What and Why of Virtue Ethics ?
Key Terms
- Ethics
- Classical Virtues
- Virtue Ethics
- Normative Ethics
- Meta Ethics
- Kantian Ethics
- Aristotle
- Utilitarianism
- John Stuart Mill
- Jeremy Bentham
- Consequentialism
- Deontological Ethics
- Immanuel Kant
- Teleological Ethics
- Act based Ethics
- Person/Agent Based Ethics
- Personality Traits
- Character
- Dispositions
- Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics
- Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle)
- Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics
- Michael Slote
- Pluralistic Virtue Ethics
- Plato
- David Hume
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- Martin Heidegger
- Confucian Ethics
- Hinduism Ethics
- Buddhist Ethics
- Self, Culture, Nature
- Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic
- Truth, Beauty, Goodness
- Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics
- Varieties of Goodness
- Forms of Ethics
- Bio Ethics
- Business Ethics
- Applied Ethics
- Narrative Ethics
- Environmental Ethics
Key Scholars
- G. E. M. Anscombe
- Alasdair MacIntyre
- Philippa Foot
- Rosalind Hursthouse
- Michael Slote
- Christine Swanton
- Julia Annas
- Philip J Ivanhoe
- May Sim
- Robert C. Roberts
- David Carr
- Liezl van Zyl
- Martha Nussbaum
Virtue Ethics
Source: THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS
Source: THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS
Source: THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS
R.B. Louden, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012
Abstract
Virtue ethics holds that judgments about the inner lives of individuals (their traits, motives, dispositions, and character) are of primary importance, and that judgments about the rightness or wrongness of acts and/or the consequences of acts are secondary. One major criticism levied against virtue ethics is that its strong agent perspective prevents it from giving sufficiently specific advice about how to act in problematic situations. In this article, the development and structure of contemporary virtue ethics is presented, the challenge posed by the application problem is analyzed, and responses to it by applied virtue ethicists are assessed.
Virtue Ethics
C. Swanton, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001
Virtue ethics is a species of normative ethical theory generally seen as opposed to both Kantian ethics and Consequentialism. In its modern incarnations, it has been largely inspired by the eudaimonistic tradition of the ancient Greeks, and in particular Aristotle. However, we can expect further developments in virtue ethics which are inspired by other sources, such as Nietzsche and Hume. Virtue ethics is characterized by the centrality of character in normative ethical theory, where norms of excellence of character provide norms for both the good life in general and acting well and rightly. In virtue ethical traditions, norms of excellence of character are rich, and involve being well disposed in regard to reason, feelings, desires, motives, emotions, as well as action. Hence, the importance of the expression of fine inner states in virtue ethics. Problems for virtue ethics include the foundations of virtue, the universality of virtue, the relation between character and issues in applied ethics such as role obligations and right action generally, demands for codifiability and determinacy, and ‘character skepticism’ suggested by situationist psychology.
J. Sim, in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012
Virtue Ethics
Within a virtue ethics approach, the emphasis is not on what one does but on the kind of person one is in terms of certain morally desirable character traits, such as compassion, benevolence, sensitivity, discretion, honesty, selflessness, and courage. The importance of such virtues can be underlined in two ways. First, it can be argued that character traits such as compassion and discretion are necessary in order for a person to recognize the moral demands of a particular situation; for example, it is only through possessing a measure of discretion that one will recognize a situation in which confidentiality is called for. Second, having identified the moral dimension in a situation, these same character traits may provide the necessary impetus or motivation to act: feelings of compassion not only allow one to identify a situation in which there is a moral demand to act to relieve another’s distress but also propel one to do so. In the process, virtues may enable a more sensitive and judicious application of the principles espoused by deontology or of the process of evaluating outcomes proposed by consequentialism. The notion of ‘caring’ that is central to health professionals’ practice has a clear resonance with virtue ethics.
Ethics
Peter J. Smith, John J. Hardt, in Developmental-Behavioral Pediatrics (Fourth Edition), 2009
Virtue Ethics
The central tenant of virtue ethics holds that the moral life is best promoted by attending to the moral agent herself or himself. Whereas deontologic ethics identifies and follows duties or obligations and utilitarian ethics attempts to maximize the good for the greatest number, virtue ethics seeks the moral formation of persons rather than the valuation of actions by paying attention to human virtue, friendship, moral wisdom, and discernment. As noted before, virtue ethics has deep roots in the classical world, and its philosophical origins are found in the Hippocratic Collection. Virtue ethics emphasizes the dynamic nature of ethical decisions, recognizing that individuals both shape and are shaped by what they choose to do in any given situation. Whereas virtue ethics flourished in the classical, philosophical world (Aquinas, 1920), its influence waned during the enlightenment. Virtue ethics has more recently experienced a revival in the 20th century in the work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and others who have creatively recovered the work of their predecessors.
Critics of virtue ethics argue that it, like deontology and utilitarianism, cannot function within a morally plural society because of the lack of agreement on what virtues are actually worthy of promotion. Who decides what constitutes the good life and the good person among our ongoing disagreements about morality and value? Furthermore, the person-centered nature of this ethical system, insofar as it focuses on the moral agent rather than on obligations or principles, makes its content difficult to translate into codes, regulations, policies, or laws (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988).
Deontology, Consequentialism, and Virtue Ethics
Source: Varieties of Virtue Ethics
Theory versus exploration in virtue ethics
Until sometime in the 1980s philosophers of ethics tended to think that the major alternatives in ethical theory were deontology and utilitarianism. Deontology is the view that some principle of obligation — Kant’s categorical imperative is the dominant contender — is the foundation of morality. Actions gain their moral worth by being generated from this foundation, and the virtuous person is one who is properly sensitive to the foundational principle (has “respect for the moral law”). Utilitarianism is the view that the goodness of actions derives not from their generating principle, but from the quality of their consequences. A classic example is J. S. Mill’s view that actions’ goodness comes from their fostering the general happiness or correcting unhappiness. Each of these theories offers its preferred basis of morality as the single ultimate and exclusive basis of moral goodness and rightness (which is not to deny that some thinkers offer “mixed” or “impure” theories that admit both bases on an equal footing, thus turning two monisms into a dualism, so to speak).
Sometime in the 1970s some philosophers got the bright idea of proposing a third alternative ethical theory, which they called “virtue ethics.” It was to have the same formal structure as the two classic modern theories, but be more plausible. So the basic idea was that virtue, not a principle of obligation or good outcomes and states of affairs, would be the foundation of ethical distinctions. Michael Slote well represents this proposal:
An agent-based approach to virtue ethics treats the moral or ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from independent and fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, character traits, or individuals… (2001, p. 5; italics added).
Eduardo Mendieta, in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), 2008
Deontology and the Pursuit of Moral Life
Virtue ethics, like Confucian ethics another form of virtue ethics, has as a fundamental assumption that humans are not born moral, but instead are socialized into morality. In both cases, the socialization entails acquiring certain social habits and living in accordance with communally sanctioned or proscribed mores and manners. These morals, in other words, do not travel well. What may be a virtue in one community may be a vice in another. Most importantly, how do we decide whether a virtue is in fact a moral excellence? The pursuit of virtue, in other words, does not produced morality, but the pursuit of morality leads us to virtue. It is in response to these doubts that Immanuel Kant developed his absolutist, deontological, and cognitivistic ethics. Kant begins with a Socratic question: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it’s pious? Or is it pious because it’s loved?” (Euthyphro 10a). According to Kant, and Socrates as well, we cannot judge something moral just because we deem it so, or have been told so. Nor can we derive morality from examples, role models, or paragons of morality, for in labeling them as such, we already operate with an inchoate notion of the moral. Kant argues that we must suspend all appeal to history, folklore, and religion in order to reflect on what we take to be truly moral. In order to do this Kant investigates the a priori assumptions of all moral action. He engages in what he calls a transcendental investigation, that is, he seeks to uncover the conditions of possibility without which morality would not make any sense. According to Kant, there are two indispensable presuppositions of morality: an absolutely free will and a rational nature. Morality is possible at all because humans are metaphysically (absolutely and not contingently) free and they have poor reason. Duty draws out for us this rational and free dimension of morality. A moral act, according to Kant, is one that is done without coercion, or without the fear of retaliation or some punishment. A moral act is one that is done for its own sake, or else it is a not a moral act but a contingent action aimed at achieving some specific end. When we act from duty, we act out of respect for the moral law. The moral worth of a moral act, therefore, is determined not by something external to it, but by the maxim (or principle that determines the will) according to which it is executed. If the moral worth of an act would be determined by something external, then the will would not be free and we would act out of inclination, desire, passion, or moral weakness. Duty thus reflects precisely how the moral is that which is universally necessary and commanded by the power of our reason. To act from duty is to act in accordance with reason and the determination of the free will. There is no other force or power that determines morality than the power of self-legislated duty. Duty in fact aims at what Kant called ‘categorical imperatives,’ which in contrast to hypothetical imperatives, are what must be done. While hypothetical imperatives are conditional, contingent, and aim at short-lived or narrow ends in such a way that the ends necessitate certain means, categorical imperatives are unconditional and unqualified and apply to all human conditions, and aim not at contingent and short-lived aims but at the very dignity of the human being. According to Kant in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, there is only one categorical imperative, which he formulates in this way: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” Moral acts are only those that can be universalized. According to Kant this principle of the universability of moral law can be expressed in three other formulas: act in such a way that you treat the humanity of others as well as your own humanity, always as an end and never as a means; act in such a away that you always assume every ‘rational being’ to be a will that ‘legislates universal law,’ and act in such a way that you take yourself, and all other rational beings, to be members of a ‘kingdom of ends.’ The categorical imperative in its three versions essentially argues that morality is the expression of the moral autonomy of rational beings that legislate upon themselves laws that command their utmost respect. Morality, in other words, both expresses the dignity of the human being and commands its utmost reverence and respect. Notwithstanding its seeming rigor and absolutism, Kantianism is parsimonious and abstemious; it neither presuppose reference to specific cultural contexts and customs, nor does it offer a set of rules. The categorical imperative merely makes implicit that which we take to be indispensable and inalienable to morality; but it also offers us a North Star. As Kant noted in the conclusion to his Critique of Practical Reason: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within me.” Like the lawfulness of the cosmos, which renders it both mysterious and awe-inspiring, the self-legislated lawfulness of morality, renders us admirable and sublime.
Source: Ethics of Physiotherapy
Varieties of Virtue Ethics
Source: THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS
- Plato and the Ethics of Virtue
- Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics
- The Stoics Theory of Virtue
- Hindu Virtue Ethics
- Why Confucius’s Ethics is a Virtue Ethics
- Mencius’s Virtue Ethics
- Virue in Buddhist Ethical Traditions
- Respect for Differences
- Xunzi and Virtue Ethics
- Consecrated Virtue
- Thomas Aquinas
- David Hume
- Nietzsche and the Virtues
- Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics
- Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics
- Pluralistic Virue Ethics
- Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics
- Contemporary Confucianism
- Virtue Epistemology and Virue Ethics
- Feminist Virtue Ethics
- Agape and Virtue Ethics
- Kant and Virtue Ethics
- The Consequentialist Critique of Virtue Ethics
- Virtue Ethics and Right Action
- Virtue Ethics and Egoism
- Models of Virtue
- The Situationist Critique
- Testing the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis against Egoistic Alternatives
- Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics
- Roles and Virtues
- Environmental Virtue Ethics
- World Virtue Ethics
- Virtue Ethics And Moral Education
- Virtue Ethics As Political Philosophy
- Law And Virtue
- Virtue Ethics And Medicine
- Business Ethics From A Virtue-Theoretic Perspective
Source: Virtue Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction
Source: A virtue ethics perspective on bioethics
Key features of virtue ethics
The most fundamental claim made by virtue ethics as a theory of right action is that reference to character and virtue are essential in the justification of right action (see Hursthouse 1999, pp. 28-31). A virtue-ethics-criterion right action can be stated initially in broad terms as holding that an action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances (see Hursthouse, 1991, p. 225). That is, a right action is one that a virtuous person would do in the circumstances, and what makes the action right is that it is what a person with a virtuous character would do here.
An important qualification was subsequently made to this initial statement of a virtue-ethics-criterion of right action. In responding to concerns that even virtuous agents might occasionally act wrongly when they act contrary to their virtuous characters, Rosalind Hursthouse stipulated that the virtuous exemplar in the above criterion of right action must be understood to be acting in character (Hursthouse 1999, p. 28). Other variants of virtue ethics have recently been developed that specify the link between virtue and right action somewhat differently from that mentioned above. For example, Christine Swanton (2003) advocates what she calls a ‘target-centered’ approach, whereby virtuous actions are those that hit the target – realize the proper goal – of the virtue relevant to the context, and right actions are those that are overall virtuous in the circumstances in which the actual agent finds themselves (pp. 228-40). Nevertheless, the primacy given to character in both of these versions helps to distinguish virtue ethics from standard forms of Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Consequentialism, whereby actions are justified according to rules or outcomes.
Of course, if virtue ethics is to guide and justify actions, this criterion clearly needs to be supplemented by an account of which character-traits count as virtues. (Similarly, a rule-utilitarian criterion of right action needs to be supplemented by an account of which universally adopted rules maximize utility.) Nevertheless, the above formulations already highlight a key difference between virtue ethics and standard Kantian and Utilitarian approaches, whereby the rightness of an act is determined by whether the act is in accordance with certain rules, or by whether it maximizes expected utility, respectively. For neither of those approaches, as standardly defined, make reference to character essential to the justification of right action. For example, Utilitarians like Henry Sidgwick (1981, p. 227) saw virtues such as generosity, gratitude, and courage as instrumentally valuable, insofar as they help to bring about the pleasure and happiness of sentient beings, or a life of ‘desirable consciousness’ (especially in circumstances where we have insufficient time to deliberate).
It is important to clarify that doing what the virtuous agent would do involves not merely the performance of certain acts, but requires acting from certain dispositions and (in many cases) certain motives. For example, acting as someone with the virtue of benevolence would act involves not only providing assistance to another person but also includes having and acting from a genuine concern for their well-being, and a disposition to have and act from that concern in particular kinds of situations. As Aristotle (1980, VI, 13, 1144b26-9) put it, “It is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue”. Acting as the virtuous agent would act typically involves acting from certain motives – though one can act justly from a variety of motives, so long as one acts from a disposition that incorporates an appropriate sense of justice. Every virtue can be thought to embody a regulative ideal, involving the internalization of a certain conception of excellence such that one is able to adjust one’s motivation and conduct so that they conform to that standard. Indeed, Julia Annas (2011) has argued that the nature of virtues must be understood by grasping how virtues are acquired, in the way that skills like piano-playing are acquired. That is, virtues should be viewed as comparable to skills “that exhibit the practical intelligence of the skilled craftsperson or athlete” (Annas 2011, p. 169). Annas argues that “part of the attraction of an ethics of virtue has always been the point that virtue is familiar and recognizable by all, so it would still be a damaging result if virtue is hopelessly unattainable by all but a few”(p. 173; see also Russell 2009).
A key difference between virtue ethics and standard Utilitarian and Kantian ethical theories is the close connection typically drawn by virtue ethics between motive and rightness. Most forms of Utilitarianism and Kantianism hold that, generally speaking, one can act rightly, whatever one’s motivation – so long as one maximizes expected utility or acts in accordance with duty, one has done the right thing, whether one’s motives were praiseworthy, reprehensible, or neutral. However, as we have seen, virtue ethics typically holds that acting rightly (in most situations) requires acting from a particular sort of motivation, since this is part of what is involved in doing what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. Indeed, Michael Slote (2001, 2007) has developed an ‘agent-based’ virtue ethics, whereby an action is right if and only if it is done from a virtuous motive, such as benevolence. Acting from the virtuous motive of benevolence, in Slote’s view, is not simply acting to help another from a warm-hearted feeling towards them, but involves seeking via an active capacity for empathy to understand their plight, and monitoring one’s action to see that it is actually helping.
Distinguishing virtue ethics more fully from contemporary versions of Kantian and Utilitarian approaches requires filling in the details about which character-traits count as virtues (see Oakley 1996). So, just as Kantians and Utilitarians need to detail their general criteria of rightness by specifying which rules we are to act in accordance with, or what expected utility consists of, virtue ethicists must likewise provide details about what the virtues are. For virtue ethics to be capable of guiding action, the criterion of right action outlined above needs to be completed with an account of the virtues. The distinctiveness of virtue ethics compared to other theories is brought out more fully when we consider the ways in which advocates of the approach ground the normative conceptions in the character of the virtuous agent.
Many virtue ethicists hold the Aristotelian view that virtues are character traits that we need to live humanly flourishing lives. In this view, developed principally by Foot (1978, 2001) and Hursthouse (1987, 1999), benevolence and justice are virtues because they are part of an interlocking web of intrinsic goods – which includes friendship, integrity and knowledge – without which we cannot have eudaimonia. According to Aristotle, the characteristic activity of human beings is the exercise of our rational capacity, and only by living virtuously is our rational capacity to guide our lives expressed in an excellent way. Construing virtues as character traits that humans need to lourish, Hursthouse argues that what makes a character trait a virtue in humans is that it serves well the following four ‘naturalistic’ ends: individual survival, individual characteristic enjoyment and freedom from pain, the good functioning of the social group, and the continuance of the species (1999, pp. 200-1, 208, 248). Aristotle argues that each virtue can be understood as involving hitting the mean between two vices – for example, the virtue of courage is the mean between the vices of cowardice and rashness. However, Aristotle realizes that telling us to aim at a mean between excess and defect is vague: “if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser – eg, we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some were to say ‘all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art’ ” (1980, VI, 1, 1138b29-33). So Aristotle proceeds to develop his account of ethical judgment as practical wisdom (phronesis), as a way of explaining how virtues can guide actions.
A different approach to grounding the virtues, pioneered by Michael Slote (1992), rejects the eudaimonist idea of Aristotle that virtues are found by considering what humans need in order to lourish, and instead derives virtues from our commonsense views about what character traits we typically find admirable – as exemplified in the lives of figures such as Albert Einstein and Mother Teresa – whether or not those traits help an individual to flourish. Swanton (2003) also rejects Aristotelian eudaimonism, and argues that virtues are dispositions to respond to morally significant features of objects in an excellent way, whether or not such dispositions are good for the person who has them. For example, Swanton (2203, pp. 82-3) argues that a great artist’s creative drive can be a virtue, even if this drive leads the artist to suffer bipolar disorder – such an artist’s creative drive need not bring flourishing, but Swanton argues it is nevertheless an excellent way of responding to value, and can certainly result in a life that is justifiably regarded as successful in some sense.
My Related Posts
Indra’s Net: On Interconnectedness
Mind, Consciousness and Quantum Entanglement
Consciousness of Cosmos: A Fractal, Recursive, Holographic Universe
Fractal Geometry and Hindu Temple Architecture
Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber
The Aesthetics of Charles Sanders Peirce
The Good, the True, and the Beautiful
Aesthetics and Ethics: At the Intersection
Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism
Meta Integral Theories: Integral Theory, Critical Realism, and Complex Thought
Human Rights and Human Development
Third and Higher Order Cybernetics
Psychology of Happiness: Value of Storytelling and Narrative Plays
Key Sources of Research
Ethics of Physiotherapy
J. Sim,
in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition), 2012
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/psychology/virtue-ethic
“Introduction” ,
van Hooft, Stan ,
in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics
ed. Stan van Hooft , Nafsika Athanassoulis , Jason Kawall , Justin Oakley , Nicole Saunders and Liezl Van Zyl
(Abingdon: Routledge, 27 Nov 2013 ), accessed 01 Oct 2022 , Routledge Handbooks Online.
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315729053.ch1#S1
Virtue Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction
By Liezl van Zyl
Routledge, 2019
On Virtue Ethics
1st Edition
by Rosalind Hursthouse
ISBN-13: 978-0198238188
ISBN-10: 0198238185
Intelligent Virtue
1st Edition
by Julia Annas (Author)
ISBN-13: 978-0199228775
ISBN-10: 0199228779
The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics
(Cambridge Companions to Philosophy) 0th Edition
by Daniel C. Russell (Editor)
ISBN-13: 978-0521171748
ISBN-10: 0521171741
The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics
(Routledge Philosophy Companions) 1st Edition
by Lorraine Besser-Jones (Editor), Michael Slote (Editor)
ISBN-13: 978-1138478220
ISBN-10: 1138478229
Virtue Ethics
(Oxford Readings in Philosophy) 1st Edition
by Roger Crisp (Editor), Michael Slote (Editor)
ISBN-13: 978-0198751885
ISBN-10: 0198751885
Natural Goodness
1st Edition
by Philippa Foot (Author)
ISBN-13: 978-0199265473
ISBN-10: 019926547X
Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
(Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) 2nd Edition
by Mary Gregor (Translator), Jens Timmermann (Translator), Christine M. Korsgaard (Introduction)
ISBN-13: 978-1107401068
ISBN-10: 1107401062
Nicomachean Ethics
Third Edition, third edition
by Aristotle (Author), Terence Irwin (Translator)
ISBN-13: 978-1624668159
ISBN-10: 1624668151
Utilitarianism
Second Edition
by John Stuart Mill (Author), George Sher (Editor)
ISBN-13: 978-0872206052
ISBN-10: 087220605X
Virtue Ethics
Science Direct Page
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/psychology/virtue-ethic
Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader
Daniel Statman (ed.)
Georgetown University Press (1997)
ISBN: 9780878402205
ISBN: 9780878402212 (0878402217)
http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/virtue-ethics
https://philpapers.org/rec/STAVE
Varieties of Virtue Ethics
edited by David Carr, James Arthur, Kristján Kristjánsson
Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy
By Bryan van Norden
The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche
By Christine Swanton
Virtue Ethics and the Chinese Confucian Tradition
Chapter
in Book Virtue Ethics and Confucianism
By PHILIP J. IVANHOE
Edition 1st Edition, First Published 2013, Imprint Routledge
eBook ISBN 9780203522653
Varieties of Virtue Ethics
Robert C. Roberts
Distinguished Professor of Ethics Emeritus, Baylor University
From James Arthur, David Carr, and Kristján Kristjánsson, eds., Varieties of Virtue Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)
THE ETHICS OF THE NODE VERSUS THE ETHICS OF THE DYAD? RECONCILING VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTRACTUALISM*
Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens
Muel Kaptein
J. (Hans) van Oosterhout
ORGANIZATION STUDIES 27(3): 391-411.
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
Third Edition Paperback – Download: Adobe Reader, March 6, 2007
First Ed – 1981
by Alasdair MacIntyre (Author)
A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century,
Second Edition Paperback – Download: Adobe Reader, January 15, 1998
by Alasdair MacIntyre (Author)
Virtue Ethics
(2018)
Rhetoric Review, 37:4, 321-392,
DOI: 10.1080/07350198.2018.1497882
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07350198.2018.1497882
A Problem Based Reading of Nussbaum’s Virtue Ethics
by John C. Brady
Epoche Magazine
Issue #16 September 2018
https://epochemagazine.org/16/a-problem-based-reading-of-nussbaums-virtue-ethics/
Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing.
Annas, J. (2013).
In R. Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2nd ed., pp. 676–686). West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Normative Virtue Ethics.
Hursthouse, R. (2013).
In R. Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2nd ed., pp. 645–652). West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category.
Nussbaum, M. (1999).
The Journal Of Ethics, 3(3), 163–201. doi: 10.1023/a:1009829301765
Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.
Nussbaum, M. (2013).
In R. Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2nd ed., pp. 630–644). West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Varieties of Virtue Ethics in Philosophy, Social Science and Theology,
Oriel College, Oxford, January 8th–10th, 2015
The third annual conference of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham. UK
https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/502/conferences/varieties-of-virtue-ethics
Which Variety of Vitue Ethics?
Julia Annas
This is an unpublished conference paper for the 3rd Annual Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues conference at Oriel College, Oxford University, Thursday 8th – Saturday 10th January 2015.
Why Confucius’s Ethics is a Virtue Ethics
May Sim
This is an unpublished conference paper for the 3rd Annual Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues conference at Oriel College, Oxford University, Thursday 8th – Saturday 10th January 2015.
Normative Virtue Ethics
Rosalind Hursthouse
Click to access hursthouse_-_normative_virtue_ethics.pdf
A virtue ethics perspective on bioethics
Una perspectiva de la ética de la virtud en bioética
Justin Oakley
Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Received 10 March 2015; accepted 27 March 2015
BIOETHICS UPdate 1 (2015) 41-53
A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action
Christine Swanton
Ethics
Volume 112, Number 1 October 2001
https://doi.org/10.1086/322742
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/322742
The Virtue of “Virtue Ethics” in Business and Business Education
- Dennis Wittmer, Kevin O’Brien
- Published 1 July 2014
- Journal of Business Ethics Education
- DOI:10.5840/JBEE20141113
- Corpus ID: 145796857
Modern Moral Philosophy
- G. Anscombe
- Published 1 January 1958
- DOI:10.1017/s0031819100037943
- Corpus ID: 197875941
Toward a Synthesis of Confucianism and Aristotelianism
Bryan W Van Norden
Chapter in Book Virtue Ethics and Confucianism
Edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote
2013
https://www.academia.edu/12762325/Toward_a_Synthesis_of_Confucianism_and_Aristotelianism
BWVN Virtue Ethics and Confucianism
Bryan W Van Norden
Chapter 5 in Book
https://www.academia.edu/12762328/BWVN_Virtue_Ethics_and_Confucianism
Why Virtue Ethics? Action and motivation in virtue ethics
Norah Woodcock*
McGill University
Aporia Vol. 19 No. 1
Virtue Ethics
First published Fri Jul 18, 2003; substantive revision Thu Dec 8, 2016
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Virtue Ethics
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Virtue Ethics
Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics
AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN ETHICAL THOUGHT: ARISTOTLE, KANT, UTILITARIANISM
Heather Wilburn, Ph.D.
Virtue ethics of clinical research
Letter to the Editor
María Pérez‐Piñar1, Luis Ayerbe1,2
1The Westborough Road Health Centre, Westcliff‐on‐Sea, Essex, SS0 9PT, 2Centre for Primary Care and Public Health, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom
Dr. Luis Ayerbe, Centre for Primary Care and Public Health, Queen Mary University of London, Yvonne Carter Building, 58, Turner Street, London E1 2AB, United Kingdom. E‐mail: l.garcia‐morzon@qmul.ac.uk
The Handbook of Virtue Ethics
2014
https://www.routledge.com/The-Handbook-of-Virtue-Ethics/Hooft/p/book/9781844656394
VIRTUE ETHICS
Michael Slote
Virtue Ethics
Speaker: David Massey
Indian Hill Schools
“Virtue Ethics”
Julia Annas
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp and published in 2007.
A virtue ethics approach to moral dilemmas in medicine
P Gardiner
J Med Ethics 2003;29:297–302
Virtue Ethics
Klement
Univ of Mass, MA
Virtue Ethics
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Copyright Date: 2002
Author (Faculty Member): Stephen Darwall
Virtue Ethics collects, for the first time, the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of virtue ethics approach to normative ethical theory. Includes classic essays by Aristotle, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, and recent reactions to this work by philosophers including Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre, Annette Baier, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Slote. With an introduction by Stephen Darwall as well as a contemporary discussion on character and virtue by Gary Watson.
https://philosophy.yale.edu/publications/virtue-ethics
Virtue Ethics
CHAPTER 12
THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
James Rachels and Stuart Rachels
Click to access james_rachels_and_stuart_rachels_virtue_ethics.pdf
Ethical Theories
The Arthur W. Page Center Public Relations Ethics
Penn State
Consumer Moral Leadership
January 2010
Sue L.T. Mcgregor
Mount Saint Vincent University
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267220449_Consumer_Moral_Leadership
Viewpoints which Matter 