Low Interest Rates and Business Investments : Update August 2017

Low Interest Rates and Business Investments : Update August 2017

 

From  Explaining Low Investment Spending

USINVEST

globalinvest

 

Please see my earlier posts.

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

The Decline in Long Term Real Interest Rates

Short term Thinking in Investment Decisions of Businesses and Financial Markets

Low Interest Rates and Monetary Policy Effectiveness

Low Interest Rates and Banks’ Profitability : Update July 2017

Low Interest Rates and Banks Profitability: Update – December 2016

 

Since my earlier posts on this subject there has been several new studies published highlighting weakness in business investments as one of the cause of slower economic growth and lower interest rates.

Other significant factors impacting interest rates are demographic changes, and slower economic growth.

I argue that there is mutual (circular) causality in weak business investment, slower economic growth, and lower interest rates which reinforce each other.

 

Decreased competition, increased concentration, corporate savings glut, share buybacks, paying dividends are also identified as factors.

Number of public companies have decreased significantly in USA since 1996 due to M&A activity.   See the data below.

Increased Mergers/Acquisitions, Increased Concentration, Decreased Competition, Decreased Number of Public Companies, Share buybacks, and Dividend Payouts are multiple perspectives of same problem.

 

From The Incredible Shrinking Universe of Stocks

The Causes and Consequences of Fewer U.S. Equities

USNUMUSSTAT

 

Key sources of Research:

The Low Level of Global Real Interest Rates

Remarks by
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

at the
Conference to Celebrate Arminio Fraga’s 60 Years
Casa das Garcas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

July 31, 2017

The Low Level of Global Real Interest Rates

 

 

INVESTMENT-LESS GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

German Gutierrez Thomas Philippon

Working Paper 22897

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138

December 2016

 

INVESTMENT-LESS GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

 

 

Explaining Low Investment Spending

The NBER Digest
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

February 2017

Explaining Low Investment Spending

 

 

The Secular Stagnation of Investment?

Callum Jones and Thomas Philippon

December 2016

 

The Secular Stagnation of Investment?

 

 

Is there an investment gap in advanced economies? If so, why?

By Robin Dottling, German Gutierrez and Thomas Philippon

 

Is there an investment gap in advanced economies? If so, why?

 

 

The Disappointing Recovery of Output after 2009

JOHN G. FERNALD ROBERT E. HALL

JAMES H. STOCK MARK W. WATSON

May 2, 2017

The Disappointing Recovery of Output after 2009

 

 

Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.

German Gutierrez and Thomas Philippon

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

July 2017

 

Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S

 

 

Real Interest Rates Over the Long Run : Decline and convergence since the 1980s

Kei-Mu Yi   Jing Zhang

ECONOMIC POLICY PAPER 16-10 SEPTEMBER 2016

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of MINNEAPOLIS

Real Interest Rates over the Long Run Decline and convergence since the 1980s, due significantly to factors causing lower investment demand

 

 

Understanding global trends in long-run real interest rates

Kei-Mu Yi and Jing Zhang

Economic Perspectives, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2017
Chicago Fed Reserve Bank

 

Understanding Global Trends in Long-run Real Interest Rates

 

 

Weakness in Investment Growth: Causes, Implications and Policy Responses

CAMA Working Paper 19/2017 March 2017

M. Ayhan Kose

Franziska Ohnsorge

Lei Sandy Ye

Ergys Islamaj

 

Weakness in Investment Growth: Causes, Implications and Policy Responses

 

 

Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?

Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin and Roni Michaely

October 2016

 

Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?

 

 

Why Is Global Business Investment So Weak? Some Insights from Advanced Economies

 

Robert Fay, Justin-Damien Guénette, Martin Leduc and Louis Morel,

International Economic Analysis Department

Bank of Canada Review Spring 2017

 

Why Is Global Business Investment So Weak? Some Insights from Advanced Economies

 

 

What Is Behind the Weakness in Global Investment?

by Maxime Leboeuf and Bob Fay

2016

Bank of Canada

 

What Is Behind the Weakness in Global Investment?

 A Structural Interpretation of the Recent Weakness in Business Investment

by Russell Barnett and Rhys Mendes

 The Corporate Saving Glut in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

 

Gruber, Joseph W., and Steven B. Kamin

International Finance Discussion Papers
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Number 1150 October 2015

 

The Corporate Saving Glut in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

 

 

The Incredible Shrinking Universe of Stocks

The Causes and Consequences of Fewer U.S. Equities

March 22, 2017

GLOBAL FINANCIAL STRATEGIES

http://www.credit-suisse.com

 

The Incredible Shrinking Universe of Stocks The Causes and Consequences of Fewer U.S. Equities

 

 

They Just Get Bigger: How Corporate Mergers Strangle the Economy

Jordan Brennan

2017 February 19

They Just Get Bigger: How Corporate Mergers Strangle the Economy

 

 

Rising Corporate Concentration, Declining Trade Union Power, and the Growing Income Gap: American Prosperity in Historical Perspective

Jordan Brennan

March 2016

 

Rising Corporate Concentration, Declining Trade Union Power, and the Growing Income Gap: American Prosperity in Historical Perspective

Low Interest Rates and Monetary Policy Effectiveness

Low Interest Rates and Monetary Policy Effectiveness

 

World economy is stuck in low interest rates environment.   Euro area, japan have even negative interest rates.  US Fed Reserve since December 2016 has started raising interest rates.

Attempts by Central Banks have not been effective in increasing economic growth.  Many Economists now are presenting counter intuitive reasons for low growth.

 

Please see my earlier related posts.

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

 

Since 2016, there are several new studies published exploring effectiveness of monetary policy in low interest rates environment.

 

Is monetary policy less effective when interest rates are persistently low?

by Claudio Borio and Boris Hofmann

April 2017

Is Monetary Policy Less Effective When Interest Rates are Persistently Low?

 

In March 2017, Brookings Institution published the following study by the economists of the US Federal Reserve.

Monetary policy in a low interest rate world

 

Fed Reserve of Chicago published speech given by Charles Evans in 2016.

Monetary Policy in a Lower Interest Rate Environment

 

Lecture by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, Macroeconomics Symposium at Utrecht School of Economics, 15 June 2016

The challenge of low real interest rates for monetary policy

 

Journal of Policy Modeling published a paper by Ken Rogoff.  Paper was presented at American Economic Association, 2017.

Monetary policy in a low interest rate world

 

Eight BIS CCA Research Conference on “Low interest rates, monetary policy and international spillovers”, hosted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington DC, 25-26 May 2017

Low interest rates, monetary policy and international spillovers

 

Economist Magazine published an article on views of Bill Gross and others.

November 2015

Do ultra-low interest rates really damage growth?

 

Bloomberg Business Week published an article describing views of Charles Calomiris and others.

June 2017

Is the World Overdoing Low Interest Rates?

 

Claudio Borio and Boris Hofmann

The Paper was prepared for the Reserve Bank of Australia conference
“Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in a World of Low Interest Rates”,

16-17 March 2017, Sydney

Is monetary policy less effective when interest rates are persistently low?

 

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: diminishing effectiveness?

Claudio Borio and Leonardo Gambacorta

February 2017

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: diminishing effectiveness?

 

Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP):
Implications for Monetary Transmission and Bank Profitability in the Euro Area

Prepared by Andreas (Andy) Jobst and Huidan Lin

IMF

August 2016

Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP): Implications for Monetary Transmission and Bank Profitability in the Euro Area

 

James Bullard, President and CEO of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

March 24, 2009

The Henry Thornton Lecture, Cass Business School, London

Effective Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment

 

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability

Tobias Adrian
Nellie Liang

Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability

 

Monetary policy, the financial cycle and ultra-low interest rates

Mikael Juselius of Bank of Finland

DNB Workshop on “Estimating and Interpreting Financial Cycles”

Amsterdam, 2 September 2016

Monetary policy, the financial cycle and ultra-low interest rates

BIS Paper

Monetary policy, the financial cycle and ultra-low interest rates

 

The dynamics of real interest rates, monetary policy and its limits

Philippe d’Arvisenet

May 2016

The dynamics of real interest rates, monetary policy and its limits

 

Output Gaps and Monetary Policy at Low Interest Rates

By Roberto M. Billi

Output Gaps and Monetary Policy at Low Interest Rates

 

The insensitivity of investment to interest rates: Evidence from a survey of CFOs

Steve A. Sharpe and Gustavo A. Suarez

2014-02

The insensitivity of investment to interest rates: Evidence from a survey of CFOs

 

Does Prolonged Monetary Policy Easing Increase Financial Vulnerability?

Prepared by Stephen Cecchetti, Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, and Machiko Narita

February 2017

Does Prolonged Monetary Policy Easing Increase Financial Vulnerability?

 

The Microeconomic Perils of Monetary Policy Experiments

Charles W. Calomiris

Cato Institute

The Microeconomic Perils of Monetary Policy Experiments

 

Why Have the Fed’s Policies Failed to Stimulate the Economy?

Mickey D. Levy

Cato Institute

Why Have the Fed’s Policies Failed to Stimulate the Economy?

Short term Thinking in Investment Decisions of Businesses and Financial Markets

Short term Thinking in Investment Decisions of Businesses and Financial Markets

 

When companies buyback shares and pay dividends rather than investing in new capacity, it leads to low economic growth and low aggregate demand.

Central Banks respond by cutting interest rates.  Yet Businesses do not invest in new capacity.

Many studies attribute this to short term thinking dominant in corporate investment decisions.  Pressures from shareholders push corporate managers to be short term oriented.

Many economists and thinkers have criticized this recently as advanced economies are suffering from anemic growth.

Larry Summers has invoked Secular Stagnation.  He says one of the reason for Secular Stagnation is short term thinking.

Andy Haldane of Bank of England has criticized short term thinking as it prevents investments and causes low economic growth.

Key Terms:

  • Quarterly Capitalism
  • Secular Stagnation
  • Short Term Thinking
  • Low Economic Growth
  • Business Investments
  • Real Interest Rates
  • Monetary Policy
  • Income and Wealth Inequality
  • Aggregate Demand
  • Productive Capacity
  • Productivity growth
  • Long Term Investments
  • Share Buybacks
  • Dividends
  • Corporate Cash Pools

 

Capitalism for the Long Term

The near meltdown of the financial system and the ensuing Great Recession have been, and will remain, the defining issue for the current generation of executives. Now that the worst seems to be behind us, it’s tempting to feel deep relief—and a strong desire to return to the comfort of business as usual. But that is simply not an option. In the past three years we’ve already seen a dramatic acceleration in the shifting balance of power between the developed West and the emerging East, a rise in populist politics and social stresses in a number of countries, and significant strains on global governance systems. As the fallout from the crisis continues, we’re likely to see increased geopolitical rivalries, new international security challenges, and rising tensions from trade, migration, and resource competition. For business leaders, however, the most consequential outcome of the crisis is the challenge to capitalism itself.

That challenge did not just arise in the wake of the Great Recession. Recall that trust in business hit historically low levels more than a decade ago. But the crisis and the surge in public antagonism it unleashed have exacerbated the friction between business and society. On top of anxiety about persistent problems such as rising income inequality, we now confront understandable anger over high unemployment, spiraling budget deficits, and a host of other issues. Governments feel pressure to reach ever deeper inside businesses to exert control and prevent another system-shattering event.

My goal here is not to offer yet another assessment of the actions policymakers have taken or will take as they try to help restart global growth. The audience I want to engage is my fellow business leaders. After all, much of what went awry before and after the crisis stemmed from failures of governance, decision making, and leadership within companies. These are failures we can and should address ourselves.

In an ongoing effort that started 18 months ago, I’ve met with more than 400 business and government leaders across the globe. Those conversations have reinforced my strong sense that, despite a certain amount of frustration on each side, the two groups share the belief that capitalism has been and can continue to be the greatest engine of prosperity ever devised—and that we will need it to be at the top of its job-creating, wealth-generating game in the years to come. At the same time, there is growing concern that if the fundamental issues revealed in the crisis remain unaddressed and the system fails again, the social contract between the capitalist system and the citizenry may truly rupture, with unpredictable but severely damaging results.

Most important, the dialogue has clarified for me the nature of the deep reform that I believe business must lead—nothing less than a shift from what I call quarterly capitalism to what might be referred to as long-term capitalism. (For a rough definition of “long term,” think of the time required to invest in and build a profitable new business, which McKinsey research suggests is at least five to seven years.) This shift is not just about persistently thinking and acting with a next-generation view—although that’s a key part of it. It’s about rewiring the fundamental ways we govern, manage, and lead corporations. It’s also about changing how we view business’s value and its role in society.

There are three essential elements of the shift. First, business and finance must jettison their short-term orientation and revamp incentives and structures in order to focus their organizations on the long term. Second, executives must infuse their organizations with the perspective that serving the interests of all major stakeholders—employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities, the environment—is not at odds with the goal of maximizing corporate value; on the contrary, it’s essential to achieving that goal. Third, public companies must cure the ills stemming from dispersed and disengaged ownership by bolstering boards’ ability to govern like owners.

When making major decisions, Asians typically think in terms of at least 10 to 15 years. In the U.S. and Europe, nearsightedness is the norm.

None of these ideas, or the specific proposals that follow, are new. What is new is the urgency of the challenge. Business leaders today face a choice: We can reform capitalism, or we can let capitalism be reformed for us, through political measures and the pressures of an angry public. The good news is that the reforms will not only increase trust in the system; they will also strengthen the system itself. They will unleash the innovation needed to tackle the world’s grand challenges, pave the way for a new era of shared prosperity, and restore public faith in business.

1. Fight the Tyranny of Short-Termism

As a Canadian who for 25 years has counseled business, public sector, and nonprofit leaders across the globe (I’ve lived in Toronto, Sydney, Seoul, Shanghai, and now London), I’ve had a privileged glimpse into different societies’ values and how leaders in various cultures think. In my view, the most striking difference between East and West is the time frame leaders consider when making major decisions. Asians typically think in terms of at least 10 to 15 years. For example, in my discussions with the South Korean president Lee Myung-bak shortly after his election in 2008, he asked us to help come up with a 60-year view of his country’s future (though we settled for producing a study called National Vision 2020.) In the U.S. and Europe, nearsightedness is the norm. I believe that having a long-term perspective is the competitive advantage of many Asian economies and businesses today.

Myopia plagues Western institutions in every sector. In business, the mania over quarterly earnings consumes extraordinary amounts of senior time and attention. Average CEO tenure has dropped from 10 to six years since 1995, even as the complexity and scale of firms have grown. In politics, democracies lurch from election to election, with candidates proffering dubious short-term panaceas while letting long-term woes in areas such as economic competitiveness, health, and education fester. Even philanthropy often exhibits a fetish for the short term and the new, with grantees expected to become self-sustaining in just a few years.

Lost in the frenzy is the notion that long-term thinking is essential for long-term success. Consider Toyota, whose journey to world-class manufacturing excellence was years in the making. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s it endured low to nonexistent sales in the U.S.—and it even stopped exporting altogether for one bleak four-year period—before finally emerging in the following decades as a global leader. Think of Hyundai, which experienced quality problems in the late 1990s but made a comeback by reengineering its cars for long-term value—a strategy exemplified by its unprecedented introduction, in 1999, of a 10-year car warranty. That radical move, viewed by some observers as a formula for disaster, helped Hyundai quadruple U.S. sales in three years and paved the way for its surprising entry into the luxury market.

To be sure, long-term perspectives can be found in the West as well. For example, in 1985, in the face of fierce Japanese competition, Intel famously decided to abandon its core business, memory chips, and focus on the then-emerging business of microprocessors. This “wrenching” decision was “nearly inconceivable” at the time, says Andy Grove, who was then the company’s president. Yet by making it, Intel emerged in a few years on top of a new multi-billion-dollar industry. Apple represents another case in point. The iPod, released in 2001, sold just 400,000 units in its first year, during which Apple’s share price fell by roughly 25%. But the board took the long view. By late 2009 the company had sold 220 million iPods—and revolutionized the music business.

It’s fair to say, however, that such stories are countercultural. In the 1970s the average holding period for U.S. equities was about seven years; now it’s more like seven months. According to a recent paper by Andrew Haldane, of the Bank of England, such churning has made markets far more volatile and produced yawning gaps between corporations’ market price and their actual value. Then there are the “hyperspeed” traders (some of whom hold stocks for only a few seconds), who now account for 70% of all U.S. equities trading, by one estimate. In response to these trends, executives must do a better job of filtering input, and should give more weight to the views of investors with a longer-term, buy-and-hold orientation.

If they don’t, short-term capital will beget short-term management through a natural chain of incentives and influence. If CEOs miss their quarterly earnings targets, some big investors agitate for their removal. As a result, CEOs and their top teams work overtime to meet those targets. The unintended upshot is that they manage for only a small portion of their firm’s value. When McKinsey’s finance experts deconstruct the value expectations embedded in share prices, we typically find that 70% to 90% of a company’s value is related to cash flows expected three or more years out. If the vast majority of most firms’ value depends on results more than three years from now, but management is preoccupied with what’s reportable three months from now, then capitalism has a problem.

Roughly 70% of all U.S. equities trading is now done by “hyperspeed” traders—some of whom hold stocks for only a few seconds.

Some rightly resist playing this game. Unilever, Coca-Cola, and Ford, to name just a few, have stopped issuing earnings guidance altogether. Google never did. IBM has created five-year road maps to encourage investors to focus more on whether it will reach its long-term earnings targets than on whether it exceeds or misses this quarter’s target by a few pennies. “I can easily make my numbers by cutting SG&A or R&D, but then we wouldn’t get the innovations we need,” IBM’s CEO, Sam Palmisano, told us recently. Mark Wiseman, executive vice president at the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, advocates investing “for the next quarter century,” not the next quarter. And Warren Buffett has quipped that his ideal holding period is “forever.” Still, these remain admirable exceptions.

To break free of the tyranny of short-termism, we must start with those who provide capital. Taken together, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and sovereign wealth funds hold $65 trillion, or roughly 35% of the world’s financial assets. If these players focus too much attention on the short term, capitalism as a whole will, too.

In theory they shouldn’t, because the beneficiaries of these funds have an obvious interest in long-term value creation. But although today’s standard practices arose from the desire to have a defensible, measurable approach to portfolio management, they have ended up encouraging shortsightedness. Fund trustees, often advised by investment consultants, assess their money managers’ performance relative to benchmark indices and offer only short-term contracts. Those managers’ compensation is linked to the amount of assets they manage, which typically rises when short-term performance is strong. Not surprisingly, then, money managers focus on such performance—and pass this emphasis along to the companies in which they invest. And so it goes, on down the line.

Only 45% of those surveyed in the U.S. and the UK expressed trust in business. This stands in stark contrast to developing countries: For example, the figure is 61% in China, 70% in India, and 81% in Brazil.

As the stewardship advocate Simon Wong points out, under the current system pension funds deem an asset manager who returns 10% to have underperformed if the relevant benchmark index rises by 12%. Would it be unthinkable for institutional investors instead to live with absolute gains on the (perfectly healthy) order of 10%—especially if they like the approach that delivered those gains—and review performance every three or five years, instead of dropping the 10-percenter? Might these big funds set targets for the number of holdings and rates of turnover, at least within the “fundamental investing” portion of their portfolios, and more aggressively monitor those targets? More radically, might they end the practice of holding thousands of stocks and achieve the benefits of diversification with fewer than a hundred—thereby increasing their capacity to effectively engage with the businesses they own and improve long-term performance? Finally, could institutional investors beef up their internal skills and staff to better execute such an agenda? These are the kinds of questions we need to address if we want to align capital’s interests more closely with capitalism’s.

2. Serve Stakeholders, Enrich Shareholders

The second imperative for renewing capitalism is disseminating the idea that serving stakeholders is essential to maximizing corporate value. Too often these aims are presented as being in tension: You’re either a champion of shareholder value or you’re a fan of the stakeholders. This is a false choice.

The inspiration for shareholder-value maximization, an idea that took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, was reasonable: Without some overarching financial goal with which to guide and gauge a firm’s performance, critics feared, managers could divert corporate resources to serve their own interests rather than the owners’. In fact, in the absence of concrete targets, management might become an exercise in politics and stakeholder engagement an excuse for inefficiency. Although this thinking was quickly caricatured in popular culture as the doctrine of “greed is good,” and was further tarnished by some companies’ destructive practices in its name, in truth there was never any inherent tension between creating value and serving the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, communities, and the environment. Indeed, thoughtful advocates of value maximization have always insisted that it is long-term value that has to be maximized.

Capitalism’s founding philosopher voiced an even bolder aspiration. “All the members of human society stand in need of each others assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries,” Adam Smith wrote in his 1759 work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. “The wise and virtuous man,” he added, “is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest,” should circumstances so demand.

Smith’s insight into the profound interdependence between business and society, and how that interdependence relates to long-term value creation, still reverberates. In 2008 and again in 2010, McKinsey surveyed nearly 2,000 executives and investors; more than 75% said that environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives create corporate value in the long term. Companies that bring a real stakeholder perspective into corporate strategy can generate tangible value even sooner. (See the sidebar “Who’s Getting It Right?”)

Creating direct business value, however, is not the only or even the strongest argument for taking a societal perspective. Capitalism depends on public trust for its legitimacy and its very survival. According to the Edelman public relations agency’s just-released 2011 Trust Barometer, trust in business in the U.S. and the UK (although up from mid-crisis record lows) is only in the vicinity of 45%. This stands in stark contrast to developing countries: For example, the figure is 61% in China, 70% in India, and 81% in Brazil. The picture is equally bleak for individual corporations in the Anglo-American world, “which saw their trust rankings drop again last year to near-crisis lows,” says Richard Edelman.

How can business leaders restore the public’s trust? Many Western executives find that nothing in their careers has prepared them for this new challenge. Lee Scott, Walmart’s former CEO, has been refreshingly candid about arriving in the top job with a serious blind spot. He was plenty busy minding the store, he says, and had little feel for the need to engage as a statesman with groups that expected something more from the world’s largest company. Fortunately, Scott was a fast learner, and Walmart has become a leader in environmental and health care issues.

Tomorrow’s CEOs will have to be, in Joseph Nye’s apt phrase, “tri-sector athletes”: able and experienced in business, government, and the social sector. But the pervading mind-set gets in the way of building those leadership and management muscles. “Analysts and investors are focused on the short term,” one executive told me recently. “They believe social initiatives don’t create value in the near term.” In other words, although a large majority of executives believe that social initiatives create value in the long term, they don’t act on this belief, out of fear that financial markets might frown. Getting capital more aligned with capitalism should help businesses enrich shareholders by better serving stakeholders.

3. Act Like You Own the Place

As the financial sector’s troubles vividly exposed, when ownership is broadly fragmented, no one acts like he’s in charge. Boards, as they currently operate, don’t begin to serve as a sufficient proxy. All the Devils Are Here, by Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, describes how little awareness Merrill Lynch’s board had of the firm’s soaring exposure to subprime mortgage instruments until it was too late. “I actually don’t think risk management failed,” Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment firm BlackRock, said during a 2009 debate about the future of capitalism, sponsored by the Financial Times. “I think corporate governance failed, because…the boards didn’t ask the right questions.”

What McKinsey has learned from studying successful family-owned companies suggests a way forward: The most effective ownership structure tends to combine some exposure in the public markets (for the discipline and capital access that exposure helps provide) with a significant, committed, long-term owner. Most large public companies, however, have extremely dispersed ownership, and boards rarely perform the single-owner-proxy role. As a result, CEOs too often listen to the investors (and members of the media) who make the most noise. Unfortunately, those parties tend to be the most nearsighted ones. And so the tyranny of the short term is reinforced.

The answer is to renew corporate governance by rooting it in committed owners and by giving those owners effective mechanisms with which to influence management. We call this ownership-based governance, and it requires three things:

Just 43% of the nonexecutive directors of public companies believe they significantly influence strategy. For this to change, board members must devote much more time to their roles.

More-effective boards.

In the absence of a dominant shareholder (and many times when there is one), the board must represent a firm’s owners and serve as the agent of long-term value creation. Even among family firms, the executives of the top-performing companies wield their influence through the board. But only 43% of the nonexecutive directors of public companies believe they significantly influence strategy. For this to change, board members must devote much more time to their roles. A government-commissioned review of the governance of British banks last year recommended an enormous increase in the time required of nonexecutive directors of banks—from the current average, between 12 and 20 days annually, to between 30 and 36 days annually. What’s especially needed is an increase in the informal time board members spend with investors and executives. The nonexecutive board directors of companies owned by private equity firms spend 54 days a year, on average, attending to the company’s business, and 70% of that time consists of informal meetings and conversations. Four to five days a month obviously give a board member much greater understanding and impact than the three days a quarter (of which two may be spent in transit) devoted by the typical board member of a public company.

Boards also need much more relevant experience. Industry knowledge—which four of five nonexecutive directors of big companies lack—helps boards identify immediate opportunities and reduce risk. Contextual knowledge about the development path of an industry—for example, whether the industry is facing consolidation, disruption from new technologies, or increased regulation—is highly valuable, too. Such insight is often obtained from experience with other industries that have undergone a similar evolution.

In addition, boards need more-effective committee structures—obtainable through, for example, the establishment of a strategy committee or of dedicated committees for large business units. Directors also need the resources to allow them to form independent views on strategy, risk, and performance (perhaps by having a small analytical staff that reports only to them). This agenda implies a certain professionalization of nonexecutive directorships and a more meaningful strategic partnership between boards and top management. It may not please some executive teams accustomed to boards they can easily “manage.” But given the failures of governance to date, it is a necessary change.

More-sensible CEO pay.

An important task of governance is setting executive compensation. Although 70% of board directors say that pay should be tied more closely to performance, CEO pay is too often structured to reward a leader simply for having made it to the top, not for what he or she does once there. Meanwhile, polls show that the disconnect between pay and performance is contributing to the decline in public esteem for business.

Companies should create real risk for executives.Some experts privately suggest mandating that new executives invest a year’s salary in the company.

CEOs and other executives should be paid to act like owners. Once upon a time we thought that stock options would achieve this result, but stock-option- based compensation schemes have largely incentivized the wrong behavior. When short-dated, options lead to a focus on meeting quarterly earnings estimates; even when long-dated (those that vest after three years or more), they can reward managers for simply surfing industry- or economy-wide trends (although reviewing performance against an appropriate peer index can help minimize free rides). Moreover, few compensation schemes carry consequences for failure—something that became clear during the financial crisis, when many of the leaders of failed institutions retired as wealthy people.

There will never be a one-size-fits-all solution to this complex issue, but companies should push for change in three key areas:

• They should link compensation to the fundamental drivers of long-term value, such as innovation and efficiency, not just to share price.

• They should extend the time frame for executive evaluations—for example, using rolling three-year performance evaluations, or requiring five-year plans and tracking performance relative to plan. This would, of course, require an effective board that is engaged in strategy formation.

• They should create real downside risk for executives, perhaps by requiring them to put some skin in the game. Some experts we’ve surveyed have privately suggested mandating that new executives invest a year’s salary in the company.

Redefined shareholder “democracy.”

The huge increase in equity churn in recent decades has spawned an anomaly of governance: At any annual meeting, a large number of those voting may soon no longer be shareholders. The advent of high-frequency trading will only worsen this trend. High churn rates, short holding periods, and vote-buying practices may mean the demise of the “one share, one vote” principle of governance, at least in some circumstances. Indeed, many large, top-performing companies, such as Google, have never adhered to it. Maybe it’s time for new rules that would give greater weight to long-term owners, like the rule in some French companies that gives two votes to shares held longer than a year. Or maybe it would make sense to assign voting rights based on the average turnover of an investor’s portfolio. If we want capitalism to focus on the long term, updating our notions of shareholder democracy in such ways will soon seem less like heresy and more like common sense.

While I remain convinced that capitalism is the economic system best suited to advancing the human condition, I’m equally persuaded that it must be renewed, both to deal with the stresses and volatility ahead and to restore business’s standing as a force for good, worthy of the public’s trust. The deficiencies of the quarterly capitalism of the past few decades were not deficiencies in capitalism itself—just in that particular variant. By rebuilding capitalism for the long term, we can make it stronger, more resilient, more equitable, and better able to deliver the sustainable growth the world needs. The three imperatives outlined above can be a start along this path and, I hope, a way to launch the conversation; others will have their own ideas to add.

The kind of deep-seated, systemic changes I’m calling for can be achieved only if boards, business executives, and investors around the world take responsibility for bettering the system they lead. Such changes will not be easy; they are bound to encounter resistance, and business leaders today have more than enough to do just to keep their companies running well. We must make the effort regardless. If capitalism emerges from the crisis vibrant and renewed, future generations will thank us. But if we merely paper over the cracks and return to our precrisis views, we will not want to read what the historians of the future will write. The time to reflect—and to act—is now.

 

Please see my other related posts.

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

 

 

Key sources of Research:

Secular stagnation and low investment: Breaking the vicious cycle—a discussion paper

McKinsey

http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/europe/secular-stagnation-and-low-investment-breaking-the-vicious-cycle

Case Still Out on Whether Corporate Short-Termism Is a Problem

Larry Summers

http://larrysummers.com/2017/02/09/case-still-out-on-whether-corporate-short-termism-is-a-problem/

Where companies with a long-term view outperform their peers

McKinsey

http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/long-term-capitalism/where-companies-with-a-long-term-view-outperform-their-peers

How short-term thinking hampers long-term economic growth

FT

https://www.ft.com/content/8c868a98-b821-11e4-b6a5-00144feab7de

Anthony Hilton: Short-term thinking hits nations as a whole, not just big business

http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/comment/anthony-hilton-short-term-thinking-hits-nations-as-a-whole-not-just-big-business-10427294.html

Short-termism in business: causes, mechanisms and consequences

EY Poland Report

http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Poland_Report/$FILE/Short-termism_raport_EY.pdf

Overcoming the Barriers to Long-term Thinking in Financial Markets

Ruth Curran and Alice Chapple
Forum for the Future

https://www.forumforthefuture.org/sites/default/files/project/downloads/long-term-thinking-fpf-report-july-11.pdf

Understanding Short-Termism: Questions and Consequences

http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Understanding-Short-Termism.pdf

Ending Short-Termism : An Investment Agenda for Growth

http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Ending-Short-Termism.pdf

The Short Long

Speech by
Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, and Richard Davies

Brussels May 2011

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2011/speech495.pdf

Capitalism for the Long Term

Dominic Barton

From the March 2011 Issue

https://hbr.org/2011/03/capitalism-for-the-long-term

Quarterly capitalism: The pervasive effects of short-termism and austerity

https://currentlyunderdevelopment.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/quarterly-capitalism-the-pervasive-effects-of-short-termism-and-austerity/

Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of Business?

http://www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehaviorJeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrategicimplications.pdf

Andrew G Haldane: The short long

Speech by Mr Andrew Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, and Mr Richard
Davies, Economist, Financial Institutions Division, Bank of England,
at the 29th Société
Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium,
Brussels, 11 May 2011

http://www.bis.org/review/r110511e.pdf

THE UNEASY CASE FOR FAVORING LONG-TERM SHAREHOLDERS

Jesse M. Fried

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/17985223/Fried_795.pdf?sequence=1

The fringe economic theory that might get traction in the 2016 campaign

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/02/the-fringe-economic-theory-that-might-get-traction-in-the-2016-campaign/?utm_term=.932bc0b97758

FCLT Global:  Focusing Capital on the Long Term

Publications

http://www.fcltglobal.org/insights/publications

Finally, Evidence That Managing for the Long Term Pays Off

Dominic Barton

James Manyika

Sarah Keohane Williamson

February 07, 2017 UPDATED February 09, 2017

https://hbr.org/2017/02/finally-proof-that-managing-for-the-long-term-pays-off

Focusing Capital on the Long Term

Dominic Barton

Mark Wiseman

From the January–February 2014 Issue

Is Corporate Short-Termism Really a Problem? The Jury’s Still Out

Lawrence H. Summers

February 16, 2017

Yes, Short-Termism Really Is a Problem

Roger L. Martin

October 09, 2015

Long-Termism or Lemons

The Role of Public Policy in Promoting Long-Term Investments

By Marc Jarsulic, Brendan V. Duke, and Michael Madowitz October 2015

Center for American Progress

https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/21060054/LongTermism-reportB.pdf

 

Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for A More Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/09/11/overcoming-short-termism-a-call-for-a-more-responsible-approach-to-investment-and-business-management/

 

 

Focusing capital on the Long Term

Jean-Hugues Monier – Senior Parter – McKinsey & Company

Princeton University – November 2016

http://jrc.princeton.edu/sites/jrc/files/jean-hugues_j._monier_slides_final.pdf

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

Mergers and Acquisitions – Long Term Trends and Waves

 

I can see now how low interest rates begets low interest rates.

Low Interest Rates and Business Investments seem to have a Circular Causality.

Low Interest rates result in low investments as a result of business decisions by corporations.  Low Investments result in Low Interest Rates as a result of Monetary Policy response to boost investments.

As a result, M&A activity, thus, increases.

 

Historical Trends and Cycles

A. Long Term Interest Rates

From Real Interest Rates Over the Long Run

real-interest-rates

 

B. Business Investments

From Real Interest Rates Over the Long Run

investments

 

C.  Merger and Acquisitions
From M&A Statistics

usmabest

D. Worldwide Monthly M&A

From M&A Statistics

maaworld

ma-monthly

 

Mergers and Acquisitions Waves

  • THE FIRST WAVE: 1897 – 1904
  • THE SECOND WAVE: 1916 – 1929
  • THE THIRD WAVE: 1965 – 1969
  • THE FOURTH WAVE: 1984 – 1989
  • THE FIFTH WAVE: 1992 – 2000
  • THE SIXTH WAVE: 2003 – 2007

 

These waves are typically labeled as

  • the horizontal merger wave of the 1890s,
  • the vertical mergers of the 1920s,
  • the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s,
  • the refocusing wave of the 1980s,
  • and the global wave of the 1990s
  • the private equity/LBO led wave of 2000s

 

From  The Business Environment / Mergers and Merger Waves: A Century of Cause and Effect / Killian J. McCarthy

Mergers are everyday occurrences. And individual mergers can be motivated by any number of motives. Proportionately, however, history tells us that most mergers are announced during a merger wave; that is, during a period of intense activity, which is usually followed by an interval of relatively less intense activity. And merger waves are very different animals.

Since the late 19th century, the world has experienced a number of major merger waves (see Figure 2.1). The first (ca. 1895–1904) and second (ca. 1918–1929) of these merger waves were US-based events, driven by changes in the physical operating environment of a US firm (Weston et al., 2004; Gaughan, 2010). The third (ca. 1960–1969) was driven, among other factors, by the rise of modern management theory (Weston & Mansinghka, 1971); a theory which spread from the USA to the UK. The fourth – the first anti-merger wave (ca. 1981–1989) – occurred when corporate raiders discovered that many of the conglomerates created in the 1960s were worth less than the sum of their parts (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991; Allen et al., 1995). And during this period, merger activity spread from the USA to the UK, and then to Continental Europe. The fifth (ca. 1991–2001) was driven by deregulation, market liberalization and globalization (Andrade et al., 2001; de Pamphilis, 2008; Gaughan, 2010), and during this merger wave records were broken in all regions (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), as the wave spread from its usual North American base to engulf Europe and then Asia (de Pamphilis, 2008). Finally, in the sixth wave (ca 2003–2008), private equity firms took advantage of historically low interest rates to make speculative acquisitions. This was the first merger wave of the 21st century, and perhaps the first truly global merger wave.

 

Mergers and Acquisitions have gone up considerably in last few years.  2015 was the best year ever in history of M&A.  2016 also will prove to be almost as good as 2015.  As the interest rates rise, the M&A activity will pick up as companies would like to lock-in current low interest rates for capital.  Forward guidance by the Fed Reserve on interest rates increases for 2017 is also going to influence M&A decisions.

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Real Interest Rates Over the Long Run

Decline and convergence since the 1980s

Kei-Mu Yi

Jing Zhang

 

https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/eppapers/16-10/kei-mu-yi-epp.pdf

 

 

M&A Statistics

https://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/

 

 

Monthly M&A Insider – December 2016

http://mergermarketgroup.com/publication/ma-insider-december-2016/#.WIFzPrG-JUE

 

 

US M&A News and Trends

 

https://www.factset.com/mergerstat_em/monthly/US_Flashwire_Monthly.pdf

 

 

2015 M&A TRENDS

financial.thomsonreuters.com

 

 

Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves

Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, Richard Rosen

NBER Working Paper No. 11364
Issued in May 2005

http://www.nber.org/papers/w11364

 

 

Understanding mergers and acquisitions: activity since 1990

Greg N. Gregoriou and Luc Renneboog

 

https://booksite.elsevier.com/samplechapters/9780750682893/02~Chapter_1.pdf

 

 

THE Q-THEORY OF MERGERS

Boyan Jovanovic Peter L. Rousseau

Working Paper 8740 http://www.nber.org/papers/w8740

http://www.nber.org/papers/w8740.pdf

 

 

Mergers as Reallocation

Boyan Jovanovic and Peter L. Rousseau

October 2002

http://www.nber.org/papers/w9279.pdf?new_window=1

 

 

Mergers and Technological Change: 1885-1998

Boyan Jovanovic and Peter L. Rousseau∗

May 15, 2001

 

http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/jovanovi/merge23a.pdf

 

 

Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s

Bengt R. Holmström

Steven N. Kaplan

February 2001

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261112

 

 

”What drives merger waves?”

Harford, Jarrad.

Journal of Financial Economics, V ol.77(2005):.529-560.

 

 

The Determinants of Merger Waves: An International Perspective

Dennis C. Mueller

Klaus Peter Gugler

2008

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275293

 

 

The Determinants of Merger Waves

Klaus Peter Gugler

Dennis C. Mueller

B. Burcin Yurtoglu

January 2006

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=507282

 

 

Economists’ Hubris – The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions

Shahin Shojai

June 14, 2009

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418986&download=yes

 

 

New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers

Gregor Andrade

Mark L. Mitchell

Erik Stafford

January 2001

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269313&download=yes

 

 

AN OVERVIEW ON THE DETERMINANTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS WAVES

Vancea Mariana

University of Oradea Faculty f Economics

http://steconomiceuoradea.ro/anale/volume/2012/n2/055.pdf

 

 

DRIVERS OF MERGER WAVES A Revisit

Soegiharto

https://journal.ugm.ac.id/index.php/gamaijb/article/viewFile/5586/4557

 

 

Business Cycle and Aggregate Industry Merger

Srdan Komlenovic1, Abdullah Mamun2 & Dev Mishra2

University of Saskatchewan

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.527.8260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

Are There Waves in Merger Activity After All?

Dennis L. Gärtner and Daniel Halbheer

August 2008

ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/92_ISU_full.pdf

 

 

Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs

Flavio Toxvaerd

Journal of Economic Theory 140 (2008) 1 – 26

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.557.4982&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

Business Investments and Low Interest Rates

 

Longstanding IS-LM macroeconomic framework says that low interest rates should result in higher investment (as the cost of capital for investments declines).  However, in practice it is not true.  Business Investment also depends on many other factors such as projections for economic growth, market growth,  and Industry/sector growth (in which a company operates).  Low Interest rates also indicate low economic growth environment.  In a low growth environment, having poor projections of future cash flows from new investments, companies can not justify domestic Investments if financial hurdle rates are not met.  

Corporations also may have attractive options for investment outside the country.  Free Trade agreements allow for business investments to move overseas for getting access to growing markets or for cost cutting reasons such as labor costs.

Instead of Investing in new capacity, companies are paying dividends, and buying back shares to boost share prices and doing acquisitions. Companies are using their own cash retained from earnings to pay dividends, buyback shares, and in some cases doing acquisitions. Debt-financed acquisitions are done through raising capital from capital markets.

Companies do not need to grow by new fixed investments when they can grow by acquiring other companies. Organic growth is the process of business expansion by increased output, customer base expansion, or new product development, as opposed to mergers and acquisitions, which is inorganic growth. Organic growth typically excludes the impact of foreign exchange.  

There has been spectacular M&A activity in 2014, 2015 and is continuing in 2016.  

In low economic growth and low interest rate environment, it may make more sense to grow by inorganic growth.  The justification for M&A is usually the combination of reduced costs of doing business and increased revenue from greater market share.   After completion of acquisition, acquiring company management may decide to rationalize business units – closing inefficient plants, laying off employees, combining overlapping internal corporate services departments.  These decisions depend on the type of M&A strategy.

Economists need to pay attention to these trends as well.  At present, there is no discussion of M&A activity in Economic Policy discourse among Economists and Policy makers.

 

Wall street data charts showing trends in Business Investments

na-cm077_resear_16u_20161026161806na-ck534_bizinv_16u_20160615183306

 

From  Jeff Cox / CNBC.com November 17 2016

Fed Chair Janet Yellen and her colleagues for quite some time have been bemoaning the low levels of business investment.

Pressed Thursday to explain why this has been the case, the central bank chief told Congress she wasn’t sure, but she denied it had anything to do with the Fed’s cheap-money policies of the past eight years.

“It’s not clear in my mind why it is that investment spending has been as weak as it is,” she told the Joint Economic Committee. “Initially, we had an economy with a lot of excess capacity. Firms were clearly operating without enough sales to justify a need to invest in additional capacity, and more recently with the economy moving toward full employment, we would expect to see investment spending pick up, and it’s not obvious exactly why it hasn’t picked up.”

Sen. Bill Cassidy, R-La., suggested that the fault may lie in what the Fed has done. Specifically, he pointed to the central bank’s quantitative easing measures that saw the Fed’s balance sheet surge to $4.5 trillion largely on three rounds of bond buying.

Faced with the uncertainty of returns from capital expenditures and the near-certainty of returns on assets like stocks and bonds during what Cassidy called “easy money” QE programs, businesses opted for the latter, he said.

“I wouldn’t agree that the Fed’s monetary policy has hampered business investment or been a negative factor,” Yellen responded. “I’m not aware of any evidence that suggests that it is.”

She explained that productivity has been on the decline since companies started reversing bare-bones employment levels during the financial crisis. However, that has not been met with business investment, in part because companies don’t believe it “will produce returns that justify those investments,” Yellen said.

 

From Moody.com

Moody’s: US non-financial corporates’ cash pile increases to $1.68 trillion, tech holding the lead

Global Credit Research – 20 May 2016

New York, May 20, 2016 — US non-financial companies rated by Moody’s held $1.68 trillion in cash at the end of 2015, up 1.8% from $1.65 trillion the year prior, Moody’s Investors Services says in a new report. The top 50 holders of cash account for $1.14 trillion of the total cash pile, and entry to the top 50 list now requires $6.12 billion in cash.

“The top four cash-heavy US industries remain technology, healthcare/pharmaceuticals, consumer products, and energy,” says Richard Lane, a Moody’s Senior Vice President. These four industries currently hold a record $1.3 trillion, or 77% of total corporate cash and have accounted for more than 72% of the total every year since 2007.

The top five cash holders are Apple, Microsoft, Google, Cisco Systems and Oracle, Moody’s says in “US Non-Financial Companies: Cash Pile Grows 1.8% to $1.68 Trillion; Tech Extends Lead Over Other Sectors.”

Apple held $215.7 billion in total cash for the period. The company has held the top spot as cash king since 2009.

“While the concentration of cash among the top-rated cash holders continues to grow, so too has the portion held by the technology sector, which accounted for a record 46% of total cash in 2015, up from 41% in 2014,” Lane says.

Moody’s expects the technology sector cash concentration will grind higher over the next year because of the sector’s strong cash flow generation and despite stronger returns of capital to shareholders. The technology sector generated 63% of the total rated non-financial free cash flow in 2015, up from 37% in 2007.

For the top 50, capital spending fell by 3% to $885 billion, and net share buybacks fell 7% to $269 billion. Dividends increased by 4% to a record high of $404 billion, while acquisition spending increased 43%, to a record $401 billion.

For the first time since 2012, cash coverage of aggregate debt maturities over the next five years fell below 100% to 93% at the end of 2015.

In 2016, Moody’s expects aggregate spending on capital investments, dividends, acquisitions and share buybacks to again approximate $1.9 trillion.

 

From Wall Street Journal

mi-cp973_divide_16u_20160603184210

 

From DealLogic

mw-dn118_ma_acq_20150602090958_mg

 

From M&A experts weigh in on deals for 2017

manda3manda2017

 

From  US M&A market on a high

us-ma-2015

From IMAA

usmabestusmabest2

 

Key ideas/issues for M & A:  

Why grow through M & A activities ?

  • Limited organic growth options
  • Need to address the transformation in the marketplace/existing business models
  • Availability of credit on favorable terms
  • Large Cash reserves/commitments
  • Shifting consumer demands
  • Improving Equity markets
  • Opportunities in emerging markets

What are concerns?

  • Slow growth environment
  • Lack of suitable targets
  • Record stock prices
  • Geopolitical risks
  • Others
  • Constrained Consumer Demand
  • Regulatory Considerations
  • Rising Interest Rates

 

 

Key terms:

  • Return on Investment (ROI)
  • Return on Invested Capital ( ROIC)
  • Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
  • Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
  • Economic Value added (EVA)
  • Return on Assets (ROA)
  • Return on Equity (ROE)
  • Net Present Value (NPV)
  • Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
  • Capital Expenditures ( CAPEX)
  • Corporate Savings Glut
  • Business Fixed Investments
  • Share Buybacks
  • DIvidends
  • Acquisitions
  • NAFTA
  • TPP
  • TTIP
  • International Investment Position (IIP)
  • Free Trade
  • Direct Investment Position (FDI)
  • Trade Flows
  • Current Account
  • Capital Account
  • Organic Growth
  • Inorganic Growth

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Business Investment in the United States: Facts, Explanations, Puzzles, and Policies

Remarks by Jason Furman Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

September 30, 2015

 

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20150930_business_investment_in_the_united_states.pdf

http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015.09.30-Jason-Furman_Business-Investment-in-US-Facts-Explanations-Puzzles-Policies.pdf

 

 

Firms’ Investment Decisions and Interest Rates

Kevin Lane and Tom Rosewall

http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2015/jun/pdf/bu-0615-1.pdf

 

 

Investing when interest rates are low

By Timothy M. Koller, Jiri Maly, and Robert N. Palter

http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/investing-when-interest-rates-are-low

 

 

Are low-interest rates contributing to low business investment?

By Nick Bunker

http://equitablegrowth.org/equitablog/are-low-interest-rates-contributing-to-low-business-investment/

 

 

Why isn’t Investment More Sensitive to Interest Rates: Evidence from Surveys

Steve A. Sharpe and Gustavo A. Suarez

2014

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/201402r.pdf

 

 

Why Aren’t Low Rates Working? Blame Dividends

Since the Federal Reserve took rates to near zero, companies have boosted buybacks 194%

http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-arent-low-rates-working-blame-dividends-1465119005

 

 

Low Interest Rates Are Hurting Growth

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/10/04/low-interest-rates-are-hurting-growth/#5e9ccf813a2b

 

 

Secular Stagnation and Returns on Capital

Paul Gomme,  B. Ravikumar, Peter Rupert,

https://files.stlouisfed.org/research/publications/es/15/ES_19_2015-08-18.pdf

 

 

The Return to Capital and the Business Cycle

Gomme, Paul, B. Ravikumar, and Peter C. Rupert, 2006.

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper no. 06-03.

https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/working-papers/working-papers-archives/2006-working-papers/wp-0603-the-return-to-capital-and-the-business-cycle.aspx

 

 

Long-term investment, the cost of capital and the dividend and buyback puzzle

Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Caroline Roulet

https://www.oecd.org/finance/Long-term-investment_CapitalCost-dividend-buyback.pdf

 

 

The “Search for Yield” and Business Investment

By Jason M. Thomas

https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/market-commentary/productivity_slowdown_may2016_final.pdf

 

 

Infrastructure versus other investments in the global economy and stagnation hypotheses: What do company data tell us?

Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Caroline Roulet*

https://www.oecd.org/investment/Infrastructure-versus-other-investments-Global-economy-Stagnation-hypotheses.pdf

 

 

(Why) Is investment weak?

Ryan Banerjee Jonathan Kearns Marco Lombardi

http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1503g.pdf

 

 

The Fed Has Hurt Business Investment

by Michael Spence, Kevin Warsh

http://www.hoover.org/research/fed-has-hurt-business-investment

 

 

FRED data series on Savings and Investments

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/112

 

 

Weak Business Investment, Lower Neutral Rate Impacting Each Other

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2160321-weak-business-investment-lower-neutral-rate-impacting-each-other/

 

 

The Corporate Saving Glut in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

Joseph W. Gruber and Steven B. Kamin

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2015/files/ifdp1150.pdf

 

 

Rising Intangible Capital, Shrinking Debt Capacity, and the US Corporate Savings Glut

Antonio Falato Dalida Kadyrzhanova Jae W. Sim

November 2012. This version: June 2013

http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/events/papers/5599_KADYRZHANOVA_Cover%20-%20Rising%20Intangible%20Capital,%20Shrinking%20Debt%20Capacity%20and%20the%20US%20Corporate%20Savings%20Glut.pdf

 

 

Corporate Profits and Business Fixed Investment: Why are Firms So Cautious about Investment?

Naoya Kato and Takuji Kawamoto

April 2016

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/rev_2016/data/rev16e02.pdf

 

 

The Evolution of Corporate Cash

John R. Graham
Mark T. Leary

Draft: February 2015

http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/seminarspring2015/graham.pdf

 

 

Adverse Effects of Ultra-Loose Monetary Policies on Investment, Growth and Income Distribution

Andreas Hoffmann & Gunther Schnabl

http://www.savings-banks.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Savings%20and%20Investment%20During%20the%20Great%20Depression%20and%20the%20Recent%20Global%20Crisis.pdf

 

 

NAFTA at 20

AFL-CIO

http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/121921/3393031/March2014_NAFTA20_nb.pdf

 

 

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

 

M. Angeles Villarreal

Ian F. Fergusson

April 16, 2015

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf

 

 

 

NAFTA Revisited

PIIE

http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/NAFTA_Revisited_Text.pdf

 

Direct Investment Positions for 2015 Country and Industry Detail

 

By Derrick T. Jenniges and James J. Fetzer

July 2016

 

http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/07%20July/0716_direct_investment_positions.pdf

 

 

Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises in the United States and Abroad

Preliminary Results From the 2014 Benchmark Survey

 

http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/12%20December/1216_activities_of_us_multinational_enterprises.pdf

 

 

2015: A Merger Bonanza
Nearly $5 trillion worth of deals were announced last year. Why do so many big companies want team up?

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/2015-mergers-acquisitions/423096/

 

 

M&A experts weigh in on deals for 2017

https://info.kpmg.us/ma-survey-2017.html?gclid=Cj0KEQiAkO7CBRDeqJ_ahuiPrtEBEiQAbYupJaJUqUI61s1m-kFVDnT112-3ocH1SdVfcCxiBiNX614aAuvj8P8HAQ

 

 

 

The Federal Reserve’s Impact on the US M&A Market: An Empirical Examination

Sebastian v. Boetticher

Spring 2015

 

http://www.cob.calpoly.edu/undergrad/files/2015/09/Boetticher.pdf

 

 

M&A Statistics

IMAA offers extensive and up-to-date information, data, research on M&A and Mergers & Acquisitions statistics

https://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/

 

 

Hearing: The Economic Outlook

Janet Yellen on November 16 2016 speaking at Joint Economic Committee

Listen/view at 1:33:00 her comments on Business Investments