Concentration, Investment, and Growth

Concentration, Investment, and Growth

 

Recent Economic Policy Symposium at Jackson Hole Wyoming (August 23-25) where economists, central bankers, policy makers gather together annually discussed issues of Rising Market Concentration, Declining Business Investments, and Declining Economic Dynamism.

2018 Economic Policy Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming

https://www.kansascityfed.org/publications/research/escp/symposiums/escp-2018

 

 

Richmond Federal Reserve Bank published an article on Market Concentration.

Are Markets Too Concentrated?

Industries are increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer firms. But is that a bad thing?

 

Click to access cover_story.pdf

Click to access full_issue.pdf

 

 

Washington Post published a story on market concentration in US companies.

Are U.S. Companies Too Big and Powerful? The Fed Wants to Know

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/are-us-companies-too-big-and-powerful-the-fed-wants-to-know/2018/08/23/35891356-a6b0-11e8-ad6f-080770dcddc2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9cb83dadde89

 

 

 

OECD held a joint conference with the World Bank and the IMF on Product Market Concentration, Inclusive Growth, and Regulation at OECD HQ, Paris, France. 11 June, 2018.

http://www.oecd.org/eco/reform/joint-imf-wb-oecd-conf-structural-reform-2018/

 

 

Please see my related posts

Rising Market Concentration and Declining Business Investments in the USA – Update June 2018

Shareholder Capitalism: Rising Market Concentration, Slower Productivity Growth, Rising Inequality, Rising Profits, and Rising Equities Markets

 

Slowdown in Global Investment (FDI) Flows

Slowdown in Global Investment (FDI) Flows

 

 

From Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a major component of globalization, together with international trade. Its operation is made possible by movements of factors across countries, in particular, capital. By definition, FDI involves long-term cross-country commitments. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF), FDI entails the establishment of a “lasting interest” by a resident entity of one economy in an enterprise located in another economy (International Monetary Fund, 1993). Lasting interest implies a long-term relationship between the foreign investor and the overseas enterprise where the said investor holds significant influence over management. The IMF defines a direct investment enterprise as one in which a foreign investor holds at least 10% of the ordinary shares or voting power (International Monetary Fund, 1993). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1996, p. 10) classifies enterprises of direct foreign investors into three groups: subsidiaries, in which a nonresident investor holds more than 50% of the ownership; associates, in which a nonresident investor’s shares range between 10 and 50%; and branches, which are unincorporated enterprises owned by a nonresident investor, wholly or jointly. Obviously, such definitions and the resultant measurements leave ambiguities and imprecisions. However, they do help maintain relative consistency in cross-country comparisons.

From 1995 to 2015, the world saw a dramatic increase in FDI. The FDI inflows in 2015 were 8.6 times those in 1995, an increase from about 0.2 trillion USD in 1995 to about 1.8 trillion USD in 2015. While FDI inflows to developed countries increased 8.6-fold, those to developing countries and transitional economies increased 23 times. In 1995, FDI inflows to developing and transitional economies were 17% of the world total, and in 2015 they accounted for 45%. FDI flows to OECD countries peaked in 2007, at about 1.3 trillion USD. Between 2013 and 2014, for the first time, developing countries received more FDI than developed countries (UNCTAD, 2016), though the developed world recaptured the position as the largest FDI recipient in 2015 (see Figure 1).

There is an ever-growing body of literature on FDI. As Markusen (2008) demonstrated, three strands of relevant literature exist:

  • the international business approach that is oriented toward the rationale of individual firms,
  • the macroeconomic approach that focuses on aggregate flows of FDI without making a distinction between direct and portfolio investments,
  • and the international trade theory approach, which increasingly moves closer to the international business approach, combining firm-level FDI analysis with aggregate analysis of capital flows.

 

 

From UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017

FDI2

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

2017 AT Kearney FDI Confidence Index

http://www.iberglobal.com/files/2017/fdi_index_atkearney.pdf

 

UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017

http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf

 

 

Recent Developments in Trade and Investment

Pierre Sauvé
Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice
World Bank Group
MIKTA Workshop on Trade and Investment
Session 2
Geneva, 20 March 2017

https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/business_e/pierre_sauve_world_bank.pdf

 

 

OECD FDI Data

https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-flows.htm

 

 

UNCTAD FDI Data

http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-database.aspx

 

 

GLOBAL FDI FLOWS SLIP IN 2016, MODEST RECOVERY EXPECTED IN 2017

http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2017d1_en.pdf

 

 

Cross border mergers make India favoured FDI route: UNCTAD

June 2017

 

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/business/economy/080617/cross-border-mergers-make-india-favoured-fdi-route-unctad.html

 

 

Cross-border M&As push global FDI flows to $1.76 trillion

June 2016

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/cross-border-mas-push-global-fdi-flows-to-1-76-trillion/articleshow/52860326.cms

 

 

OECD Bilateral FDI Data

http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER

 

 

UNCTAD Bilateral FDI Data

http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx

 

 

World Bank FDI Database

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD

 

 

FDI Markets

https://www.fdimarkets.com

 

 

FDI Reports

http://www.fdireports.com/home/index.cfm?CFID=16605395&CFTOKEN=534deb8f9bfff240-CA8D9CBD-9042-6C79-7D3F0DD68E9B6616&jsessionid=2030aa76f30310567d2372163935674e554c

 

 

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Yi Feng

Online Publication Date: Jun 2017

http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-559?print=pdf

Trading Down: NAFTA, TPP, TATIP and Economic Globalization

Trading Down: NAFTA, TPP, TATIP and Economic Globalization

Top Institutions and Economists Now Say Globalization Increases Inequality

World Bank, IMF, BIS, NBER, McKinsey Now Admit that Globalization Increases Inequality

We’ve all heard that globalization lifts all boats and increases our prosperity …

But mainstream economists and organizations are now starting to say that globalization increases inequality.

The National Bureau of Economic Research – the largest economics research organization in the United States, with many Nobel economists and Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers as members –  published,  a report in May finding:

Recent globalization trends have increased U.S. inequality by disproportionately raising top incomes.

***

Rising import competition has adversely affected manufacturing employment, led firms to upgrade their production and caused labor earnings to fall.

NBER explains that globalization allows executives to gain the system to their advantage:

This paper examines the role of globalization in the rapid increase in top incomes. Using a comprehensive data set of thousands of executives at U.S. firms from 1993-2013, we find that exports, along with technology and firm size, have contributed to rising executive compensation. Isolating changes in exports that are unrelated to the executive’s talent and actions, we show that globalization has affected executive pay not only through market channels but also through non-market channels. Furthermore, exogenous export shocks raise executive compensation mostly through bonus payments in poor-governance settings, in line with the hypothesis that globalization has enhanced the executive’s rent capture opportunities. Overall, these results indicate that globalization has played a more central role in the rapid growth of executive compensation and U.S. inequality than previously thought, and that rent capture is an important part of this story.

A World Bank document says globalization “may have led to rising wage inequality”. It  notes:

Recent evidence for the US suggests that adjustment costs for those employed in sectors exposed to import competition from China are much higher than previously thought.

***

Trade may have contributed to rising inequality in high income economies ….

The World Bank also cites Nobel prize-winning economist Eric Maskin’s view that globalization increases inequality because it increases the mismatch between the skills of different workers.

A report by the International Monetary Fund notes:

High trade and financial flows between countries, partly enabled by technological advances, are commonly cited as driving income inequality …. In advanced economies, the ability of firms to adopt laborsaving technologies and offshoring has been cited as an important driver of the decline in manufacturing and rising skill premium (Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1999, 2003) ….

***

Increased financial flows, particularly foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows have been shown to increase income inequality in both advanced and emerging market economies (Freeman 2010). One potential explanation is the concentration of foreign assets and liabilities in relatively higher skill- and technology-intensive sectors, which pushes up the demand for and wages of higher skilled workers. In addition, FDI could induce skill-specific technological change, be associated with skill-specific wage bargaining, and result in more training for skilled than unskilled workers (Willem te Velde 2003). Moreover, low-skill, outward FDI from advanced economies may in effect be relatively high-skilled, inward FDI in developing economies (Figini and Görg 2011), thus exacerbating the demand for high-skilled workers in recipient countries. Financial deregulation and globalization have also been cited as factors underlying the increase in financial wealth, relative skill intensity, and wages in the finance industry, one of the fastest growing sectors in advanced economies (Phillipon and Reshef 2012; Furceri and Loungani 2013).

The Bank of International Settlements – the “Central Banks’ Central Bank” – also notes  that globalization isn’t all peaches and cream.  The Financial Times explains :

A trio of recent papers by top officials from the Bank for International Settlements goes further, however, arguing that financial globalisation itself makes booms and busts far more frequent and destabilising than they otherwise would be.

McKinsey & Company notes:

Even as globalization has narrowed inequality among countries, it has aggravated income inequality within them.

The Economist points out:

Most economists have been blindsided by the backlash [against globalization]. A few saw it coming. It is worth studying their reasoning ….

***

Branko Milanovic of the City University of New York believes such costs perpetuate a cycle of globalisation. He argues that periods of global integration and technological progress generate rising inequality ….

Supporters of economic integration underestimated the risks … that big slices of society would feel left behind ….

The New York Times reported:

Were the experts wrong about the benefits of trade for the American economy?

***

Voters’ anger and frustration, driven in part by relentless globalization and technological change [has made Trump and Sanders popular, and] is already having a big impact on America’s future, shaking a once-solid consensus that freer trade is, necessarily, a good thing.

“The economic populism of the presidential campaign has forced the recognition that expanded trade is a double-edged sword,” wrote Jared Bernstein, former economic adviser to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

What seems most striking is that the angry working class — dismissed so often as myopic, unable to understand the economic trade-offs presented by trade — appears to have understood what the experts are only belatedly finding to be true: The benefits from trade to the American economy may not always justify its costs.

In a recent study, three economists — David Autor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, David Dorn at the University of Zurich and Gordon Hanson at the University of California, San Diego — raised a profound challenge to all of us brought up to believe that economies quickly recover from trade shocks. In theory, a developed industrial country like the United States adjusts to import competition by moving workers into more advanced industries that can successfully compete in global markets.

They examined the experience of American workers after China erupted onto world markets some two decades ago. The presumed adjustment, they concluded, never happened. Or at least hasn’t happened yet. Wages remain low and unemployment high in the most affected local job markets. Nationally, there is no sign of offsetting job gains elsewhere in the economy. What’s more, they found that sagging wages in local labor markets exposed to Chinese competition reduced earnings by $213 per adult per year.

In another study they wrote with Daron Acemoglu and Brendan Price from M.I.T., they estimated that rising Chinese imports from 1999 to 2011 cost up to 2.4 million American jobs.

“These results should cause us to rethink the short- and medium-run gains from trade,” they argued. “Having failed to anticipate how significant the dislocations from trade might be, it is incumbent on the literature to more convincingly estimate the gains from trade, such that the case for free trade is not based on the sway of theory alone, but on a foundation of evidence that illuminates who gains, who loses, by how much, and under what conditions.”

***

The case for globalization based on the fact that it helps expand the economic pie by 3 percent becomes much weaker when it also changes the distribution of the slices by 50 percent, Mr. Autor argued.

And Steve Keen – economics professor and Head of the School of Economics, History and Politics at Kingston University in London – notes:

Plenty of people will try to convince you that globalization and free trade could benefit everyone, if only the gains were more fairly shared. The only problem with the party, they’ll say, is that the neighbours weren’t invited. We’ll share the benefits more equally now, we promise. Let’s keep the party going. Globalization and Free Trade are good.

This belief is shared by almost all politicians in both parties, and it’s an article of faith for the economics profession.

***

It’s a fallacy based on a fantasy, and it has been ever since David Ricardo dreamed up the idea of “Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Trade” two centuries ago.

***

[Globalization’s] little shell and pea trick is therefore like most conventional economic theory: it’s neat, plausible, and wrong. It’s the product of armchair thinking by people who never put foot in the factories that their economic theories turned into rust buckets.

So the gains from trade for everyone and for every country that could supposedly be shared more fairly simply aren’t there in the first place. Specialization is a con job—but one that the Washington elite fell for (to its benefit, of course). Rather than making a country better off, specialization makes it worse off, with scrapped machinery that’s no longer useful for anything, and with less ways to invent new industries from which growth actually comes.-

Excellent real-world research by Harvard University’s “Atlas of Economic Complexity” has found diversity, not specialization, is the “magic ingredient” that actually generates growth. Successful countries have a diversified set of industries, and they grow more rapidly than more specialized economies because they can invent new industries by melding existing ones.

***

Of course, specialization, and the trade it necessitates, generates plenty of financial services and insurance fees, and plenty of international junkets to negotiate trade deals. The wealthy elite that hangs out in the Washington party benefits, but the country as a whole loses, especially its working class.

Some Big Companies Losing Interest In Globalization

Ironically, the Washington Post noted in 2015 that the giant multinational corporations themselves are losing interest in globalization … and many are starting to bring the factories back home:

Yet despite all this activity and enthusiasm, hardly any of the promised returns from globalization have materialized, and what was until recently a taboo topic inside multinationals — to wit, should we reconsider, even rein in, our global growth strategy? — has become an urgent, if still hushed, discussion.

***

Given the failures of globalization, virtually every major company is struggling to find the most productive international business model.

***

Reshoring — or relocating manufacturing operations back to Western factories from emerging nations — is one option. As labor costs escalate in places such as China, Thailand, Brazil and South Africa, companies are finding that making products in, say, the United States that are destined for North American markets is much more cost-efficient. The gains are even more significant when productivity of emerging countries is taken into account.

***

Moreover, new disruptive manufacturing technologies — such as 3-D printing, which allows on-site production of components and parts at assembly plants — make the idea of locating factories where the assembled products will be sold more practicable.

***

GE, Whirlpool, Stanley Black & Decker, Peerless and many others have reopened shuttered factories or built new ones in the United States.

 Key Sources of Research

 

Trading Down: Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

 

Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta

with Jomo Kwame Sundaram

January 2016

 

Click to access 16-01Capaldo-IzurietaTPP.pdf

 

 

The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Disintegration, Unemployment and Instability

Jeronim Capaldo

October 2014

 

Click to access 14-03CapaldoTTIP.pdf

 

 

 Revisiting the Link between Trade, Growth and Inequality:
Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean

by Kimberly Beaton, Aliona Cebotari, and Andras Komaromi

 

 

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

 

Click to access inequality.pdf

 

 

Data Fail: The Divergence between Rosy International Trade Commission Projections and U.S. Trade Agreements’ Actual Outcomes

Tradewatch.com

May 2016

Click to access usitc-tpp-prebuttal.pdf

 

Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality

Robert C. Feenstra, Gordon H. Hanson

NBER Working Paper No. 5424
Issued in January 1996

http://www.nber.org/papers/w5424

Economic Inequality in the United States

Janet Yellen

2006

http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/press/presidents-speeches/yellen-speeches/2006/november/economic-inequality-in-the-united-states/

http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2006/december/economic-inequality-in-the-united-states/

 

 

What’s caused the rise in income inequality in the US?

WEF

2015

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/whats-caused-the-rise-in-income-inequality-in-the-us/

 

Worsening American Income: Inequality: Is world trade to blame?

Gary Burtless

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/worsening-american-income-inequality-is-world-trade-to-blame/

 

 

Income inequality in the United States: What do we know and what does it mean? Issues by the Numbers, July 2017

Dr. Daniel Bachman

July 12, 2017

https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/economy/issues-by-the-numbers/july-2017/rising-income-inequality-gap-united-states.html

 

 

Top Institutions and Economists Now Say Globalization Increases Inequality

August 20, 2017

Washington Post Blog

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2017/08/globalization-increases-inequality-destabilizes-economies-political-systems.html

Understanding Global Value Chains – G20/OECD/WB Initiative

Understanding Global Value Chains – G20/OECD/WB Initiative

 

There is lot of opacity in understanding of GVCs.  Efforts are underway since last few years to get better analytical and statistical tools to understand International Trade and Global Value Chains.

Globalization in Trade and Finance encouraged by International organizations such as IMF/WB/OECD/WTO/UNCTAD/UNIDO and others has changed the landscape of Trade.

There is still a long way to go to make better sense of issues and concerns for policy makers.

OECD/WB/WTO along with G20 Trade Ministers have initiated efforts since 2012.

 

From Global Value Chains 

Introduction to GVCs

International production, trade and investments are increasingly organised within so-called global value chains (GVCs) where the different stages of the production process are located across different countries. Globalisation motivates companies to restructure their operations internationally through outsourcing and offshoring of activities.

Firms try to optimise their production processes by locating the various stages across different sites. The past decades have witnessed a strong trend towards the international dispersion of value chain activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution, etc.

This emergence of GVCs challenges conventional wisdom on how we look at economic globalisation and in particular, the policies that we develop around it.

 

Trade in Value Added

The goods and services we buy are composed of inputs from various countries around the world. However, the flows of goods and services within these global production chains are not always reflected in conventional measures of international trade. The joint OECD – WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) initiative addresses this issue by considering the value added by each country in the production of goods and services that are consumed worldwide. TiVA indicators are designed to better inform policy makers by providing new insights into the commercial relations between nations.

 

GVCs and Trade Policy

Global value chains (GVCs) have become a dominant feature of world trade, encompassing developing, emerging, and developed economies. The whole process of producing goods, from raw materials to finished products, is increasingly carried out wherever the necessary skills and materials are available at competitive cost and quality. Similarly, trade in services is essential for the efficient functioning of GVCs, not only because services link activities across countries but also because they help companies to increase the value of their products. This fragmentation highlights the importance of an ambitious complementary policy agenda to leverage engagement in GVCs into more inclusive growth and employment and the OECD is currently undertaking comprehensive statistical and analytical work that aims to shed light on the scale, nature and consequences of international production sharing.

 

From Global Value Chains/Global Production Networks: Organizing the Global Economy

The key organizational feature of the global economy?

  • “Global Value Chains are defined by fragmented supply chains, with internationally dispersed tasks and activities coordinated by a lead firm (a TNC)” (UNCTAD, 2013, p.125; original italics).
  • Data gathering exercises:UNCTAD,OECD,WTO,JETRO…
  • Now firmly on the agenda among leading international economic organizations
  • The international division of labour:imperial/colonialsystems and exchanges of raw materials and finished goods
  • The new international division of labour(NIDL):establishment of overseas production bases of core country TNCs
  • The global division of labour:much more complex global networks lying behind the production of different goods and services

The phenomenon

  • About 60% of global trade, which today amounts to more than $20 trillion, consists of trade in intermediate goods and services that are incorporated at various stages in the production process of goods and services for final consumption” (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 122)
  • Not new, but since 2000 trade and FDI have increased exponentially, and ahead of GDP growth, highlighting a growth in TNC coordinated global value chains
  • Double counting – approx. 25-30% of value of world trade, e.g. the iPhone example. Not just trade from China to US, but incorporates high value components from Japan, South Korea etc.
  • Beyond national economies and basic trade data, and beyond TNCs and FDI, to more complex organizational structures involving intra-firm trade, arm’s length trade and non-equity modes e.g. subcontracting

 

 

From GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS: A PRIMER

gvc5

 

From Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward

gvc4

 

From Global Value Chains/Global Production Networks: Organizing the Global Economy

gvc1gvc-2gvc3

 

Key Terms

  • Global Commodities Chains (GCCs)
  • Global Production Networks (GPNs)
  • Global Value Chains (GVCs)
  • Strategic Coupling
  • Economic Deepening
  • Trans National Corporation (TNC)
  • Multi National Corporation (MNC)
  • Multi National Enterprises (MNE)
  • SMILE curve
  • Economic Clusters
  • UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization)
  • OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
  • WTO (World Trade Organization)
  • WB (World Bank)
  • UNESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific)
  • UNCTAD ( United Nations Commission for Trade and Development)
  • ILO ( International Labor Organization)
  • G20 ( Group of 20 Nations)
  • TIVA ( Trade in Value Added)
  • On shoring
  • Off shoring
  • Outsourcing

 

 

Key People

  • Gary Gereffi
  • Neil M Coe
  • Jennifer Bair
  • Henry Wai-chung Yeung
  • Timothy Sturgeon

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Measuring Trade in Value Added: An OECD-WTO joint initiative

https://www.oecd.org/tad/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-wtojointinitiative.htm

 

 

Global Value Chains

https://www.oecd.org/about/g20-oecd-global-value-chains.htm

https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-value-chains.htm

 

 

OECD Stocktaking Seminar on Global Value Chains 2014

https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/trade-and-investment/g20-oecd-global-value-chains-2014.htm

 

 

IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
FOR TRADE, INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND JOBS

OECD, WTO, UNCTAD 6 August 2013

Prepared for the
G-20 Leaders Summit
Saint Petersburg (Russian Federation) September 2013

 

Click to access G20-Global-Value-Chains-2013.pdf

 

 

Inclusive Global Value Chains

Policy options in trade and complementary areas for GVC Integration by small and medium enterprises and low-income developing countries

OECD and World Bank Group

Report prepared for submission to G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Istanbul, Turkey, 6 October 2015

 

Click to access Participation-Developing-Countries-GVCs-Summary-Paper-April-2015.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

OECD, WTO and World Bank Group

Report prepared for submission to the G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Sydney, Australia, 19 July 2014

 

Click to access gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf

 

 

Making Global Value Chains (GVCs) Accessible to All

Progress Report
Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level

6-7 May 2014

 

Click to access MCM-GVC-Progress-Report-May-2014.pdf

 

 

Inclusive Global Value Chains

Policy Options for Small and Medium Enterprises and Low-Income Countries

Ana Paula Cusolito, Raed Safadi, and Daria Taglioni

2016

Click to access 9781464808425.pdf

 

 

Global value chains in a changing world

Edited by Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low

2013

 

Click to access aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf

 

 

The rise of global value chains

WORLD TRADE REPORT 2014

 

Click to access wtr14-2c_e.pdf

 

 

Who Captures the Value in the Global Value Chain? High Level Implications for the World Trade Organization

Peter Draper and Andreas Freytag

July 2014

 

Click to access E15-Global-Value-Chains-DraperFreytag-FINAL.pdf

 

 

Joining, Upgrading and Being Competitive in Global Value Chains: 

A Strategic Framework

 

O. Cattaneo G. Gereffi S. Miroudot D. Taglioni

 

Click to access 2013-04_WorldBank_wps6406_Cattaneo_Gereffi_Miroudot_Taglioni_Competitiveness_GVCs.pdf

 

 

Global value chains, development and emerging economies

Gary Gereffi

2015

Click to access WP_18.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi, and Cornelia Staritz

2010

Click to access Gereffi_GVCs_in_the_Postcrisis_World_Book.pdf

 

 

 

Global value chains and global production networks in the changing international political economy: An introduction

Jeffrey Neilson1, Bill Pritchard1 and Henry Wai-chung Yeung

2014

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09692290.2013.873369

 

 

Combining the Global Value Chain and global I-O approaches

 

 

 

Global value chains and world trade : Prospects and challenges for Latin America

René A. Hernández
Jorge Mario Martínez-Piva Nanno Mulder

 

http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/37176/S2014061_en.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

 

Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world

Gary Gereffi

2014

 

https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/10696/2014%20Feb_RIPE_Gereffi,%20Gary_GVCs%20in%20a%20post-Washington%20Consensus%20world.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND DEVELOPMENT: Governance, Upgrading & Emerging Economies

Gary Gereffi

Director, Duke CGGC Duke University

2016

Click to access 697_10587.pdf

 

 

 

MaPPing gLoBaL VaLUe CHainS

Koen De Backer and Sébastien Miroudot

2014

Click to access ecbwp1677.pdf

 

 

 

Global Value Chains/Global Production Networks: Organizing the Global Economy

Neil M. Coe

2013

Click to access DrCoe.pdf

 

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS: A PRIMER

Gary Gereffi
Karina Fernandez-Stark

July 2016

 

http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/12488/2016-07-28_GVC%20Primer%202016_2nd%20edition.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

 

WHY THE WORLD SUDDENLY CARES ABOUT GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS

GARY GEREFFI AND JOONKOO LEE

Duke University

http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/10699/2012-07_JSCM_Gereffi%20&%20Lee_Why%20the%20world%20suddenly%20cares%20about%20global%20supply%20chains.pdf?sequence=1

 

 

 

The Economic Crisis: A Global Value Chain Perspective

 

Gary Gereffi

 

Click to access a-global-value-chain-perspective.pdf

 

 

The governance of global value chains

Gary Gereffi John Humphrey Timothy Sturgeon

2005

 

Click to access sturgeon2005.pdf

 

 

Global production networks and the analysis of economic development

Jeffrey Henderson, Peter Dicken, Martin Hess, Neil Coe and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung

2002

Click to access 2002_RIPE.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT

UNCTAD 2013

Click to access wir2013_en.pdf

 

 

Asia and Global Production Networks

Implications for Trade, Incomes and Economic Vulnerability

Benno Ferrarini David Hummels

2014

Click to access asia-and-global-production-networks.pdf

 

 

 

Global Production Networks: Theorizing Economic Development in an Interconnected World

By Neil M. Coe, Henry Wai-Chung Yeung

2015

 

 

Toward a Dynamic Theory of Global Production Networks

Henry Wai-chung Yeung

Neil M. Coe

 

Click to access 2015_GPN_theory_paper_EG%20Vol91(1)_29-58.pdf

 

 

Global Value Chains and deVelopment

unido’s support towards inclusive and sustainable industrial development

2015

Click to access GVC_REPORT_FINAL.PDF

 

 

Global Value Chains: The New Reality of International Trade

Sherry Stephenson

December 2013

Click to access E15_GVCs_BP_Stephenson_FINAL.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS SURVEYING DRIVERS AND MEASURES

João Amador and Sónia Cabral

2014

Click to access ecbwp1739.en.pdf

 

 

GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES

Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Report

2015

 

Click to access Chapter%207%20-%20GVCs%20in%20the%20Asia-Pacific.pdf

Click to access Full%20Report%20%20-%20APTIR%202015.pdf

 

 

Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward

JENNIFER BAIR

2005

COMPETITION & CHANGE, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005 153–180

 

 

Global Value Chains: Development Challenges and Policy Options

Proposals and Analysis

December 2013

Click to access E15-Global-Value-Chains-Compliation-Report-FINAL.pdf

 

 

Globalizing’ regional development: a global production networks perspective

Neil M Coe, Martin Hess, Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Peter Dicken and Jeffrey Henderson

Click to access 2004_TIBG.pdf

 

 

Multilateral approaches to Global Supply Chains

 

International Labour Office

2014

 

Click to access wcms_485351.pdf