization for the Future in an Unpredictable World, Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd ed., 2018 

Harris, Jared D. and Michael J. Lenox, The Strategist’s Toolkit, Darden Business Publishing, 2013

Laudicina, Paul, World Out of Balance: Navigating Global Risks to Seize Competitive Advantage, McGraw Hill, 2005

Ramirez, Rafael and Angela Wilkinson, Strategic Reframing: The Oxford Scenario Planning Approach, Oxford University Press, May 24, 2016

Ramirez, Rafael, John W. Selsky and Kees van der Heijden, Business Planning for Turbulent Times: New Methods for Applying Scenarios, earthscan, 2010

Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, Crown Business Publishing, 1996

Van Der Heijden, Kees, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2010

Wade, Woody, Scenario Planning: A Field Guide to the Future, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2012


Have question or additional suggestions? Please contact Terry Toland

Frames in Interaction

Frames in Interaction

Key Terms

  • Interaction
  • Frames
  • Frames in Interaction
  • Cognitive Frames
  • Media Frames
  • Audience Frame
  • Multiple Frames
  • Ambiguity
  • Uncertainty
  • Unpredictability
  • Incomplete Knowledge
  • Frame Production
  • Frame Alignment
  • Dialectics
  • Dialogical Interaction
  • Learning
  • Individual Learning
  • Social Learning
  • Agenda Setting
  • Priming

Interacting Frames

  • Frames in Interaction
    • Interaction as a cause of frame production, reflection, learning and frame alignment.
  • Competing Frames
    • Differing perspectives on a current issue. Contesting and competing.
  • Frames of Possibilities
    • Farmes of possible future due to uncertainty. Scenarios of future states.
  • Media Frames and Audience frames
    • Dielectics between media frames and audience frames

Frames – Sociological and Psychological

Source: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN FRAMING THEORY: A Systematic Examination of a Decade’s Literature

Conceptually, framing can be said to have two broad foundations—sociological (Entman, 1991; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974) and psychological (Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; Iyengar, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Framing research that grew from sociological foundations refers to the ‘‘frames in communication’’ (Chong & Druckman, 2007b, p. 106). In general, this research tends to focus on the ‘‘words, images, phrases, and presentation styles’’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 227) that are used to construct news stories and the processes that shape this construction.

Goffman (1974) was one of the first scholars to have developed the general concept of framing. As such, frames help people organize what they see in everyday life. Goffman calls frames the ‘‘schemata of interpretation,’’ a framework that helps in making an otherwise meaningless succession of events into something meaningful (p. 21). Gitlin (1980) defines frames as devices that facilitate how journalists organize enormous amounts of information and package them effectively for their audiences. He sees frames as ‘‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion,’’ organizing the information for both the journalists and their audiences (p. 7). According to Entman (1993), framing involves selection and salience—‘‘to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’’ (p. 52). Framing could have significant connotations as frames highlight some aspects of reality while excluding other elements, which might lead individuals to interpret issues differently.

Besides examining media frames, researchers have most enthusiastically studied the processes involved in the formation of the audience frame. There is much research that demonstrates how news framing influences information processing and the subsequent decision-making processes. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) were the first to demonstrate how different presentations of essentially the same information can have an impact on people’s choices. They found that individuals were inclined to take risks when ‘‘losses’’ are highlighted. But when the same information is presented in terms of ‘‘gains,’’ individuals shy away from risks. This approach, called ‘‘equivalency’’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 228), examines the influence of different but logically equivalent messages. In this approach, all factual and stylistic elements are comparable so that the pure influence of the frame can be observed. The ‘‘equivalency’’ perspective draws extensively on the experiments of risk-gain research (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984).

The ‘‘emphasis’’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 230) approach to framing demonstrates that accentuating certain considerations in a message can influence individuals to focus on those particular considerations. Scholars (Domke et al., 1998; Iyengar, 1991; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999) aligned to this interpretation of framing maintain that it is not always possible to manipulate a frame without changing some of the facts. Druckman (2004) aptly points out that in many cases, especially with political issues, there is not always a way to present a situation in different but equivalent ways. Instead, emphasis framing effects refer to situations when, by ‘‘emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations,’’ individuals are led to focus on these considerations in the decision-making process (Druckman, 2004, p. 672). Thus, for political issues the concept of framing usually refers to ‘‘characterizations’’ of a course of action where a central idea provides meaning to the event (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 136). It is within ‘‘emphasis’’ framing that scholars have again differentiated frames—episodic versus thematic (Iyengar, 1991); strategy versus issue (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997); in terms of values (Brewer & Gross, 2005; Shah et al., 1996) to name a few.

The dual nature of framing research—frames in the news versus frames in the individuals’ minds—is evident. Scholars have examined both areas of literature in the past decades.

Frame competition

Source: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN FRAMING THEORY: A Systematic Examination of a Decade’s Literature

Moreover, in previous experimental research, scholars have focused largely on how different frames can affect the audiences’ attitudes, their learning, or political behavior. These studies have mainly focused on the difference of framing effects in single frame conditions, for instance, strategic versus value framing, loss versus gain, or episodic versus thematic (Iyengar, 1987, 1991; Nelson, Clawson, et al., 1997; Shah et al., 1996). However, there has been little research on the effects of multiple frame conditions, where the same subjects get alternative frames of an issue (Shah, Kwak, Schmierbach, & Zubric, 2004; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). In general ‘‘the role of multiple competing frames has gone largely unexplored’’ (Chong & Druckman, 2007a, p. 101).

To be able to capture what actually happens in politics, ‘‘it is necessary to have an additional condition in framing experiments, in which opposing frames are presented together’’ (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004, p. 146). The authors consider ‘‘ambivalence’’ as key for framing effects (p. 137). They argue that the very nature of politics requires choices to be made between competing values. So value conflict is critical to the link between issue framing and political judgment. As such, the present study examined the published literature for the presence of studies exploring mixed frames.

Frames, Frame Effects, and Multiple Frames in Interaction

Sources: Toward a Relational Concept of Uncertainty: about Knowing Too Little, Knowing Too Differently, and Accepting Not to Know

Framing research has important roots in the work on cognitive biases and decision heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, De Martino et al. 2006). From this perspective, frames are representations of the external world, but these heuristic representations are biased when compared with accurate, decision theoretical representations (cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1981). This view has been adopted in classical decision-making theory, and served as a basis to study inconsistencies underlying judgment and choice (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky’s (1996) work on judgmental heuristics and limitations of intuitive choice). In this context, “framing effects” represent a violation of the standard economic account of human rationality. Having different formulations of what decision theory considers to be the same problem (in terms of expected utility) elicits different preferences: risk aversion can be encouraged by framing the situation in terms of gains, whereas risk seeking is encouraged by framing the situation in terms of losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Although we do not share the assumption of the decision-heuristic approach that there is always a unique and correct decision theoretical formulation of a decision problem, this research does demonstrate that formulating a problem in a different way may elicit distinct decision preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), affecting the meaning of and the importance attributed to uncertain information, and pointing toward different actions.

We understand frames as sense-making devices (Weick 1995) that mediate the interpretation of reality by adding meaning to a situation. The same situation can thus be framed in multiple, equally valid ways. For example, a situation of water shortage can be framed as a problem of “insufficient water supply” by one actor and, one of “excessive water consumption” by another. When a problem is framed as insufficient water supply, the most relevant uncertainties will be those associated with the amount of water available, and technical solutions that help avoiding water shortage can be favored (e.g., adopt a more efficient irrigation technology, Koundouri et al. 2006). However, when the problem is framed as an excessive water consumption issue, other solutions can be considered, such as changing the way in which water is used and consumed (e.g., diversification of crops). In this case, uncertainties associated with how society will react to a change in land use, or policies that stimulate the change (e.g., Common Agricultural Policy) will be the most important. In this way, frames significantly affect how meaning is inferred and how a situation is understood, serving to define a problem relative to core values and assumptions and to determine how to respond to it (Nisbet and Mooney 2007).

There have been two main approaches to framing research, namely, a cognitive approach where frames are defined as “cognitive representations,” and an interactional approach where frames are defined as “interactional co-constructions” (an in-depth comparison of both approaches can be found in Dewulf et al. (2008)). The cognitive approach has focused on frames as knowledge structures. It is based on the idea that frames are memory structures that help us organize and interpret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality (Minsky 1975). In contrast, the interactional approach focuses on how parties negotiate frame alignments in interactions. It considers frames as communicative devices, that is interactional alignments or co-constructions that are negotiated and produced in the ongoing interaction through “metacommunication” that indicates how a situation should be understood. From this perspective, frames are co-constructions of the meaning of the external world. This view has been adopted in multiparty collaborations and is exemplified in Dewulf et al. (2004) and Putnam and Holmer (1992).

Here, we adopt an interactional approach, where framing is defined as the process through which the meaning of a situation is negotiated among different actors (Putnam and Holmer 1992, Gray 2003a, Dewulf et al. 2004). Thus, framing is thought to be an interactive process where actors are engaged in developing an understanding of problems and alternative solutions. It is through the joint activities of framing, and reframing, that the actors can arrive at a joint problem definition. From this social experience, a common language and a new sense of community can emerge, opening up possibilities for further creativity and developments, and fostering learning and change (Bouwen 2001).

In our definition of uncertainty, we incorporate the concept of multiple frames, in order to capture the difference among multiple forms of knowledge. We consider each frame to represent a potentially valid view of a situation, reflecting the viewpoint of a particular community of practice (Bouwen 2001). Under the rationale of an interactional approach to framing research, we acknowledge the social processing of uncertain information and capture the interactions among actors during deliberative processes of framing and reframing. However, during these processes, encountering multiple frames that are incompatible is unavoidable, and results in ambiguity about the meaning and importance attributed to uncertain information.

Next, we discuss and describe some of the implications of ambiguity in the conceptualization of uncertainty.

Source: Towards a relational concept of uncertainty: Incorporating the human dimension

Source: Towards a relational concept of uncertainty: Incorporating the human dimension

Source: More is not always better: Coping with ambiguity in natural resources management

Strategies for dealing with Multiple Knowledge Frames

Source: Towards a relational concept of uncertainty: Incorporating the human dimension

Multiple or conflicting views about how to understand the system often represent different kinds of knowledge that are difficult to reconcile or integrate. The incompatibility in frames may result from different scientific backgrounds, from differences between context-specific experiential knowledge and general expert knowledge, from different societal positions of ideological backgrounds, and so forth.

In relational terms, actor A has a certain knowledge relation to phenomenon X, and actor B has a different knowledge relation to the same phenomenon X. In these kind of situations, relevant strategies address the relation between A and B and have something to do with dealing with differences.

We draw on a Table (Table 2) from Bouwen, Dewulf & Craps (2006) to give an overview of relevant strategies to deal with multiple knowledge frames.

Action PrincipleAccept. ofInterde- pendenceProcessCharac- teristicsPossible OutcomesContextContingen- cies
Persuasive Communic ationApproachPersuasionModerateExposure to persuasionAdoption or imitationUnequal involvement or competence
Dialogical LearningApproachMutual Interactive LearningHighJoint discovery and exchangeMutual understandi ng and synergyShared involvement
Negotiation ApproachTit for that, deal makingHigh/ moderateNegotiation tactical phasesFair deal, settlementCalculative involvement
Opposition al Modes ofActioncold or hot conflictLow or negationKeeping distance or escalationFreeze or dominanceMutual negation or fight

Table 2. Strategies to deal with multiple frames

The first strategy can be called the persuasive communication approach. This consists of trying to convince others of your own frame of reference, not by imposing it but by presenting it as attractive and worthwhile. This strategy is successful if others can be convinced to adopt your own frame of reference.

The second strategy is the dialogical learning approach, where the aim is to understand each other’s frames better through open dialogue and encourage learning on all sides. The literature on participation, organizational learning and consensual group decision making documents extensively this approach (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Wenger, 1998). The emphasis is on the interactive nature and reciprocal quality of the communication. Actors engage with each other as equally valuable partners and inclusion of all actors is the overall goal.

The negotiation approach aims at reaching a mutually beneficial and integrative agreement which makes sense from multiple perspectives or frames. Theories of conflict in organizations deal extensively with these negotiation strategies. Actors engage in a mutual calculative information sharing and positioning strategy. They develop alternative packages for giving and taking to come to a balanced sharing of positives and negatives. The negotiation can have a dominantly ‘integrating’ quality when both actors develop in common some synergetic win-win outcomes. The negotiation can rather be ‘distributive’ when the actors take a win-loose position and they distribute equally profits and gains in an antagonistic way.

The fourth strategy is the oppositional mode. When parties have a history of rivalry for resources or they don’t have any history of collaboration, taking or holding distance is likely. In conflict theory the distinction is made between cold and hot conflict. Cold conflict means that there is no recognition of mutual interdependence and distancing from each other is a dominant mode of operating. Hot conflict refers to heated opposition as a result of an adversarial experience of the mutual interdependency. Parties try by force a strategy to change the power difference in the relationship. When it comes to some form of collaboration, parties will move their strategy in the direction of a negotiation approach.

My Related Posts

Frames, Framing and Reframing

Frames, Communication, and Public Policymaking

What are Problem Structuring Methods?

Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism

Networks, Narratives, and Interaction

Erving Goffman: Dramaturgy of Social Life

Narrative, Rhetoric and Possible Worlds

Key Sources of Research

Framing mechanisms: the interpretive policy entrepreneur’s toolbox,

Ewert Aukes, Kris Lulofs & Hans Bressers (2017):

Critical Policy Studies, DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2017.1314219

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2017.1314219

“From Interactions to Institutions: Microprocesses of Framing and Mechanisms for the Structuring of Institutional Fields”

Gray, Barbara; Purdy, Jill M.; and Ansari, Shahzad (Shaz),

(2015). Business Publications. 79. https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/business_pub/79

Contrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation

Art Dewulf∗

Issue Framing in Conversations for Change: Discursive Interaction Strategies for “Doing Differences”

Art Dewulf1 and René Bouwen2

The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science XX(X) 1–26 2012

Deliberating Our Frames: How Members of Multi‑Stakeholder Initiatives Use Shared Frames to Tackle Within‑Frame Conflicts Over Sustainability Issues

Angelika Zimmermann1 · Nora Albers2 · Jasper O. Kenter3

Received: 11 December 2019 / Accepted: 5 March 2021

Journal of Business Ethics

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04789-1

Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research:

A meta-paradigmatic perspective

Art Dewulf, Barbara Gray, Linda Putnam, Roy Lewicki,

Noelle Aarts, Rene Bouwen and Cees van Woerkum

Human Relations

DOI: 10.1177/0018726708100356

Volume 62(2): 155–193 Copyright © 2009

Toward a Relational Concept of Uncertainty: about Knowing Too Little, Knowing Too Differently, and Accepting Not to Know

Marcela Brugnach 1Art Dewulf 2Claudia Pahl-Wostl and Tharsi Taillieu 3


1Institute for Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, 2Public Administration and Policy Group, Wageningen University, 3Center for Work, Organizational and Personnel Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art30/

Ambiguity: the challenge of knowing and deciding together

M. Brugnach a,*, H. Ingram b,c

a Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands b Southwest Center, University of Arizona, United States
c School of Social Ecology, University of California Irvine, United States

environmental science & policy 15 (2012) 60–71

Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication

Dietram A. Scheufele 

Pages 297-316 | Published online: 17 Nov 2009

Mass Communication and Society 

Volume 3, 2000 – Issue 2-3

Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models

Dietram A. Scheufele1 & David Tewksbury2

1 Department of Life Sciences Communication and School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706
2 Department of Speech Communication and Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

Framing as a Theory of Media Effects

by Dietram A. Scheufele

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.958.1933&rep=rep1&type=pdf

The End of Framing as we Know it . . . and the Future of Media Effects

Michael A. Cacciatore

Department of Advertising and Public Relations University of Georgia

Dietram A. Scheufele

Department of Life Sciences Communication University of Wisconsin and Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania

Shanto Iyengar

Department of Communication and Department of Political Science Stanford University

Mass Communication and Society, 19:7–23, 2016

The State of Framing Research: A Call for New Directions

Dietram A. Scheufele and Shanto Iyengar
The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication

Edited by Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson

Subject: Political Science, Political Methodology, Political Behavior
Online Publication Date: Oct 2014 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.47

News Framing Theory and Research

David Tewksbury and Dietram A. Scheufele

https://prod-com-bibliolabs-nuvique-app-content.s3.amazonaws.com/SID-0000003307846/SID-0000003307846.pdf?X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEFQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQChctaF%2FK2CfiZr%2F38ZR5uN2EGzbwIfzQR4La8zK%2F%2F8NAIgYYHP8QeI2sRjjHKVDGcXgp1GNPcc8%2F%2B2v4K0XDOamHIq9wMITRAAGgwwMDY4NDgwOTEwMTQiDBXPo7zzeyaG3Tb4ySrUA6LgiuHTH%2F9KihxRLYkZCk7iMGRDGHP3GlRlF9CCE1I9R1DuxpAwLtuzydz2vJHAUKxOBKwYwKTo0E%2FJY%2FISYO1czRMdYwwZLXnHl2sRThYWhnv3b095JFIKFh%2BPu1d18JDbxmhwtLtEQeWw1I3abis%2F2C4ZZZ6rJs4YRW6UEIP2TxaLOa6dxkPnMJ83OZGJEF7Ez0LK3KuTIP0QVYsn14YBg5RG%2Fju75KBPta41vbg6bvcdhU%2BSTxN75smmCOhRtuL6h1pwBoBVbECTzcMueJ62tiEsmAuG3uHa062pMmGunouX%2F0uOvXXGD14dNnYKcYBK0Pf8nkrBwBeaxm8BVRWrGmvAjC6jkor54Azxxh7%2FNJkLqqmmBH2o6AG5mAD71sn1G6lyZAbBfzNjD%2FDSP2f5lAgd2Qr96U5iS3XcKkJI9xal%2BNquQuPp7CayjSol9YyqdrP%2FuI45%2FUOZP%2FshJHRmPgzesYxuWKK9icjU4HFXBKc%2FoTWnA95eA3aQx6EwqXAkBM2aX4CRxE7xdVcIaaXsFSv8%2FS15mFi7UIXZ2gnujn5ZQqDG32qwhQb%2B02FukuJ%2Fe2vdxjgfLoz2jctjLGfH2gzaB%2F2qWAdQ6OFzTfKK95AJQDDmu8eHBjqlAZLm2b0f0I%2BeldoQC44wvSHbMSL4Mw2tBNZzIYMSnKVWcupVxElsci6599Z4ONO6%2BUcMXbl%2F8%2FaeoAAKWLXZJOcW1byyV%2FDCo4x6CZr3W8rYhVPfIbpPK25iYhH76cHuPVSuqy5XgpBLLn%2Fpi2lFT97rD5JH5A4YAZ1jy%2BCf1qUbwyomv6h1R%2FY5j8XLOWBuXtgVIbaKcvy4h7iqywKHQX6jI%2F%2F5MQ%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20210716T213140Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=120&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQDGBNSODPMJ2V7ZO%2F20210716%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=432bb6277efd8055bc4fb223e18e03afac6a84ff8801d1d4dfd4f61543dbf6d6#page=62

Social Movements

An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective”

Robert D. Benford, University of Nebrasku- Lincoln

Framing Social Interaction. Continuities and Cracks in Goffman’s Frame Analysis

  • August 2018

DOI:10.4324/9781315582931

  • ISBN: 9781315582931

Authors:

Anders Persson

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326753186_Framing_Social_Interaction_Continuities_and_Cracks_in_Goffman%27s_Frame_Analysis

MICROFOUNDATIONS OF FRAMING: THE INTERACTIONAL PRODUCTION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES IN THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT

Juliane Reinecke

King’s Business School,

King’s College London, Bush House, 30 Aldwych London, WC2B 4BG United Kingdom
Phone: +44 20 7848 8753 Email: juliane.reinecke@kcl.ac.uk

Shahzad (Shaz) Ansari

Judge Business School University of Cambridge Cambridge, CB2 1AG United Kingdom Phone: +44 1223 768 128 Email: s.ansari@jbs.cam.ac.uk

Forthcoming in the Academy of Management Journal, Published Online: 1 Apr 2020

https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.1063

Are Logics Enough? Framing as an Alternative Tool for Understanding Institutional Meaning Making

Jill Purdy

Milgard School of Business University of Washington Tacoma

Shaz Ansari

Cambridge Judge Business School University of Cambridge

Barbara Gray

Smeal College of Business The Pennsylvania State University

https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/267326/Are+Logics+Enough+May+31+2017.pdf;jsessionid=67B97F57301F833C96876E1CD4078A5C?sequence=3

Priming and Framing

Chapter 13 in Book

The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Sociology

edited by Wayne H. Brekhus, Gabe Ignatow

Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming

David H. Weaver

School of Journalism, University of Indiana, Bloomington, IN 47405

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.4056&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power

Robert M. Entman

School of Media and Public Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

Click to access Media%20and%20framing%20bias.pdf

A Failure to Communicate: Agenda Setting in Media and Policy Studies,

Michelle Wolfe , Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner (2013)

Political Communication, 30:2, 175-192, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2012.737419

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.737419

Media Effects Theory

PORISMITA BORAH

Washington State University, USA

The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, First Edition. Edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

DOI: 10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc156

Attribute agenda setting, priming and the media’s influence on how to think about a controversial issue

Sei-Hill Kim

University of South Carolina, USA

Miejeong Han

Hanyang University, South Korea

Doo-Hun Choi

University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

Jeong-Nam Kim

Purdue University, USA

the International Communication Gazette 74(1) 43–59 a  2012

DOI: 10.1177/1748048511426991

A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments

Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION EFFECTS

Douglas M. McLeod University of Wisconsin-Madison

Gerald M. Kosicki The Ohio State University

Jack M. McLeod University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter in Book MEDIA EFFECTS Advances in Theory and Research Third Edition

FRAMING THEORY

Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208; email: dchong@northwestern.edu; druckman@northwestern.edu

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2007. 10:103–26

doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory:

A Systematic Examination of a Decade’s Literature

Porismita Borah

School of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53726, USA

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

Click to access Conceptual-Issues-in-Framing-Theory-A-Systematic-Examination-of-a-Decades-Literature.pdf

Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research:

A meta-paradigmatic perspective

Art Dewulf, Barbara Gray, Linda Putnam, Roy Lewicki,

Noelle Aarts, Rene Bouwen and Cees van Woerkum

Human Relations 2009

DOI: 10.1177/0018726708100356

Volume 62(2): 155–193

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37789783_Disentangling_Approaches_to_Framing_in_Conflict_and_Negotiation_Research_A_Meta-paradigmatic_Perspective

Towards a relational concept of uncertainty: Incorporating the human dimension

Brugnach, M.1; A. Dewulf 2; C. Pahl-Wostl 1 and T. Taillieu 3

1. Universität Osnabrück, Germany
2. Wageningen University, The Netherlands
3. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Contact author: Marcela Brugnach, mbrugnac@usf.uos.de

Social Learning and Water Resources Management

Author(s): Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Marc Craps, Art Dewulf, Erik Mostert, David Tabara and Tharsi Taillieu

Source: Ecology and Society , Dec 2007, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec 2007) Published by: Resilience Alliance Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26267868

AN OVERVIEW OF INTEGRAL ECOLOGY

A Comprehensive Approach to Today’s Complex Planetary Issues

Sean Esbjörn-Hargens Michael E. Zimmerman

The Variety of Integral Ecologies
Nature, Culture, and Knowledge in the Planetary Era

Sam Mickey – Editor
Sean Kelly – Editor
Adam Robbert – Editor
Mary Evelyn Tucker – Foreword by

SUNY series in Integral Theory
Release Date: June 2017
ISBN13: 978-1-4384-6527-2

Integrated management of natural resources: dealing with ambiguous issues, multiple actors and diverging frames

A. Dewulf*, M. Craps*, R. Bouwen*, T. Taillieu* and C. Pahl-Wostl**

*Center for Organizational and Personnel Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, 3000 Leuven, Belgium (E-mail: art.dewulf@psy.kuleuven.ac.be, marc.craps@psy.kuleuven.ac.be,rene.bouwen@psy.kuleuven.ac.be, tharsi.taillieu@psy.kuleuven.ac.be)
**Institute of Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabru ̈ck, Albrechtstrasse 28, Osnabru ̈ck, Germany (E-mail: pahl@usf.uni-osnabrueck.de)

Integral Ecology

UNITING MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURAL WORLD

By SEAN ESBJORN-HARGENS, PH.D. and MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN, PH.D.
Foreword by Marc Bekoff

https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/46964/integral-ecology-by-sean-esbjorn-hargens-phd-and-michael-e-zimmerman-phd-foreword-by-marc-bekoff/

Integral Ecology: Uniting Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World

Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Ken Wilber

March 25, 2009

Governance Capabilities for Dealing Wisely With Wicked Problems

Catrien J. A. M. Termeer1, Art Dewulf1, Gerard Breeman1, and Sabina J. Stiller1

Administration & Society XX(X) 1–31 © 2012

DOI: 10.1177/0095399712469195

More is not always better: Coping with ambiguity in natural resources management

M. Brugnach a, b, *, A. Dewulf c, H.J. Henriksen d, P. van der Keur d

a Faculty of Engineering Technology, University of Twente, The Netherlands
b Institute for Environmental Systems Research, University of Osnabrück, Germany c Public Administration and Policy Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands d Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Denmark

Journal of Environmental Management xxx (2010) 1e7

Issue Framing in Conversations for Change: Discursive Interaction Strategies for “Doing Differences”

Art Dewulf1 and René Bouwen2

The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science XX(X) 1–26 2012

DOI: 10.1177/0021886312438858

Contrasting frames in policy debates on climate change adaptation

Art Dewulf∗

Defining Uncertainty A Conceptual Basis for Uncertainty Management in Model-Based Decision Support

W.E. WALKER1, P. HARREMO€EES2, J. ROTMANS3, J.P. VAN DER SLUIJS5, M.B.A. VAN ASSELT4,

P. JANSSEN6 AND M.P. KRAYER VON KRAUSS2

Integrated Assessment 1389-5176/03/0000-000

2003

The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In

Baldwin Van Gorp

Department of Communication Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HC Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

Frames, Framing and Reframing

Frames, Framing and Reframing

Sources: Locating Frames in the Discursive Universe

Scholars from a range of disciplines use the term ‘frame’ to mean a variety of disjointed and incompatible concepts. This paper examines a range of framing literature, from the writings of authors including Erving Goffman, Tuen van Dijk, Serge Moscovici, George Lakoff, Alan Johnson, William Gamson, David Snow, Robert Benford and Paolo Donati. Then it develops the theoretical case for defining frames as semi-structured elements of discourse which people use to make sense of information they encounter. Additionally, this paper demonstrates the need to include social system frames, which provide patterns for understanding social relations, among the presently acknowledged frame types. Frames develop in parallel with language, vary across cultures, and shape, but are distinct from other extra-linguistic discourse forms, including myths and ideologies.

Sources: Frames and Their Consequences

The concept of framing has been used to capture these diverse processes by scholars of the media (Gitlin 1980; Carragee and Woefs 2004), international relations (Bernstein 2002; Berejekian 1997), decisionmaking (Kahneman and Tversky 1986), policymaking (Schon and Rein 1994), and social movements.

Key Terms

  • Mental Models
  • World Views
  • Perspectives
  • Narratives
  • Retrospective Narrative
  • Multi Valent Logic
  • AnteNarrative
  • Law of Requisite Variety
  • Problem Structuring Methods
  • Drama
  • Scenarios
  • Dialectics
  • Meta Theater
  • Lenses
  • System in Focus
  • Focal Point
  • Boundaries
  • Inclusion and Exclusion
  • Frames
  • Framing
  • Reframing
  • Frames Rejected
  • Frames Accepted
  • Multi Perspectivism
  • Multiple Frames
  • Arguments
  • Biases and Prejudices
  • Counterfactuals (for past events)
  • What Ifs
  • Ideology
  • Mindset
  • Script
  • Preferences
  • Selection
  • Self Interest
  • Agenda
  • Why, What and How of a Narrative
  • Frame the Domain
  • Point of View
  • Field of Vision
  • Histories and Plots
  • Frame the issue

David Boje’s Dramatic Septet

David Boje expanded Kenneth Burke’s dramatic pentad to include Rhythms and Frames.

What are Frames?

Source: Critical Dramaturgical Analysis of Enron Antenarratives and Metatheatre

Source: Critical Dramaturgical Analysis of Enron Antenarratives and Metatheatre

Frames, Framing and Reframing

By
Sanda Kaufman
Michael Elliott
Deborah Shmueli

Original Publication September 2003

What Frames Are

Frames are cognitive shortcuts that people use to help make sense of complex information. Frames help us to interpret the world around us and represent that world to others. They help us organize complex phenomena into coherent, understandable categories. When we label a phenomenon, we give meaning to some aspects of what is observed, while discounting other aspects because they appear irrelevant or counter-intuitive. Thus, frames provide meaning through selective simplification, by filtering people’s perceptions and providing them with a field of vision for a problem.

Frames can significantly affect the intractability of a conflict by creating mutually incompatible interpretations of events. Because frames are built upon underlying structures of beliefs, values, and experiences, disputants often construct frames that differ in significant ways. A simple example is attitudes towards abortion in the US.  “Pro-life” advocates believe abortion is murder of an innocent, unborn child which has as much right to live as anyone else–thus they see the fetus as a person, and abortion as a willful act that murders a person. “Pro-choice” advocates, however, do not see the fetus as a “person” with human rights–not until it becomes “viable” outside the womb, at any rate.  Before then, they focus on the rights of the mother, asserting that she should have ultimate control and “choice” about her medical decisions and what happens to her body.

Frames often exist prior to conscious processing of information for decision-making[1] and affect subsequent individual decisions.[2] Thus, disputants are separated not only by differences in interests, beliefs, and values, but also in how they perceive and understand the world, both at a conscious and pre-conscious level.[3]  

Framing involves both the construction of interpretive frames and their representation to others. Disputants may use framing not only as an aid to interpreting events, but also to promote strategic advantage.[4] Framing can be useful for rationalizing self-interest, convincing a broader audience, building coalitions, or lending preferentiality to specific outcomes. As such, many factors affect how people frame a conflict, which, in turn, influences the direction the conflict takes.[5]

This essay explores the nature of frames and the framing process. It seeks to

  • clarify the basic concepts,
  • present an overview of what is known about frames and framing and their impact on conflict dynamics,
  • explore the forms of framing that are most significant to intractable conflicts,
  • examine the potential for reframing and frame changes as part of a process of reconciliation or conflict resolution, and
  • direct the reader to other web- and print-based resources that can provide more detail.
Definitions

Differing conceptual frames held by the parties involved in a dispute form the basis on which they act. Each party to a conflict has its own perception and understanding of their agenda, the relevance of various issues, their priorities, and the opportunities and risks involved with different choices. This assemblage of factors can be considered as a set of lenses, or filters, through which the various parties view the conflict, and is called the frame or conceptual frame.

In the English language, the word “frame” can be used both as a verb (to frame) or as a noun (a frame). As a noun, frame denotes the boundary within which the whole picture is displayed (similar to a frame placed around a picture or painting), and is used as a tool for interpreting and understanding the perceptions and underlying objectives of the various actors in the conflict. As a verb, framing refers to the creation of frames, either from a simple reading of the situation or through a deliberative, analytic, or strategic process.

The concept of frames has been developed as a tool for analysis in various fields, including psychology and sociology,[6] business management,[7] artificial intelligence,[8] decision-making,[9] negotiation,[10] and environmental conflict management.[11] Relevant to understanding intractable conflict are definitions given by such scholars as Minsky,[12] Tannen,[13] and Gray,[14] for whom frames are “cognitive structures held in memory and used to guide interpretation of new experience.” Furthermore, “parties rely on these mental structures to interpret or make sense of ongoing events.”[15] Frames are also defined as “collections of perceptions and thoughts that people use to define a situation, organize information, and determine what is important and what is not.”[16] We create frames to name a situation in which we find ourselves, to identify and interpret specific aspects that seem key to us in understanding the situation, and to communicate that interpretation to others.[17]

Why are Frames Important?

An essential element in conflict resolution is an understanding of how frames affect conflict development. In the context of a conflict, we create frames to help us understand why the conflict exists, what actions are important to the conflict, why the parties act as they do, and how we should act in response.[18] During the evolution of a conflict, frames act as sieves through which information is gathered and analyzed, positions are determined (including priorities, means, and solutions), and action plans developed. Depending on the context, frames may be used to conceptualize and interpret, or to manipulate and convince.

Putnam and Holmer[19] hold that framing and reframing are vital to the negotiationprocess and are tied to information processing, message patterns, linguistic cues, and socially constructed meanings. Knowing what types of frames are in use and how they are constructed allows one to draw conclusions about how they affect the development of a conflict, and can be used to influence it. Thus, analyzing the frames people use in a given conflict provides fresh insight and better understanding of the conflict dynamics and development. With such insight, and with the help of reframing, stakeholders may find new ways to reach agreements.

The Sources and Forms of Frames

Many factors influence frames and their formation. Intractable disputes are usually associated with a complex and reinforcing set of frames about oneself, the “others,” risks, what information should apply to the situation, and how decisions should be made. The frames of most importance to intractability usually include identity, characterization, power, conflict management/process, risk/information, and loss versus gain. Their forms and most common sources are as follows:

  • Identity frames: Disputants view themselves as having particular identities in the context of specific conflict situations.[20] These identities spring from the individuals’ self-conception and group affiliations. One might frame oneself as a Hutu or a Tutsi, a Muslim or a Christian, a man or a woman, or a Republican or Democrat.  The more central the challenge to one’s sense of self, the more oppositional one is likely to act. Typical responses to threats to identity include ignoring information and perspectives that threaten the core identity, reinforcing affiliations with like-minded individuals and groups, and negatively characterizing outsiders.
  • Characterization frames: Disputants view others in the conflict as having particular characteristics. Closely related to stereotyping, characterization frames may be either positive or negative. Parties to intractable conflicts often construct characterization frames for others that significantly differ from how the other parties view themselves. Such characterizations often undermine the others’ legitimacy, cast doubt on their motivations, or exploit their sensitivity. For example, many Americans characterize Al Queda as “terrorists,” yet they most certainly do not see themselves that way.  Rather, they see themselves as freedom-fighters, or jihadi warriors fighting for the protection of Islam.  Characterization frames are also often linked to identity frames, serving to strengthen one’s own identity while justifying your actions toward the other (e.g., for me to be a liberator, my opponent must be an oppressor).
  • Power frames: Because intractable conflicts are often imbedded in struggles to alter existing institutions or decision-making procedures, disputants’ conceptions of power and social control play a significant role in conflict dynamics. Power frames help the disputant determine not only which forms of power are legitimate (e.g., governmental, legal, civil disobedience) but also the forms of power that are likely to advance one’s own position (e.g., authority, resources, expertise, coalition-building, threat, voice). For instance, some people may see money as the best way to “buy influence,” while other people might rely more on technical expertise or personal charisma to sway people’s views..
  • Conflict management or process frames: Conflict over how best to manage or resolve differences is central to many intractable disputes. Depending on disputants’ identity, characterization of other disputants, perceived power, and perception of the available options, conflict frames may impel parties to seek very different remedies in response to common problems. These remedies may range from actions as disparate as violence, civil disobedience, litigation, and negotiation. Because of the wide complexity of possible actions and the uncertainty of their consequences, groups with shared interests and values may draw significantly different conclusions as to the best course of action within a particular dispute..One side, for instance, may be willing to sit down with a mediator and negotiate, while the other, thinking that it has the upper hand, may refuse negotiation, preferring litigation or violent action.
  • Risk and information frames: Intractable disputes often involve expectations about future events, in which the events are risky and the likelihood of the events occurring is uncertain.[21] In such conditions, disputants often construct risk and information frames that yield highly variable assessments about the level and extent of a particular risk. Additionally, these frames indicate to the disputant which sources of information are reliable and which are not. Risk and information frames depend not just on the disputant’s interests, but also on the disputant’s training, expertise, level of exposure to the risk, familiarity with the risk, potential for catastrophic impacts associated with the risk, and degree to which the risk is dreaded. People who are used to working and traveling in war-torn areas, for example, have a far different assessment of the risks of such activities than people who don’t do that (who thus are more likely to see the risk of doing so to be unacceptably high). Likewise, engineers who understand the technical aspects of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) are likely to access the risks of that process differently than “ordinary” people who live near the wells who have read popular media stories about the dangers of fracking–but also differently from the people working on the wells who simply want a job, and are much less worried about the impacts of their work than on the money it puts in their pockets.
  • Loss versus gain framesIn intractable disputes, it is common for most parties to the conflict to focus on threats of potential loss rather than on opportunities for gains. People tend to react differently to a proposed action when its expected consequences are framed in terms of losses as opposed to gains, where preventing a perceived loss is often more salient and more highly valued than capturing a commensurate gain.[22] Going back to the fracking example mentioned above, psychology tells us that most people are more likely to focus on the dangers of fracking (the potential loss of safe drinking water, clean habitat, and quiet) to be more significant than the gains that can be obtained from fracking–reduced reliance on foreign oil, and improved economy, and more jobs.

Many other types of frames can be constructed, but these six categories stand out as particularly applicable to intractable disputes.

Reframing

Within processes of reconciliationnegotiation, or joint problem solving, the explicit management of frames, and the framing process may lead to important shifts in both the frames themselves and in their impact on the conflict dynamics. This purposive management of frames is called reframing. Use of frame analysis and reframing processes have the following goals:

  • to clarify or “refresh” the perception of the issues in dispute (in order to promote more productive information exchange and listening to ideas not previously considered, and to expand the framework of discussion and explore means of action or solutions not yet attempted);
  • to sharpen the parties’ understanding of their interests and how the modes of action they have chosen serve those interests (in order to examine potential processes for managing conflict more productively and to reconsider patterns of relationships among stakeholders);
  • to identify those subjects which the involved parties view differently, even when the basis for the divergent frames are more fully understood (in order to identify opportunities for trade-offs based on clearly understood differences); and
  • to identify differences which cannot be bridged (in order to more fully appreciate conflict dynamics and to evaluate the potential for conflict reduction processes that do not violate these intractable differences, to determine the degree of importance attributed to these intractable differences in frames, and to seek ways to address them).

Thus, reframing, stemming from stakeholders’ understanding of their own as well as others’ expressed frames, may pave ways for resolving, or at least better managing, a dispute.

Framing diagram

Figure 1: Frames and their role in conflict development

Figure 1 illustrates the roles frames and framing play in the dynamics of conflict development. It demonstrates how a frame change (or reframing) may cause a shift in conflict development, towards conflict management and/or resolution. Types of frame categories are numerous and coined differently by researchers in various fields. The categories cited in this diagram are: substance (reframing that affects how one views the world today or potential future states of the world), process (reframing that affects how one interacts with others in the dispute), values (reframing that allows parties to clarify the relationship between values and interests for both themselves and for other parties), and phrasing (the language used by disputants to communicate with one other).

Frame Analysis and Reframing as Conflict Management Tools

Frame analysis can be used by both third party interveners and by individual stakeholders and conveners to better understand conflict dynamics. Frame analysis has been used both retrospectively (to understand past conflicts) and prospectively (as a tool for better managing an existing conflict). Retrospectively, it seeks to better understand conflict dynamics in order to glean lessons for the future. Prospectively, it advances consensus building in both the conflict assessments and intervention stages.

Analytic techniques for frame analysis include interviewing the various stakeholders to ascertain their perceptions and interpretations, feeding back to the parties the resulting analysis, and then exploring with the parties the meaning and impact of these frames on the conflict dynamics. Particularly within the framework of conflict assessments, [23] frame analysis and the resulting understanding of frames can help the stakeholders to better grasp the conflict, including the factors and contexts that can lead to changes within a frame or changes to the frames themselves. In this sense, framing becomes a formative analytic technique.

In intractable conflicts, frames are often quite stable over time, even when specific individuals move in and out of the conflict. This stability comes both because various frames held by an individual tend to be self reinforcing, and because frames are often shared within a community and therefore are socially reinforced through story-telling and shared perspectives. Yet research into intractable conflicts suggests that in at least some conflicts, frames can be altered over time through intentional interventions, and that the shift in frames helps to render disputes more tractable.[24]

At the same time, research shows that reframing is often not easy for parties. It requires taking on new perspectives, and often requires some degree of risk-taking on the part of the parties. As such, reframing works best when changes in the context of the dispute can be made, such that incentives to consider new perspectives increase, or in the context of careful and constructive dialogue, with a strong focus on improving communication and building trust.

A number of strategies and techniques exist in the use of dialogue to reframe intractable conflicts. These include:[25]

  • Reducing tension and promoting the de-escalation of hostility: by using techniques such as listening projects, study circles, and some forms of mediation which seek to reduce tension by creating forums that promote more effective communication around a set of limited objectives. The forums focus explicitly on improving communication and reducing escalatory cycles that are often associated with mutually-incompatible frames.
  • Perspective taking: techniques such as acknowledging critical identities, imaging of identities and characterizations, narrative forums, and listening circles allow disputants to understand the conflict and its dynamics from the perspective of other disputants. These approaches are particularly geared toward better understanding of identity and characterization frames, in order to see oneself more objectively and the other party in a more positive light. They seek to enable disputants to see the potential validity and credibility of other perspectives, and to examine the interplay between one’s own frames and those of other disputants.
  • Establishing a common ground as a basis for agreement: by using techniques such as visioning exercises and common-ground search processes which enable reframing around a smaller set of issues. Common ground processes are used in highly divisive issues (such as abortion and ethnic disputes) and seek to explore areas of agreement and possible joint action between parties who normally focus on their differences, in order to open up communication between the parties. Search processes seek to identify desired futures in order to shift the focus from a short-term perspective to a long-term one.
  • Enhancing the desirability of options and alternatives: Several approaches exist that may enhance the desirability of alternative options when presented to parties with divergent frames. For a disputant to examine options from the perspective of other parties, he or she must understand the other parties’ frames, and be able to view options from other perspectives. Third-party interveners are often helpful in this regard. In addition, seeking to reframe perceptions of losses as gains can enhance the openness and creativity of parties to a dispute.
Conclusion

Frames play a significant role in perpetuating intractable conflict. As lenses through which disputants interpret conflicts, frames limit the clarity of communication and the quality of information, as well as instigate escalatory processes. These frames, imbedded in personal, social, and institutional roles, are often quite stable over time, even through the ebb and flow of many dispute episodes. As such, they contribute to the intractability of the conflict. In addition, frames interact, often in ways that tend to reinforce the stability of other frames. Yet, in at least some intractable conflicts, changes in the context of the dispute or purposive interventions designed to alter frames have led to reframing that, in turn, has increased the tractability of the conflict. Strategies to accomplish this reframing include frame analysis and the construction of forums designed to enhance communication, understanding, and trust.


[1] Gray, B. and A. Donnellon, 1989. “An Interactive Theory of Reframing in Negotiation,” unpublished manuscript. Pennsylvania State University, College of Business Administration.

[2] Sheppard, B.H., K. Blumenfeld-Jones and J.W. Minton, 1987. “To control or not to control: Two models of conflict intervention,” unpublished manuscript sited in Pinkley, 1990).

[3] Elliott, M., Gray, B., & Lewicki, R., 2003. Lessons learned about the framing of intractable environmental conflicts. In R. Lewicki, B. Gray, & M. Elliott (Eds.), Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concepts and cases (pp. 409-436), Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

[4] Kaufman, S. and J. Smith, 1999. “Framing and Reframing in Land Use Change Conflicts,” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, Vol.16, no.2, Summer, pp. 164-180.

[5] Elliott, M., Kaufman, S., Gardner, R., and Burgess, G., 2002. “Teaching conflict Assessment and frame analysis through interactive web-based simulations ” The International Journal of Conflict Management, 13:4, pp. 320-340.

[6] e.g. Taylor , D.E., 2000. “The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm. Injustice Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses,” American Behavioral Scientist. 43 (4), pp. 508-580; and Gonos, G., 1997. “Situation” versus “frame”: The “interactionist” and the “structualist” analyses of everyday life,” American Sociological Review, 42, pp. 854-867.

[7] Watzlawick, P., J. Weakland, and R. Fisch, 1974. Change, Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution, Norton & Company, Inc.; and Goldratt, E.M., 1990. What is this thing called Theory of Constraints and how should it be implemented?, Corton-on-Hudson, NY: North River Press, Inc.

[8] e.g., Minsky, M., 1975. “A Framework for Representing Knowledge,” in Winston, P.H.( Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision, New York, NY: McGraw Hill, pp. 177-211.

[9] e.g., Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, Econometrica 47, pp. 263-289.

[10] e.g., Neale, M.A. and M.H. Bazerman, 1985. “The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes,” Academy of Management Journal 28, pp. 34-49; Gray, B., 1989. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publication; and Pinkley, R.L., 1990. “Dimensions of Conflict Frame: Disputant Interpretations of Conflict,” Journal of Applied Psychology 75, pp. 117-126.

[11] Lewicki, R., Gray, B., & Elliott, M., 2003. Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concepts and cases, Washington, D.C.: Island Press; Kaufman and Smith, 1999, op cit.; and Vaughan, E. and M. Seifert, 1992. “Variability in the Framing of Risk Issues,” Journal of Social Issues 48 (4), pp. 119-135.

[12] Minsky, 1975, op cit. 

[13] Tannen, D., 1979. “What’s in a Frame? Surface Evidence of Underlying Expectations,” In Freedle, R. (ed.), New Dimensions in Discourse Processes, Norwood, NJ: Albex, pp. 137-181.

[14] Gray, B., 1997. “Framing and Reframing of Intractable Environmental Disputes,” in Lewicki, R., R. Bies, and B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 6, p. 171.

[15] Gray 1997, ibid.

[16] Lewicki, R, Saunders, D, and Minton, J., 1999. Negotiation. Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

[17] Buechler, S., 2000. Social movements in advanced Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.

[18] Gray, B., 2003. Framing of environmental disputes. In R. Lewicki, B. Gray, & M. Elliott (Eds.), Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concepts and cases (pp. 11-34), Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

[19] Putnam, L. and M. Holmer, 1992. “Framing, Reframing, and Issue Development”, in Putnam L. and Roloff, M.E. (Eds.), Communication and Negotiation, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, Vol. 20. pp.128-155.

[20] Rothman, J., 1997. Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

[21] Heimer, C.A., 1988. “Social Structures, Psychology and the Estimation of Risk,” Annual Review of Sociology 14, pp. 491-519.

[22] Kahneman & Tverski, 1979, op cit.; Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman, 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, pp. 453-458; Schweitzer , M.E. and L.A. DeChurch, 2001. “Linking Frames in Negotiations: Gains, Losses and Conflict Frame Adoption.” International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 100-113.

[23] Shmueli, D. and M. Ben Gal, 2000. “Reframing of Protracted Environmental Disputes”, interim report to the Israeli Ministry of Environment, March (Hebrew); Shmueli, D. and M. Ben Gal, 2001. “Conflict Assessment to Promote Dialogue between the Stakeholders involved in the Dispute Surrounding the Treatment and Discharge of Industrial Wastes in the Lower Kishon Basin,” draft June, final November (Hebrew); and Shmueli, D. and M. Ben Gal, forthcoming. “The Potential of Framing in Managing and Resolving Environmental Conflict.” In E. Feitelson, G. de Roo and D. Miller (Eds.), Advancing Sustainability at the Sub-National Level, Ashgate Press.

[24] Elliott, M., Gray, B., & Lewicki, R., 2003. Lessons learned about the framing of intractable environmental conflicts. In R. Lewicki, B. Gray, & M. Elliott (Eds.), Making sense of intractable environmental conflicts: Concepts and cases (pp. 409–436), Washington, D.C.: Island Press at 420.

[25] ibid, at 425-434.

What is Framed?

  • Situations
  • Attributes
  • Choices
  • Actions
  • Issues
  • Responsibility
  • News

Source: Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations


Frame Development, Generation, and Elaboration

Source: FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview and Assessment

  • Discursive Processes
  • Strategic Processes
  • Contested Processes
Strategic Processes

Source: FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview and Assessment

  • Frame Bridging,
  • Frame Amplification,
  • Frame Extension,
  • Frame Transformation.

Contested Processes in Social Movements

Source: FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview and Assessment

There is widespread agreement among movement framing researchers that the development, generation, and elaboration of collective action frames are contested processes. All actors within the collective action arena who engage in this reality construction work are embroiled in the politics of signification. This means that activists are not able to construct and impose on their intended targets any version of reality they would like; rather there are a variety of challenges confronting all those who engage in movement framing activities. Thus far the literature elaborates on three forms these challenges tend to take: counterframing by movement opponents, bystanders, and the media; frame disputes within movements; and the dialectic between frames and events.

Frames and Scenarios

How are Frames related to Scenario Planning?

My Related Posts

Victor Turner’s Postmodern Theory of Social Drama

Erving Goffman: Dramaturgy of Social Life

Kenneth Burke and Dramatism

Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber

Dialogs and Dialectics

Global Trends, Scenarios, and Futures: For Foresight and Strategic Management

Shell Oil’s Scenarios: Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning for the Future

Narrative, Rhetoric and Possible Worlds

Art of Long View: Future, Uncertainty and Scenario Planning

Strategy | Strategic Management | Strategic Planning | Strategic Thinking

Networks, Narratives, and Interaction

Levels of Human Psychological Development in Integral Spiral Dynamics

Key Sources of Research

Framing (Social Sciences)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framing_(social_sciences)

Frames and Their Consequences

Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho

Click to access 2006%20polletta%20and%20ho%20frames%20and%20their%20consequences.pdf

“Finding frames in a web of culture: The case of the War on Terror,”

Stephen Reese,

in P. D’Angelo and J. Kuypers (eds.) Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical, Theoretical, and Normative Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2009).

Locating Frames in the Discursive Universe

K. Fisher

First Published September 1, 1997 

Sociological Research Online

Vol 2, Issue 3, 1997

https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.78

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5153/sro.78

Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations

Kirk Hallahan

Department of Journalism and Technical Communication Colorado State University

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC RELATIONS RESEARCH, 11(3), 205–242 Copyright © 1999, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

FRAMING THEORY

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2007. 10:103–26 doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208; email: dchong@northwestern.edu; druckman@northwestern.edu

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054

Frames, Framing and Reframing


Sanda Kaufman
Michael Elliott
Deborah Shmueli

Original Publication September 2003, updated in June, 2013 and again in June, 2017 by Heidi Burgess

https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing

Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership, 

Bolman, L. G., and Deal, T. E. 

7th ed., expected September, 2021.

https://sites.google.com/site/reframingorganizations1/home

FRAMING PROCESSES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: An Overview and Assessment

Robert D. Benford

Department of Sociology, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0324; e-mail: Rbenford1@unl.edu

David A. Snow

Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721; e-mail: snowd@u.arizona.edu

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000. 26:611–39

Documentary Impact: Social Change Through Storytelling

Five Framing Tips: Framing for Social Change

Nat Kendall-Taylor , Allison Stevens

PublishedJune 4, 2019

FrameWorks UK

https://www.frameworksinstitute.org/article/five-framing-tips-framing-for-social-change/

FUNDAMENTAL FRAMES: HOW CULTURAL FRAMES INFORM THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

ANDERS WALKER

From theatrics to metatheatre: The Enron Drama

David Boje

https://davidboje.com/vita/pub/index.html

https://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/theatrics/7/

LIFE IMITATES ART

Enron’s Epic and Tragic Narration

DAVID M. BOJE

GRACE ANN ROSILE 

New Mexico State University

Dramatic Septet

David Boje

https://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/septet/

Critical Dramaturgical Analysis of Enron Antenarratives and Metatheatre

David M. Boje

New Mexico State University

July 10, 2002; July 31, 2002 version

https://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/papers/ENRON_critical_dramaturgical_analysis.htm

Enron Metatheatre:

A Critical Dramaturgy Analysis of Enron�s Quasi-Objects

David M. Boje, New Mexico State University

Paper presented at the Networks, Quasi-Objects, and Identity: Reintegrating Humans, Technology, and Nature session of Denver Academy of Management Meetings. Tuesday August 13, 2002. http://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/  Revision Date: August 9 2002.

https://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/papers/enron_theatre_LJM.htm

Frame Analysis

Erving Goffman

Framers: Human Advantage in an Age of Technology and Turmoil

Book by Francis de Véricourt, Kenneth Cukier, and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger

2021

A Dialectic Perspective on the Organization Theatre Metaphor

David M. Boje, John T. Luhman, & Ann L. Cunliffe

American Communication Journal

Volume 6, Issue 2, Winter 2003

Doing A Boje: Using Dramaturgical Analysis In Critical Management Studies

Stream 4: Theatrics of Capitalism

Alexis Downs

Adrian N. Carr

From theatrics to metatheatre: The Enron Drama.

Boje, D. M.; Hansen, Hans; & Rosile, Grace Ann.

2007.

Revue Sciences do Gestion, Management Sciences, no 58, p63-83.

Social Movements and the Dramatic Framing of Social Reality

  • January 2013
  • In book: The Drama of Social Life: A Dramaturgical Sourcebook (pp.139-155)
  • Chapter: 9
  • Publisher: Ashgate
  • Editors: Charles Edgley

Robert D Benford

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296333275_Social_Movements_and_the_Dramatic_Framing_of_Social_Reality

Frame Analysis

WIKI

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frame_analysis

THE EMERGENCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF THE FRAMING PERSPECTIVE: 25+ YEARS SINCE “FRAME ALIGNMENT”*

David A. Snow, Robert D. Benford, Holly J. McCammon, Lyndi Hewitt, and Scott Fitzgerald

Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization

  • January 1988

Authors:

David Snow

Robert D Benford

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285098685_Ideology_Frame_Resonance_and_Participant_Mobilization

Using Scenario Planning to reshape Strategy

Rafael Ramírez, Steve Churchhouse, Alejandra Palermo, and Jonas Hoffmann

June 13, 2017

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/using-scenario-planning-to-reshape-strategy/

Strategic Reframing

The Oxford Scenario Planning Approach

Rafael Ramírez and Angela Wilkinson

Print Length: 272 pages

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Publication Date: May 24, 2016

https://www.apf.org/blogpost/1784113/365221/Book-Review-Strategic-Reframing

https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198745693.001.0001/acprof-9780198745693

Our Scenario Approach

Center for Strategy and Scenario Planning

https://www.scenarioplanning.eu/our-scenario-approach

Scenario planning meets frame analysis: Using citizens’ frames as test conditions for policy measures

Petervan Wijcka

Bert Niemeijerbc

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016328716000069

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292679294_Scenario_planning_meets_frame_analysis_Using_citizens%27_frames_as_test_conditions_for_policy_measures

The use and abuse of scenarios

November 1, 2009 

McKinsey

https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-use-and-abuse-of-scenarios

Living in the Futures

From the Magazine (May 2013)

https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures

Scenarios: an Explorers Guide

Shell International

Global Trends, Scenarios, and Futures: For Foresight and Strategic Management

Global Trends, Scenarios, and Futures: For Foresight and Strategic Management

There are a few Institutions which do general long term trends and scenario analysis.

  • US DNI NIC
  • Atlantic Council
  • UK MOD
  • Shell International
  • HP
  • EY
  • WEF

There are many institutions both public and private which do issue or industry specific scenarios, trends, and futures analysis.

  • Water
  • Food
  • Energy
  • Climate Change
  • Globalization
  • Urbanization
  • Governance
  • Security
  • Technology
  • Demographic
  • Industry specific
  • Nationalism
  • Protectionism
  • Healthcare
  • Human Development

Why do Scenarios?

Its a way to internalize an organization’s external environment. By doing so, managers and leaders can future-proof their strategy.

Image Source: If only we knew. With scenario planning, we do. Here’s how to prepare better for the next crisis

Image Source: Global Business Network

Image Source: WHY THE SOCIAL SECTOR NEEDS SCENARIO PLANNING NOW

Image Source: Megatrends 2020 and beyond /EY Mega Trends

The article below was published in MIT Sloan Review.

The World in 2030: Nine Megatrends to Watch

Where will we be in 2030? 

I don’t usually play the futurist game — I’m more of a “presentist,” looking at the data we have right now on fast-moving megatrends that shape the world today. But a client asked me to paint a picture of what the big trends tell us about 2030. And I’d say we do have some strong indications of where we could be in 11 years. 

The directions we go and choices we make will have enormous impacts on our lives, careers, businesses, and the world. Here are my predictions of how nine important trends will evolve by 2030 — listed in order roughly from nearly certain to very likely to hard to say

Nine Global Trends on the Horizon

Demographics: There will be about 1 billion more of us, and we will live longer. The world should reach 8.5 billion people by 2030, up from 7.3 billion in 2015. The fastest growing demographic will be the elderly, with the population of people over 65 years old at 1 billion by 2030. Most of those new billion will be in the middle class economically, as the percentage of citizens in dire poverty continues to drop (a rare sustainability win). Even as the middle swells, however, the percentage of all new wealth accruing to the very top of the pyramid will continue to be a major, and destabilizing, issue. That said, the other megatrends, especially climate change, could slow or change the outcomes here.

Urbanization: Two-thirds of us will live in cities. The urbanization of our populations will increase, creating more megacities as well as small- and medium-size metropolises. Countervailing forces will include a rising cost of living in the most desirable cities. The effects will include the need for more big buildings with better management technologies (big data and AI that makes buildings much more efficient), and we will need more food moved in from where we grow it to where we eat it — or rapidly expand urban agriculture.

Transparency: Our world will become even more open — and less private.It’s hard to imagine that the trend to track everything will be going anywhere but in one direction: a radically more open world. The amount of information collected on every person, product, and organization will grow exponentially, and the pressure to share that information — with customers and consumers in particular — will expand. The tools to analyze information will be well-developed and will make some decision-making easier; for instance, it will be easier to choose products with the lowest carbon footprints, highest wages for employees, and fewest toxic ingredients. But all these tools will shatter privacy in the process.

Privacy Policy

Climate Crisis: The climate will continue to change quickly and feature regular, extreme weather everywhere. Yes, there’s still uncertainty about how everything will play out exactly, but not about whether the climate is changing dramatically and dangerously. Significant inertia in both atmospheric and economic/human systems allows for a more confident prediction of what will happen in just 11 years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has made clear how critical it is to radically alter the path of carbon emissions to hold the world to 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. But that’s not likely to happen with current levels of commitment in global governments: The important Paris climate accord of 2015, in theory, agrees to hold warming to 2 degrees Celsius. But in practice, what countries have committed to so far will only hold us to no more than 3 degrees of warming. By 2030, we are very likely to already be at or approaching the 1.5 mark. 

The results of climate change will be unrelenting. Many highly populated coastal areas will be in consistent trouble, as sea levels rise. The natural world will be much less rich, with drastic to catastrophic declines in populations of many species and major to total losses of ecosystems like coral. Droughts and floods will stress global breadbasket regions and shift where we grow major crops. The Arctic will be ice-free in the summer (this will allow ships to move freely in this region, which is technically good for shorter supply chains but a Pyrrhic victory at best). Between seas, heat, and shifts in water availability, mass migrations will likely have begun. By 2030, we will have much better clarity on how bad the coming decades after that point will be. We will know whether the melting of the major ice sheets will be literally inundating most coastal cities, and if we’re truly approaching an “Uninhabitable Earth” in our lifetimes. 

Resource Pressures: We will be forced to more aggressively confront resource constraints. To keep volumes of major commodities (such as metals) in line with economic growth, we will need to more quickly embrace circular models: sourcing much less from virgin materials, using recycled content and remanufactured products, and generally rethinking the material economy. Water will be a stressed resource, and it seems likely that many cities will be constantly in a state of water shortage. We will need more investment in water tech and desalination to help. 

Clean Tech: The transformation of our grid, our roadways, and our buildings to zero-carbon technology will be surprisingly far along. Here’s some good news: Due to continuing drops in the cost of clean technologies, renewable energy is dramatically on the rise, making up more than half the global new power capacity every year since 2015. By 2030, effectively no new additions of generating capacity will come from fossil-fuel-based technologies.Electric vehicles will be a large part of the transportation equation: While estimates about the share of EVs on the road by 2030 range from the teens to nearly 100% (assuming early retirement of internal combustion engines), nearly all sales of new vehicles will be EVs. This will be driven by dramatic reductions in the cost of batteries and strict legislation banning fossil-fuel engines. We will also see an explosion of data-driven technologies that make buildings, the grid, roadways, and water systems substantially more efficient.

Technology Shifts: The internet of things will have won the day, and every new device will be connected. Proponents of the “singularity” have long projected that by around 2030, affordable AI will achieve human levels of intelligence. AI and machine learning will plan much of our lives and make us more efficient, well beyond choosing driving routes to optimize traffic. Technology will manipulate us even more than it does today — Russian interference in U.S. elections may look quaint. AI will create some new kinds of jobs but will also nearly eliminate entire segments of work, from truck and taxi drivers to some high-skill jobs such as paralegals and engineers.

Global Policy: There’s an open question about how we’ll get important things done. I’m thinking specifically about whether global governments and institutions will be working in sync to aggressively fight climate change and resource pressures, and tackle vast inequality and poverty — or whether it will be every region and ethnic group for itself. Predicting politics is nearly impossible, and it’s hard to imagine how global policy action on climate and other megatrends will play out. The Paris Agreement was a monumental start, but countries, most notably the U.S., have lately retreated from global cooperation in general. Trade wars and tariffs are all the rage in 2019. It seems likely that, even more than today, it will be up to business to play a major role in driving sustainability.

Populism: The rise of nationalism and radicalism may increase … or it won’t. Even less certain than policy is the support, or lack thereof, of the mass of people for different philosophies of governing. In recent years, populists have been elected or consolidated power in countries as varied as the U.S., Brazil, and Hungary. And yet, in recent weeks, citizens in countries like Turkey, Algeria, and Sudan have pushed back on autocracy. Will that trend continue?

How Should Business Prepare?

Laying out strategies for companies to navigate this likely future world is a book-length conversation. But let me suggest a few themes of action to consider:

  • Engage everyone in the sphere of the business world on climate. A dangerously changing climate is the biggest threat humanity has ever faced. But it’s not all set in stone … yet. Companies have an economic incentive and moral responsibility to work hard to reduce the damage as much as possible. Engage employees (stamp out climate denial), talk to consumers and customers about climate issues through your products, and change internal rules on corporate finance to make investment decisions with flexible hurdle rates that favor pro-climate spending. Most importantly, use influence and lobbying power to demand, at all levels of government, an escalating public price on carbon — and publicly admonish industry lobbying groups that don’t.
  • Consider the human aspect of business more. As new technologies sweep through society and business, the change will be jarring. Those changes and pressures are part of why people are turning to populist leaders who promise solutions. Business leaders should think through what these big shifts mean for the people that make up our companies, value chains, and communities.
  • Embrace transparency. To be blunt, you don’t have a choice. Each successive generation will expect more openness from the companies they buy from and work for. 
  • Listen to the next generation. By 2030, the leading edge of millennials will be nearing 50, and they and Gen Z will make up the vast majority of the workforce. Listen to them now about their priorities and values. 

Predicting the future means projecting forward from what’s already happening, while throwing in expected inertia in human and natural systems. It can give us an impressionistic picture of the world of the future. Our choices matter a great deal, as individuals and through our organizations and institutions. Business, in particular, will play a large role in where the world goes. Employees, customers, and even investors increasingly demand that the role of business be a positive one. 

Look, we could all just wait and see where these historic waves take us. But I prefer that we all work proactively to ensure that a better, thriving future is the one we choose.

About the Author

Andrew Winston is founder of Winston Eco-Strategies and an adviser to multinationals on how they can navigate humanity’s biggest challenges and profit from solving them. He is the coauthor of the international best seller Green to Gold and the author of the popular book The Big Pivot: Radically Practical Strategies for a Hotter, Scarcer, and More Open World. He tweets @andrewwinston.

a database of reports globally published by many institutions.

Global Trends and Future Scenarios

IDB InterAmerican Development Bank

Key Institutions doing Global Scenarios, Trends, and Futures analysis

Shell Scenarios

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios.html

HP Mega Trends

https://hpmegatrends.com

World Economic Forum

Global Risks Report

https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020

US DNI NIC Global Trends

Paradox of Progress

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends-home

https://www.dni.gov/index.php/digital-extras/previous-reports

Atlantic Council

Global Risks 2035 Update

Decline or New Renaissance?

Mathew J. Burrows 2019

UK MOD Global Strategic Trends
EY Mega Trends

Megatrends 2020 and beyond

https://www.ey.com/en_gl/megatrends

OECD

The Long View: Scenarios for the world economy to 2060

http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/scenarios-for-the-world-economy-to-2060.htm

EU Parliament
World Bank

The Future is Now: Scenarios to 2025 and Beyond

J. Warren Evans

https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/full/10.1596/978-1-4648-0307-9_ch4

International Monetary Fund

World Economic Outlook

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO

World Resources Institute

https://www.wri.org/publication/which-world-scenarios-21st-century

United Nations

McKinsey Global Institute

MGI in 2019

Highlights of our research this year

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Innovation/Ten%20highlights%20from%20our%202019%20research/MGI-in-2019-A-compendium-of-our-research-this-year-vF.ashx

McKinsey and Company

The Use and Abuse of Scenarios

https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-use-and-abuse-of-scenarios

McKinsey Special Collections
Trends and global forces

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Strategy%20and%20Corporate%20Finance/Our%20Insights/Strategy%20and%20corporate%20finance%20special%20collection/Final%20PDFs/McKinsey-Special-Collections_Trends-and-global-forces.ashx

Shifting tides: Global economic scenarios for 2015–25

https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/shifting-tides-global-economic-scenarios-for-2015-25

Boston Consulting Group BCG

Have you future Proofed your strategy?

APRIL 17, 2020 By Alan InyHans KuipersEnrique Rueda-Sabater, and Christian Haakonsen

https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/four-scenarios-assess-business-resilience

International Food Policy Research Institute IFPRI

Global food projections to 2020 

emerging trends and alternative futures

https://www.ifpri.org/publication/global-food-projections-2020

World Energy Council

WORLD ENERGY SCENARIOS: COMPOSING ENERGY FUTURES TO 2050

https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/entry/world-energy-scenarios-composing-energy-futures-to-2050

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

A Perspective on the Future of Energy: Scenarios, Trends, and Global Points of View

Millienium Project

THE MILLENNIUM PROJECT

The Institute for the Future

My Related Posts

Shell Oil’s Scenarios: Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning for the Future

Strategy | Strategic Management | Strategic Planning | Strategic Thinking

Art of Long View: Future, Uncertainty and Scenario Planning

On Anticipation: Going Beyond Forecasts and Scenarios

HP’s Megatrends

Clock of the Long Now: Time and Responsibility

History of Operations Research

Profiles in Operations Research

Jay W. Forrester and System Dynamics

Water | Food | Energy | Nexus: Mega Trends and Scenarios for the Future

Short term Thinking in Investment Decisions of Businesses and Financial Markets

The Origins and History of Management Consulting

Multilevel Approach to Research in Organizations

Hierarchical Planning: Integration of Strategy, Planning, Scheduling, and Execution

Networks and Hierarchies

Hierarchy Theory in Biology, Ecology and Evolution

Systems Biology: Biological Networks, Network Motifs, Switches and Oscillators

Growth and Form in Nature: Power Laws and Fractals

Shapes and Patterns in Nature

Systems View of Life: A Synthesis by Fritjof Capra

Multiplex Financial Networks

Boundaries and Networks

Key Sources of Research

Future Population Growth

by Max Roser

Our World in Data

This article was first published in 2014. It was last revised in November 2019.

https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth

Future Studies

Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futures_studies

Global Foresight 2050 – Six global scenarios and implications for the forest sector 

AUTHORS: Sten Nilsson, Fredrik Ingemarson
PUBLISHED: 2017, Uppsala
PUBLISHER: Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU)

An overview of global energy scenarios by 2040: identifying the driving forces using cross‑impact analysis method

S. Ghasemian1 · A. Faridzad1 · P. Abbaszadeh2 · A. Taklif1 · A. Ghasemi1 · R. Hafezi3

Received: 27 November 2019 / Revised: 11 March 2020 / Accepted: 6 April 2020

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13762-020-02738-5

Learning from the Future

How to make robust strategy in times of deep uncertainty 

From the Magazine (July–August 2020)

https://hbr.org/2020/07/learning-from-the-future

Why the Social Sector Needs Scenario Planning Now

BCG

OCTOBER 01, 2020 

https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2020/why-social-sector-needs-scenario-planning

Future Worlds

PA Consulting

https://www.paconsulting.com/insights/2020/futureworlds/

Directions in Scenario Planning Literature – A Review of the Past Decades

Celeste Amorim Varuma, Carla Meloa
aDepartment of Economics, Management and Industrial Engineering, University of Aveiro,

Campus Universitário de Santiago, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal

The Century Ahead:
Four Global Scenarios

Christi Electris, Paul Raskin, Rich Rosen, and John Stutz

Tellus

https://greattransition.org

Four Scenarios for Geopolitical Order in 2025-2030: What Will Great Power Competition Look Like?

September 16, 2020

CSIS

https://www.csis.org/analysis/four-scenarios-geopolitical-order-2025-2030-what-will-great-power-competition-look

Futurology Why it’s worth reading crazy-sounding scenarios about the future

Speculating about the future can make it easier to respond to unexpected events

Jul 6th 2019

Economist

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/07/06/why-its-worth-reading-crazy-sounding-scenarios-about-the-future

THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY

Scenarios for the United States in 2030

Johanna Zmud, Liisa Ecola, Peter Phleps, Irene Feige

Rand

Future energy: In search of a scenario reflecting current and future pressures and trends

Jennifer Morris, David Hone, Martin Haigh, Andrei Sokolov and Sergey Paltsev

November 2020

MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change

2018 Food, Water, Energy and Climate Outlook 

MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change

Consensus Forecasts

Global Outlook 2020 – 2030

The Conference Board

Global Economic Outlook

https://www.conference-board.org/topics/global-economic-outlook

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus

A new approach in support of food security and sustainable agriculture

FAO

The Food Water Energy Nexus

UNECE

https://www.unece.org/env/water/nexus

Water, Food and Energy Nexus in Asia and the Pacific

UNESCAP

Developing the Pardee RAND Food-Energy-Water Security Index

Toward a Global Standardized, Quantitative, and Transparent Resource Assessment

by Henry H. WillisDavid G. GrovesJeanne S. RingelZhimin MaoShira EfronMichele Abbott

RAND

https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL165.html

Introduction to the water-energy nexus

Article — 23 March 2020

IEA

https://www.iea.org/articles/introduction-to-water-and-energy

Mining & Metals Scenarios to 2030

McKinsey

WEF

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/Metals%20and%20Mining/PDFs/mining_metals_scenarios.aspx

The Long View: Scenarios for the world economy to 2060

OECD

http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/scenarios-for-the-world-economy-to-2060.htm

Risk, Resilience, and Alternative Futures: Scenario-building at the World Economic Forum

Christina Garsten, Adrienne Sörbom

CBS

https://research.cbs.dk/en/publications/risk-resilience-and-alternative-futures-scenario-building-at-the-

If only we knew. With scenario planning, we do. Here’s how to prepare better for the next crisis

WEF

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/scenario-planning-is-the-what-if-in-business-here-s-how-it-works/

Energy and Climate Scenarios

IHS Markit

https://ihsmarkit.com/products/energy-climate-scenarios.html

The World in 2030: Nine Megatrends to Watch

Andrew S. Winston 

May 07, 2019

MIT Sloan Review

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-world-in-2030-nine-megatrends-to-watch/

The future of capitalism: Trends, scenarios and prospects for the future

Gerard Delanty

First Published January 30, 2019 

Journal of Classical Sociology

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1468795X18810569

EYQ Mega Trends

Year 2020 Mega Trends

https://www.ey.com/en_gl/megatrends

Year 2016 Megatrends

Year 2018 Megatrends

Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios Analysis

Highlights from the report February 2017

Deloitte and WEF

Global Risks 2035: The Search for a New Normal

Atlantic Council

2016

Vision 2040: Global Scenarios for the Oil and Gas Industry

Deloitte

The future of Asia

Asian flows and networks are defining the next phase of globalization

MGI 2020

Shell Oil’s Scenarios: Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning for the Future

Shell Oil’s Scenarios: Strategic Foresight and Scenario Planning for the Future

 

 

Why Scenarios

  • World is complex (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Ecological)
  • Future is Uncertain (Critical Uncertainties)
  • Weak Signals
  • Forecasts are wrong
  • Predetermined elements ( Structure given, only variables are changing)
  • Possibility vs Probability Space
  • Scenarios are needed – Global, Specific, Exploratory, Decision
  • To Refine World Views/Mental Models/Re-perceiving/Learning/Right Brain
  • Links to Strategy and Decisions
  • Options Planning
  • Strategic Vision
  • Competitive Positioning
  • Actions and Execution

 

Please watch this video: Pierre Wack on Scenario Planning at Shell

http://oxfordfutures.sbs.ox.ac.uk/pierre-wack-memorial-library/video/index.html

 

Please see my related posts:

Art of Long View: Future, Uncertainty and Scenario Planning

Water | Food | Energy | Nexus: Mega Trends and Scenarios for the Future

Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber

Systems and Organizational Cybernetics

Semiotics, Bio-Semiotics and Cyber Semiotics

Meta Integral Theories: Integral Theory, Critical Realism, and Complex Thought

Integral Philosophy of the Rg Veda: Four Dimensional Man

 

 

 

 

Key Sources for Research:

 

 

Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide

2008

Shell

 

Click to access shell-scenarios-explorersguide.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

Foundations of Scenario Planning

The Story of Pierre Wack

By Thomas J Chermack
2017

 

https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781317279402

The scenario approach to possible futures for oil and natural gas

 

Jeremy Bentham

Shell

2014

 

https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421513008124/1-s2.0-S0301421513008124-main.pdf?_tid=1967f236-80f8-4756-854d-fb8fe083a1b7&acdnat=1526180172_f00c5f0478a3e7970e9187a000aae807

https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Strategy%20and%20Corporate%20Finance/Our%20Insights/The%20use%20and%20abuse%20of%20scenarios/The%20use%20and%20abuse%20of%20scenarios.ashx

 

Scenarios as a Tool for the 21st Century

 

Ged Davis

Shell

 

Click to access davis_how_does_shell_do_scenarios.pdf

 

Plotting Your Scenarios

Jay Ogilvy and Peter Schwartz

 

Click to access plotting_your_scenarios.pdf

 

 

Advantages and disadvantages of scenario approaches for strategic foresight

Dana Mietzner and Guido Reger

2005

 

Click to access stragegicforesight2005.pdf

 

 

 

Chapter 4
Scenario development: a typology of approaches

by
Philip van Notten

Click to access 37246431.pdf

 

 

Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead

FROM THE SEPTEMBER 1985 ISSUE

https://hbr.org/1985/09/scenarios-uncharted-waters-ahead?referral=03758&cm_vc=rr_item_page.top_right

 

 

 

Living in the Futures

FROM THE MAY 2013 ISSUE

https://hbr.org/2013/05/living-in-the-futures

Click to access Link-14.pdf

 

 

 

 

Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids

FROM THE NOVEMBER 1985 ISSUE

Scenario Planning

Economist

 

https://www.economist.com/node/12000755

Inside Oil Giant Shell’s Race to Remake Itself For a Low-Price World

Fortune

http://fortune.com/2018/01/24/royal-dutch-shell-lower-oil-prices/

 

 

 

 

The Man Who Saw the Future

As the pace of change in business accelerates, the legacy of Pierre Wack, the father of scenario planning, is more relevant than ever.

Oil scenarios for long-term business planning: Royal Dutch Shell and generative explanation, 1960-2010

Michael Jefferson and Vlasios Voudouris

 

Click to access JeffersonVoudouris.pdf

 

 

the scenarios question

Andrew Curry

 

Click to access the-scenarios-question.pdf

 

 

 

 

Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking

Paul J.H. Schoemaker
MIT Sloan Review

 

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/scenario-planning-a-tool-for-strategic-thinking/

Click to access Scenario-Planning-A-Tool-for-Strategic-Thinking.pdf

 

 

Vision 2040

Global scenarios for the oil and gas industry

 

Deloitte

Click to access ru_er_vision2040_eng.pdf

 

 

 

The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning

 

Ron Bradfield, George Wright, George Burt, George Cairns, Kees Van Der Heijden

 

2005

Click to access read_Bradfield-Origins-and-Evolution-of-Scenerio-Techniques.pdf

 

 

 

 

Scenario Planning and Strategic Forecasting

Jay Ogilvy

Forbes

2015

https://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2015/01/08/scenario-planning-and-strategic-forecasting/2/

 

 

 

Scenarios Practices: In Search of Theory

Angela Wilkinson

2009

 

Click to access 0620a938a0d2f66266e9ce52c8a7c5ce1d09.pdf

 

 

 

Scenario Planning

UK Govenment

 

Click to access foresight_scenario_planning.pdf

 

 Definitions and Outcome Variables of Scenario Planning

 

THOMAS J. CHERMACK

SUSAN A. LYNHAM

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1010.1821&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

Rafael Ramirez (Oxford University)

Cynthia Selin (Arizona State University)

 

Click to access ACCEPTED__Plausibility_and_Probability_in_Scenario_Planning_March_24_2013.pdf

Click to access ACCEPTED_Plausibility_and_Probability_in_Scenario_Planning_March_24_2013.pdf

 

 

 

How to Build Scenarios Planning for “long fuse, big bang” problems in an era of uncertainty.

BY LAWRENCE WILKINSON

 

Click to access Wilkinson%20on%20scenarios_Martin%20B.pdf

 

 

 

 

Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios Analysis

WEF

2017

 

Click to access WEF_FSA_FutureofGlobalFoodSystems.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls

 

MICHEL GODET

 

Click to access art_of_scenarios.pdf

 

 

 

 

Scenario-Based Strategic Planning in Times of Tumultuous Change

AT Kearney

https://www.atkearney.de/documents/10192/376745/Scenario-Based_Strategic_Planning_in_Times_of_Tumultuous_Change.pdf/0012fe94-4038-449b-8423-bc81a3dba1a5

 

 

 

SHELL SCENARIOS

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios.html

 

 

WHAT ARE SHELL SCENARIOS?

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/what-are-scenarios.html

 

 

SKY SCENARIO

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/shell-scenario-sky.html

 

 

 

EARLIER SCENARIOS

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/new-lenses-on-the-future/earlier-scenarios.html

 

NEW LENS ON THE FUTURE

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/new-lenses-on-the-future.html

 

 

SHELL SCENARIOS ENERGY MODELS

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/shell-scenarios-energy-models.html

 

 

 

SHELL SCENARIOS IN FILM

 

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/shell-scenarios-in-film.html

 

 

40 Years of Shell Scenarios

Click to access shell-scenarios-40yearsbook080213.pdf

 

 

 

Understanding the Stress Nexus

 

Click to access stress-nexus-booklet.pdf

 

 

 

SHELL ENERGY TRANSITION REPORT

 

Click to access web-shell-energy-transition-report.pdf

 

 

MEET THE SHELL SCENARIOS TEAM

https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/meet-the-shell-scenarios-team.html

 

 

 

SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS

https://www.shell.com/sustainability/sustainability-reporting-and-performance-data/sustainability-reports.html

 

 

 

Scenario planning resources

https://people.well.com/user/mb/scenario_planning/

 

 

HOW CAN SCENARIOS SHAPE DECISION MAKING?

Dr. John W. Selsky

2013

 

Click to access Scenarios%20Decision%20Making-Berlin.pdf

 

 

 

PROFESSIONAL DREAMERS:

THE PAST IN THE FUTURE OF SCENARIO PLANNING

By Cynthia Selin, Arizona State University

 

2007

Click to access selin_2007_professional_dreamers.pdf

 

 

 

 

An Introduction to Scenario Thinking

“ We cannot predict the future, but we must act!”

 

By Eric Best

 

Click to access An-Introduction-to-Secnario-Thinking.pdf

 

 

the future of futures

A Curry

 

Click to access FutureOfFutures_APF_ebook_E2.pdf

 

 

We are grateful to Cynthia Selin and Napier Collyns for compiling this bibliography.

 

Click to access donmichael_bibliography.pdf

 

 

 

 

In Memory of Pierre Wack

by Napier Collyns and Hardin Tibbs

Netview

GBN

 

Click to access Pierre+Wack+1922-1997+.pdf

 

 

 

 

Re-reading Pierre Wack on scenarios

A Curry

2017

https://thenextwavefutures.wordpress.com/2017/12/09/pierre-wack-on-scenarios-shell/

 

 

 

Scenario Planning Resources

Thinking Futures

https://thinkingfutures.net/scenario-planning-resources/

 

 

 

Journal of Futures Studies

http://jfsdigital.org

 

 

 WHAT IF? THE ART OF SCENARIO

THINKING FOR NONPROFITS

 

Click to access What_if-Art_of_Scenario_Thinking_for_NonProfits.pdf

 

 

Oxford Futures Library unveils rare footage of scenarios planning pioneer Pierre Wack

https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/school/news/oxford-futures-library-unveils-rare-footage-scenarios-planning-pioneer-pierre-wack

 

 

Should Probabilities Be Used with Scenarios?

 

Stephen M. Millett

Click to access f9cef0b618c480312802fbb78e49bd69fa83.pdf

GBN (Global Business Network)

Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Business_Network

Understanding Trade in Intermediate Goods

Understanding Trade in Intermediate Goods

 

One of the key source of International Trade statistics is a document published by the UNCTAD since 2013:

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade

Please see references below to access reports for 2015 and 2016.

 

In 2014, out of USD 18.5 trillion in global trade, about USD 8 trillion was in intermediate goods.

 

From TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND SERVICES

Introduction: the international dimension of the exchange of intermediate inputs

1. Trade in intermediate inputs has been steadily growing over the last decade. However, despite the internationalisation of production and the increasing importance of outsourcing and foreign investment, some studies have found little rise in intermediate goods trade as a share of total trade1. More than half of goods trade is however made up of intermediate inputs and trade in services is even more of an intermediate type with about three quarters of trade flows being comprised of intermediate services. Trade in intermediate goods and services thus deserves special attention from trade policymakers and so far few studies have investigated how it differs from trade in consumption goods or services.

2. An intermediate good can be defined as an input to the production process that has itself been produced and, unlike capital, is used up in production3. The difference between intermediate and capital goods lies in the latter entering as a fixed asset in the production process. Like any primary factor (such as labour, land, or natural resources) capital is used but not used up in the production process4. On the contrary, an intermediate good is used, often transformed, and incorporated in the final output. As an input, an intermediate good has itself been produced and is hence defined in contrast to a primary input. As an output, an intermediate good is used to produce other goods (or services) contrary to a final good which is consumed and can be referred to as a “consumption good”.

3. Intermediate inputs are not restricted to material goods; they can also consist of services. Thelatter can be potentially used as an input to any sector of the economy; that is for the production of the same, or other services, as well as manufacturing goods. Symmetrically, manufacturing goods can be potentially used to produce the same, or other manufacturing goods, as well as services.

4. An important question we can ask is how to identify inputs among all goods and services produced in an economy. Many types of goods can be easily distinguished as inputs, when their use excludes them from final consumption. Notable examples include chemical substances, construction materials, or business services. The exact same type of good used as an input to some production process can however be destined to consumption. For instance, oranges can be sold to households as a final good, as well as to a factory as an input for food preparation. Telecommunication services can be sold to individuals or to business services firms as an intermediate input for their output. The United Nations distinguish commodities in each basic heading on the basis of the main end-use (United Nations, 2007). It is however recognized that many commodities that are traded internationally may be put to a variety of uses. Other methodologies involve the use of input-output (I-O) tables to distinguish between intermediate and consumption goods.

5. The importance of intermediate goods and services in the economy and trade is associated with a number of developments in the last decades. Growth and increased sophistication of production has given birth to strategies involving fragmentation and reorganisation of firm’s activities, both in terms of ownership boundaries, as in terms of the location for production. In what follows, the international dimension of the exchange of intermediate goods and services is explored by clarifying terms and concepts as well as the links between trade in intermediate inputs and FDI.

From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

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From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

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From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

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From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

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From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

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From Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

Trade networks relating to global value chains have evolved during the last 10 years. In 2004, the East Asian production network was still in its infancy. Most trade flows of parts and components concerned the USA and the European Union, with a number of other countries loosely connected with these two main hubs. As of 2014 trade of parts and components was much more developed. The current state is characterized not only by the prominent role of China, but also by a much more tightly integrated network with a much larger number of countries many of which have multiple connections to different hubs.

From Mapping Global Value Chains: Intermediate Goods Trade and Structural Change in the World Economy

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Key sources of Research:

 

TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND SERVICES

OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 93
by Sébastien Miroudot, Rainer Lanz and Alexandros Ragoussis

2009

Click to access 44056524.pdf

 

 

An Essay on Intra-Industry Trade in Intermediate Goods

Rosanna Pittiglio

2014

Click to access ME_2014051916452646.pdf

 

 

The Rise of International Supply Chains: Implications for Global Trade

Click to access GETR_Chapter1.2.pdf

 

 

 

Growing Trade in Intermediate Goods: Outsourcing, Global Sourcing or Increasing
Importance of MNE Networks?

by
Jörn Kleinert
October 2000

Click to access kap1006.pdf

 

 

 

Imported Inputs and the Gains from Trade

Ananth Ramanarayanan
University of Western Ontario
September, 2014

https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/index.php/index/research/downloadSeminarPaper/49816

 

 

 

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2015

Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Click to access ditctab2015d1_en.pdf

 

 

 

Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2016

Division on International Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Click to access ditctab2016d3_en.pdf

 

 

Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy

Robert C. Feenstra
Revised, April 1998

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.39.7178&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

OECD, WTO and World Bank Group
Report prepared for submission to the G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Sydney, Australia, 19 July 2014

Click to access gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf

 

 

Trade in Value Added: Concepts, Estimation and Analysis

Marko Javorsek* and Ignacio Camacho

20015

Click to access AWP150Trade%20in%20Value%20Added.pdf

 

 

The Similarities and Differences among Three Major Inter-Country Input-Output Databases and their Implications for Trade in Value-Added Estimates

Lin Jones and Zhi Wang, United States International Trade Commission Li Xin, Beijing Normal University and Peking University Christophe Degain, World Trade Organization

December, 2014

Click to access ec201412b.pdf

 

 

Advanced Topics in Trade
Lecture 9 – Multinational Firms and Foreign Direct Investment

Heiwai Tang – SAIS
April 8, 2015

Click to access lecture_8_new.pdf

 

 

Efforts to Measure Trade in Value-Added and Map Global Value Chains: A Guide

Andrew Reamer

May 29, 2014

Click to access Reamer_ISA_Trade_in_Value_Added_05-29-2014.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains for Value Added and Intermediate Goods in Asia

N Shrestha

20015

Click to access CESSA%20WP%202015-07.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains: The New Reality of International Trade

Sherry Stephenson
December 2013

Click to access E15-GVCs-Stephenson-Final.pdf

 

 

Asia and Global Production Networks Implications for Trade, Incomes and Economic Vulnerability

Benno Ferrarini

David Hummels

20014

Click to access asia-and-global-production-networks.pdf

 

 

Participation of Developing Countries in Global Value Chains:
Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policies

by
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Alexandros Ragoussis
and Cristian Ugarte

Click to access OECD_Trade_Policy_Papers_179.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: SURVEYING DRIVERS, MEASURES AND IMPACTS

João Amador
Sónia Cabral

2014

Click to access wp20143.pdf

 

World Intermediate goods Exports By Country and Region

2014

WITS World International Trade Statistics

http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/WLD/Year/2014/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/all/Product/UNCTAD-SoP2

 

 

Trade in global value chains

2013

WTO

Click to access its13_highlights4_e.pdf

 

 

The Rise of Trade in Intermediates: Policy Implications

  • February 10, 2011

http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/02/10/rise-of-trade-in-intermediates-policy-implications-pub-42578

 

 

International trade with intermediate and final goods under economic crisis

Elżbieta Czarny, Warsaw School of Economics
Paweł Folfas, Warsaw School of Economics
Katarzyna Śledziewska, Warsaw University

Click to access 375.pdf

 

 

 

Trade in Intermediate Goods: Implications for Productivity and Welfare in Korea

Young Gui Kim

Hak K. PYO

Date Written: December 30, 2016

 

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929118

 

 

Growing Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico

BY CHRISTOPHER WILSON

Click to access growing_together_economic_ties_between_the_united_states_and_mexico.pdf

 

 

Mapping Global Value Chains: Intermediate Goods Trade and Structural Change in the World Economy

Timothy J. Sturgeon
Olga Memedovic

Click to access WP%2005%20Mapping%20Glocal%20Value%20Chains.pdf

 

India’s Intermediate Goods Trade in the Inter Regional Value Chain:
An examination based on Trade data and Input Output Analysis

Simi Thambi

Click to access 10_2%20fp.pdf

 

Global Supply Chains

Click to access pub4253_2.pdf

 

 

Global value chains in a changing world

Edited by Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low

Click to access aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf

 

Understanding Global OTC Foreign Exchange (FX) Market

Understanding Global OTC Foreign Exchange (FX) Market

 

OTC FX Market is biggest market in the world.  About 5.1 trillion USD are traded in this market every day.

Originally all FX transactions were for cross border trades in goods and services, but later on developments led to speculative investments activities in foreign currencies.

OTC FX Market is decentralized.  It means there is no exchange on which currencies are traded. Interbank market in FX is among dealer banks.  Dealer Banks are the biggest global banks.  Top 10 banks who trade in FX have total trade volume of 67%.

USD is the dominant currency in global FX market.  UK is the biggest location for FX trading followed by USA and Singapore.  Hong Kong SAR and Japan are other important FX trading centers.

Markets operate 24/7 unlike other financial markets which open and close at certain times.

Bank of International Settlement publishes its triennial survey of global FX markets.  2016 survey showed 5.1 trillion USD/day FX turnover down from 5.3 T/Day back in 2013 survey.  Markets peaked in September of 2014 at 6.5 Trillion USD/day.  Since then the trend is declining.  De-risking by global banks, decline in global trade are cited as main reasons for decline.  Will attempt to understand this issue at a later date.

 

Following Issues emerge from this post but are not discussed here in detail.

  • Retail FX Market
  • Algorithmic Trading
  • Non Bank High Frequency Liquidity Providers
  • FX  Prime Brokerage
  • Financial Stability in OTC Market – Case for CCP
  • China RMB Internationalization
  • Clearing and Settlement in FX Markets – CLS Bank and CLSNet
  • Liquidity for FX trades – Funding and Market Liquidity

 

Highlights from the 2016 Triennial Survey of turnover in OTC foreign exchange markets:

  •   Trading in foreign exchange markets averaged $5.1 trillion per day in April 2016. This is down from $5.4 trillion in April 2013, a month which had seen heightened activity in Japanese yen against the background of monetary policy developments at that time.
  •   For first time since 2001, spot turnover declined. Spot transactions fell to $1.7 trillion per day in April 2016 from $2.0 trillion in 2013. In contrast, the turnover of FX swaps rose further, reaching $2.4 trillion per day in April 2016. This rise was driven in large part by increased trading of FX swaps involving yen.
  •   The US dollar remained the dominant vehicle currency, being on one side of 88% of all trades in April 2016. The euro, yen and Australian dollar all lost market share. In contrast, many emerging market currencies increased their share. The renminbi doubled its share, to 4%, to become the world’s eighth most actively traded currency and the most actively traded emerging market currency, overtaking the Mexican peso. The rise in the share of renminbi was primarily due to the increase in trading against the US dollar. In April 2016, as much as 95% of renminbi trading volume was against the US dollar.
  •   The share of trading between reporting dealers grew over the three-year period, accounting for 42% of turnover in April 2016, compared with 39% in April 2013. Banks other than reporting dealers accounted for a further 22% of turnover. Institutional investors were the third largest group of counterparties in FX markets, at 16%.
  •   In April 2016, sales desks in five countries – the United Kingdom, the United States, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and Japan – intermediated 77% of foreign exchange trading, up from 75% in April 2013 and 71% in April 2010.

 

Interbank (OTC) Market Infrastructure and Institutions

  • Banks
  • Non Banks
  • Exchanges

 

Top 10 Banks in FX

 

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From All change in the 2016 Euromoney FX rankings

Citi holds on to the top ranking in this year’s Euromoney foreign exchange rankings, but elsewhere there have been unprecedented shifts.

Structural changes to the markets, management upheaval among many big banks, new non-bank entrants and lack of volumes and volatility have seemingly levelled the playing field among the industry’s biggest firms.

The biggest change in the rankings this year is the decline of the combined market share of the top five global banks. Their market share in the survey peaked in 2009 at 61.5% and was still above 60% as recently as 2014.

This year the top five banks account for just 44.7% of total volume. The hopes of many global FX heads and their investment bank bosses – that the share of the big banks would rise inexorably as the market became more automated and that they would be able to benefit from oligopolistic pricing power as a result – now seem like distant and deluded dreams.

One FX veteran tells Euromoney that the decline of the top five banks’ combined market share “is exactly what the regulators would want in a market they continue to keep a very close eye on.”

While the market share of the top 10 FX houses overall also declines, from over 75% last year to just 66% this year, the fall is entirely due to the performance of the top five banks. The banks ranked from sixth to 10th place overall produced a combined market share of 22%, roughly in line with the last five years of the survey and considerably higher than the 14% they managed in 2008.

Citi actually extends its lead over the second-placed bank in the survey, which market participants regard as the most accurate reflection of client-based activity in the global foreign exchange markets, to more than four percentage points – even though the bank’s own market share declined by more than three percentage points, from 16.11% in the 2015 survey to 12.91% of trading in 2016.

That winning market share is the lowest for any top-ranked bank in the survey since UBS won the survey in 2004.

Citi maintained its leadership overall in important product areas such as spot/forwards and swaps, as well as in the key real money and bank client categories. It rises one place this year to win in corporates and overall electronic market share, although it falls to third overall for options.

One big story in this year’s rankings is the decline of Deutsche Bank. It was once the undisputed leader in global foreign exchange, losing the top position in the Euromoney rankings three years ago after nearly a decade of dominance.

While new group CEO John Cryan has gone out of his way both publicly and privately to describe the FX business as one of the beleaguered bank’s crown jewels, the days when Deutsche Bank was able to secure an overall market share of more than 20% (as recently as 2009) are long gone.

In the latest set of rankings, Deutsche falls from second to fourth place overall: its market share of 7.86% is almost half what it was a year ago. Deutsche’s decline is widespread, and competitors say has been driven in part by the bank cutting back on the number of clients it covers. It falls from second to fifth in spot/forward; from second to eighth among real money clients and loses top spot among bank clients. It remains the leading overall options house.

Perhaps the most surprising fall of all is in its overall electronic market share. Deutsche’s Autobahn system revolutionized global FX trading and in banner years accounted for more than a quarter of all electronic trading. This year, Deutsche can only manage fourth place in e-market share, from holding the top ranking last year, and its share has fallen from 17.5% to 8.73%.

Two banks overtake Deutsche to move into the top three overall, but the similarities end there: the two banks in question have very different recent histories in global foreign exchange.

JPMorgan jumps to second place in the survey, with a market share of 8.77%, up from fourth place with 7.65% last year. For many years, competitors have said that JPMorgan has failed to punch its weight in FX; it has typically ranked outside the top five overall banks in the Euromoney survey for the last decade. Those accusations have less weight now, even though they have been replaced by rumours about the bank’s competitive pricing strategy.

The US bank rises across a range of categories. Its most notable successes are winning the leveraged fund category with a lead over second-placed UBS of almost eight percentage points and a market share of more than 18%; and jumping from fifth to second place in overall electronic trading. JPMorgan’s one poor ranking is now in options, where it comes a lowly eighth.

UBS returns to the top three global FX banks overall this year. A winner back in 2004, it has been outside the top three since 2009, and last challenged for the top spot overall a year earlier, when its market share of almost 16% was only beaten by Deutsche. Last year it fell to fifth place, its worst performance in a decade, with a market share of 7.3%.

Given the bank’s leadership has spent the last few years de-emphasizing the role of its investment bank, some competitors believed UBS was on a long, slow decline in FX.

But, quietly and consistently, UBS’s markets business has been recalibrating to the new capital and markets environment, as well as maintaining a commitment to best-in-class electronic platforms. Its overall market share rises to 8.76%; and it breaks into the top three overall in spot/forward, swaps, electronic market share and for bank clients. Like JPMorgan, it is a laggard in options, where it ranks seventh.

JPMorgan and UBS have one other important thing in common: while other banks have lost entire benches of senior management from their FX teams in recent years, JPMorgan and UBS have been relatively stable.

At the former, Troy Rohrbach has overseen the FX business since 2005 (he now also runs rates and public finance globally); at UBS, Chris Murphy and George Athanasopoulos, the global co-heads of FX, rates and credit, both joined the bank more than five years ago and have jointly run the division since 2013. Leadership, it seems, does count.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch continues its steady rise up the rankings of recent years, from a nadir of 12th place from 2009 to 2012. It finally breaks into the top five global FX houses overall, up from sixth place last year.

BAML jumped up the rankings into the top five for corporates and real money accounts, and gained ground in both swaps and options – in the latter, it ranks second globally. But BAML still has work to do in the electronic market, where its overall ranking fell from sixth to seventh place. Other US banks also performed well.

Goldman Sachs rose from ninth to seventh overall and Morgan Stanley jumped three places to break back into the top 10.

It has not been a good year in FX for Barclays. Perhaps the bank’s decision to not have a global head of foreign exchange has backfired. The UK-cum-transatlantic bank dropped from third place overall to sixth, and its market share from 8.11% to 5.67%.

Barclays slipped three places to seventh in spot/forward, four places to seventh in swaps and three places to ninth in options. Among client groups, its biggest reversal came among real money accounts, falling from fourth place last year to outside the top 10.

HSBC has also had a disappointing year, falling from seventh to eighth place overall. It also loses its top ranking among corporates last year, falling out of the top five of that client category altogether. Electronic trading remains the bank’s weakest link, and may even be getting weaker, as the bank falls to ninth place in overall e-market share.

New phenomenon

Banks have always risen and fallen in the Euromoney rankings over the last 40 years, but this year sees a new phenomenon – the advent of the non-bank liquidity provider. Leading the way is XTX Markets, a spin-off of GSA Capital, whose co-CEO Zar Amrolia was a frequent winner of the Euromoney FX rankings in his previous role as head of Deutsche Bank’s FX business.

In its first year of eligibility, the spot-only XTX makes a stunning debut: ninth place in the overall rankings with a market share of 3.87%; fourth in spot/forwards; fifth for bank clients; third for FX trading platforms; fifth overall for e-market share; and third for electronic trading of spot, ahead of Deutsche Bank with a market share of more than 10%.

XTX is the leader, but not the only non-bank entrant to the survey. Tower Research Capital, Jump Trading, Virtu Financial, Lucid Markets and Citadel Securities all make the top 50 overall market share rankings.

XTX’s ninth place overall looks like a line in the sand for the FX markets. The banks above it are, for the most part, the remaining price-makers; the banks below often price-takers, with the ability to make markets in particular currencies or products.

Many of the banks ranked outside the top 10 overall this year are understood to be sourcing liquidity from non-bank providers such as XTX, Tower and Jump. They look set to gain more market share in the future, helped by new technology, more defined business models and a lower-cost infrastructure base than the traditional FX banks. They could look to build capability in forwards and other markets in the near future.

Among multi-dealer platforms, Thomson Reuters – through its FXall service – remains the clear leader with a 30% market share, although its margin over second-ranked FXConnect almost halved. The big riser among MDPs was third-ranked HotspotFXi, which increased its market share from less than 7% to almost 18% this year.

Total volumes in the Euromoney FX survey came in at almost $95 trillion, while the number of votes held steady compared with last year at around 3,500 clients. That represents a volume fall of around 23% on last year, in line with market expectations.

 

 

Electronic FX platforms 

There are three types of trading platforms.

  • Interdealer
  • Multidealer
  • Singledealer

 

Trading platforms can be divided into three different types:

  • Inter-dealer electronic broking platforms. These platforms were developed in the 1990s and are regarded, according to the Bank for international Settlements (BiS, 2010), as the dominant source of interbank liquidity on the foreign exchange market. They mediate information on various market makers’ indicative prices. EBS and Reuters, based in London, are the two dominant platforms within this category.
  • Multi-bank platforms. These platforms are also known as multi-bank ECNs (electronic communication networks). They were created in the first decade of this century and resemble the previous category in that they mediate several market makers’ prices. one difference is that they have freer access regulations for market makers, which makes it easier for market makers to join these platforms. Another difference is that they are largely used outside the interbank market, which is to say by market participants that are not banks. The US platforms Fx All, currenex, Hotspot Fx, State Street and Fx connect are examples of this type of trading platform. There are also platforms that provide standardised algorithmic trading functions as a service. currenex is one such platform.
  • Single-bank platforms. This type of platform is run by an individual bank. The platform mediates only the individual bank’s own prices for various currency pairs, unlike the trading platforms discussed above, which mediate several market makers’ prices. in Sweden, SeB has a platform of this type, SeB Trading Station. other examples of banks with such platforms are JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank and citibank.

 

A. Multi Dealer Platforms

J.P. Morgan has significantly increased its footprint on these platforms over the past couple of years and now ranks first for penetration globally, followed closely by Citi. Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank and HSBC round out the top five most prominent banks on MDPs.

B. Single Dealer Platforms

While multi-dealer systems are clearly on the rise, an average of more than 20% of trading volume of banks and hedge funds is still executed on single-bank platforms. Barclays, Citi and Deutsche Bank are the clear top three most actively used single-dealer platforms globally.

“Proprietary platforms give banks a means of retaining profitable trading volumes, so dealers are expanding these systems to provide a range of liquidity choices that enable clients to access the market in a variety of ways, including disclosed and non-disclosed liquidity, agency and principal trades, and links to exchange-based execution,” says Greenwich Associates Managing Director Woody Canaday.

C. Algorithmic Trading

Dealers are also in the early days of what promises to be an all-out arms race in algorithmic trading. Currently only 13% of top-tier FX customers use algorithmic trading models. However, that share approaches one-quarter among the market’s biggest buy-side participants and 30% among hedge funds.

Two trends suggest that algorithmic trading is gaining traction in FX. First, market participants that use algo-rithmic models are tapping an expanding number of dealers for algorithms. Second, current users are routing growing shares of trading volume through the models, from 25% in 2014 to 28% in 2015. Hedge funds that trade algorithmically now use these models for about half of total trading volume.

 

A.  Inter-dealer electronic broking platforms

  • Reuters Dealing 3000
  • ICAP EBS

EBS is the primary trading venue for EUR/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/JPY, USD/CHF, EUR/CHF and USD/CNH.

Thomson Reuters Matching is the primary trading venue for commonwealth (AUD/USD, NZD/USD, USD/CAD) and emerging market currency pairs.

 

ICAP EBS

EBS was created by a partnership of the world’s largest foreign exchange (FX) market making banks in 1990 to challenge Reuters’ threatened monopoly in interbank spot foreign exchange and provide effective competition. By 2007, approximately US$164 billion in spot foreign exchange transactions were traded every day over EBS’s central limit order book, EBS Market.

EBS’s closest competitor is Reuters Dealing 3000 Spot Matching. The decision by an FX trader whether to use EBS or Thomson Reuters Matching is driven largely by currency pair. In practice, EBS is the primary trading venue for EUR/USD, USD/JPY, EUR/JPY, USD/CHF, EUR/CHF and USD/CNH, and Thomson Reuters Matching is the primary trading venue for commonwealth (AUD/USD, NZD/USD, USD/CAD) and emerging market currency pairs.

EBS initiated e-trading in spot precious metals, spanning spot gold, silver, platinum and palladium, and remains the leading electronic broker in spot gold and silver through the Loco London Market.

They were the first organisation to facilitate orderly black box or algorithmic trading in spot FX, through an application programming interface (API). By 2007 this accounted for 60% of all EBS flow.

In addition to spot FX and Precious Metals, EBS has expanded trading products through its venues to include NDFs, forwards and FX options. It has also increased the range of trading style to include RFQ and streaming in disclosed and non-disclosed environments.

EBS was acquired by ICAP, the world’s largest inter-dealer broker, in June 2006. ICAP said that the acquisition would combine EBS’ strengths in electronic spot foreign exchange with ICAP’s Electronic Broking business to create a single global multi-product business with further growth potential and significant economies of scale. It went on to say that would provide customers with more efficient electronic trade execution, reduced integration costs and give access to broad liquidity across a wide product range.[1]

In 2014, EBS merged with BrokerTec – a leading service provider in the fixed income markets – to form EBS BrokerTec. BrokerTec’s offering comprises trading solutions for many US and European fixed income products including US Treasuries, European Government Bonds and European Repo.

EBS BrokerTec is now recognised as a market-leading e-trading technology and solutions provider, offering access to multiple execution options and diverse, valuable liquidity across the FX and fixed income markets.

 

  • ICAP EBS is one of the world’s premier inter-dealer brokers with average daily transaction volume in excess of USD 2.3 trillion.
  • ICAP’s electronic EBS platform provides the primary market of natural interest for more than 2800 global FX, Precious Metals and NDF traders.
  • ICAP EBS global access platform delivers anonymous, transparent and reliable FX Liquidity.
  • Authoritative real-time and historical market data.
  • Available for clearing only. Relationship with EBS required.

 

B. Multidealer Platforms – FX ECNs

Since 1999, banks have been developing proprietary systems for their customers to trade foreign exchange and access research material over the internet. To trade with multiple banks online, customers therefore need to use a variety of authentication methods, websites and price request methods. Multi-bank platforms have evolved to allow customers to use a single website to request prices simultaneously from multiple banks and view research material online. Multi-bank platforms (also known as ECNs or electronic communication networks) offer significant advantages to customers, but fewer advantages to banks, and therefore active participation by banks in multi-bank platforms is driven largely by customer demand. However, for the banks it remains preferable for their customers to trade through bank proprietary systems as the banks avoid paying brokerage and customers are encouraged to focus only on the particular bank’s prices.

There are five main customer-facing FX ECNs:

FXall – founded by Bank of America, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and UBS

Currenex – independent and venture backed by major market participants, e.g. Barclays Capital and Royal Dutch/Shell

FX Connect – owned by State Street

360T – independent and venture backed by financial and major private investors

Hotspot FXi – independent privately held venture capital-backed company

 

 

Currency Trading Shifts to Multi-Dealer Systems, Greenwich Says

Lananh Nguyen
July 14, 2015, 11:28 AM EDT

Currency investors are increasingly using electronic systems connected to multiple dealers as the market comes under greater scrutiny by regulators, according to Greenwich Associates.

Institutional investors and large corporations executed 49 percent of their foreign-exchange trading volumes on multi-dealer platforms last year, up from 45 percent in 2013 and 38 percent in 2008, the Stamford, Connecticut-based consultant said in a report. The increase comes as trading by traditional methods, such as phone, instant messaging and single-dealer platforms, has fallen.

“The FX ‘fixing scandal’ and related bank fines have already played a part in changing buy-side behavior,” wrote Kevin McPartland, head of research for market structure and technology at Greenwich, who co-authored the report based on interviews with more than 1,600 people participating in foreign-exchange markets globally.

Asset-management companies are boosting electronic trading as regulatory scrutiny discourages banks and dealers from providing “market color” to clients to avoid any perception of impropriety, according to Greenwich. The platforms are also becoming more popular as banks become less active in currency markets because of rising capital requirements.

“Asset managers have proactively worked to beef up internal policies to both ensure maximum returns for the impacted funds and to reassure customers, such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, that they’re getting the best the market has to offer at that moment in time,” McPartland wrote.

Thomson Reuters Corp.’s FXall platform had the largest volume-weighted share of trading last year at 21 percent, according to Greenwich. It’s followed in popularity by 360T, State Street Corp.’s Currenex, Bloomberg LP’s FXGO and FX Connect.

 

Dealer-to-client platforms

  • State Street FX Connect
  • Thomson Reuters FXall
  • State Street Currenex
  • CBOE/BATS Hotspot FX
  • Bloomberg FXGO

 

fx11

 

C. Single Dealer FX Trading Platforms

  • Barclays BARX
  • Citi Velocity
  • Deutsche Autobahn
  • Morgan Stanley Matrix
  • UBS Neo

 

Best Single-Dealer FX Trading Platform

Financial News is delighted to announce the . The winners will be announced at a gala dinner in London in October.

Here are the nominees in the category of Best Single-Dealer FX Trading Platform:

Barclays BARX
The BARX platform remains a dominant force among single-dealer platforms, with streaming prices in more than 80 currencies and 480 currency pairs, with a wide range of products available. Following the launch of BARX Gator, a liquidity aggregator, Barclays now gives clients access to the increasingly popular agency-style of execution.

Citi Velocity
Since its relaunch in 2012, Citi Velocity 2.0 has become a leading source of single-bank liquidity in FX cash, options and rates trading. Citi has also led the adoption of mobile and tablet technology in this space, and has focused its efforts with Velocity on delivering speed, lower transaction costs, cross-asset information, cross-asset trading, deep liquidity, and desktop efficiency.

Deutsche Bank Autobahn
Deutsche Bank has channelled significant resources into its electronic trading franchise in recent years, and Autobahn remains a major player across asset classes. In FX, Autobahn provides a single blotter for trades executed via both voice and electronic channels. Users can thus benefit from a combined view and take greater control over their portfolios.

Morgan Stanley Matrix
While not a top-tier bank in FX, Morgan Stanley has sought to add unique value with its Matrix platform. That has been achieved in part through execution and post-trade services, but also through the bank’s quantitative solutions and innovations group, which develops unique analytical tools to help users make more informed trading and investment decisions.

UBS Neo
Launched in 2013, UBS Neo is a cross-asset class platform providing a single point of access with a strong user experience, re-establishing the Swiss bank as a significant player in electronic trading. UBS Neo FX covers 550 currency pairs, with access to cash, NDFs and options available through the platform.

 

Trends in use of Electronic Platforms

fx10

 

From The $4 trillion question: what explains FX growth since the 2007 survey?

Electronic execution methods are transforming the FX market The greater activity of all three of the above-mentioned customer types – highfrequency traders, banks as clients and retail investors – is closely related to the growth of electronic execution methods in FX markets. Greenwich Associates estimates that more than 50% of total foreign exchange trading volume is now being executed electronically (Graph 3, left-hand panel).

Electronic execution methods can be divided into three categories: electronic brokers, multi-bank trading systems and single-bank trading systems. Electronic brokers were introduced in the inter-dealer FX market as early as in 1992. For customers, however, the main channel for trading continued to be direct contact with dealers by telephone. In the rather opaque and fragmented FX market of the 1990s, barriers to entry were high and competition was limited. Customers typically paid large spreads on their FX trades.

The first multi-bank trading system was Currenex, which was launched in 1999. By providing customers with competing quotes from different FX dealers on a single page, Currenex increased transparency, reduced transaction costs and attracted a growing customer base. State Street’s FXConnect, which had been launched in 1996 as a single-bank trading system servicing only State Street’s clients, opened up in 2000 and became a multi-bank ECN.

In response to the increased competition, top FX dealers launched proprietary single-bank trading systems for their clients, such as Barclays’ BARX in 2001, Deutsche Bank’s Autobahn in 2002 and Citigroup’s Velocity in 2006. According to data provided to the BIS, daily average trading volumes on the top single-bank trading systems have increased by up to 200% over the past three years.

 

 

Market Participants in

  • Interbank Market
  • Retail Market

Forex Market Players

Forex Market

The Forex market is an international over-the-counter market (OTC). It means that it is a decentralized, self-regulated market with no central exchange or clearing house, unlike stocks and futures markets. This structure eliminates fees for exchange and clearing, thereby reducing transaction costs.

The Forex OTC market is formed by different participants – with varying needs and interests – that trade directly with each other. These participants can be divided in two groups: the interbank market and the retail market.

The Interbank Market

The interbank market designates Forex transactions that occur between central banks, commercial banks and financial institutions.

Central Banks – National central banks (such as the US Fed and the ECB) play an important role in the Forex market. As principal monetary authority, their role consists in achieving price stability and economic growth. To do so, they regulate the entire money supply in the economy by setting interest rates and reserve requirements. They also manage the country’s foreign exchange reserves that they can use in order to influence market conditions and exchange rates.

Commercial Banks – Commercial banks (such as Deutsche Bank and Barclays) provide liquidity to the Forex market due to the trading volume they handle every day. Some of this trading represents foreign currency conversions on behalf of customers’ needs while some is carried out by the banks’ proprietary trading desk for speculative purpose.

Financial Institutions – Financial institutions such as money managers, investment funds, pension funds and brokerage companies trade foreign currencies as part of their obligations to seek the best investment opportunities for their clients. For example, a manager of an international equity portfolio will have to engage in currency trading in order to buy and sell foreign stocks.

The Retail Market

The retail market designates transactions made by smaller speculators and investors. These transactions are executed through Forex brokers who act as a mediator between the retail market and the interbank market. The participants of the retail market are hedge funds, corporations and individuals.

Hedge Funds – Hedge funds are private investment funds that speculate in various assets classes using leverage. Macro Hedge Funds pursue trading opportunities in the Forex Market. They design and execute trades after conducting a macroeconomic analysis that reviews the challenges affecting a country and its currency. Due to their large amounts of liquidity and their aggressive strategies, they are a major contributor to the dynamic of Forex Market.

Corporations – They represent the companies that are engaged in import/export activities with foreign counterparts. Their primary business requires them to purchase and sell foreign currencies in exchange for goods, exposing them to currency risks. Through the Forex market, they convert currencies and hedge themselves against future fluctuations.

Individuals – Individual traders or investors trade Forex on their own capital in order to profit from speculation on future exchange rates. They mainly operate through Forex platforms that offer tight spreads, immediate execution and highly leveraged margin accounts.

 

Trend Towards Exchanges ?

Only 200 billion daily turnover using exchanges

 

Exchanges are staking out the $5tn a day global currency market as part of their latest efforts to tap this lucrative and booming sector that has long been dominated by global banks.

This week Bats Global Markets, the US’s second largest equities exchange, fired the latest salvo by offering three months of free trading on its forthcoming London-based Hotspot currency trading platform, the centrepiece of Bats’ $365m purchase of the venue from KCG Holdings in March.

That came only days after Deutsche Börse, Europe’s largest exchanges operator, bought 360T, one of the world’s largest currency trading networks, for €725m.

Their moves are audacious attempts to break into the world’s most liquid over-the-counter market, where a notional $5.3tn a day is traded in cash, or spot, and derivatives trades. It is dominated by banks, which continue to make billions of dollars in profits from it each year. Exchanges have generally been unable to establish a presence in this and other OTC markets, despite repeated attempts to do so.

In currencies, Chicago’s CME Group dominates futures trading, reflecting how it seized the terrain in the 1970s when the present era of floating foreign exchanges began. Markets in Moscow, Brazil and India also trade local currency, but of that $5.3tn total, global exchanges account for just $200bn according to Aite Group, a financial markets consultancy.

However, cracks are appearing in the market edifice, brought on by a combination of unlawful activity by banks, deep structural change and the emergence of cheap and reliable technology that has allowed alternative ways of trading to emerge.
“The banks as a whole will continue to have a substantial piece of the pie but the regulations will force them to let go of pieces of it,” says Javier Paz, an analyst at Aite Group.

Waves of post financial crisis regulation have accelerated change in equity and interest rate swaps markets, but global policymakers largely left the currency market alone.

However, the currency industry is mopping up after two of its own existential crises — the Wm/Reuters benchmark rate rigging scandal, which resulted in multibillion-dollar fines for banks, and the sudden move by the Swiss franc in January when the national central bank abolished its ceiling against the euro.

Market observers say that end users such as corporations, hedge funds and asset managers are now taking far more care with their orders, and they have the tools to do it, turning the banks more into agency brokers.

“End users are getting used to technology where they have a full view of the market. They are accessing more markets than they could ever do 10 years ago,” says Chris Concannon, chief executive of Bats Global Markets.

At the same time, incidents like the Swiss move have also raised the alarm among banks. By the end of that day in January some smaller retail brokers faced ruin but even several larger broker-dealers such as Barclays, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank nursed tens of millions of dollars in losses. That has also left the market seeking as many different venues as possible where they can offset their customers’ trades.
“People are not holding risk like they were a year ago. A year ago they would warehouse that risk and wait for another customer to come along,” says Mr Concannon.

Not helping matters is how foreign exchange market liquidity is highly concentrated among just a handful of trading pairs, known as the G10. Into the gap on the other side of the trade are stepping high-frequency traders such as the US’s Virtu Financial. It is one of the world’s largest currency market makers.

“Clients that are trading on anonymous platforms by definition have no insight into whom they are trading with, and as such are likely interacting with non-bank liquidity providers more often than they know,” notes a report by Greenwich Associates last month.

However, even if the diagnosis is right, exchanges still face tough competition from well-established platforms not run by banks, such as Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg FXGO and ICAP’s EBS. These make up the majority of the $1.1tn average daily volume traded on electronic FX platforms and provide a role as a more centralised price benchmark independent of banks.

Bats, which has targeted London because it is the world’s main location for forex trading, will aim to provide a reliable venue for pricing and take more trading volume from the 220 banks, asset managers, hedge funds, dealers and retail brokers signed up to the venue.

Deutsche Börse sees 360T as a key part of its growth strategy, using it as a way to sell market data and develop futures, FX forwards and swaps trading to boost its Eurex derivatives business. But it is trading network, not an exchange-like central limit order book.

Critically, OTC markets are historically highly resistant to encroachment from exchanges and some see little sign of that changing.

The head of one currency trading platform says: “I don’t see any signs of moving to an exchange model. I don’t see a slam dunk here, I see some desperate buyers looking for a growth story.”

OTC FX trading becomes ‘exchange-like’

Thursday, April 21, 2016

The acquisition of trading platforms Hotspot and 360T by Bats Global Markets and Deutsche Börse respectively last year were bold statements of intent by exchange operators to grab a larger chunk of the trillions of dollars traded in FX every day.

FXSpotStream

However, while consolidation in the venues supporting FX trading can be expected to result in exchanges becoming more involved in the FX space, any actual market structure change is likely to take a long time to materialize, according to

FXSpotStream CEO Alan Schwarz.

“The FX market continues to do a good job of addressing regulatory requirements and meeting the demands of market participants,” he says.

“We have seen a shift in the FX market looking to trade more on a disclosed basis. Our business has continued to see year-on-year growth because there is a move taking place from exchange-like anonymous trading to bilateral, fully disclosed trading between counterparties.

“Unlike trading on an exchange, the relationship via FXSpotStream is transparent and trading with the liquidity providing banks is on a fully disclosed basis.”

Nuances

Kevin McPartland, head of market structure and technology research at Greenwich Associates, believes that discussion of migration from OTC to exchange fails to take account of some of the nuances of the FX market and that the future lies in venues that support multiple trading models.

“There are a host of non-exchange electronic trading venues that allow clients to trade with each other in a variety of ways,” he says.

Kevin McPartland,
Greenwich Associates

On the question of whether there is a discernible shift towards fully disclosed trading, McPartland refers to both central limit order book (CLOB) and request-for-quote (RFQ) having their merits.

Despite observations made by the likes of TeraExchange – that order book platforms offer a democratic marketplace through transparent, firm and executable prices – corporates have remained reluctant to abandon the RFQ model.

The key question for CLOB platform providers continues to be not why market participants have migrated to alternative models but rather when they will be in a position to win new business for products that are most suited for order books, such as the benchmarks and plain vanilla products.

“RGQ offers liquidity on demand and identification of counterparties, whereas CLOB is faster and its anonymity can be helpful,” says McPartland.

“But we are now seeing demand for a solution that provides the best of both worlds by enabling trading in an order book format while maintaining a bilateral relationship with counterparties.”

Regulation

According to James Sinclair, CEO of MarketFactory, options and other derivatives are moving closer to an exchange model due to the direct effects of regulation and the increased costs of compliance in OTC markets.

He refers to CME FX options as an example, noting they are effectively options on futures.

“However, the situation in the spot market is more complicated – some aspects are becoming closer to an exchange, others are moving further away,” he says. “FX has its own market structure that is hard to fit into the OTC/exchange paradigm.”

James Sinclair,
MarketFactory

One of the fundamental reasons why the market does not become centrally cleared, says Sinclair, is that a cleared model carries the cost of insurance against both settlement and market risk.

“CLS insures you against settlement risk but not the market risk,” he adds. “Counterparts still find it cheaper to self-insure against market risk in case of a counterparty default than to pay the extra cost of a fully cleared solution.”

A senior platform source observes that growth in exchange-traded products has largely come from futures traders who have looked for diversification and added FX as another asset class.

“Very little business has moved from OTC – some banks have added exchanges as additional liquidity sources to cover risk, but that is really the only business that has crossed the divide,” the source says.

OTC has become more exchange-like in that the largest banks have continued to extend their internalization of flow, so each now runs an order book trading structure internally.

However, our source also points out that the tightening of credit has reduced the number of prime brokers in FX and costs have risen “so the nearest thing that the FX OTC market has to centralized clearing has actually reduced its volume and capacity”, he concludes.

 

Evolution of Information Exchange in Trading Platforms

  • Clients C
  • Voice Broker VB
  • Dealers D
  • Electronic Broker EB
  • Prime Broker PB
  • Retail Aggregator – RA
  • Multi Bank Trading – MBT
  • Single Bank Trading – SBT

 

fx12

 

fxtradingplatforms_1

 

Top 10 FX Turnover Locations

  • United Kingdom – 37%
  • United States – 20%
  • Singapore – 7.9%
  • Hong Kong SAR – 6.7%
  • Japan – 6.1 %
  • France – 2.8%
  • Switzerland – 2.4%
  • Australia – 1.9%
  • Germany – 1.8%
  • Canada – 1.3%

 

fx13

 

FX Instruments

  • Spot
  • FX Swap
  • Outright Forward
  • Currency Swaps
  • FX Options

 

fx3

 

fx4

fx15

 

 

Currencies and Currency Pairs

US Dollar is the king in FX market.  87.6% of transactions include USD on one side of currency pair.  Euro comes at second with 31%.  Japanese Yen is at 21.6%.  UK Pound Sterling is at 12.8%.  Chinese Yuan has moved to 4%.

fx

 

Currencies and Currencies Pairs

fx2

 

Trends in FX Market

  • Electronic Trading
  • Algorithmic Trading
  • High Frequency Trading
  • Non Bank Liquidity Providers (Market Makers)

 

Non Bank Electronic Market Makers

The diverse set of non-bank electronic market-makers includes

  • XTX Markets
  • Virtu Financial
  • Citadel Securities
  • GTS
  • Jump Trading.

These market-makers’ trading volume is captured in the Triennial because their trades are prime-brokered by a dealer bank. They are active on multilateral trading platforms, where they provide prices to banks’ e-trading desks, retail aggregators, hedge funds and institutional clients.

 

 

Chinese RMB – in FX Markets

  • Second in Trade Finance
  • Sixth in Payments
  • Eighth in FX Trading

 

Considering China’s Renminbi for International Settlement and Forex Trading

On October 1, 2016, the International Monetary Fund added China’s renminbi1 (RMB) to its elite Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket of currencies, alongside the U.S. dollar, euro, yen and British pound. IMF said the change reflected China’s progress in reforming its monetary, foreign exchange and financial systems, and improving its financial market infrastructure.2 Short-term, this means countries can now include RMB assets in official FX reserves, making it easier for them to meet IMF guidelines.3 Beyond this, however, inclusion in SDR is a symbol of RMB’s emergence as an international currency for forex trading and settlement of global business transactions.

RMB’s ongoing progress is an important consideration for businesses involved in any FX trading, and particularly for those whose business or currency trading activities involve China.

RMB Usage Grows in Trade and Currency Trading

IMF’s decision arrives in the context of growing RMB usage in trade finance, international payments, and forex trading. In trade finance, RMB is now second amongst world currencies, reflecting enormous international trade with China.4

Since 2013, according to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication’s (SWIFT’s) monthly Renminbi Tracker, China’s currency has risen from ninth to fifth worldwide in total payments sent and received by value, not counting payments by central banks. During that period, it surpassed the Swedish Krona (SEK), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Swiss Franc (CHF), Australian Dollar (AUD) and, briefly during summer 2015, even the yen (JPY). RMB use is growing slowly in some markets (such as France, Switzerland and Germany), and is rapidly accelerating in others (e.g., the United Arab Emirates).5 SWIFT has elsewhere reported that 50 countries now use RMB for 10 percent or more of their trade with China.6

Meanwhile, according to the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS’) September 2016 Central Bank Survey, RMB has doubled its share of OTC currency trading transactions since 2013. It has surpassed Mexico’s peso to become the most active developing market currency on forex trading exchanges, and is now eighth in FX trading amongst all currencies worldwide. BIS’s report notes that “as much as 95 percent of renminbi trading volume was against the U.S. dollar.”7

Building the Global Infrastructure for an Internationalized Currency

To promote RMB usage abroad, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) – China’s central bank – has authorized 18 new official clearing banks worldwide since December 2012. These have opened in locations including Toronto, Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Johannesburg, Sydney, Seoul and Taipei.8 In September 2016, PBOC announced the first RMB clearing and settlement services in the U.S.9

Domestically, China has eliminated a cap on the number of enterprises permitted to carry out cross-border RMB settlements. Any company permitted to engage in import-export business may settle in RMB, unless it appears on a “black name list” (in which case its transactions may be reviewed individually).10 Restrictions have also been relaxed on RMB-denominated investments by foreigners.11

As Yu Yongding of the Asian Development Bank Institute has pointed out, China is the only country that has ever decided on its own to make internationalizing its currency a national priority.12 In determining how far RMB’s internationalization will go, China’s authorities appear to be balancing the benefits and risks of liberalization,13 carefully timing their decisions accordingly.

They face significant obstacles, not least the continuing downward pressure on the value of China’s currency on forex trading exchanges since it peaked against the U.S. dollar in early 2014. Some market observers believe RMB faces bank sector headwinds that might require a government bailout,14 as well as increased protectionist pressures in the U.S.15 and elsewhere. If these events lead to further reductions in RMB’s value, China could face accelerating capital flight,16 deepening internal opposition to the full elimination of capital controls.

Transacting in RMB

China’s reforms have made it easier for companies that do business in China to settle their transactions in RMB if they so desire. Many of their Chinese trading partners would welcome this, and some may even offer discounts if they can invoice in RMB.17 China’s central bank has estimated that transacting in U.S. dollars may add 2-to-3 percent in administrative expenses alone.18

The risk of currency fluctuation, however, remains a significant issue. Hedging vehicles exist; of course, these have their own costs. In making the decision about whether to transact business in RMB or another currency, companies may wish to make careful and timely assessments about currency risk.

The Takeaway

As China’s financial and market reforms move forward, RMB is emerging as a leading international currency. It has become far easier for international businesses and currency traders to transact in China’s home currency. International businesses may wish to carefully consider currency risk in developing their own plans for RMB forex trading and settlement.

 

 

Key Terms:

  • PB (Prime Brokerages)
  • Inter Dealer
  • Multi Dealer Trading
  • Single Dealer Trading
  • HFT (High Frequency Trading)
  • Market Makers
  • Liquidity Providers
  • Retail Aggregators
  • Retail FX Systems
  • Algorithmic Trading
  • FX ECNs (Electronic Communication Networks)
  • e-Trading
  • Hedge Funds
  • Institutional Clients
  • Non Bank Liquidity Providers
  • FXPB (Foreign Exchange Prime Brokerage)

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Buttonwood The financial markets in an era of deglobalisation

Why the global volume of foreign-exchange trading is shrinking

Dec 15th 2016

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21711887-why-global-volume-foreign-exchange-trading-shrinking-financial?zid=295&ah=0bca374e65f2354d553956ea65f756e0

 

 

Downsized FX markets: causes and implications

BIS

Click to access r_qt1612.pdf

 

 

Triennial Central Bank Survey Foreign exchange turnover in April 2016

 

Click to access rpfx16fx.pdf

 

 

TheForeign Exchange andInterest Rate Derivatives Markets:Turnover in the United States, April 2016

Click to access 2016triennialreport.pdf

 

 

 

The foreign exchange and over-the-counter interest rate derivatives market in the United Kingdom 

Quarterly Bulletin 2016 Q4
16 December 2016

By Alexander Hutton and Edward Kent

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/quarterlybulletin/2016/q4/a6.aspx

 

 

The anatomy of the global FX market through the lens of the 2013 Triennial Survey

Click to access r_qt1312e.pdf

 

 

The foreign exchange and over-the-counter interest rate derivatives market in the United Kingdom

2013

 

Click to access qb130410.pdf

 

 

The $4 trillion question: what explains FX growth since the 2007 survey?

Click to access r_qt1012e.pdf

 

 

 

CME Group OTC FX Clearing

 

Click to access otc-fx-clearing.pdf

 

 

 

CME Group Cleared OTC Financial Products

 

Click to access cleared-otc-financial-products.pdf

 

 

Citi tops Euromoney global FX poll again, but big banks lose grip

http://www.reuters.com/article/global-forex-euromoney-idUSL5N18M29O

 

 

Foreign Exchange Market

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_exchange_market

 

 

All change in the 2016 Euromoney FX rankings

http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3556871/All-change-in-the-2016-Euromoney-FX-rankings.html?single=true

 

 

World’s Best FX Providers 2017

Automation, “algo trading” and a tighter regulatory environment are driving change in the industry

https://www.gfmag.com/topics/blogs/it-pays-have-good-forex-bank

 

 

360T

http://www.360t.com/about-us/press/

 

 

CBOE Will Acquire BATS Global Markets for $3.2 Billion

http://fortune.com/2016/09/26/cboe-acquires-bats/

 

 

e-FOREX

http://www.e-forex.net/institutional-fx-ecommerce.html

 

 

Providing Differentiated Service in an Ever-Evolving Market

2016 Greenwich Leaders: Global Foreign Exchange Services

https://www.greenwich.com/fixed-income-fx-cmds/providing-differentiated-service-ever-evolving-market

 

 

Press Release: Best FX Awards 2017 – Providers and Corporate

https://www.gfmag.com/media/press-releases/best-fx-awards-2017-providers-and-corporate

 

 

 

Global Finance Names The World’s Best Foreign Exchange Providers 2016

https://www.gfmag.com/media/press-releases/global-finance-names-worlds-best-foreign-exchange-providers-2016

 

 

Global Banking & Finance Review Awards – 2015

https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/global-banking-finance-review-awards-2015/

 

 

New Electronic Trading Systems in Foreign Exchange Markets

2003

D Rime

Click to access Rime-1.pdf

 

Click to access Rime%20New%20Electronic%20FX1.pdf

 

 

Foreign exchange market structure, players and evolution

Michael R. King, Carol Osler and Dagfinn Rime

2011

Click to access Rime-2.pdf

 

 

Settlement Risk in the Global FX Market: How Much Remains?

8 Nov 2016

Dino Kos

Richard M. Levich

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2827530

 

 

The Retail Spot Foreign Exchange Market Structure and Participants
John H. Forman III

March 22, 2016

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2753823

 

 

Algorithmic trading in the foreign exchange market

Maria Bergsten and Johannes Forss sandahl

2013

 

Click to access rap_pov_artikel_2_130321_eng.pdf

 

 

The Future of the Foreign Exchange Market

Richard K. Lyons

 

Click to access Lyons%20Brookings.pdf

 

 

Multi Bank Platforms

http://www.londonfx.co.uk/ecn.html

 

 

ECNs/Alternative Trading Systems

https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrecn.shtml

 

 

The Transition to Electronic Communications Networks in the Secondary Treasury Market

Bruce Mizrach and Christopher J. Neely

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.205.6479&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Deal or no deal: anatomy of an FX portal

http://treasurytoday.com/2013/06/deal-or-no-deal-anatomy-of-an-fx-portal

 

 

The 3 Pillars of Forex

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-06-11/3-pillars-forex

 

 

THE VALUE OF APAMA

IN FAST-CHANGING FX MARKETS

 

Click to access sec_SAG_Apama_In-Fast-Changing-FX-Markets_4PG_WP_Feb16_tcm16-116205.pdf

 

 

The Global Foreign Exchange Market: Growth and Transformation

 

William Barker

 

Click to access barker.pdf

 

 

FX ALL

http://www.fxall.com

 

 

Currenex

https://www.currenex.com

 

 

Most Innovative Bank e-FX Trading Platform: Citi

http://www.fxweek.com/fx-week/interview/2464092/most-innovative-bank-e-fx-trading-platform-citi#

 

 

Citi sells its electronic FX platform

https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2010/01/04/118946/citi-sells-its-electronic-fx-platform/

 

 

Nasdaq poised to launch FX trading platform: top executive

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nasdaq-forex-idUSKCN0QT1VD20150824

 

 

State Street buys electronic foreign exchange trading platform Currenex

http://www.thetradenews.com/Asset-Classes/Foreign-exchange/State-Street-buys-electronic-foreign-exchange-trading-platform-Currenex/

 

 

EBS

http://www.ebs.com

 

 

Electronic Platforms in Foreign Exchange Trading

http://celent.com/reports/electronic-platforms-foreign-exchange-trading

 

 

HOTSPOT FX

https://www.hotspotfx.com

 

 

Icap’s EBS BrokerTec Inks Deal With China’s CFETS

http://www.waterstechnology.com/sell-side-technology/news/2460560/icaps-ebs-brokertec-inks-deal-with-chinas-cfets

 

 

Best Single-Dealer FX Trading Platform

https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/fn-trading-and-technology-awards-shortlist-2015-best-single-dealer-fx-trading-platform-20150810

 

 

Multi-Dealer Platforms to gain ground in 2015

http://www.e-forex.net/articles/apr-2015-multidealer-platforms-to-gain-ground-in-2015.html

 

 

PERSPECTIVE ON NEW ELECTRONIC PLATFORMS, FROM EXECUTION TO DISTRIBUTION

http://fintank.net/position_papers/electronic_platforms/

 

 

FX Trading Platforms: Models Converge and Competition Heats Up

http://celent.com/reports/fx-trading-platforms-models-converge-and-competition-heats

 

 

Trends in Foreign Exchange Markets and the Challenges Ahead

https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/pot150714

 

 

Restoring trust in global FX markets

Click to access restoring-trust-report.pdf

 

 

2016 – Entering the Age of the “Non-Bank”

http://www.financemagnates.com/thought-leadership/prime-of-prime/2016-entering-the-age-of-the-non-bank/

 

 

The New Wall Street: Even Big Banks Want Help Navigating Markets

Matthew Leising and Annie Massa

Aug 10, 2016

http://www.wealthmanagement.com/markets/new-wall-street-even-big-banks-want-help-navigating-markets

 

 

The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets

An International Perspective

 

Click to access tacfuturecomputertrading1012.pdf

 

 

Small Fish Big Prize:  Market Makers out to eat Bank’s lunch

Click to access Small-fish-big-prize-The-Market-makers-out-to-eat-the-banks.pdf

 

 

Automated Trading in Treasury Markets

 

Click to access TMPG%20HFT%20White%20Paper%20FINAL%20-%202015-04-08.pdf

 

 

High Frequency Traders Elbow Their Way Into the Currency Markets

by Lananh Nguyen

September 12, 2016

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-12/fastest-guys-in-stocks-are-becoming-a-force-in-currency-markets

 

 

Exclusive: U.S. investigates market-making operations of Citadel, KCG

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-stocks-probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0Y11CJ

 

 

Considering China’s Renminbi for International Settlement and Forex Trading

By Bill Camarda

https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/foreign-exchange/articles/renminbi-for-forex-trading/

 

 

Pound plummet blamed on ‘liquidity holes’

Sterling’s flash crash was triggered during Asian ‘graveyard shift’ when US/European traders away

https://www.ft.com/content/dc7c0846-8e00-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78

 

 

Settlement risk in foreign exchange markets and CLS Bank

Click to access r_qt0212f.pdf

 

 

CLS Bank

https://www.cls-group.com/Pages/default.aspx

Global Financial Safety Net: Regional Reserve Pools and Currency Swap Networks of Central Banks

Global Financial Safety Net: Regional Reserve Pools and Currency Swap Networks of Central Banks

 

You can read this post from two perspectives

  • Geo Strategic (International Financial and Economic Architecture)
  • Financial and Economic stability / Macro-prudential Policy

 

Recent Financial Crisis has exposed the fact that global financial liquidity can be in shortage.  Since US Dollar is the global currency and is used in more that 40 percent of all financial transactions globally.

Asian Countries faced dollar shortage during 1997-1998 asian financial crisis.  Recent Global Financial crisis caused dollar shortage in advanced countries.  US Central Bank Federal Reserve responded by setting up currency swap lines with central banks of other countries.  These swap lines were made permanent in 2013.

After Asian financial crisis in 1997, many countries in developing world started accumulating FX reserves.  There was also a swap agreement (known as Chiang Mai Initiative) which was set up between ASEAN countries in south east Asia.

Nations also go to IMF to get conditional financing which they do not like to do.  New Trend is toward regional pooling of financial resources.  Latest example is BRICS CRA.

Even advanced economies such as EU have established European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

Chiang Mai Initiative has been revamped as Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralism (CMIM).

 

Financial and Economic Stability / Macro Prudential Policy

A. Reserve Pools

  • Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
  • Chiang Mai Initiative Multi-Lateralism (CMIM)
  • BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)
  • European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

B. Currency Swap Lines

  • Federal Reserve Central Bank US Dollar Swap Lines
  • PBOC China Central bank RMB Swap Lines

C. Global

  • IMF Financing

D. Self Insurance

  • Nation’s Foreign Exchange (FX) Reserves

 

From The decentralised global monetary system requires an efficient safety net

The global financial safety net as a set of protection mechanisms

The current decentralised system also lacks a central authority that is actively integrated and, above all, contractually bound into the maintenance of the monetary system by providing temporary liquidity, such as the IMF in the Bretton Woods system. Instead, various protection mechanisms have evolved because the current system has not led to greater external stability of national economies and the global economy. The problem of volatile capital flows became particularly clear once again in the course of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. For emerging market economies, the warning of a sudden reversal of capital flows has been omnipresent ever since the Asian crisis. However, the last crisis has demonstrated that even for industrialised countries their developed financial markets are a significant contagion mechanism for crisis developments. The following are regarded as key elements of the global financial safety net:11

International reserves. These include official foreign exchange and gold reserves as well as claims on inter-national financial institutions such as the IMF that can be rapidly converted into foreign currency under the countries’ own responsibility. •

Bilateral swap arrangements between central banks.  In a currency swap two central banks agree to exchange currency amounts, e.g. US dollars for euros. They agree on a fixed date in the future on which they will reverse the transaction applying the same exchange rate. During the term central banks can make foreign currency loans to private banks. •

IMF programmes and regional financing arrangements (e.g. European Stability Mechanism, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation Agreement, BRICs CRA, Arab Monetary Fund, Latin American Reserve Fund). They make financial resources available to the members to tackle balance of payments difficulties, manage crises and prevent regional contagion effects. Depending on their design, they may impose conditions and requirements for economic policy measures on the recipient countries. Some regional programmes require a combination with IMF funds.

The most important element of the protection mechanisms: international reserves

International reserves are by far the largest element of the global safety net.12 The lack of predictability and robustness of other elements has led to an over-accumulation of reserves. After the Asian crisis, upper middle income countries in particular built up reserves. While China holds a major portion of the reserves in this group of countries, all other countries also boosted their reserves significantly. As a result of central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market, reserves have decreased since the year 2013.

The renaissance of bilateral swap arrangements

Bilateral swap arrangements were used by the US Treasury as early as in 1936 to supply developing countries with bridging loans. During the Bretton Woods period, the Fed introduced a network of swap lines known as reciprocal currency arrangements to prevent a sudden and substantial withdrawal of gold by official foreign institutions.13 A swap protected foreign central banks from the exchange rate risk when they had obtained excess and unwanted dollar positions. It allowed them to dispense with the temporary conversion of dollars into gold. Between 1973 and 1980, the swap lines were used instead of US currency reserves to finance interventions by the Fed in the foreign exchange market. Gains and losses were shared with the other central bank when the Fed drew on a line. However, the G10 central banks could try to use the swap arrangements to influence the US foreign currency market interventions, so the Fed stopped using them in the mid-1980s. All existing swap lines except those with Canada and Mexico were ended in 1998. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the Fed established swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Bank of England for 30 days and expanded the existing line with the Bank of Canada. Currency swaps were used here for the first time to restore liquidity in financial markets. During the global financial crisis, the Fed then financed the lender-of-last-resort actions of other central banks in industrialised and emerging market economies, with the latter assuming the credit risk. The international reserves of many central banks at the start of the crisis were smaller than the amounts they borrowed under the swap lines. In 2013 the swap arrangements between the six most important central banks were converted into standing arrangements. All these swap arrangements have one thing in common: they signal the central banks’ willingness to cooperate with each other, whether it be in defence of the parities under the Bretton Woods system, to avert speculative attacks on the Fed, or with the aim of providing dollar liquidity during the financial crisis. China has also set up a far-reaching system of swap arrangements, mainly with the aim of pushing ahead with the internationalisation of the renminbi. But from the perspective of these central banks, the agreements with the Bank of England, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the ECB also serve the goal of being able to provide renminbi liquidity in their area of responsibility when needed Swaps represent a powerful and flexible tool of central banks that issue reserve currencies to regulate international capital flows. Central banks are the only institutions capable of changing their balance sheets quickly enough to keep pace with the volatility of international capital flows. Swaps are unsuitable, however, for longer-lasting crises, sovereign debt crises and to finance balance of payments imbalances. That is why they would be the most suitable tool for emerging market economies, as they are more likely to face abrupt changes in capital flows. Nevertheless, so far only the most important central banks that issue reserve currencies have been able to access unlimited swaps. Granting them is determined by the mandate of the central banks and they represent contractual, not institutional agreements. Accordingly, the central banks are able to choose their contractual partners, and there is no central independent authority to supervise swap arrangements. The swap arrangements for central banks in industrial countries that do not issue a reserve currency can therefore be expected to be reinstated in the event of a global shock, while they are less likely to be employed in case of a regional shock. Their use is even less predictable for systemic emerging market economies.

 

Growth of Global Financial Safety Net

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Features of Instruments in the Global Financial Safety net

 

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Use of GFSN in various shock Scenarios

  • Balance of Payment shock
  • Banking Sector FX Liquidity shock
  • Sovereign Debt shock

 

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US Dollar Swap Lines

These six central banks have permanent US Dollar swap lines since 2013.

  • USA (Fed Reserve),
  • Canada (BoC),
  • Japan (BoJ),
  • Switzerland (SNB),
  • EU (ECB),
  • UK(BOE)

 

During the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve extended swap arrangements to 14 other central banks. The ECB drew very heavily, followed by the BoJ. At one point during the crisis in 2009, outstanding swaps amounted to more than $580 billion and represented about one-quarter of the Fed’s balance sheet. The novel element of this effort was the extension of swaps to four countries outside the usual set of advanced-country central banks: Mexico, Brazil, South Korea and Singapore.16 Mexico previously had a standing swap facility with the Federal Reserve by virtue of geographic proximity and the North American Free Trade Agreement, but the new arrangement expanded the amount that Mexico’s central bank could draw and the Fed’s swaps with Brazil, South Korea and Singapore broke new ground. The swaps in general were credited with preventing a more serious seizing up of interbank lending and financial markets during 2008 to 2009 (Helleiner 2014, 38–45; Prasad 2014, 202–11; IMF 2013a; 2014a, Box 2). The Federal Reserve board of governors considered the “boundary” question at length, torn between opening itself up to additional demands for coverage from emerging markets and creating stigma against those left outside the safety net. Fed officials used economic size and connections to international financial markets as the main criteria for selecting Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and South Korea. Chile, Peru, Indonesia, India, Iceland and likely others also requested swaps but were denied. The governors wanted to deflect requests by additional countries to the IMF, which coordinated its announcement of the SLF with the Fed’s announcement of the additional swaps at the end of October 2008. Governors and staff saw in this tiering a natural division of labour that coincided with the resources and analytical capacity of the Fed and IMF.17 The ECB extended swaps to Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark, in addition to its arrangement with the United States. The BoJ extended swaps as well, notably to South Korea after the Federal Reserve announced its Korean swap. The PBoC began to conclude a set of swap agreements with Asian and non-Asian central banks that would eventually number more than 20 and amount to RMB 2.57 trillion. Only those swaps with the central banks of Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea are known to have been activated (Zhang 2015, 5). Boosting the role of the renminbi in international trade was the express objective of these swaps, although their establishment also helped to secure market confidence during unsettled times. The proliferation of swaps resulted in a set of star-shaped networks of agreements among central banks that were linked by Fed liquidity (Allen and Moessner 2010). Although a number of the swaps in the network were activated, only those swaps of the Federal Reserve were heavily used during the crisis. The “fortunate four” emerging market countries among the Fed 14 were each covered for amounts up to $30 billion, but only temporarily. When the Fed later declined to renew the swaps,  these countries became as vulnerable to liquidity shortfalls as the others. So, when South Korea took the chair of the G20 in 2010, its government proposed that the central bank swaps be multilateralized on a more permanent basis. It argued this would be increasingly necessary to stabilize the global financial system and would be in the interest of swap providers and recipients alike. Specifically, during the preparations for the G20 summit, South Korean officials proposed that the advanced-country central banks provide swaps to the IMF, which would conduct due diligence and provide liquidity to qualifying central banks. In this way, the global community could mobilize enough resources to address even a massive liquidity crunch and central banks would avoid credit risk.

In late 2013, six key-currency central banks made their temporary swap arrangements permanent standing facilities. Each central bank entered into a bilateral arrangement with the five others, comprising a network of 30 such agreements.18 But they prefer to maintain a constructive ambiguity with respect to whether they would re-extend swap arrangements to the other central banks that were covered during the global financial crisis, including Brazil, Mexico,19 South Korea and Singapore (Papadia 2013).

 

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During the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Federal Reserve extended USD swap lines to several central banks.  The financial institutions in these countries faced USD shortages as the normal channels of money markets froze during crisis.

 

US Dollar Swap amounts extended during 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis

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China RMB Swap Lines

During the 2007-8 global financial crisis, the international monetary system experienced an acute US dollar shortage that severely curtailed global trade and pressured international banking business (McCauley and McGuire, 2009; McGuire and von Peter, 2009). The US authorities, in response to the elevated strain in the global market, have arranged dollar swap lines with major central banks to mitigate the global dollar squeeze (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010; Aizenman, Jinjarak and Park, 2011). On Thursday, October 31, 2013, the network of central banks comprises the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank agreed to convert their bilateral liquidity swap arrangements to standing arrangements until further notice.1 The dollar squeeze critically illustrated the danger of operating a US-centric global financial system. Against this backdrop, China has actively implemented measures of promoting the cross-border use of the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), to reduce its reliance on the US dollar. The aggressive policy move was considered a clear signal of China’s efforts to internationalize RMB (Chen and Cheung, 2011; Cheung, Ma and McCauley, 2011). In 2009, China launched the scheme of cross-border trade settlement in RMB to encourage the denomination and settlement of international trade in its own currencies. One practical issue of settling trade in RMB is the limited availability of the currency outside China. China at that time had strict regulations on circulating the RMB across its border. To facilitate its RMB trade settlement initiative, China signed its first bilateral RMB local currency swap agreement with the Bank of Korea in December 2008, and the second one with Hong Kong in January 2009. Since then, China has signed various swap agreements with economies around the world.2

 

crossbor7

 

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BRICS CRA

The 5th and 6th BRICS summits in 2013–2014 marked a watershed in the evolution of the BRICS group with the establishment of the first BRICS institutions. These included the BRICS New Development Bank, the CRA, the BRICS Business Council and the Think Tanks Council. Although this has weakened the ‘political talk shop’ perception of the group, critics have questioned whether these institutions will have a substantive effect. In particular, doubts have been cast upon the effectiveness of the CRA.

The CRA is modest in size in comparison to the IMF and other similar arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). At this stage the BRICS countries have committed $100 billion to the CRA, with China committing $41 billion, Russia, Brazil and India $18 billion each and South Africa $5 billion. The CMIM reportedly has a reserve pool of $240 billion and the IMF resources of $780 billion. It has been noted that with BRICS’s foreign reserves standing at about $5 trillion, a commitment of 16% would take the CRA pool to $800 billion.

 

From GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS: LESSONS FROM EUROPE AND ASIA

ASEAN +3 CMIM

ASEAN + Japan Korea China

The embryo of an Asian regional safety net arrangement has existed since 1977, when the five founding members of the ASEAN signed the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA)5. Following the Asian crisis and after aborted discussion on the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, Japan launched the New Miyazawa Initiative in October 1998 amounting to about $35 billion, which was targeted at stabilising the foreign exchange markets of Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand6. The initiative was particularly valuable in containing instability in Malaysia’s financial sector, since that country had refused an IMF Stand-By Arrangement. The Japanese manoeuvre was deemed somewhat mutinous, since the IMF was very critical of Malaysia’s approach. But it also cemented the idea that Asia could gather enough resources to sandbag itself during a crisis period so long as Asian countries were united and managed to roll out timely and credible support mechanisms. In Asian countries under IMF programmes, the conditionality associated with the loans included severe fiscal cuts, deep structural reforms, and substantial increases in interest rates to stabilise currency markets. The economic and social cost of the adjustment was so high and abrupt that it provoked social unrest in a number of countries. This would reverberate strongly in the months that followed and leave a lasting scar in relations between Asian countries and the IMF7. This experience fuelled both a willingness to self-insure through accelerated reserve accumulation and to strengthen regional arrangements to reduce the reliance on global financial safety nets. Building on this lesson, the CMI was formalised in May 2000 during the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting8. It largely built on the original ASA and bilateral swap agreements involving the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea but was grounded in a broader programme that also included developing Asia’s local currency bond market and introduced a regional economic review and policy dialogue to enhance the region’s surveillance mechanism (Kawai and Houser 2007). The initiative included the new ASEAN members, increasing the total number of parties to the arrangement from 5 to 10. Table A.1 in the appendix highlights the evolution of the CMI. The question of cooperation between the CMI and the IMF quickly became quite heated, with a number of countries arguing that strong ties to the Fund would defeat the initial purpose of the initiative (Korea Institute of Finance, 2012), but the ties were kept nonetheless both to mitigate moral hazard (Sussangkarn, 2011) and to ensure some consistency with conditionality attached to the IMF’s own programmes. After the formal creation of the CMI in 2000, the era of Great Moderation that followed to some degree doused further ambitions to strengthen regional arrangements. As a result, when the global financial crisis hit in 2008, the Asian regional financial safety net proved too modest to play a meaningful role.

Indeed, instead of seeking support under CMI, the Bank of Korea and the Monetary Authority of Singapore sought a swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve for some $30 billion each. The Republic of Korea concluded bilateral agreements with Japan and the PRC that were not related to the CMI. Similarly, Indonesia established separate bilateral swap lines with Japan and the PRC to shore up its crisis buffer and did not resort to the CMI for credit support (Sussangkarn, 2011). The plan to consolidate the bilateral swap arrangements and form a single, more solid, and effective reserve pooling mechanism – which had initially been put forward by the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 in May 2007 in Kyoto – was accelerated and evolved in several iterations before the final version was laid out more than two years later. In December 2009, the CMI was multilateralised and the ASEAN+3 representatives signed the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement, which effectively became binding on March 24, 2010 (BSP, 2012). These successive transformations have strengthened the initiative, but it remains largely untested. In addition, other aspects of any credible regional financial arrangement, such as surveillance capacity and coordination of some basic economic policies, remain relatively embryonic.

 

 

From GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS: LESSONS FROM EUROPE AND ASIA

 

EU ESM

The history of European financial safety nets cannot be dissociated from the history of European monetary integration. With this perspective in mind, it dates back to the late 1960s and has been an ongoing debate to this day. The history of European political integration at every turn is marked by failed projects or actual mechanisms of financial solidarity, ranging from loose exchange rate arrangements to the project of a full-fledged European Monetary Fund. The advent of the monetary union was precisely designed to reduce the need for financial safety nets within the euro area. But the architectural deficiencies of the euro area and the lack of internal transfers have required the establishment of alternative mutual insurance mechanisms since the onset of the euro crisis in 2010. In 2008, when the global financial crisis hit, Hungary had accumulated important external imbalances and large foreign exchange exposures. It had to seek financial assistance almost immediately and initiated contacts with the IMF. The total absence of coordination with European authorities came as an initial shock because it showed that despite decades of intense economic, political, and monetary integration, EU countries could still come to require international financial assistance. The experience pushed European institutions to unearth a forgotten provision of the Maastricht Treaty to provide financial assistance through the Balance of Payments Assistance Facility9. This created preliminary and at first ad-hoc coordination between the IMF and the European Commission, which was then rediscovering design and monitoring of macroeconomic adjustment programmes. Despite the rapid use of this facility and the emergence of a framework of cooperation with the IMF, contagion from the global financial crisis continued for months and prompted some Eastern European leaders to seek broader and more pre-emptive support10, which failed. However, beyond official sector participation, there was a relatively rapid realisation that cross-border banking and financial retrenchment could become a major source of financial disruption and effectively propagate the crisis further – including back to the core of Europe, as large European banks were heavily exposed to Eastern Europe through vast and dense networks of branches and subsidiaries. In response, in late February 2009, under the leadership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank decided to establish what was known as the Vienna Initiative. This was designed as a joint multilateral and private sector coordination and enforcement mechanism to reduce the risk of banking sector sudden stops. In particular, it compelled cross-border European banks to continue to provide appropriate liquidity to their branches and subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The formalisation of such an arrangement11 quite early in the crisis has certainly proven the case for coordination of financial institutions in emerging-market economies, especially when a relatively small number of institutions have a disproportionate impact on capital flows. But with the crisis spreading to the euro area, starting with Greece in the fall of 2010, new regional arrangements proved necessary. The lack of instruments forced European officials to first consider bilateral assistance from member states. The idea of involving the IMF was initially violently rejected 9 on intellectual and political grounds12 but proved inevitable. In a number of successive iterations, more solid regional arrangements were designed (Bijlsma and Vallée 2012). Table A.2 in the appendix shows the evolution of European regional financial safety nets.

 

List of Regional Financial Agreements (RFA)

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Key Terms:

  • RMB
  • Bilateral Currency Swaps
  • Reserve Pooling
  • CMI
  • CMIM
  • BRICS CRA
  • AMRO
  • IMF SDR Basket
  • Currency Internationalization
  • Global Liquidity
  • Funding Liquidity
  • Market Liquidity
  • BRICS NDB
  • CHINA AIIB
  • Regional Integration
  • Multilateralism
  • Multipolar
  • FX Swap Networks
  • Central Banks
  • Reserve Currency
  • Global Financial Safety Nets (GFSN)
  • Foreign Exchange Reserves
  • Regional Financial Agreements (RFA)
  • Regional Financial Networks (RFN)
  • Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement (BSA)
  • RMB (Renminbi also known as Yuan)
  • International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR)
  • Regional Financial Safety Net (RFSN)
  • Multilateral Financial Safety Net (MFSN)
  • National Financial Safety Net (NFSN)

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Self-Insurance, Reserve Pooling Arrangements, and Pre-emptive Financing

Sunil Sharma

 

Click to access sharma.pdf

 

 

Regional Reserve Pooling Arrangements

Suman S. Basu Ran Bi

Prakash Kannan

First Draft: 8 February, 2010 This Draft: 7 June, 2010

 

Click to access Prakash.pdf

 

 

Toward a functional Chiang Mai Initiative

15 May 2012

Author: Chalongphob Sussangkarn, TDRI

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/15/toward-a-functional-chiang-mai-initiative/

 

 

The International Financial Architecture and the Role of Regional Funds

Barry Eichengreen

University of California, Berkeley

August 2010

 

Click to access intl_finan_arch_2010.pdf

 

 

Examining the case for Reserve Pooling in East Asia: Empirical Analysis

Ramkishen S. Rajan, Reza Siregar and Graham Bird

2003

 

Click to access 0323.pdf

 

 

Financial Architectures and Development: Resilience, Policy Space and Human Development in the Global South

by Ilene Grabel

2013

 

Click to access hdro_1307_grabel.pdf

 

 

International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements?

Joshua Aizenman,
Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park,

March 2010

 

Click to access ajp-ir-sw-0301.pdf

 

 

How can we fix the global financial safety net?

WEF

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/how-can-we-fix-the-global-financial-safety-net/

 

 

Regional Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Euro Crisis for Developing Areas?

Sebastian Dullien

Barbara Fritz

Laurissa Mühlich

 

Click to access WEA-WER2-Dullien.pdf

 

 

The Global Dollar System

Stephen G Cecchetti

 

Click to access Polp61.pdf

 

 

The Future of the IMF and of Regional Cooperation in East Asia

Yung Chul Park, Charles Wyplosz

2008

 

Click to access 20081111-12_Y-C_Park-C_Wyplosz.pdf

 

 

China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Agreements: Recent Trends

Aravind Yelery

 

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0009445515627210

 

 

The Spread of Chinese Swaps

CFR

 

https://www.cfr.org/international-finance/central-bank-currency-swaps-since-financial-crisis/p36419#!/

 

 

Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

Click to access CMIM.pdf

 

 

The Chiang Mai Initiative

Click to access 3iie3381.pdf

 

 

Beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative: Prospects for Regional Financial and Monetary Integration in East Asia

 

Click to access Session-2_1-4.pdf

 

 

Currency internationalisation: an overview

 

Peter B Kenen

 

Click to access arpresearch200903.01.pdf

 

 

 

Why Was the CMI Possible?

Embedded Domestic Preferences and Internationally Nested Constraints in Regional Institution Building in East Asia

Saori N. Katada

 

Click to access 1f1966fe-1c48-4d32-a463-ea268ecb2903.pdf

 

 

Emergent International Liquidity Agreements: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis

Daniel McDowell

 

Click to access mcdowell_eln.pdf

 

 

Regional Financial Cooperation in Asia

Daikichi Momma

 

Click to access Session_2_Momma.pdf

 

 

East Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Japan’s Perspective

Takatoshi Ito

 

Click to access 41RegionalCoop.pdf

 

 

What Motivates Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia Today?

JENNIFER AMYX

 

http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api076.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32049

 

 

Evaluating Asian Swap Arrangements

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park

No. 297 July 2011

 

Click to access adbi-wp297.pdf

 

 

Regional Monetary Cooperation in East Asia Should the United States Be Concerned?

Wen Jin Yuan Melissa Murphy

 

Click to access 101129_Yuan_RegionalCoop_WEB.pdf

 

 

Chiang Mai Initiative as the Foundation of Financial Stability in East Asia

Click to access 17902.pdf

 

 

COMPLEX DECISION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASIAN REGIONAL FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT

Iwan J Azis

 

Click to access p02.pdf

 

 

Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

December 2013

 

Click to access ChiangMaiInitiative_0.pdf

 

 

 

RMBI or RMBR?
Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency?

Barry Eichengreen

Domenico Lombardi

 

Click to access RMBI_or_RMBR_-_Eichengreen.pdf

 

 

 

Monetary and financial cooperation in Asia: taking stock of recent ongoings

Ramkishen S. Rajan

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.361&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

FINANCIAL CRISES AND EAST ASIA’S FINANCIAL COOPERATION

 

By Park Young-joon

 

Click to access ParkYJ.pdf

 

 

MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA

Peter B. Kenen
Ellen E. Meade

 

Click to access Kenen.pdf

 

 

Regional cooperation for financial and exchange rates stability in East Asia

 

Kenichi Shimizu

Click to access WP_FG7_2013_01_Dezember_Kenichi_Shimizu.pdf

 

 

ASIAN FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION

Address by Mr GR Stevens

 

Click to access bu-1105-3.pdf

 

 

The Rise of China and Regional Integration in East Asia

 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290788291_The_Rise_of_China_and_Regional_Integration_in_East_Asia

 

 

REGIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA: THE CHIANG MAI INITIATIVE AND BEYOND

 

Click to access Bulletin02-ch8.pdf

 

 

Financial RegionaliSm: a Review oF the iSSueS

Domenico lombaRDi

2010

 

Click to access 11_global_economy_lombardi.pdf

 

 

The layers of the global financial safety net: taking stock

2016

 

Click to access eb201605_article01.en.pdf

 

 

Regional Financial Arrangements for East Asia: A Different Agenda from Latin America

By Yung Chul Park

 

Click to access 00510.pdf

 

 

Elasticity and Discipline in the Global Swap Network

Perry Mehrling

Working Paper No. 27 November 12, 2015

 

Click to access WP27-Mehrling.pdf

 

 

 Swap Agreements & China’s RMB Currency Network

https://www.cogitasia.com/swap-agreements-chinas-rmb-currency-network/

 

 

Central Bank Currency Swaps and the International Monetary System

Christophe Destais

 

Click to access CentralBankCurrencySwap_ChristopheDestais.pdf

 

 

Renminbi internationalisation – The pace quickens

Click to access Renminbi-internationalisation-The-pace-quickens.pdf

 

 

What Will China’s RMB Bilateral Currency Swap Deals Lead To?

 

https://www.chinamoneynetwork.com/2013/11/08/what-will-chinas-rmb-bilateral-currency-swap-deals-lead-to

 

 

Emergent International Liquidity Agreements: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis

Daniel McDowell

 

Click to access mcdowell_eln.pdf

 

 

Currency Swap of Central Bank: Influence on International Currency System

 

Click to access 20160316142214_202.pdf

 

 

Building Global and Regional Financial Safety Nets

February 2016

Yung Chul Park

 

Click to access 35E%20Yung%20Chul%20Park£∫Building%20Global%20and%20Regional%20Financial%20Safety%20Nets%20%20Final.pdf

 

 

RMBI or RMBR?

Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency?

Barry Eichengreen

Domenico Lombardi

 

Click to access RMBI_or_RMBR_-_Eichengreen.pdf

 

 

China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Lines

Yin-Wong Cheung, Hung Hing Ying  LIN Zhitao

ZHAN Wenjie

2016

 

Click to access GRU%232016-013%20_YW.pdf

 

 

Internationalisation of the Chinese Currency: Towards a Multipolar International Monetary System?

Lucia Országhová

 

Click to access biatec_01_2016_orszaghova.pdf

 

 

Central bank: China currency swap deals surpass 3t yuan

http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2015/06/11/content_281475125318660.htm

 

 

The International Lender of Last Resort for Emerging Countries: A Bilateral Currency Swap?

Camila Villard Duran

Click to access WP_108%20-%20The%20International%20Lender%20of%20Last%20Resort%20for%20Emerging%20Countries%20-%20Camila%20Duran.pdf

 

Click to access Duran%20-%20The%20International%20Lender%20of%20Last%20Resort%20for%20Emerging%20Countries.pdf

 

 

Entry of yuan into SDR may give a boost to global liquidity

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/entry-of-yuan-into-sdr-may-give-a-boost-to-global-liquidity-2016-10-17

 

 

Redback Rising: China’s Bilateral Swap Agreements and RMB Internationalization

Steven Liao
Daniel E. McDowell

 

Click to access yuan_isq.pdf

 

 

International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements? 

Joshua Aizenman
Yothin Jinjarak,  Donghyun Park

March 2010

 

Click to access ajp-ir-sw-0301.pdf

 

 

The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

William W. Grimes

2011

 

Click to access Grimes.pdf

 

 

Avoiding the next liquidity crunch: how the G20 must support monetary cooperation to increase resilience to crisis

Camila Villard Duran

 

Click to access GEG%20Villard%20Duran%20October%202015.pdf

 

Stitching together the global financial safety net

Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò

2016

 

Click to access fs_paper36.pdf

 

 

Why Are There Large Foreign Exchange Reserves?  The Case of South Korea

Franklin Allen

Joo Yun Hong

 

Click to access 01_KSSJ_11-02-03.pdf

 

 

Federal Reserve Policy in an International Context

Ben S. Bernanke

 

Click to access Bernanke.pdf

 

 

The dollar’s international role: An “exorbitant privilege”?

Ben S. Bernanke

Thursday, January 7, 2016

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/01/07/the-dollars-international-role-an-exorbitant-privilege-2/

 

 

TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2015

Making the international financial architecture work for development

 

Click to access tdr2015ch3_en.pdf

 

 

Global Economic Governance in Asia: Through the Looking Glass of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

China in Global Financial Governance: Implications from Regional Leadership Challenge in East Asia

Takashi Terada

 

Click to access China-in-Global-Financial-Governance-Implications-from-Regional-Leadership-Challenge-in-East-Asia-by-Takashi-Terada.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Currency Swaps Key to International Monetary System

http://andrewsheng.net/Article_Central_bank_currency_swaps_key_to_IMS.html

 

 

The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines

Michael J. Fleming and Nicholas J. Klagge

 

Click to access ci16-4.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Liquidity Swaps

https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/liquidity_swap.html

 

 

Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs

Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.422.11&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

eXperience With foreign currency liquidity-providing centrAl bAnK sWAps

 

Click to access art1_mb201408_pp65-82en.pdf

 

 

Banking on China through Currency Swap Agreements

October 23, 2015

By Cindy Li

http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asia-program/pacific-exchange-blog/banking-on-china-renminbi-currency-swap-agreements/

 

 

TESTING THE GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK SWAP NETWORK

http://www.perrymehrling.com/2015/07/testing-the-global-central-bank-swap-network/

 

 

The impact of international swap lines on stock returns of banks in emerging markets

Alin Marius Andries1 Andreas M. Fischer2 Pınar Ye ̧sin

June 2015

 

Click to access sem_2015_07_09_Andries_Fischer_Yesin.n.pdf

 

 

Why Did the US Federal Reserve Unprecedentedly Offer Swap Lines to Emerging Market Economies during the Global Financial Crisis? Can We Expect Them Again in the Future?

Hyoung-kyu Chey

 

Click to access 11-18.pdf

 

 

International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements? 

Joshua Aizenman,
Yothin Jinjarak,  Donghyun Park

July 2010

 

Click to access 037b0b0312cfb51cee7dffd5c3399332a669.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs

Linda S. Goldberg Craig Kennedy Jason Miu

 

Click to access 9a564d30e508dcd3799ceb7a99b5e2c2e273.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Liquidity Swaps

https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-trends/2011-economic-trends/et-20111219-central-bank-liquidity-swaps.aspx

 

 

Central bank currency swaps key to international monetary system

April 2014

Author: Andrew Sheng, Fung Global Institute

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/01/central-bank-currency-swaps-key-to-international-monetary-system/

 

 

Evaluating Asian Swap Arrangements

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park

No. 297 July 2011

 

Click to access adbi-wp297.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Overview

Yubo Wang

February 15, 2010

 

Click to access Central_Bank_Liquidity_Swaps_201002.pdf

 

 

The implications of cross-border banking and foreign currency swap lines for the international monetary system

 

Már Guðmundsson:

Click to access MGpresentation.pdf

 

 

The Politics of Rescuing the World’s Financial System: The Federal Reserve as a Global Lender of Last Resort

J. Lawrence Broz

 

2014

Click to access broz2014.pdf

 

 

From Exorbitant Privilege to Existential Trilemma

 

https://doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&sourceid=em&document_id=1067001821&serialid=FdgDLSRBS51YJLr69%2BcO6H1iGqGyLNuzqEDE5DwoUt8%3D

 

 

The dollar is now everyone’s problem

September 29, 2014

http://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2014/9/29/the-dollar-is-now-everyones-problem

 

 

The Global Dollar System

Stephen G Cecchetti

 

Click to access Polp61.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Swaps and International Dollar Illiquidity

Andrew K. Rose Mark M. Spiegel∗

March 14, 2012

 

Click to access RSGJE.pdf

 

 

DOLLAR FUNDING AND THE LENDING BEHAVIOR OF GLOBAL BANKS

VICTORIA IVASHINA DAVID S. SCHARFSTEIN JEREMY C. STEIN

First draft: October 2012 This draft: March 2015

 

Click to access ISS%20revision%20march%202015%20FINAL_7529aa88-fe19-4fd1-8427-43b83c5d8589.pdf

 

 

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RENMINBI AND THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR CURRENCY SYSTEM

By Miriam Campanella

 

Click to access WP201201_1.pdf

 

 

Dollar Illiquidity and Central Bank Swap Arrangements During the Global Financial Crisis

Andrew K. Rose Mark M. Spiegel

August 2011

 

Click to access wp11-18bk.pdf

 

 

Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs

Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, Jason Miu

Click to access w15763.pdf

 

 

US Dollar Swap Arrangements between Central Banks

 

Click to access box-b.pdf

 

 

Currency Swaps with Foreign Central Banks

 

BY RENEE COURTOIS

 

Click to access policy_update.pdf

 

 

Central Banks Make Swaps Permanent as Crisis Backstop

Jeff Black

October 31, 2013

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-31/ecb-makes-crisis-cash-lines-at-central-banks-permanent

 

 

Swap Lines Underscore the Dollar’s Global Role

 

Click to access 12q1currencyswaps.pdf

 

 

Central bank co-operation and international liquidity in the financial crisis of 2008-9

by William A Allen and Richhild Moessner

Monetary and Economic Department

May 2010

 

Click to access work310.pdf

 

 

Financial instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008

Maurice Obstfeld Jay C. Shambaugh  Alan M. Taylor

 

Click to access ObstfeldShambaughTaylorAEAPP.pdf

 

 

The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010

 

J. Lawrence Broz

 

Click to access Broz_Fed.pdf

 

 

Lenders of Last Resort and Global Liquidity

Rethinking the system

 

Click to access outreach_obstfeld_dec09.pdf

 

 

The Fed’s FX swap facilities have been quiet… too quiet?

https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/07/13/2169137/the-feds-fx-swap-facilities-have-been-quiet-too-quiet/

 

 

Swap Lines Underscore the Dollar’s Global Role

 

Click to access 12q1currencyswaps.pdf

 

 

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SWAP LINES SINCE 1962

Michael D. Bordo Owen F. Humpage Anna J. Schwartz

2014

 

Click to access w20755.pdf

 

 

How China Covered The World In “Liquidity Swap Lines”

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-17/how-china-covered-world-liquidity-swap-lines

 

 

The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines

Michael J. Fleming  Nicholas Klagge

April 1, 2010

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1597320

 

 

The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010

 

J. Lawrence Broz

 

Click to access dp-30.pdf

 

 

The Fed’s Role in International Crises

Donald Kohn

Thursday, September 18, 2014

https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-feds-role-in-international-crises/

 

 

Options for meeting the demand for international liquidity during financial crises

 

Click to access r_qt1009g.pdf

 

 

The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development and Outlook

Chalongphob Sussangkarn

No. 230 July 2010

 

Click to access adbi-wp230.pdf

 

 

The Amended Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Comes Into Effect on July 17, 2014

 

Click to access rel140717a.pdf

 

 

Note on Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)* 

Chalongphob Sussangkarn

 

Click to access Chalongphabs_Note.pdf

 

 

SOURCES AND EVOLUTION OF THE CHIANG MAI INITIATIVE

 

Vyacheslav Amirov

Click to access 7.pdf

 

 

The Chiang Mai Initiative

PIIE

Click to access 3iie3381.pdf

 

 

Why Was the CMI Possible?

Embedded Domestic Preferences and Internationally Nested Constraints in Regional Institution Building in East Asia**

Saori N. Katada

 

Click to access 1f1966fe-1c48-4d32-a463-ea268ecb2903.pdf

 

 

From the Chiang Mai Initiative to an Asian Monetary Fund

Masahiro Kawai

No. 527 May 2015

 

Click to access adbi-wp527.pdf

 

 

Asian Monetary Fund: Getting Nearer

By Pradumna B. Rana

 

Click to access CO11079.pdf

 

 

Panel on Financial Affairs Meeting on 2 November 2009

 

Background Brief
on Hong Kong’s participation in Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

 

Click to access fa1102cb1-144-e.pdf

 

 

The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation: Origin, Development and Outlook

 

 

 

Much Ado about Nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian Exchange Rate Cooperation

Wolf HASSDORF

 

Click to access 06Hassdorf.pdf

 

 

Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward

Hal Hill and Jayant Menon

 

Click to access wp_econ_2012_17.pdf

 

 

Financial Community Building in East Asia

The Chiang Mai Initiative: Its Causes and Evaluation

 

EPIK 2010 Economics of Community Building

Yoon Jin Lee

 

Click to access YoonJinLee.pdf

 

 

FROM “TAOGUANG YANGHUI” TO “YOUSUO ZUOWEI”:

CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL MINILATERALISM

HONGYING WANG

 

Click to access cigi_paper_no52.pdf

 

 

Foundation of Regional Integration: Common or Divergent Interests?

Yong Wook Lee

 

Click to access -_foundation_of_regional_integration__1_.pdf

 

 

CMIM and ESM: ASEAN+3 and Eurozone Crisis Management and Resolution Liquidity Provision in Comparative Perspective

Ramon PACHECO PARDO

 

Click to access CBFL-WP-RPP01.pdf

 

 

An Overview of Regional Financial Cooperation: Implication for BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement

Zhang Liqing,NianShuting

 

Click to access 20160316142109_641.pdf

 

 

CMIM-Asian Multilateralism and Cooperation

Keynote speech by Dr. Junhong Chang, AMRO Director, at the 6th Asia Research Forum
1 July 2016

http://www.amro-asia.org/keynote-speech-by-dr-junhong-chang-amro-director-at-the-6th-asia-research-forum-cmim-asian-multilateralism-and-cooperation/

 

 

Financial RegionaliSm: a Review oF the iSSueS

Domenico lombaRDi

 

Click to access 11_global_economy_lombardi.pdf

 

 

Practices of Financial Regionalism and the Negotiation of Community in East Asia

Mikko Huotari

 

Click to access op8_huotari_feb-2012_end.pdf

 

 

Financial Integration in Emerging Asian Economies

Gladys Siow

 

Click to access 032-ICEBI2012-A10048.pdf

 

 

Regional Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Euro Crisis for Developing Areas?

Sebastian Dullien

Barbara Fritz

Laurissa Mühlich

 

Click to access WEA-WER2-Dullien.pdf

 

 

The Need and Scope for Strengthening Co-operation Between Regional Financing Arrangements and the IMF

 

Ulrich Volz

 

Click to access DP_15.2012.pdf

 

 

Towards institutionalization: The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)

http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/05/12/the-politics-of-the-brics-contingency-reserve-arrangement-cra/

 

 

The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position

in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture

NIColETTE CATTANEo, MAyAMIko BIzIwICk & DAvID FRyER

 

https://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/752-policy-insights-10-the-brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-and-its-position-in-the-emerging-global-financial-architecture/file

 

 

Financial Architectures and Development:

Resilience, Policy Space and Human Development in the Global South

by Ilene Grabel

 

Click to access hdro_1307_grabel.pdf

 

 

Financial Regionalism in East Asia

 

Click to access VOLZ.pdf

 

 

Enhancing the Effectiveness of CMIM and AMRO: Selected Immediate Challenges and Tasks

Reza Siregar and Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol

No. 403 January 2013

 

Click to access 2013.01.17.wp403.enhancing.effectiveness.cmim_.amro_.pdf

 

 

Regional and Global Liquidity Arrangements

Ulrich Volz / Aldo Caliari (Editors)

 

Click to access regional_funds_oct2010.pdf

 

 

A regional reserve fund for Latin America

Daniel Titelman, Cecilia Vera, Pablo Carvallo and Esteban Pérez Caldentey

 

Click to access RVI112Titelmanetal_en.pdf

 

 

Financial Crises as Catalysts for Regional Integration? The Chances and Obstacles for Monetary Integration in ASEAN+3 and MERCOSUR

Sebastian Krapohl  Daniel Rempe

 

Click to access KrapohlRempe.pdf

 

 

Financial Integration

 

Click to access Financial%20Integration.pdf

 

 

Framework of the ASEAN Plus Three Mechanisms Operating in the Sphere of Economic Cooperation

Prof. Dr. Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov

 

Click to access CALE20DP20No.207-110826.pdf

 

 

Regional Integration in Europe and East Asia: Experiences of Integration and Lessons from Functional Multilateralism

Uwe Wissenbach

 

Click to access 13-2-02_Uwe_Wissenbach.pdf

 

 

General Overview: “Financial Risk and Crisis Management after the Global Financial Crisis”

 

Click to access Jun2016No9.pdf

 

 

Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation 

GREGORY T. CHIN

 

Click to access chin1.pdf

 

 

The Origins and Transformation of East Asian Financial Regionalism

 

http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11089/18824/6-069_084-Klecha-Tylec.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

 

 

Regional Financial Arrangement: An Impetus for Regional Policy Cooperation

Reza Siregar and Keita Miyaki

 

Click to access MPRA_paper_51050.pdf

 

 

Role of Regional Institutions in East Asia

 

Click to access RPR_FY2011_No.10_Chapter_11.pdf

 

 

Asia’s new financial safety net: Is the Chiang Mai Initiative designed not to be used?

Hal Hill, Jayant Menon

25 July 2012

http://voxeu.org/article/chiang-mai-initiative-designed-not-be-used

 

 

Will the new BRICS institutions work?

 

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/08/brics-new-development-bank-contingent-reserve-agreement/

 

 

BRICS NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CONTINGENT RESERVE ARRANGEMENT

 

Click to access 150428BRICS_Bank.pdf

 

 

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the International Monetary System

Manmohan Agarwal

 

Click to access 2ead896b5e52456a098bbd2d0b25774b.pdf

 

 

The BRICS Bank and Reserve Arrangement: towards a new global financial framework?

2014

 

Click to access EPRS_ATA(2014)542178_REV1_EN.pdf

 

 

China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Lines

Lin Zhitao Zhan Wenjie Yin-Wong Cheung

CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 5736 CATEGORY 7:MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE JANUARY 2016

 

 

Elasticity and Discipline in the Global Swap Network

Perry Mehrling Barnard College and INET

November 6, 2015

Click to access Global-Swap-Network.pdf

 

 

A Proposal for a New Regional Financial Arrangement: The Reserve Liquidity Line

Young-Joon Park

2014

 

 

International Liquidity in a Multipolar World

Barry Eichengreen

 

 

 

International Liquidity Swaps: Is the Chiang Mai Initiative Pooling Reserves Efficiently ?

Emanuel Kohlscheen and Mark P. Tayl

Click to access liquidity_swaps.pdf

Click to access twerp_752.pdf

 

 

International Reserves and Swap Lines in Times of Financial Distress: Overview and Interpretations

Joshua Aizenman

No. 192 February 2010

Click to access adbi-wp192.pdf

 

 

Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions

C. Randall Henning

 

Click to access wp11-9.pdf

 

 

The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization

William W. Grimes

Click to access Grimes.pdf

 

 

REGIONAL LIQUIDITY MECHANISMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Gustavo Rojas de Cerqueira César

Click to access PWR_v4_n3_Regional.pdf

 

 

Much Ado about Nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian Exchange Rate Cooperation

Wolf HASSDORF

Click to access 06Hassdorf.pdf

 

 

Global Liquidity: Public and Private

Jean-Pierre Landau

 

Click to access Jackson-Hole-Print.pdf

 

 

Safety for whom? The scattered global financial safety net and the role of regional financial arrangements

Mühlich, Laurissa; Fritz, Barbara

 

http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/48298/ssoar-2016-muhlich_et_al-Safety_for_whom_The_scattered.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

The International Financial Architecture and the Role of Regional Funds

Barry Eichengreen

August 2010

 

Click to access intl_finan_arch_2010.pdf

 

 

The evolving multi-layered global financial safety net : role of Asia

 

 

 

The decentralised global monetary system requires an efficient safety net

Click to access Fokus-Nr.-147-November-2016-monetäres-System_EN.pdf

 

 

Asian Regional Financial Safety Nets? Don’t Hold Your Breath

Iwan J Azis

Click to access ppr017e.pdf

 

 

STITCHING TOGETHER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET

Minouche Shafik,

Deputy Governor, Bank of England

26th February 2016

 

Click to access 31E%20Minouche%20Shafik£∫Stitching%20Together%20The%20Global%20Financial%20Safety%20Net.pdf

 

 

The Global Financial Safety Net through the Prism of G20 Summits

Gong Cheng

European Stability Mechanism

Click to access MPRA_paper_68070.pdf

 

 

ADEQUACY OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET

 

 The Evolving Multi-layered Global Financial Safety Net: Role of Asia

Pradumna B. Rana

 

Global Financial Safety Nets: Where Do We Go from Here?
Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Eduardo Fernández-AriasFriday,
January 14, 2011
 Strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net

 

The Global Liquidity Safety Net

Institutional Cooperation on Precautionary Facilities and Central Bank Swaps

Click to access new_thinking_g20_no5_web.pdf

 

 

Inadequate Regional Financial Safety Nets Reflect Complacency

Iwan J. Azis

No. 411 March 2013

 

Click to access adbi-wp411.pdf

 

 

Stitching together the global financial safety net

by Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò

 

Click to access QEF_322_16.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS: LESSONS FROM EUROPE AND ASIA

CHANGYONG RHEE, LEA SUMULONG AND SHAHIN VALLÉE

 

Click to access WP_2013_02.pdf

 

 

Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward

 

Hal Hill and Jayant Menon

No. 395 November 2012

Click to access adbi-wp395.pdf

 What we really know about the global financial safety net

 

Beatrice Scheubel, Livio Stracca

04 October 2016

Global Financial Safety Nets: Where Do We Go from Here?

Eduardo Fernandez-Arias

Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati

November 2010

Global Financial Safety Nets
How can countries cooperate to mitigate contagion and limit the spread of crises?November 7, 2011

 

What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution

 Global Financial Safety Net