Global Liquidity and Cross Border Capital Flows

Global Liquidity and Cross Border Capital Flows

 

Types of Cross Border Capital Flows

  • Intra Bank Flows (Intra Firm Transfers)
  • Inter Bank Flows (wholesale Money Markets)
  • International Shadow Banking
  • Euro Dollar Market
  • International Bond and Equity Portfolio Flows

Growth of Capital Flows and FX Reserves

From INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Capitalflows

 

From INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Capital Flows 2

From Stitching together the global financial safety net

Cap Flows 6

 

Decline in Global Trade and Cross Border Capital Flows since 2008

 

From Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows

Cap Flows 7

 

US DOLLAR FLOWS – Inter regional Flows

  • Not all dollar flows are from USA.
  • Through Eurodollar Market, firms in many countries are engaged in US Dollar transactions.
  • US Dollar dominates cross border capital flows.

 

From External dimension of monetary policy

Cap Flows 4

 

 

From Economic resilience: a financial perspective

 

Cap Flow 15

 

 

ALL CURRENCIES

From Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

Cap Flows 10

 

Who is Involved in Cross Border Capital Flows

From The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Cap Flows 8

 

Recent Trends in Capital Flows

 

From The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Cap Flows 9

 

Problem of Boundaries

From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Capital Flows 3

Cross Border (International) Capital Flows (Networks) for

  • Intra Bank Flows
  • Inter-bank Lending
  • Debt and Securities Flows
  • International Shadow Banking

Capital Flows are not confined to National Boundaries.

Boundaries for

  • Monetary Policy
  • National Income Accounting
  • National Currencies

Types of Flows

From From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 11

 

A. Round tripping of Capital Flows

From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 12

B. International Debt Issuance by Non Financial Corporates in Emerging Markets

 

From From Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Cap Flows 13

From Global dollar credit: links to US monetary policy and leverage

Cap flow 14

 

From  What does the new face of international financial intermediation mean for emerging market economies?

capflows 16

 

 

From Economic resilience: a financial perspective

 

Cap Flow 16

Please see my other related posts:

The Dollar Shortage, Again! in International Wholesale Money Markets

Currency Credit Networks of International Banks

Low Interest Rates and International Capital Flows

Low Interest Rates and International Investment Position of USA

Economics of Trade Finance

External Balance sheets of Nations

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

 

Breaking the Triple Coincidence in International Finance

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements
Keynote speech at seventh conference of
Irving Fisher Committee on Central Bank Statistics

Basel, 5 September 2014

Click to access ifcb39_keynote-rh.pdf

 

 

Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

Hyun Song Shin, BIS

Eighth IFC Conference on “Statistical implications of the new financial landscape”
Basel, 8–9 September 2016

Click to access ifcb43_zp_rh.pdf

 

 

 

Breaking free of the triple coincidence in international finance

by Stefan Avdjiev, Robert N McCauley and Hyun Song Shin

Monetary and Economic Department

BIS

October 2015

Click to access work524.pdf

 

 

 

Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows

Eugenio Cerutti (International Monetary Fund)
Stijn Claessens (Federal Reserve Board)
Lev Ratnovski (International Monetary Fund)

Economic Policy
63rd Panel Meeting
Hosted by the De Nederlandsche Bank

Amsterdam, 22-23 April 2016

Click to access Global-liquidity-and-cross-border-bank-flows.pdf

 

 

 

Stitching together the global financial safety net

Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò

Financial Stability Paper No. 36 – February 2016

BOE

Click to access fs_paper36.pdf

 

 

 

Gross Capital Inflows to Banks, Corporates and Sovereigns

Stefan Advjiev

Bryan Hardy

Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan

Luis Serven

January 2017

Click to access GrossFlows_jan17_final.pdf

 

 

External dimension of monetary policy

Hyun Song Shin

Remarks at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conference
“Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the post-crisis period”

Washington DC, Friday 13 November 2015

Click to access sp151113.pdf

 

 

 

 

Financial deglobalisation in banking?

Robert N McCauley, Agustín S Bénétrix,
Patrick M McGuire and Goetz von Peter

TEP Working Paper No. 1717

July 2017

Click to access tep1717.pdf

 

 

Monetary policy spillovers and currency networks in cross-border bank lending

by Stefan Avdjiev and Előd Takáts
Monetary and Economic Department

March 2016

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749311

 

 

 

Accounting for global liquidity: reloading the matrix

Hyun Song Shin
Economic Adviser and Head of Research

IMF-IBRN Joint Conference “Transmission of macroprudential and monetary policies across borders”

Washington DC, 19 April 2017

Click to access sp170419.pdf

 

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS: TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY

Maurice Obstfeld
Alan M. Taylor
May 2017

Click to access w23440.pdf

 

 

 

The Currency Dimension of the Bank Lending Channel in International Monetary Transmission

BIS Working Paper No. 600

Posted: 2 Jan 2017

Előd Takáts

Judit Temesvary

 

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891530

Click to access The-Currency-Dimension-of-the-Bank-Lending-Channel-in-International-Monetary-Transmission.pdf

 

 

 

The Second Phase of Global Liquidity and Its Impact on Emerging Economies

Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University

November 7, 2013

 

Click to access The-Second-Phase-of-Global-Liquidity-and-Its-Impact-on-Emerging-Economies.pdf

 

 

 

 

BIS Quarterly Review

September 2017

International banking and financial market developments

 

Click to access r_qt1709.pdf

 

 

 

 

The Three Phases of Global Liquidity

https://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9789812872838-c2.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1490720-p177066168

 

 

 

 

The Shifting Drivers of Global Liquidity

Stefan Avdjiev
Leonardo Gambacorta
Linda S. Goldberg
Stefano Schiaffi

Staff Report No. 819
June 2017

https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr819.pdf?la=en

 

 

 

How Do Global Liquidity Phases Manifest Themselves in Asia?

Iwan J. Azis
Asian Development Bank and Cornell University
Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University
August 2013

Click to access Iwan-Azis-Paper-Shin-Global-Liquidity2013.pdf

 

 

 

 

GLOBAL LIQUIDITY—ISSUES FOR SURVEILLANCE

2014

IMF

Click to access 031114.pdf

 

 

 

 

The shifting drivers of global liquidity

Stefan Avdjiev, Leonardo Gambacorta, Linda S. Goldberg and Stefano Schiaffi

May 2017

FED NY

 

Click to access linda-goldberg.pdf

 

 

 

CAPITAL FLOWS AND GLOBAL LIQUIDITY

IMF Note for G20 IFA WG
February 2016

 

Click to access P020160811536051676178.pdf

 

 

 

 

Capital Flows, Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity∗

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

March 15, 2012

Click to access capital_flows_global_liquidity.pdf

 

 

Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

August 28, 2014

 

Click to access work458.pdf

 

 

The international monetary and financial system: a capital account historical perspective

by Claudio Borio, Harold James and Hyun Song Shin

2014

 

Click to access work457.pdf

 

 

Banks and Cross-Border Capital Flows: Policy Challenges and Regulatory Responses

 

Click to access CIEPR_banking_capital_flows_report_Sept12.pdf

 

 

 

Global dollar credit and carry trades: a firm-level analysis

Valentina Bruno

Hyun Song Shin

August 2015

 

Click to access work510.pdf

 

 

Global dollar credit: links to US monetary policy and leverage

by Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko

2015

 

Click to access work483.pdf

 

 

 

Global liquidity and procyclicality

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements

“The State of Economics, The State of the World” World Bank conference,

8 June 2016

 

Click to access Shin-Son-Shin-Presentation.pdf

 

 

 

 

Economic resilience: a financial perspective

Note submitted to the G20 on 7 November 2016

December 2016

 

Click to access 2017-Germany-BIS-economic-resilience.pdf

 

 

Emerging Market Nonfinancial Corporate Debt: How Concerned Should We Be?,

Beltran, Daniel, Keshav Garud, and Aaron Rosenblum (2017).

IFDP Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 2017.

 

Click to access emerging-market-nonfinancial-corporate-debt-how-concerned-should-we-be-20170601.pdf

 

 

 

 

International capital flows and financial vulnerabilities in emerging market economies: analysis and data gaps

By Nikola Tarashev, Stefan Avdjiev and Ben Cohen

Note submitted to the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group

August 2016

 

Click to access othp25.pdf

 

 

 

Recent trends in EME government debt volume and composition

Corporate Debt in Emerging Economies: Threat to Financial Stability

Viral Acharya et al
2015

 

 

 

 

 Dollar credit to emerging market economies

Robert N McCauley Patrick McGuire Vladyslav Sushko

2015

 

Click to access r_qt1512e.pdf

 

 

 

 

What does the new face of international financial intermediation mean
for emerging market economies?

Hyun song shin and PhiliP Turner, Bank for International Settlements

2015

 

Click to access financial-stability-review-19_2015-04.pdf

Large Value (Wholesale) Payment and Settlement Systems around the Globe

Large Value (Wholesale) Payment and Settlement Systems around the Globe

 

LVPS are managed by the Central Banks.

LVPS are Systemically important financial market infrastructure and critical for smooth functioning of the national and International financial system.

The FEDWIRE is the LVPS in the USA.  TARGET2 is the LVPS in the European Monetary Union.  TARGET2 is a unique system  as it is a common LVPS among many nations in the EMU. CNAPS is the LVPS in China.  CLS System is unique as it is a global FX settlement system.

CIPS of China and CHIPS of USA are also LVPS but are used as offshore clearing and settlement system.

 

From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems

1.1 The benefits of RTGS

Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) is a clumsy term for a crucial process in the financial markets. This is the reduction of counterparty credit risk by the delivery of cash or the delivery of securities in exchange for cash, instantaneously and without the netting of the obligations outstanding between the parties. Since the 1980s, the central banks which operate payment market infrastructures (PMIs)1 around the world have gradually adopted RTGS for the settlement of high value payments (HVP). Their private sector equivalents which settle low value payments (LVP) are also gravitating towards RTGS. In RTGS settlement, credit risk is reduced because cash is transferred between banks continuously in real time, transaction by transaction. Every payment is settled finally and irrevocably in central bank money, obviating the need to settle obligations between banks in batches on a net basis.

1.2 What is an RTGS?

The role of a PMI is to provide predictable and secure multilateral payment services to banks and their corporate and retail clients, usually within a single country, but sometimes across several countries within a region. They tend to divide into two broad groups.

The first are HVP systems, which settle a relatively low volume of high value and high priority payments.

The second are LVP systems, which are also known as Retail Payment Systems (RPS), because they net relatively high volumes of low value and low priority payments.

There is a further distinction to be made between HVP systems. Not all HVP systems settle on a gross basis in real time (RTGS). Some settle on a net basis, in which case they are technically described as High Value Payment Deferred Net Settlement (HVP DNS) systems. This is because settlement of transactions does not take place instantaneously but is instead deferred until transactions can be aggregated into batches, and the sums owed by one bank to another netted into a single net payment, made either at the end of the business day or at regular intervals throughout the business day. The net settlement typically takes place in central bank money at the RTGS. LVP or RPS systems tend to net transactions in a fashion comparable with HVP DNS systems. Operated mainly by automated clearing houses (ACHs), they aggregate and net transactions between banks, and then settle net amounts between banks in central bank money at the RTGS either in a single payment at the end of the business day or in multiple payments made at regular intervals throughout the day. Although a variety of net settlement systems persist, more than half the PMIs in the world are now RTGS, and even net settlement systems ultimately settle in RTGS (see Chart 1).

It follows that RTGS systems are crucial to the settlement of both HVP, LVP and CSD transactions. In fact, the purpose of every RTGS is to provide final, irrevocable settlement of transactions in a specific currency, usually through the transfer of the reserves held by banks at the central bank. They act on payment instructions, and settle transaction by simultaneously debiting the account of the paying bank and crediting the account of the receiving bank. Reserves are a vital tool of monetary policy. They are the cash balances that banks are required to hold at central banks, both to limit the ability of banks to lend deposits without limit, and to guarantee the stability of the financial system by ensuring banks can always settle their obligations to each other. This makes RTGS an essential tool for every central bank in managing the stability of the financial system, because it is a means by which it can inject and withdraw liquidity (see Chart 2).

 

From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems

lvps5lvps6

 

From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems

History and Evolution of RTGS

Since they emerged in the late 1990s, RTGS systems have become the industry standard for settlement of high value payments. In 1985, only three countries in the world operated an RTGS system. By December 1999, when the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published the first draft of what became the ten Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, the number had risen to 25 countries. After the publication of the final version of the Core Principles, the number of countries operating RTGS systems grew exponentially (see Chart 4). In July 2000, the final version of the BIS Core Principles paper declared, “there has been extensive progress in payment system design in the course of the past ten years, notably in the development and widespread adoption of systems involving real-time gross settlement (RTGS), which can very effectively address the financial risks highlighted by the Core Principles”.3 Today, the adoption of RTGS systems continues to grow, and has reached 124 systems supporting payments in 160 countries.4

 

Regional (Cross Border) RTGS

The fact that more countries enjoy the benefits of an RTGS system than there are RTGS systems in existence reflects the fact that several RTGS systems are used by more than one country. Obvious examples include the TARGET2 system operated by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the euro-zone, the shared platform operated by the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) in west Africa, and the equivalent platform operated by the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) in central Africa.

 

Systemic Importance of RTGS

As RTGS systems are adopted by more countries, their systemic importance is increasing. Cross-border transactions mean domestic RTGS systems are also becoming part of a global network of RTGS systems, which in turn links the capital market infrastructures of each country with the capital infrastructures of every country. Domestic PMIs, CSDs and banks are now all part of a complex international eco-system.

In some parts of the world, such as the European Union and west and central Africa, RTGS systems are now formally operating on a regional basis (see Table 1). Some of these regional systems operate from a single shared RTGS platform, while others link a number of separate RTGS platforms. In these regions, it is obvious that the failure of an RTGS system can no longer be confined to one country only. But the same is true of RTGS systems everywhere. They are systemically important, and on a global scale.

 

From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments

Global Trends in LVPS

Globalization and technological innovation are two of the most pervasive forces affecting the financial system and its infrastructure. Perhaps nowhere are these trends more apparent than in the internationalization and automation of payments. The evolving landscape is most obvious in retail payments. The use of paper checks is in rapid decline or has been eliminated in most of the industrialized world. Credit and debit cards can be used in the most surprising places. Internet banking with money transfer capabilities is common, and several providers are competing to service consumers’ payments over the Internet and mobile devices.

In wholesale, or interbank, payments, the effect of globalization and technological innovation is probably less obvious to the casual observer—but it has been equally impressive. Given the importance of payments and settlement systems to the smooth operation as well as resiliency of the financial system, stakeholders need to understand and assess the potential consequences of this evolution. This article offers an in-depth look at the current environment for large-value payments systems (LVPSs). We describe ten trends common to LVPSs around the world and identify the key drivers of these developments and the most important policy issues facing central banks (see box). Furthermore, we provide empirical support for each of the trends by using numerous publicly available sources, including Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics on payments and settlement systems in selected countries (the “Red Book”). We focus on large-value payments systems in countries where the central bank is a member of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), a body under the auspices of the BIS (Appendix A).

Technological innovation, structural changes in banking, and the evolution of central bank policies are the three main reasons for the recent developments in large-value payments. First, technological innovation has created opportunities to make existing large-value payments systems safer and more efficient. Such innovation has also accommodated the industry’s growing need for new types of systems that are not limited to a single country or a currency. Second, the financial sector has experienced immense growth over the last few decades accompanied by changes in the role of individual firms and the products they offer. In addition, financial institutions and their services have become increasingly globalized. These structural changes have affected how participants use largevalue payments systems. Third, the role of central banks in large-value payments systems has changed significantly in recent years. Central banks have become more involved in payments systems and have created formal and systematic oversight functions. The main focus lies in promoting safety and efficiency in LVPSs and in maintaining overall financial stability. Central banks therefore have taken more active roles in monitoring existing and planned systems, in assessing systems according to international standards, and, if necessary, in inducing change.

 

From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments

lvps4

From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments

As the box illustrates, the ten trends that we describe can be assigned to three key drivers.

The first four trends

  • the diffusion of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems,
  • the take-off of hybrid systems,
  • the emergence of cross-border and offshore systems,
  • and the rise of Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank

are all associated with settlement technology and fall into the first category. Technological innovation has enabled new settlement methodologies to emerge that allow a better balance between settlement risks, immediacy, and liquidity requirements. RTGS systems have to a large extent replaced deferred net settlement (DNS) systems. However, the high liquidity needs associated with RTGS have led some system operators to explore liquidity-saving mechanisms and have motivated them to develop hybrid systems. Developments in payments system technology have also facilitated the emergence of systems that settle payments across national borders in one or more currencies. In addition, the clearing of payments is in some instances moving offshore and the ability of participants to connect remotely—eliminating the need for a physical “footprint” in the jurisdiction of LVPSs—is becoming more widespread. Foreign exchange (FX) settlement and counterparty risk are being managed more tightly in part because of the use of payment-versus-payment (PvP) mechanisms.1 CLS Bank operates a multicurrency payments system for the simultaneous settlement of both sides of a foreign exchange transaction on a PvP basis. With CLS Bank, existing risks associated with FX trades are virtually eliminated.

The next three trends

  • increasing settlement values and volumes,
  • shrinking average payment sizes,
  • and falling numbers of system participants

as well as the emergence of crossborder and offshore systems (Trend 3) fall into the second category. They are determined largely by how the banking sector uses payments systems and by the structural changes taking place therein. The values and volumes originated over LVPSs grew exponentially until the turn of the century. However, in terms of value, growth has since slowed and is no longer outpacing economic growth as measured by GDP.  Because many LVPSs process a large amount of relatively low-value payments, the average payment size settled has shrunk. Hence, the dichotomy between small- and large-value payments systems is not always applicable. In addition, consolidation in the banking sector has led to fewer participants in LVPSs. Structural changes have also resulted in the emergence of global banks that require a global payment infrastructure, which in turn has led to the creation of new systems that accommodate these needs.

The last three trends and the rise of CLS Bank (Trend 4) fall into the third category. They are associated with central banks’ operating policies regarding LVPSs. The service level of all systems is improving with longer operating hours. Some systems are even approaching a twenty-four-hour settlement cycle. Transaction costs in various LVPSs have been falling since the late 1990s because the savings achieved through improvements in operating efficiency have been passed on to system participants in the form of lower fees. Through the adoption of common standards, such as the CPSS’ Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems, risk management in LVPSs has become more standardized. Furthermore, the central bank community was the driving force behind the development of CLS Bank.

 

These networks are also known as High Value payment (HVPS) networks.

 

List of LVPS Systems in some countries

UK

  • CHAPS Sterling
  • CHAPS Euro

Canada

  • LVTS

China

  • CIPS
  • CNAPS

India

  • RTGS

EU

  • TARGET2
  • EURO1

USA

  • CHIPS
  • FEDWIRE

International Foreign Exchange FX Networks

  • CLS

 

From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments

From  Clearing and Settlement Systems from Around the World: A Qualitative Analysis

lvpslvps3lvps2

 

From Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System/Wikipedia

China’s Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (CIPS)

The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is a payment system which, offers clearing and settlement services for its participants’ in cross-border RMB payments and trade. It is a significant financial market infrastructure in China. As planned, CIPS will be developed in two phases. On 8th October 2015, CIPS (Phase I) went live. The first batch of direct participants includes 19 Chinese and foreign banks which were set up in mainland China and 176 indirect participants which cover 6 continents and 47 countries and regions. On 25th March 2016, CIPS signed an MoU with SWIFT with mu- tual understanding of deploying SWIFT as a secure, effi- cient and reliable communication channel for CIPS’s con- nection with SWIFT’s members, which would provide a network that enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions in a secure, standardised and reliable environment. CIPS is sometimes referred to as the China Interbank Pay- ment System.

CIPS would not facilitate funds transfer; rather, it sends payment orders, which must be settled by correspondent accounts that the institutions have with each other. Each financial institution, to exchange banking transactions, must have a banking relationship by either being a bank or affiliating itself with one (or more) so as to enjoy those particular business features.

However, it was reported in July 2015 that CIPS would be ‘”watered down” and used only for cross-border yuan trade deals rather than including capital-related transac- tions, which would delay billions of dollars worth of trans- actions, including securities purchases and foreign direct investment, that would have gone through the system. It was reported to be a second setback to the plan to provide a unified network for settling deals in yuan after technical problems delayed its launch, and that other measures to open up China’s financial infrastructure have been dented by the 2015 Chinese stock market crash. It was said to now offer, at best, a complementary network for settling trade-related deals in the Chinese currency to a current patchwork of Chinese clearing banks around the world.[1]

 

From ECB Website

TARGET2 – Eurosystem Cross Border RTGS System

TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) is the real- time gross settlement (RTGS) system for the Eurozone, and is available to non-Eurozone countries. It was devel- oped by and is owned by the Eurosystem. TARGET2 is based on an integrated central technical infrastructure, called the Single Shared Platform (SSP).[1] SSP is operated by three providing central banks: France (Banque de France), Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Italy (Banca d’Italia). TARGET2 started to replace TARGET in November 2007.

TARGET2 is also an interbank RTGS payment system for the clearing of cross-border transfers in the eurozone. Participants in the system are either direct or indirect. Di- rect participants hold an RTGS account and have access to real-time information and control tools. They are re- sponsible for all payments sent from or received on their accounts by themselves or any indirect participants op- erating through them. Indirect participation means that payment orders are always sent to and received from the system via a direct participant, with only the relevant di- rect participant having a legal relationship with the Eu- rosystem. Finally, bank branches and subsidiaries can choose to participate in TARGET2 as multi-addressee access or addressable BICs (Bank Identifier Code).

Since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958, there has been a progressive movement towards a more integrated European financial market. This movement has been marked by several events: In the field of payments, the most visible were the launch of the euro in 1999 and the cash changeover in the euro area countries in 2002. The establishment of the large-value central bank payment system TARGET was less visible, but also of great importance. It formed an integral part of the introduction of the euro and facilitated the rapid integration of the euro area money market.

The implementation of TARGET2 was based on a decision of the ECB Council of autumn 2002. TARGET2 started operations on 19 November 2007, when the first group of countries (Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia) migrated to the SSP. This first migration was successful and con- firmed the reliability of SSP. After this initial migration, TARGET2 already settled around 50% of overall traffic in terms of volume and 30% in terms of value.

On 18 February 2008, the second migration successfully migrated to TARGET2, comprising Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

On 19 May 2008, the final group migrated to TARGET2, comprising Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland and the ECB. The six-month migration process went smoothly and did not cause any operational disruptions.

Slovakia joined TARGET2 on 1 January 2009, Bulgaria joined in February 2010, and Romania joined on 4 July 2011.

A unique feature of TARGET2 is the fact that its payment services in euro are available across a geographical area which is larger than the euro area. National central banks which have not yet adopted the euro also have the option to participate in TARGET2 to facilitate the settlement of transactions in euro. When new Member States join the euro area the participation in TARGET2 becomes mandatory. The use of TARGET2 is mandatory for the settlement of any euro operations involving the Eurosystem.

As of February 2016, 25 central banks of the EU and their respective user communities are participating in, or connected to, TARGET2:

  • The 20 euro area central banks (including the ECB) and
  • five central banks from non-euro area countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Poland and Romania.

 

From ECB website

lvps8

 

From The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)

 

Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS)

Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) is an international payment system which was launched in September 2002 for the settlement of foreign exchange transactions. In the conventional settlement of a foreign exchange transaction the exchange of the two currencies involved in the trade is not normally synchronous. For one party to the trade there is therefore a risk that it will transfer the currency it has sold without receiving from the counterparty the currency it has bought (settlement risk). Even if a bank’s risk position vis-à-vis a counterparty is short-term, it may be many times greater than its capital. With CLS, an infrastructure has been created which eliminates settlement risk by means of a payment-versus-payment (PvP)2 mechanism.

CLS has 59 direct participants and more than 6,000 indirect participants (as of October 2009), and in 2008 it settled on average around 546,000 instructions to a value of around USD 4 trillion a day.3 Because of the vast volume of transactions on the global foreign exchange market, with its risk-reducing settlement mechanism CLS makes a significant contribution to the stability of the global financial system. By now, around a half of all foreign exchange transactions in the world are settled via CLS.4 The Swiss franc was one of the currencies settled in CLS from the very start, together with the US dollar, the pound sterling, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar and the euro. By now, the number of currencies settled in CLS has expanded from seven to 17. The Danish krone, the Norwegian krone, the Singapore dollar and the Swedish krona joined in September 2003, followed by the Hong Kong dollar, the Korean won, the New Zealand dollar and the South African rand in December 2004. The last two currencies up to now, the Israeli shekel and the Mexican peso, joined in May 2008.

 

From CHIPS website

CHIPS

CHIPS is the largest private-sector U.S.-dollar funds-transfer system in the world, clearing and settling an average of $1.5 trillion in cross-border and domestic payments daily. It combines best of two types of payments systems: the liquidity efficiency of a netting system and the intraday finality of a RTGS.

The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS®1) is a funds-transfer system that transmits and settles payment orders in U.S. dollars for some of the largest and most active banks in the world. On an average day, CHIPS transmits and settles over 430,000 “payment messages”2 worth an aggregate of $1.5 trillion. It has been estimated that CHIPS carries a very high percentage of all international interbank funds transfers that are denominated in U.S. dollars. For these reasons, CHIPS has been widely regarded as a systemically important payment system, and on July 18, 2012, FSOC designated The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. (), which owns and operates CHIPS, as a systemically important financial market utility (SIFMU) under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act on the basis of its role as the operator of CHIPS.3

The Clearing House

The Clearing House11 was founded in 1853, and is the oldest, most innovative bank association and payments processor in the United States. Established to simplify the daily check exchanges in New York City, The Clearing House later became a pioneer in the emerging field of electronic funds transfers and continues to be a leader in the payments arena, operating in addition to CHIPS, an automated clearinghouse (ACH) known as EPN (Electronic Payments Network), and a check-image clearinghouse. PaymentsCo continues to pioneer in emerging areas of the payment system in its work to protect account credentials through tokenization12 and to design and build a new low-value real-time payment system13 for the United States.

CHIPS

CHIPS is a real-time system for transmitting and settling high-value U.S.-dollar payments among its participating banks. The Clearing House began operating CHIPS in 1970 to simplify and expedite interbank payments in New York City.

Backed by over 44 years of reliable operation, CHIPS serves 49 foreign and domestic banks,14 representing 21 countries, through a network of sending and receiving devices, which range from microcomputers to large-scale mainframe computers. CHIPS participants include U.S. commercial banks and foreign banks with offices in the United States.

 

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Payment and settlement systems in selected countries

Prepared by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries

April 2003

 

Click to access d53.pdf

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries

Volume 1

2011

 

Click to access d97.pdf

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries

Volume 2

November 2012

Click to access d105.pdf

 

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the United States

 

Click to access d105_us.pdf

 

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Japan

Click to access d105_jp.pdf

 

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the United Kingdom

 

Click to access d105_uk.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in India

 

Click to access d97_in.pdf

 

 

A Primer on Canada’s Large Value Transfer System

 

Click to access lvts_neville.pdf

 

 

 

Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Canada

 

Click to access d97_ca.pdf

 

 

 

Global Trends in Large-Value Payments

Morten L. Bech, Christine Preisig, and Kimmo Soramäki

2008

 

Click to access 0809prei.pdf

 

 

 

Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems

SWIFT

2014

https://www.swift.com/node/4001

 

 

 

The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)

2009

Click to access continuous_linked_settlement.en.pdf

 

 

 

 

Overview of the U.S. Payments, Clearing and Settlement Landscape

2015

 

Click to access 03.Overview-US-PCS-landscape-Merle.pdf

 

 

International payment arrangements

 

Click to access d53p16.pdf

 

 

International Settlements: A New Source of Systemic Risk?

ROBERT A. EISENBEIS

 

Click to access 82b045cb0c5c7a82da1f43ff61006fe73c18.pdf

 

 

 

Clearing and Settlement Systems from Around the World: A Qualitative Analysis

 

Click to access sdp2016-14.pdf

 

 

 

SYSTEMIC RISK IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge

Rahul Dhumale

1999

 

Click to access wp152.pdf

 

 

PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN INDIA VISION 2009-12

RBI

 

Click to access VDF16022010.pdf

 

 

 

Payment systems to facilitate South Asian integration

 

Click to access WP-2015-021.pdf

 

 

 

PAYMENT SYSTEMS TO FACILITATE SOUTH ASIAN INTRA- REGIONAL TRADE

Ashima Goyal

September 2014

Click to access Development%20Paper_1403.pdf

 

 

 

Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk

As amended effective September 23, 2016

 

Click to access psr_policy.pdf

 

 

 

Contagion in Payment and Settlement Systems

 

Matti Hellqvist

2006

 

Click to access mh.pdf

 

 

 

Overview of payment system settlement

BOE UK

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/paymentsystem/default.aspx

 

 

 

A Guide to the Bank of England’s Real Time Gross Settlement System

2013

Click to access rtgsguide.pdf

 

 

 

Evolution of payment systems in India – or is it a revolution?

Speech by Mr R Gandhi, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India

Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 22 October 2016.

http://www.afi-global.org/speeches/2016/10/evolution-payment-systems-india

 

 

 

How Modernizing India’s Payment System can Drive Financial Inclusion

April 26, 2016

By Sean Creehan

 

http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asia-program/pacific-exchange-blog/how-modernizing-indias-payment-system-can-drive-financial-inclusion/

Click to access Asia-Focus-Modernizing-the-Payment-System-to-Increase-Financial-Inclusion-in-India.pdf

 

 

 

Payment Systems in India: Opportunities and Challenges

DEEPANKAR ROY

 

Click to access payment-systems-in-india-opportunities-and-challenges.pdf

 

 

Payment Systems in India and Current Status: A Perspective

March 2016 by Graham Wright and Anil Kumar Gupta

 

http://blog.microsave.net/payment-systems-in-india-and-current-status-a-perspective/

 

 

 

PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

RBI India

https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/paymentsystems.aspx

https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PaymentSystems_UM.aspx

http://www.npci.org.in/aboutus.aspx

 

 

NPCI playing a key role in India’s push towards cashless economy

http://www.livemint.com/Industry/Sp5XB4G687Kq5eCAI8Y51O/NPCI-playing-a-key-role-in-Indias-push-towards-cashless-eco.html

 

 

India Has The Most Sophisticated Payments System In The World – And Six Men Made It Happen

R Jagannathan – Apr 12, 2016,

https://swarajyamag.com/economy/india-has-the-most-sophisticated-payments-system-in-the-world-and-six-men-made-it-happen

 

 

Supervision of U.S. Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems: Designation of Financial Market Utilities (FMUs)

 

Marc Labonte

Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy

September 10, 2012

 

Click to access 8a3d9e1f088d8cba80d4fd5cf6f28d62a462.pdf

 

 

Interdependencies among payment and settlement systems Overview of forms and

challenges for risk management

 

Denis Beau

 

Click to access slides2beau.pdf

 

 

 

SELECTED ISSUES ON LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN FEDWIRE FUNDS AND PRIVATE SECTOR PAYMENT SYSTEMS

TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2010

 

Click to access FSAP_Technical%20Note_Payment%20Systems_Liquidity%20Risk%20Management_Final_5%2011%2010.pdf

 

 

 

Managing Operational Risk in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems

by

Kim McPhail

 

Click to access 17521118.pdf

 

 

Interdependencies of payment and settlement systems: the Hong Kong experience

 

Click to access fa2_print.pdf

 

 

Fundamentals oF Payment systems

 

Click to access Fundamentals_of_Payment_Systems.pdf

 

 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS

Click to access glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf

 

 

Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems

May 2005

 

Click to access d68.pdf

 

 

Creating an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Payment System: Policy and Regulatory Issues

Tanai Khiaonarong

No. 422 May 2013

 

Click to access adbi-wp422.pdf

 

 

 

Oversight of payment and settlement systems

2012

 

http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Oversight%20of%20payments%20and%20settlement%20systems%202012_tcm47-286470.pdf?2016122522

 

 

 

Payment & Settelment System in India

 

Click to access All%20about%20Payment%20and%20Settlement%20Systems%20in%20India.pdf

 

 

 

Payment and Settlement Systems in India

VISION-2018

 

Click to access VISION20181A8972F5582F4B2B8B46C5B669CE396A.PDF

 

 

 

Clearing House Interbank Payments System (“CHIPS®”)

Self-Assessment of Compliance with Standards for Systemically Important Payment Systems

January 2016

 

https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/payco%20files/standards%20self%20assessment%202016.pdf?la=en

 

 

 

Supervision of Payment, Clearing and Settlement

 

Click to access FSR_Supervision_of_Payment_Clearing_and_Settlement.pdf

 

 

The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)

 

Click to access continuous_linked_settlement.en.pdf

 

 

Indian Payments Industry: Mobile POS Solutions

Click to access IE%20Insight%20-%20India%20Payments%20-%20Mobile%20POS%20Solutions.pdf

 

 

 

Payment systems in Sweden

 

Click to access swedencomp.pdf

 

 

 

CIPS and the International Role of the Renminbi

January 27, 2016

By Nicholas Borst

http://www.frbsf.org/banking/asia-program/pacific-exchange-blog/cips-and-the-international-role-of-the-renminbi/

 

 

Chinese Central Bank has introduced CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System)

 

Click to access chinese-central-bank-cips.pdf

Balance Sheets, Financial Interconnectedness, and Financial Stability – G20 Data Gaps Initiative

Balance Sheets, Financial Interconnectedness, and Financial Stability – G20 Data Gaps Initiative

 

From G-20 Data Gaps Initiative II: Meeting the Policy Challenge

In 2009, the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) endorsed 20 recommendations to address data gaps revealed by the global financial crisis. The initiative, aimed at supporting enhanced policy analysis, is led by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics (IAG)1 plays the global facilitator role to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the DGI recommendations.

The financial crisis which started in 2007 with problems in the U.S. subprime market, spread to the rest of the world becoming the most severe global crisis since the Great Depression. One difference between the global financial crisis and earlier post-war crises was that the crisis struck at the heart of the global financial system spreading throughout the global economy. This required global efforts for recovery. As one element of the global response, in October 2009, the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) endorsed a DGI led by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Secretariat and the IMF Staff. DGI was launched as an overarching initiative of 20 recommendations to address information gaps revealed by the global financial crisis.

Following the global financial crisis, in 2008, the G-20 leaders, at their meeting in Washington,9 committed to implement a fundamental reform of the global financial system to strengthen financial markets and regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises.10 As part of the reform agenda, the FSB was established in April 2009 as the successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and started working as the central locus of coordination to take forward the financial reform program as developed by the relevant bodies. The obligations of members of the FSB were set to include agreeing to undergo periodic peer reviews, using among other inputs IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) reports. The G-20 leaders noted the importance of global efforts in implementing the global regulatory reform so as to protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global developments affecting international financial stability.

The components of the G-20 regulatory reform agenda complement each other with an ultimate goal of strengthening the international financial system. The DGI has been an important element of this agenda as the regulatory reform agenda items mostly require better data. The collection of data on Global Systemically Important Banks’ (G-SIBs) exposures and funding dependencies is among the steps towards addressing the “too-big-to-fail” issue by reducing the probability and impact of G-SIBs’ failing. The FSB work on developing standards and processes for global data collection and aggregation on securities financing transactions aims to improve transparency in securitization towards the main goal of reducing risks related to the shadow banking system. Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets including Credit Default Swap (CDS) were brought under greater scrutiny towards the main goal of making derivatives markets safer following the global crisis. DGI supported this goal by improving information in CDS markets. A number of other G-20 initiatives have strong links with the DGI project including the FSB work on strengthening the oversight and regulation of the shadow banking system; and on the work on global legal entity identifiers (LEI)11 which contribute to the robustness of the data frameworks with a more micro focus. The changing global regulatory reforms particularly the implementation of Basel III was also taken into consideration in the development of the DGI.

Surveillance Agenda

The importance of closing the data gaps hampering the surveillance of financial systems was also highlighted as part of the IMF’s 2014 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR).12 The 2014 TSR emphasized that due to growing interconnectedness across borders, financial market shocks will continue to have significant spillovers via both capital flows and shifts in risk positions. Also, new dimensions to interconnectedness will continue to emerge such as through the potential short-run adverse spillovers generated by the financial regulatory reforms. To this end, the TSR recommended improving information on balance-sheets and enriching flow-of funds data. The IMF has overhauled its surveillance to make it more risk-based. To this end, the IMF Managing Director’s Action Plan for Strengthening Surveillance following the 2014 TSR13 underlined that the IMF will revive and adapt the Balance Sheet Approach (BSA) to facilitate a more in-depth analysis of the impact of shocks and their transmission across sectors, and possibly initiate the global flow of funds to better reflect global interconnections (Box 1). This work requires data from the DGI as it will help support the IMF’s macro-financial work including in the key exercises and reports (i.e., Early Warning Exercise, FSAP, and GFSR).

Global Flow of Funds

Through the use of internationally-agreed statistical standards, data on cross-border financial exposures (IBS, CPIS, and Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS)) can be linked with the domestic sectoral accounts data to build up a comprehensive picture of financial interconnections domestically and across borders, with a link back to the real economy through the sectoral accounts. This work is known as the “Global Flow of Funds (GFF).”14 The GFF project is mainly aimed at constructing a matrix that identifies interlinkages among domestic sectors and with counterpart countries (and possibly counterpart country sectors) to build up a picture of bilateral financial exposures and support analysis of potential sources of contagion. The concept of the GFF was first outlined in the Second Progress Report on the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative and initiated in 2013 as part of a broader IMF initiative aimed at strengthening the analysis of interconnectedness across borders, global liquidity flows and global financial interdependencies. In the longer term, the GFF matrix is intended to support regular monitoring of bilateral cross-border financial positions through a framework that highlight risks to national and international financial stability. IMF Staff is working towards developing a GFF matrix starting with the largest global economies.

 

How Does the DGI Address the Surveillance Agenda?

As noted above, in the wake of the 2014 TSR the IMF Managing Director published an Action Plan for Strengthening Surveillance. Among the actions to be taken was that “The Fund will revive and adapt the balance sheet approach to facilitate a more in-depth analysis of the impact of shocks and their transmission across sectors.” This responded to a call from outside experts David Li and Paul Tucker in their external study for the 2014 TSR on risks and spillovers.37

Sectoral Analysis

Even though the 2007/2008 crisis emerged in the financial sector, given its intermediary role, the problems in the financial sector also affected other sectors of an economy. To this end, analysis of balance sheet exposures is essential given the increasingly interconnected global economy. As it is pointed out in the IMF TSR 2014, the use of balance sheets to identify sources of vulnerability and the transmission of shocks, could have helped detect risks associated with European banks’ reliance on U.S. wholesale funding to finance structured products. In June 2015, the IMF set out the way forward in a paper for the IMF Executive Board on Balance Sheet Analysis in Surveillance. 38 Sectoral accounts and balance sheet data are essential, including from-whom to-whom data, in providing the context for an assessment of the links between the real economy and financial sectors. The sectoral balance sheets of the SNA is seen as the overarching framework for balance sheet analysis as the IMF Executive Board paper makes clear. Further, the paper sets out a data framework for such analysis.39 Putting the sectoral balance sheets of the SNA in a policy context, the IMF has developed a BSA, which compiles all the main balance sheets in an economy using aggregate data by sector. The BSA is based on the same conceptual principles as the sectoral accounts, providing information on a from-whom-to-whom basis with an additional focus on vulnerabilities arising from maturity and, currency mismatches as well as the capital structure of economic sectors.

While currently not that many economies compile from-whom-to-whom balance sheet data, BSA data can be compiled from the IMF’s Standardized Report Forms, IIP, and government balance sheet data—a more limited set of data than needed to compile the sectoral accounts. The DGI-2 recommendations address key data gaps that act as a constraint on a full-fledged balance sheet analysis. The DGI recommends addressing such gaps through improving G-20 economies’ dissemination of sectoral accounts and balance sheets building on 2008 SNA, including for the non-financial corporate and household sectors. (Annex 1, Recommendation II.8) Given the multifaceted character of the datasets, implementation of this recommendation is challenging and progress has been slow. However, all G-20 economies agree on the importance of having such information and have plans in place to make it happen.

Understanding Cross-border Financial Interconnections

The crisis emphasized the fact that it is not possible to isolate the problems in a single financial system as shocks propagate rapidly across the financial systems. Indeed, the IMF, since 2010, has been identifying jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors based on a set of relevant and transparent criteria including size and interconnectedness. Within this identification framework, cross-border interconnectedness is considered an important complementary measure to the size of the economy: it captures the systemic risk that can arise through direct and indirect interlinkages among financial sectors in the global financial system (i.e., the risk that failure or malfunction of a national financial system may have severe repercussions on other countries or on overall systemic stability.48 The 2014 TSR summed up the issue succinctly in its Executive Summary: “Risks and spillovers remain first-order issues for the world economy and should be central to Fund surveillance. Recent reforms have made surveillance more risk-based, helping to better capture global interconnections. Experience so far also points to the need to build a deeper understanding of how risks map across countries, and how spillovers can quickly spread across sectors to expose domestic vulnerabilities.”49 Four existing datasets that include key information on cross-country financial linkages are the IIP, BIS IBS, IMF CPIS and IMF CDIS. Together these datasets provide a comprehensive picture of cross-border financial interconnections. This picture is especially relevant for policy makers as financial connections strengthen across border and domestic conditions are affected by financial developments in other economies to whom they are closely linked financially. DGI-2 focuses on improving the availability and cross-country comparability of these datasets (Annex1, Recommendations II.10, 11, 12 and 13). The well-known IIP is a key data source to understanding the linkages between the domestic economy and the rest of the world by providing information on both external assets and liabilities of the economy with a detailed instrument breakdown. However, the crisis revealed the need for currency and more detailed sector breakdowns, particularly for the other financial corporations (OFCs) sector. Consequently, as part of the DGI, the IIP was enhanced to support these policy needs. Significant progress has also been made in ensuring regular reporting of IIP along with the increase in frequency of reporting from annual to quarterly. By end-2015 virtually all G-20 economies reported quarterly IIP data. The IBS have been a key source of data for many decades providing information on aggregate assets and liabilities of internationally active banking systems on a quarterly frequency. The CPIS data, while on an annual frequency, provided significant insights into portfolio investment assets. That said, both datasets had limitations in terms of country coverage and granularity. CPIS also needed to be improved in terms of frequency and timeliness. To this end, the DGI supported the enhancements in these datasets.

 

Key Terms:

  • G-20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI)
  • Financial Stability Board (FSB)
  • The Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics (IAG)
  • Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG)
  • Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
  • Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)
  • Over-the-counter (OTC)
  • Credit Default Swap (CDS)
  • Global legal entity identifiers (LEI)
  • IMF Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR)
  • IMF Balance Sheet Approach (BSA)
  • IMF Global Flow of Funds (GFF)
  • IMF IIP (International Investment Positions)
  • BIS IBS (International Banking Statistics)
  • IMF CPIS (Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey)
  • IMF CDIS (Coordinated Direct Investment Survey)
  • IMF GFSR ( Global Financial Stability Report)

 

Other Related Terms:

  • Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs )
  • GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSURERS (G-SIIS)
  • Systemically Important Financial Market Utilities (G-FMUs)
  • Nonbank Financial Companies (G-SINFC)
  • Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)

     

The IAG members are

  • BIS (Bank of International Settlements)
  • G20 (Group of 20 Nations)
  • IMF (International Monetary Fund)
  • OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
  • ECB (European Central Bank)
  • World Bank
  • Eurostat (European Statistics/Directorate-General of the European Commission)
  • UN (United Nations)

 

From G-20 Data Gaps Initiative II: Meeting the Policy Challenge

balancesheets

From G-20 Data Gaps Initiative II: Meeting the Policy Challenge

dgi

 

Progress of DGI ((DGI-I and DGI-II)

From G-20 Data Gaps Initiative II: Meeting the Policy Challenge

The first phase of the DGI was successfully concluded in September 2015 and the second phase of the initiative (DGI-2) was endorsed by the G-20 FMCBG. The key objective of the DGI-2 is to implement the regular collection and dissemination of comparable, timely, integrated, high quality, and standardized statistics for policy use. DGI-2 encompasses 20 new or revised recommendations, focused on datasets that support: (i) monitoring of risk in the financial sector; and (ii) analysis of vulnerabilities, interconnections and spillovers, not least cross-border.

Following the significant progress in closing some of the information gaps identified during the global financial crisis of 2007/08, the G-20 FMCBG endorsed, in September 2015, the closing of DGI-1. During the six-year implementation of DGI-1, significant achievements were obtained, particularly regarding the development of conceptual frameworks, as well as enhancements in some statistical collection and reporting. Regarding the latter, more work is needed for the implementation of some recommendations, especially in seven high-priority areas across G-20 economies, notably in government finance statistics and sectoral accounts and balance sheets.

In September 2015, the G-20 FMCBG also endorsed the launch of the second phase of the DGI. The main objective of DGI-2 is to implement the regular collection and dissemination of reliable and timely statistics for policy use. Its twenty recommendations are clustered under three main headings: (1) monitoring risk in the financial sector, (2) vulnerabilities, interconnections and spillovers, and (3) data sharing and communication of official statistics. The DGI-2 maintains the continuity with the DGI-1 recommendations while setting more specific objectives with the intention for the G-20 economies to compile and disseminate minimum common datasets for these recommendations. The DGI-2 also includes new recommendations to reflect the evolving users’ needs. Furthermore, the DGI-2 aims at strengthening the synergies with other relevant global initiatives.

The DGI-2 facilitates closing data gaps that are policy-relevant. By achieving its main objective, the DGI-2 will be instrumental in closing gaps in policy-relevant data. Most of the datasets covered by the DGI-2 are particularly relevant for meeting the emerging macro- financial policy needs, including the analysis of international positions, global liquidity, foreign currency exposures, and capital flows volatility.

The DGI-2 introduces action plans that set out specific “targets” for the implementation of its twenty recommendations through the five-year horizon of the initiative. The action plans acknowledge that countries may be at different stages of statistical development and take into account national priorities and resource constraints. The DGI-2 intends to bring the G-20 economies at higher common statistical standards through a coordinated effort; however, flexibility will be considered in terms of intermediate steps to achieve the targets based on national priorities, resource constraints, emerging data needs, and other considerations.

 

 

 

Key Sources of Research:

 

Second Phase of the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-2) Second Progress Report

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2017

Click to access 092117.pdf

http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=290

 

 

 

Second Phase of the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-2) First Progress Report

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2016

 

Click to access 090216.pdf

 

 

Sixth Progress Report on the Implementation of the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2015

 

Click to access The-Financial-Crisis-and-Information-Gaps.pdf

 

 

Fifth Progress Report on the Implementation of the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2014

Click to access 5thprogressrep.pdf

 

 

Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2013

 

Click to access 093013.pdf

 

 

 

Progress Report on the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative: Status, Action Plans, and Timetables

 

Prepared by the Staff of the IMF and the FSB Secretariat September 2012

Click to access 093012.pdf

 

 

 

Implementation Progress Report

 

Prepared by the IMF Staff and the FSB Secretariat June 2011

Click to access 063011.pdf

 

 

 

Progress Report Action Plans and Timetables

 

Prepared by the IMF Staff and the FSB Secretariat May 2010

 

Click to access 053110.pdf

 

 

 

Report to the
G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors

 

Prepared by the IMF Staff and the FSB Secretariat October 29, 2009

 

Click to access 102909.pdf

 

 

 

G-20 Data Gaps Initiative II: Meeting the Policy Challenge

by Robert Heath and Evrim Bese Goksu

2016

Click to access wp1643.pdf

 

 

 

Why are the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative and the SDDS Plus Relevant for Financial Stability Analysis?

Robert Heath

Click to access wp1306.pdf

 

 

 

Toward the Development of Sectoral Financial Positions and Flows in a From-Whom-to-Whom Framework

Manik Shrestha

 

Click to access c12835.pdf

 

 

An Integrated Framework for Financial Positions and Flows on a From-Whom-to- Whom Basis: Concepts, Status, and Prospects

Manik Shrestha, Reimund Mink, and Segismundo Fassler

 

Click to access wp1257.pdf

 

 

Financial investment and financing in a from-whom-to-whom framework

Mink, Reimund

Click to access 2011_dublin_61_01_mink.pdf

 

 

Users Conference on the Financial Crisis and Information Gaps

Conference co-hosted by The International Monetary Fund and The Financial Stability Board

2009

http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2009/usersconf/index.htm

 

 

A Status on the Availability of Sectoral Balance Sheets and Accumulation Accounts in Advanced Economies not Represented by Membership in the G-20

2011

 

Click to access g20a.pdf

 

 

A Status on the Availability of Sectoral Balance Sheets and Accumulation Accounts in G-20 Economies

2011

 

Click to access g20b.pdf

 

 

AN UPDATE ON THE IMF-OECD CONFERENCE ON STRENGTHENING SECTORAL POSITION AND FLOW DATA IN THE MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS

FEBRUARY 28 – MARCH 2, 2011

 

http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=COM/STD/DAF(2010)21&docLanguage=En

 

 

The Balance Sheet Approach:
Data Needs, Data at Hand, and Data Gaps (August 2009)

 

Alfredo Leone, Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund

 

Click to access leone_paper.pdf

 

 

Development of financial sectoral accounts

New opportunities and challenges for supporting financial stability analysis

by Bruno Tissot

2016

 

Click to access ifcwork15.pdf

 

 

A Flow-of-Funds Perspective on the Financial Crisis Volume I: Money, Credit

edited by B. Winkler, A. van Riet, P. Bull, Ad van Riet

 

 

A Flow-of-Funds Perspective on the Financial Crisis Volume II: Macroeconomic

edited by B. Winkler, A. van Riet, P. Bull

 

 

Financial investment and financing in a from-whom-to-whom framework

Mink, Reimund

2011

Click to access 650287.pdf

 

 

Expanding the Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts’ Financial Sector

By Robert J. Kornfeld, Lisa Lynn, and Takashi Yamashita

2016

Click to access 0116_expanding_the_integrated_macroeconomic_accounts_financial_sector.pdf

 

 

Using the Balance Sheet Approach in Surveillance: Framework, Data Sources, and Data Availability

Johan Mathisen and Anthony Pellechio

2006

Click to access wp06100.pdf

 

 

Balance Sheet Analysis: A New Approach to Financial Stability

Surveillance

By Jean Christine A. Armas

2016

 

Click to access EN16-01.pdf

 

 

USING THE BALNCE SHEET APPROACH IN FINANCIAL STABILITY SURVEILLANCE:
Analyzing the Israeli economy’s resilience to exchange rate risk

 

Click to access JFS2007_HaimLevy_pres.pdf

Click to access dp0701e.pdf

 

 

 

A Balance Sheet Approach to Financial Crisis

Mark Allen, Christoph Rosenberg, Christian Keller, Brad Setser, and Nouriel Roubini

2002

Click to access wp02210.pdf

 

 

THE BALANCE SHEET APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS

Giovanni Cozzi and
Jan Toporowski

2006

Click to access wp_485.pdf

 

 

Balance-sheets. A financial/liability approach

Bo Bergman

2015

 

Click to access bergman_paper.pdf

 

 

Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models

Dirk J Bezemer

2009

Click to access Bezemer_-_No_one_show_this_comming.pdf

 

 

 

Schumpeter Might Be Right Again: The Functional Differentiation of Credit

Dirk J. Bezemer
University of Groningen

Click to access the_functional_differentiation_of_credit.pdf

 

 

Causes of Financial Instability: Don’t Forget Finance

Dirk J. Bezemer

April 2011

 

Click to access wp_665.pdf

 

 

THE ECONOMY AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM: THE BALANCE SHEET DIMENSION

DIRK J BEZEMER

2012

Click to access ACS_1250047_1st_Prf.pdf

 

 

Did Credit Decouple from Output in the Great Moderation?

Maria Grydaki and Dirk Bezemer

June 2013

Click to access MPRA_paper_47424.pdf

 

 

 

Towards an ‘accounting view’ on money, banking and the macroeconomy: history, empirics, theory

Dirk J. Bezemer

2016

Click to access Camb._J._Econ.-2016-Bezemer-1275-95.pdf

 

 

Modelling systemic financial sector and sovereign risk

Dale F. Gray anD anDreas a. Jobst

2011

 

Click to access Gray_2.pdf

 

 

BALANCE SHEET ANALYSIS IN FUND SURVEILLANCE

2015

Click to access 061215.pdf

Click to access 071315.pdf

 

 

The role of external balance sheets in the financial crisis

Yaser Al-Saffar, Wolfgang Ridinger and Simon Whitaker

2013

 

Click to access fs_paper24.pdf

 

 

Global Conferences on DGI

June 2, 2016

http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/dgi/

 

 

CAPITAL FLOWS AND GLOBAL LIQUIDITY

IMF Note for G20 IFA WG

February 2016

 

Click to access P020160811536051676178.pdf

 

 

Introduction to Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6th Edition and BPM6 Compilation Guide

Click to access Link3_766_105.pdf

 

 

Introduction: ‘cranks’ and ‘brave heretics’: rethinking money and banking after the Great Financial Crisis

Geoffrey Ingham Ken Coutts Sue Konzelmann

Camb J Econ (2016) 40 (5): 1247-1257.

 

 

Network Analysis of Sectoral Accounts: Identifying Sectoral Interlinkages in G-4 Economies

by Luiza Antoun de Almeida

2016

Click to access wp15111.pdf

 

 

2014 TRIENNIAL SURVEILLANCE REVIEW—EXTERNAL STUDY—RISKS AND SPILLOVERS

Prepared By David Daokui Li and Paul Tucker

 

Click to access 073014e.pdf

Click to access 14-10.pdf

 

 

 

2014 TRIENNIAL SURVEILLANCE REVIEW—OVERVIEW PAPER

 

Click to access 073014.pdf

http://www.imf.org/external/np/spr/triennial/2014/

 

 

Measuring Global Flow of Funds and Integrating Real and Financial Accounts: Concepts, Data Sources and Approaches

Nan Zhang (Stanford University)

2015

Click to access zhang.pdf

 

 

Cross-border financial linkages: Identifying and measuring vulnerabilities

 

Philip R. Lane

2014

 

Click to access PolicyInsight77.pdf

 

 

Global Flow of Funds: Mapping Bilateral Geographic Flows

Authors1: Luca Errico, Richard Walton, Alicia Hierro, Hanan AbuShanab, Goran Amidzic

 

2013

Click to access STS083-P1-S.pdf

 

Global-Flow-of-Funds Analysis in a Theoretical Model -What Happened in China’s External Flow of Funds –

 

Nan Zhang

 

Click to access 08GFOF.pdf

 

 

Mapping the Shadow Banking System through a Global Flow of Funds Analysis

Hyun Song Shin

Princeton University

Click to access Hyun-Song-Shin2.pdf

 

 

The Composition of the Global Flow of Funds in East Asia

 

Nan Zhang

 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.534.757&rep=rep1&type=pdf

 

 

What Has Capital Flow Liberalization Meant for Economic and Financial Statistics?

Robert Heath

2015

Click to access 41aac8864e53b6176f7b3b7df22aba05ac0e.pdf

 

 

Global flows in a digital age: How trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy

McKinsey & Company Report

2014

 

 

Managing global finance as a system

Speech given by

Andrew G Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England

At the Maxwell Fry Annual Global Finance Lecture, Birmingham University 29 October 2014

Click to access speech772.pdf

External Balance sheets of Nations

External Balance sheets of Nations

Also read my other related post.

Foundations of Balance Sheet Economics

 

From The role of external balance sheets in the financial crisis

Gross external balance sheets are important in explaining the incidence of the financial crisis across economies. Just as for banks, leverage of the national balance sheet was an indicator of subsequent vulnerability. Countries that also experienced strong domestic credit growth, in part fuelled by ‘savings glut’ net capital inflows, suffered particularly badly. And banks’ balance sheets were critical in the transmission mechanism: high gross external interbank debt — the ‘banking glut’ — and maturity and currency mismatches, contributed to foreign rollover risk.

 

From  Bilateral Financial Linkages and Global Imbalances: a View on The Eve of the Financial Crisis

During the last 15 years international financial integration has increased dramatically. This process was characterized in particular by two related trends: an explosion in the size of cross-border capital inflows and outflows, reflected in rapidly expanding stocks of external assets and liabilities; and the emergence of global imbalances, reflected in an increased dispersion in world current account positions and a sharp widening of global net debtor and creditor positions. With cross-border financial linkages becoming much stronger, measuring them accurately is essential to understand the impact and international transmission of shocks, as the global financial crisis has clearly shown. However, while research on causes and consequences of global imbalances and international financial integration has been extensive, and recent pioneering work by Kubelec and Sa (2010) has documented the increase in bilateral financial linkages among 18 advanced economies and emerging markets, we still lack a comprehensive global picture of bilateral net and gross positions across countries. This paper takes a first step towards filling that gap.

From The geographical composition of national external balance sheets: 1980–2005

Financial globalisation has been one of the most striking phenomena happening in the world economy in the past two decades. Until recently, very little was known about the size and composition of countries’ external nancial assets and liabilities. This gap was partly narrowed by the work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, which provides estimates of the total external nancial assets and liabilities of 145 countries, from 1970 to 2004. These data show that there has been a marked increase in the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, particularly since the mid-1990s. This increase has been especially pronounced among industrial countries, where nancial integration has exceeded trade integration. However, very little is known about the geographical composition of assets and liabilities. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the geographical composition of countries’ external positions by constructing a data set of stocks of bilateral assets and liabilities for a group of 18 countries, covering the period from 1980 to 2005.

The data distinguish between four asset classes: foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves. For the rst three asset classes, missing data are constructed using gravity models, which have been extensively applied to explain cross-border trade and have been increasingly used to explain nancial stocks and ows. These models explain bilateral assets by the geographical and historical proximity between the source and host countries, including variables such as distance, time difference, whether the source and host countries share a common border, a common language, or have colonial links. These models tend to have a large explanatory power, suggesting that nancial markets are not frictionless, but are segmented by information asymmetries and familiarity effects. For reserves, a two-step procedure is adopted. First, data on the currency composition are collected and then are translated into geographical composition.

 

Key Sources of Research:

Financial globalisation, external balance sheets and economic adjustment

By Chris Kubelec

 

Click to access qb070204.pdf

 

Global imbalances and external adjustment after the crisis

Philip R. Lane

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

This draft: May 15, 2014

 

Click to access LMF%20EXTADJUST%20July2014.pdf

 

The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004

Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

2006

 

Click to access wp0669.pdf

 

Europe and Global Imbalances

Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

 

Click to access wp07144.pdf

 

A Global Perspective on External Positions

Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Click to access c0122.pdf

 

Capital Flows to Central and Eastern Europe

Philip R. Lane

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Click to access iiisdp161.pdf

 

Cross-border portfolios: assets, liabilities, and non- flow adjustments

Stephanie E Curcuru,2 Charles P Thomas,2 Francis E Warnock

Click to access bispap82a.pdf

 

Why do Foreigners Invest in the United States?

Kristin J. Forbes

03/15/08

Click to access Why_Do_Foreigners_Invest_in_US-03-15-08.pdf

 

GLOBAL IMBALANCES: A SOURCE OF STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS?

Kristin J. Forbes

Click to access cj27n2-9.pdf

 

Patterns of International Capital Flows and Their Implications for Economic Development

Eswar Prasad, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Arvind Subramanian

Click to access NEG11Rajan.pdf

 

Financial Globalisation and the Crisis

Philip R. Lane

June 2012

Click to access lseGC_lane_FinGlob.pdf

 

The financial crisis and its international transmission: some tentative lessons 

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

September 14, 2009

Click to access 1_Milesi_Ferretti.pdf

 

External liabilities and crises

Luis A.V. Catão , Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

2014

Click to access Catao_Milesi-Ferretti_External%20Liabil_Crises_jie%2014.pdf

 

International Investment Patterns

Philip R. Lane
and
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

 

Click to access wp04134.pdf

 

Where Did All the Borrowing Go?
A Forensic Analysis of the U.S. External Position

Prepared by Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti1

February 2008

Click to access wp0828.pdf

 

An Elephant in the Room: The US External Balance Sheet and International Monetary Power

 

Iain Hardie

Sylvia Maxfield

 

Click to access An%20Elephant%20in%20the%20Room%20Brown%20Oct%202015.pdf

 

THE EXTERNAL WEALTH OF NATIONS Measures of Foreign Assets and Liabilities For Industrial and Developing Countries

Philip Lane

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

August 14, 2000

Click to access TEPNo4PL21.pdf

 

The role of external balance sheets in the financial crisis

Yaser Al-Saffar, Wolfgang Ridinger and Simon Whitaker

 

Click to access fs_paper24.pdf

 

Domestic Credit Growth and International Capital Flows

Philip R. Lane and Peter McQuade

 

Click to access ecbwp1566.pdf

 

STOCKS, FLOWS, AND VALUATION EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ASSETS AND LIABILITIES: DO THEY MATTER?

Alfredo Pistelli

Jorge Selaive

Rodrigo O. Valdés

 

Click to access 6360170.pdf

 

External Balance Sheets as Countercyclical Crisis Buffers

Joseph Joyce

2015

Click to access MPRA_paper_66039.pdf

 

Bilateral Financial Linkages and Global Imbalances: a View on the Eve of the Financial Crisis

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Francesco Strobbe

Natalia Tamirisa

This Draft: May 13, 2011

 

Click to access Milesi-Ferretti_Bilateral%20Financial%20Linkages%20and%20Global%20Imbalances.pdf

 

Financial Globalization and Cross-Country Spillovers

Chris Kubelec  and Filipa Sa

 

http://economics.mit.edu/files/3519

 

The geographical composition of national external balance sheets: 1980–2005

Chris Kubelec and Filipa Sá

March 2010

Click to access wp384.pdf

 

U.S. Net International Investment Position

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

 

The International Balance Sheets of China and India

Philip R. Lane

Preliminary Draft. March 2006.

 

Click to access Philip_lane.pdf