“Know thyself,” advised the oracle at Delphi. “Show thyself,” is the motto of today. The prevalence of selfies, sexting, Facebook pics and stories, tweets and Twitters, and new apps, all demonstrate the transition from a personal and private self to a public, even pubic, self.
This cult of the self may have emerged remotely from Delphi and Socrates but accelerated in the late 19th and 20th centuries with many philosophers, psychologists, and social psychologists, some of whom are mentioned here. These are now left behind by activists and the identity politics of gender, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and color. The front-page news in The New York Times recently (22 May) was the latest battle in the culture wars: bathrooms! We can fight about anything! — and everything, and we do.
Who are you? What are you? What is your self? Most people, in my limited research on this topic, tend to identify in three principal ways: their familial roles, or their occupational roles or the defining characteristics of their personality (warm, strong, a survivor, romantic, adventurer, nurturing were common responses). (Thomas Kuhn’s Twenty Statements Test is more scientific.) And if you really don’t know who and what you are, the are plenty of personality tests to tell you, and perhaps some frenemies to explain precisely what is wrong with you.
Some adopt a more existential vision. One respondent identified herself as “a butterfly” and as “a river. I have to keep moving or I’d die.” Active, but hopefully not all downhill. Performers are particularly demonstrative on the self. The Beatles: “I am the walrus” (A very strange self-concept, drawn from Lewis Carroll. “I am the emu” sounds much better). Michael Jackson: “I’m a lover, not a fighter.” Paul Simon: “I am a rock. I am an island.” (John Donne disagreed: “No man is an island.”) And Nietzsche: “I am… the Anti-Christ.” (1992:72.)
All sorts of different self-definitions and identities. All sorts of different people and types of people. What is also fascinating is how many people have tried to define this self, without too much agreement. It is elusive not least because it is constantly changing as we age, and enjoy or suffer different experiences: marriage, parenthood, promotion, job-change, sickness, disability, conversion, discrimination, lotto-winner, etc. Indeed the self is so mobile that Peg O’Connor described the self as a “unicorn” — “there is no authentic self. Identity is always a work in progress” (2014:50). One does have an identity, but it is fluid. You are not going to France or Indonesia in your gap year to “find yourself.” You are taking your self with you! Others believe it is a chameleon, for similar reasons. So this search for this unicorn-chameleon, albeit brief, looks useful, even fun.
1. Sigmund Freud: Self as Iceberg.
Influenced by Charcot’s work on hypnotism and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, Freud came to understand that there are two types of mental processes, conscious and unconscious. And the unconscious is not easily accessed, but it is possible in therapy through dreams (in The Interpretation of Dreams) and the analysis of symbolism, and through parapraxes (in The Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life), which we now know as Freudian slips (verbal slips, slips of the pen or of the body, mislaying, misreading, forgetting, and errors generally). He gives numerous examples of these giveaways. These parapraxes are thought of as expressions of repressed psychic material. Also conversion: how psychic concerns can affect the physical self: a union, or communion, of mind and body. One friend said that whenever her husband was unfaithful, she got sick. They say that 90% of an iceberg is underwater. Freud suggested that much of the self is below consciousness, and that it was important to bring it to the conscious. Perhaps how much is below varies with degrees of repression.
Freud theorized the self far beyond the iceberg/unconscious to include the stages of psychosexual development (oral, anal, and phallic) and the stages of id, ego, and super-ego to include the many mechanisms of adaptation including fixation, regression, projection, repression, displacement, sublimation, transference, resistance (defense mechanisms), and more. While some of his contributions to self-understanding and to psychiatry have been contested, others have led to his being labeled among the top 10 intellectuals of the 20th century by Time magazine.
2. William James: Self as Multiple.
“A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.” But social selves may be contradictory, depending on the individuals. Your spouse will not have the same view of you as your ex-spouse. I think we can agree on that. And co-workers will not have the same image of him or her as the children do. But that is their concept of you, not your image of your self. So James does imply the possibility of contradictory, conflicting and multiple selves in the minds of others. Walt Whitman expressed this well: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well, then I contradict myself. / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)” As did American best-selling novelist Karin Slaughter. Here the protagonist, a rookie cop, debates shooting a villain:
The fifth Kate reared her ugly head. This Kate wanted darkness…Then the other Kates took over. She wasn’t sure which ones. The daughter? The widow? The cop? The whore? The real Kate, she wanted to think…The real Kate was a good person (2014:392).
So that makes six Kates in one; a double trinity, multiple personalities, and even conflicted and contradictory. Some of these images may be negative. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903) W.E.B. Du Bois pondered the question: “How does it feel to be a problem?” He explained that “being a problem is a strange experience – peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in boyhood and in Europe.” He added, “I remember well when the shadow swept across me. “ When as a “little thing” in school, a girl refused to accept his play visiting card. “Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others…shut out from their world by a vast veil.” Self as problem to self, and to others who create the problem.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. “One ever feels his two-ness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (ch. 1).
3. C.H. Cooley: Self as Looking-Glass
His couplet:
Each to each a looking-glass,
Reflects the other that doth pass.
The couplet reflects not only how poetic sociologists may be (don’t you love the “doth?”), but also their insight. Our idea of our selves is deeply influenced by what other people think of us or, strictly, what we think other people think of us. (True, the looking-glass is a flawed metaphor since it does not judge, unlike people.) This is especially true for our primary groups of intimate personal relations, the families of birth and our closest friendships. Significant others mirror us back to our selves, ranging from invective (crooked Hillary, crazy Bernie) to labelling (he’s a sexist, racist, fascist) to positive reinforcement (you’re the best) and high self-esteem to narcissism (I’m the best!). But there are many mirrors, all with different reflections, so figuring out who or what the self is would be tricky; indeed this self too would be multiple and contradictory.
Cooley perhaps under-estimated the degree to which we can refuse to internalize and can resist these looking-glass reflections which may problematize us, as Du Bois made clear. Distorting mirrors reflect us, badly. And much as mirrors may influence us, they do not determine us. One can fight back, resist the reflection, smash the mirror, as Frederick Douglass showed. Reflecting on his victory over an overseer when he was a slave, Douglass wrote: “The battle with Mr. Covey… was the turning point in my “life as a slave.”… I was a changed being after that fight. I was nothing before — I was a man now” (1962:143). A new self. Dramatic identity change.
4. G. H. Mead: Self as Structure
“The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience” (1967: 140). Mead reflects both James and Cooley, but perhaps goes beyond them in his emphasis that the self is not only a reflection but is essentially a product, and reflexive. One can think about other people’s ideas about oneself, and react against them, like Douglass, (the boomerang effect,) or double-down and reinforce them, (the self-fulfilling prophecy). Yet Mead distinguishes between the core, the “me”, as object, developed out of past experiences and understandings, and the “I,” the sometimes impulsive subject, generating new ideas and new selves. So the self is both both solid and fluid.
5. Abraham Maslow: Self as Flower
Maslow is well known for moving psychology away from Freud to Humanistic Psychology: “It is as if Freud supplied us with the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half.” (Not a very generous verdict!) He is also well-known for his “hierarchy of needs” which should be satisfied for optimal psychic health. The self in this view is like a flower, potentially growing into full bloom. The seven needs are: 1) physiological: warmth, food, etc. for the baby; 2) safety needs; 3) psychological needs: love, belonging; 4) esteem needs: self-satisfaction; 5) cognitive needs: education, skills; 6) aesthetic needs: harmony, order; 7) self-actualization: maturity, joy, creativity. The process is not automatic, like an elevator, but it can be linked to changes in the life cycle as discussed by Eric Erikson, Daniel Levinson, George Vaillant, and Gail Sheehy.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre: Self as Self-Creative
“Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.” (1957:15). Rejecting any traditional, essentialist idea of human nature, Sartre adds: “In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom” (p.23). To clarify: “You are nothing less than your life” (p.33) combining all your projects, actions, and choices. We are who and what we make our selves to be. We create our selves. If we persistently cheat, we become cheats. The meaning of our lives is the meaning we give it. Again: “Man makes himself” (p.43). There is a choice of ethics, and a freedom to choose, whether we want it or not. Hence his idea that “man is condemned to be free” (p.23). He insists that “life has no meaning a priori. Before you come alive, life is nothing; it’s up to you to give it a meaning…” (p.43). The self, in his view, is not an iceberg, nor a passive reflection, nor a flower that may grow; it is what we make it. But it is somewhat atomistic.
Two dissenting opinions are worth noting. Schopenhauer insists on luck as the prevailing wind. That would include the luck of parents, genetics, country of birth, status, war, plague, etc.: pure chance, no freedom there.
A man’s life is like the voyage of a ship, where luck…acts the part of the wind, and speeds the vessel on its way or drives it far out of its course. All that a man can do for himself is of little avail; like the rudder, which if worked hard and continuously, may help in the navigation of the ship; and yet all may be lost again by a sudden squall (n.d.:169)
He was a bit of a pessimist: “We are like lambs in a field, disporting ourselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey.” (n.d. 382)
The second opinion, of a physicist, is also deterministic, not luck but neurons, but less pessimistic:
We have 100 billion neurons in our brains, as many as there are stars in a galaxy, with an even more astronomical number of links and potential combinations through which they can interact… “We” are the process formed by this entire intricacy, not just by the little bit of it of which we are conscious (in Lapham, 2016:17).
7. Self as Onion
We might think of others, or ourselves, as like onions, layer upon layer, level upon level, or as a many-sided diamond, or like those Russian dolls, the matryoshka, one inside another, inside another. Someone might say: “I’ve never seen this side of you before!” (self as polygon). The novelist Dick Francis described this layering:
I was amazed by his compassion and felt I should have recognised earlier how many unexpected layers there were to Tremayne below the loud executive exterior: not just his love of horses, not just his need to be recorded, not even his disguised delight in Gareth [his son], but other, secret, unrevealed privacies…(1990:50).
But the funniest has to be Shrek. Ogres are like onions, not layer-cakes.
This model is indicated by the phrase “hidden depths” (wherein monsters may lurk) and reflects the notion that one may not really know someone, just the Goffmanesque presentations of the different selves acting in different roles and circumstances, which may be camouflage and masks. But the better one gets to know someone under very different circumstances, the more clearly one can see different selves emerging — or not. The self may be remarkably opaque, not only to the self, as Freud indicated, but also to others.
Two classic examples are Kim Philby and Bernie Madoff. They were not who they seemed to be. Shakespeare got it, as Julius Caesar mused: “One may smile and smile and be a villain.” And as Lady Macbeth instructed her husband: “Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under it.” It took years before investigators “uncovered” who Philby and Madoff were — and their double lives, double selves. “Uncovering” indicates the utility of this onion/layer metaphor.
In a less lethal application, spouses may take years to realize (and hopefully appreciate more and more) who and what their beloved “really” is. (Not as in the comic phrase: “deep down you’re shallow”). Onions do not have cores as dates and avocados do, so the metaphor is somewhat inadequate, but it does capture the layering.
Winston Churchill expressed this well speaking of Russia: “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” (Much like their nesting dolls.) Banyan in the Economist just applied exactly the same phrase to China (2 July 2016:36). The journalist Kim Barker wrote something similar about India: “India was a series of challenges wrapped up in a mystical blanket covered in an existential quandary” (2016:82-3). It seems that we do not know each other very well.
8. Self as Identity
Our self-concept is our identity, but identities are socially constructed according to cultural norms, which are not universal. Consider Barack Obama, widely described as the first black President of the USA, in accord with American norms, specifically in the tradition of the “one-drop” rule. But his mother was white. In accord with another possible rule, “one drop of white blood,” he would be considered white. He is really a shade of brown, anyway, and would be described as such in many other cultures, more sensitive to shades of color.
James McBride offers a classic example. His father was black, his mother white. He remarks about his 11 siblings: “We were all clearly black, of various shades of brown, some light brown, some medium brown, some very light-skinned, and all of us had curly hair” (1997:22). The usual confusion of chromatic and social color. The terms “black” and “white” are symbolic, cultural, and political. Malcolm X noted: “…when he says he’s white, he means he’s boss. That’s right. That’s what white means in this language.” (1966:163).
Then again, Rachel Dolezal exemplifies the issue of who defines us. The daughter of white parents, she identified as black, darkened her hair and her skin and passed as black for years, and worked for the NAACP; but when her parentage became known, her self-defined identity was largely rejected by others as a lie and a fraud. She defended herself insisting that her identity was not biological, but presumably political or psychological. Color identity is seemingly problematic.
Consider too how gender identities have suddenly been spotlighted, most publicly by Caitlin Jenner. We used to recognize two genders, biologically defined and immutable; now we recognize that they are psychologically defined and are mutable. India, however, recognizes three on visa applications. Other cultures also recognize three. As do some individuals who refuse to be labeled male or female. If even such apparently basic identities as color and gender are culturally constructed, not to mention age, beauty, and more, then so, clearly, are ideas of the self. Identity is slippery.
9 & 10. Self as Unicorn and Chameleon
In sum, the self is both unicorn and chameleon. From the fog or flashlight brilliance of identity, theorists we might conclude that the self is a unicorn since it is partly unknown, even unknowable because it is so below consciousness and “in progress”; and a chameleon because it is multiple, mutable, adaptable, and selective in presentation. These selves may be complementary, contradictory, or conflicted.
So while the self is constantly presented to numerous “friends,” it is itself both one and many: unicorn and chameleon, iceberg and onion, a mask and camouflage, a flower and what you create, a looking-glass and a distorting mirror, fluid, a work in progress, a polygon with hidden depths and many layers. Given all these ideas and models, I suspect that there are not many selves who are an “open book.” If nothing else, the self and other selves are: “Surprise!” “Know thyself” is hard enough. Know someone else… really?
Yet surely all this fixation with the self is a trifle unhealthy — me! me! me! — since it may vitiate against community, and concern with and for others: a cultural narcissism.
References
Barker, Kim 2016. Whiskey, Tango, Foxtrot. New York: Anchor.
Douglass, Frederick. 1962 [1892]. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass. London: Collier-Macmillan.
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1995 [1903]. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Signet.
Francis, Dick 1990. Long Shot. London: Michael Joseph.
Lapham, Lewis H. 2016 “Dame Fortune” Lapham’s Quarterly Summer 13-19.
McBride, James 1997. The Color of Water. A Black Man’s Tribute to his White Mother. New York: Riverhead Books.
Mead, G.H. 1967 [1934]. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich 1992 [1888]. Ecce Homo. Penguin Classics.
O’Connor, Peg 2014. “Searching for the Self, and Other Unicorns.” Psychology Today Nov/Dec 50-1.
Sartre, J-P. 1957. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: The Wisdom Library.
Schopenhauer, Arthur n.d. Essays. New York: Burt.
Slaughter, Karin 2014. Cop Town. New York: Delacorte.
X, Malcolm 1966. Malcolm X Speaks. New York: Grove Press.
Theories of Individual Social Development
Source: Ch 5: Theories of Individual Social Development
Freud’s Theory of the Id, Ego & Superego
Jean Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Carol Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development
George Herbert Mead: The Self, ”Me” & ”I”
Erikson’s Stages of Psychosocial Development: Theory & Examples
Freud’s Structure of Personality
Let’s talk about the id, the ego and the superego, the three parts of the structure of personality and a theory that was developed by Sigmund Freud. He’s probably someone you’ve heard of; he’s a pretty famous psychologist from the late 19th early 20th centuries. While his theory of personalities is outdated, it was monumental in influencing how we think about personality today.
When you think of Freud, you might think about going into therapy and lying down on a couch, telling your therapist about your problems. But if someone goes into therapy today, the therapist isn’t going to say ‘Oh, of course! Aha! It’s the id, the ego and the superego. They’re just not talking to each other right. Nevertheless, these three personality parts have entered the mainstream understanding of how we think about internal conflict.
Let’s think about an average person who’s pushed and pulled in lots of directions by different drives, like sex and food, but also ethics and a wish to maintain a healthy body. These drives are pushing them and pulling them in different directions, and maybe they’re not even aware.
This is the idea of internal conflict. It’s the conflict between basic desires (the id), morality and being a good person (the superego) and consciousness (the ego.)
The Id
So first let’s start with the id. This is an unconscious part of your personality. It is basically the childish and impulsive part of you that just does what it wants, and it wants things really intensely and doesn’t really think about the consequences. Freud describes this as operating on a pleasure principle, which essentially means what it sounds like, which is that it’s always seeking to try to increase pleasure and decrease pain.
Now, as an example of this, let’s say you come home and you find to your delight that your roommate has baked a cake. Your id would think ‘Oh! I want that cake right now! That looks delicious!’ You know your roommate’s not going to be happy if you eat it, so first, you eat a little piece of the corner, and then you have to cut yourself a slice so it doesn’t look disgusting, and then soon enough you’ve eaten the whole thing; it’s gone.
How did you manage to eat the whole cake? Blame your id for taking over. That’s what your id aims to do in life. It wants you to eat whole cakes because it wants you to increase pleasure. Cakes are going to make you feel good – why not eat the whole thing? Now, what it also wants to do is decrease pain. So let’s say you wake up the next morning and you think, ‘Oh no, I just ate a whole cake. That’s really bad, maybe I’ll get some exercise.’ You think to yourself about how you will go hiking in the mountains all day, and you tell yourself, ‘Alright, let’s get some exercise!’ No, your id says, ‘That’s not gonna happen; that’s gonna hurt. We don’t want to do that.’ So if you’re totally id driven, you’d basically eat the whole cake and then you would not go hiking the next day to burn off the calories. That’s the pleasure principle.
The Superego
Now, we usually don’t eat whole cakes and lay on the couch all day every day. What helps to control the rampaging id? There is another part of your personality that’s mainly unconscious, and it’s the superego. The superego is the part of you that’s super judgmental and moralizing and is always trying to get you to behave in a socially appropriate way. Now let’s see what the superego would do if you come home and you find the cake.
If the superego is in charge, you wouldn’t eat the cake at all. You’d still think it looks delicious and want to eat it, but the superego would say, ‘No, it’s my roommate’s cake. I’m not gonna eat this cake!’ Remember, the superego wants you to behave morally and appropriately, and it’s not that socially appropriate to eat other people’s baked goods.
But, let’s imagine that your id takes over, so you do eat the cake. The same thing happens: you eat a little bit, you eat a little bit more, and somehow you end up eating it all. But now your superego jumps back into action. What happens now that you already ate the cake? Guilt is what’s going to happen. Your superego makes you feel really guilty when you do things that are not socially appropriate.
What do you do now? If your superego is in control again, you would certainly go jogging, but you would also apologize to your roommate and bake them a new cake, maybe an even better one than before. The superego controls our sense of right and wrong. We feel bad when we do things that are wrong, and we feel good when we do things that are right, and that’s what the superego controls.
Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Introduction
Mark, a two-year-old, and Ally, an eight-year-old, are sitting at the table waiting for a snack. Their mom presents them each with a cup of juice, the same amount in each cup. Mark begins to cry and point, saying ‘You gave her more.’ Mark’s mom tries to reason with the young child, explaining that the same amount of juice is in each cup, but he is insistent that he is being treated unfairly. What is happening in this situation? In this lesson, we will learn about the stages of cognitive development while watching Mark proceed through infancy to adolescence.
Jean Piaget proposed stages of cognitive development through which children and adolescents proceed based on maturation and experience. They are: sensorimotor stage, preoperational stage, concrete operations and formal operations.
Sensorimotor Intelligence and Preoperational Thinking
The first two sequential stages deal with the cognitive development of infants and young children. They are sensorimotor intelligence and preoperational (prelogical) intelligence.
The sensorimotor intelligence stage occurs from birth to approximately 1-2 years. In the child’s first year, the processes of intelligence are both presymbolic and preverbal. For the infant, the meaning of an object involves what can be done with it. These actions include pushing, opening, pulling, closing and so forth. In the second year of life, the young child develops the identity of his or her own body and others in time and space. The infant develops action schemes, such as reaching for an object or grasping something or pulling it towards them. At this stage of development, Mark can pull a string to reach the object at the end of it. He can pull a blanket to get an out-of-reach toy and so on. Another example is Mark putting objects into his mouth to determine the shape and structure. This is something that many infants and young toddlers do.
Our next stage is preoperational thinking. This occurs from around 2-3 years to approximately 7 years of age. Partially logical thinking or thought begins during these years. For example, the child recognizes that water poured from one container to another is the same water. However, the child reasons only from one specific item of information to another and makes decisions based on perceptual cues. Preoperational thinking can and usually is illogical. For example, Mark, based on his perceptions, thought that the taller, slender glass had more juice in it than the shorter, wider glass that he received. In other words, perceptual cues, such as the height of the juice in the glass, dominate the child’s judgment. Also, children in this stage have difficulty accepting another person’s perspective or point of view. Piaget referred to this as egocentrism.
Concrete Operational and Formal Operational Thinking
The basic units of logical thinking are particular kinds of cognitive activity that Piaget referred to as operations. The two levels of logical thinking identified by Piaget are concrete operational and formal operational thinking.
The concrete operational stage occurs from around 7-8 years of age to 12-14 or older. Concrete operational thinking is linked to the direct manipulation of objects. It involves situations that require an understanding of simultaneous changes in multiple characteristics of objects. An example is flattening a ball of clay into a hot dog shape – as the shape becomes longer, it also becomes thinner.
The child at the level of concrete operational thinking can demonstrate the following:
A transformation in one feature or characteristic of a situation is exactly balanced by a transformation in another characteristic.
The essential nature of the object or data remains consistent.
The transformation in the object can be returned to the original form by an opposite or inverse action.
Let’s discuss these more specifically and put some terms in. The capability of recognizing the unchanging characteristic of an object is referred to as conservation. The child can demonstrate conservation by returning the object to its original form or organization. For example, Mark has a ball of clay. It’s first in a ball shape. He can flatten it out. He understands now that the same amount of clay exists whether it’s in the ball form or the flat form. This is conservation.
Moral Decision
At some point in your life, you’ve probably been faced with a moral dilemma. Consider this example: a father tells his daughter, Lauren, that she can have a bike if she saves enough money from her weekly allowance to pay for half of it. Finally, when Lauren tells her father she’s saved up all the money, her father gives her the other half and tells her to buy her bike. Lauren goes to the store to buy her bike and sees the one she’s been saving up for is on sale, so she will have money left over. She deliberates if she should return the extra money to her father or keep it and not tell him. They both kept their end of the agreement, so the extra money is a bonus surprise, but if she doesn’t tell him, it feels like she’s deceiving him.
Lawrence Kohlberg: Stages of Moral Development
Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was especially interested in how children develop their ability to make moral decisions like this one. He came up with several stages of moral development, which, though not without criticism from other psychologists, form a good starting point to think about these questions. It is important to remember that not everyone, even adults, necessarily make it into all of the higher stages.
Pre-Conventional Level
People first pass through two stages known collectively as the pre-conventional level. In the first stage, people are motivated by trying to avoid punishment; their actions are bad if they get punished and good if they don’t. In this stage, Lauren would give her father the money because she doesn’t want him to punish her.
At the second stage, people are motivated purely by self-interest. Lauren at this stage would likely keep the money, thinking that, even if she has the bike, she can’t use it unless she can buy a helmet.
Conventional Level
The next level of moral development, the conventional, also contains two stages. Adolescents typically operate at this level, as do some adults. In stage three, people make moral decisions based on getting people to like them. Lauren might decide to give her father the money because this will improve her relationship with him; but if her mother is upset that her father spent money they needed for bills, she might decide to give the money to her mother in order to be a ‘good girl’ in her eyes. Her decision would be based on whichever social relationship seemed most important.
In stage four, moral reasoning centers around maintaining a functioning society by recognizing that laws are more important than individual needs. In this stage, Lauren probably would give her father the extra money because not doing so, in her eyes, equates to stealing from her family.
Carol Gilligan: Moral Development
A community of moles gives shelter to a homeless porcupine. The moles, however, are constantly stabbed by the porcupine’s quills. What should they do?
This scenario was used to aid in the development of a theory that argued women and men may have differing paths to moral development. This lesson will introduce and apply that theory, developed by Carol Gilligan.
The field of moral development encompasses prosocial behavior, such as altruism, caring and helping, along with traits such as honesty, fairness, and respect. Many theories of moral development have been proposed, but this lesson will focus on the specific theory proposed by Psychologist Carol Gilligan.
Gilligan was a student of Developmental Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who introduced the theory of stages of moral development. Gilligan, however, felt as though her mentor’s theory did not adequately address the gender differences of moral development due to the fact that participants in Kohlberg’s study were predominately male and because his theory did not include the caring perspective.
Gilligan argued that males and females are often socialized differently, and females are more apt than males to stress interpersonal relationships and take responsibility for the well-being of others. Gilligan suggested this difference is due to the child’s relationship with the mother and that females are traditionally taught a moral perspective that focuses on community and caring about personal relationships.
Care-Based Morality & Justice-Based Morality
Gilligan proposed the Stages of the Ethics of Care theory, which addresses what makes actions ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Gilligan’s theory focused on both care-based morality and justice-based morality.
Care-based morality is based on the following principles:
Emphasizes interconnectedness and universality.
Acting justly means avoiding violence and helping those in need.
Care-based morality is thought to be more common in girls because of their connections to their mothers.
Because girls remain connected to their mothers, they are less inclined to worry about issues of fairness.
Justice-based morality is based on the following principles:
Views the world as being composed of autonomous individuals who interact with another.
Acting justly means avoiding inequality.
Is thought to be more common in boys because of their need to differentiate between themselves and their mothers.
Because they are separated from their mothers, boys become more concerned with the concept of inequality.
Returning to our mole/porcupine scenario, researchers found individuals approached the problem with two perspectives: justice-based morality or care-based morality. Gender differences were also evident.
Individuals with a justice-based perspective tend to see any dilemma as a conflict between different claims. The moles want one thing; the porcupine wants something incompatible. They can’t both have a valid claim on the burrow, so only one of them can be right. A solution to the dilemma is not a resolution of the conflict; it’s a verdict, in which one side gets everything and the other side gets nothing.
The care-based perspective approaches the problem differently. Rather than seeing all the parties as separate individuals with their own valid or invalid claims, it sees them as already in a difficult situation together. If there is a conflict between them, that is part of the problem. The point is not to decide the conflict one way or the other but to find a way to get around it or remove it. This perspective starts from the particular case and the actual people within it and hopes to find a solution that will not damage anyone. It will be ready to embrace compromise and creative solutions.
Researchers have found a tendency for males to adopt the justice perspective and for females to be more likely than males to adopt the caring perspective.
Stages of Ethics of Care
George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Self
In sociological conceptions of the Self, the development of the Self is examined in the context of social phenomena like socialization. George Herbert Mead, an American sociologist, pioneered an essential theory in sociology. The mentality is viewed by George Herbert Mead’s theory as an individual’s incorporation of the collective. Mead used a social process to describe the person and the mind. A person’s body takes in gestures and the collective sentiments of others and responds accordingly with other structured mindsets that are also absorbed by the human organism.
Mead’s theory of self refers to this as the “I” and the “me” phase. The “I” is the answer to the “me,” which is the interpersonal Self. Put another way, “I” is a person’s reaction to other people’s emotions, whereas “me” is the ordered set of those perceptions that one acquires. How one assumes one’s organization sees oneself is what one refers to as the “me,” which is the total of the “generalized other“. The “I” stands for a person’s feelings and instincts. Self-as-subject and self-as-object are synonymous in the “I.” The “I” is the one who knows, and the “me” is the one who is being understood. “I” and “me” are constantly interacting, and this interaction is what we refer to as the “stream of thought.” The human cognition concept is based on these processes, which go beyond the idea of selfhood in a restricted sense. Mead sees the internal debate between “I” and “me” as the thinking process.
Mead’s “I” and “me,” when viewed as a synthesis of the “I” and the “me,” reveal a profoundly social nature. In Mead’s view, a person’s place in a community is more important than individuality. Being aware of one’s self-consciousness can only come about when one has actively participated in various social roles.
According to Mead and Charles Cooley, the Self is determined by people’s social interactions. How one appears to others determines one’s social identity, or looking-glass self (a term coined by Cooley). In other words, the stage is attached to the concept of developing self. Cooley’s assertions about the social development of children formed the basis of this initial theory. People get the most direct feedback about themselves from the responses of others to their actions. This idea means that solitary activities cannot contribute to the development of the Self as it requires external interactions.
As per Cooley and Mead, self-identity is formed in three phases. First, people perceive how they look in the eyes of others. Additionally, individuals imagine how others judge them by relying on looks and how they display themselves. Finally, individuals perceive how others feel about them due to the moral judgments they create.
However, Heinz Kohut, a psychologist from the United States, proposed a bipolar self, which he claimed was composed of two processes of narcissistic brilliance, one of which contained goals and the other constituted ideals. The narcissistic Self, according to Kohut, seems to be the pinnacle of aspiration. He referred to the idealized parental image as the pole of standards. According to Kohut, the two poles of Self portray the regular advancement of a child’s psychic life.
On the other hand, according to Jungian theory, the Self is one of several archetypes. It’s a metaphor for a person’s entire mind, including their subconscious and conscious thoughts, defined by Jung as the procedure of combining one’s personality that leads to the Self.
What is the Role of Self in the Socialization Process?
In both Cooley and Mead’s view, a person’s identity is formed through self-socialization. For anyone to develop a precise self-image, self-socialization provides an opportunity to reflect and contend with themselves.
Developing an image of oneself predicated on how one thinks or appears to others is known as the “looking-glass self”. Through one’s reactions to a behavior, other people serve as a reflector, referring to others the image they project. In Mead’s view, the first step is to see oneself as others do.
Sociological theories of Self attempt to describe how social processes like socialization impact the growth of the Self. It is common to use the concept of “self-concept” to describe how an individual views, assesses and interprets their own identity. To have a notion of oneself is to be self-aware.
Mead believed that the Self is formed through the child’s interactions with those around them. The newborn child’s needs, including clothes and food, are pressing and must be met. The mother meets these needs, and the baby develops a strong emotional attachment to her and grows to rely heavily on her.
According to Mead’s theory, as the child grows older, they separate from their mother and must learn to submit to the mother’s authority over them. The child then repeats this for their dad. They distinguish the father from the mother before assimilating him into society. In this sense, the child’s number of significant others grows, and the child integrates the role of such others in their development. Using his own words, the child responds to them and behaves according to what they mean to the other individual.
Mead’s Theory of Self: Development of Self
Mead held the notion that humans form their self-images via connections with others. He contended that the Self results from society’s experience, which would be the part of a person’s personality that includes self-awareness or self-image. Mead laid out three concepts on how one’s Self grows:
Language
Symbols are exchanged in social interactions. According to Mead, language and other symbolic representations are uniquely human in how they carry sense. Therefore, the best way to understand others is to imagine the scenario from their point of view first. He formulated the term “taking the other’s role” to describe the way people perceive themselves concerning others. When children are in this phase, they begin to mimic their surroundings. Because of this, parents usually avoid using foul language in front of their children.
Play
At this stage, children assume and break the rules of structured games such as sports or freeze tag. Playing along with whatever rules they create throughout the game will be much more convenient than enforcing guidelines on them. Here, children pretend that they are the ones they love. As a result, they attempt to be their mothers and fathers when they role-play.
Forming Psychological Identities / Erik Erikson
What are Erikson’s stages of development? Learn about Erikson life stages, psychosocial development theory, and the history and contributions to the theory.
How do we develop an identity, or a sense of self? Psychologists have many theories. One, named Erik Erikson, believed that we work on constructing psychosocial identities throughout our whole lives. By ‘psychosocial,’ he meant an interplay between our inner, emotional lives (psycho), and our outer, social circumstances (social).
Erikson believed that as we grow and age, we pass through eight stages of development. He thought that each stage was defined by a specific conflict between a pair of opposing impulses or behaviors. The resolution (or inability to resolve) these conflicts affects our personalities and identities.
Erikson defines four childhood stages and three adult stages, bridged together by one stage of adolescence. We’ll go through each stage and define it by its central conflict, as well we give some examples of behaviors and patterns of thinking characteristic of the stage.
Oral-Sensory Stage
The first is the oral-sensory stage, encompassing the first year of life and defined by a conflict between trust and mistrust. Infants during this time learn to trust their parents if they’re reliably cared for and fed; if not, if they’re neglected or abused, they’ll develop mistrust instead. Infants at this stage either learn that they can trust others to fulfill their needs, or that they can’t, that the world is a dangerous and unreliable place.
Muscular-Anal Stage
The second stage is called muscular-anal and defined by the conflict between autonomy and shame and doubt. Parents who allow their toddlers, between the ages of about 1-3, to explore their surroundings and develop interests of their own help to foster a sense of autonomy. But parents who are too restrictive or cautious with their children can instead leave them with doubt about their abilities. Like learning mistrust instead of trust, this can have longstanding consequences.
Locomotor Stage
A related conflict between initiative and guilt defines the next stage, the locomotor stage. Children in this stage, between the ages of three and six, need to develop initiative, or independent decision-making, about planning and doing various activities. If they are not encouraged to do this, or if their efforts are dismissed, they may learn to feel guilt instead about their desire for independence.
Latency
The last childhood stage is called latency and is defined by a conflict between industry and inferiority. Children in this stage are between the ages of six and twelve, and during this time are starting to gain real adult skills like reading, writing and logic. If they’re encouraged, they’ll develop industry, or motivation to keep learning and practicing; they’ll start to want to be productive instead of just wanting to play. Children who aren’t encouraged to work hard at learning new skills will instead feel inferior and unmotivated.
Adolescence
Variations on the self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
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Summary: Carol Dweck and others have Identified two implicit theories of intelligence. Those learners who have an “entity” theory view intelligence as being an unchangeable, fixed internal characteristic. Those who have an “incremental” theory believe that their intelligence is malleable and can be increased through effort.
Originators: Carol Dweck, based on over 30 years of research on belief systems, and their role in motivation and achievement.
Key Terms: entity theory, incremental theory
Self-Theories (Dweck)
Carol Dweck (currently at Indiana University) describes a series of empirically-based studies that investigate how people develop beliefs about themselves (i.e., self-theories) and how these self-theories create their psychological worlds, shaping thoughts, feelings and behaviors[1]. The theories reveal why some students are motivated to work harder, and why others fall into patterns of helplessness and are self-defeating. Dweck’s conclusions explore the implications for the concept of self-esteem, suggesting a rethinking of its role in motivation, and the conditions that foster it. She demonstrated empirically that students who hold an entity theory of intelligence are less likely to attempt challenging tasks and are at risk for academic underachievement[1][2].
Students carry two types of views on ability/intelligence:
Entity View – This view (those who are called “Entity theorists”) treats intelligence as fixed and stable. These students have a high desire to prove themselves to others; to be seen as smart and avoid looking unintelligent.
Incremental View – This view treats intelligence as malleable, fluid, and changeable. These students see satisfaction coming from the process of learning and often see opportunities to get better. They do not focus on what the outcome will say about them, but what they can attain from taking part in the venture.
Entity theorists are susceptible to learned helplessness because they may feel that circumstances are outside their control (i.e. there’s nothing that could have been done to make things better), thus they may give up easily. As a result, they may simply avoid situations or activities that they perceive to be challenging (perhaps through procrastination, absenteeism, etc.). Alternatively, they may purposely choose extremely difficult tasks so that they have an excuse for failure. Ultimately, they may stop trying altogether. Because success (or failure) is often linked to what is perceived as a fixed amount of intelligence rather than effort (e.g., the belief that “I did poorly because I’m not a smart person”), students may think that failure implies a natural lack of intelligence. Dweck found that students with a long history of success may be the most vulnerable for developing learned helplessness because they may buy into the entity view of intelligence more readily than those with less frequent success[1].
Those with an incremental view (“Incremental theorists”) when faced with failure, react differently: these students desire to master challenges, and therefore adopt a mastery-oriented pattern. They immediately began to consider various ways that they could approach the task differently, and they increase their efforts. Unlike Entity theorists, Incremental theorists believe that effort, through increased learning and strategy development, will actually increase their intelligence.
Carol Dweck’s book: Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. Dweck explains how to achieve success — and how approaching problems with a fixed vs. growth mindset makes a big difference. Praising intelligence and ability doesn’t foster self-esteem and lead to accomplishment, but may actually jeopardize success. This book is an excllent read for helping people motivate their children and reach one’s one personal and professional goals.
References
Dweck, C. S. (2000). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. (2006). Mindset: The new psychology of success. Random House.
The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of articles that address questions across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience. Research on the topic of self has increased significantly in recent years in all of these areas. In philosophy and some areas of cognitive science, the emphasis on embodied cognition has fostered a renewed interest in rethinking personal identity, mind-body dualism, and overly Cartesian conceptions of self. Poststructuralist deconstructions of traditional metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity have led to debates about whether there are any grounds (moral if not metaphysical) for reconstructing the notion of self. Questions about whether selves actually exist or have an illusory status have been raised from perspectives as diverse as neuroscience, Buddhism, and narrative theory. With respect to self-agency, similar questions arise in experimental psychology. In addition, advances in developmental psychology have pushed to the forefront questions about the ontogenetic origin of self-experience, while studies of psychopathology suggest that concepts like self and agency are central to explaining important aspects of pathological experience. These and other issues motivate questions about how we understand, not only the self, but also how we understand ourselves in social and cultural contexts.
This article examines the historical conception of the words self and person in philosophical theory. It discusses John Locke’s definition of the self as the conscious thinking thing and the person as a thinking intelligent being. It describes the Platonist view of the self as spiritual substance and Aristotelian belief that the self is a hylomorphic substance. It also explores the relevant topics of Epicureanism atomism, Cartesian dualism, and the developmental and social origin of self-concepts.
“A Contrast of Individualistic and Social Theories of the Self”,
George Herbert Mead.
Section 29 in Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Edited by Charles W. Morris). Chicago: University of Chicago (1934): 222-226 .
Understand the difference between psychological and sociological theories of self-development
Explain the process of moral development
When we are born, we have a genetic makeup and biological traits. However, who we are as human beings develops through social interaction. Many scholars, both in the fields of psychology and in sociology, have described the process of self-development as a precursor to understanding how that “self” becomes socialized.
Psychological Perspectives on Self-Development
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was one of the most influential modern scientists to put forth a theory about how people develop a sense of self. He believed that personality and sexual development were closely linked, and he divided the maturation process into psychosexual stages: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital. He posited that people’s self-development is closely linked to early stages of development, like breastfeeding, toilet training, and sexual awareness (Freud 1905).
According to Freud, failure to properly engage in or disengage from a specific stage results in emotional and psychological consequences throughout adulthood. An adult with an oral fixation may indulge in overeating or binge drinking. An anal fixation may produce a neat freak (hence the term “anal retentive”), while a person stuck in the phallic stage may be promiscuous or emotionally immature. Although no solid empirical evidence supports Freud’s theory, his ideas continue to contribute to the work of scholars in a variety of disciplines.
Sociology or Psychology: What’s the Difference?
You might be wondering: if sociologists and psychologists are both interested in people and their behavior, how are these two disciplines different? What do they agree on, and where do their ideas diverge? The answers are complicated, but the distinction is important to scholars in both fields.
As a general difference, we might say that while both disciplines are interested in human behavior, psychologists are focused on how the mind influences that behavior, while sociologists study the role of society in shaping behavior. Psychologists are interested in people’s mental development and how their minds process their world. Sociologists are more likely to focus on how different aspects of society contribute to an individual’s relationship with his world. Another way to think of the difference is that psychologists tend to look inward (mental health, emotional processes), while sociologists tend to look outward (social institutions, cultural norms, interactions with others) to understand human behavior.
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the first to make this distinction in research, when he attributed differences in suicide rates among people to social causes (religious differences) rather than to psychological causes (like their mental wellbeing) (Durkheim 1897). Today, we see this same distinction. For example, a sociologist studying how a couple gets to the point of their first kiss on a date might focus her research on cultural norms for dating, social patterns of sexual activity over time, or how this process is different for seniors than for teens. A psychologist would more likely be interested in the person’s earliest sexual awareness or the mental processing of sexual desire.
Sometimes sociologists and psychologists have collaborated to increase knowledge. In recent decades, however, their fields have become more clearly separated as sociologists increasingly focus on large societal issues and patterns, while psychologists remain honed in on the human mind. Both disciplines make valuable contributions through different approaches that provide us with different types of useful insights.
Psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) created a theory of personality development based, in part, on the work of Freud. However, Erikson believed the personality continued to change over time and was never truly finished. His theory includes eight stages of development, beginning with birth and ending with death. According to Erikson, people move through these stages throughout their lives. In contrast to Freud’s focus on psychosexual stages and basic human urges, Erikson’s view of self-development gave credit to more social aspects, like the way we negotiate between our own base desires and what is socially accepted (Erikson 1982).
Jean Piaget (1896–1980) was a psychologist who specialized in child development who focused specifically on the role of social interactions in their development. He recognized that the development of self evolved through a negotiation between the world as it exists in one’s mind and the world that exists as it is experienced socially (Piaget 1954). All three of these thinkers have contributed to our modern understanding of self-development.
Sociological Theories of Self-Development
One of the pioneering contributors to sociological perspectives was Charles Cooley (1864–1929). He asserted that people’s self understanding is constructed, in part, by their perception of how others view them—a process termed “the looking glass self” (Cooley 1902).
Later, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) studied the self, a person’s distinct identity that is developed through social interaction. In order to engage in this process of “self,” an individual has to be able to view him or herself through the eyes of others. That’s not an ability that we are born with (Mead 1934). Through socialization we learn to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes and look at the world through their perspective. This assists us in becoming self-aware, as we look at ourselves from the perspective of the “other.” The case of Danielle, for example, illustrates what happens when social interaction is absent from early experience: Danielle had no ability to see herself as others would see her. From Mead’s point of view, she had no “self.”
How do we go from being newborns to being humans with “selves?” Mead believed that there is a specific path of development that all people go through. During the preparatory stage, children are only capable of imitation: they have no ability to imagine how others see things. They copy the actions of people with whom they regularly interact, such as their caregivers. This is followed by the play stage, during which children begin to take on the role that one other person might have. Thus, children might try on a parent’s point of view by acting out “grownup” behavior, like playing “dress up” and acting out the “mom” role, or talking on a toy telephone the way they see their father do.
During the game stage, children learn to consider several roles at the same time and how those roles interact with each other. They learn to understand interactions involving different people with a variety of purposes. For example, a child at this stage is likely to be aware of the different responsibilities of people in a restaurant who together make for a smooth dining experience (someone seats you, another takes your order, someone else cooks the food, while yet another clears away dirty dishes).
Finally, children develop, understand, and learn the idea of the generalized other, the common behavioral expectations of general society. By this stage of development, an individual is able to imagine how he or she is viewed by one or many others—and thus, from a sociological perspective, to have a “self” (Mead 1934; Mead 1964).
Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development
Moral development is an important part of the socialization process. The term refers to the way people learn what society considered to be “good” and “bad,” which is important for a smoothly functioning society. Moral development prevents people from acting on unchecked urges, instead considering what is right for society and good for others. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) was interested in how people learn to decide what is right and what is wrong. To understand this topic, he developed a theory of moral development that includes three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.
In the preconventional stage, young children, who lack a higher level of cognitive ability, experience the world around them only through their senses. It isn’t until the teen years that the conventional theory develops, when youngsters become increasingly aware of others’ feelings and take those into consideration when determining what’s “good” and “bad.” The final stage, called postconventional, is when people begin to think of morality in abstract terms, such as Americans believing that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. At this stage, people also recognize that legality and morality do not always match up evenly (Kohlberg 1981). When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out in 2011 to protest government corruption, they were using postconventional morality. They understood that although their government was legal, it was not morally correct.
Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development and Gender
Another sociologist, Carol Gilligan (1936–), recognized that Kohlberg’s theory might show gender bias since his research was only conducted on male subjects. Would females study subjects have responded differently? Would a female social scientist notice different patterns when analyzing the research? To answer the first question, she set out to study differences between how boys and girls developed morality. Gilligan’s research suggested that boys and girls do have different understandings of morality. Boys appeared to have a justice perspective, by placing emphasis on rules and laws. Girls, on the other hand, seem to have a care and responsibility perspective; they consider people’s reasons behind behavior that seems morally wrong.
While Gilligan is correct that Kohlberg’s research should have included both male and female subjects, her study has been scientifically discredited due to its small sample size. The results Gilligan noted in this study also have not been replicated by subsequent researchers. The differences Gilligan observed were not an issue of the development of morality, but an issue of socialization. Differences in behavior between males and females is the result of gender socialization that teaches boys and girls societal norms and behaviors expected of them based on their sex (see “What a Pretty Little Lady”).
Gilligan also recognized that Kohlberg’s theory rested on the assumption that the justice perspective was the right, or better, perspective. Gilligan, in contrast, theorized that neither perspective was “better”: the two norms of justice served different purposes. Ultimately, she explained that boys are socialized for a work environment where rules make operations run smoothly, while girls are socialized for a home environment where flexibility allows for harmony in caretaking and nurturing (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1990).
What a Pretty Little Lady!
“What a cute dress!” “I like the ribbons in your hair.” “Wow, you look so pretty today.”
According to Lisa Bloom, author of Think: Straight Talk for Women to Stay Smart in a Dumbed Down World, most of us use pleasantries like these when we first meet little girls. “So what?” you might ask.
Bloom asserts that we are too focused on the appearance of young girls, and as a result, our society is socializing them to believe that how they look is of vital importance. And Bloom may be on to something. How often do you tell a little boy how attractive his outfit is, how nice looking his shoes are, or how handsome he looks today? To support her assertions, Bloom cites, as one example, that about 50 percent of girls ages three to six worry about being fat (Bloom 2011). We’re talking about kindergarteners who are concerned about their body image. Sociologists are acutely interested in of this type of gender socialization, by which societal expectations of how boys and girls should be—how they should behave, what toys and colors they should like, and how important their attire is—are reinforced.
One solution to this type of gender socialization is being experimented with at the Egalia preschool in Sweden, where children develop in a genderless environment. All the children at Egalia are referred to with neutral terms like “friend” instead of “he” or “she.” Play areas and toys are consciously set up to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations (Haney 2011). Egalia strives to eliminate all societal gender norms from these children’s preschool world.
Extreme? Perhaps. So what is the middle ground? Bloom suggests that we start with simple steps: when introduced to a young girl, ask about her favorite book or what she likes. In short, engage with her mind … not her outward appearance (Bloom 2011).
Summary
Psychological theories of self-development have been broadened by sociologists who explicitly study the role of society and social interaction in self-development. Charles Cooley and George Mead both contributed significantly to the sociological understanding of the development of self. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan developed their ideas further and researched how our sense of morality develops. Gilligan added the dimension of gender differences to Kohlberg’s theory.
Section Quiz
Socialization, as a sociological term, describes:
how people interact during social situations
how people learn societal norms, beliefs, and values
a person’s internal mental state when in a group setting
the difference between introverts and extroverts
Answer
B
The Harlows’ study on rhesus monkeys showed that:
rhesus monkeys raised by other primate species are poorly socialized
monkeys can be adequately socialized by imitating humans
food is more important than social comfort
social comfort is more important than food
Answer
D
What occurs in Lawrence Kohlberg’s conventional level?
Children develop the ability to have abstract thoughts.
Morality is developed by pain and pleasure.
Children begin to consider what society considers moral and immoral.
Parental beliefs have no influence on children’s morality.
Answer
C
What did Carol Gilligan believe earlier researchers into morality had overlooked?
The justice perspective
Sympathetic reactions to moral situations
The perspective of females
How social environment affects how morality develops
Answer
C
What is one way to distinguish between psychology and sociology?
Psychology focuses on the mind, while sociology focuses on society.
Psychologists are interested in mental health, while sociologists are interested in societal functions.
Psychologists look inward to understand behavior while sociologists look outward.
All of the above
Answer
D
How did nearly complete isolation as a child affect Danielle’s verbal abilities?
She could not communicate at all.
She never learned words, but she did learn signs.
She could not understand much, but she could use gestures.
She could understand and use basic language like “yes” and “no.”
Answer
A
Short Answer
Think of a current issue or pattern that a sociologist might study. What types of questions would the sociologist ask, and what research methods might he employ? Now consider the questions and methods a psychologist might use to study the same issue. Comment on their different approaches.
Explain why it’s important to conduct research using both male and female participants. What sociological topics might show gender differences? Provide some examples to illustrate your ideas.
Further Research
Lawrence Kohlberg was most famous for his research using moral dilemmas. He presented dilemmas to boys and asked them how they would judge the situations. Visit http://openstax.org/l/Dilemma to read about Kohlberg’s most famous moral dilemma, known as the Heinz dilemma.
References
Cooley, Charles Horton. 1902. “The Looking Glass Self.” Pp. 179–185 in Human Nature and Social Order. New York: Scribner’s.
This dissertation is about the concept of self, specifically I seek to answer the question of what constitutes the self. To deal conceptually and theoretically with the concept of self is to consider what the nature of self is, how the self develops, and under what conditions. I explore the dialectical relationship between self and society at three levels, the complexity of social structure and its influence upon the formation of the self, the relationship between the self and the “generalized other,” and the relationship between the “I” and the “me.” The goal of the dissertation is a synthesis of theories of self which includes both a micro and a macro perspective. The model of self is based on Markus and Katayama’s (1994) Enculturation Model, modified extensively to include macro components. The model has four levels, moving from the social structure to the individual: collective reality, socio-psychological processes, local worlds, and habitual psychological tendencies. Part one and part two review symbolic interactionist theorists and structural Marxist theorists, respectively. Part three elaborates the model of self by plugging into the four levels each theorist, where appropriate. Marx’s base/superstructure conceptualization of social structure, Althusser’s materialist dialectic, and Mead’s conceptualization of mind are used to deal with collective reality. Althusser’s concept of “interpellation” is used to link the core ideologies associated with collective reality to socio-psychological practices occurring in the institutions of social structure. Stryker’s identity theory is used to connect social structure to the interaction networks in the local world, out of which individuals construct and identity and self. Lastly, all the theorists are brought together and their theories synthesized in the section dealing with habitual psychological tendencies.
How people define themselves in relation to others greatly influences how they think, feel, and behave, and is ultimately related to the construct of identity. Self-development is a continuous process throughout the lifespan; one’s sense of self may change, at least somewhat, throughout one’s life. Self-representation has important implications for socio-emotional functioning throughout the lifespan.
Philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910) was one of the first to postulate a theory of the self in The Principles of Psychology. James described two aspects of the self that he termed the “I Self” and “Me Self.” The I Self reflects what people see or perceive themselves doing in the physical world (e.g., recognizing that one is walking, eating, writing), whereas the Me Self is a more subjective and psychological phenomenon, referring to individuals’reflections about themselves (e.g. characterizing oneself as athletic, smart, cooperative). Other terms such as self-view, self-image, self-schema, and self-concept are also used to describe the self-referent thoughts characteristic of the Me Self. James further distinguished three components of the Me Self. These include: (1) the material self (e.g., tangible objects or possessions we collect for ourselves); (2) the social self (e.g., how we interact and portray ourselves within different groups, situations, or persons); and (3) the spiritual self (e.g., internal dispositions).
In the late twentieth century, researchers began to argue that the self is a cognitive and social construction. Cognitive perspectives suggest that one’s self-representation affects how one thinks about and gives meaning to experiences. Like James, psychologist Ulric Neisser distinguished between one’s self-representation connected to directly perceived experiences and that resulting from reflection on one’s experiences. The “ecological self,”connections of oneself to experiences in the physical environment, and the “interpersonal self,” connections of oneself to others through verbal or nonverbal communication, comprise direct perception of experience. Neisser proposed that these two types of self-representation develop early in infancy. Regarding reflections on one’s experiences, Neisser identified three types of self-representation that emerge in later infancy and childhood with cognitive and social maturation. The temporally “extended self”is based on memories of one’s past experiences and expectations for the future. The “private self”emerges with the understanding that one’s experiences are not directly perceived by others, but rather must be communicated to be shared. The “conceptual self,” one’s overarching theory or schema about oneself based on one’s reflection on experiences within social and cultural context, parallels terms such as self-concept and self-schema. In a 1977 article, psychologist Hazel Markus showed that one’s self-representation or self-schema guides information processing and influences one’s behavior.
As psychologist Roy Baumeister pointed out in Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self, because self-representation develops through one’s experience of the world, cultural and social factors are important in who we are and what we think about ourselves. Philosopher George Herbert Mead (in Mind, Self, and Society ) postulated that acquisition of self-representation emerges from socialization practices. Mead argued that individuals are socialized to adopt the values, standards, and norms of society through their ability to perceive what others and society would like them to be. Psychologists Tory Higgins, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman further suggested that self-representation includes ideas about who we are (actual self), who we potentially could be (ideal self), and who we should be (ought self), both from one’s own perspective and from one’s perception of valued others’ perspectives. Discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal self or ought self may result in depression or anxiety, respectively.
Attachment theory likewise demonstrates how the self is socially constructed and, in turn, affects how people evaluate themselves (i.e., their self-esteem). Thus, relationships with others play an important role in people’s self-representation and self-esteem. Psychologist John Bowlby focused on caregiver-child relationships. Securely attached children feel safe in the environment and are able to actively explore their surroundings. Through experiencing secure attachment to a consistent caregiver, children develop a belief that they are good and worthy of love. This forms the basis of self-esteem. In contrast, an insecure attachment, in which the child does not feel confident in the caregiver’s protection, may result in feeling unworthy of love, anxious and distressed, and relatively low self-esteem.
The beginnings of self-representation emerge early in infancy, with the recognition that one is a separate physical being from others. Self-representation development continues throughout adulthood. Because self-representation involves social and cognitive constructions, changes in self-representation occur with individuals’ cognitive and social development. Psychologist Susan Harter has conducted highly influential research on the developmental course of self-representation. Excerpts from Harter’s summary of self-representation development from early childhood through adolescence (Harter, 1988) are presented in the Table 1.
In addition to cognitive and social maturation, changes in one’s social context may be equally important influences on self-representation. For example, Susan Cross (in “Self-construals, Coping, and Stress in Cross-cultural Adaptation”) notes that cultural values influence self-development. As an individual moves from one cultural context (e.g., Eastern culture) to another (e.g., Western culture), changes in self-representation may emerge. Individuals can learn to adopt a self-representation that embraces multiple cultures.
SEE ALSOAttachment Theory; Bowlby, John; Child Development; Developmental Psychology; James, William; Mead, George Herbert; Mental Health;Psychology; Self-Awareness Theory; Self-Consciousness, Private vs. Public; Self-Guides; Self-Perception Theory; Self-Schemata; Social Psychology; Stages of Development
Table 1
Early childhood
Middle childhood
Adolescence
Content
specific examples of observable physical characteristics, behaviors, preferences, etc.
trait labels, focusing on abilities, interpersonal characteristics, and emotional attributes
abstractions about the self involving psychological constructs, focusing on different relationships and roles
Organization
little coherence, due to inability to logically organize single self-descriptors
logically organized, integrated within domains that are differentiated from one another
ability to construct a formal theory of the self in which all attributes across and within role domains are integrated and should be internally consistent
Stability over time
not stable over time
recognition of and interest in continuity of self-attributes over time
Intrapsychic conflict and confusion over contradictions and instability within the self, concern with creation of an integrated identity
Basis
fantasies and wishes dominate descriptions of behaviors and abilities
use of social comparison due to ability to simultaneously observe and evaluate the self in relation to others
intense focus on the opinions that significant others hold about the self, especially peers and close friends
Baumeister, Roy F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Harter, Susan. 1988. Developmental Processes in the Construction of the Self. In Integrative Processes and Socialization: Early to Middle Childhood, eds. Thomas D. Yawkey and James E. Johnson, 45–78. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Harter, Susan. 1999. The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York: Guilford.
Higgins, Tory, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman. 1985. Self-concept Discrepancy Theory: A Psychological Model for Distinguishing Among Different Aspects of Depression and Anxiety. Social Cognition 3: 51–76.
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The popularity of such books as Frank McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes, Mary Karr’s The Liars’ Club, and Kathryn Harrison’s controversial The Kiss, has led columnists to call ours “the age of memoir.” And while some critics have derided the explosion of memoir as exhibitionistic and self-aggrandizing, literary theorists are now beginning to look seriously at this profusion of autobiographical literature. Informed by literary, scientific, and experiential concerns, How Our Lives Become Stories enhances knowledge of the complex forces that shape identity, and confronts the equally complex problems that arise when we write about who we think we are.
Using life writings as examples—including works by Christa Wolf, Art Spiegelman, Oliver Sacks, Henry Louis Gates, Melanie Thernstrom, and Philip Roth—Paul John Eakin draws on the latest research in neurology, cognitive science, memory studies, developmental psychology, and related fields to rethink the very nature of self-representation. After showing how the experience of living in one’s body shapes one’s identity, he explores relational and narrative modes of being, emphasizing social sources of identity, and demonstrating that the self and the story of the self are constantly evolving in relation to others. Eakin concludes by engaging the ethical issues raised by the conflict between the authorial impulse to life writing and a traditional, privacy-based ethics that such writings often violate.
Author / Editor information
Eakin Paul John :
Paul John Eakin is Ruth N. Halls Professor Emeritus of English at Indiana University. He is the author of How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves; The New England Girl: Cultural Ideals in Hawthorne, Stowe, Howells, and James; Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention; and Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography. He is the editor of The Ethics of Life Writing, also from Cornell; On Autobiography by Philippe Lejeune, and American Autobiography: Retrospect and Prospect.
Reviews
“In How Our Lives Become Stories, Paul John Eakin explains why he prefers ‘to think of self less as an entity and more as a kind of awareness in process.’… Eakin makes the ethics of reading integral to his project…. Eakin attends to those who are repelled by the ‘urge to confess’ and he talks about telling all as a cultural imperative that may, for example, be costly to the families of memoirists despite the therapeutic value such confessions might have. The ethics of privacy, the fact of relational lives, and the moral strictures that shadow autobiographical tellings bring Eakin to ask, ‘What is right and fair?’.”
“In this intriguing book, Paul John Eakin problematizes the notion of autobiography as ‘the story of the self’ and argues that in the act of narration one is engaged in a process of making a self…. How Our Lives Become Stories is a concise and engaging synopsis of the state of the art for anyone interested in the subject.”
Nancy K. Miller, author of Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent’s Death:
“Paul John Eakin has accomplished here what many preach and few practice: a genuinely cross- disciplinary study. How Our Lives Become Stories is a fascinating account of the creation of an autobiographical self seen from the multiple vantage points of literature, philosophy, neurology, and psychology. Eakin shows the infinitely complex ways in which we become and remember who we are in our bodies and our brains. Equally important in this pioneering study is Eakin’s penetrating analysis of how as a culture we negotiate the changing boundaries of private and public life. How Our Lives Become Stories offers a subtle and intelligent guide to the ethical dilemmas of disclosure and confession, memory and narrative, that pervade contemporary American life. A book for our times.”
“This fascinating new book… offers an engaging introduction to identity and narrative…. This is a well-written, timely, and progressive book—a surprisingly rare mix.”
H. Porter Abbott, University of California, Santa Barbara:
“Paul John Eakin has always been a few steps ahead of the rest of us. Now, with How Our Lives Become Stories, he has contributed another indispensable reassessment of the field of autobiography, this time keyed to the disturbingly fluid sense of the self that has emerged from recent research throughout the cognitive sciences.”
Susanna Egan, University of British Columbia:
“Rethinking what he calls ‘registers of self and self-experience,’ Paul John Eakin once again offers new and necessary work in autobiography studies. A most accessible and engaging book, How Our Lives Become Stories draws on recent scholarship in neurology, cognitive sciences, memory studies, developmental psychology, cultural narratives, and ethics in order to demonstrate that ‘there are many stories of self to tell, and more than one self to tell them.’.”
“When we write about our lives, the complex work of constructing the story is intertwined with all that constitutes the process of identity formation. In this book, Eakin expertly guides us through the thorny terrain of research in neurology, developmental psychology, and memory theory and revisits philosophy and literary theory. By the end of the journey, we have a far richer understanding of how individuals construct their lives and how they tell the story of that construction, as well as a sense of the dynamic interplay between the two processes.”
The reflexive self and culture: a critique
Matthew Adams
Identity in Question
edited by Anthony Elliott, Paul du Gay
Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic
edited by Yoshihisa Kashima, Margaret Foddy, Michael Platow
Narrative Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity.
This paper aims to provide an overview of a narrative psychological approach towards the study of self and identity. The narrative psychological approach can be classified as broadly social constructionist insofar as it attempts to examine the cultural structuration of individual experience. However, building on recent criticism of certain social constructionist approaches (such as discourse analysis), it is argued that these approaches tend to lose touch with the phenomenological and experiential realities of everyday, practical life. Accordingly, they overplay the disorderly, chaotic, variable and flux-like nature of self-experience. Drawing on recent research on traumatizing experiences such as living with serious illness, this paper argues that the disruption and fragmentation manifest in such experiences serves as a useful means of highlighting the sense of unity, meaning and coherence (the `narrative configuration’) more commonly experienced on an everyday level. Moreover, when disorder and incoherence prevail, as in the case of trauma, narratives are used to rebuild the individual’s shattered sense of identity and meaning.
Self and social identity.
Brewer, M. B., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (2004).
Blackwell Publishing.
Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory
edited by Hubert J. M. Hermans, Thorsten Gieser
Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway
What am I referring to when I say ‘I’? This little word is so easy to use in daily life, yet it has become the focus of intense theoretical debate. Where does my sense of self come from? Does it arise spontaneously or is it created by the media or society? Do I really know myself?
This concern with the self, with our subjectivity, is now our main point of reference in Western societies. How has it come to be so important? What are the different ways in which we can approach subjectivity?
Nick Mansfield explores how our understanding of our subjectivity has developed over the past century. He looks at the work of key modern and postmodern theorists, including Freud, Foucault, Nietzsche, Lacan, Kristeva, Deleuze and Guattari, and he shows how subjectivity is central to debates in contemporary culture, including gender, sexuality, ethnicity, postmodernism and technology.
I am who? No topic is more crucial to contemporary cultural theory than subjectivity, and Nick Mansfield has written what has long been lacking-a lucid, smart introduction to work in the field.
Professor Simon During, University of Melbourne
Effortlessly and with humour, passion and panache, Mansfield offers the reader a telling, trenchantly articulate d account of the complex enigma of the self, without resorting to reductively simple critical cliches.This book, in its graceful movements between disciplines, ideas, and areas of interest, deserves to become a benchmark for all such student introductions for some time to come.
Julian Wolfreys, University of Florida
Nick Mansfield is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. He is co-author of Cultural Studies and the New Humanities (Oxford 1997) and author of Masochism: The art of power (Praeger 1997).
Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self
Nathan N. Cheeka § and Jonathan M. Cheekb aDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA; bDepartment of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA
Self and Identity · July 2018 DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2017.1412347
The broad concept of the self is fundamental to psychology, serving as an anchor by which we perceive and make sense of the world as well as how we relate to and think about others. This book develops creative points of view of the self which have not previously been reviewed, creating a web of interconnected concepts under the umbrella of the self.
The various contributions to this book discuss these concepts, such as self-regulation, self-concept, self-esteem, self-awareness, social comparison, and self-reference. All of them are related to the self, and all would justify a review of their own, yet none of them have up to this point. As a whole, the book develops these new, creative points of view of the self—the integral (primary) component of our experience as social beings.
Offering numerous perspectives on various aspects of the self which can foster new thinking and research, this timely and important book makes suggestions for future research that will spur additional lines of work by readers. This book was originally published as a special issue of Self and Identity.
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The nature of consciousness has mystified and intrigued humanity for centuries. As we progress in our understanding of the physical world, the question of what it means to be conscious remains one of the most complex and challenging inquiries in modern science. Despite this challenge, many leading theorists have developed compelling explanations for the phenomenon of consciousness. These theories seek to answer questions about the origins of our inner lives, the relationship between the mind and the brain, and the seemingly impenetrable problem of subjective experience. In this article, we’ll explore seven leading theories of consciousness, delving into their strengths, weaknesses, and historical roots.
Integrated Information Theory: Consciousness as a Web of Information
Developed by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi in the early 2000s, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness arises from the integration of information within a system. The more interconnected and differentiated the information in a system, the higher the degree of consciousness. In other words, conscious experience is not simply a byproduct of brain activity but is fundamentally tied to the way information is structured, processed, and integrated within the brain.
IIT proposes that consciousness is quantifiable and can be measured using a mathematical value called “phi.” Phi is a measure of the degree of information integration within a system, considering both the amount of information and the complexity of its connections. According to IIT, systems with higher phi values possess a greater degree of consciousness.
A central concept in IIT is the idea of “causal power,” which refers to the ability of a system to affect its own future states. Consciousness, in this view, emerges from the causal interactions within a system, with greater causal power leading to richer conscious experiences. This approach allows IIT to provide a unified framework for understanding various aspects of consciousness, including its degrees, quality, and dynamics.
One of the most intriguing implications of IIT is its potential to extend the concept of consciousness beyond biological systems. If consciousness arises from the integration of information, then non-biological systems, such as advanced artificial intelligence, could also possess consciousness if they meet the necessary criteria.
Strengths:
IIT offers a quantifiable measure of consciousness called “phi,” which allows for comparisons between different systems and states.
The theory has provided a foundation for understanding the neural correlates of consciousness and the potential for artificial consciousness.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that IIT’s reliance on a single metric oversimplifies the complexity of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether IIT can account for the subjective nature of conscious experience.
Higher-Order Theories: Consciousness as Self-Reflection
Higher-Order Theories (HOT) of consciousness, which originated in the 1990s with philosophers like David Rosenthal and William Lycan, propose that consciousness arises when the brain represents its own mental states. In other words, conscious experience is the result of thoughts about thoughts, or metacognition. According to HOT, unconscious mental states become conscious when they are accompanied by higher-order mental states that represent or are aware of them.
There are two main variants of HOT: Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories, which focus on the cognitive aspect of higher-order representation, and Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, which emphasize the perceptual aspect. Both variants share the core idea that consciousness is a matter of self-representation, but they differ in how they conceive of the nature and role of higher-order mental states.
To further elucidate the HOT framework, it is helpful to consider an example. Imagine you are looking at a red apple. According to HOT, the perceptual experience of the red apple is an unconscious mental state. This experience becomes conscious when you have a higher-order thought that represents your experience of the apple, such as “I am perceiving a red apple.” The higher-order thought effectively “lights up” the unconscious mental state, transforming it into a conscious experience.
HOT theorists argue that this self-representational account of consciousness can explain various features of conscious experience, such as its subjective nature, introspection, and the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. For instance, the difference between conscious pain and unconscious pain can be understood in terms of the presence or absence of a higher-order mental state representing the pain.
Strengths:
HOT offers a clear distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states.
The theory provides a plausible explanation for introspection and self-awareness.
HOT is compatible with empirical findings in cognitive neuroscience, particularly the role of the prefrontal cortex in metacognition and self-representation.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that HOT is circular, as it requires conscious awareness to be conscious.
The subjective nature of conscious experience remains unexplained within the HOT framework.
Some have questioned whether higher-order mental states are sufficient to account for the rich phenomenology of conscious experience.
Biological Naturalism: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon
Biological Naturalism, a theory proposed by the American philosopher John Searle, posits that consciousness is an emergent biological phenomenon resulting from specific neural mechanisms in the brain. Unlike some other theories of consciousness, Biological Naturalism maintains that conscious experience is a purely physical process, deeply rooted in the biological functioning of the brain.
At the core of Biological Naturalism is the idea that subjective conscious experiences, or qualia, are not separate from the physical world but are instead the product of the brain’s biological processes. This theory asserts that consciousness emerges from the complex interactions between neurons and other brain structures, forming a higher-level property of the brain’s activity, much like the properties of wetness in water molecules or the solidity of a table.
According to Searle, one of the key challenges in understanding consciousness from a biological perspective is to determine the specific neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). NCCs are the minimal set of brain mechanisms or events responsible for producing a particular conscious experience. Identifying these correlates would help to bridge the gap between neuroscientific research and the subjective nature of conscious experience, ultimately contributing to a deeper understanding of how consciousness arises from the brain’s activity.
Strengths:
Biological Naturalism grounds consciousness in the physical, biological world, which aligns well with empirical scientific research and the naturalistic view of the universe.
The theory provides a solid foundation for investigating the neural mechanisms of consciousness, encouraging neuroscientific studies to reveal the specific brain processes that give rise to conscious experience.
Weaknesses:
Biological Naturalism has been criticized for not adequately addressing the “hard problem” of consciousness, which is the question of how and why specific neural processes give rise to subjective conscious experiences.
Some critics argue that the theory’s focus on neural correlates may not fully capture the complexity of consciousness, as it might overlook the potential contributions of other factors, such as the brain’s global neural dynamics or the interactions between different brain regions.
Panpsychism: The Universal Consciousness
Panpsychism is a philosophical theory tracing back to ancient Greece and India, which has recently been revived by contemporary philosophers like David Chalmers and Galen Strawson. Panpsychism posits that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, akin to mass or charge. According to this view, all physical entities, from electrons to galaxies, possess some form of consciousness or proto-consciousness, even if in a highly rudimentary form.
The core idea of panpsychism is that consciousness is not exclusive to complex biological systems, but rather is an intrinsic aspect of the fabric of reality. By attributing consciousness to all matter, panpsychism offers a unique solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness – the question of why and how certain physical processes give rise to subjective experience.
To gain a deeper understanding of panpsychism, it is important to clarify that the theory does not imply that all objects have thoughts, emotions, or self-awareness. Instead, panpsychism posits that even the most basic constituents of reality possess some form of experiential quality or “proto-consciousness.” This fundamental consciousness is thought to be combined and integrated in complex systems, such as the human brain, to give rise to the rich and varied conscious experiences we are familiar with.
One of the main challenges facing panpsychism is the so-called “combination problem.” This problem arises from the question of how individual conscious entities, such as the proto-consciousness of elementary particles, can combine to form a unified conscious experience, like the experience of a human being. Various panpsychist theorists have proposed different solutions to the combination problem, including the idea of “constitutive panpsychism,” in which higher-level conscious experiences are composed of more basic forms of consciousness.
Strengths:
Panpsychism offers a unique solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness by positing that subjective experience is inherent to all matter.
The theory provides a potential explanation for the emergence of consciousness in complex systems and avoids the difficulties associated with explaining how consciousness arises from non-conscious matter.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that panpsychism is untestable and lacks empirical support.
The theory struggles to address the “combination problem,” which questions how individual conscious entities combine to form a unified conscious experience.
Some have criticized panpsychism as a form of “panprotopsychism,” arguing that attributing proto-consciousness to all matter does not necessarily explain the nature of full-fledged conscious experience.
Quantum Consciousness Theory: The Microscopic World Meets the Mind
Quantum Consciousness Theory, also known as Quantum Mind Theory, posits that the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics play a significant role in the emergence and functioning of consciousness. Developed in the late 20th century by physicists and mathematicians such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, this theory suggests that the microtubules within the brain’s neurons are responsible for consciousness through quantum processes.
Quantum Consciousness Theory is based on the idea that microtubules, which are tiny protein structures found within neurons, can facilitate quantum computations. These quantum computations are thought to be responsible for the emergence of consciousness. According to proponents of this theory, the unique properties of quantum mechanics—such as superposition, entanglement, and wave-particle duality—allow for the generation of conscious experience in ways that classical physics cannot explain.
To delve deeper into Quantum Consciousness Theory, it’s essential to understand the concepts of quantum superposition and entanglement. Quantum superposition refers to the ability of a quantum system to exist in multiple states simultaneously until a measurement or observation is made, at which point the system collapses into one definite state. Quantum entanglement occurs when particles become interconnected in such a way that the state of one particle directly influences the state of another, even when they are separated by vast distances. Proponents of Quantum Consciousness Theory believe that these quantum phenomena can occur within the brain’s microtubules, leading to the emergence of conscious experience.
One of the most well-known models within Quantum Consciousness Theory is the Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR) model, proposed by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff. In the Orch-OR model, consciousness arises from quantum computations that occur within microtubules. These quantum computations are thought to be orchestrated by molecular structures called tubulins, which can switch between different quantum states. When a certain threshold of tubulin activity is reached, a collapse of the quantum superposition occurs, and this collapse is hypothesized to produce a moment of conscious experience.
Strengths:
Quantum Consciousness Theory offers an intriguing explanation for the emergence of consciousness that incorporates the exotic principles of quantum mechanics.
The theory has inspired interdisciplinary research, bridging the gap between neuroscience, physics, and philosophy.
Weaknesses:
Many scientists and philosophers remain skeptical of the role of quantum mechanics in consciousness, arguing that the brain’s warm, wet environment is not conducive to maintaining quantum states.
Critics also argue that Quantum Consciousness Theory does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Empirical evidence supporting the involvement of quantum processes in consciousness is limited and controversial.
Neural Darwinism: The Evolution of Consciousness
Neural Darwinism, also known as the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, is a theory proposed by neuroscientist Gerald Edelman in the 1980s. It suggests that consciousness emerges through a process of selection among groups of neurons, akin to the principles of natural selection in biological evolution. According to Neural Darwinism, the brain’s structure and function are shaped by a competitive process in which neural circuits compete for resources and connectivity.
At the foundation of Neural Darwinism is the idea that the brain is composed of neuronal groups that are functionally interconnected. These neuronal groups, or assemblies, are constantly interacting and reconfiguring themselves based on their activity and the input they receive. Through this dynamic process, the brain’s neural networks are refined and optimized, resulting in the emergence of consciousness.
To gain a deeper understanding of Neural Darwinism, it is crucial to recognize the three main processes that drive the theory: (1) developmental selection, (2) experiential selection, and (3) reentrant signaling. Developmental selection refers to the formation of neuronal groups during development, with some groups being strengthened and others eliminated based on genetic and environmental factors. Experiential selection occurs as the brain encounters new experiences, leading to the strengthening of some neuronal groups and the weakening or elimination of others. Reentrant signaling involves the constant exchange of information between neuronal groups, which allows for the integration of information across different brain areas and the emergence of conscious experience.
Neural Darwinism posits that through these processes, the brain continually adapts and reorganizes its neural networks, giving rise to the dynamic and ever-changing nature of conscious experience. This theory emphasizes the importance of both genetic and experiential factors in shaping the structure and function of the brain and provides a compelling account of how consciousness might arise from the brain’s evolutionary processes.
Strengths:
Neural Darwinism offers a biologically plausible account of consciousness based on the principles of evolution and natural selection.
The theory provides a potential explanation for the individual variability of conscious experience, as each person’s brain develops and adapts differently based on their unique genetic and environmental influences.
Neural Darwinism has been supported by various empirical findings in neuroscience, such as the observation of competitive processes in neural development and plasticity.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that Neural Darwinism does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether the principles of natural selection can be adequately applied to neural networks and their development.
Global Workspace Theory: Consciousness as a Central Information Hub
Global Workspace Theory (GWT), proposed by psychologist Bernard Baars in the 1980s, postulates that consciousness arises from the integration and sharing of information across different brain regions. According to GWT, the brain contains a “global workspace” that functions as a central information hub, allowing various cognitive processes to communicate and cooperate with each other.
At the core of GWT is the idea that conscious experience is the result of the brain’s capacity to broadcast information to a wide array of specialized cognitive processes. In this view, consciousness is not localized to a specific brain area but is a product of the dynamic interplay between different brain regions and systems.
To better understand GWT, it is useful to consider the “theater metaphor” often used to describe the theory. In this metaphor, the global workspace is likened to a theater stage, with various cognitive processes represented as actors performing on the stage. As information is processed and integrated within the global workspace, it becomes “conscious” and is broadcast to the entire “audience” of specialized cognitive processes. This broadcast allows for the integration of information across different domains and the generation of a unified conscious experience.
GWT posits that this information integration and broadcasting process is essential for consciousness, as it enables the brain to efficiently allocate resources, make decisions, and adapt to new situations. The theory suggests that conscious experience arises when information is accessible and available to multiple cognitive processes, allowing for the flexible and adaptive behavior that characterizes conscious beings.
Strengths:
GWT provides a plausible account of the brain’s capacity to integrate and share information across different cognitive domains.
The theory has been supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience, including findings related to the role of the prefrontal cortex and other brain areas in information integration and broadcasting.
GWT offers a potential explanation for the functional role of consciousness in decision-making and resource allocation.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that GWT does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether the global workspace concept is sufficient to account for the rich phenomenology of conscious experience.
In conclusion
The quest to understand the enigma of consciousness has been a driving force for researchers and philosophers alike for centuries. The seven leading theories presented in this article offer a glimpse into the remarkable diversity of perspectives attempting to unravel the mysteries of the conscious mind. Each theory brings its unique insights, strengths, and weaknesses to the table, and together they paint a rich, multifaceted picture of the complex phenomenon we call consciousness.
As our scientific knowledge continues to advance, it becomes increasingly clear that the path to understanding consciousness is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor. It is likely that a comprehensive understanding of this enigmatic aspect of human experience will require the integration of ideas from multiple disciplines, including neuroscience, psychology, physics, and philosophy. By exploring the intersections between these theories and fostering collaboration across fields, we may gradually unravel the secrets of the conscious mind.
In the pursuit of understanding consciousness, we are not only striving to make sense of our own experiences but also to gain insight into the very essence of what it means to be human. Ultimately, the journey to comprehend consciousness is not merely an intellectual pursuit; it has profound implications for how we perceive ourselves, our place in the world, and our connections with others. The quest to decipher the mind’s mysteries is one of the most thrilling and significant adventures of human inquiry, and it is our collective curiosity, determination, and ingenuity that will propel us forward on this exciting journey.
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Posted November 3, 2022
Ralph Lewis, M.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Toronto, a psychiatrist at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, and a consultant at the Odette Cancer Centre in Toronto.
ISBN-10: 0415834090 ISBN-13: 9780415834094 Pub. Date: 02/10/2016 Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Despite recent strides in neuroscience and psychology that have deepened understanding of the brain, consciousness remains one of the greatest philosophical and scientific puzzles. The second edition of Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment provides a fresh and up-to-date introduction to a variety of approaches to consciousness, and contributes to the current lively debate about the nature of consciousness and whether a scientific understanding of it is possible.
After an initial overview of the status and prospects of physicalism in the face of the problem of consciousness, William Seager explores key themes from Descartes – the founder of the modern problem of consciousness. He then turns to the most important theories of consciousness:
identity theories and the generation problem
higher-order thought theories of consciousness
self-representational theories of consciousness
Daniel Dennett’s theory of consciousness
attention-based theories of consciousness
representational theories of consciousness
conscious intentionality
panpsychism
neutral monism.
Thoroughly revised and expanded throughout, this second edition includes new chapters on animal consciousness, reflexive consciousness, combinatorial forms of panpsychism and neutral monism, as well as a significant new chapter on physicalism, emergence and consciousness.
The book’s broad scope, depth of coverage and focus on key philosophical positions and arguments make it an indispensable text for those teaching or studying philosophy of mind and psychology. It is also an excellent resource for those working in related fields such as cognitive science and the neuroscience of consciousness.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Consciousness & Physicalism 2. Themes from Descartes 3. Identity Theories & the Generation Problem 4. HOT Theory I: The Mentalistic Reduction of Consciousness 5. HOT Theory II: Animals, Mental Sophistication & Dispositions 6. Self-Representational Theories7. Dennett I: Qualia Eliminated 8. Dennett II: Consciousness Fictionalized 9. Consciousness & Attention10. Representational Theories of Consciousness I 11. Representational Theories of Consciousness II 12. Conscious Intentionality & the Anti-Cartesian Catastrophe 13. Consciousness, Information & Panpsychism 14. Panpsychism, Aggregation & Combinatorial Infusion 15. Monism & Models. Index
Higher-order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology
edited by Rocco J. Gennaro
Unifying matter, energy and consciousness,
Mahendra Samarawickrama,
11th International Conference on Mathematical Modeling in Physical Sciences (2023). DOI: 10.1063/5.0162815
This book reviews some of the most important scientific and philosophical theories concerning the nature of mind and consciousness. Current theories on the mind-body problem and the neural correlates of consciousness are presented through a series of biographical sketches of the most influential thinkers across the fields of philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience. The book is divided into two parts: the first is dedicated to philosophers of mind and the second, to neuroscientists/experimental psychologists. Each part comprises twenty short chapters, with each chapter being dedicated to one author. A brief introduction is given on his or her life and most important works and influences. The most influential theory/ies developed by each author are then carefully explained and examined with the aim of scrutinizing the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches to the nature of consciousness.
David Chalmers Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 3-7
Paul and Patricia Churchland Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 9-13
Tim Crane Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 15-18
Donald Davidson Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 19-24
Daniel Dennett Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 25-28
René Descartes Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 29-36
Jerry Fodor Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 37-41
Jaegwon Kim Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 43-47
William Lycan Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 49-53
Colin McGinn Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 55-59
Thomas Nagel Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 61-65
Alva Noë Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 67-71
Hilary Putnam Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 73-78
David Rosenthal Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 79-83
John Searle Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 85-89
Bernard Baars Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 93-97
Francis Crick and Christof Koch Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 99-103
In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1111–1122). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0099
What a Contest of Consciousness Theories Really Proved
A five-year “adversarial collaboration” of consciousness theorists led to a stagy showdown in front of an audience. It crowned no winners — but it can still claim progress.
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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