The Three-Treatise (or Sanlun) school is an orthodox Chinese Mādhyamika tradition, which was pioneered by Kumārajīva (344?−413?), a prestigious thinker and translator of Indian extraction, and his distinguished disciple Sengzhao (Seng-chao; 374?−414), and later vigorously revived by Jizang (Chi-tsang; 549−623). The school derives its name “three-treatise” from its emphasis on the three translation texts of early Indian Madhyamaka, the Middle Treatise (Zhong lun), the Twelve Gate Treatise (Shiermen lun), and the Hundred Treatise (Bai lun). Both Sengzhao and Jizang, the two leading philosophers of the school, uphold the view that all things are indeterminate and empty. Sengzhao affirms the nonduality of motion and rest, the myriad things and emptiness, and also the subject and the object. Jizang highlights the notion of nonacquisition (or nonattachment) and famously reinterprets and reconstructs the Mādhyamika doctrine of two truths.
Key works
Liebenthal 1968 contains a complete, though often inaccurate, English translation of Sengzhao’s main work, the Zhaolun; a few essays in the work are available in English in Chan 1963 and Robinson 1967. Jizang’s main writings include the Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises (Sanlun xuanyi), the Meaning of the Two Truths (Erdi yi), and A Commentary on the Middle Treatise (Zhongguan lun shu). However, none of the texts is available in English.
Three Treatises school ［三論宗］ (Chin San-lun-tsung; Sanron-shū): A school based on three treatises—Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way and Treatise on the Twelve Gates, and Āryadeva’s One-Hundred-Verse Treatise. Kumārajīva translated these three treatises into Chinese in the early fifth century. Their doctrines were successively transmitted by Tao-sheng, T’an-chi, Seng-lang, Seng-ch’üan, and Fa-lang, and finally systematized by Chi-tsang (549–623), who is often regarded as the first patriarch of the Chinese Three Treatises, or San-lun, school. The doctrines of the Three Treatises school were transmitted to Japan by three persons during the seventh and early eighth centuries: First, by the Korean priest Hyekwan, known in Japan as Ekan, who went to Japan in 625. He was a disciple of Chi-tsang. Second, by the Chinese priest Chih-tsang, known in Japan as Chizō, who also went to Japan in the seventh century. He studied the Three Treatises doctrines under Ekan at Gangō-ji temple in Nara and returned to China to further his study under Chi-tsang. On his return to Japan, he taught the Three Treatises doctrines at Hōryū-ji temple. Third, by Chizō’s disciple Dōji, who went to China in 702 and returned to Japan in 718 with the Three Treatises doctrines. He lived at Daian-ji temple in Nara. Actually, a priest named Kwallŭk (known in Japan as Kanroku) of the Korean state of Paekche had brought the Three Treatises teachings to Japan in 602, but Ekan established the theoretical foundation of the school. For this reason, Ekan is regarded as the first to formally introduce the Three Treatises doctrine to Japan. The lineage of Chizō’s disciples, carried on by Chikō and Raikō, was called the Gangō-ji branch of the Three Treatises school, and that of Dōji, the Daian-ji branch. The Three Treatises doctrine holds that, because all phenomena appear and disappear solely by virtue of their relationship with other phenomena (dependent origination), they have no existence of their own, or self-nature, and are without substance. The school upholds Nāgārjuna’s “middle path of the eight negations” (non-birth, non-extinction, non-cessation, non-permanence, non-uniformity, non-diversity, non-coming, and non-going), and sees refutation of dualistic or one-sided views in itself as revealing the truth of the Middle Way.
(Jap.). One of the Six Schools of Nara Buddhism during the early history of Buddhism in Japan. The word is a Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese ‘San-lun’, and represented an effort to import the texts and teachings of the Chinese school into Japan. It is said to have been transmitted to Japan by the Korean monk Hyegwan (Jap., Ekan) in 625. Perhaps as many as three other transmissions occurred over the next century, leading to various streams of Sanron thought based in different temples. However, the school, which limited itself to academic study and practice by a handful of clergy, never reached out to the masses of people, and so never became a major force outside the realm of theory and doctrine. The various streams died out one by one, and the last actual Sanron master passed away in 1149.
Jizang. (J. Kichizō; K. Kilchang) (549–623). In Chinese, “Storehouse of Auspiciousness”; Chinese Buddhist monk of originally Parthian descent and exegete within the San lun zong, the Chinese counterpart of the Madhyamaka school of Indian thought. At a young age, he is said to have met the Indian translator Paramārtha, who gave him his dharma name. Jizang is also known to have frequented the lectures of the monk Falang (507–581) with his father, who was also [an] ordained monk. Jizang eventually was ordained by Falang, under whom he studied the so-called Three Treatises (San lun), the foundational texts of the Chinese counterpart of the Madhyamaka school: namely, the Zhong lun(Mūlamadhyamakārikā), Bai lun (*Śataśāstra), and Shi’ermen lun (*Dvādaśamukhaśāstra). At the age of twenty-one, Jizang received the full monastic precepts. After Falang’s death in 581, Jizang moved to the monastery of Jiaxiangsi in Huiji (present-day Zhejiang province). There, he devoted himself to lecturing and writing and is said to have attracted more than a thousand students. In 598, Jizang wrote a letter to Tiantai Zhiyi, inviting him to lecture on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra. In 606, Emperor Yang (r. 604–617) constructed four major centers of Buddhism around the country and assigned Jizang to one in Yangzhou (present-day Jiangsu province). During this period, Jizang composed his influential overview of the doctrines of the Three Treatises school, entitled the San lun xuanyi. Jizang’s efforts to promote the study of the three treatises earned him the name “reviver of the San lun tradition.” Jizang was a prolific writer who composed numerous commentaries on the three treatises, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra, etc., as well as an overview of Mahāyāna doctrine, entitled the Dasheng xuan lun. (“Jizang”. In The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 395. Princeton University Press, 2014)
The Chinese Buddhist Schools.
Lusthaus, Dan.
Buddhist philosophy, Chinese, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-G002-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
In the critical environment that followed Dao’an, two sets of events moved Chinese Buddhism in new directions. First, Kumārajīva, a Mahāyāna Buddhist from Kucha in Central Asia, was brought to Changan, the Chinese capital, in 401. Under the auspices of the ruler, he began translating numerous important works with the help of hundreds of assistants, including some of the brightest minds of his day. Some works, such as the Lotus Sutra, Vimalakīrti Sutra and Diamond Sutra, quickly became popular classics. He also introduced the emptiness philosophy of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka thought (see Buddhism, Mādhyamika: India and Tibet; Nāgārjuna), which in China came to be called the Three Treatise School (Sanlun) after the three Madhyamaka texts he translated: the Madhyamaka-kārikās, the Twelve Gate Treatise and Āryadeva’s One Hundred Verse Treatise. In a series of famous letters exchanged with a disciple of Dao’an, Huiyuan (344–416), who had mastered most of the Buddhist theory and practice known in China up to that time, Kumārajīva attacked the shortcomings of the current Chinese Buddhist theories and argued persuasively for the preeminence of Madhyamaka in matters of both theory and practice. His leading disciple, Seng Zhao (384–414), further popularized Madhyamaka thought by packaging it in an exquisite adoption of the literary style of Laozi (see Daodejing) and Zhuangzi, both of whom were extremely popular amongst literati at that time. Sanlun thought continued to spread through the fifth through seventh centuries, greatly influencing other Buddhist schools. After Jizang (549–623), who attempted to synthesize Madhyamakan emptiness with the Buddha-nature and tathāgatagarbha thought gaining prominence at his time, the Sanlun school declined, its most important ideas absorbed by other schools.
Second, in 418 Faxian (the first Chinese monk successfully to return to China with scriptures from pilgrimage to India) and Buddhabhadra produced a partial translation of the Mahāyāna Nirvāṇa Sutra. One of the topics it discusses is the icchantika, incorrigible beings lacking the requisites for achieving enlightenment. Daosheng (c.360–434), a disciple of Huiyuan, convinced that all beings, including icchantikas, must possess Buddha-nature and hence are capable of enlightenment, insisted that the Nirvāṇa Sutra be understood in that light. Since that violated the obvious meaning of the text, Daosheng was unanimously rebuked, whereupon he left the capital in disgrace. In ad 421, a new translation by Dharmakṣema of the Nirvāṇa Sutra based on a Central Asian original appeared containing sections absent from the previous version. The twenty-third chapter of Dharmakṣema’s version contained passages declaring that Buddha-nature was indeed universal, and that even icchantikas possessed it and could thus reach the goal. Daosheng’s detractors in the capital were humbled, suddenly impressed at his prescience. The lesson was never forgotten, so that two centuries later, when Xuan Zang (600–64) translated Indian texts that once again declared that icchantikas lacked the requisite qualities to attain enlightenment, his school was attacked from all quarters as promoting a less than ‘Mahāyānic’ doctrine. However, it should be noted that there is no clear precedent or term in Indian Buddhism for ‘Buddha-nature’; the notion probably either arose in China through a certain degree of license taken by translators when rendering terms like buddhatva (‘Buddhahood’, an accomplishment, not a primordial ontological ground), or it developed from nascent forms of the theory possibly constructed in Central Asia. However, from this moment on, Buddha-nature become one of the foundational tenets of virtually all forms of East Asian Buddhism.
“Zen and San-Lun Mādhyamika Thought: Exploring the Theoretical Foundation of Zen Teachings and Practices.”
‘Non-dualism of the Two Truths: Sanlun and Tiantai on Contradictions’,
Deguchi, Yasuo,
What Can’t be Said: Paradox and Contradiction in East Asian Thought (New York, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Feb. 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197526187.003.0004, accessed 23 May 2024.
China possesses a history of over five thousand years. Therefore, if one tries to talk about Chinese culture without touching on Buddhism, one will be in the position of a blind man as told in the story of the Blind Men and the Elephant. Even though Buddhism had been established some twenty-five centuries ago, it was only transmitted to China during the Chin and Han Dynasties (some five hundred years after the Parinirvana of Sakyamuni Buddha). Even though Buddhism in China had risen and fallen according to the law of constant changes during the past two thousand years, it had been well established in China. The Chinese have been open-minded in their nature and have been capable of absorbing foreign culture. Therefore when Buddhism was introduced into the well-cultured land of China, it has flourished abundantly and developed fruitfully. The golden age of Chinese Buddhism was from the age of the Three Kingdoms to the Tang Dynasty. During this period the various Schools in Buddhism evolved their irreproachable and infallible theories based on the doctrine of Sakyamuni Buddha. Historically speaking the rise and fall of the various schools had been closely connected to the evolution of cultural thoughts and current events in China. A student of Chinese Culture cannot simply neglect Buddhism as his progress will be handicapped like a wheel without an axis. Therefore it is the duty of a lover of Chinese culture to shoulder the responsibility of fostering the study of Buddhism so that the culture will again radiate its splendid light.
The Ten Schools of Chinese Buddhism are as follows: 1. Reality School or Abhidharma School. 2. Satysiddhi School or Cheng-se School. 3. Three Sastra School or San-lun School. 4. The Lotus School or T’ien-t’ai School. 5. The Hua-yen School or Avatamsaka School. 6. Ch’an School or Dhyana School. 7. Discipline School or Vinaya School. 8. Esoteric School or Chen-yen School. 9. Dharmalaksana School or Fa-siang School. 10. Pure-land School or Ching-t’u School.
The principles of all the above schools are based on the partial doctrine of Sakyamuni Buddha. In the beginning there were no such things as schools in Buddhism. The disciples of Buddha, however, took up what had been most beneficial and most practicable for them. Thus ten schools have evolved. This is just a general view of classification on the Buddhist Schools in China. (Source: BDEA & Buddhanet)
Nagarjuna’s Contribution Towards Chinese Buddhism
by Cheng Jianhua Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
Po: Jizang’s Negations in the Four Levels of the Twofold Truth.
Zhang, E.Y. (2018).
In: Wang, Y., Wawrytko, S. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2939-3_9
Abstract
As a synthesizer of the Māhayānic Prajñāpāramitā tradition in the early development of Chinese Buddhism, Jizang (549–623 CE) was one of the most important representatives of the Sunlun School (aka. The Three-Treatises School), whose doctrine centers on emptiness. This paper concerns the unfolding of the deconstructive strategies in Jizang’s rendering of the four levels of twofold truth, demonstrating how Jizang’s method of negation as a form of “critical philosophy” is utilized to correspond to the Sanlun appropriation of the Madhyāmikan understanding of emptiness. According to Jizang, the doctrine of the twofold truth functions as a pedagogical means, aiming to achieve two major purposes: (1) to put forth a critique of both nihilist and absolutist interpretations of emptiness; and (2) to resolve certain obscurities and inconsistencies in the teachings within the Buddhist tradition.
The author submits the idea that the Sanlun philosophy exhibits a more positive attitude toward the conventional through Sinicized conceptualization of the Middle-Way-as-Buddha-Nature, and that the Sanlun thought is more dependence upon affirmative expressions (i.e. kataphasis) than negative ones (i.e. apophasis) to promulgate its thesis. The paper concludes by pointing out that the Jizang’s method of negation has a significant impact on the later development of Chinese Buddhism, such as the Tiantai school’s doctrine of Emptiness-Provision-Middle and the Chan Buddhist teaching of non-abiding.
Notes
The Sanlun School, known as the “School of Emptiness” (Kong Zong 空宗) and the School of Wisdom, (Bore Zong 般若宗) is one of the earliest Buddhist schools in China during Sui and early Tang periods. The Sanlun School is also known as the Chinese representative of the Indian Madhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna. It was introduced to China by a half-Indian missionary-scholar names Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什 344–413 CE) who translated into Chinese three Madhyāmika texts, namely, the Zhong Lun 中論 (Treatise on the Middle Doctrine, Madhyāmika Śāstra) by Nāgārjuna, the Shiermen Lun 十二門論 (Treatise on Twelve Gates, Dvadasamukha Śāstra) by Nāgārjuna, and the Bai Lun 百論 (Treatise on One Hundred Verses, Satasastra Śāstra) by Aryadeva 提婆. See the section on “The Philosophy of Emptiness: Chi-Tsang [Jizang] of the Three Treatise School” in Chan 1973. The five Sanlun precursors whose works influence Jizang’s philosophy include Nāgārjuna, Kumārajīva, Sengzhao 僧肇 (Seng-Chao 364–414 CE), and Falang 法朗 (507–581 CE), Jizang’s mentor. While some scholars have pointed out that there was no Sanlun School existed before Jizang, others contend that the Sanlun thought represented by Kumārajīva and his disciples are called in the Buddhist history of China “The Old Sanlun of Central Gate” (Guanzhong Jiulun 關中舊論) or “The Old Sanlun of West Gate (Guanxi Jiulun 關西舊論). The two names here indicate the places where the group transmitted Mādhyamika. For a more detailed discussion, see Yang 2008: 251–252.
The Sanskrit word bhāva denotes a metaphysical existence which Nāgārjuna rejects. See Kalupahana 1986: 32.
Also see Liu 1994: 140. Liu also contends that Jizang’s negative argument aims at making “nonattachment” the common thread for the Sanlun school in order to ultimately overcoming existence/nonexistence duality.
The citation is from Jingang Bore Shu 金剛般若疏. Also see Shih Chang-Wing 2004: 99.
The quotation is cited from Cheng 1981. The English translation has been modified for the sake of consistency, and those in [] are added by me.
In the article “Once More on the Two Truths: What Does Chi-tsang [Jizang] Mean by the Two Truths as ‘Yueh-chiao [Juejiao]’?” Whalen Lai contends that the distinction between the verbal teaching and a fixed principle is critical for Jizang’s non-attached position on the hermeneutical understanding of the Madhyāmika notion of emptiness. For a detailed analysis, see Lai 1983: 505–521. Also Nagao 1989.
CT here refers to conventional truth and UT refers to ultimate truth.
In his insightful essay “The Non-duality of Speech and Silence: A comparative Analysis of Jizang’s Thought on Language and Beyond,” Chien-hsing Ho points out that there are two kinds of silence implied in Jizang’s notion of silence even though Jizang has not spelt it out explicitly for the sake of avoiding a dualistic distinction. That is, silence as a principle and silence as teaching, and the latter belongs to the level of conventional truth. See Ho 2012: 13.
I need to point out here that the notion of non-conceptual religious/spiritual knowledge qua silence has been the subject of some debate in past decades among scholars. Stephen Katz, for example, questions the claim of a pure, unmediated experience, that is, a non-conceptual, mystical experience maintained by Buddhism. Katz insists that the mystical experience or direct awareness spoken by Buddhism must be conceptually-laden. See Katz 1978: 22–74.
See Ho 2012: 11. In fact, Ho in his essay renders ti as “body” rather than “substance” in order to avoid substantiating Jizang’s position and thus making the principle of the twofold truth dualistic.
The concept of “mutual identity” is another way for Jizang to express his idea of non-duality of the twofold truth.
Jizang sometimes follows traditional interpretations. For example, he takes śāstras (lun論) upon which his own Sanlun theories have formulated as a “zheng” to a variety of inconsistence existent in śutrās (jing 經). This is Jizang’s way of operating panjiao (判教) through which different teachings and doctrinal issues can be harmonized by reclassification.
The terms truth-qua-instruction (jiaodi 教諦) and truth-qua-viewpoint (yudi 於諦) are used to refer to the conventional truth and the ultimate truth by the Sanlun School exclusively. See Hong 2009: 137.
Here the first view, “mental non-existence” (xinwu 心無), refers to the idea that one has noawareness of things, but the things are not non-existent. The second view, “identical with form” (jise 即色), refers to one that identifies emptiness with form (or matter) even though it agrees to the idea that form does not cause itself to form. The third view, “original non-existence” (benwu 本無), refers to a position that takes “non-existence” as the non-existence of existence. All these views are rejected by Sengzhao. See Swanson 1985: 35–36.
Some changes have been made to his translation for the sake of consistence in terms and concepts.
The word “un-negation” here refers to Jizang’s notion of weiwu 非無, a method of negation. At the same time, it has a similar meaning to Derrida’s idea of “de-negation” which I use in the paper as well. It is a method of a negation that “denies itself” rather than a pure negation of negation. See Coward and Foshay 1992: 25.
Here Jizang also uses water and fire metaphors, pointing out that emptiness is like water and the purpose of it is to extinguish fire (of attachment). But “if water itself were to catch on fire, what would one use to distinguish it? Both nihilism and eternalism are like the fire, and emptiness is capable of extinguishing them. But if one persists in becoming attached to emptiness, there is no medicine which can extinguish this.” (T45, 1852: 7a14).
Sanlun Xuanyi. Quotation is from De Bary and Bloom 1999: 438–9. Minor changes in translation are done for the sake of coherence in wording for this paper.
Fox argues that Jizang’s threefold category of being corrective can be recapitulated as three methods of negation: (1) the method of refuting competing points of view in terms of independent criteria; (2) the method of using opponent’s own logic against himself (reduction absurdum), and the method of putting to rest of obsessive intellectualized and discursive discourse. See Fox 1992: 17.
It should be noted that sometimes it is ambivalent that Jizang’s suspicion of concepts is due to their intrinsic limitations or confusions caused by the fact that there is a problem of having a clear definition in Chinese Buddhism. Alan Fox has pointed out the Sanlun tradition, including Jizang, seems to ignore the problem of definitions such as the concept of “self-nature” that so occupied Candrakirti and others in the Indian Madhyāmika tradition. Fox is correct on this difference since the Chinese tradition as a whole does not pay much attention to conceptual definitions. For more detailed discussion on Jizang’s view on language, see Ho 2012: 1–19. Ho insists that Jizang does not hold a clear-cut distinction on conventional speech and sacred silence as one would see in the works of Nāgārjuna.
Although the Hongzhou Ch’an lineage is the subject of some contention, the descended line, namely, the lineage in the order of MazuBaizhangHuangboLinji is traditionally accepted according to the dialogical history of Ch’an Buddhism. For a comprehensive and systematic study of the method of negation in Ch’an, see Wang 2003: 52–80.
For example, before the arising of the Sanlun school, one of the most popular notions of the Buddha-nature is the “Buddha nature of a correct cause” (zhengyin foxing 正因佛性) which puts an emphasis on the existence of a subjective mind. See Yang 2007: 259–260. Yang argues that Jizang in his late life held more affirmative views such as the idea of the Buddha-nature due to his interaction with masters of other schools such as Zhiyi 智顗 (Chih-i 538–597 CE) of the Tiantai School 天台宗). At the same time, Zhiyi’s theory on emptiness-provision-middle-way (kong-jia-zhong 空-假-中) shows the influence of the Sanlun School. For a more comprehensive study of the relationship between the Sanlun School and the Tiantai School with regard to the doctrine of emptiness, see Ng 1993.
Cf. Chap. 7 of this anthology for the discussion of Sengzhao’s Wubuqian Lun.
Also see Chapter Six on Sengzhao in Robinson 1967: 123–155.
Mogliola plays with the Buddhist notion of coming/going, pointing out that emptiness is BETWEEN “easy come and easy go” and “hard to come by.”
It should be noted that whether Nāgārjuna’s ultimate truth in his twofold truth theory points to something absolutely transcendent is a question under the debate. T.R.V. Murti, for example, has pointed out that for Nāgārjuna the ultimate truth transcends discursive thought in a sense that it is unreachable via rationality, either empirical investigation or philosophical speculation. Yet this does not mean that Nāgārjuna is a nihilist or negativistic thinker, for “[t]he dialectic should not be taken, as it is done by the uniformed, as the denial of the Real – Nihilism” See Tuck 1990: 52.
Of course, whether or not Jizang dichotomizes ti and yong is debatable. Wing-Tist Chan argues that in Jizang “substance and function are sharply contrasted” in comparison with Sengzhao who identifies substance with function. See Chan 1973: 358. Aaron K. Koseki holds the same opinion. See Koseki 1982: 58. Ho, on the other hand, shows a different viewpoint. I concur with Ho on this point. I think one of the major differences between Sengzhao and Jizang is that the former tends to use more conjunctions (both…and) whereas the latter more disjunctions (neither…nor), yet both expressions can lend to the idea of nonduality.
For Jizang, “loss” or “non-acquisition” is another word for “emptiness.”
Shih Chang-Qing, who has offered a historical overview of the development of the Sanlun School, points out that Jizang’s emphasis on the relationship between acquisition and loss is due to the influence of Falang, his mentor. To establish the relationship between these two concepts enables Jizang to contend his argument on nonduality between the wisdom of the sage and the mind of the ordinary people. See Shih 2004: 337–338.
When speaking of a Derridean deconstruction, John Caputo makes a remark that deconstruction is a “religion without religion” that points to a moment of transcendence yet not “transcendence” in a traditional sense, since it means “excess,” the exceeding of the stable boarders of the presently possible.” See Caputo 1997: xix. I think that the same thing can be said of Sanlun Buddhists in China.
Scholars like Wing-Tist Chan, however, argues that Sanlun thought is not Chinese enough which accounts for its failure to survive in China. He says, “Ironically, Chi-tsang’s (Jizang) success was at the same time the failure his school, for it became less and less Chinese. As a systematizer and transmitter of Indian philosophy, he brought about no cross-fertilization between Buddhist and Chinese thought.” See Chan 1973: 358.
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Convergence and Harmony: On the Schools of Chinese Buddhism
Volume 9 of Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy Editors Youru Wang, Sandra A. Wawrytko Edition illustrated Publisher Springer, 2019 ISBN 9048129397, 9789048129393 Length 440 pages
Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy
Editor Antonio S. Cua Publisher Routledge, 2013 ISBN 1135367485, 9781135367480 Length 1020 pages
The different Buddhist schools of thought, still operating in the present day, developed after the death of the Buddha (l. c. 563 – c. 483 BCE) in an effort to perpetuate his teachings and honor his example. Each of the schools claimed to represent Buddha’s original vision and still do so in the modern era.
Although Buddha himself is said to have requested that, following his death, no leader was to be chosen to lead anything like a school, this was ignored and his disciples seem to have fairly quickly institutionalized Buddhist thought with rules, regulations, and a hierarchy.
At first, there may have been a unified vision of what Buddha had taught but, in time, disagreements over what constituted the “true teaching” resulted in fragmentation and the establishment of three main schools:
Theravada Buddhism claims to be the oldest school and to maintain Buddha’s original vision and teachings. Mahayana Buddhism is said to have split off from Theravada in the belief that it was too self-centered and had lost the true vision; this school also claims it holds to the Buddha’s original teaching. Actually, however, the two schools may have been established around the same time, just with different focus, and probably emerged from two earlier schools: the Sthaviravada (possible precursor to Theravada) and the Mahasanghika (also given as Mahasamghika, considered by some the earlier Mahayana). The connection between these earlier schools and the later ones, however, has been challenged. Vajrayana Buddhism developed, largely in Tibet, in response to what were perceived as too many rules in Mahayana Buddhism and emphasized living the Buddhist walk naturally without regard to ideas of what one was “supposed” to do and so it, too, claims to be the most authentic.
All three schools maintain a belief in the Four Noble Truths and Eightfold Path as preached by the Buddha but differ – sometimes significantly – in how they choose to follow that path. Objectively, none are considered any more legitimate than the others, nor are the many minor schools which have developed, although adherents of each believe otherwise while, at the same time, recognizing they are all part of Ekayana (“One Vehicle” or “One Path”) in that all embrace Buddha’s central vision and seek to promote harmony and compassion in the world.
Although Buddhism is often perceived by non-adherents as a uniform belief system, it is as varied as any other in practice but, theoretically at least, a modern-day secular Buddhist can participate in rituals with a religious Buddhist without concern or conflict and all work toward the same essential goals.
Buddha & Buddhism
According to the foundational account of Buddha’s life, he was born Siddhartha Gautama, a Hindu prince, and his father, hoping to prevent him from following a spiritual path instead of succeeding him as king, kept him from any experiences which might have made him aware of suffering and death. The king’s plan succeeded for 29 years until Siddhartha witnessed the famous Four Signs while out riding one day – an aged man, a sick man, a dead man, and a spiritual ascetic – and became aware of the reality of sickness, old age, and death.
He renounced his wealth and position and followed the example of the spiritual ascetic, eventually attaining enlightenment upon recognizing the inherent impermanence of all aspects of life and realizing how one could live without suffering. He developed the concept of the Four Noble Truths, which state that suffering in life is caused by attachment to the things of life, and the Eightfold Path, the spiritual discipline one should follow to achieve release from attachment and the pain of craving and loss. Scholar John M. Koller comments:
The Buddha’s teaching of [the Four Noble Truths] was based on his insight into interdependent arising (pratitya samutpada) as the nature of existence. Interdependent arising means that everything is constantly changing, that nothing is permanent. It also means that all existence is selfless, that nothing exists separately, by itself. And beyond the impermanence and selflessness of existence, interdependent arising means that whatever arises or ceases does so dependent upon conditions. This is why understanding the conditions that give rise to [suffering] is crucial to the process of eliminating [suffering]. (64)
Buddha illustrated these conditions through the Wheel of Becoming which has in its hub the triad of ignorance, craving, and aversion, between the hub and rim the six types of suffering existence, and on the rim the conditions which give rise to duhkha (translated as “suffering”). Ignorance of the true nature of life encourages craving for those things one believes are desirable and aversion to things one fears and rejects. Caught on this wheel, the soul is blinded to the true nature of life and so condemns itself to samsara, the endless repetition of rebirth and death.
Spread & Fragmentation
Buddha preached his vision from the time of his enlightenment until his death at 80 years of age, at which point he requested that his disciples should not choose a leader but that each should lead themselves. He also requested that his remains be placed in a stupa at a crossroads. Neither of these requests was honored as his disciples fairly quickly organized themselves as a group with a leader and divided his remains among themselves, each choosing to place them in a stupa in a location of their choice.
Around 400 BCE, they held the First Council at which they established accepted Buddhist doctrine based on the Buddha’s teachings and, in 383 BCE, they held a Second Council at which, according to the standard account of the meeting, the Sthaviravada school insisted on the observance of ten proscriptions in the monastic discipline which the majority rejected.
At this point, either the Sthaviravada school left the community (known as the sangha) or the majority distanced themselves from the Sthaviravada and called themselves Mahasanghika (“Great Congregation”). All the later schools then developed from this first schism.
These schools had to contend with the more well-established belief systems of Hinduism and Jainism and, in an effort to level the playing field, developed an illustrious foundation story for their founder and attributed to him a number of miracles. Still, Buddhism remained a small sect in India, one among many, until it was championed by the Mauryan king Ashoka the Great (r. 268-232 BCE) who embraced the faith and initiated its spread. He sent missionaries to other nations such as Sri Lanka, China, Korea, Thailand, and Buddhism was accepted in these places far more quickly than in its home country.
Doctrinal differences, however, led to further divisions within the community of adherents. As the belief system became more institutionalized, these differences became more significant. Different canons of scripture developed which were held by some as true while rejected by others and different practices arose in response to the scripture. For example, the Pali canon, which emerged from Sri Lanka, maintained that Buddha was a human being who, although endowed with great spiritual power, still attained enlightenment through his own efforts and, when he died, he was set free from samsara and achieved total liberation from human affairs.
As Buddhism spread, however, the founder was deified as a transcendent being who had always existed and would always exist. Buddha’s death was still understood as his nirvana, a “blowing out” of all attachment and craving, but some adherents no longer saw this as simply an escape from samsara but an elevation to an eternally abiding state; freed from samsara, but still present in spirit. The Mahasanghika school held to this belief as well as many others (such as the claim that the Buddha had never existed physically, only as a kind of holy apparition) which stood in direct contrast to the Sthaviravada and, later, the Theravada schools. Although the central vision of the Buddha was retained by adherents, doctrinal differences like this one led to the establishment of the different schools of Buddhist thought.
Although there were actually many schisms before the establishment of Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana (the Mahasanghika school alone produced three different sects by c. 283 BCE), the division of these schools from the original sangha is said to have been predicted by the Buddha himself in what is known as The Three Turnings. This concept is based on that of the Dharmachakra (wheel of eight spokes, a familiar Buddhist symbol) which represents the Eightfold Path, informed by dharma which, in Buddhism, is understood as “cosmic law”. The Dharmachakra has always been in motion and always will be but, as far as human recognition of it goes, it was set in motion when Buddha gave his first sermon, would then make the first turn with the establishment of Theravada Buddhism, a second with Mahayana, and a third with Vajrayana.
Theravada Buddhism
Theravada Buddhism is said to be the oldest form of the belief system, but this is challenged by modern scholars. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Donald S. Lopez, Jr. explain:
Despite the way in which scholars have portrayed the tradition, Theravada is neither synonymous with early Buddhism nor a more pristine form of the religion prior to the rise of the Mahayana. Such a claim suggests a state of sectarian inertia that belies the diversity over time of doctrine and practice within what comes to be called the Theravada tradition. (904)
Even so, many of those who self-identify as Theravada Buddhists do still make the claim that it is the oldest version of Buddhism and the closest to the founder’s vision. It is known as the “Teaching of the Elders” which derives from the same name held by the earlier school of Sthaviravada, and this is sometimes interpreted to mean that its founders were those closest to the Buddha but, actually, the term was commonly used in India to denote any monastic sect, and this applies directly to Theravada.
Adherents focus on the Three Trainings (trisksa):
Sila (moral conduct)
Samadhi (meditation)
Prajna (wisdom)
This discipline is observed as part of the Eightfold Path and is inspired by the central figure of the school, the sage Buddhaghosa (5th century CE) whose name means “Voice of the Buddha” for his ability to interpret and comment upon Buddhist doctrine. They hold the Pali canon to be the most authentic and focus on a monastic interpretation of the Buddhist path in which the individual seeks to become an arhat (saint) and has no obligation to teach others the way toward enlightenment. One may certainly do so if one chooses but, unlike Mahayana Buddhism, the goal is not to become a spiritual guide to others but to free one’s self from samsara.
Theravada Buddhism is divided between a clergy of monks and a congregation of laypeople and it is understood that the monks are more spiritually advanced than the common folk. Women are considered inferior to men and are not thought capable of attaining enlightenment until they are reincarnated as a male. The Theravada school is sometimes referred to as Hinayana (“little vehicle”) by Mahayana Buddhists, but it should be noted that this is considered an insult by Theravada Buddhists in that it suggests their school is not as important as Mahayana.
Mahayana Buddhism
Mahayana Buddhists named themselves the “Great Vehicle” either because they felt they retained the true teachings and could carry the most people to enlightenment (as has been claimed) or because they developed from the early “Great Congregation” Mahasanghika school and wished to distance themselves from it, however slightly. It was founded 400 years after Buddha’s death, probably inspired by the early Mahasanghika ideology, and was streamlined and codified by the sage Nagarjuna (c. 2nd century CE), the central figure of the school. It may have initially been a minor school before interacting with Mahasanghika or, according to some scholars, developed on its own without that school’s influence but, either way, Mahayana is the most widespread and popular form of Buddhism in the world today, spreading from its initial acceptance in China, Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Tibet to points all around the world.
The Mahayana school believes that all human beings possess a Buddha nature and can attain transcendent awareness, becoming a Bodhisattva (“essence of enlightenment”), who can then guide others on the same path. Adherents seek to attain the state of sunyata – the realization that all things are devoid of intrinsic existence, nature, and lasting meaning – a clearing of the mind that enables one to recognize the true nature of life. Having attained this higher state, just as Buddha did, one becomes a buddha. This transcendental state is similar to how gods and spirits were viewed by the Buddha himself – as existing but incapable of rendering any service to the individual – but, as a Bodhisattva, both women and men who have awakened are able to help others to help themselves.
As with Theravada and every other school of Buddhism, the focus is on the self – self-perfection and self-redemption – and no other can do the spiritual work which one needs to do to release one’s self from suffering. Although Buddha is sometimes seen as a deified being by Mahayana Buddhists, the tenets do not encourage one to call on him for help. Following Buddha’s own vision, a belief in a creator god who is attentive to one’s prayers is discouraged because it attaches one to a power outside of one’s self and sets one up for disappointment and frustration when prayers go unanswered.
This is not to say that no Mahayana Buddhists pray directly to the Buddha; the tradition of representing Buddha in statuary and art, of praying to these objects, and considering them holy – observed in Mahayana Buddhism – was initiated by the Mahasanghika school and is among the many compelling reasons to believe the younger school emerged from the older one.
Vajrayana Buddhism
Vajrayana Buddhism (“Diamond Vehicle”) is so-called because of its association of enlightenment with an unbreakable substance. Its name is also given as “Thunderbolt Vehicle”, especially in reference to Tantric or Zen Buddhism, in that enlightenment falls like a thunderbolt after one has put in the required effort at perfecting the self. It is often considered an offshoot of Mahayana Buddhism – is even referenced as a sect of that school – but actually borrows tenets from both Mahayana and Theravada Buddhism while adding an innovation of its own.
In both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, one decides to follow the path, accepts the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path as legitimate, and commits to a spiritual discipline which will lead to enlightenment by renouncing unprofitable habits. In Vajrayana Buddhism, it is understood that one already has a Buddha nature – everyone does, just as Mahayana believes – but, in Vajrayana, one only has to realize this in order to fully awaken. An adherent, therefore, does not have to give up bad habits such as drinking alcohol or smoking right away in order to begin one’s work on the path; one only has to commit to following the path and the desire to engage in unhealthy and damaging behaviors will steadily lose their allure. Instead of distancing one’s self from desire, one steps toward and through it, shedding one’s attachment as one proceeds in the discipline.
As with Mahayana Buddhism, the Vajrayana school focuses one on becoming a Bodhisattva who will then guide others. It was systematized by the sage Atisha (l. 982-1054 CE) in Tibet and so is sometimes referred to as Tibetan Buddhism. The Dalai Lama, often referenced as the spiritual leader of all Buddhists, is technically only the spiritual head of the Vajrayana School, and his views are most directly in line with this school of thought.
Other Schools
There are many other Buddhist schools which have developed from these three all around the world. In the West, the most popular of these is Zen Buddhism which traveled from China to Japan and was most fully developed there before arriving in the West. As Zen Masters are fond of saying, “What you call Zen is not Zen; What you do not call Zen is not Zen” meaning that the state of being one wishes to attain cannot be defined; it can only be experienced. One arrives at this state through deep meditation and mental concentration on koans – usually translated as “riddles” – which have no answer, such as the famous “What is the sound of one hand clapping?” – in order to clear the mind, rid the self of attachment, and attain the state of samadhi, a state of psychological and spiritual vision similar to sunyata. Students of Zen Buddhism frequently study with a master who might slap them, shout, or suddenly hit them with a stout stick in order to awaken them from the illusion of who they think they are and what they think they are doing. These sudden attacks without warning are engaged in, like the koans, to snap an adherent out of rational, linear thinking into a higher state of awareness.
Pure Land Buddhism is another which developed from Mahayana Buddhism and its goal is rebirth in a “pure land” of a Buddha Realm which exists on a higher plane. The belief comes from a story in the text known as the Infinite Life Sutra in which the Buddha tells a story of a past buddha named Amitabha who became a Bodhisattva and to whom were revealed the Buddha Realms available to the enlightened. Amitabha’s efforts to save all sentient creatures from suffering resulted in the creation of the realm of Sukhavati, the greatest of all, in which one experiences complete bliss after leaving the body at death. Although Pure Land is its own school, some Mahayana Buddhists observe the same tenets.
An increasingly popular school in the West is Secular Buddhism which rejects all metaphysical aspects of the belief system to focus on self-improvement for its own sake. Secular Buddhism recognizes the Four Noble Truths and Eight-Fold Path but on purely practical and psychological levels. There are no saints, no Bodhisattvas, no Buddha Realms, no concept of reincarnation to be considered. One engages in the discipline as set down by the Buddha in order to become a better version of one’s self and, when one dies, one no longer exists. There is no concept of a reward after death; one’s efforts in being the best person one can be in life is considered its own reward.
Conclusion
It is actually impossible to tell which, if any, of these schools is closest to the original vision of the Buddha. Siddhartha Gautama, himself, wrote nothing down but instead – like many great spiritual figures throughout history whose followers then founded a religion in their name – lived his beliefs and tried to help others in their struggles. Since the earliest Buddhist texts were written centuries after the Buddha lived, and in an era when the events of a famous person’s life were regularly embellished upon, it is unknown whether his so-called “biography” is accurate nor even the dates between which he is said to have lived.
However that may be, and whoever he was, the Buddha established a belief system which attracts over 500 million adherents in the present day and has, for centuries, offered people a path toward peace of mind and inspiration to help others. The Buddhist belief in the sanctity of all life – no matter which school one attaches one’s self to – promotes care for other human beings, animals, and the earth in an effort to end suffering and offer transformative possibilities. In this respect, each school works toward goals that Buddha himself would approve of and differences in how those goals are reached are ultimately irrelevant.
“DOXOGRAPHICAL APPROPRIATION OF NĀGĀRJUNA’S CATUṢKOṬI IN CHINESE SANLUN AND TIANTAI THOUGHT”
It is well known that the cultural development in ancient China from the Eastern Han (25-220 AD) to the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) was directly and deeply influenced by Indian culture and civilization. The influence was largely achieved through the dissemination of Indian Buddhism. Without this magnificent religious media, it is hard to imagine that a foreign culture with considerably different characters could have made such great influence on the already highly developed and extremely secularized Chinese culture. For this reason, scholars nowadays in China generally tend to consider the influence of Indian culture as resulting from the influence of Indian Buddhism. In this regard, Prof. Ji Xianlin once said, “Without studying the impacts of Buddhism on Chinese culture, it is impossible to write an authentic history of Chinese culture, a history of Chinese philosophy, or even a history of China”. The term “Buddhism” mentioned here does not only refer to the religion per se, but to the whole complex of ancient Indian culture that had been brought by Buddhism into China. One may wonder: how did Buddhism, the carrier of Indian culture, find its way into China? The languages used for transmission of Indian Buddhism and Indian culture are basically from the Indo-European language family, while the Chinese language as the essential vehicle of Chinese culture belongs to the Sino-Tibetan language family. The huge typological gap between Indian and Chinese languages reflects the great underlying difference between Indian and Chinese cultures. Anyone who has some knowledge about this difference is astonished by the fruitful achievements of the communication of these two cultures made in ancient times. A substantial part of the achievements, fairly speaking, owes to the enterprise of translating Buddhist texts into Chinese, which lasted between the early first millennium AD and the early second millennium AD. This enterprise represents perhaps one of the most spectacular examples of intercultural exchange in human history: during nearly ten centuries from the Eastern Han to the Northern Song Dynasty, hundreds of Buddhist masters coming from India or Central Asia to China, along with their Chinese assistants, translated thousands of Indian Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and thereby made known to Chinese people not only Buddhist teachings, but also an extensively rich set of Indian cultural information, which finally even had effects on their daily life. In this sense, it is reasonable to say that without the translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese, there could have neither been the widespread dissemination of Buddhism in China, nor the establishment of Chinese Buddhism, not to mention the profound influence of Indian culture on the Chinese popular culture. Among those honourable Buddhist masters, the most outstanding one is Kumārajīva whom we commemorate today. The present paper consists of three parts: 1) The significance of Chinese Buddhist translations in the history of Chinese Buddhism and the history of Chinese culture; 2) Kumārajīva and his translation activities; 3) The characteristics of Kumārajīva’s translations and their influence on the Chinese culture.
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Wisdom is an essential concern of Buddhism, and “education” in the Buddhist sense should be understood as a process of attaining wisdom or becoming wise-in getting oneself enlightened and ridding oneself of the original ignorance. The teaching of and about wisdom should be considered as part of this process. Since the attainment of wisdom is for Buddhism not a remote possibility but rather a spiritual reality, as evidenced by Buddha himself and so many other bodhisattvas, the answer to questions such as whether or not wisdom is possible is indubitably “yes”. Also, as the final end of Buddhist teaching is to attain enlightenment and to get rid of the original ignorance, the question as to whether wisdom could be taught is also definitively “yes”. Therefore, instead of questioning whether it is possible to teach wisdom, what we should ask here is rather the nature of the Buddhist wisdom and the Buddhist pedagogical process of attaining it. In this chapter I’ll deal with the concept of “wisdom” in three schools of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism: the Sanlun Zong (Three Treatises School), the Weishi Zong (Conscious-Only School) and the Chan Zong (Chan School), which have appeared successively in the history of Chinese Buddhism. We know that Mahayana Buddhism has two major schools in its Indian tradition: Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. They must have contained in themselves such an original generosity to go outside of themselves and the capacity to recontextualize themselves in Chinese culture and become Chinese Mahayana Buddhism. After their spreading and recontextualization in China, the Sanlun School could be seen as the Chinese development of Mādhyamika, whereas the Weishi School should be seen as Yogācāra in its Chinese version. As to the Chan School, which later in its Japanese version was called “Zen”, it should be seen as a properly Chinese Mahayana Buddhism. For reasons of space, we will leave other Chinese Mahayana Buddhist Schools undiscussed, such as Tiantai Zong, which was thus named because of its being built on theMt. Tiantai by Master Zhiyi (538-597), and Huayan Zong, founded by Fazang (643-712) and was thus named because of its focusing on the Huayan Jing(Avatamsaka Sutra, or The Flower Splendor Scripture). In Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, the mostly used term for “wisdom” is the Chinese phonetic translation “bore” of the Sanskrit word “prajñā”. In its Indian tradition, the term “prajñā” means knowledge as well as wisdom, perfect wisdom as well as imperfect wisdom; whereas in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, “prajñā” is taken to mean only perfect wisdom. It is in this sense that when Xuanzang (596-664), who had launched the biggest project of translation of the Buddhist Scriptures in Chinese intellectual history, set up a system of rules for translation, he showed a particular respect for this term in establishing the wu bu fan (five categories of terms not to be translated), of which the fifth concerns itself with the term prajñā. There, it is said, “the use of the Sanskrit term ‘prajñā’ shows respect, whereas the use of the Chinese term zhihui (wisdom) turns out to be superficial”. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we still have to use the term zhihui (wisdom) to render the meaning of prajñā. This is especially the case in Weishi’s concept of zhuanshi dezhi (transformation of consciousness to obtain wisdom) or zhuanshi chengzhi (transformation of consciousness into wisdom). For the Weishi School, wisdom is based on the marvellous being of the Alaya-consciousness (Alya-vijñāna). But, for the Sanlun School, prajñā would mean the attainment of and the marvellous function of emptiness. In Chan Buddhism, prajñā would mean the immediate self-realization of the Buddhahood in the details of everyday life. One of the major focuses of this chapter is to relate the concept of wisdom (and various ways to learn to be wise) to the relation between the mind (or consciousness) and the multiple others in which it finds itself. My basic idea, to be developed in the following sections, is that both Mādhyamika and Yogācāra in their Indian traditions keep a certain dimension of the other. For example, Yogācāra pays respect to the “textual other” and the “ethical other”, in the sense that wisdom is to be acquired by appropriating the meaning of the Scriptures; and the meaning of life thus acquired is to be put into practice with an unconditional generosity towards multiple others, that is, all sentient beings, without even expecting a return from them. For the Mādhyamika, the dimension of the other becomes that which lies always beyond, in denying or making empty that which one achieves in negative dialectics: to render empty in order to show the nonsubstantial character of the Ultimate Reality. The Middle Path, which is the way wisdom or prajñā takes, consists in understanding the interdependent causation in the sense of non-substantiality. After destroying any dualistic situation in the process of negative dialectics, even the reality of interdependent causation should be denied. Unfortunately, the dimension of the other gradually got lost in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, through Sanlun and Weishi, finally to be radically abandoned in absolute immanentism without any necessity to refer to the other-in Chan Buddhism.
The Beopseong sect, as the name hints at, attempts to clarify the meaning of various dharmas. The Beopseong sect used the Three Treatises as their primary texts. These three texts are: 1. The Middle Treatise – Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 2. The Treatise on the Twelve Gates – Dvādaśadvāraśāstra, 3. The Hundred Verse Treatise – Śataśāstra. As a result, the Beopseong sect is also sometimes called the Three Treatises School, or the “Samnon-jong” in Korean.
One of the main focuses of the Samnon-jong sect, which is known as the “Buddha Nature” in English, focuses on how it’s possible for sentient beings to attain the state of a Buddha. This is a central topic in Mahayana Buddhism. So one of the meanings of the term “Buddha Nature” is that all sentient beings contain an enlightened Buddha within themselves. Another approach to the idea of “Buddha Nature” is the idea that allows for the enabling of sentient beings to become Buddhas. Debate continues to this day on what the “Buddha Nature” means, and it plays a major role in doctrinal Mahayana Buddhism.
With this in mind, the Samnon-jong (Buddha Nature) sect sharply criticized the Smaller Vehicle – Hinayana Buddhism. The reason for this is that the Samnon-jong sect believed that the Smaller Vehicle served no purpose. The Samnon-jong sect considered the idea of emptiness found in Prajnaparamita (the Perfection of [Transcendent] Wisdom) as corresponding perfectly to the ultimate end, or “Gugyeong” in Korean. That’s why the Samnon-jong sect is also known as the Emptiness of Nature Sect, or “Seonggong-jong” in Korean.
So how did Samnon Buddhism first develop? In China, during the reign of Emperor Yao Chang (r. 384-394 A.D.) of Later Qin, a monk from Kucha named Kumārajīva (344-413 A.D.) followed Lü Guang (337-400 A.D.) to Liangzhou and reached Changan in 400 A.D. Kumārajīva immediately started to translate Buddhist sutras. Among the 380 sutras that he translated, the Śataśāstra was completed in 404 A.D. And the other two sutras, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Dvādaśadvāraśāstra, were both completed in 410 A.D. It was from these sutras, and their translations, that a sect was founded. But not only was it founded, but it began to flourish right away, as well. Kumarajiva became the first patriarch of the sect.
With all that being said, it’s unclear how this sect first came to the Korean peninsula. Also, it’s impossible to know the person that first expounded and taught these teachings, as well. However, it can safely be assumed that because of the proximity of Northern China (which is where Sanlun Buddhism was first founded and developed) to the Korean peninsula, that it was transmitted through trade and cultural exchanges. And because Sanlun Buddhism passed through the Korean peninsula to arrive in Japan, which it did as Sanron Buddhism in 625 A.D., Sanlun Buddhism was already present in the Three Kingdoms of Korea (18 B.C. – 660 A.D.) at this time. With this in mind, and without being able to be more specific, Sanlun Buddhism is believed to have first been introduced around the time other sects arrived on the Korean peninsula from Tang China (618–690, 705–907 A.D.) like Huayan and Vinaya Buddhism. Additionally, the Hwaeom-jong sect and Samnon-jong sect were believed to have strong ties. Later, and at the beginning of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), the Samnon-jong sect was unified with the Jungdo sect, and it became the Jungsin sect. This sect continued to use the same doctrinal content of the Three Treatises.
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Chien-hsing Ho
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Empty Logic: Mādhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources
Author Hsueh-li Cheng Publisher Philosophical Library, 1984 Original from the University of Virginia Digitized Aug 2, 2007 ISBN 0802224423, 9780802224422 Length 220 pages
The study on The Philosophy of Zhao Lun
Yan Li Beijing Language and Culture University, Beijing 100083, China
The meaning of the two truths–the worldly or mundane truth samvrtisatya , and the real or supreme truth — was a hotly debated topic among Chinese Buddhists in the 5th and 6th century a.d. From the time of Kumarajiva this issue was discussed in terms of yu and wu . Usually yu was iden- tified with samvrtisatya and wu with paramarthasatya, leading to the mistaken conclusion that the two truths represent two separate realities. The ambiguous meaning of these terms also contributed to the confusion. Yu and wu have both positive and negative conno- tations for Buddhist philosophy. Yu understood as substantial Being is denied by the Buddhist concept of emptiness sunyata , but yu as conventional, conditioned, co-arising dharmas is compatible with the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada. Wu understood as a nihilistic nothingness is a misunderstanding of emptiness, but wu as a lack of substantial Being is synonymous with emptiness. The use of these ambiguous terms to interpret the meaning of the two truths prevented a satisfactory resolution of the problem until the issue was dealt with by Chi-tsang, of the Sanlun tradition, and Chih-i, founder of T’ien-t’ai philosophy. ;In this dissertation I outline the debate on the two truths in China from the time of Kumarajiva and Seng-chao, the first appearance of three truth formulations in Chinese apocryphal Sutras, the debate on the two truths led by Prince Chao-ming, Hui-yuan’s discussion in his Ta ch’eng i chang, the positive evaluation of conventional existence by the Ch’eng shih lun scholars, and the contributions of Chi-tsang. Finally I discuss Chih-i’s T’ien-t’ai philosophy and his resolution of the problem by means of his threefold truth concept. Chih-i tran- scends the yu/wu duality by emphasizing the oneness of reality and discussing the issue in terms of emptiness sunyata , conventional existence prajnaptirupadaya , and the middle madhyama . An annotated translation of the pertinent section of the Fa hua hsuan i is included in an Appendix
Sŭng Tonang (僧 道朗) (a.k.a. Sŭngnang (僧朗), fl. 476?-512) from Koguryŏ and his Role in Chinese San-lun
Joerg Plassen
Joerg Plassen is an Assistant Professor of the Department of Ostasienwissenschaften at Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the First World Congress of Korean Studies, Academy of Korean Studies, Sŏngnam, July 18-20, 2002.
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture February 2005, Vol. 5, pp. 165~198.
Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) is the founder of the Madhyamaka or Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy and the most influential of all Buddhist thinkers following the Buddha himself. Throughout his works, Nāgārjuna repeatedly calls for the complete abandonment of all views. But how could anyone possibly abandon all views? And how could a philosopher of Nāgārjuna’s stature resort to using so self-contradictory a form of argumentation as the tetralemma, which openly negates a position, its contrary, both, and neither? Many scholars have attempted to parameterize Nāgārjuna’s paradoxes in an apologetic effort to justify him to mainstream Western philosophers as being irreproachably logical. This book, however, shows not only how Nāgārjuna’s truly radical teaching of no-view or “abelief” makes perfect sense within his Buddhist philosophy but also how it stands at the summit of his religious mission to care for all living beings. Rather than treating any one aspect of Nāgārjuna’s ideas in isolation, here his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics emerge as forging a single coherent and convincing philosophical-religious system of thought and practice. Overall, this book takes a comprehensive approach to Nāgārjuna’s thought in its Buddhist context, integrating his views on views, belief, and conceptualization; language, mind, and intention; action, attachment, and selfhood; suffering, violence, and peace; and emptiness, nirvāṇa, and Buddhahood. By drawing on Buddhist sources in a way that resolutely strives to move beyond the Christianocentrism and Occidentocentrism still so dominant in scholarship today, this work challenges the very ways in which we think about religion and philosophy.
‘Abandoning All Views: A Buddhist Critique of Belief’,
Stepien, Rafal K.,
Buddhism Between Religion and Philosophy: Nāgārjuna and the Ethics of Emptiness (New York , 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 30 Apr. 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197771303.003.0005, accessed 26 May 2024.
Chapter 4 brings preceding discussions of the tetralemma to bear on the central role that abandoning all views plays within Nāgārjuna’s thought as a whole. For Nāgārjuna’s masterwork opens and closes with salutations to the Buddha as one who taught the “cessation of conceptualization” and the “abandonment of all views.” In addition, this and Nāgārjuna’s other texts contain numerous analogous calls for the complete abandonment of views, which are surveyed and explained. Despite these copious, clear, and comprehensive disavowals of views, contemporary scholars almost unanimously interpret such statements as referring only to “false” views. This chapter argues instead that Nāgārjuna’s insistence on the abandonment of all views—including ultimately his own—constitutes his distinctive epistemological means to the metaphysical “exhaustion” characteristic of nirvāṇa, wherein all views are and must be abandoned as so many subtle affirmations of an only ever empty self.
‘Logical, Buddhological, Buddhist: A Critical Study of the Tetralemma’,
Stepien, Rafal K.,
Buddhism Between Religion and Philosophy: Nāgārjuna and the Ethics of Emptiness (New York , 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 30 Apr. 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197771303.003.0003, accessed 26 May 2024.
Chapter 2 focuses on the tetralemma or catuṣkoṭi. This fourfold form of discourse typically negates a given position, its contrary, both, and neither, as when, for example, Nāgārjuna states at the very outset of his masterwork that “Not from itself nor from another / Not from both nor without cause // Does any entity whatsoever / Anywhere arise.” The logicalizing approach predominant in contemporary scholarship on the tetralemma is motivated by a desire to demonstrate that, contrary to appearances, Nāgārjuna cannot possibly be serious in denying all four positions. This chapter articulates and dismantles three major iterations of this approach, which are called the Mereological, Modal, and Qualitative Interpretations. An alternative reading is then proposed that is not only just as methodologically legitimate but also better equipped for the hermeneutical endeavor of describing Nāgārjuna’s religiosophical project taken in its entirety.
‘Nāgārjuna’s Tetralemma: Tetrāletheia and Tathāgata, Utterance and Anontology’,
Stepien, Rafal K.,
Buddhism Between Religion and Philosophy: Nāgārjuna and the Ethics of Emptiness (New York , 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 30 Apr. 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197771303.003.0004, accessed 26 May 2024.
Chapter 3 turns from the critique of currently prevalent interpretive strategies to the construction of an alternative method. In contradistinction to analyses aimed at demonstrating the logicality of the tetralemma, an interpretation is proposed along what are called paralogical lines. An argument is made for the inadequacy of the dialetheic reading currently preferred, and therefore a new term is proposed—“tetrāletheia”—designed to better represent the four-folded nature of the tetralemma. Subsequent sections of the chapter are devoted to explication of this neologism, together with a reading of the tetralemma as embodied in the archetypal Buddhist figure of the Tathāgata. In the final section, “utterance” is proposed as an alternative descriptor for the totality of the tetralemma, one that is better suited to the paralogical and “anontological” tetralemma than are terms in standard use insofar as it dispenses with their substantialist value(s).
Baizhang
Viewpoints which Matter 