This chapter shows the kind of difficulties philosophers face while ascertaining the meaning and the referent of the word ‘I’. While a general overview is presented of the linguistic analysis of the word ‘I’ both from Indian and Western philosophical sources, focus is made on the view of K.C. Bhattacharya, on his remarkable analysis of the various layers of subjectivity while he explores the meaning of the pronoun in first person singular number.
‘The Vanishing Subject: The Many Faces of Subjectivity’,
Rorty, AmÉlie Oksenberg,
in Joao Biehl, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman (eds), Subjectivity: Ethnographic Investigations (Oakland, CA, 2007; online edn, California Scholarship Online, 24 May 2012), https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520247925.003.0002, accessed 5 May 2024.
“We-Subjectivity”: Husserl on Community and Communal Constitution
Ronald McIntyre / California State University, Northridge
From Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl, ed. by Christel Fricke and Dagfinn Føllesdal, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2012, pp. 61-92.
SENSE, NONSENSE, and SUBJECTIVITY
MARKUS GABRIEL
Culture, tools, and subjectivity: The (re)construction of self.
Haste, H. (2014).
In T. Magioglou, Culture and political psychology: A societal perspective (pp. 27–48). IAP Information Age Publishing.
Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity
Cambridge University Press Online publication date: June 2012 Print publication year: 1990 Online ISBN: 9780511624827 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624827
This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte’s notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant’s accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argued that the subject has a self-positing structure which distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an activity rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhouser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self’s autonomy, or self-determination.
Higher-order theories are theories of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the property of there being something that it is like for one to have an experience. Something that it is like from the point of view of the organism. According to the higher-order approach, an organism is phenomenally conscious just in case it has an appropriate kind of inner awareness of itself as being in some mental state or other. So, when one consciously believes that Kentucky is south New York one is aware of oneself as believing that Kentucky is south of New York. Similarly, when one consciously sees red, or experiences fear, one is aware of oneself as seeing red or being afraid.
The relevant kind of inner awareness is what distinguishes the various kinds of higher-order theories. One might think that the right kind of inner awareness would be a kind of inner perception. Yet contemporary psychology and neuroscience do not seem to support the idea of a kind of inner sense. We do, in addition, become aware of things by thinking about them as being present. This has inspired the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, which was first explicitly developed in the 1990s.
There are many different kinds of higher-order thought theories. One version, the Relational Model, claims that the first-order state is transformed into a phenomenally conscious state when one becomes aware of that very state via having a higher-order thought. In addition, there are Joint-Determination Models which hold that the higher-order content and first-order content are part of the same mental state. These come in at least two varieties: the Same-Order Model and the Split-Level Model. These are distinguished by how they respond to worries about misrepresentation. In addition, there are Non-relational models which hold that the relevant higher-order state determines what it is like for one to have a conscious experience. Finally, there are non-standard higher-order theories that appeal to acquaintance or mental quotation.
This document discusses K.C. Bhattacharyya’s views on the problem of meaning and how they compare to analytical philosophers like Strawson and Russell. It summarizes that for Bhattacharyya, the subject cannot be meant by words like “I” as it has no objective content and varies between speakers, while objects are meant entities referred to by general terms. Strawson argues expressions only have reference in context of utterance, with “I” uniquely referring to the speaker, but for Bhattacharyya “I” expresses rather than refers to the subject. Overall, the document examines Bhattacharyya and analytical philosophers’ differing views on reference and meaning regarding subjective and objective contents.
Self and Subjectivity in Colonial India: AC Mukerji and KC Bhattcharyya
The Concept of Freedom and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya *
D.P. Chattopadhyaya Book The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy Edition 1st Edition First Published 2023 Imprint Routledge Pages 26 eBook ISBN 9781003153320
D.P. Chattopadhyaya’s (DPC’s) chapter aims to cover the concept of freedom in K.C. Bhattacharyya (KCB). “Unlike most of the contemporary approaches to freedom”, DPC suggests, “KCB’s approach is not mainly social, ethical or aesthetic. … His concept of freedom is basically ontological or metaphysical. Its dimensions range from the physical via the somatological and the psychological to the psychical and the spiritual. … [H]e describes the disclosive process of freedom in the world, in our relation to the world of objects, within the contexts of psychological and psychical subjectivity, and beyond them”. DPC identifies a conversation in KCB’s writings between three approaches or systems of freedom: the Vedāntic, Kantian and phenomenological approaches. He discusses these three trajectories and their amalgamation in KCB. DPC further depicts KCB’s phenomenological process of inwardization toward the subject as freedom. He touches on the role of the body in this process, and explains that “our body-feeling starts getting resolved into psychic feeling. This is a sort of anti-projective or regressive ‘withdrawal’ of consciousness within a deeper layer of itself. The feeling of detachment or disengagement from the object, in this case from the body, provides us the ‘first’ or an inarticulate taste of freedom”.
OVERVIEW The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyyas Philosophy is the only exhaustive exposition of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyyas seminal philosophical ideas. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, son of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, had the opportunity of a prolonged critical exposure to this unique tradition. This monograph deals with Krishnachandra Bhattacharyyas epistemic and metaphysical line of thought from the definite to the indefinite, from the objective level to the higher levels of subjectivity, and from association to dissociation or freedom leading to an alternation between knowledge and freedom. Both definiteness and indefiniteness have been identified. The two, however, do not have a coordinate status. There is an alternation between them. One and the same situation could be alternatively understood as definite or as indefinite. This leads to Krishnachandra Bhattacharyyas well-known philosophical position of Alternative Standpoints. The indefinite has to be made definite through layers of transcendental knowledge. The absolute-as-transcendental-knowledge is related to the understanding of the absolute-as-transcendental-will. The predatory outlook of the scientific intellect has been referred to and insightful correctives have been offered. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyyas style of writing is commensurate with the rigour and subtlety of his philosophy. The uninitiated requires a roadmap. This need is amply fulfilled by the present work. The monograph focuses on epistemology and metaphysics. The insights gained through this faithful commentary will help advanced readers to develop their own philosophical pursuits and the beginner will receive a good grounding.
CONTENTS Editors Note Preface Introduction by Shefali Moitra
The Definite and the Indefinite
The Indefinite as Subjective
Subjectivity as Freedom
Truth Freedom and Value as Alternative Absolutes Index
Feeling for Freedom: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Rasa.
Lopes, Dominic McIver (2019).
British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (4):465-477.
“Second Persons and the Constitution of the First Person”
Subject As Freedom (1930) is correctly regarded as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s magnum opus. But this text relies on a set of ideas and develops from a set of concerns that KCB develops more explicitly in essays written both before and after that text, which might be regarded as its intellectual bookends. These ideas are important and fascinating in their own right. They also illuminate KCB’s engagement with Kant and with the Vedānta tradition as well as his understanding of freedom itself, including its soteriological dimension. These two essays are” Sankara’s Doctrine of Māyā”(1930) and” The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance”(1936). We explore KCB’s conception of philosophy and its relation to spiritual practice through a close reading of these two essays.
“Know thyself,” advised the oracle at Delphi. “Show thyself,” is the motto of today. The prevalence of selfies, sexting, Facebook pics and stories, tweets and Twitters, and new apps, all demonstrate the transition from a personal and private self to a public, even pubic, self.
This cult of the self may have emerged remotely from Delphi and Socrates but accelerated in the late 19th and 20th centuries with many philosophers, psychologists, and social psychologists, some of whom are mentioned here. These are now left behind by activists and the identity politics of gender, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and color. The front-page news in The New York Times recently (22 May) was the latest battle in the culture wars: bathrooms! We can fight about anything! — and everything, and we do.
Who are you? What are you? What is your self? Most people, in my limited research on this topic, tend to identify in three principal ways: their familial roles, or their occupational roles or the defining characteristics of their personality (warm, strong, a survivor, romantic, adventurer, nurturing were common responses). (Thomas Kuhn’s Twenty Statements Test is more scientific.) And if you really don’t know who and what you are, the are plenty of personality tests to tell you, and perhaps some frenemies to explain precisely what is wrong with you.
Some adopt a more existential vision. One respondent identified herself as “a butterfly” and as “a river. I have to keep moving or I’d die.” Active, but hopefully not all downhill. Performers are particularly demonstrative on the self. The Beatles: “I am the walrus” (A very strange self-concept, drawn from Lewis Carroll. “I am the emu” sounds much better). Michael Jackson: “I’m a lover, not a fighter.” Paul Simon: “I am a rock. I am an island.” (John Donne disagreed: “No man is an island.”) And Nietzsche: “I am… the Anti-Christ.” (1992:72.)
All sorts of different self-definitions and identities. All sorts of different people and types of people. What is also fascinating is how many people have tried to define this self, without too much agreement. It is elusive not least because it is constantly changing as we age, and enjoy or suffer different experiences: marriage, parenthood, promotion, job-change, sickness, disability, conversion, discrimination, lotto-winner, etc. Indeed the self is so mobile that Peg O’Connor described the self as a “unicorn” — “there is no authentic self. Identity is always a work in progress” (2014:50). One does have an identity, but it is fluid. You are not going to France or Indonesia in your gap year to “find yourself.” You are taking your self with you! Others believe it is a chameleon, for similar reasons. So this search for this unicorn-chameleon, albeit brief, looks useful, even fun.
1. Sigmund Freud: Self as Iceberg.
Influenced by Charcot’s work on hypnotism and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, Freud came to understand that there are two types of mental processes, conscious and unconscious. And the unconscious is not easily accessed, but it is possible in therapy through dreams (in The Interpretation of Dreams) and the analysis of symbolism, and through parapraxes (in The Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life), which we now know as Freudian slips (verbal slips, slips of the pen or of the body, mislaying, misreading, forgetting, and errors generally). He gives numerous examples of these giveaways. These parapraxes are thought of as expressions of repressed psychic material. Also conversion: how psychic concerns can affect the physical self: a union, or communion, of mind and body. One friend said that whenever her husband was unfaithful, she got sick. They say that 90% of an iceberg is underwater. Freud suggested that much of the self is below consciousness, and that it was important to bring it to the conscious. Perhaps how much is below varies with degrees of repression.
Freud theorized the self far beyond the iceberg/unconscious to include the stages of psychosexual development (oral, anal, and phallic) and the stages of id, ego, and super-ego to include the many mechanisms of adaptation including fixation, regression, projection, repression, displacement, sublimation, transference, resistance (defense mechanisms), and more. While some of his contributions to self-understanding and to psychiatry have been contested, others have led to his being labeled among the top 10 intellectuals of the 20th century by Time magazine.
2. William James: Self as Multiple.
“A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.” But social selves may be contradictory, depending on the individuals. Your spouse will not have the same view of you as your ex-spouse. I think we can agree on that. And co-workers will not have the same image of him or her as the children do. But that is their concept of you, not your image of your self. So James does imply the possibility of contradictory, conflicting and multiple selves in the minds of others. Walt Whitman expressed this well: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well, then I contradict myself. / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)” As did American best-selling novelist Karin Slaughter. Here the protagonist, a rookie cop, debates shooting a villain:
The fifth Kate reared her ugly head. This Kate wanted darkness…Then the other Kates took over. She wasn’t sure which ones. The daughter? The widow? The cop? The whore? The real Kate, she wanted to think…The real Kate was a good person (2014:392).
So that makes six Kates in one; a double trinity, multiple personalities, and even conflicted and contradictory. Some of these images may be negative. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903) W.E.B. Du Bois pondered the question: “How does it feel to be a problem?” He explained that “being a problem is a strange experience – peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in boyhood and in Europe.” He added, “I remember well when the shadow swept across me. “ When as a “little thing” in school, a girl refused to accept his play visiting card. “Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others…shut out from their world by a vast veil.” Self as problem to self, and to others who create the problem.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. “One ever feels his two-ness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (ch. 1).
3. C.H. Cooley: Self as Looking-Glass
His couplet:
Each to each a looking-glass,
Reflects the other that doth pass.
The couplet reflects not only how poetic sociologists may be (don’t you love the “doth?”), but also their insight. Our idea of our selves is deeply influenced by what other people think of us or, strictly, what we think other people think of us. (True, the looking-glass is a flawed metaphor since it does not judge, unlike people.) This is especially true for our primary groups of intimate personal relations, the families of birth and our closest friendships. Significant others mirror us back to our selves, ranging from invective (crooked Hillary, crazy Bernie) to labelling (he’s a sexist, racist, fascist) to positive reinforcement (you’re the best) and high self-esteem to narcissism (I’m the best!). But there are many mirrors, all with different reflections, so figuring out who or what the self is would be tricky; indeed this self too would be multiple and contradictory.
Cooley perhaps under-estimated the degree to which we can refuse to internalize and can resist these looking-glass reflections which may problematize us, as Du Bois made clear. Distorting mirrors reflect us, badly. And much as mirrors may influence us, they do not determine us. One can fight back, resist the reflection, smash the mirror, as Frederick Douglass showed. Reflecting on his victory over an overseer when he was a slave, Douglass wrote: “The battle with Mr. Covey… was the turning point in my “life as a slave.”… I was a changed being after that fight. I was nothing before — I was a man now” (1962:143). A new self. Dramatic identity change.
4. G. H. Mead: Self as Structure
“The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience” (1967: 140). Mead reflects both James and Cooley, but perhaps goes beyond them in his emphasis that the self is not only a reflection but is essentially a product, and reflexive. One can think about other people’s ideas about oneself, and react against them, like Douglass, (the boomerang effect,) or double-down and reinforce them, (the self-fulfilling prophecy). Yet Mead distinguishes between the core, the “me”, as object, developed out of past experiences and understandings, and the “I,” the sometimes impulsive subject, generating new ideas and new selves. So the self is both both solid and fluid.
5. Abraham Maslow: Self as Flower
Maslow is well known for moving psychology away from Freud to Humanistic Psychology: “It is as if Freud supplied us with the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half.” (Not a very generous verdict!) He is also well-known for his “hierarchy of needs” which should be satisfied for optimal psychic health. The self in this view is like a flower, potentially growing into full bloom. The seven needs are: 1) physiological: warmth, food, etc. for the baby; 2) safety needs; 3) psychological needs: love, belonging; 4) esteem needs: self-satisfaction; 5) cognitive needs: education, skills; 6) aesthetic needs: harmony, order; 7) self-actualization: maturity, joy, creativity. The process is not automatic, like an elevator, but it can be linked to changes in the life cycle as discussed by Eric Erikson, Daniel Levinson, George Vaillant, and Gail Sheehy.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre: Self as Self-Creative
“Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.” (1957:15). Rejecting any traditional, essentialist idea of human nature, Sartre adds: “In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom” (p.23). To clarify: “You are nothing less than your life” (p.33) combining all your projects, actions, and choices. We are who and what we make our selves to be. We create our selves. If we persistently cheat, we become cheats. The meaning of our lives is the meaning we give it. Again: “Man makes himself” (p.43). There is a choice of ethics, and a freedom to choose, whether we want it or not. Hence his idea that “man is condemned to be free” (p.23). He insists that “life has no meaning a priori. Before you come alive, life is nothing; it’s up to you to give it a meaning…” (p.43). The self, in his view, is not an iceberg, nor a passive reflection, nor a flower that may grow; it is what we make it. But it is somewhat atomistic.
Two dissenting opinions are worth noting. Schopenhauer insists on luck as the prevailing wind. That would include the luck of parents, genetics, country of birth, status, war, plague, etc.: pure chance, no freedom there.
A man’s life is like the voyage of a ship, where luck…acts the part of the wind, and speeds the vessel on its way or drives it far out of its course. All that a man can do for himself is of little avail; like the rudder, which if worked hard and continuously, may help in the navigation of the ship; and yet all may be lost again by a sudden squall (n.d.:169)
He was a bit of a pessimist: “We are like lambs in a field, disporting ourselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey.” (n.d. 382)
The second opinion, of a physicist, is also deterministic, not luck but neurons, but less pessimistic:
We have 100 billion neurons in our brains, as many as there are stars in a galaxy, with an even more astronomical number of links and potential combinations through which they can interact… “We” are the process formed by this entire intricacy, not just by the little bit of it of which we are conscious (in Lapham, 2016:17).
7. Self as Onion
We might think of others, or ourselves, as like onions, layer upon layer, level upon level, or as a many-sided diamond, or like those Russian dolls, the matryoshka, one inside another, inside another. Someone might say: “I’ve never seen this side of you before!” (self as polygon). The novelist Dick Francis described this layering:
I was amazed by his compassion and felt I should have recognised earlier how many unexpected layers there were to Tremayne below the loud executive exterior: not just his love of horses, not just his need to be recorded, not even his disguised delight in Gareth [his son], but other, secret, unrevealed privacies…(1990:50).
But the funniest has to be Shrek. Ogres are like onions, not layer-cakes.
This model is indicated by the phrase “hidden depths” (wherein monsters may lurk) and reflects the notion that one may not really know someone, just the Goffmanesque presentations of the different selves acting in different roles and circumstances, which may be camouflage and masks. But the better one gets to know someone under very different circumstances, the more clearly one can see different selves emerging — or not. The self may be remarkably opaque, not only to the self, as Freud indicated, but also to others.
Two classic examples are Kim Philby and Bernie Madoff. They were not who they seemed to be. Shakespeare got it, as Julius Caesar mused: “One may smile and smile and be a villain.” And as Lady Macbeth instructed her husband: “Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under it.” It took years before investigators “uncovered” who Philby and Madoff were — and their double lives, double selves. “Uncovering” indicates the utility of this onion/layer metaphor.
In a less lethal application, spouses may take years to realize (and hopefully appreciate more and more) who and what their beloved “really” is. (Not as in the comic phrase: “deep down you’re shallow”). Onions do not have cores as dates and avocados do, so the metaphor is somewhat inadequate, but it does capture the layering.
Winston Churchill expressed this well speaking of Russia: “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” (Much like their nesting dolls.) Banyan in the Economist just applied exactly the same phrase to China (2 July 2016:36). The journalist Kim Barker wrote something similar about India: “India was a series of challenges wrapped up in a mystical blanket covered in an existential quandary” (2016:82-3). It seems that we do not know each other very well.
8. Self as Identity
Our self-concept is our identity, but identities are socially constructed according to cultural norms, which are not universal. Consider Barack Obama, widely described as the first black President of the USA, in accord with American norms, specifically in the tradition of the “one-drop” rule. But his mother was white. In accord with another possible rule, “one drop of white blood,” he would be considered white. He is really a shade of brown, anyway, and would be described as such in many other cultures, more sensitive to shades of color.
James McBride offers a classic example. His father was black, his mother white. He remarks about his 11 siblings: “We were all clearly black, of various shades of brown, some light brown, some medium brown, some very light-skinned, and all of us had curly hair” (1997:22). The usual confusion of chromatic and social color. The terms “black” and “white” are symbolic, cultural, and political. Malcolm X noted: “…when he says he’s white, he means he’s boss. That’s right. That’s what white means in this language.” (1966:163).
Then again, Rachel Dolezal exemplifies the issue of who defines us. The daughter of white parents, she identified as black, darkened her hair and her skin and passed as black for years, and worked for the NAACP; but when her parentage became known, her self-defined identity was largely rejected by others as a lie and a fraud. She defended herself insisting that her identity was not biological, but presumably political or psychological. Color identity is seemingly problematic.
Consider too how gender identities have suddenly been spotlighted, most publicly by Caitlin Jenner. We used to recognize two genders, biologically defined and immutable; now we recognize that they are psychologically defined and are mutable. India, however, recognizes three on visa applications. Other cultures also recognize three. As do some individuals who refuse to be labeled male or female. If even such apparently basic identities as color and gender are culturally constructed, not to mention age, beauty, and more, then so, clearly, are ideas of the self. Identity is slippery.
9 & 10. Self as Unicorn and Chameleon
In sum, the self is both unicorn and chameleon. From the fog or flashlight brilliance of identity, theorists we might conclude that the self is a unicorn since it is partly unknown, even unknowable because it is so below consciousness and “in progress”; and a chameleon because it is multiple, mutable, adaptable, and selective in presentation. These selves may be complementary, contradictory, or conflicted.
So while the self is constantly presented to numerous “friends,” it is itself both one and many: unicorn and chameleon, iceberg and onion, a mask and camouflage, a flower and what you create, a looking-glass and a distorting mirror, fluid, a work in progress, a polygon with hidden depths and many layers. Given all these ideas and models, I suspect that there are not many selves who are an “open book.” If nothing else, the self and other selves are: “Surprise!” “Know thyself” is hard enough. Know someone else… really?
Yet surely all this fixation with the self is a trifle unhealthy — me! me! me! — since it may vitiate against community, and concern with and for others: a cultural narcissism.
References
Barker, Kim 2016. Whiskey, Tango, Foxtrot. New York: Anchor.
Douglass, Frederick. 1962 [1892]. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass. London: Collier-Macmillan.
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1995 [1903]. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Signet.
Francis, Dick 1990. Long Shot. London: Michael Joseph.
Lapham, Lewis H. 2016 “Dame Fortune” Lapham’s Quarterly Summer 13-19.
McBride, James 1997. The Color of Water. A Black Man’s Tribute to his White Mother. New York: Riverhead Books.
Mead, G.H. 1967 [1934]. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich 1992 [1888]. Ecce Homo. Penguin Classics.
O’Connor, Peg 2014. “Searching for the Self, and Other Unicorns.” Psychology Today Nov/Dec 50-1.
Sartre, J-P. 1957. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: The Wisdom Library.
Schopenhauer, Arthur n.d. Essays. New York: Burt.
Slaughter, Karin 2014. Cop Town. New York: Delacorte.
X, Malcolm 1966. Malcolm X Speaks. New York: Grove Press.
Theories of Individual Social Development
Source: Ch 5: Theories of Individual Social Development
Freud’s Theory of the Id, Ego & Superego
Jean Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Carol Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development
George Herbert Mead: The Self, ”Me” & ”I”
Erikson’s Stages of Psychosocial Development: Theory & Examples
Freud’s Structure of Personality
Let’s talk about the id, the ego and the superego, the three parts of the structure of personality and a theory that was developed by Sigmund Freud. He’s probably someone you’ve heard of; he’s a pretty famous psychologist from the late 19th early 20th centuries. While his theory of personalities is outdated, it was monumental in influencing how we think about personality today.
When you think of Freud, you might think about going into therapy and lying down on a couch, telling your therapist about your problems. But if someone goes into therapy today, the therapist isn’t going to say ‘Oh, of course! Aha! It’s the id, the ego and the superego. They’re just not talking to each other right. Nevertheless, these three personality parts have entered the mainstream understanding of how we think about internal conflict.
Let’s think about an average person who’s pushed and pulled in lots of directions by different drives, like sex and food, but also ethics and a wish to maintain a healthy body. These drives are pushing them and pulling them in different directions, and maybe they’re not even aware.
This is the idea of internal conflict. It’s the conflict between basic desires (the id), morality and being a good person (the superego) and consciousness (the ego.)
The Id
So first let’s start with the id. This is an unconscious part of your personality. It is basically the childish and impulsive part of you that just does what it wants, and it wants things really intensely and doesn’t really think about the consequences. Freud describes this as operating on a pleasure principle, which essentially means what it sounds like, which is that it’s always seeking to try to increase pleasure and decrease pain.
Now, as an example of this, let’s say you come home and you find to your delight that your roommate has baked a cake. Your id would think ‘Oh! I want that cake right now! That looks delicious!’ You know your roommate’s not going to be happy if you eat it, so first, you eat a little piece of the corner, and then you have to cut yourself a slice so it doesn’t look disgusting, and then soon enough you’ve eaten the whole thing; it’s gone.
How did you manage to eat the whole cake? Blame your id for taking over. That’s what your id aims to do in life. It wants you to eat whole cakes because it wants you to increase pleasure. Cakes are going to make you feel good – why not eat the whole thing? Now, what it also wants to do is decrease pain. So let’s say you wake up the next morning and you think, ‘Oh no, I just ate a whole cake. That’s really bad, maybe I’ll get some exercise.’ You think to yourself about how you will go hiking in the mountains all day, and you tell yourself, ‘Alright, let’s get some exercise!’ No, your id says, ‘That’s not gonna happen; that’s gonna hurt. We don’t want to do that.’ So if you’re totally id driven, you’d basically eat the whole cake and then you would not go hiking the next day to burn off the calories. That’s the pleasure principle.
The Superego
Now, we usually don’t eat whole cakes and lay on the couch all day every day. What helps to control the rampaging id? There is another part of your personality that’s mainly unconscious, and it’s the superego. The superego is the part of you that’s super judgmental and moralizing and is always trying to get you to behave in a socially appropriate way. Now let’s see what the superego would do if you come home and you find the cake.
If the superego is in charge, you wouldn’t eat the cake at all. You’d still think it looks delicious and want to eat it, but the superego would say, ‘No, it’s my roommate’s cake. I’m not gonna eat this cake!’ Remember, the superego wants you to behave morally and appropriately, and it’s not that socially appropriate to eat other people’s baked goods.
But, let’s imagine that your id takes over, so you do eat the cake. The same thing happens: you eat a little bit, you eat a little bit more, and somehow you end up eating it all. But now your superego jumps back into action. What happens now that you already ate the cake? Guilt is what’s going to happen. Your superego makes you feel really guilty when you do things that are not socially appropriate.
What do you do now? If your superego is in control again, you would certainly go jogging, but you would also apologize to your roommate and bake them a new cake, maybe an even better one than before. The superego controls our sense of right and wrong. We feel bad when we do things that are wrong, and we feel good when we do things that are right, and that’s what the superego controls.
Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Introduction
Mark, a two-year-old, and Ally, an eight-year-old, are sitting at the table waiting for a snack. Their mom presents them each with a cup of juice, the same amount in each cup. Mark begins to cry and point, saying ‘You gave her more.’ Mark’s mom tries to reason with the young child, explaining that the same amount of juice is in each cup, but he is insistent that he is being treated unfairly. What is happening in this situation? In this lesson, we will learn about the stages of cognitive development while watching Mark proceed through infancy to adolescence.
Jean Piaget proposed stages of cognitive development through which children and adolescents proceed based on maturation and experience. They are: sensorimotor stage, preoperational stage, concrete operations and formal operations.
Sensorimotor Intelligence and Preoperational Thinking
The first two sequential stages deal with the cognitive development of infants and young children. They are sensorimotor intelligence and preoperational (prelogical) intelligence.
The sensorimotor intelligence stage occurs from birth to approximately 1-2 years. In the child’s first year, the processes of intelligence are both presymbolic and preverbal. For the infant, the meaning of an object involves what can be done with it. These actions include pushing, opening, pulling, closing and so forth. In the second year of life, the young child develops the identity of his or her own body and others in time and space. The infant develops action schemes, such as reaching for an object or grasping something or pulling it towards them. At this stage of development, Mark can pull a string to reach the object at the end of it. He can pull a blanket to get an out-of-reach toy and so on. Another example is Mark putting objects into his mouth to determine the shape and structure. This is something that many infants and young toddlers do.
Our next stage is preoperational thinking. This occurs from around 2-3 years to approximately 7 years of age. Partially logical thinking or thought begins during these years. For example, the child recognizes that water poured from one container to another is the same water. However, the child reasons only from one specific item of information to another and makes decisions based on perceptual cues. Preoperational thinking can and usually is illogical. For example, Mark, based on his perceptions, thought that the taller, slender glass had more juice in it than the shorter, wider glass that he received. In other words, perceptual cues, such as the height of the juice in the glass, dominate the child’s judgment. Also, children in this stage have difficulty accepting another person’s perspective or point of view. Piaget referred to this as egocentrism.
Concrete Operational and Formal Operational Thinking
The basic units of logical thinking are particular kinds of cognitive activity that Piaget referred to as operations. The two levels of logical thinking identified by Piaget are concrete operational and formal operational thinking.
The concrete operational stage occurs from around 7-8 years of age to 12-14 or older. Concrete operational thinking is linked to the direct manipulation of objects. It involves situations that require an understanding of simultaneous changes in multiple characteristics of objects. An example is flattening a ball of clay into a hot dog shape – as the shape becomes longer, it also becomes thinner.
The child at the level of concrete operational thinking can demonstrate the following:
A transformation in one feature or characteristic of a situation is exactly balanced by a transformation in another characteristic.
The essential nature of the object or data remains consistent.
The transformation in the object can be returned to the original form by an opposite or inverse action.
Let’s discuss these more specifically and put some terms in. The capability of recognizing the unchanging characteristic of an object is referred to as conservation. The child can demonstrate conservation by returning the object to its original form or organization. For example, Mark has a ball of clay. It’s first in a ball shape. He can flatten it out. He understands now that the same amount of clay exists whether it’s in the ball form or the flat form. This is conservation.
Moral Decision
At some point in your life, you’ve probably been faced with a moral dilemma. Consider this example: a father tells his daughter, Lauren, that she can have a bike if she saves enough money from her weekly allowance to pay for half of it. Finally, when Lauren tells her father she’s saved up all the money, her father gives her the other half and tells her to buy her bike. Lauren goes to the store to buy her bike and sees the one she’s been saving up for is on sale, so she will have money left over. She deliberates if she should return the extra money to her father or keep it and not tell him. They both kept their end of the agreement, so the extra money is a bonus surprise, but if she doesn’t tell him, it feels like she’s deceiving him.
Lawrence Kohlberg: Stages of Moral Development
Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was especially interested in how children develop their ability to make moral decisions like this one. He came up with several stages of moral development, which, though not without criticism from other psychologists, form a good starting point to think about these questions. It is important to remember that not everyone, even adults, necessarily make it into all of the higher stages.
Pre-Conventional Level
People first pass through two stages known collectively as the pre-conventional level. In the first stage, people are motivated by trying to avoid punishment; their actions are bad if they get punished and good if they don’t. In this stage, Lauren would give her father the money because she doesn’t want him to punish her.
At the second stage, people are motivated purely by self-interest. Lauren at this stage would likely keep the money, thinking that, even if she has the bike, she can’t use it unless she can buy a helmet.
Conventional Level
The next level of moral development, the conventional, also contains two stages. Adolescents typically operate at this level, as do some adults. In stage three, people make moral decisions based on getting people to like them. Lauren might decide to give her father the money because this will improve her relationship with him; but if her mother is upset that her father spent money they needed for bills, she might decide to give the money to her mother in order to be a ‘good girl’ in her eyes. Her decision would be based on whichever social relationship seemed most important.
In stage four, moral reasoning centers around maintaining a functioning society by recognizing that laws are more important than individual needs. In this stage, Lauren probably would give her father the extra money because not doing so, in her eyes, equates to stealing from her family.
Carol Gilligan: Moral Development
A community of moles gives shelter to a homeless porcupine. The moles, however, are constantly stabbed by the porcupine’s quills. What should they do?
This scenario was used to aid in the development of a theory that argued women and men may have differing paths to moral development. This lesson will introduce and apply that theory, developed by Carol Gilligan.
The field of moral development encompasses prosocial behavior, such as altruism, caring and helping, along with traits such as honesty, fairness, and respect. Many theories of moral development have been proposed, but this lesson will focus on the specific theory proposed by Psychologist Carol Gilligan.
Gilligan was a student of Developmental Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who introduced the theory of stages of moral development. Gilligan, however, felt as though her mentor’s theory did not adequately address the gender differences of moral development due to the fact that participants in Kohlberg’s study were predominately male and because his theory did not include the caring perspective.
Gilligan argued that males and females are often socialized differently, and females are more apt than males to stress interpersonal relationships and take responsibility for the well-being of others. Gilligan suggested this difference is due to the child’s relationship with the mother and that females are traditionally taught a moral perspective that focuses on community and caring about personal relationships.
Care-Based Morality & Justice-Based Morality
Gilligan proposed the Stages of the Ethics of Care theory, which addresses what makes actions ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Gilligan’s theory focused on both care-based morality and justice-based morality.
Care-based morality is based on the following principles:
Emphasizes interconnectedness and universality.
Acting justly means avoiding violence and helping those in need.
Care-based morality is thought to be more common in girls because of their connections to their mothers.
Because girls remain connected to their mothers, they are less inclined to worry about issues of fairness.
Justice-based morality is based on the following principles:
Views the world as being composed of autonomous individuals who interact with another.
Acting justly means avoiding inequality.
Is thought to be more common in boys because of their need to differentiate between themselves and their mothers.
Because they are separated from their mothers, boys become more concerned with the concept of inequality.
Returning to our mole/porcupine scenario, researchers found individuals approached the problem with two perspectives: justice-based morality or care-based morality. Gender differences were also evident.
Individuals with a justice-based perspective tend to see any dilemma as a conflict between different claims. The moles want one thing; the porcupine wants something incompatible. They can’t both have a valid claim on the burrow, so only one of them can be right. A solution to the dilemma is not a resolution of the conflict; it’s a verdict, in which one side gets everything and the other side gets nothing.
The care-based perspective approaches the problem differently. Rather than seeing all the parties as separate individuals with their own valid or invalid claims, it sees them as already in a difficult situation together. If there is a conflict between them, that is part of the problem. The point is not to decide the conflict one way or the other but to find a way to get around it or remove it. This perspective starts from the particular case and the actual people within it and hopes to find a solution that will not damage anyone. It will be ready to embrace compromise and creative solutions.
Researchers have found a tendency for males to adopt the justice perspective and for females to be more likely than males to adopt the caring perspective.
Stages of Ethics of Care
George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Self
In sociological conceptions of the Self, the development of the Self is examined in the context of social phenomena like socialization. George Herbert Mead, an American sociologist, pioneered an essential theory in sociology. The mentality is viewed by George Herbert Mead’s theory as an individual’s incorporation of the collective. Mead used a social process to describe the person and the mind. A person’s body takes in gestures and the collective sentiments of others and responds accordingly with other structured mindsets that are also absorbed by the human organism.
Mead’s theory of self refers to this as the “I” and the “me” phase. The “I” is the answer to the “me,” which is the interpersonal Self. Put another way, “I” is a person’s reaction to other people’s emotions, whereas “me” is the ordered set of those perceptions that one acquires. How one assumes one’s organization sees oneself is what one refers to as the “me,” which is the total of the “generalized other“. The “I” stands for a person’s feelings and instincts. Self-as-subject and self-as-object are synonymous in the “I.” The “I” is the one who knows, and the “me” is the one who is being understood. “I” and “me” are constantly interacting, and this interaction is what we refer to as the “stream of thought.” The human cognition concept is based on these processes, which go beyond the idea of selfhood in a restricted sense. Mead sees the internal debate between “I” and “me” as the thinking process.
Mead’s “I” and “me,” when viewed as a synthesis of the “I” and the “me,” reveal a profoundly social nature. In Mead’s view, a person’s place in a community is more important than individuality. Being aware of one’s self-consciousness can only come about when one has actively participated in various social roles.
According to Mead and Charles Cooley, the Self is determined by people’s social interactions. How one appears to others determines one’s social identity, or looking-glass self (a term coined by Cooley). In other words, the stage is attached to the concept of developing self. Cooley’s assertions about the social development of children formed the basis of this initial theory. People get the most direct feedback about themselves from the responses of others to their actions. This idea means that solitary activities cannot contribute to the development of the Self as it requires external interactions.
As per Cooley and Mead, self-identity is formed in three phases. First, people perceive how they look in the eyes of others. Additionally, individuals imagine how others judge them by relying on looks and how they display themselves. Finally, individuals perceive how others feel about them due to the moral judgments they create.
However, Heinz Kohut, a psychologist from the United States, proposed a bipolar self, which he claimed was composed of two processes of narcissistic brilliance, one of which contained goals and the other constituted ideals. The narcissistic Self, according to Kohut, seems to be the pinnacle of aspiration. He referred to the idealized parental image as the pole of standards. According to Kohut, the two poles of Self portray the regular advancement of a child’s psychic life.
On the other hand, according to Jungian theory, the Self is one of several archetypes. It’s a metaphor for a person’s entire mind, including their subconscious and conscious thoughts, defined by Jung as the procedure of combining one’s personality that leads to the Self.
What is the Role of Self in the Socialization Process?
In both Cooley and Mead’s view, a person’s identity is formed through self-socialization. For anyone to develop a precise self-image, self-socialization provides an opportunity to reflect and contend with themselves.
Developing an image of oneself predicated on how one thinks or appears to others is known as the “looking-glass self”. Through one’s reactions to a behavior, other people serve as a reflector, referring to others the image they project. In Mead’s view, the first step is to see oneself as others do.
Sociological theories of Self attempt to describe how social processes like socialization impact the growth of the Self. It is common to use the concept of “self-concept” to describe how an individual views, assesses and interprets their own identity. To have a notion of oneself is to be self-aware.
Mead believed that the Self is formed through the child’s interactions with those around them. The newborn child’s needs, including clothes and food, are pressing and must be met. The mother meets these needs, and the baby develops a strong emotional attachment to her and grows to rely heavily on her.
According to Mead’s theory, as the child grows older, they separate from their mother and must learn to submit to the mother’s authority over them. The child then repeats this for their dad. They distinguish the father from the mother before assimilating him into society. In this sense, the child’s number of significant others grows, and the child integrates the role of such others in their development. Using his own words, the child responds to them and behaves according to what they mean to the other individual.
Mead’s Theory of Self: Development of Self
Mead held the notion that humans form their self-images via connections with others. He contended that the Self results from society’s experience, which would be the part of a person’s personality that includes self-awareness or self-image. Mead laid out three concepts on how one’s Self grows:
Language
Symbols are exchanged in social interactions. According to Mead, language and other symbolic representations are uniquely human in how they carry sense. Therefore, the best way to understand others is to imagine the scenario from their point of view first. He formulated the term “taking the other’s role” to describe the way people perceive themselves concerning others. When children are in this phase, they begin to mimic their surroundings. Because of this, parents usually avoid using foul language in front of their children.
Play
At this stage, children assume and break the rules of structured games such as sports or freeze tag. Playing along with whatever rules they create throughout the game will be much more convenient than enforcing guidelines on them. Here, children pretend that they are the ones they love. As a result, they attempt to be their mothers and fathers when they role-play.
Forming Psychological Identities / Erik Erikson
What are Erikson’s stages of development? Learn about Erikson life stages, psychosocial development theory, and the history and contributions to the theory.
How do we develop an identity, or a sense of self? Psychologists have many theories. One, named Erik Erikson, believed that we work on constructing psychosocial identities throughout our whole lives. By ‘psychosocial,’ he meant an interplay between our inner, emotional lives (psycho), and our outer, social circumstances (social).
Erikson believed that as we grow and age, we pass through eight stages of development. He thought that each stage was defined by a specific conflict between a pair of opposing impulses or behaviors. The resolution (or inability to resolve) these conflicts affects our personalities and identities.
Erikson defines four childhood stages and three adult stages, bridged together by one stage of adolescence. We’ll go through each stage and define it by its central conflict, as well we give some examples of behaviors and patterns of thinking characteristic of the stage.
Oral-Sensory Stage
The first is the oral-sensory stage, encompassing the first year of life and defined by a conflict between trust and mistrust. Infants during this time learn to trust their parents if they’re reliably cared for and fed; if not, if they’re neglected or abused, they’ll develop mistrust instead. Infants at this stage either learn that they can trust others to fulfill their needs, or that they can’t, that the world is a dangerous and unreliable place.
Muscular-Anal Stage
The second stage is called muscular-anal and defined by the conflict between autonomy and shame and doubt. Parents who allow their toddlers, between the ages of about 1-3, to explore their surroundings and develop interests of their own help to foster a sense of autonomy. But parents who are too restrictive or cautious with their children can instead leave them with doubt about their abilities. Like learning mistrust instead of trust, this can have longstanding consequences.
Locomotor Stage
A related conflict between initiative and guilt defines the next stage, the locomotor stage. Children in this stage, between the ages of three and six, need to develop initiative, or independent decision-making, about planning and doing various activities. If they are not encouraged to do this, or if their efforts are dismissed, they may learn to feel guilt instead about their desire for independence.
Latency
The last childhood stage is called latency and is defined by a conflict between industry and inferiority. Children in this stage are between the ages of six and twelve, and during this time are starting to gain real adult skills like reading, writing and logic. If they’re encouraged, they’ll develop industry, or motivation to keep learning and practicing; they’ll start to want to be productive instead of just wanting to play. Children who aren’t encouraged to work hard at learning new skills will instead feel inferior and unmotivated.
Adolescence
Variations on the self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
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Dialogs and Dialectics
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Summary: Carol Dweck and others have Identified two implicit theories of intelligence. Those learners who have an “entity” theory view intelligence as being an unchangeable, fixed internal characteristic. Those who have an “incremental” theory believe that their intelligence is malleable and can be increased through effort.
Originators: Carol Dweck, based on over 30 years of research on belief systems, and their role in motivation and achievement.
Key Terms: entity theory, incremental theory
Self-Theories (Dweck)
Carol Dweck (currently at Indiana University) describes a series of empirically-based studies that investigate how people develop beliefs about themselves (i.e., self-theories) and how these self-theories create their psychological worlds, shaping thoughts, feelings and behaviors[1]. The theories reveal why some students are motivated to work harder, and why others fall into patterns of helplessness and are self-defeating. Dweck’s conclusions explore the implications for the concept of self-esteem, suggesting a rethinking of its role in motivation, and the conditions that foster it. She demonstrated empirically that students who hold an entity theory of intelligence are less likely to attempt challenging tasks and are at risk for academic underachievement[1][2].
Students carry two types of views on ability/intelligence:
Entity View – This view (those who are called “Entity theorists”) treats intelligence as fixed and stable. These students have a high desire to prove themselves to others; to be seen as smart and avoid looking unintelligent.
Incremental View – This view treats intelligence as malleable, fluid, and changeable. These students see satisfaction coming from the process of learning and often see opportunities to get better. They do not focus on what the outcome will say about them, but what they can attain from taking part in the venture.
Entity theorists are susceptible to learned helplessness because they may feel that circumstances are outside their control (i.e. there’s nothing that could have been done to make things better), thus they may give up easily. As a result, they may simply avoid situations or activities that they perceive to be challenging (perhaps through procrastination, absenteeism, etc.). Alternatively, they may purposely choose extremely difficult tasks so that they have an excuse for failure. Ultimately, they may stop trying altogether. Because success (or failure) is often linked to what is perceived as a fixed amount of intelligence rather than effort (e.g., the belief that “I did poorly because I’m not a smart person”), students may think that failure implies a natural lack of intelligence. Dweck found that students with a long history of success may be the most vulnerable for developing learned helplessness because they may buy into the entity view of intelligence more readily than those with less frequent success[1].
Those with an incremental view (“Incremental theorists”) when faced with failure, react differently: these students desire to master challenges, and therefore adopt a mastery-oriented pattern. They immediately began to consider various ways that they could approach the task differently, and they increase their efforts. Unlike Entity theorists, Incremental theorists believe that effort, through increased learning and strategy development, will actually increase their intelligence.
Carol Dweck’s book: Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. Dweck explains how to achieve success — and how approaching problems with a fixed vs. growth mindset makes a big difference. Praising intelligence and ability doesn’t foster self-esteem and lead to accomplishment, but may actually jeopardize success. This book is an excllent read for helping people motivate their children and reach one’s one personal and professional goals.
References
Dweck, C. S. (2000). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. (2006). Mindset: The new psychology of success. Random House.
The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of articles that address questions across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience. Research on the topic of self has increased significantly in recent years in all of these areas. In philosophy and some areas of cognitive science, the emphasis on embodied cognition has fostered a renewed interest in rethinking personal identity, mind-body dualism, and overly Cartesian conceptions of self. Poststructuralist deconstructions of traditional metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity have led to debates about whether there are any grounds (moral if not metaphysical) for reconstructing the notion of self. Questions about whether selves actually exist or have an illusory status have been raised from perspectives as diverse as neuroscience, Buddhism, and narrative theory. With respect to self-agency, similar questions arise in experimental psychology. In addition, advances in developmental psychology have pushed to the forefront questions about the ontogenetic origin of self-experience, while studies of psychopathology suggest that concepts like self and agency are central to explaining important aspects of pathological experience. These and other issues motivate questions about how we understand, not only the self, but also how we understand ourselves in social and cultural contexts.
This article examines the historical conception of the words self and person in philosophical theory. It discusses John Locke’s definition of the self as the conscious thinking thing and the person as a thinking intelligent being. It describes the Platonist view of the self as spiritual substance and Aristotelian belief that the self is a hylomorphic substance. It also explores the relevant topics of Epicureanism atomism, Cartesian dualism, and the developmental and social origin of self-concepts.
“A Contrast of Individualistic and Social Theories of the Self”,
George Herbert Mead.
Section 29 in Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Edited by Charles W. Morris). Chicago: University of Chicago (1934): 222-226 .
Understand the difference between psychological and sociological theories of self-development
Explain the process of moral development
When we are born, we have a genetic makeup and biological traits. However, who we are as human beings develops through social interaction. Many scholars, both in the fields of psychology and in sociology, have described the process of self-development as a precursor to understanding how that “self” becomes socialized.
Psychological Perspectives on Self-Development
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was one of the most influential modern scientists to put forth a theory about how people develop a sense of self. He believed that personality and sexual development were closely linked, and he divided the maturation process into psychosexual stages: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital. He posited that people’s self-development is closely linked to early stages of development, like breastfeeding, toilet training, and sexual awareness (Freud 1905).
According to Freud, failure to properly engage in or disengage from a specific stage results in emotional and psychological consequences throughout adulthood. An adult with an oral fixation may indulge in overeating or binge drinking. An anal fixation may produce a neat freak (hence the term “anal retentive”), while a person stuck in the phallic stage may be promiscuous or emotionally immature. Although no solid empirical evidence supports Freud’s theory, his ideas continue to contribute to the work of scholars in a variety of disciplines.
Sociology or Psychology: What’s the Difference?
You might be wondering: if sociologists and psychologists are both interested in people and their behavior, how are these two disciplines different? What do they agree on, and where do their ideas diverge? The answers are complicated, but the distinction is important to scholars in both fields.
As a general difference, we might say that while both disciplines are interested in human behavior, psychologists are focused on how the mind influences that behavior, while sociologists study the role of society in shaping behavior. Psychologists are interested in people’s mental development and how their minds process their world. Sociologists are more likely to focus on how different aspects of society contribute to an individual’s relationship with his world. Another way to think of the difference is that psychologists tend to look inward (mental health, emotional processes), while sociologists tend to look outward (social institutions, cultural norms, interactions with others) to understand human behavior.
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the first to make this distinction in research, when he attributed differences in suicide rates among people to social causes (religious differences) rather than to psychological causes (like their mental wellbeing) (Durkheim 1897). Today, we see this same distinction. For example, a sociologist studying how a couple gets to the point of their first kiss on a date might focus her research on cultural norms for dating, social patterns of sexual activity over time, or how this process is different for seniors than for teens. A psychologist would more likely be interested in the person’s earliest sexual awareness or the mental processing of sexual desire.
Sometimes sociologists and psychologists have collaborated to increase knowledge. In recent decades, however, their fields have become more clearly separated as sociologists increasingly focus on large societal issues and patterns, while psychologists remain honed in on the human mind. Both disciplines make valuable contributions through different approaches that provide us with different types of useful insights.
Psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) created a theory of personality development based, in part, on the work of Freud. However, Erikson believed the personality continued to change over time and was never truly finished. His theory includes eight stages of development, beginning with birth and ending with death. According to Erikson, people move through these stages throughout their lives. In contrast to Freud’s focus on psychosexual stages and basic human urges, Erikson’s view of self-development gave credit to more social aspects, like the way we negotiate between our own base desires and what is socially accepted (Erikson 1982).
Jean Piaget (1896–1980) was a psychologist who specialized in child development who focused specifically on the role of social interactions in their development. He recognized that the development of self evolved through a negotiation between the world as it exists in one’s mind and the world that exists as it is experienced socially (Piaget 1954). All three of these thinkers have contributed to our modern understanding of self-development.
Sociological Theories of Self-Development
One of the pioneering contributors to sociological perspectives was Charles Cooley (1864–1929). He asserted that people’s self understanding is constructed, in part, by their perception of how others view them—a process termed “the looking glass self” (Cooley 1902).
Later, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) studied the self, a person’s distinct identity that is developed through social interaction. In order to engage in this process of “self,” an individual has to be able to view him or herself through the eyes of others. That’s not an ability that we are born with (Mead 1934). Through socialization we learn to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes and look at the world through their perspective. This assists us in becoming self-aware, as we look at ourselves from the perspective of the “other.” The case of Danielle, for example, illustrates what happens when social interaction is absent from early experience: Danielle had no ability to see herself as others would see her. From Mead’s point of view, she had no “self.”
How do we go from being newborns to being humans with “selves?” Mead believed that there is a specific path of development that all people go through. During the preparatory stage, children are only capable of imitation: they have no ability to imagine how others see things. They copy the actions of people with whom they regularly interact, such as their caregivers. This is followed by the play stage, during which children begin to take on the role that one other person might have. Thus, children might try on a parent’s point of view by acting out “grownup” behavior, like playing “dress up” and acting out the “mom” role, or talking on a toy telephone the way they see their father do.
During the game stage, children learn to consider several roles at the same time and how those roles interact with each other. They learn to understand interactions involving different people with a variety of purposes. For example, a child at this stage is likely to be aware of the different responsibilities of people in a restaurant who together make for a smooth dining experience (someone seats you, another takes your order, someone else cooks the food, while yet another clears away dirty dishes).
Finally, children develop, understand, and learn the idea of the generalized other, the common behavioral expectations of general society. By this stage of development, an individual is able to imagine how he or she is viewed by one or many others—and thus, from a sociological perspective, to have a “self” (Mead 1934; Mead 1964).
Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development
Moral development is an important part of the socialization process. The term refers to the way people learn what society considered to be “good” and “bad,” which is important for a smoothly functioning society. Moral development prevents people from acting on unchecked urges, instead considering what is right for society and good for others. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) was interested in how people learn to decide what is right and what is wrong. To understand this topic, he developed a theory of moral development that includes three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.
In the preconventional stage, young children, who lack a higher level of cognitive ability, experience the world around them only through their senses. It isn’t until the teen years that the conventional theory develops, when youngsters become increasingly aware of others’ feelings and take those into consideration when determining what’s “good” and “bad.” The final stage, called postconventional, is when people begin to think of morality in abstract terms, such as Americans believing that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. At this stage, people also recognize that legality and morality do not always match up evenly (Kohlberg 1981). When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out in 2011 to protest government corruption, they were using postconventional morality. They understood that although their government was legal, it was not morally correct.
Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development and Gender
Another sociologist, Carol Gilligan (1936–), recognized that Kohlberg’s theory might show gender bias since his research was only conducted on male subjects. Would females study subjects have responded differently? Would a female social scientist notice different patterns when analyzing the research? To answer the first question, she set out to study differences between how boys and girls developed morality. Gilligan’s research suggested that boys and girls do have different understandings of morality. Boys appeared to have a justice perspective, by placing emphasis on rules and laws. Girls, on the other hand, seem to have a care and responsibility perspective; they consider people’s reasons behind behavior that seems morally wrong.
While Gilligan is correct that Kohlberg’s research should have included both male and female subjects, her study has been scientifically discredited due to its small sample size. The results Gilligan noted in this study also have not been replicated by subsequent researchers. The differences Gilligan observed were not an issue of the development of morality, but an issue of socialization. Differences in behavior between males and females is the result of gender socialization that teaches boys and girls societal norms and behaviors expected of them based on their sex (see “What a Pretty Little Lady”).
Gilligan also recognized that Kohlberg’s theory rested on the assumption that the justice perspective was the right, or better, perspective. Gilligan, in contrast, theorized that neither perspective was “better”: the two norms of justice served different purposes. Ultimately, she explained that boys are socialized for a work environment where rules make operations run smoothly, while girls are socialized for a home environment where flexibility allows for harmony in caretaking and nurturing (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1990).
What a Pretty Little Lady!
“What a cute dress!” “I like the ribbons in your hair.” “Wow, you look so pretty today.”
According to Lisa Bloom, author of Think: Straight Talk for Women to Stay Smart in a Dumbed Down World, most of us use pleasantries like these when we first meet little girls. “So what?” you might ask.
Bloom asserts that we are too focused on the appearance of young girls, and as a result, our society is socializing them to believe that how they look is of vital importance. And Bloom may be on to something. How often do you tell a little boy how attractive his outfit is, how nice looking his shoes are, or how handsome he looks today? To support her assertions, Bloom cites, as one example, that about 50 percent of girls ages three to six worry about being fat (Bloom 2011). We’re talking about kindergarteners who are concerned about their body image. Sociologists are acutely interested in of this type of gender socialization, by which societal expectations of how boys and girls should be—how they should behave, what toys and colors they should like, and how important their attire is—are reinforced.
One solution to this type of gender socialization is being experimented with at the Egalia preschool in Sweden, where children develop in a genderless environment. All the children at Egalia are referred to with neutral terms like “friend” instead of “he” or “she.” Play areas and toys are consciously set up to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations (Haney 2011). Egalia strives to eliminate all societal gender norms from these children’s preschool world.
Extreme? Perhaps. So what is the middle ground? Bloom suggests that we start with simple steps: when introduced to a young girl, ask about her favorite book or what she likes. In short, engage with her mind … not her outward appearance (Bloom 2011).
Summary
Psychological theories of self-development have been broadened by sociologists who explicitly study the role of society and social interaction in self-development. Charles Cooley and George Mead both contributed significantly to the sociological understanding of the development of self. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan developed their ideas further and researched how our sense of morality develops. Gilligan added the dimension of gender differences to Kohlberg’s theory.
Section Quiz
Socialization, as a sociological term, describes:
how people interact during social situations
how people learn societal norms, beliefs, and values
a person’s internal mental state when in a group setting
the difference between introverts and extroverts
Answer
B
The Harlows’ study on rhesus monkeys showed that:
rhesus monkeys raised by other primate species are poorly socialized
monkeys can be adequately socialized by imitating humans
food is more important than social comfort
social comfort is more important than food
Answer
D
What occurs in Lawrence Kohlberg’s conventional level?
Children develop the ability to have abstract thoughts.
Morality is developed by pain and pleasure.
Children begin to consider what society considers moral and immoral.
Parental beliefs have no influence on children’s morality.
Answer
C
What did Carol Gilligan believe earlier researchers into morality had overlooked?
The justice perspective
Sympathetic reactions to moral situations
The perspective of females
How social environment affects how morality develops
Answer
C
What is one way to distinguish between psychology and sociology?
Psychology focuses on the mind, while sociology focuses on society.
Psychologists are interested in mental health, while sociologists are interested in societal functions.
Psychologists look inward to understand behavior while sociologists look outward.
All of the above
Answer
D
How did nearly complete isolation as a child affect Danielle’s verbal abilities?
She could not communicate at all.
She never learned words, but she did learn signs.
She could not understand much, but she could use gestures.
She could understand and use basic language like “yes” and “no.”
Answer
A
Short Answer
Think of a current issue or pattern that a sociologist might study. What types of questions would the sociologist ask, and what research methods might he employ? Now consider the questions and methods a psychologist might use to study the same issue. Comment on their different approaches.
Explain why it’s important to conduct research using both male and female participants. What sociological topics might show gender differences? Provide some examples to illustrate your ideas.
Further Research
Lawrence Kohlberg was most famous for his research using moral dilemmas. He presented dilemmas to boys and asked them how they would judge the situations. Visit http://openstax.org/l/Dilemma to read about Kohlberg’s most famous moral dilemma, known as the Heinz dilemma.
References
Cooley, Charles Horton. 1902. “The Looking Glass Self.” Pp. 179–185 in Human Nature and Social Order. New York: Scribner’s.
This dissertation is about the concept of self, specifically I seek to answer the question of what constitutes the self. To deal conceptually and theoretically with the concept of self is to consider what the nature of self is, how the self develops, and under what conditions. I explore the dialectical relationship between self and society at three levels, the complexity of social structure and its influence upon the formation of the self, the relationship between the self and the “generalized other,” and the relationship between the “I” and the “me.” The goal of the dissertation is a synthesis of theories of self which includes both a micro and a macro perspective. The model of self is based on Markus and Katayama’s (1994) Enculturation Model, modified extensively to include macro components. The model has four levels, moving from the social structure to the individual: collective reality, socio-psychological processes, local worlds, and habitual psychological tendencies. Part one and part two review symbolic interactionist theorists and structural Marxist theorists, respectively. Part three elaborates the model of self by plugging into the four levels each theorist, where appropriate. Marx’s base/superstructure conceptualization of social structure, Althusser’s materialist dialectic, and Mead’s conceptualization of mind are used to deal with collective reality. Althusser’s concept of “interpellation” is used to link the core ideologies associated with collective reality to socio-psychological practices occurring in the institutions of social structure. Stryker’s identity theory is used to connect social structure to the interaction networks in the local world, out of which individuals construct and identity and self. Lastly, all the theorists are brought together and their theories synthesized in the section dealing with habitual psychological tendencies.
How people define themselves in relation to others greatly influences how they think, feel, and behave, and is ultimately related to the construct of identity. Self-development is a continuous process throughout the lifespan; one’s sense of self may change, at least somewhat, throughout one’s life. Self-representation has important implications for socio-emotional functioning throughout the lifespan.
Philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910) was one of the first to postulate a theory of the self in The Principles of Psychology. James described two aspects of the self that he termed the “I Self” and “Me Self.” The I Self reflects what people see or perceive themselves doing in the physical world (e.g., recognizing that one is walking, eating, writing), whereas the Me Self is a more subjective and psychological phenomenon, referring to individuals’reflections about themselves (e.g. characterizing oneself as athletic, smart, cooperative). Other terms such as self-view, self-image, self-schema, and self-concept are also used to describe the self-referent thoughts characteristic of the Me Self. James further distinguished three components of the Me Self. These include: (1) the material self (e.g., tangible objects or possessions we collect for ourselves); (2) the social self (e.g., how we interact and portray ourselves within different groups, situations, or persons); and (3) the spiritual self (e.g., internal dispositions).
In the late twentieth century, researchers began to argue that the self is a cognitive and social construction. Cognitive perspectives suggest that one’s self-representation affects how one thinks about and gives meaning to experiences. Like James, psychologist Ulric Neisser distinguished between one’s self-representation connected to directly perceived experiences and that resulting from reflection on one’s experiences. The “ecological self,”connections of oneself to experiences in the physical environment, and the “interpersonal self,” connections of oneself to others through verbal or nonverbal communication, comprise direct perception of experience. Neisser proposed that these two types of self-representation develop early in infancy. Regarding reflections on one’s experiences, Neisser identified three types of self-representation that emerge in later infancy and childhood with cognitive and social maturation. The temporally “extended self”is based on memories of one’s past experiences and expectations for the future. The “private self”emerges with the understanding that one’s experiences are not directly perceived by others, but rather must be communicated to be shared. The “conceptual self,” one’s overarching theory or schema about oneself based on one’s reflection on experiences within social and cultural context, parallels terms such as self-concept and self-schema. In a 1977 article, psychologist Hazel Markus showed that one’s self-representation or self-schema guides information processing and influences one’s behavior.
As psychologist Roy Baumeister pointed out in Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self, because self-representation develops through one’s experience of the world, cultural and social factors are important in who we are and what we think about ourselves. Philosopher George Herbert Mead (in Mind, Self, and Society ) postulated that acquisition of self-representation emerges from socialization practices. Mead argued that individuals are socialized to adopt the values, standards, and norms of society through their ability to perceive what others and society would like them to be. Psychologists Tory Higgins, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman further suggested that self-representation includes ideas about who we are (actual self), who we potentially could be (ideal self), and who we should be (ought self), both from one’s own perspective and from one’s perception of valued others’ perspectives. Discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal self or ought self may result in depression or anxiety, respectively.
Attachment theory likewise demonstrates how the self is socially constructed and, in turn, affects how people evaluate themselves (i.e., their self-esteem). Thus, relationships with others play an important role in people’s self-representation and self-esteem. Psychologist John Bowlby focused on caregiver-child relationships. Securely attached children feel safe in the environment and are able to actively explore their surroundings. Through experiencing secure attachment to a consistent caregiver, children develop a belief that they are good and worthy of love. This forms the basis of self-esteem. In contrast, an insecure attachment, in which the child does not feel confident in the caregiver’s protection, may result in feeling unworthy of love, anxious and distressed, and relatively low self-esteem.
The beginnings of self-representation emerge early in infancy, with the recognition that one is a separate physical being from others. Self-representation development continues throughout adulthood. Because self-representation involves social and cognitive constructions, changes in self-representation occur with individuals’ cognitive and social development. Psychologist Susan Harter has conducted highly influential research on the developmental course of self-representation. Excerpts from Harter’s summary of self-representation development from early childhood through adolescence (Harter, 1988) are presented in the Table 1.
In addition to cognitive and social maturation, changes in one’s social context may be equally important influences on self-representation. For example, Susan Cross (in “Self-construals, Coping, and Stress in Cross-cultural Adaptation”) notes that cultural values influence self-development. As an individual moves from one cultural context (e.g., Eastern culture) to another (e.g., Western culture), changes in self-representation may emerge. Individuals can learn to adopt a self-representation that embraces multiple cultures.
SEE ALSOAttachment Theory; Bowlby, John; Child Development; Developmental Psychology; James, William; Mead, George Herbert; Mental Health;Psychology; Self-Awareness Theory; Self-Consciousness, Private vs. Public; Self-Guides; Self-Perception Theory; Self-Schemata; Social Psychology; Stages of Development
Table 1
Early childhood
Middle childhood
Adolescence
Content
specific examples of observable physical characteristics, behaviors, preferences, etc.
trait labels, focusing on abilities, interpersonal characteristics, and emotional attributes
abstractions about the self involving psychological constructs, focusing on different relationships and roles
Organization
little coherence, due to inability to logically organize single self-descriptors
logically organized, integrated within domains that are differentiated from one another
ability to construct a formal theory of the self in which all attributes across and within role domains are integrated and should be internally consistent
Stability over time
not stable over time
recognition of and interest in continuity of self-attributes over time
Intrapsychic conflict and confusion over contradictions and instability within the self, concern with creation of an integrated identity
Basis
fantasies and wishes dominate descriptions of behaviors and abilities
use of social comparison due to ability to simultaneously observe and evaluate the self in relation to others
intense focus on the opinions that significant others hold about the self, especially peers and close friends
Baumeister, Roy F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bowlby, John. 1969. Attachment and Loss. New York: Basic Books.
Cross, Susan. 1995. Self-construals, Coping, and Stress in Cross-cultural Adaptation. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26 (6): 673–697.
Harter, Susan. 1988. Developmental Processes in the Construction of the Self. In Integrative Processes and Socialization: Early to Middle Childhood, eds. Thomas D. Yawkey and James E. Johnson, 45–78. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Harter, Susan. 1999. The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York: Guilford.
Higgins, Tory, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman. 1985. Self-concept Discrepancy Theory: A Psychological Model for Distinguishing Among Different Aspects of Depression and Anxiety. Social Cognition 3: 51–76.
James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt.
Kanagawa, Chie, Susan Cross, and Hazel Rose Markus. 2001. Who Am I?: The Cultural Psychology of the Conceptual Self. Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin 27 (1): 90–103.
Markus, Hazel. 1977. Self-schemata and Processing Information about the Self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (2): 63–78.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Neisser, Ulric. 1988. Five Kinds of Self Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1): 35–59.
The popularity of such books as Frank McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes, Mary Karr’s The Liars’ Club, and Kathryn Harrison’s controversial The Kiss, has led columnists to call ours “the age of memoir.” And while some critics have derided the explosion of memoir as exhibitionistic and self-aggrandizing, literary theorists are now beginning to look seriously at this profusion of autobiographical literature. Informed by literary, scientific, and experiential concerns, How Our Lives Become Stories enhances knowledge of the complex forces that shape identity, and confronts the equally complex problems that arise when we write about who we think we are.
Using life writings as examples—including works by Christa Wolf, Art Spiegelman, Oliver Sacks, Henry Louis Gates, Melanie Thernstrom, and Philip Roth—Paul John Eakin draws on the latest research in neurology, cognitive science, memory studies, developmental psychology, and related fields to rethink the very nature of self-representation. After showing how the experience of living in one’s body shapes one’s identity, he explores relational and narrative modes of being, emphasizing social sources of identity, and demonstrating that the self and the story of the self are constantly evolving in relation to others. Eakin concludes by engaging the ethical issues raised by the conflict between the authorial impulse to life writing and a traditional, privacy-based ethics that such writings often violate.
Author / Editor information
Eakin Paul John :
Paul John Eakin is Ruth N. Halls Professor Emeritus of English at Indiana University. He is the author of How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves; The New England Girl: Cultural Ideals in Hawthorne, Stowe, Howells, and James; Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention; and Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography. He is the editor of The Ethics of Life Writing, also from Cornell; On Autobiography by Philippe Lejeune, and American Autobiography: Retrospect and Prospect.
Reviews
“In How Our Lives Become Stories, Paul John Eakin explains why he prefers ‘to think of self less as an entity and more as a kind of awareness in process.’… Eakin makes the ethics of reading integral to his project…. Eakin attends to those who are repelled by the ‘urge to confess’ and he talks about telling all as a cultural imperative that may, for example, be costly to the families of memoirists despite the therapeutic value such confessions might have. The ethics of privacy, the fact of relational lives, and the moral strictures that shadow autobiographical tellings bring Eakin to ask, ‘What is right and fair?’.”
“In this intriguing book, Paul John Eakin problematizes the notion of autobiography as ‘the story of the self’ and argues that in the act of narration one is engaged in a process of making a self…. How Our Lives Become Stories is a concise and engaging synopsis of the state of the art for anyone interested in the subject.”
Nancy K. Miller, author of Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent’s Death:
“Paul John Eakin has accomplished here what many preach and few practice: a genuinely cross- disciplinary study. How Our Lives Become Stories is a fascinating account of the creation of an autobiographical self seen from the multiple vantage points of literature, philosophy, neurology, and psychology. Eakin shows the infinitely complex ways in which we become and remember who we are in our bodies and our brains. Equally important in this pioneering study is Eakin’s penetrating analysis of how as a culture we negotiate the changing boundaries of private and public life. How Our Lives Become Stories offers a subtle and intelligent guide to the ethical dilemmas of disclosure and confession, memory and narrative, that pervade contemporary American life. A book for our times.”
“This fascinating new book… offers an engaging introduction to identity and narrative…. This is a well-written, timely, and progressive book—a surprisingly rare mix.”
H. Porter Abbott, University of California, Santa Barbara:
“Paul John Eakin has always been a few steps ahead of the rest of us. Now, with How Our Lives Become Stories, he has contributed another indispensable reassessment of the field of autobiography, this time keyed to the disturbingly fluid sense of the self that has emerged from recent research throughout the cognitive sciences.”
Susanna Egan, University of British Columbia:
“Rethinking what he calls ‘registers of self and self-experience,’ Paul John Eakin once again offers new and necessary work in autobiography studies. A most accessible and engaging book, How Our Lives Become Stories draws on recent scholarship in neurology, cognitive sciences, memory studies, developmental psychology, cultural narratives, and ethics in order to demonstrate that ‘there are many stories of self to tell, and more than one self to tell them.’.”
“When we write about our lives, the complex work of constructing the story is intertwined with all that constitutes the process of identity formation. In this book, Eakin expertly guides us through the thorny terrain of research in neurology, developmental psychology, and memory theory and revisits philosophy and literary theory. By the end of the journey, we have a far richer understanding of how individuals construct their lives and how they tell the story of that construction, as well as a sense of the dynamic interplay between the two processes.”
The reflexive self and culture: a critique
Matthew Adams
Identity in Question
edited by Anthony Elliott, Paul du Gay
Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic
edited by Yoshihisa Kashima, Margaret Foddy, Michael Platow
Narrative Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity.
This paper aims to provide an overview of a narrative psychological approach towards the study of self and identity. The narrative psychological approach can be classified as broadly social constructionist insofar as it attempts to examine the cultural structuration of individual experience. However, building on recent criticism of certain social constructionist approaches (such as discourse analysis), it is argued that these approaches tend to lose touch with the phenomenological and experiential realities of everyday, practical life. Accordingly, they overplay the disorderly, chaotic, variable and flux-like nature of self-experience. Drawing on recent research on traumatizing experiences such as living with serious illness, this paper argues that the disruption and fragmentation manifest in such experiences serves as a useful means of highlighting the sense of unity, meaning and coherence (the `narrative configuration’) more commonly experienced on an everyday level. Moreover, when disorder and incoherence prevail, as in the case of trauma, narratives are used to rebuild the individual’s shattered sense of identity and meaning.
Self and social identity.
Brewer, M. B., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (2004).
Blackwell Publishing.
Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory
edited by Hubert J. M. Hermans, Thorsten Gieser
Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway
What am I referring to when I say ‘I’? This little word is so easy to use in daily life, yet it has become the focus of intense theoretical debate. Where does my sense of self come from? Does it arise spontaneously or is it created by the media or society? Do I really know myself?
This concern with the self, with our subjectivity, is now our main point of reference in Western societies. How has it come to be so important? What are the different ways in which we can approach subjectivity?
Nick Mansfield explores how our understanding of our subjectivity has developed over the past century. He looks at the work of key modern and postmodern theorists, including Freud, Foucault, Nietzsche, Lacan, Kristeva, Deleuze and Guattari, and he shows how subjectivity is central to debates in contemporary culture, including gender, sexuality, ethnicity, postmodernism and technology.
I am who? No topic is more crucial to contemporary cultural theory than subjectivity, and Nick Mansfield has written what has long been lacking-a lucid, smart introduction to work in the field.
Professor Simon During, University of Melbourne
Effortlessly and with humour, passion and panache, Mansfield offers the reader a telling, trenchantly articulate d account of the complex enigma of the self, without resorting to reductively simple critical cliches.This book, in its graceful movements between disciplines, ideas, and areas of interest, deserves to become a benchmark for all such student introductions for some time to come.
Julian Wolfreys, University of Florida
Nick Mansfield is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. He is co-author of Cultural Studies and the New Humanities (Oxford 1997) and author of Masochism: The art of power (Praeger 1997).
Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self
Nathan N. Cheeka § and Jonathan M. Cheekb aDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA; bDepartment of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA
Self and Identity · July 2018 DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2017.1412347
The broad concept of the self is fundamental to psychology, serving as an anchor by which we perceive and make sense of the world as well as how we relate to and think about others. This book develops creative points of view of the self which have not previously been reviewed, creating a web of interconnected concepts under the umbrella of the self.
The various contributions to this book discuss these concepts, such as self-regulation, self-concept, self-esteem, self-awareness, social comparison, and self-reference. All of them are related to the self, and all would justify a review of their own, yet none of them have up to this point. As a whole, the book develops these new, creative points of view of the self—the integral (primary) component of our experience as social beings.
Offering numerous perspectives on various aspects of the self which can foster new thinking and research, this timely and important book makes suggestions for future research that will spur additional lines of work by readers. This book was originally published as a special issue of Self and Identity.
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The nature of consciousness has mystified and intrigued humanity for centuries. As we progress in our understanding of the physical world, the question of what it means to be conscious remains one of the most complex and challenging inquiries in modern science. Despite this challenge, many leading theorists have developed compelling explanations for the phenomenon of consciousness. These theories seek to answer questions about the origins of our inner lives, the relationship between the mind and the brain, and the seemingly impenetrable problem of subjective experience. In this article, we’ll explore seven leading theories of consciousness, delving into their strengths, weaknesses, and historical roots.
Integrated Information Theory: Consciousness as a Web of Information
Developed by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi in the early 2000s, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness arises from the integration of information within a system. The more interconnected and differentiated the information in a system, the higher the degree of consciousness. In other words, conscious experience is not simply a byproduct of brain activity but is fundamentally tied to the way information is structured, processed, and integrated within the brain.
IIT proposes that consciousness is quantifiable and can be measured using a mathematical value called “phi.” Phi is a measure of the degree of information integration within a system, considering both the amount of information and the complexity of its connections. According to IIT, systems with higher phi values possess a greater degree of consciousness.
A central concept in IIT is the idea of “causal power,” which refers to the ability of a system to affect its own future states. Consciousness, in this view, emerges from the causal interactions within a system, with greater causal power leading to richer conscious experiences. This approach allows IIT to provide a unified framework for understanding various aspects of consciousness, including its degrees, quality, and dynamics.
One of the most intriguing implications of IIT is its potential to extend the concept of consciousness beyond biological systems. If consciousness arises from the integration of information, then non-biological systems, such as advanced artificial intelligence, could also possess consciousness if they meet the necessary criteria.
Strengths:
IIT offers a quantifiable measure of consciousness called “phi,” which allows for comparisons between different systems and states.
The theory has provided a foundation for understanding the neural correlates of consciousness and the potential for artificial consciousness.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that IIT’s reliance on a single metric oversimplifies the complexity of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether IIT can account for the subjective nature of conscious experience.
Higher-Order Theories: Consciousness as Self-Reflection
Higher-Order Theories (HOT) of consciousness, which originated in the 1990s with philosophers like David Rosenthal and William Lycan, propose that consciousness arises when the brain represents its own mental states. In other words, conscious experience is the result of thoughts about thoughts, or metacognition. According to HOT, unconscious mental states become conscious when they are accompanied by higher-order mental states that represent or are aware of them.
There are two main variants of HOT: Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories, which focus on the cognitive aspect of higher-order representation, and Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, which emphasize the perceptual aspect. Both variants share the core idea that consciousness is a matter of self-representation, but they differ in how they conceive of the nature and role of higher-order mental states.
To further elucidate the HOT framework, it is helpful to consider an example. Imagine you are looking at a red apple. According to HOT, the perceptual experience of the red apple is an unconscious mental state. This experience becomes conscious when you have a higher-order thought that represents your experience of the apple, such as “I am perceiving a red apple.” The higher-order thought effectively “lights up” the unconscious mental state, transforming it into a conscious experience.
HOT theorists argue that this self-representational account of consciousness can explain various features of conscious experience, such as its subjective nature, introspection, and the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. For instance, the difference between conscious pain and unconscious pain can be understood in terms of the presence or absence of a higher-order mental state representing the pain.
Strengths:
HOT offers a clear distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states.
The theory provides a plausible explanation for introspection and self-awareness.
HOT is compatible with empirical findings in cognitive neuroscience, particularly the role of the prefrontal cortex in metacognition and self-representation.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that HOT is circular, as it requires conscious awareness to be conscious.
The subjective nature of conscious experience remains unexplained within the HOT framework.
Some have questioned whether higher-order mental states are sufficient to account for the rich phenomenology of conscious experience.
Biological Naturalism: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon
Biological Naturalism, a theory proposed by the American philosopher John Searle, posits that consciousness is an emergent biological phenomenon resulting from specific neural mechanisms in the brain. Unlike some other theories of consciousness, Biological Naturalism maintains that conscious experience is a purely physical process, deeply rooted in the biological functioning of the brain.
At the core of Biological Naturalism is the idea that subjective conscious experiences, or qualia, are not separate from the physical world but are instead the product of the brain’s biological processes. This theory asserts that consciousness emerges from the complex interactions between neurons and other brain structures, forming a higher-level property of the brain’s activity, much like the properties of wetness in water molecules or the solidity of a table.
According to Searle, one of the key challenges in understanding consciousness from a biological perspective is to determine the specific neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). NCCs are the minimal set of brain mechanisms or events responsible for producing a particular conscious experience. Identifying these correlates would help to bridge the gap between neuroscientific research and the subjective nature of conscious experience, ultimately contributing to a deeper understanding of how consciousness arises from the brain’s activity.
Strengths:
Biological Naturalism grounds consciousness in the physical, biological world, which aligns well with empirical scientific research and the naturalistic view of the universe.
The theory provides a solid foundation for investigating the neural mechanisms of consciousness, encouraging neuroscientific studies to reveal the specific brain processes that give rise to conscious experience.
Weaknesses:
Biological Naturalism has been criticized for not adequately addressing the “hard problem” of consciousness, which is the question of how and why specific neural processes give rise to subjective conscious experiences.
Some critics argue that the theory’s focus on neural correlates may not fully capture the complexity of consciousness, as it might overlook the potential contributions of other factors, such as the brain’s global neural dynamics or the interactions between different brain regions.
Panpsychism: The Universal Consciousness
Panpsychism is a philosophical theory tracing back to ancient Greece and India, which has recently been revived by contemporary philosophers like David Chalmers and Galen Strawson. Panpsychism posits that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe, akin to mass or charge. According to this view, all physical entities, from electrons to galaxies, possess some form of consciousness or proto-consciousness, even if in a highly rudimentary form.
The core idea of panpsychism is that consciousness is not exclusive to complex biological systems, but rather is an intrinsic aspect of the fabric of reality. By attributing consciousness to all matter, panpsychism offers a unique solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness – the question of why and how certain physical processes give rise to subjective experience.
To gain a deeper understanding of panpsychism, it is important to clarify that the theory does not imply that all objects have thoughts, emotions, or self-awareness. Instead, panpsychism posits that even the most basic constituents of reality possess some form of experiential quality or “proto-consciousness.” This fundamental consciousness is thought to be combined and integrated in complex systems, such as the human brain, to give rise to the rich and varied conscious experiences we are familiar with.
One of the main challenges facing panpsychism is the so-called “combination problem.” This problem arises from the question of how individual conscious entities, such as the proto-consciousness of elementary particles, can combine to form a unified conscious experience, like the experience of a human being. Various panpsychist theorists have proposed different solutions to the combination problem, including the idea of “constitutive panpsychism,” in which higher-level conscious experiences are composed of more basic forms of consciousness.
Strengths:
Panpsychism offers a unique solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness by positing that subjective experience is inherent to all matter.
The theory provides a potential explanation for the emergence of consciousness in complex systems and avoids the difficulties associated with explaining how consciousness arises from non-conscious matter.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that panpsychism is untestable and lacks empirical support.
The theory struggles to address the “combination problem,” which questions how individual conscious entities combine to form a unified conscious experience.
Some have criticized panpsychism as a form of “panprotopsychism,” arguing that attributing proto-consciousness to all matter does not necessarily explain the nature of full-fledged conscious experience.
Quantum Consciousness Theory: The Microscopic World Meets the Mind
Quantum Consciousness Theory, also known as Quantum Mind Theory, posits that the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics play a significant role in the emergence and functioning of consciousness. Developed in the late 20th century by physicists and mathematicians such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, this theory suggests that the microtubules within the brain’s neurons are responsible for consciousness through quantum processes.
Quantum Consciousness Theory is based on the idea that microtubules, which are tiny protein structures found within neurons, can facilitate quantum computations. These quantum computations are thought to be responsible for the emergence of consciousness. According to proponents of this theory, the unique properties of quantum mechanics—such as superposition, entanglement, and wave-particle duality—allow for the generation of conscious experience in ways that classical physics cannot explain.
To delve deeper into Quantum Consciousness Theory, it’s essential to understand the concepts of quantum superposition and entanglement. Quantum superposition refers to the ability of a quantum system to exist in multiple states simultaneously until a measurement or observation is made, at which point the system collapses into one definite state. Quantum entanglement occurs when particles become interconnected in such a way that the state of one particle directly influences the state of another, even when they are separated by vast distances. Proponents of Quantum Consciousness Theory believe that these quantum phenomena can occur within the brain’s microtubules, leading to the emergence of conscious experience.
One of the most well-known models within Quantum Consciousness Theory is the Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR) model, proposed by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff. In the Orch-OR model, consciousness arises from quantum computations that occur within microtubules. These quantum computations are thought to be orchestrated by molecular structures called tubulins, which can switch between different quantum states. When a certain threshold of tubulin activity is reached, a collapse of the quantum superposition occurs, and this collapse is hypothesized to produce a moment of conscious experience.
Strengths:
Quantum Consciousness Theory offers an intriguing explanation for the emergence of consciousness that incorporates the exotic principles of quantum mechanics.
The theory has inspired interdisciplinary research, bridging the gap between neuroscience, physics, and philosophy.
Weaknesses:
Many scientists and philosophers remain skeptical of the role of quantum mechanics in consciousness, arguing that the brain’s warm, wet environment is not conducive to maintaining quantum states.
Critics also argue that Quantum Consciousness Theory does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Empirical evidence supporting the involvement of quantum processes in consciousness is limited and controversial.
Neural Darwinism: The Evolution of Consciousness
Neural Darwinism, also known as the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, is a theory proposed by neuroscientist Gerald Edelman in the 1980s. It suggests that consciousness emerges through a process of selection among groups of neurons, akin to the principles of natural selection in biological evolution. According to Neural Darwinism, the brain’s structure and function are shaped by a competitive process in which neural circuits compete for resources and connectivity.
At the foundation of Neural Darwinism is the idea that the brain is composed of neuronal groups that are functionally interconnected. These neuronal groups, or assemblies, are constantly interacting and reconfiguring themselves based on their activity and the input they receive. Through this dynamic process, the brain’s neural networks are refined and optimized, resulting in the emergence of consciousness.
To gain a deeper understanding of Neural Darwinism, it is crucial to recognize the three main processes that drive the theory: (1) developmental selection, (2) experiential selection, and (3) reentrant signaling. Developmental selection refers to the formation of neuronal groups during development, with some groups being strengthened and others eliminated based on genetic and environmental factors. Experiential selection occurs as the brain encounters new experiences, leading to the strengthening of some neuronal groups and the weakening or elimination of others. Reentrant signaling involves the constant exchange of information between neuronal groups, which allows for the integration of information across different brain areas and the emergence of conscious experience.
Neural Darwinism posits that through these processes, the brain continually adapts and reorganizes its neural networks, giving rise to the dynamic and ever-changing nature of conscious experience. This theory emphasizes the importance of both genetic and experiential factors in shaping the structure and function of the brain and provides a compelling account of how consciousness might arise from the brain’s evolutionary processes.
Strengths:
Neural Darwinism offers a biologically plausible account of consciousness based on the principles of evolution and natural selection.
The theory provides a potential explanation for the individual variability of conscious experience, as each person’s brain develops and adapts differently based on their unique genetic and environmental influences.
Neural Darwinism has been supported by various empirical findings in neuroscience, such as the observation of competitive processes in neural development and plasticity.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that Neural Darwinism does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether the principles of natural selection can be adequately applied to neural networks and their development.
Global Workspace Theory: Consciousness as a Central Information Hub
Global Workspace Theory (GWT), proposed by psychologist Bernard Baars in the 1980s, postulates that consciousness arises from the integration and sharing of information across different brain regions. According to GWT, the brain contains a “global workspace” that functions as a central information hub, allowing various cognitive processes to communicate and cooperate with each other.
At the core of GWT is the idea that conscious experience is the result of the brain’s capacity to broadcast information to a wide array of specialized cognitive processes. In this view, consciousness is not localized to a specific brain area but is a product of the dynamic interplay between different brain regions and systems.
To better understand GWT, it is useful to consider the “theater metaphor” often used to describe the theory. In this metaphor, the global workspace is likened to a theater stage, with various cognitive processes represented as actors performing on the stage. As information is processed and integrated within the global workspace, it becomes “conscious” and is broadcast to the entire “audience” of specialized cognitive processes. This broadcast allows for the integration of information across different domains and the generation of a unified conscious experience.
GWT posits that this information integration and broadcasting process is essential for consciousness, as it enables the brain to efficiently allocate resources, make decisions, and adapt to new situations. The theory suggests that conscious experience arises when information is accessible and available to multiple cognitive processes, allowing for the flexible and adaptive behavior that characterizes conscious beings.
Strengths:
GWT provides a plausible account of the brain’s capacity to integrate and share information across different cognitive domains.
The theory has been supported by empirical evidence from neuroscience, including findings related to the role of the prefrontal cortex and other brain areas in information integration and broadcasting.
GWT offers a potential explanation for the functional role of consciousness in decision-making and resource allocation.
Weaknesses:
Critics argue that GWT does not directly address the subjective nature of conscious experience or the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Some have questioned whether the global workspace concept is sufficient to account for the rich phenomenology of conscious experience.
In conclusion
The quest to understand the enigma of consciousness has been a driving force for researchers and philosophers alike for centuries. The seven leading theories presented in this article offer a glimpse into the remarkable diversity of perspectives attempting to unravel the mysteries of the conscious mind. Each theory brings its unique insights, strengths, and weaknesses to the table, and together they paint a rich, multifaceted picture of the complex phenomenon we call consciousness.
As our scientific knowledge continues to advance, it becomes increasingly clear that the path to understanding consciousness is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor. It is likely that a comprehensive understanding of this enigmatic aspect of human experience will require the integration of ideas from multiple disciplines, including neuroscience, psychology, physics, and philosophy. By exploring the intersections between these theories and fostering collaboration across fields, we may gradually unravel the secrets of the conscious mind.
In the pursuit of understanding consciousness, we are not only striving to make sense of our own experiences but also to gain insight into the very essence of what it means to be human. Ultimately, the journey to comprehend consciousness is not merely an intellectual pursuit; it has profound implications for how we perceive ourselves, our place in the world, and our connections with others. The quest to decipher the mind’s mysteries is one of the most thrilling and significant adventures of human inquiry, and it is our collective curiosity, determination, and ingenuity that will propel us forward on this exciting journey.
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Organizing and comparing the major candidate theories in the field.
Ralph Lewis, M.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Toronto, a psychiatrist at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, and a consultant at the Odette Cancer Centre in Toronto.
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Learning May Be the Key to the Evolution of Consciousness
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Posted November 3, 2022
Ralph Lewis, M.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Toronto, a psychiatrist at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, and a consultant at the Odette Cancer Centre in Toronto.
ISBN-10: 0415834090 ISBN-13: 9780415834094 Pub. Date: 02/10/2016 Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Despite recent strides in neuroscience and psychology that have deepened understanding of the brain, consciousness remains one of the greatest philosophical and scientific puzzles. The second edition of Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment provides a fresh and up-to-date introduction to a variety of approaches to consciousness, and contributes to the current lively debate about the nature of consciousness and whether a scientific understanding of it is possible.
After an initial overview of the status and prospects of physicalism in the face of the problem of consciousness, William Seager explores key themes from Descartes – the founder of the modern problem of consciousness. He then turns to the most important theories of consciousness:
identity theories and the generation problem
higher-order thought theories of consciousness
self-representational theories of consciousness
Daniel Dennett’s theory of consciousness
attention-based theories of consciousness
representational theories of consciousness
conscious intentionality
panpsychism
neutral monism.
Thoroughly revised and expanded throughout, this second edition includes new chapters on animal consciousness, reflexive consciousness, combinatorial forms of panpsychism and neutral monism, as well as a significant new chapter on physicalism, emergence and consciousness.
The book’s broad scope, depth of coverage and focus on key philosophical positions and arguments make it an indispensable text for those teaching or studying philosophy of mind and psychology. It is also an excellent resource for those working in related fields such as cognitive science and the neuroscience of consciousness.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Consciousness & Physicalism 2. Themes from Descartes 3. Identity Theories & the Generation Problem 4. HOT Theory I: The Mentalistic Reduction of Consciousness 5. HOT Theory II: Animals, Mental Sophistication & Dispositions 6. Self-Representational Theories7. Dennett I: Qualia Eliminated 8. Dennett II: Consciousness Fictionalized 9. Consciousness & Attention10. Representational Theories of Consciousness I 11. Representational Theories of Consciousness II 12. Conscious Intentionality & the Anti-Cartesian Catastrophe 13. Consciousness, Information & Panpsychism 14. Panpsychism, Aggregation & Combinatorial Infusion 15. Monism & Models. Index
Higher-order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology
edited by Rocco J. Gennaro
Unifying matter, energy and consciousness,
Mahendra Samarawickrama,
11th International Conference on Mathematical Modeling in Physical Sciences (2023). DOI: 10.1063/5.0162815
This book reviews some of the most important scientific and philosophical theories concerning the nature of mind and consciousness. Current theories on the mind-body problem and the neural correlates of consciousness are presented through a series of biographical sketches of the most influential thinkers across the fields of philosophy of mind, psychology and neuroscience. The book is divided into two parts: the first is dedicated to philosophers of mind and the second, to neuroscientists/experimental psychologists. Each part comprises twenty short chapters, with each chapter being dedicated to one author. A brief introduction is given on his or her life and most important works and influences. The most influential theory/ies developed by each author are then carefully explained and examined with the aim of scrutinizing the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches to the nature of consciousness.
David Chalmers Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 3-7
Paul and Patricia Churchland Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 9-13
Tim Crane Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 15-18
Donald Davidson Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 19-24
Daniel Dennett Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 25-28
René Descartes Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 29-36
Jerry Fodor Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 37-41
Jaegwon Kim Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 43-47
William Lycan Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 49-53
Colin McGinn Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 55-59
Thomas Nagel Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 61-65
Alva Noë Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 67-71
Hilary Putnam Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 73-78
David Rosenthal Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 79-83
John Searle Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 85-89
Bernard Baars Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 93-97
Francis Crick and Christof Koch Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Andrea Nani Pages 99-103
In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, J. E. LeDoux, S. J. Luck, G. R. Mangan, J. A. Movshon, H. Neville, E. A. Phelps, P. Rakic, D. L. Schacter, M. Sur, & B. A. Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1111–1122). Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0099
What a Contest of Consciousness Theories Really Proved
A five-year “adversarial collaboration” of consciousness theorists led to a stagy showdown in front of an audience. It crowned no winners — but it can still claim progress.
Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.
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Habermas’s interactionist cum dialogical intersubjectivity
Brandom’s discursive intersubjectivity
Transpersonal Psychology
Consciousness
Key Researchers
Jessica Benjamin
Judith Blackstone
Dan Zahavi
Roy Tzohar
B. Alan Wallace
Bill Waldron
Jeannine A. Davies
Brook Ziporyn
Gerald Dōkō Virtbauer
de Balbian, Ulrich
Loy, David
Joel Krueger
Joshua May
Evan Thompson
Brincat, S
Linda A. Chernus
G. E. Atwood
R. D. Stolorow
Lewis A. Kirshner
Christian de Quincey
Shaun Gallagher
Orange, D.M.
Alex Gillespie
Flora Cornish
Peter Buirski
Hanne De Jaegher
Vygotsky, Lev S.
Toma Strle
Merleau-Ponty M.
Buber, Martin
Mackenzie, Matthew
Source: The Buddhist Philosophical Conception of Intersubjectivity: an Introduction.
This paper serves as a retrospective introduction to a series of four tightly connected articlesFootnote 1published over the course of several issues in SOPHIA, all of which arose from a panel on the Buddhist Philosophical Notion of Intersubjectivity at the Yogācāra Studies Unit of the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR, Atlanta, 2015). The growing online access to academic journals seems increasingly to obviate the need to group thematically related articles in a special issue, but nonetheless, readers may wish for some guidance regarding the editorial reasons for grouping them in a series, the common concerns they address, and the ways in which they relate to each other. This brief introduction therefore outlines a possible framework for approaching these papers, and suggests a particular order in which they can be most profitably read.
The philosophical engagement with the issue of intersubjectivity—i.e., the shared nature of our experiences, in particular of the external world—has evident significance for an array of Buddhist concerns. Intersubjective experience is of interest not just for its role in bridging the self and others, but also because it allows (and for the philosophical realist, indeed reaffirms) an emergent notion of objectivity. Viewed on the one hand against the background of the Buddhist metaphysics of momentariness and causality, the critique of the self, and nominalism, and on the other hand in light of the Buddhist emphasis on the practical and social role of the Sangha and of meaningful salvific discourse, intersubjectivity poses a particularly tenacious explanatory challenge for Buddhist schools of thought. It is a curious fact, then, that despite the significance of this topic and its relevance to the Buddhist understanding of personal identity, otherness, and the nature of the life-world, it has received relatively little explicit attention in either Buddhist philosophical writing (see Garfield’s response paper on this point) or contemporary scholarship. As a corrective, the AAR panel and the set of articles that ensued from it—by Kachru, Prueitt, and Tzohar, and a response paper by Garfield—addressed this theme from various angles. The overarching question at the background of the discussion was whether there is a uniquely Buddhist conception of intersubjectivity, and if so what it entails and what are its expressions in the Buddhist philosophical conception of experience, language, and the life-world.
Aiming to situate these questions within a concrete and continuous intellectual and historical context, the papers focus on the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition as a case study. Taken together, they provide a diachronic account of the development of this particular Buddhist approach to the topic, by tracing continuity, disruption, and innovation as the outcomes of shifting intellectual agendas in the works of Vasubandhu and his commentators (Tzohar), Dharmakīrti’s thought (Prueitt), and Ratnakīrti’s response (Kachru).
While they are attuned to differences between the respective accounts of these thinkers, the papers all seem to suggest certain overlapping concerns. These concerns, and the ways in which they were addressed by the Buddhist thinkers, are spelled out and assessed in Jay Garfield’s response paper, “I Take Refuge in the Sangha. But how? The Puzzle of Intersubjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy Comments on Tzohar, Prueitt, and Kachru.” The most common concern, pointed out by Garfield, has to do with the need to account for and justify the possibility of intersubjective experiences under a view of phenomena as mind-dependent, and it is framed—not unlike the way it appears in the Western philosophical tradition—in terms of the perennial debate between the realist and the idealist. Another major if more subtle concern has to do with the question of meaning—in both the perceptual and the linguistic communicative realm—and how it can be construed intersubjectively so as to allow for shared perceptual content and efficacious actions, to account for successful and meaningful language use (in the constitution of norms), and to avoid the pitfalls of solipsism on the one hand or incommensurability on the other.
Dealing broadly with these concerns within the context of each thinker, the papers before us reveal the way in which intersubjectivity branches off into a range of fundamental questions in Buddhist metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language, all of which are deeply grounded in particular Buddhist conceptions—of, for instance, cosmology, the category of species, the concept of mind and the operation of language. In this respect, the emergent collective account of Buddhist intersubjectivity serves as a step toward much needed conceptual groundwork regarding this notion in its original context, that is, groundwork that takes into account the meaning of specific specialized terms and categories involved in this notion, and the way in which it conveys a complex set of cultural preferences and doctrinal premises.
My own paper in the series, “Imagine being a Preta: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to Intersubjectivity,” deals with the early Yogācāra strategies for explaining intersubjective agreement under a “mere representations” view. Thus, this paper presents the foundational tradition to which the other Buddhist thinkers react, and in this respect sets down the terms of the discussion taken up in the other three papers. Examining Vasubandhu’s, Asaṅga’s, and Sthiramati’s uses of the example of intersubjective agreement among the hungry ghosts (pretas)—an agreement explained by appeal to a shared karma—I demonstrate that the Yogācāra arguments should be understood as an ironic inversion of the realist premise; in other words, as showing that intersubjective agreement not only does not require the existence of external mind-independent objects, but in fact is incompatible with their existence. Under this account, I argue, intersubjectivity is not only possible under a “mere-representation” view but necessary for the coherence of the Yogācāra view. As Garfield observes about this Yogācāra reasoning, “it is the fact that external objects are imagined not by a single mind, but by many… that gives the argument its force, for that enables genuinely alternative realities to be compared to one another to demonstrate that reality, not hallucination, is mind-dependent” (Garfield, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0708-7).
My paper goes on to explicate the emergent Yogācāra understanding of the life-world—as the outcome of the shared karma of all its beings—as a realm that is understood in terms of the self and others’ shared engagement in a common world. This has some affinity with the way the contemporary phenomenological tradition conceives of intersubjectivity, but unlike the phenomenological account, the Yogācāra takes the first-person perspective to be a product rather than the enabling condition of this engagement. Among the ramifications of this reluctance to privilege the first-person perspective, I argued, is a radical revision of the “shared” and “private” distinction as it is used with respect to experiences, both ordinarily and philosophically.
Exploring the later development of these themes from the perspective of Buddhist philosophy of language is the focus of Catherine Prueitt’s paper “Karmic Imprints, Exclusion, and the Creation of the Worlds of Conventional Experience in Dharmakīrti’s Thought.” The early Yogācāra attempt to uphold and justify intersubjectivity by appeal to shared karmic imprints (vāsanā) is the starting point for Prueitt’s paper, which explicates the way in which this strategy is used by Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 550–650 C.E.) to explain the absence of universals under his theory of apoha. While she traces the continuity between these two accounts, Prueitt points out important points in which Dharmakīrti departs from the early Yogācāra reasoning. For Dharmakīrti, she suggests, intersubjectivity was important not so much for defending a view of phenomena as mind-dependent but insofar as it was involved in the more fundamental question of how shared meaning—in its most fundamental function as concept formation—may be construed and normatively applied.
Prueitt’s paper demonstrates how, with the premise of the non-existence of universals, Dharmakīrti explains concept formation by tracing concepts ultimately to the mechanism of karmic imprints (which in turn are understood to be developed over countless lifetimes and continuously and recursively reshaped by ongoing actions). Couched in terms similar to those of the early Yogācāra account, according to Dharmakīrti, the extent to which individuals experience themselves as acting within a shared world (or not) depends on these imprints. Whatever is shared—manifested in terms of similar sensory capacities, habits, and aims—allows in turn for the judgment of sameness, that is, forms the basis for selectively collecting certain particulars (taking them as if having the same effects) under a single concept.
Prueitt’s argument goes on to show that Dharmakīrti’s appeal to karmic imprints also allows him to meet the critique (both traditional and modern) that his denial of the reality of the subject/object duality is incompatible with his theory of apoha. She concludes that Dharmakīrti’s reliance on karmic imprints on two distinct levels—one within the conventional world (i.e., concept formation), and one that constitutes the conventional world (i.e., the subject/object duality)—provides a round and complete account of intersubjectivity without relying on universals.
Proceeding to examine the changing conception of intersubjectivity within changing theories of mind in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, Sonam Kachru’s paper “Ratnakīrti and the Extent of Inner Space: An Essay on Yogācāra and the Threat of Genuine of Solipsism” traces the outlines of what may be described as a paradigm shift in the tradition with respect to the conceptual foundations of intersubjectivity.
The paper achieves this by focusing on the response by Ratnakīrti (990–1050 C.E.) to Dharmakīrti’s attempt to defuse the threat of epistemological solipsism, with particular attention to the former’s sensitivity to the conceptual preconditions of this problem, and to the ways in which his conclusions differ from Dharmakīrti’s.
According to Kachru’s analysis, Ratnakīrti’s critique, in essence, is that Dharmakīrti overlooks the fact that in framing the problem he is helping himself to an equivocation between two distinct concepts of mind (which, however, remain inactive in forming his solution to the problem). The first is a notion of mind that emerges out of our ordinary linguistic practices, and the second, a phenomenological concept of mind as phenomenal presence. Given the latter conception of mind, so goes Ratnakīrti’s argument—which, as Garfield notes, has interesting affinities with similar treatments of the problem of other minds in contemporary philosophy of mind and language, beginning with Wittgenstein—there is indeed no justification for applying the concept of “other minds,” but neither are there any grounds to speak of “one’s own mind” (because insofar as the phenomenological concept of mind is experienced as such, we have no room to meaningfully ask whether there is only one mind or many). Kachru’s essay concludes by considering which of the different ways we find in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition to assuage epistemological solipsism we have reason to prefer, thereby exploring the impact these various theories of mind have had on the changing place of intersubjectivity within that tradition.
Notes
Guest edited by Roy Tzohar and Jake Davis, and include: Roy Tzohar, “Imagine Being a Preta: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to Intersubjectivity” Sophia 56 (2017): 337–354; Catherine Prueitt, “Karmic Imprints, Exclusion, and the Creation of the Worlds of Conventional Experience in Dharmakīrti’s Thought,” Sophia 57 (2018): 313–335; Sonam Kachru, “Ratnakīrti and the Extent of Inner Space: An Essay on Yogācāra and the Threat of Genuine of Solipsism,” Sophia 58 (2019): https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0707-8; Jay L. Garfield, “I Take Refuge in the Sangha. But how? The Puzzle of Intersubjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy, Comments on Tzohar, Prueitt, and Kachru,” Sophia 58 (2019): https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0708-7.
A Buddhist Philosophical Approach to Intersubjectivity
CFS Lecture by Roy Tzohar, Department of East Asian Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel
In this talk I propose that there is a uniquely Buddhist philosophical conception of intersubjectivity, and explore some of its expressions in the Buddhist conception of experience, language, and the social realm. For the Buddhist philosophical schools of thought, intersubjective experiences were of interest not just for their role in bridging the self and others, but also because they allegedly involve an emergent notion of objectivity. Given the Buddhist metaphysics of momentariness and causality and the critique of the first-person perspective, intersubjectivity posed a particularly tenacious explanatory challenge for Buddhist thought. In discussing how this challenge was met, I focus in particular on the strategies devised by one Buddhist school, the Indian Yogācāra, to explain intersubjective agreement under a view of phenomena as mind-dependent. This explanation, I show, involved an ironic inversion of the realist premise, since it proceeds by arguing that intersubjective agreement not only does not require the existence of mind-independent objects but is in fact incompatible with their existence. By delineating the phenomenological complexity underlying this account, I unpack the emergent Yogācāra account of intersubjectivity along with its implications for the understanding of being, the life-world, and alterity, and argue that it proposes a radical revision of the way in which we conceive of the “shared” and “private” distinction with respect to experiences, both ordinarily and philosophically.
Roy Tzohar specializes in the history of philosophy with a focus on Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophical traditions in India. He is currently an assistant professor in the East Asian Studies Department at Tel Aviv University. He holds a PhD from the Religion Department at Columbia University (New York, 2011), and an M.A. in philosophy from Tel Aviv University’s Interdisciplinary Program for Outstanding Students (Tel Aviv, 2004). His research, under the Marie Curie IRG fellowship, concerns intersubjectivity and language in the Indian Buddhist Yogācāra thought. His monograph “Meaning in the World and in Texts: A Buddhist Theory of Metaphor” is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
My Related Posts
Self and Other: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity
Meditations on Emptiness and Fullness
Indira’s Net: On Interconnectedness
Third and Higher Order Cybernetics
The Great Chain of Being
Law of Dependent Origination
Key Sources of Research
The Buddhist Philosophical Conception of Intersubjectivity: an Introduction.
Buddhism has become one of the main dialogue partners for different psychotherapeutic approaches. As a psychological ethical system, it offers structural elements that are compatible with psychotherapeutic theory and practice. A main concept in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and postmodern psychoanalysis is intersubjectivity. In relational psychoanalysis the individual is analysed within a matrix of relationships that turn out to be the central power in her/his psychological development. By realising why one has become the present individual and how personal development is connected with relationships, the freedom to choose and create a life that is independent from inner restrictions should be strengthened. In Mahāyāna-Buddhism, intersubjectivity is the result of an understanding of all phenomena as being in interdependent connection. Human beings are a collection of different phenomena and in constant interchange with everything else. Personal happiness and freedom from suffering depends on how this interchange can be realised in experience. The article focuses on the philosophical psychological fundaments in both approaches and emphasises clarification of to what the term ‘intersubjectivity’ exactly refers. This clarification is essential for the current dialogues, as well as further perspectives in this interdisciplinary field.
Intersubjectivity in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and Relational Psychoanalysis.
Intersubjectivity as an antidote to stress: Using dyadic active inference model of intersubjectivity to predict the efficacy of parenting interventions in reducing stress—through the lens of dependent origination in Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy
Ho S. Shaun, Nakamura Yoshio, Gopang Meroona, Swain James E.
“CHAPTER 11 What Is the Buddha Looking At? The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the T’ien-t’ai Tradition as Understood by Chih-li”
Ziporyn, Brook.
In Buddhism in the Sung edited by Daniel A. Getz and Peter N. Gregory, 442-476. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780824843649-013
In this volume, volume 6, I will deal with insight and understanding, meaning and communication and intersubjectivity. (In an appendix I will include a number of -isms, cognitive biases and fallacies that might interfere in, with and distort these things.)
The latter is pre-supposed by, present, necessary and operating in all four of these notions when they are employed as verbs. I hope and intend to employ these words and explore them without the need for ghost-in-the-machine like mysterious, mystical and mythical ‘mental’ processes and organs such as ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ but by means of different meanings, dimensions, levels of t notions of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity enfolds (like a pregnant mother her foetus) insight, understanding, meaning and communication. Intersubjectivity is the beginning, the ground and reason for and the end of all meanings or sense that human beings could have. I am not interested in all the details of insight, experience, understanding, meaning, concepts and ideas, dialogue, discourse, interaction, communication (for example as speculated about by Habermas and his followers, Brandom et al). etc but merely the fact that these things require, assume, presuppose (different aspects, features, functions, processes, etc of) intersubjectivity. For those who are so inclined they could execute experiments (for example in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, sociology, cognitive sciences, anthropology, etc) to establish that what I state here is a fact and not merely speculate. I will leave speculation - about the activities and nature of the first, second and third person (the public, etc) participants in the activities and process of communication, the question of second and third contingencies, or Habermas’s interactionist cum dialogical intersubjectivity and/or Brandom’s discursive intersubjectivity, the insufficiency of the former’s coordination and the need for synthesis, modes of structuration and the temporal dimensions of communication, threefold semiotic or twofold semiological structuralist theories of signs, theories of individualist or collective learning, action-directing models cultural models, pre-supposed structural features of the social relationships that are involved in communication, the structure parameters of for example the process of communication embedded in an intersubjective context (I would say all the following themselves are intersubjective), as discursive practice, including discourse, argumentation, communication, communication exchange, linguistic communication, everyday communication, interaction, etc - those, especially Continentals and those influenced by them, who suffer from the need for metaphysical speculation and to ontologize in complex terms about the most simple and obvious notions.
The reason for these attitudes of mine towards mental things, processes, organs, etc is that I do not believe they exist, apart from being umbrella-notions that refer to a number of undefined and not yet conceptualized meanings. They have their origins in uneducated, uninformed redundant myths and folk psychology. Their usage date back to almost pre-historic times in the evolution of human thinking and psychology and are conceptual remainders and linguistic left overs of primitive flat earth socio-cultural attitudes and beliefs.
I further need to make four points concerning my approach in this volume and my approach to or understanding of philosophy, they manner or style in which I write, especially in this volume and how I employ and interpret the nature and one function of intersubjectivity, both in this volume and in general. The latter I present as a kind of hypothesis and conclusion.
Institutionalized and internalized, competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality, including of themselves (Dennett and Sellars),. This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive, understanding intersubjectivity. It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding (scientific, Dennett and Sellars) image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics and morality deal with the reality of competence intersubjectivity (by means of socio-cultural practices that are derived from, based on an created by means of this restrictive, misleading, unreal, illusory, unrealistic intersubjectivity and the life-worlds associated with it) and human life-worlds constituted on the basis of and in terms of this intersubjectivity. This is why I am a nihilist, a libertarian, at least a minarchist or rather an anarchist and epistemologically a sceptic.
Kant’s things in themselves are similar to Dennett and Searle’s notions of manifest and scientific image. With my addition that we are socialized and internalize the competent, know how to do it, institutionalized manifest, everyday intersubjectivity, instead of the comprehension, insights and understanding knowing that, scientific intersubjectivity of all scientific disciplines.
Buddhist practices can be understood as inquiries into individual experience within a community, whereas analytic psychotherapy is an inquiry into mutual discovery through a dyadic relationship. While Buddhism invites us to investigate the subjective and objective worlds, psychotherapy especially invites us to investigate the intersubjective. In this program, we will explore both the resonances and divergences between psychotherapy and Buddhist practice in these regards, focusing on selected strands in depth psychology and psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and Zen, Pure Land Buddhism, and Vipassana Mindfulness, on the other. Themes of subjectivity, objectivity, and intersubjectivity will be especially helpful in thinking through Buddhism in a Western context, where the majority of practitioners are living in couple and family relationships. The program emphasizes both embodied practice and reflective inquiry.
Buddhist Notion of Intersubjectivity.
Bandyopadhyay, P. S. (Guest ed.), Tzohar, R. (Guest ed.), & Davis, J. (Guest ed.) (2019).
This paper disputes the claim that the so-called soul-body dualism finds its solution in the analysis of the intersubjectivity from the viewpoint of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and in the concept of selflessness in the philosophy of Mahayana-Buddhism. The intentionality of instinctual drive as the passive synthesis provides the reason for Husserl’s intersubjectivity and the possibility of Buber’s I-Thou relation. The selflessness in this relation is the concept of Buber’s thou and in Husserl’s intersubjectivity lies in the interesting connection with the non-egological dimension of Buddhism.
“‘I’ Without ‘I am’: On the Presence of Subjectivity in Early Buddhism, in the Light of Transcendental Phenomenology”.
Ordinary Mind: Exploring the Common Ground of Zen and Psychotherapy (Book Review)
Title: Ordinary Mind: Exploring the Common Ground of Zen and Psychotherapy Author: Magid, Barry Publisher: Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002 Reviewed By: Susan B. Parlow, Winter 2004, pp. 34-36
LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
Empathy and Consciousness
Evan Thompson
First a consulting report prepared for the Fetzer Institute (Kalamazoo, MI) that also served as the discussion paper for the meeting I convened at Fetzer on ‘The Intersubjectivity of Human Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology and Cognitive Science’ (Sep- tember 24–27, 1999), and the second my opening address to this meeting.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, No. 5–7, 2001, pp. 1–32
Intersubjectivity Theory Revisited: A 30-Year Retrospective,
Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism, edited by G. E. Atwood, & R. D. Stolorow (2014). New York, NY: Routledge,
The author views the analytic enterprise as centrally involving an effort on the part of the analyst to track the dialectical movement of individual subjectivity (of analyst and analysand) and intersubjectivity (the jointly created unconscious life of the analytic pair—the analytic third). In Part I of this paper, the author discusses clinical material in which he relies heavily on his reverie experiences to recognize and verbally symbolize what is occurring in the analytic relationship at an unconscious level. In Part II, the author conceives of projective identification as a form of the analytic third in which the individual subjectivities of analyst and analysand are subjugated to a co-created third subject of analysis. Successful analytic work involves a superseding of the subjugating third by means of mutual recognition of analyst and analysand as separate subjects and a reap-propriation of their (transformed) individual subjectivities.
The relational unconscious is the fundamental structuring property of each interpersonal relation; it permits, as well as constrains, modes of engagement specific to that dyad and influences individual subjective experience within the dyad. Three usages of the concept of thirdness are delineated and contrasted with the concept of the relational unconscious, which, it is suggested, has the advantage of being both consistent with existing views of unconscious processes and more directly applicable to therapeutic concerns. Enactments and intersubjective resistances are viewed as clinical manifestations of the relational unconscious, and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis results, in part, from altering the structure of the relational unconscious that binds analysand and analyst.
In this book, Lewis Kirshner explains and illustrates the concept of intersubjectivity and its application to psychoanalysis. By drawing on findings from neuroscience, infant research, cognitive psychology, Lacanian theory, and philosophy, Kirshner argues that the analytic relationship is best understood as a dialogic exchange of signs between two subjects—a semiotic process. Both subjects bring to the interaction a history and a set of unconscious desires, which inflect their responses. In order to work most effectively with patients, analysts must attend closely to the actual content of the exchange, rather than focusing on imagined contents of the patient’s mind. The current situation revives a history that is shaped by the analyst’s participation.
Intersubjective Systems Theory in Psychoanalysis – An Overview
George E. Atwood, Robert D. Stolorow, and Donna M. Orange are the core theorists of intersubjective systems theory, a form of psychoanalytic practice that focuses on the relational origins of mental distress and does so through the interpersonal and intersubjective relationship of the analyst and analysand.
These theorists, all of whom are practicing psychoanalysts, have rejected the Cartesian version of self as a unitary, isolated entity, and have likewise rejected mental illness as an intrapsychic dysfunction. In their model, which relies heavily on phenomenological philosophy as its explanatory foundation, the patient’s troubles (excluding organic disease or physical trauma) exist only within the experiential and relational contexts in which they developed.
There are two powerful and often implicit beliefs that underlie most current psychotherapeutic models: (1) the Myth of Modeling, “a way of thinking which over-emphasizes the conscious, cognitive, rational and technique based aspects of the psychoanalytic encounter” (Mikko Martela and Esa Saarinen, 2008), and (2) the Myth of the Isolated Mind (Stolorow and Atwood 2002), a remnant of the Cartesian dualism that has infected Western philosophy until the middle of the 20th Century and still is embedded in modern psychology.
Intersubjective systems theory (IST, or intersubjectivity theory) proposes that minds are not isolated, unitary things that exist as individual entities, as though in a vacuum. Rather, minds exist within interpersonal and intersubjective relationships, beginning at birth (and even before) with the attachment bond to the mother, and they develop within interpersonal, intersubjective, relational contexts.
Here is a wide-angle definition of intersubjectivity from Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish (2009):
Gillespie, A. & Cornish, F. (2009). Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 40:1; 20-46.
Intersubjectivity is central to the social life of humans. Thus, unsurprisingly, research pertaining, either directly or indirectly, to intersubjectivity spans many research areas of psychology. In developmental psychology it lies just below the surface of widely used concepts such as decentration (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), theory of mind (Doherty, 2008) and perspective taking (Martin, Sokol and Elfers, 2008). In neuroscience, intersubjectivity has recently become a popular topic with the discovery of “mirror neurons” which are thought to provide a neurological basis for imitation, theory of mind, language, and social emotions (Hurley & Chater, 2005). In the field of comparative psychology, there has been a surge of interest in intersubjectivity, in the form of investigations of possible perspective-taking amongst, for example, monkeys (Tomasello, Call and Hare, 2003) and scrub jays (Emery & Clayton, 2001). Intersubjectivity, going by various names, is also central to research on communication. Phenomena such as addressivity, double voiced discourse, and dialogue are deeply intersubjective (Linell, 2009). Intersubjectivity has also been identified as important in small group research because it has been found that mutual understanding within small groups creates increased efficiency, reliability and flexibility (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Research on self and identity has long emphasised the importance of Self’s perceptions of Other’s perceptions of Self (James, 1890; Howarth, 2002). In the field of counselling, much therapeutic effort is directed at resolving misunderstandings and feelings of being misunderstood both of which indicate dysfunctional intersubjective relations (Cooper, 2009). (p. 20)
Unfortunately, intersubjective theory falls into an area of overlap between psychology and sociology, and the insularity of each has precluded any serious cooperation in terms of research. Most of the research has been done in the realm of psychology and philosophy (especially by Stolorow and Orange).
Mind, as understood by current developmental research, is a relational construction. As we have discussed previously, there is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity and there can be no intersubjectivity without subjectivity (Buirski and Haglund, 2001). That is, subjective worlds of personal experience are inextricably embedded in intersubjective systems. When viewed from a systems or contextual perspective, distinctions, like those between one-person and two-person psychologies, are revealed as too limited because worlds of personal experience encompass more than just the two people involved. (p. 4)
Kenneth Gergen (Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community, 2009) offers another way of looking at this, specifically at the therapeutic relationship within a relational context.
We now turn to the therapeutic relationship itself. From the present standpoint, how are we to understand the relationship between therapist and client, its potentials, and its efficacy? In responding to this question, we are invited to think beyond the tradition of bounded being in which the aim of therapy is to “cure” the mind of the individual client. The metaphors of the therapist as one who “plumbs the depths,” or serves as a mechanic of the cognitive machinery must be bracketed. We also set aside the causal model in which the therapist acts upon the client to produce change. Rather, we are invited to view the therapist and client as engaged in a subtle and complex dance of co-action, a dance in which meaning is continuously in motion, and the outcomes of which may transform the relational life of the client.
Consider the situation: Both therapist and client enter the therapeutic relationship as multi-beings. Both carry with them the residues of multiple relationships. Therapists bring not only a repertoire of actions garnered from their history of therapeutic relations; they also carry potentials from myriad relations stretching from childhood to the present. Likewise, clients enter carrying a repertoire of actions, some deemed problematic, but alongside a trove of less obvious alternatives. The primary question, then, is whether the process of client/therapist coordination can contribute to a transformation in relationships of extended consequence. Can their dance together reverberate across the client’s relational plane in such a way that more viable coordination results? This is no small challenge, for the client’s plane of relationships is complex and fluid. (p. 282, Kindle Edition)
Much of IST is based in philosophy. Stolorow and his collaborators believe that in order to make sense of the therapeutic relationship, we need make objects of our subjective beliefs about the mind. If we believe in a unitary, isolated mind, we are going to relate to our clients as objects to be fixed, to see their pain as faulty scripts that we have the expertise to reprogram.
But if we believe in the social construction of mind within its physical, intrapsychic, intersubjective, and environmental contexts, then we are more likely to approach the client with a relational and co-constructive perspective on the therapeutic process, where healing comes from relationship and process (for example, the co-transference process).
This is how they explain the need for self-analysis:
Atwood, G.E., Stolorow, R.D. & Orange, D.M. (2011, Jun). The Madness and Genius of Post-Cartesian Philosophy: A Distant Mirror. Psychoanalytic Review, 98(3), 263-285.
In studying the psychological sources of philosophical ideas, we go against a pervasive opinion in contemporary intellectual circles that is rooted in Cartesianism. This opinion, perhaps surprising in its prevalence so long after the life and death of Descartes, arises from a continuing belief—one could almost say a mystical faith—in the autonomy of the life of the mind. The products of the mind are in this view to be treated as independent, self-sufficient creations, verified, falsified, or otherwise evaluated according to criteria that exist apart from the personal contexts out of which they arise. Any attempt to bring considerations of origin to bear on the understanding and development of intellectual works is seen to exemplify the unforgivable fallacy of ad hominem reasoning. It is therefore said that the study of the individual details of a thinker’s life, although perhaps of some limited interest as simple biography, can in principle have no relevance to the broader enterprise of the development or evaluation of that thinker’s work in its own terms. Intellectual constructions are claimed to have a life of their own, freely subsisting in the realm of public discourse, above and beyond the historical particularities of specific contributors’ personal life circumstances. (p. 264)
Our thesis here is that the task of self-analysis must be extended to the philosophical premises underlying psychoanalytic inquiry which, like all specific theoretical ideas in the field, also necessarily embody the analyst’s personal forms of being. Our approach to this great task is to study the individual worlds of selected post-Cartesian philosophers, with the aim of comprehending the psychological sources of each thinker’s specific repudiation of Cartesian doctrines. We hope to use the insights gained in this study as a distant mirror to which we may turn for a clarifying glimpse of how our own departures from the Cartesian view also reflect the patterns of our specific personal worlds. It is our additional faith that such an undertaking of self-reflection carries with it the possibility of the opening up of new pathways of inquiry for our discipline and the enrichment of psychoanalytic practice. (p. 266-267)
The following quotes are from Stolorow (in an interview) on the practice of IST in a clinical setting, which is it becomes useful for me as a clinician. It is important to note that there is no uniform body of technique to which all proponents of ITS adhere, nor is there any standardized or manualized series of interventions. If there is one thing upon which they all agree it’s that every treatment is unique and must be created anew by its participants. So even Stolorow is only speaking for himself here, not for all the other advocates for ITS.
Stolorow, R., & Sassenfeld, A. (2010, Summer). A Phenomenological-Contextual Psychoanalyst: Intersubjective-Systems Theory and Clinical Practice. Psychologist-Psychoanalyst: APA Division 39, Psychoanalysis; 6-10.
I describe intersubjective-systems theory as a “phenomenological contextualism.” It is phenomenological in that it investigates organizations or worlds of emotional experience. It is contextual in that it claims that such organizations of emotional experience take form, both developmentally and in the therapeutic situation, in constitutive intersubjective contexts.
Developmentally, recurring patterns of intersubjective transaction within the developmental system give rise to principles that unconsciously organize subsequent emotional and relational experiences. Such unconscious organizing principles are the basic building blocks of the personality. They show up in the therapeutic situation in the form of transference, which intersubjective systems theory conceptualizes as unconscious organizing activity. The patient’s transference experience is co-constituted by the patient’s unconscious organizing principles and whatever is coming from the analyst that is lending itself to being organized by them. A parallel statement can be made about the analyst’s transference. The interplay of the patient’s transference and the analyst’s transference is an example of what we call an intersubjective field or system.
From an intersubjective-systems perspective, all of the clinical phenomena with which psychoanalysis has been traditionally concerned: manifest psychopathology, transference, resistance, therapeutic impasses, therapeutic action, emotional conflict, indeed, the unconscious itself are seen as taking form within systems constituted by the interplay between differently organized, mutually influencing subjective worlds. (p. 6)
And more from the 2010 interview with Sassenfeld:
One’s philosophical presuppositions, and one’s awareness or unawareness of them, can have a monumental clinical impact. For example, the Cartesian objectivist analyst who sees himself/herself as treating deranged isolated minds and correcting “distortions” of what he/she “knows” to be true can unwittingly retraumatize his/her patients by repeating devastating early experiences of massive invalidation. On the other hand, the phenomenological-contextualist analyst, in seeking to understand and make sense out his/her patients’ experiences in terms of the contexts of meaning in which they occur, no matter how bizarre these experiences may seem to be, helps to create a therapeutic bond in which genuine psychological transformation can gradually take place. (p. 6-7)
But this does not lead inevitably to some form of navel-gazing relativism.
A phenomenological, contextualist, perspectivalist stance, although embracing a fallibilistic attitude of epistemological humility and a level epistemological playing field in the therapeutic situation (no one has privileged access to truth and reality), should not be confused with postmodern nihilism or relativism. Relativity to context and to perspective is not the same thing as a relativism that considers every framework to be as good as the next. Pragmatically, some ideas are better than others in facilitating psychoanalytic inquiry and the psychoanalytic process. Moreover, we do not abandon the search for truth, that is, for lived experience.
Intersubjectivity theory holds that closer and closer approximations of such truth are gradually achieved through a psychoanalytic dialogue in which the domain of reflective awareness is enlarged for both participants. Truth, in other words, is dialogic, crystallizing from the inescapable interplay of observer and observed.
My own phenomenological orientation did not, by the way, originate in Kohut’s self psychology. Its origins go back to a series of studies that George Atwood and I conducted in the early and mid-1970s investigating the personal subjective origins of four psychoanalytic theories. These studies were collected together in our first book, Faces in a Cloud, which was completed in 1976 (although not published until 1979), one year prior to the birth of Kohut’s self psychology. In the concluding chapter of our book, we reasoned that, since psychoanalytic theories can be shown to a significant degree to be shaped by the personal subjectivity of their creators, what psychoanalysis needs to be is a theory of subjectivity itself–a depth psychology of personal experience broad enough to encompass, not only the phenomena that other theories address, but also these theories themselves. We christened pur proposed framework “Psychoanalytic Phenomenology,” but that appellation never caught on. It was that framework that gradually evolved into intersubjective-systems theory.
A phenomenological emphasis does not in anyway entail abandonment of the exploration of unconsciousness. Going back to the father of philosophical phenomenology; Edmund Husserl, phenomenological inquiry has never been restricted to mere description of conscious experiences. Phenomenological investigation has always been centrally concerned with the structures that unconsciously organize conscious experience. Whereas philosophical phenomenologists are concerned with those structures that operate universally, a psychoanalytic phenomenologist seeks to illuminate those principles that unconsciously organize individual worlds of experience. Such principles include, importantly, those that dictate the experiences that must be prevented from coming into full being, that is, repressed, because they are prohibited or too dangerous. Intersubjective-systems theory emphasizes that all such forms of unconsciousness are constituted in relational contexts. The very boundary between conscious and unconscious (the repression barrier) is seen, not as a fixed intrapsychic structure within an isolated mind, but as a property of ongoing dynamic intersubjective systems. Phenomenology leads us inexorably to contextualism. (p. 7)
According to Orange (1995, p. 8), “Intersubjectivity theory sees human beings as organizers of experience, as subjects. Therefore it views psychoanalytic treatment as a dialogic attempt of two people to understand one person’s organization of emotional experience by ‘making sense together’ of their shared experience” (p. 26)
Another note of clarification is needed here. Although ITS makes a point of the co-transference and the co-creation on the intersubjective space, there is not full equality in the relationship. I, as the therapist, am talking less than my client and offering questions, clarifications, or interpretations when I do speak, while the client is telling me the story of who s/he is and how it feels to be in that subjective space.
In practice, what a ITS psychotherapist says in a session may look no different than what any experienced psychotherapist might say in a session. Buirski (2005) notes:
I try to articulate my grasp of the other’s subjective world of experience, which is what I believe most good therapists, regardless of theory, do most of the time. Perhaps the difference lies in the inverse: what distinguishes the therapist working from the intersubjective systems perspective from the therapists working from other orientations is to be found more in what they do not do or say than in what they actually do or say. For example, we try to avoid taking an objectivist stance, assuming that we are privy to some greater authority or knowledge than the other. And we avoid pathologizing, which is revealed by a focus on the person’s maladaptive behaviors or motives, like his masochism. Instead we wonder about how the person’s striving for health might be obscured by behaviors or motives that appear self-defeating. (xvi-xvii).
Finally, the following comments from Stolorow come from a 1998 article/response to another author (George Frank) who had raised objections to the ITS model. This piece is an attempt to explain the foundational ideas of intersubjective systems theory more clearly (and to discredit the critic). Stolorow and his collaborators were getting a lot of push-back from more traditional psychoanalytic therapists who thought they were staging a coup (they were, really, bringing a whole new perspective into the psychoanalytic and therapeutic equation). There are many similar articles from the 1990s, including some from Donna Orange, as well.
Stolorow, R.D. (1998). Clarifying the intersubjective perspective: A reply to George Frank. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 15(3), 424-427. doi: 10.1037/0736-9735.15.3.424
In response to Frank, G. (1998). The intersubjective school of psychoanalysis: Concerns and questions. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 15(3), 420-423. doi:10.1037/0736-9735.15.3.420
I have quoted almost all of the article since it was short and the material is less coherent without the full context.
First, the collaborators of intersubjectivity theory have not sought to create yet another “school of psychoanalysis,” if what is meant by that phrase is a fixed metapsychological doctrine with accompanying rules of technique. Rather, the intersubjective perspective offers a unifying framework for conceptualizing psychoanalytic work of all theoretical schools. The hallmark of our viewpoint is a clinical sensibility emphasizing “the inescapable interplay of observer and observed” (Orange, Atwood, & Stolorow, 1997, p. 9). It is not our aim to have our theory replace Freud’s “as the theory that can explain the psychological life of humans” (Frank, 1998, p. 420). On the contrary, intersubjectivity theory exists at a different level of abstraction and generality than does Freud’s and other psychoanalytic theories, in that it does not posit particular psychological contents that are presumed to be universally salient in personality development and in pathogenesis. It is a process theory offering broad methodological and epistemological principles for investigating and comprehending the intersubjective contexts in which psychological phenomena, including psychoanalytic theories (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993), arise. It also provides a framework for integrating different psychoanalytic theories by contextualizing them. From an intersubjective perspective, the content themes of various metapsychological doctrines can be de-absolutized, de-universalized, and recognized as powerful metaphors and imagery that can become salient in the subjective worlds of some people under particular intersubjective circumstances (Orange et al., 1997).
Second, we have never made the absurd claim, which Frank attributed to us, that “there is no objective reality” (Frank, 1998, p. 421). We have instead consistently maintained that objective reality is unknowable by the psychoanalytic method, which investigates only subjective reality as it crystallizes within the intersubjective field of an analysis. Frank was correct when he concluded that from our point of view the analyst has no privileged access to “what is really going on between patient and analyst.” All psychoanalytic understanding is interpretive. This means that there are no neutral or objective analysts, no immaculate perceptions, no God’s-eye views of anything. Intersubjectivity theory holds that closer and closer approximations of “what is really going on” are gradually achieved through an analytic dialogue in which the domain of reflective selfawareness is enlarged for both participants. There is no danger of solipsism or of relativism here, only a contextual, perspectival, and fallibilistic epistemology (Orange, 1995) that consistently “opens our horizons to expanded possibilities of meaning” (Orange et al., 1997, p. 89).
Third, Frank was incorrect when he inferred that our intersubjective contextualism means that we “have moved away from” (Frank, 1998, p. 422) our focus on the invariant principles that unconsciously organize experience:
Some may see a contradiction between the concept of developmentally preestablished principles that organize subsequent experiences and our repeated contention that experience is always embedded in a constitutive intersubjective context. This contradiction is more apparent than real. A person enters any situation with an established set of ordering principles (the subject’s contribution to the intersubjective system), but it is the context that determines which among the array of these principles will be called on to organize the experience. Experience becomes organized by a particular invariant principle only when there is a situation that lends itself to being so organized. The organization of experience can therefore be seen as codetermined both by preexisting principles and by an ongoing context that favors one or another of them over the others. (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 24)
Fourth, Frank confused the aim of analysis with the method of analysis when he mistakenly concluded that we advocate “analyzing] the interaction between patient and analyst to understand the nature of that interaction” (Frank, 1998, p. 422). From our perspective, the aim of an analysis has always been the illumination of the patient’s world of personal experience, but the method of investigation must continually take into account its own exquisite context sensitivity:
The development of psychoanalytic understanding may be conceptualized as an intersubjective process involving a dialogue between two personal universes. The goal of this dialogue is the illumination of the inner pattern of a life, that distinctive structure of meanings that connects the different parts of an individual’s world into an intelligible whole. The actual conduct of a psychoanalysis . . . comprises a series of empathic inferences into the structure of an individual’s subjective life, alternating and interacting with the analyst’s acts of reflection upon the involvement of his own personal reality in the ongoing investigation. (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, p. 5)
[Intersubjectivity theory] views psychoanalysis as the dialogic attempt of two people together to understand one person’s organization of emotional experience by making sense together of their intersubjectively configured experience. (Orange et al., 1997, p. 5)
Fifth, contrary to Frank’s misperception, there is nothing in our view of psychoanalytic investigation that could result in “ignoring the patient’s history” (Frank, 1998, p. 423):
Clinically, we find ourselves, our patients, and our psychoanalytic work always embedded in constitutive process. Process means temporality and history. To work contextually is to work developmentally. To work developmentally is to maintain a continuing sensibility to past, present, and future experience…. [It] affirms the emotional life of persons who have come from somewhere and are going somewhere. (Orange et al., 1997, p. 77)
Sixth, it is clear, I hope, that Frank (1998) seriously mischaracterized our views when he claimed that we “abandon” the intrapsychic world or adopt “an extreme position contra Freud’s intrapsychic orientation” (p. 423). I close with an explicit statement of our position on this matter:
We must emphasize, because we are often misunderstood on this point [!], that the intersubjective viewpoint does not eliminate psychoanalysis’s traditional focus on the intrapsychic. Rather, it contextualizes the intrapsychic. The problem with classical theory was not its focus on the intrapsychic, but its inability to recognize that the intrapsychic world, as it forms and evolves within a nexus of living systems, is profoundly context-dependent. (Orange et al., 1997, pp. 67-68)
Martela, M. & Saarinen, E. (2008). Overcoming the objectifying bias implicit in therapeutic practice – Intersubjective Systems Theory complemented with Systems Intelligence. Unpublished manuscript.
“Intersubjectivity and Physical Laws in Post-Kantian Theory of Knowledge Natorp and Cassirer”
Edgar, Scott.
In The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment edited by J Tyler Friedman and Sebastian Luft, 141-162. Berlin, München, Boston: De Gruyter, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110421811-007
Based on the work of Alfred Schutz, this article develops a theory of intersubjectivity—one of the basic building blocks of social experience—and shows how such a theory can be empirically leveraged in sociological work. Complementing the interactionist and ethnomethodological emphasis on the situated production of intersubjectivity, this paper revisits the basic theoretical assumptions undergirding this theory. Schutz tied intersubjectivity to the way people experience the world of everyday life: a world that he held as distinct from other provinces of meaning, such as religious experience, humor, or scientific reasoning. However, as this article shows, such neat distinctions are problematic for both empirical and theoretical reasons: The cognitive styles that define different provinces of meaning often bleed into one another; people often inhabit multiple provinces of meaning simultaneously. Intersubjectivity may thus be simultaneously anchored in multiple worlds, opening a host of empirical research questions: not only about how intersubjectivity is done in interaction, but about how different kinds of intersubjective experiences are constructed, how multi-layered they are, as well as opening up questions about possible asymmetries in the experiences of intersubjectivity.
Intersubjectivity Theory Revisited: A 30-Year Retrospective:
Chernus, Linda. (2017).
Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism, edited by G. E. Atwood, & R. D. Stolorow (2014). New York, NY: Routledge, 157 pp.,
Psychoanalytic Social Work. 24. 1-8. 10.1080/15228878.2017.1346516.
Correspondence: Thomas J. Csordas, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, Social Sciences Building 210, La Jolla, CA 92093-0532, USA E-mail: tcsordas@ucsd.edu
Robert D. Stolorow, Ph.D. and George E. Atwood, Ph.D.
In our early psychobiographical studies of Freud, Jung, Reich, and Rank (Stolorow and Atwood, 1979), we found that psychoanalytic metapsychologies derive profoundly from the personal, subjective worlds of their creators. This finding, which has a powerfully relativizing impact on one’s view of psychological theories, led us inexorably to the conclusion that what psychoanalysis needs is a theory of subjectivity itself‐a unifying framework that can account not only for the phenomena that other theories address but also for the theories themselves.
Our own proposals for such a framework (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992), have undergone a significant process of development during the past two decades, culminating in what we have come to call the theory of intersubjectivity. The central metaphor of our intersubjective perspective is the larger relational system or field in which psychological phenomena crystallize and in which experience is continually and mutually shaped. Our vocabulary is one of interacting subjectivities, reciprocal mutual influence, colliding organizing principles, conjunctions and disjunctions, attunements and malattunements‐a lexicon attempting to capture the endlessly shifting, constitutive intersubjective context of intrapsychic experience, both in the psychoanalytic situation and in the course of psychological development. From this perspective, the observer and his or her language are grasped as intrinsic to the observed, and the impact of the analyst and his or her organizing activity on the unfolding of the therapeutic relationship itself becomes a focus of analytic investigation and reflection.
Intersubjectivity theory is a field theory or systems theory in that it seeks to comprehend psychological phenomena not as products
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of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms, but as forming at the interface of reciprocally interacting worlds of experience. Psychological phenomena, we have repeatedly emphasized, “cannot be understood apart from the intersubjective contexts in which they take form” (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984, p. 64). Intrapsychic determinism thus gives way to an unremitting intersubjective contextualism. It is not the isolated individual mind, we have argued, but the larger system created by the mutual interplay
between the subjective worlds of patient and analyst, or of child and caregiver, that constitutes the proper domain of psychoanalytic inquiry. Indeed, as we have shown, the concept of an individual mind or psyche is itself a psychological product crystallizing from within a nexus of intersubjective relatedness and serving specific psychological purposes (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992).
Psychological Development and Pathogenesis
Intersubjectivity theory is both experience‐near and relational; its central constructs seek to conceptualize the organization of personal experience and its vicissitudes within an ongoing intersubjective system. It differs from other psychoanalytic theories in that it does not posit particular psychological contents (the Oedipus complex, the paranoid and depressive positions, separation‐ individuation conflicts, idealizing and mirroring longings, and so on) that are presumed to be universally salient in personality development and in pathogenesis. Instead, it is a process theory offering broad methodological and epistemological principles for investigating and comprehending the intersubjective contexts in which psychological phenomena arise. With regard to psychological development, for example, we have proposed that the “organization of the child’s experience must be seen as a property of the child‐caregiver system of mutual regulation” (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992, p. 23) and that it is the “recurring patterns of intersubjective transaction within the developmental system [that] result in the establishment of invariant principles that unconsciously organize the child’s subsequent experiences” (p. 24). The concept of intersubjectively derived unconscious organizing principles‐what we term the realm of “the prereflective unconscious” (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992)‐is our alternative to the notion of unconscious instinctual fantasy. It is these unconscious
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ordering principles, forged within the crucible of the child‐caregiver system, that form the basic building blocks of personality development and that constitute the quintessential focus of psychoanalytic investigation and interpretation. The essence of psychoanalytic cure lies in the establishment of new, alternative principles for organizing experience, so that the patient’s experiential repertoire becomes enlarged, enriched, more flexible, and more complex (Stolorow, 1994).
Increasingly, we have found that those principles that unconsciously organize patients’ experience of affect are of the greatest import clinically. From early recurring experiences of malattunement, patients have acquired the unconscious conviction that their unmet developmental yearnings and reactive feeling states are manifestations of a loathsome defect or of an inherent inner badness. Qualities or activities of the analyst that lend themselves to being interpreted according to such automatic meanings of affect, confirm the patient’s fears and expectations in the transference that emerging feelings will be met with disgust, disdain, disinterest, alarm, hostility, withdrawal, exploitation, and so on, or will damage the analyst and destroy the therapeutic bond. The investigation and illumination of these invariant meanings as they take form within the intersubjective dialogue between patient and analyst can produce powerful therapeutic reactions in liberating the patient’s affectivity and in strengthening the patient’s capacities for affect tolerance, integration, and articulation. We regard such expansion and enrichment of the patient’s affective life as central aims of an analytic process.
Any pathological constellation can be understood, from our perspective, only in terms of the unique intersubjective contexts in which it originated and is continuing to be maintained. “The intersubjective context,” we have contended, “has a constitutive role in all forms of psychopathology” (Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood, 1987, p. 3), and “the exploration of the particular patterns of intersubjective transaction involved in developing and maintaining each of the various forms of psychopathology is…one of the most important areas for continuing clinical psychoanalytic research” (p. 4). The proposition that psychopathology always takes form within a constitutive intersubjective context calls into question the very concept of psychodiagnosis (Atwood and Stolorow, 1993). What is diagnosed, from an intersubjective perspective, is not the patient’s
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psychological organization seen in isolation but the functioning of the entire therapeutic system. Similar considerations apply to the question of analyzability, which cannot be assessed on the basis of the patient’s psychological structures alone but must be recognized as a property of the patient‐analyst system‐the goodness of fit between what a particular patient most needs to have understood and what a particular analyst is capable of understanding.
Conflict Formation and the Dynamic Unconscious
The foregoing conceptualizations of development and pathogenesis are well illustrated by our formulation of the intersubjective origins of intrapsychic conflict:
The specific intersubjective contexts in which conflict takes form are those in which central affect states of the child cannot be integrated because they fail to evoke the requisite attuned responsiveness from the caregiving surround. Such unintegrated affect states become the source of lifelong inner conflict, because they are experienced as threats both to the person’s established psychological organization and to the maintenance of vitally needed ties. Thus affect‐dissociating defensive operations are called into play, which reappear in the analytic situation in the form of resistance….It is in the defensive walling off of central affect states, rooted in early derailments of affect integration, that the origins of what has traditionally been called the dynamic unconscious can be found.
(Stolorow et al., 1987, pp. 91‐92)
From this perspective, the dynamic unconscious is seen to consist not of repressed instinctual drive derivatives, but of affect states that have been defensively walled off because they evoked massive malattunement from the early surround. This defensive sequestering of central affective states, which attempts to protect against retraumatization, is a principal source of resistance in psychoanalytic treatment. We wish to emphasize that the shift from drives to affectivity as forming the basis for the dynamic unconscious is not merely a change in terminology. The regulation of affective experience is not a product of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms; it is a property of the child‐caregiver system of reciprocal mutual influence (Beebe, Jaffe, and Lachmann, 1992; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992). If we understand the dynamic unconscious as taking form within such a system, then it becomes apparent that the
boundary between ‐ 184 ‐
conscious and unconscious is always the product of a specific intersubjective context.1 This idea of a fluid boundary forming within an intersubjective system continues to apply beyond the period of childhood and is readily demonstrated in the psychoanalytic situation as well, wherein the patient’s resistance can be seen to fluctuate in concert with perceptions of the analyst’s varying receptivity and attunement to the patient’s emotional experience.
Transference and Countertransference
Our intersubjective view of conflict formation has been incorporated into our conceptualization of two basic dimensions of transference (or two broad classes of unconscious organizing principles) (Stolorow et al., 1987). In one, which we term the development, or following Kohut (1984), the selfobject dimension, the patient longs for the analyst to provide development enhancing experiences that were missing or insufficient during the formative years. In the other, called the repetitive dimension, which object relations theorists have attempted to capture metaphorically with such terms as “internal objects” and “internalized object relations,” and which is a source of conflict and resistance, the patient expects and fears a repetition with the analyst of early experiences of developmental failure.
These two dimensions continually oscillate between the experiential foreground and background of the transference in concert with perceptions of the analyst’s varying attunement to the patient’s emotional states and needs (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992). For example, when the analyst is experienced as malattuned, foreshadowing a traumatic repetition of early developmental failure, the conflictual and resistive dimension is frequently brought into the foreground, while the patient’s developmental yearnings are driven into hiding. On the other hand, when the analyst is able to analyze accurately the patient’s experience of rupture of the therapeutic bond, demonstrating an understanding of the patient’s reactive affect states and the principles that organize them, the developmental dimension becomes restored and strengthened, and the conflictual/resistive/repetitive dimension tends to recede, for the time being, into the background. Alternatively, at other times, the patient’s experience of the analyst’s understanding may heighten the conflictual and resistive aspect of the transference because it stirs the patient’s walled‐off
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longings and archaic hopes, along with dread of the retraumatization that the patient fears will follow from the exposure of these longings and hopes to the analyst. In still other circumstances, it is the repetitive dimension of the transference that is resisted because the patient fears that its articulation will jeopardize a precariously established and urgently needed selfobject tie to the analyst. For us, the essence of transference analysis lies in the investigative and interpretive tracking of these and other shifting figure‐ground relationships among the various dimensions of the transference as they take form within the ongoing intersubjective system constituted by the patient’s and analyst’s interacting worlds
of experience.
The foregoing description of the shifting figure‐ground relationships among dimensions of the transference applies not only to the patient’s transference but also to the analyst’s transference, usually termed countertransference. The larger system formed by the interplay between transference and countertransference is a prime example of what we call an intersubjective field or context. Transference and countertransference together form an intersubjective system of reciprocal mutual influence.
From the continual interplay between the patient’s and analyst’s psychological worlds two basic situations repeatedly arise: intersubjective conjunction and intersubjective disjunction (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992). The first of these is illustrated by instances in which the principles organizing the patient’s experiences give rise to expressions that are assimilated into closely similar central configurations in the psychological life of the analyst. Disjunction, by contrast, occurs when the analyst assimilates the material expressed by the patient into configurations that significantly alter its meaning for the patient. Repetitive occurrences of intersubjective conjunction and disjunction are inevitable accompaniments of the therapeutic process and reflect the interactions of differently organized subjective worlds.
When the analyst is able to become reflectively aware of the principles organizing his or her experience of the therapeutic relationship, then the correspondence or disparity between the subjective worlds of patient and analyst can be used to promote empathic understanding and insight. In the absence of reflective self‐awareness on the part of the analyst, such conjunctions and disjunctions can seriously impede the progress of an analysis. When the principles
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unconsciously organizing the experiences of patient and analyst in an impasse are successfully investigated and illuminated, however, we have found that such analysis can transform a therapeutic stalemate into a royal road to new analytic understandings for both patient and analyst (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992).
The therapeutic action of psychoanalytic interpretation is something that takes form within a specific intersubjective interaction, to which the psychological organizations of both analyst and patient make distinctive contributions. The analyst, with an awareness of his or her own personal organizing principles and their codetermining impact on the course of the therapeutic relationship, contructs, through sustained empathic inquiry, an interpretation of the meaning of the patient’s experience that enables the patient to feel deeply understood. The patient, from within the depths of his or her own subjective world, weaves that experience of being understood into the tapestry of unique mobilized developmental yearnings, permitting a thwarted developmental process to become reinstated and new organizing principles to take root. Psychoanalytic interpretations thus derive their mutative power from the intersubjective matrix in which they crystallize (Stolorow, 1994).
Some Technical Implications
Psychoanalytic theories that postulate universal psychodynamic contents also tend to prescribe rigid rules of therapeutic technique or style that follow from the theoretical presuppositions. Freudian drive theory, for example, prescribes for the analyst a “rule of abstinence.” The more general and encompassing nature of intersubjectivity theory, by contrast, allows for much greater flexibility, so long as the analyst consistently investigates the impact of his or her own techniques, style, and theoretical assumptions on the patient’s experience and on the course of the therapeutic process. This greater flexibility frees analysts to explore new modes of intervention and to discover hitherto unarticulated dimensions of personal experience.
The doctrine of intrapsychic determinism and corresponding focus on the isolated mind in psychoanalysis has historically been associated with an objectivist epistemology. Such a position envisions the mind in isolation, radically estranged from an external reality that it either accurately apprehends or distorts. Analysts embracing
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an objectivist epistemology presume to have privileged access to the essence of the patient’s psychic reality and to the objective truths that the patient’s psychic reality obscures. In contrast, the intersubjective viewpoint, emphasizing the constitutive interplay between worlds of experience, leads inevitably to an epistemological stance that is best characterized as “perspectivalist” (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992; Orange, 1994). Such a stance does not presume either that the analyst’s subjective reality is more true than the patient’s, or that the analyst can directly know the subjective reality of the patient; the analyst can only approximate the patient’s psychic reality from within the particularized scope of the analyst’s own perspective. A perspectivalist stance has a profound impact on the ambiance of the analytic situation, in that it is grounded in respect for the personal realities of both participants. Liberated from the need to justify and defend their experiences, both patient and analyst are freed to understand themselves, each other, and their ongoing relationship with increasing depth and richness.
Some Common Misunderstandings
In order to bring the assumptions underlying our theoretical framework more sharply into view, we close with a discussion of four common misunderstandings of the intersubjective perspective that we have encountered in dialogues with students and colleagues (Stolorow, Atwood, and Brandchaft, 1994).
1. The misunderstanding based on the fear of structureless chaos. The first misunderstanding involves a reading of our work as containing a claim that there is no psychic structure, pattern, or organization of personality that does not derive entirely from immediate, ongoing interactions with other people. Our vision of the individual person is thus seen as a portrait of an essentially formless void, radically vulnerable to and dependent on the shaping influence of events occurring in the interpersonal milieu. This misreading, exemplified by one critic’s characterization of our book Contexts of Being (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992) as promoting a “myth of the structureless mind,” fails to take into account the organizing activity that the individual contributes to every intersubjective field in which he or she participates. Here intersubjectivity theory is being interpreted as destroying the basis for concepts of
character, psychic continuity, the ‐ 188 ‐
achievement of regulatory capacities, and the development of complex psychological organizations. This misreading and criticism arise, we believe, because of a commitment on the part of such critics to what we have called the myth of the isolated mind (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992). Within the thinking of theorists of the isolated mind, the stability of character and of self‐experience becomes reified as a property of a mind or psyche having internal structures that exist separately from the embeddedness of experience in constitutive intersubjective fields. It is as if the isolated‐mind theorist cannot imagine a stable character or psychological organization unless it is pictured inside a spatialized mental apparatus or perhaps even inside the physical boundaries of the cranium. Intersubjectivity theory, which specifically dispenses with all such ideas, thus raises the specter for these theorists of falling into structureless chaos.
This misunderstanding involves an interpretation of what we call a constitutive intersubjective field as an all‐determining interpersonal milieu in which the individual is totally the product of interactions with others. Again, this interpretation ignores the contribution of that individual to each intersubjective transaction that occurs. Intersubjective fields are, by definition, codetermined and thus cocreated.
Let us consider in this connection the analytic dyad. According to the older, classical traditions in psychoanalysis, psychological structure and the processes and mechanisms of psychopathology are located inside the patient’s mind. This isolating focus of the classical perspective fails to do justice to every individual’s irreducible engagement with others and blinds psychoanalytic clinicians to the specific ways they are implicated in the phenomena they observe and seek to treat. The intersubjectively oriented analyst, by contrast, while committed to illuminating the unconscious organizing principles the patient brings to the analytic encounter, also understands that the psychopathological phenomena that are seen to unfold do so within an intersubjective field that includes the analyst as a codetermining influence.
A variant of the misunderstanding based on the fear of structureless chaos appears in a similarly mistaken conception of our view of the process of psychological development. Here our standpoint becomes confused with a naive environmentalism according to
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which the child’s psychological growth is interpreted as entirely the product of the shaping influence of external interpersonal events. The intersubjective view of psychological development embraces what Wallace (1985) terms “intersectional causation.” At any stage the child’s formative experiences are understood to emerge from the intersection of, and to be codetermined by, his or her psychological organization as it has evolved to that point and specific features of the caregiving surround. In this model, the development of the child’s psychological organization is always seen as an aspect of an evolving and maturing child‐caregiver system.
2. The misunderstanding based on the fear of surrendering one’s personal reality. The second misunderstanding concerns the epistemological stance of intersubjectivity theory and the problem of truth and reality. As we have said, a defining feature of our thinking lies in our not assigning any greater intrinsic validity to the analyst’s world of reality than to the patient’s. This is in contrast to an objectivist epistemology that posits an objective external world, a true world to which the analyst is presumed to have access. Corresponding to this latter stance, a goal of treatment inevitably materializes involving the bringing of the patient’s experiences into alignment with that objective reality. Such a goal appears in the notion of correcting transference distortions.
The misreading we are discussing here is the interpretation of our refraining from granting absolute validity to the analyst’s reality and not to the patient’s as somehow containing an injunction to analysts not to have a theoretical framework to order clinical data. It appears that our critics on this point cannot envision holding to their theoretical ideas without conferring upon those ideas an absolute validity, or at least a greater measure of truth than is ascribed to the patient’s ideas. The specter here is of losing a grip on any assumptions at all, of the dissolution of the analyst’s personal reality, leaving the analyst adrift in a sea of uncertainty, perhaps in danger of being swept into the vortex of the patient’s psychological world. A key distinction lost in this misunderstanding is that between holding an assumption or belief and elevating that assumption to the status of an ultimate, objective truth. Once such an elevation has taken place, the belief necessarily escapes the perimeter of what can be analytically reflected upon. Intersubjectivity theory contains a commitment to examining and analytically reflecting upon the impact of
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the analyst and his or her theories, as well as that of the patient’s organizing principles, on the analytic process. This means that there can be no belief or idea that in principle escapes the field of potential analytic investigation, even including the ideas of intersubjectivity theory itself (see Atwood and Stolorow, 1993).
3. The misunderstanding based on the fear of an annihilating ad hominem attack. The third misunderstanding pertains to our tendency to explore the formative psychological background of various ideas we discuss and criticize. An objection is sometimes raised on our analysis of the myth of the isolated mind, because of our focus of this doctrine as a symbol of alienated self‐experience (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992). We argued that the image of the isolated mind is a genuine myth in the sense of being a symbol of pervasive cultural experiences involving an alienation of the person from the physical world, from social life and engagement with others, and from the nature of subjectivity itself. We suggested further that this alienation exists for the purpose of disavowing a set of specific vulnerabilities that are in our time otherwise felt as unbearable. This discussion of alienation and the need to disavow vulnerability is not intended as an attack on theoretical viewpoints that embody the myth of the isolated mind; it is rather an attempt to explain why it is that an idea that has so manifestly hindered the development of psychoanalysis could nevertheless have maintained such a tenacious hold on thinkers in our field.
An ad hominem argument is one that seeks to dispose of a proposition or idea by pointing at the individual who espouses it. It would be an example of such a fallacious argument if we were maintaining that doctrines incorporating the idea of the isolated mind ought to be rejected simply because of the personal alienation and evasions of anguish shown by those who promulgate them. Clearly the value of a psychological or philosophical system needs to be assessed in relation to issues and traditions larger than the personal characteristics and events in a thinker’s life. The separation of the life out of which an idea originates and that idea itself is, however, not as clean as one might think in a discipline concerned with illuminating subjectivity; in fact, we view the total isolation of the personal context of origin from assessments of value and validity as still another manifestation of the alienation afflicting our field. We (Stolorow and Atwood, 1979) have addressed this issue as follows:
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It would be incorrect to view an explication of the personal realities embedded in psychological theories as giving no more than an account of the conditions of their genesis. Every [such] analysis delimits, in content as well as origin, the view being studied. It seeks not only to establish a relationship between the theorist and his works, but also to determine the particularization of scope of the theory, and hence to delimit its generality and validity. (pp. 22‐23).
Faces in a Cloud: Intersubjectivity in Personality Theory (1993) discusses the ways in which theories of personality symbolically crystallize central dimensions of the personal subjective world of the theorist, and the critical importance of the study of such relationships to the further development of personality theory. The concept of intersubjectivity was clearly implicit in the studies described in this work in that they pictured various theories as, on the one hand, reflecting the empirical domain of human experience to which they were addressed (more or less adequately) and, on the other hand, as also reflecting the psychological organization of the theorist. This is a prime example of what is meant by the idea of intersubjectivity.
4. The misunderstanding based on the fear of anarchy in the analytic relationship. The fourth misunderstanding pertains to the implications of intersubjectivity theory for the conduct of psychoanalytic treatment. A cardinal feature of the intersubjective perspective is the view of the analytic relationship in terms of an interaction between the subjective worlds of analyst and patient. The parity we ascribe to the worlds of patient and analyst at the level of abstract conceptualization of the therapeutic dyad becomes, however, misinterpreted as implying symmetry in that relationship at the level of concrete clinical practice. Here the authority ordinarily assumed by the analyst collapses, as the patient is thought to acquire a voice equal to that of the analyst in setting the conditions of the treatment. The theoretical vision of interacting subjective worlds thus becomes transposed into a picture of the decisions affecting the patient’s treatment being made on an egalitarian, democratic basis. The ultimate extreme of this overly concrete misinterpretation of intersubjectivity theory is the loss of the very distinction between patient and analyst. If the worlds of both participants are fully engaged in the analytic process, it is said, then what is left to tell us which of the two is the patient? If the life themes structuring the analyst’s world need to be constantly borne in mind as they impact on
the therapeutic process, ‐ 192 ‐
it is asked, whose analysis is it anyway? The disciplined practice of psychoanalytic treatment thereby threatens to dissolve into confusion and anarchy.
It seems to us that these misunderstandings arise because of an insufficiently abstract interpretation of the principles of intersubjectivity theory. The intersubjective perspective contains few concrete recommendations as to technique or style in the practice of psychoanalytic therapy; indeed, it is a perspective intended to be broad enough to accommodate a wide range of therapeutic styles and techniques, so long as the meanings and impact on the treatment process of these various approaches are made a focus of analytic investigation and reflection. The authority of the analyst is not comprised in any way by the adopting of an intersubjective standpoint, nor does this perspective necessarily introduce any confusion into the analytic dyad as to which participant is the patient. The asymmetry between analyst and patient seems to us to inhere in the very definition of a professional therapeutic relationship. The interacting meanings of this inherent asymmetry for the patient and the analyst may, of course, represent an important focus of analytic inquiry in the therapeutic dialogue.
Note
1 In addition to the prereflective and the dynamic unconscious, we have described a third intersubjectively derived form of unconsciousness‐the unvalidated unconscious: experiences that could not be consciously articulated because they never evoked validating responsiveness from the surround (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992).
Acknowledgment
This article contains material previously published in Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life, by R. Stolorow and G. Atwood (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1992), and in The Intersubjective Perspective, edited by R. Stolorow, G. Atwood, and B. Brandchaft (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1994). We thank the publishers for giving us permission to reuse this material.
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RUNNING HEAD: DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis
GILLESPIE, A. and CORNISH, F. (2010),
Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 40: 19–46. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00419.x;
Paper presented at the Fourth Congress of the International Society for Cultural Research and Activity Theory (ISCRAT 98), University of Aarhus, Denmark, June 7-11, 1998
READING BETWEEN THE MINDS: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERNISM FROM ROBERT BROWNING TO HENRY JAMES
by Jennie Hann A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2017
Intersubjectivity, Spirituality, and Disappointment in Group Therapy for Loss
Rachel Langford, PsyD, LP Sejal Patel, PsyD, LP Steven J. Sandage, PhD, LP David R. Paine, MA Sarah H. Moon, PsyD Miriam Bronstein, MSW Barbod Salimi, PhD
“An Intersubjective Theory of Value”, in Intersubjectivity in Economics: Agents and Structures, editor Edward Fullbrook. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 273-299. ISBN 0-415-26697-1 (hbk), ISBN 0-415-26698-X (pbk)
Stolorow, R. D., & Orange, D. M. (1999). Book Review: SUBJECTIVITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: A STUDY OF SARTRE, BINSWANGER, LACAN, AND HABERMAS.
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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED BY PAUL JULIAN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE SUBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY HARVARD UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS JANUARY 2017
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RUNNING HEAD: DIALOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis
Alex Gillespie1 Department of Psychology University of Stirling Stirling FK9 4LA UK Tel: + 44 (0) 1786 466841 alex.gillespie@stir.ac.uk Flora Cornish School of Health Glasgow Caledonian University Glasgow G4 0BA UK
The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity
Author(s): James Giles
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 175-200 Published by: University of Hawai’i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612 .
Awakening to Wholeness: Aikido as an Embodied Praxis of Intersubjectivity
2019
As a lifelong practitioner of Aikido, known as the ‘Art of Peace,’ the author reflects on how cultivating one’s ‘mind and body coordination’ through this defensive art develops embodied non-dissention. This principle is expressed and observed through calmer, more harmonious interaction with others and one’s entire life sphere. A non-competitive art that emerged in modern Japan from the deep spiritual values of its founder, Morihei Ueshiba (O Sensei) Aikido teaches one to blend with an attacker’s movements and ki (‘life force’ or ‘energy’). In the context of moving from ‘first person’ to ‘second-person’ contemplative education practices, this chapter explores through the lens of Aikido the implications of intersubjectivity as a double-bind paradox: How can dualistic consciousness of subject-object dichotomy apply itself to resolving human conflicts while inherently operating from a position of dualism that creates such conflict in the first place? Put yet another way, if one inhabits a dualistic consciousness regarding ‘other’ subject-objects then by the logic of such consciousness, one cannot be intersubjective, and hence, one cannot practice non-dissention. Reflections from Aikido pedagogy and training offer a transformative approach to relationality, one that offers contemplative education a model by which to transcend the habitual conditioning of subject-subject consciousness toward peaceful dialogic interconnectedness. The contention is that contemplative education practices in this way approach more engaged—and not split—intersubjectivity. Through a series of vignettes and explication, the author presents Aikido as a contemplative way of being and living that demands an intersubjective, second-person model of engagement. Thus, this model is based on the view of cosmos as interdependent relationality.
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE THROUGH SHARED SUFFERING : AN INTERSUBJECTIVE THEORY OF COMPASSION
2016
The value of compassion has often been appraised in terms of its benefits to the recipient, or its contribution to civil society. Less attention has been paid to the positive effect it may have upon the protagonists themselves, partly because compassion ostensibly appears to involve mainly dysphoric emotions (i.e., sharing another’s suffering). However, driven by the question of why traditions such as Buddhism and Christianity esteem compassion so highly, in this article, a theory of compassion is proposed that focuses on its transformative potential. In particular, I argue that compassion inherently involves a process of self-transcendence, enabling people to enter into an intersubjective state of selfhood. Drawing on Buddhist and Christian ideas, I then suggest that this intersubjective state is not only an antidote to the protagonists’ own suffering, but can accelerate their psychospiritual development. Thus, the article offers a new perspective on compassion that allows us to fully appreciate its transpersonal and transformative potential.
Intersubjectivity as an antidote to stress: Using dyadic active inference model of intersubjectivity to predict the efficacy of parenting interventions in reducing stress—through the lens of dependent origination in Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy
2022
Intersubjectivity refers to one person’s awareness in relation to another person’s awareness. It is key to well-being and human development. From infancy to adulthood, human interactions ceaselessly contribute to the flourishing or impairment of intersubjectivity. In this work, we first describe intersubjectivity as a hallmark of quality dyadic processes. Then, using parent-child relationship as an example, we propose a dyadic active inference model to elucidate an inverse relation between stress and intersubjectivity. We postulate that impaired intersubjectivity is a manifestation of underlying problems of deficient relational benevolence, misattributing another person’s intentions (over-mentalizing), and neglecting the effects of one’s own actions on the other person (under-coupling). These problems can exacerbate stress due to excessive variational free energy in a person’s active inference engine when that person feels threatened and holds on to his/her invalid (mis)beliefs. In support of this dyadic model, we briefly describe relevant neuroimaging literature to elucidate brain networks underlying the effects of an intersubjectivity-oriented parenting intervention on parenting stress. Using the active inference dyadic model, we identified critical interventional strategies necessary to rectify these problems and hereby developed a coding system in reference to these strategies. In a theory-guided quantitative review, we used this coding system to code 35 clinical trials of parenting interventions published between 2016 and 2020, based on PubMed database, to predict their efficacy for reducing parenting stress. The results of this theory-guided analysis corroborated our hypothesis that parenting intervention can effectively reduce parenting stress if the intervention is designed to mitigate the problems of deficient relational benevolence, under-coupling, and over-mentalizing. We integrated our work with several dyadic concepts identified in the literature. Finally, inspired by Arya Nagarjuna’s Buddhist Madhyamaka Philosophy, we described abstract expressions of Dependent Origination as a relational worldview to reflect on the normality, impairment, and rehabilitation of intersubjectivity.
Meditation Effects in the Social Domain: Self-Other Connectedness as a General Mechanism?
2014
Recent theories and findings in psychology and neuroscience suggest that self and other are interconnected, both on a conceptual and on a more basic bodily-affective representational level. Such self-other connectedness is supposed to be fundamental to empathy, social bonding and compassion. Meditation techniques – in particular mindfulness and loving-kindness meditation – have been found to foster these social capacities. Therefore, this contribution brings together both fields of research. In a first step, we examine self and other from the perspective of psychology and neuroscience, integrating findings from these fields into a dimension of mental functioning anchored to self-centeredness and self-other-connectedness, respectively. In a second step, we explore how mindfulness and loving-kindness meditation may act differentially upon this dimension. Finally, by referring to a recent experiment from our lab, it is illustrated how research hypotheses can be derived from this framework. Such investigations could help to comprehend meditation effects in the social domain, and more generally, further the scientific understanding of self and other.
Decentering the Self? Reduced Bias in Self- vs. Other-Related Processing in Long-Term Practitioners of Loving-Kindness Meditation
2016
TLDR
Preliminary evidence is provided that prolonged meditation practice may modulate self- vs. other-related processing, accompanied by an increase in compassion, which is needed to show if this is a direct outcome of loving-kindness meditation.
Abstract
Research in social neuroscience provides increasing evidence that self and other are interconnected, both on a conceptual and on an affective representational level. Moreover, the ability to recognize the other as “like the self” is thought to be essential for social phenomena like empathy and compassion. Meditation practices such as loving-kindness meditation (LKM) have been found to enhance these capacities. Therefore, we investigated whether LKM is associated to an increased integration of self–other-representations. As an indicator, we assessed the P300 event-related potential elicited by oddball stimuli of the self-face and a close other’s face in 12 long-term practitioners of LKM and 12 matched controls. In line with previous studies, the self elicited larger P300 amplitudes than close other. This effect was reduced in the meditation sample at parietal but not frontal midline sites. Within this group, smaller differences between self- and other-related P300 were associated with increasing meditation practice. Across groups, smaller P300 differences correlated with self-reported compassion. In meditators, we also investigated the effect of a short LKM compared to a control priming procedure in order to test whether the state induction would additionally modulate self- vs. other-related P300. However, no effect of the priming conditions was observed. Overall, our findings provide preliminary evidence that prolonged meditation practice may modulate self- vs. other-related processing, accompanied by an increase in compassion. Further evidence is needed, however, to show if this is a direct outcome of loving-kindness meditation.
Decentering the Self? Reduced Bias in Self- vs. Other-Related Processing in Long-Term Practitioners of Loving-Kindness Meditation.
In this paper, we start exploring the affective and ethical dimension of what De Jaegher and Di Paolo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:485–507, 2007) have called ‘participatory sense-making’. In the first part, we distinguish various ways in which we are, and feel, affectively inter-connected in interpersonal encounters. In the second part, we discuss the ethical character of this affective inter-connectedness, as well as the implications that taking an ‘inter-(en)active approach’ has for ethical theory itself.
This paper is part of a paper series on the Buddhist Notion of Intersubjectivity, published in this journal from 2017 to 2019, guest-edited by Roy Tzohar and Jake Davis. Readers are recommended to view these papers in the following order:
Tzohar, R. 2017. ‘Imagine Being a Preta: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to Intersubjectivity.’ Sophia, 56, 337–354;
Prueitt, C. 2018. ‘Karmic Imprints, Exclusion, and the Creation of the Worlds of Conventional Experience in Dharmakīrti’s Thought.’ Sophia, 57, 313–335;
Kachru, S. 2019. ‘Ratnakīrti and the Extent of Inner Space: An Essay on Yogācāra and the Threat of Genuine of Solipsism.’ Sophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0707-8;
Garfield, J. L. ‘I Take Refuge in the Sangha. But how? The Puzzle of Intersubjectivity in Buddhist Philosophy Comments on Tzohar, Prueitt, and Kachru.’ Sophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0708-7.
“The Self-Effacing Buddhist: No(t)-Self in Early Buddhism and Contemplative Neuroscience.”
Verhaeghen, Paul.
Contemporary Buddhism 18 (2017): 21 – 36.
Essential Others on the Path to Enlightenment: The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the Visuddhimagga’s Presentation of Progress along the Path
To See the Three Thousand Worlds in a Single Thought Moment (yi-nian san-qian 一念三千)
Three Truths (san-di 三諦)
The One Vehicle (eka-yāna; yisheng 一乘) and Buddha Nature (tathāgata-garbha; rulai zang 如來藏)
Five Times and Eight Teachings (wushi bajiao 五時八教)
Tiantai Buddhism
Source: From Tiantai to Hiei: Transborder and Transcultural Spread of Tiantai/Chontae/Tendai/ Buddhism & East Asian Societies
It would be difficult to find a more influential Chinese Buddhist monk than Tiantai Zhiyi 天台智顗 (538-597). He wrote a seminal treatise about Indian Buddhist meditation practices (e.g., Great Treatise on Concentration (śamatha) and Insight (vipśayanā), Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀), advocated for classifying the teachings (panjiao 判教) of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni into the five periods and eight teachings, and he wrote or monumental commentaries to three key Mahāyāna sūtras are attributed to him. These sūtras include the Lotus (Fahua xuanyi 法華玄義 and Fahua wenju 法華文句), Suvarṇabhāsottama (Jinguangming jing xuanyi 金光明經玄義 and Jingguangming jing wenju金光明經文句), and Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (Weimo jing xuanshu 維摩經玄疏 and Weimo jing wenshu 維摩經文疏). Furthermore, by the 9thcentury the temple on Mount Tiantai in present day Zhejiang province which legend says was commissioned immediately after his death by emperor Sui Wendi 隋文帝 (r. 581-604), Guoqing monastery 國清寺, had become the focus of pilgrimage by monks from Japan and Korea. Pilgrims including Saichō 最澄 (767-822), Ennin 圓仁 (794-864), and Enchin 圓珍 (814-191) returned with Zhiyi’s teachings and those from their contemporaries at Guoqing si to establish two of the most enduring monastic institutions in Japan: Enryakuji 延暦寺 on Mount Hiei 比叡山 and Onjōji 園城寺 (alt. Miidera 三井寺).The organizing committee for the international conference on “Tiantai Buddhism and East Asian Societies” cordially invites the submission of related papers. The conference is hosted by the Center for Buddhist Studies at Peking University 北京大學佛教研究中心 in Beijing, China, sponsored by the Cultural Exchange Center of Mount Tiantai 天台山文化交流中心, and co-organized by the From the Ground Up project based at the University of British Columbia (www.frogbear.org). The conference will be held between December 6 and 8, 2019 at Peking University.
Compared with other Buddhist traditions in East Asia, Tiantai/ Chontae/Tendai seems to have maintained particularly intensive and extensive engagement in doctrinal debates, resulting in the increasing deepening and widening of Buddhist teachings and practices as shown, among others, by the rare documents known as “Tōketsu” 唐決 (Authorizing Answers from Tang China). These documents amply demonstrate the multi-directional nature of the impacts between East Asian Buddhist communities and broach the extent to which Chinese Tiantai Buddhist scholiasts were influenced by their counterparts in Korea and Japan.
Tiantai adherents revolutionized the ritual life of Buddhism across China during the 10th and 11th centuries when the Jiangnan 江南 region remained a vibrant crossroads for monastics from across East Asia; Uicheon 義天 (1055-1101) traveled to Song China from Goryeo 高麗 Korea to meet eminent Tiantai and Huayan 華嚴 teachers. For nearly a millennium thereafter, monastics from the Tiantai or Tendai or Chontae traditions in China, Japan, and Korea interacted with members of other Buddhist traditions (esp. Vinaya, Chan, Huayan, or Esoteric Buddhism) and beyond to fundamentally shape religion in East Asia.
This conference seeks to address how Tiantai Buddhism spread throughout East Asia, and to explore how Tiantai teachings and teachers contributed to the multi-dimensional and multi-directional circulation of book culture in East Asia. In particular, we seek to investigate how Tiantai texts were exported from China to the rest of East Asia, and conversely how their re-importation back into China, especially from the Korean peninsula and Japan, transformed not only the intellectual history of East Asian Buddhism, but also how the trade in specifically Tiantai books—not necessarily Buddhist—can be an innovative lens through which to examine the social, economic, institutional, and religious life of East Asia.
Source: Tiantai Buddhism in China
A monk named Zhiyi (538-597; also spelled Chih-i) founded Tiantai and developed most of its doctrines, although the school considers Zhiyi to be either its third or fourth patriarch, not the first. Nagarjuna is sometimes considered the first patriarch. A monk named Huiwen (550–577), who may have first proposed the Three Truths doctrine, is sometimes considered the first patriarch and sometimes the second, after Nagarjuna. The next patriarch is Huiwen’s student Huisi (515-577), who was the teacher of Zhiyi.
Zhiyi’s school is named for Mount Tiantai, which is located in what is now the eastern coastal province of Zhejiang. The Guoqing Temple on Mount Tiantai, probably built shortly after Zhiyi’s death, has served as the “home” temple of Tendai through the centuries, although today it is mostly a tourist attraction.
After Zhiyi, Tiantai’s most prominent patriarch was Zhanran (711-782), who further developed Zhiyi’s work and also raised the profile of Tiantai in China. The Japanese monk Saicho (767-822) came to Mount Tiantai to study. Saicho established Tiantai Buddhism in Japan as Tendai, which for a time was the dominant school of Buddhism in Japan.
In 845 the Tang Dynasty Emperor Wuzong ordered all “foreign” religions in China, which included Buddhism, to be eliminated. Guoqing Temple was destroyed, along with its library and manuscripts, and the monks scattered. However, Tiantai did not become extinct in China. In time, with the help of Korean disciples, Guoqing was rebuilt and copies of essential texts were returned to the mountain.
Source: Tiantai Buddhism / SEP
In this article, the term “Tiantai” will be used to refer to the philosophical ideas developed from the sixth to eleventh centuries by this school, as expounded in the writings of its three most representative figures: Tiantai Zhiyi (538–597), Jingxi Zhanran (711–782) and Siming Zhili (960–1028).
Source: Tiantai / China Connect University
Source: Tiantai / China Connect University
Source: Tiantai / China Connect University
Source: The Ten Worlds of Tiantai Zhiyi within Atiśa’s Stages of the Path.
Source: The Ten Worlds of Tiantai Zhiyi within Atiśa’s Stages of the Path.
Source: Tiantai School
TIANTAI SCHOOL
Often described as the first genuinely Sinitic school of Buddhism, the Tiantai school traces its ancestry back to NĀgĀrjuna (ca. second century c.e.) in India, not by any direct transmission but through the reading of translated texts by its proto-patriarchs, Huiwen (Beiqi zunzhe, mid-sixth century) and Huisi (Nanyue chanshi, 515–577). Very little is known of these two figures. Huiwen in particular is little more than a shadowy presence; traditional biographies report that he was active during China’s Northern Qi dynasty (550–577), stressed strict meditation practice, and initiated the characteristic Tiantai emphasis on triplicity. In particular, Huiwen is reported to have emphasized the “simultaneity of the three contemplations,” namely, the contemplation of each object as emptiness, provisional positing, and the “mean,” as derived from a strong misreading of works attributed to Nagarjuna. Huisi, on the other hand, authored several extant texts, and is credited with combining Huiwen’s “three contemplations” with the teaching of the Lotus SŪtra (SaddharmapuṆḌarĪkasŪtra), to which Huisi was especially devoted. This combination proved to be explosive.
Huisi interpreted the lotus from the title of this sūtra as a metaphor suggesting a special relationship between cause and effect, or practice and enlightenment. The lotus, he noted, is unusual in that it gives no flower without producing a fruit, that the fruit is concealed and copresent in the flower, and a single flower produces many fruits. This suggests that every practice leads to many different results, which are copresent in the practice, and yet unrevealed; every practice, even those that show no orientation toward buddhahood, lead to and are copresent with buddhahood. The translation of the Lotus Sūtra by KumĀrajĪva (350–409/413 c.e.) characterizes “the ultimate reality” (literally, “real mark”) “of all dharmas” in terms of “ten suchnesses” (literally, ten like-this’s). They are:
like-this (suchlike) appearance
nature
substance
power
activity
cause
condition
effect
response
equality of ultimacy from beginning to end.
Huisi developed a special reading of this passage, facilitated by the peculiarity of the Chinese translation, where each phrase referred to every element of experience simultaneously as “empty,” in addition to its literal reference to each as provisionally posited, referring to each specific differentiated aspect (i.e., appearance, nature, etc.). In Zhiyi’s exfoliation of this interpretative move, each was also understood as the “mean.” This bold hermeneutic approach and its threefold implication formed the basis for what would develop into the distinctive Tiantai conception of “the ultimate reality of/as all dharmas.”
The de facto founder of the school, from whose part-time residence—Mount Tiantai in modern Zhejiang—the school gets its name, is Zhiyi (Tiantai Zhizhe dashi, 538–597). It was Zhiyi’s numerous and voluminous works, most of which were transcribed by his disciple Guanding (Zhangan dashi, 561–632) from Zhiyi’s lectures, that become authoritative for all later Tiantai tradition.
Provisional and ultimate truth: The Lotus Sūtra and the classification of teachings
Zhiyi constructed a vast syncretic system of MahĀyĀna thought and practice that aimed at giving a comprehensive overview of all of Buddhism and that found a place for all known modes of practice and doctrine. Confronted with the massive influx of Mahāyāna texts translated into Chinese, many of which directly contradicted one another in matters of both doctrine and practice, Zhiyi was faced with the challenge of accommodating the claim that all these texts represented the authoritative teaching of the Buddha. The solution he arrived at can be described as an insight into the interconnection between two central Mahāyāna doctrines: the concept of upĀya (skillful means), particularly as presented in the Lotus Sūtra, and the concept of ŚŪnyatĀ (emptiness), particularly as developed in the Madhyamaka school. From the synthesis of these ideas, Zhiyi developed a distinctive understanding of the buddha-nature, rooted especially in the universalist exposition given in the NirvĀṆa SŪtra, and the identity between delusion and enlightenment as invoked in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and other sūtras, which entailed a reconfiguring of both upāya and śūnyatā as they had been understood in earlier Mahāyāna Buddhism.
The Lotus Sūtra asserts that the śrāvakas (HĪnayĀna disciples), who had hitherto been regarded as having no aspiration toward bodhisattvahood or buddhahood—indeed, as having explicitly repudiated these goals—are in fact bodhisattvas currently working toward buddhahood, although they are unaware of the real efficacy of their current practice. The text develops the idea that it is possible to be a bodhisattva without realizing it into a claim that in fact all Buddhist disciples are really bodhisattvas, and all who hear the Lotus teaching will finally attain buddhahood. Indeed, it is said in the text that no sentient being really knows what he or she is practicing, what the ultimate karmic efficacy of his or her deeds and cognitions is, nor what his or her own real identity is. Only buddhas know these things, and the real efficacy of all their deeds as thus known by the buddhas is that these deeds allow these beings eventually to become buddhas themselves. The non-bodhisattva practices and teachings are all skillful means provided by the Buddha, sometimes requiring an ignorance of the final goal in order to have efficacy toward reaching that goal. This is the teaching of the first half of the sūtra, which Zhiyi calls the “trace gate.” Another wrinkle is given in the second half of the sūtra, which Zhiyi calls the “root gate.” Here it is claimed that Śākyamuni Buddha did not attain buddhahood at Bodh GayĀ, but had actually been and would continue to be a buddha for countless eons, in spite of his apparent imminent decease. The implication is that while practicing the bodhisattva path, he was in fact already a buddha (leaving ambiguous his own degree of awareness of this fact at the time), and that being a buddha does not mean a transcendence of engagement in the intersubjective work of liberating sentient beings, but the mastering of all possible skillful means by which to accomplish this task, and a ceaseless indefatigable endeavor to do so.
Taken together then, the two halves of the sūtra suggest that all beings are bodhisattvas, and all bodhisattvas are buddhas. And yet this is only so if the division between them, the opacity and ignorance that keeps them from collapsing these identities, remains intact, just as the upāyas work only as long as they are not known as such. This means that the intersubjective liberative relationship between buddhas and sentient beings is primary and always operative, whichever role one may seem to be playing at any time. To be is to be intersubjective, and each being is always both liberating and being liberated by all others, even while also creating karma (action) and duḤkha (suffering). Ontology is here made soteriological: All existence is instructive and revelatory, and can be read as a salvational device put forth by a buddha to liberate sentient beings.
The relation between illusion and reality is thus reconfigured as the relation between provisional and ultimate truth in the Buddha’s teaching. Zhiyi characterizes the Lotus teaching as the “opening of the provisional to reveal the real” (kaiquan xianshi), allowing one to see the provisional truths as both a means to and an expression of the ultimate truth. Provisional and ultimate truth are nondual, even while maintaining their strict opposition. Their relation is similar to that between the set-up and punch line of a joke; the punch line is funny only because the set-up was not, but once the punch line is understood, the set-up too is seen to have always been pervaded with the quality of humorousness, precisely by being contrastingly nonhumorous. On the basis of this doctrine, Zhiyi established a comprehensive system of “classification of teachings,” which categorizes all Buddhist teachings as expressions of ultimate truth tailored to specific circumstances and listeners.
The Madhyamaka doctrine of “two truths” can be understood as asserting that ultimate truth is somehow more real than conventional truth, and indeed that while conventional truth covers both common language (i.e., the everyday use of terms like I, you, cause, effect, and the like) and verbal Buddhist teachings, the metaphysical claims of rival schools (i.e., attempts to make rigorous ultimate truths of causality, selfhood, a first cause, and so on) are not even conventional truth, but are simply falsehoods and errors. Zhiyi reinterprets the Madhyamaka position as implying the “three truths”: emptiness, provisional positing, and the mean, which includes both and signifies their synonymy. The relation between these three is understood on the model of the Lotus Sūtra‘s doctrine of “opening the provisional to reveal the real,” which annuls any hierarchy between conventional and ultimate truth, and also expands conventional truth so as to include any provisionally posited assertion or cognition without exception. Zhiyi’s claim is that these three aspects are not only on precisely equal footing and of equal ultimacy, but that each is in fact simply a way of stating the other two; the three are synonymous.
The three truths and the doctrine of inherent entailment
The reasoning behind the three truths doctrine follows the traditional Buddhist doctrine of pratĪtyasamutpĀda (dependent origination), which holds that every element of experience necessarily appears “together with” other elements, which it depends upon for its existence and determinate character. These other, conditioning, elements, of course, also gain their determinate character only through their dependence on still other elements that simultaneously condition them. But it was this determinate character that was supposed to serve as a determining ground for the first element. If the determiner is not determinate, the determined also fails to be determined. Hence each element is coherent only locally, in relation to a limited set of these conditions; when all of its conditions—including contexts, components, and precedents—are considered, its coherence vanishes. There arises, then, no unambiguous particular element or entity with a univocally decidable nature. Precisely because all are determined in dependence on conditions, they are simultaneously without a fixed, determinate identity. This is the meaning of emptiness.
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Elements of experience are normally taken to have definitive identities, to be determinate, to be finite, to have “simple location,” and to have borders or boundaries between themselves and what is outside themselves. Tiantai meditation, however, calls for an inquiry into the borders between being X and not being X, either in time, space, or conceptual space (i.e., the arising of a given state from its qualitatively different antecedents, conceptual contrasts, or efficient causes). To appear in experience at all, X must be “non-all,” must be contrasted to some non-X, and must have an “outside.” But to necessarily have an outside means the outside is not really outside; the relation between the internal and the external is itself internal. One can always ask: Is the border (spatial, temporal, or conceptual) part of the inside or the outside, both, or neither? There is no coherent way to answer these questions if to exist is assumed to mean “simply located.” Hence, the interface always proves unintelligible, and the outside proves paradoxically both ineradicable and impossible, since it always proves to be equally internal, and hence not an outside at all. Therefore, the inside (X) is equally ineradicable and impossible (bukede, bukeshe). Like space, each determinate existent is simultaneously a merely nominal reality, is unobstructed and unobstructing, is beyond being and nonbeing, and is all-pervasive, present equally in the opposite of itself, in contrast to which it was originally defined. Precisely the same analysis applies to the difference between those defining borders that “determine as X” and those that “determine as Y,” which is why Zhiyi goes on to assert that to be determined as X is always at the same time to be determined as Y, and all other possible quiddities.
In sum, what is only locally coherent is thereby globally incoherent. It is what it is only because the horizon of relevant contexts has been arbitrarily limited, but the fact that all being is necessarily contextualized (arises with qualitative othernesses) means that any such limit is ultimately arbitrary, and there are more relevant contexts that can be brought to bear in every case. The “mean” signifies that these two are merely alternate statements of the same fact, which necessarily appears in these two contrasted ways. Determinateness, thought through to the end, turns out to be ambiguity, and vice versa. Hence, ambiguity and determinateness are no longer “other” to one another, and each is itself, just as it is, “absolute” (i.e., free of dependence on a relationship to an outside). Therefore, determinateness is a synonym for ambiguity, and either is a synonym for absoluteness (the ultimate reality and value, “eternal, blissful, self, and pure”). Any of these always signifies all three aspects. Moreover, determinateness is never simply “determinateness as such or in general”: It always means precisely this determinateness and precisely all other possible determinateness, which Zhiyi formulates for convenience as “the three thousand quiddities.” Any possible experienced content is necessarily dependently co-arisen, which is to be provisionally posited as precisely this (like-this appearance, etc.), which is to be empty, which is to be readable equally as provisional positing and as emptiness, which is to be readable as precisely every other possible determinacy.
It is from the “mean” that the Zhiyi deduces the claim that all things are everywhere at once. For if to be definitively X and not definitively X are merely alternate ways of stating the same fact about X, the contrast between the absence and presence of X is annulled, and X is no more present here and now than it is present there and then. It is “simply located” at neither locus, but “virtually located” at both. It pervades all possible times and places to exactly the extent that it is present here at all. It can be read into any experience, and is here and now only because it has been so read into the here and now. X, in other words, is eternal and omnipresent, but only as “canceled,” divested of the putative opacity of its simple location.
As an exfoliation of these claims, Zhiyi develops his theory of “the three thousand quiddities in each moment of experience,” which implies the interinclusion of the ten realms of sentient experience: purgatories, hungry ghosts, asuras, animals, humans, devas, śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas. Each realm is a process of causes and effects that inherently entails all the other realms. Each of these realms can at each moment be characterized by the ten “suchnesses” from the Lotus Sūtra. All of these may be understood either in terms of the sentient beings experiencing these realms, the environment conditioning these beings, or these beings considered in terms of their components. Ten realms, each including all the others, makes one hundred; multiplied by the ten suchnesses, one gets one thousand, and multiplied by the three aspects, three thousand. Zhiyi asserts that all of these qualities, which indicate not merely all things as considered from a single perspective, but all processes as simultaneously understood from the perspectives of all the cognitive misperceptions of all sentient beings, are inherently entailed in each moment of experience undergone by any sentient being at any time.
The three tracks and buddha-nature
The three truths are a name for the ultimate reality of all dharmas, or the ultimate reality as all dharmas, since to be is to be determinate as just these particular things, in their ambiguity and conditioning relationships. From various perspectives, the three truths can be renamed as a number of other triads, all of which maintain the same relation of interpervasive identity as difference. Zhiyi calls these parallel triads the “three tracks,” which he characterizes as:
the track of contemplation and awareness (corresponding to emptiness)
the track of conditions for actualization or practice (provisional positing)
the track of the real nature or the absolute as such (the mean)
The triads belonging to these tracks include the three buddha-natures:
buddha-nature as manifesting cause (the awareness that allows the omnipresent buddha-nature to be made manifest)
buddha-nature as conditioning cause (practical and physical conditions that make this awareness possible)
buddha-nature as proper cause (the omnipresent absolute reality to be realized)
but also the three virtues of nirvĀṆa:
prajñā (wisdom)
liberation
dharmakayā
and the three paths:
kleśa (delusion)
karma (activity as cause of suffering)
duḥkha (suffering)
Since all these triads are merely alternate names for the three truths and bear the same internally interinclusive relationship derived from the relation of upāyato ultimate truth, one arrives at the identity between delusion and wisdom, karma and liberation, dharmakāya and suffering. Each of these is eternal and omnipresent, always present in every possible quiddity. In addition, there is the identity between each of these as actualized realities and as potentials, between the virtues of nirvāṇa and the buddha-nature as potential, between buddha-nature and delusion-karma-suffering, and so on. These paradoxical identities between oppositely valued realities come to be the distinctive mark of the Tiantai school, culminating in its unique doctrine of “the evil inherent in the buddha-nature,” the perfect interpervasion of delusion and enlightenment.
Zhanran and the buddha-nature of insentient beings
The Tiantai school fell into decline in the Tang dynasty (618–907), losing its imperial patronage and dominant influence to the newly arisen Huayan school and Chan school. Zhanran (Jingxi zunzhe, 711–782) is credited with revitalizing the tradition, meeting the challenges of the new schools and consolidating and reorganizing Tiantai doctrine. The bulk of his writings concentrate on detailed commentaries to Zhiyi’s works, but he is also responsible for adopting and adapting Huayan terminology into Tiantai doctrine while reasserting the distinctiveness of the Tiantai school, particularly noting the uniqueness of its doctrine of the evil inherent in the buddha-nature.
In his work Jin’gangbei (Diamond Scalpel), his only noncommentarial composition, Zhanran makes a frontal attack on the Huayan and early Chan doctrine that views the buddha-nature as an aspect of sentience, reasserting the Tiantai view that the buddha-nature is necessarily threefold from beginning to end, omnipresent in all three aspects, and impossible to restrict to sentient beings only. In fact, the threefold buddha-nature is another name for the three truths, which are the reality of any content of experience whatsoever, mind or matter, sentient or insentient. To be any one among them is to be all of them, so there can be no division of buddha-nature as the unconditioned essence of sentience and awareness as opposed to the passive inertness of insentient beings. Whenever one being attains buddhahood, all beings are buddha; whenever one entity is insentient, all beings are insentient. This is the interpervasion of all realms as understood in a Tiantai perspective; all possible predicates are always applicable to all possible beings.
The Song dynasty (960–1279) schism
Zhanran had imported certain formulations from Huayan thought into his teaching, most notably an interpretation of mind-only doctrine not found in Zhiyi, including the phrase “unchanging but following conditions, following conditions but unchanging,” as a characterization of the mind and its nature, respectively, as derived from the Huayan patriarch Fazang (643–712). In the Northern Song dynasty, some Tiantai writers later called the Shanwai (i.e., “off-mountain,” or heterodox) began to adopt the privileging of “awareness” (zhi), or mind, that characterizes later Huayan and early Chan thought. Even in Fazang a similar tendency is arguably discernible. Here the mind in its present function is a transcendent category that produces all phenomena, and of which all phenomena are transformations; the mind is in this sense at least conceptually prior to these phenomena, and is their ontological base, although it is not a definite objective entity. Realizing this all-pervasive awareness as all things is equivalent to awakening, and so this mind is also called “ultimate reality.” Praxishere means to see “the three thousand quiddities” as this present moment of mind, which is the transformation of mind, with nothing left out. Mind is the all-embracing “whole” that is uniquely capable of producing, determining, containing, and unifying all differentiated existences.
Zhili (Siming Fazhi fashi, 960–1028) led an attack on this interpretation of Tiantai thought, developing a position that was later called the Shanjia (Mountain Masters, or orthodox) position. Zhili holds fast to the traditional Tiantai interpretation of the claim in the Huayan jing (Sanskrit, Avataṃsaka-sūtra) that “there is no difference between the mind, buddhas, and sentient beings,” holding that this means that each of these three may be considered the creator of the other two, and vice versa. This interpretation rejects the assertion that mind is the real source that is able to create, or manifest itself, as either buddhas or sentient beings (as the Shanwai, Huayan, and Chan putatively claim), depending on whether it is enlightened or deluded. On the latter view, although buddhas and sentient beings could still be said to be “identical” to mind and hence to each other, this identity would be mediated by a one-way dependence relation. Zhili holds that this would not be real “identity,” for mind has at least one quality that the other two lack: It is creator, as opposed to created. In Zhili’s view, each is creator, each is created, and none is more ultimate than the others.
Zhili’s teaching combats a one-sidedly “idealist” interpretation of Tiantai doctrine. He holds that while it is true to say that mind inherently entails all entities, it is equally true to say that form or matter inherently entails all entities, and not merely because matter is actually nothing but mind. Here Zhili is echoing Zhiyi’s teaching that reality can be spoken of equally as mind-only, matter-only, taste-only, smell-only, touch-only, and so on. Zhili also insists that Tiantai meditation is a contemplation of the deluded mind, not directly of the pure or absolute mind that is the source and ground of all existence. The object of contemplation is the deluded process of differentiation itself, which is to be seen as creating the particular determinacies of the experienced world, then as inherently including all these determinacies, then as being identical to them all, and finally as itself determined, hence conditioned, hence empty, hence provisionally posited, hence the “mean.” Once this is done, all other contents are equally seen as the three truths, but the process of transformation must begin with the deluded mind, the mind that mistakenly sees itself as “inside” as opposed to “outside,” which makes arbitrary distinctions, and which is conditioned in a particular manner by particular causes. Only in this way, Zhili thinks, is practice both possible and necessary.
Zhili also reasserts the centrality of the doctrine of inherent evil, as is particularly evident in his teaching of “the six identities as applicable even to the dung beetle.” The six identities were propounded by Zhiyi originally to maintain a balance to the claims of identity between sentient beings and buddhahood. All beings are identical to the Buddha (1) in principle; (2) in name, once they hear of this teaching and accept it intellectually; (3) in cultivation; (4) in partial attainment;(5) in approximation to final identity; and finally (6) when Buddhist practice is completed and one becomes explicitly a buddha. Zhili asserts that these six levels of difference and identity apply not only to the relations between sentient beings and buddhas, but also to the relations between any two sentient beings, any two determinations of any kind, indeed, even between any entity and itself. This means that prior to Buddhist practice one is identical to, say, a dung beetle in principle only, but as one’s practice continues, one finally attains a more and more fully realized identity with the dung beetle, so that all the marks and names associated with dung beetle-hood become increasingly explicit and fully realized as practice continues. Evil, in other words, is not only what is cut off, but also what is more fully realized with practice; all things become more explicit together, and this full realization of their own determinate marks, by virtue of the three truths, is their liberation and transformation. This is the real goal of practice; indeed this is buddhahood itself.
Transmission to and development in Japan and Korea
Much of Zhili’s concern in his polemic against the Shanwai and his defense of the doctrine of “inherent evil” was to maintain the seriousness of Tiantai ritual practice, an evil that he saw threatened by the “sudden” doctrines of Chan and the Shanwai. Zhili and his dharma-brother Zunshi (Ciyun fashi, 963–1032) were instrumental in combining Tiantai contemplation with the practice of the Pure Land schools, particularly the visualizations of AmitĀbha, which were to be done in tandem with Tiantai doctrinal ruminations, “contemplating the image of the Buddha as an inherent aspect of the mind, utilizing the Buddha image to manifest the nature of mind.” This was consistent with Zhili’s general teaching that when any given content is made more explicit, it simultaneously makes all contents more explicit, as well as their interpervasion, the interpervasive three thousand being the realm of enlightenment.
In China, Tiantai and Pure Land practice came to be closely associated. A different development took place in Japan, where Tiantai, or Tendai in the Japanese pronunciation, became closely associated with esoteric Buddhism. Tiantai texts were first brought to Japan by the Chinese vinaya monk Jianzhen (687–763), but did not really take hold until the founding of the Japanese Tendai school by SaichŌ (Dengyo daishi, 767–822). Saichō combined the Tiantai teachings he had studied in Tang China under Zhanran’s disciple Daosui with elements of esoteric and Chan Buddhism. The tradition he founded later split into several rival schools, but Tendai remained for centuries the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism, providing the theoretical foundation of Buddhist practice to a much greater degree than was the case in China, where Huayan and Chan understandings of Buddhist doctrine arguably took a more preeminent position. Later Japanese Tendai contributed distinctive developments to the doctrines of original enlightenment (hongaku) and the buddhahood of inanimate objects, on which it laid special stress. All of the Buddhist reformers who created the new Japanese sects in the Kamakura period, including HŌnen (1133–1212), Shinran (1173–1263), Nichiren (1222–1282), and DŌgen (1200–1253), were trained initially as Tendai monks.
Both Huisi and Zhiyi are said to have had direct disciples hailing from the Korean peninsula, and this tradition of exchange continued for many centuries. But it was not until 1097 that a separate Tiantai (Korean, Ch’ŏnt’ae) school was established there. Its founder, Ŭich’Ŏn (1055–1101), hoped the new school would help reconcile the long-standing conflict in Korean Buddhism between scholastic studies and meditative practice. Ch’ŏnt’ae became one of the two main pillars of Korean Buddhism, together with Chan (Korean, Sŏn). The schools were unified under the auspices of a reconstituted Sŏn school in the early fifteenth century.
Chan, Chi-wah. “Chih-li (960–1028) and the Crisis of T’ien-t’ai Buddhism in the Early Sung.” In Buddhism in the Sung, ed. Peter N. Gregory and Daniel A. Getz, Jr. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.
Cleary, Thomas, trans. Stopping and Seeing: A Comprehensive Guide to Buddhist Meditation (a partial translation of Zhiyi’s Mohe zhiguan). Boston: Shambhala, 1997.
Donner, Neal. “Chih-i’s Meditation on Evil.” In Buddhist and Taoist Practice in Medieval Chinese Society, ed. David W. Chappell. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1987.
Donner, Neal. “Sudden and Gradual Intimately Conjoined: Chih-i’s T’ien-t’ai View.” In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Buddhism, ed. Peter N. Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
Donner, Neal, and Stevenson, Daniel B. The Great Calming and Contemplation: A Study and Annotated Translation of the First Chapter of Chih-i’s Mo-ho chih-kuan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993.
Gregory, Peter, and Getz, Daniel, eds. Buddhism in the Sung. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.
Hurvitz, Leon. Chih-i (538–597): An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese Buddhist Monk. M’elange Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. 12 (1960–1962). Brussels: Institut Belges Des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1980.
Ng Yu-kwan, T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993.
Stevenson, Daniel. “The Four Kinds of Samādhi in Early T’ient’ai Buddhism.” In Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism, ed. Peter N. Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986.
Stone, Jacqueline. Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.
Swanson, Paul L. Foundations of T’ien-t’ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989.
Ziporyn, Brook. “Anti-Chan Polemics in Post-Tang Tiantai.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 17, no. 1 (1994): 26–63.
Ziporyn, Brook. Evil and/or/as the Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
Brook Ziporyn
Source: Tiantai / Britannica
Tiantai
Tiantai, Wade-Giles T’ien-t’ai, Japanese Tendai, rationalist school of Buddhist thought that takes its name from the mountain in southeastern China where its founder and greatest exponent, Zhiyi, lived and taught in the 6th century. The school was introduced into Japan in 806 by Saichō, known posthumously as Dengyō Daishi.
The basic philosophical doctrine is summarized as the triple truth, or jiguan(“perfected comprehension”): (1) all things (dharmas) lack ontological reality; (2) they, nevertheless, have a temporary existence; (3) they are simultaneously unreal and temporarily existing—being the middle, or absolute, truth, which includes and yet surpasses the others. The three truths are considered to be mutually inclusive, and each is contained within the others. Because existence is ever-changing, the phenomenal world is regarded as identical with the world as it really is.
The doctrine of the triple truth was first taught by Huiwen (550–577); but Zhiyi, the third patriarch, is regarded as the founder of the school because of his own great contributions. Zhiyi organized the whole of the Buddhist canon according to the supposition that all the doctrines were present in the mind of Shakyamuni (the historical Buddha) at the time of his enlightenment but were unfolded gradually according to the mental capacities of his hearers. The Lotus Sūtra was considered the supreme doctrine, embodying all of the Buddha’steachings.
In 804 Saichō, a Japanese monk, was sent to China expressly to study the Tiantai tradition. The inclusiveness of the Tiantai school, which arranged all Buddhist learning into one grand hierarchical scheme, was attractive to Saichō. On his return to Japan he attempted to incorporate within the framework of the Tiantai doctrine Zen meditation, vinayadiscipline, and esoteric cults. The Tendai school, as it is called in Japanese, also encouraged an amalgamation of Shintō and Buddhism in the Ichijitsu (“One Truth”), or Sannō Ichijitsu Shintō.
The monastery founded by Saichō on Mount Hiei, near Kyōto, the Enryaku Temple, became the greatest centre of Buddhist learning of its time in Japan. Hōnen, and many other famous monks who later established their own schools, went there for training.
Saichō’s efforts to establish a Tendai ritual of ordination that would be more in keeping with Mahāyāna teachings and independent from the kaidan(“ordination centre”) at Nara bore results only after his death but was an important step in the Mahāyāna development in Japan.
After the death of Saichō, rivalry broke out between two factions of the school, which separated in the 9th century into the Sammon and the Jimon sects, headed by the two monks Ennin and Enchin. A third branch, the Shinsei, emphasizes devotion to the Buddha Amida.
Source: Chinese Foundations / Tendai in China: The Tiantai School
Beginning around the first century CE, Indian and Central Asian Buddhist texts and lineages began to flow into China. Buddhism spread throughout South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia NOT through conquest or forced conversion, but through intercultural dialogue. With Buddhist cultural diversity came an explosion of new approaches to the Dharma. New traditions, new texts, new teachings, and new practices spread throughout Asia.
It was Mahayana Buddhism that most caught the attention of Chinese Buddhists. The diversity of Mahayana Buddhism, however, posed something of an obstacle. There are hundreds of sutras that sometimes contain radically different teachings. Which ones were correct? How did they fit together? Did they fit together? To answer these questions, Chinese Buddhist thinkers developed doctrinal classification systems (panjiao) and new theories of Buddhist study and practice.
Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) of Mt. Tiantai
Zhiyi, the founder of the Chinese Tiantai School, Image courtesy Wikimedia Commons
Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597) of Mt. Tiantai was one of the first and most influential scholar-monks in the history of East Asian Buddhism. Today he is regarded as the founder of the Tiantai School of Chinese Buddhism, the parent tradition of the Japanese Tendai School. Zhiyi’s thought also greatly impacted East Asian traditions like Huayan, Chan, Pure Land, and Esoteric Buddhism. Study and Practice: The Two Wings of the Buddha-Dharma Central to Zhiyi’s thought is the notion that meditation and study form the two wings of one’s practice of the Buddha-dharma. If one becomes unbalanced, you will not fly straight. In his day there were some meditation masters who focused exclusively upon meditation and neglected the study of the Buddhist scriptures. Similarly, there were some scholar-monks who were merely Buddhist bookworms who neglected to put into practice what they had learned. Zhiyi practiced what he preached, and during his lifetime he was a widely respected scholar, teacher, and meditation master.
The mind is sometimes compared to a bowl of water. The water in this bowl is murky, and the water is being jostled around. If, however, one were to set the bowl down in a quiet place, and let it sit peacefully, then eventually the ripples would disappear, and the silt would settle to the bottom, leaving behind crystal clear water. Shamatha (pronounced: “sha-ma-ta”) refers to the cultivation and calming of the mind. The Chinese character zhi can actually mean “stop.” This “stopping” leads to clarity and peace, and allows the naturally luminescent quality of one’s very own mind (your “Buddha nature”) to shine through. Shamatha meditation is sometimes described as “calm-abiding.”
Vipashyana (guan觀)
Once one has honed their mind’s ability to reach a state of “calm abiding,” or attentive stillness, then one is able to engage in contemplative or analytical meditation. Vipashyana refers to contemplation or analysis of reality, and the attainment of insight and wisdom into the nature of reality. (For more: Basic Buddhist Teachings and Basic Buddhist practices)
Four-fold Samādhi (si-zhong sanmei 四種三昧)
The Four-fold Samādhi is one of the foundational approaches to meditation devised by Zhiyi in the Mohezhiguan. Four 90-day periods of constant practice: 1) 90 days, Constant Sitting Samādhi 常坐三昧 2) 90 days, Constant Walking Samādhi 常行三昧 3) 90 days, Half-Walking and Half-Sitting Samādhi 半行半坐三昧 4) 90 days, Neither Walking nor Sitting Samādhi 非行非坐三昧Zhiyi drew upon the Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sutra (Banzhou sanmei jing 般舟三昧經) in developing this meditation practice. In the Pratyutpanna Samādhi Sutra, the Buddha recommends both the contemplation of the Buddha Amitābha, and the recitation of his name. Zhiyi also recommended contemplation of this Amitābha, thus influencing the development of Pure Land Buddhism throughout the history of East Asia.
Resources for Further Study
For a more thorough explanation of Tiantai meditation practice, please consult your local Tendai sangha leader and read the following books:
However, the Mohe zhiguan is not merely a guide to meditation, but rather consists of a comprehensive introduction to Buddhism and Zhiyi’s approach to Buddhist thought and practice more broadly.
The One Vehicle (eka-yāna; yisheng 一乘) and Buddha Nature (tathāgata-garbha; rulai zang如來藏)
Zhiyi argued that the Lotus Sutra (Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra; Miaofa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華經 ) and the Nirvana Sutra (Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sutra; Da banniepan jing 大般涅槃經) together constituted the ultimate teachings of the Buddha. The Lotus Sutra promotes a universalistic view of Buddhism, arguing that all paths ultimately converge on the same path. This all-inclusive path is called the Eka-yana, “One Vehicle,” a synonym for the Mahayana. Behind the diversity of the many Buddhist paths, there is a unity that binds them. The Nirvana Sutra and Lotus Sutra both promote the idea that all beings have the potential to attain Buddhahood. These two teachings, the unity of the vast Buddha-dharma and the inherent capacity for all beings to attain awakening form the basis for later Chinese Tiantai and Japanese Tendai Buddhism.
Three Truths (san-di 三諦)
Chinese Tiantai was highly influenced by the Indian school of Buddhist philosophy known as Madhyamaka. Madhyamaka thinkers look to Nagarjuna as their founder. Nagarjuna taught that all things are Shunyata, or lacking an inherent unchanging essence. This “ultimate reality” is somewhat at odds with our “conventional reality.” We tend to see the world as we want to see it, not as it truly is. The point of Buddhist practice is see the world as it truly is. For Mahayana Buddhists, influenced by Nagarjuna, we aspire to see the Shunyata in our ordinary “conventional” reality. Nāgārjuna famously said, “for whom Shunyata is possible, all things are possible.” In other words, when you see things as fixed and rigid (“conventional” reality), there is no hope for change. However, when you see things as they truly are, constantly changing and fluid (Shunyata), then anything is possible. The Bodhisattva (enlightening being) perceives this reality, and is therefore free from fear and pain.Chinese Tiantai Buddhist thinkers elaborated on this “Two Truths” view of reality, and posited that there were three truths:
The Truth of Shunyata (kongdi 空諦)
The Truth Conventional Reality (jiadi 假諦)
The Truth of the Middle (zongdi 中諦)
The third truth, the “middle,” signifies the ability to abide in two worlds simultaneously: to function on the level of conventional reality and yet perceive ultimate reality. In other words, both conventional reality and ultimate reality have a kind of reality from different perspectives. The Bodhisattva knows how to put these two views together to more effectively alleviate suffering in the world.
To See the Three Thousand Worlds in a Single Thought Moment (yi-nian san-qian一念三千)
Zhiyi and later Tiantai scholars argued that microcosm and macrocosm are connected. Past, present, and future, and every aspect of reality, all things in existence are interconnected. In other words, the whole is in the part and the part is the whole. In a single moment of thought, all aspects of reality are present. Nothing exists by itself but all things are dependent upon and connected with each other. Even in the ordinary mind, even a single thought, contains the whole of the universe (or “multi-verse” in the case of Mahayana Buddhism).
Five Times and Eight Teachings (wushi bajiao 五時八教)
One of the hallmarks of Zhiyi’s teachings is a comprehensive approach to Buddhism. This comprehensive framework, upon which Zhiyi’s disciples and interpreters elaborated, divides the whole of the Buddha-dharma into “five times and eight teachings.” The Buddha is commonly compared to a doctor who dispensed remedies as appropriate for particular afflictions. For spiritualists the Buddha taught the doctrine of “no-self,” while to the materialists he taught the doctrine of “Buddha nature.” In other words, the truth and even the meaning of a teaching is dependent upon context and audience. Zhiyi developed a comprehensive system encompassing the Mahayana and non-Mahayana teachings delivered by the Buddha throughout his lifetime. Zhiyi organized the teachings into “five times” and “eight teachings.” The five times refers to five time periods in the Buddha’s life during which, Zhiyi believed, the Buddha delivered particular teachings. The eight teachings refers to the differing ways the Buddha taught and the different ways disciples understood the content. For a more detailed overview of the five times and eight teachings, as well as other aspects of Tiantai and Tendai Buddhist thought, see the following resources:
Below is a short summary of the Five Times and Eight Teachings framework with links to available English language resources for further study:
The Five Times 五時
1. Avataṃsaka華嚴 Period
Following his awakening under the Bodhi tree (Life of Buddha), the Buddha preached what came to be known as the Avataṃsaka-sūtra (Huayan-jing 華嚴經, “Flower Ornament Sutra”) for 21 days. This teaching was intended for Bodhisattvas of very high attainment, as it presents a complex interconnected view of the universe and the path to awakening.
Realizing that the complexity of the “big picture” as presented in the Avatamsaka would be too much for most people, the Buddha spent 12 years explaining some of the basic insights he had gained, using his skills in upaya, or skillful means. These teachings took place at Deer Park, and were collected in the Āgamas (which roughly correspond to the Nikayas of the Pali Canon of the Theravada tradition).
Next, for eight years the Buddha began to introduce the “expansive” (vaipulya) Mahayana teachings. Some of the sutras taught during this period include, but are not limited to, the following:
Having introduced some of his disciples to the profound teachings of the Mahayana, the Buddha went on to expound “perfection of wisdom” (prajñāpāramitā) for the next twenty-two years. The texts in this division are focused primarily on outlining the Bodhisattva Path and Shunyata (Section in Mahayana Basics)
Lotus Sutra presents the idea that all paths fit together and ultimately lead to Buddhahood. The Nirvana Sutra presents the notion that all beings possess as their fundamental nature Buddhahood. Zhiyi suggested that taken together, the Lotus Sutraand the Nirvana Sutra constitute the pinnacle of the Buddha’s teachings. Zhiyi believed that these teachings were delivered by the Buddha toward the end of his life. Historically the Tiantai tradition has placed somewhat more emphasis on the Lotus Sutra. Popular English Language Translations of the Lotus Sutra
The Lotus Sutra (BDK English Tripitaka, Free Online Version)
Just as the teachings of the Buddha may be organized chronologically, so too may they be organized according to the ways the Buddha accommodated the teachings to the specific needs of his audiences, and the differing approaches the Buddha used to teach different groups of people. Taken together, these constitute what are known as the Eight Teachings:
Four Approaches to Teaching 化儀四教 (huayi sijiao)
Sudden Teaching 頓教: This teaching corresponds to the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, which Zhiyi believed to have been taught by the Buddha immediately (or “suddenly”) upon the attainment of awakening to Bodhisattvas of the highest capacities.
Gradual Teaching 漸教: This teaching includes the gradual revelation of the teachings, progressing from non-Mahayana teachings (the “Deer Park Period”) to the full Mahayana teachings (“Perfection of Wisdom Period”).
Indeterminate Teaching 不定教: The Buddha teaches beings according to their individual capacities. Though beings may hear the same teaching, they derive from that teaching different truths depending on their karmic inclination. This does not refer to a specific set of scripture, but rather serves as a recognition of how beings encounter the Dharma. The teaching is not set in stone, but subjective, or “indeterminate.”
Secret Teachings 祕密教: The so-called secret teachings are also referred to as the “secret indeterminate teaching.” Beings may hear the same teaching, but they comprehend the teaching differently. Because beings are unaware of these subjective differences, some of these indeterminate teachings tare called secret teachings.
Four Ways of Accommodating the Teachings 化法四教
Tripiṭaka Teachings 三藏教: These are the teachings given for the benefit of those who are not yet studying the Mahayana teachings. These include the “Deer Park” period teachings listed above.
Shared Teachings 通教: These are the teachings that are taught for both Mahayana and non-Mahayana Buddhists.
Distinct Teaching 別教: These are the teachings that are designed to speak directly to students of the Mahayana teachings.
Perfect Teachings 圓教: These include teachings of the Lotus Sutra, and other Mahayana sutras to greater or lesser degrees.
Guanding 灌頂 (561–632) and the Tiantai School
Following Zhiyi’s remarkable career, his disciples systematized and promoted his comprehensive approach to the study and practice of Buddhism. It should be remembered that Zhiyi likely did not regard himself as a member of something called “the Tiantai School.” The idea of a Tiantai School was constructed over time by later generations of thinkers who saw themselves as members of Zhiyi’s lineage. Guanding 灌頂 (561–632) was Zhiyi’s close disciple. Most of what we know about Zhiyi comes from documents written by Guanding, and many of Zhiyi’s major works were actually compiled and edited from Guanding’s notes taken during Zhiyi’s many lectures. For more information on Guanding’s foundational role in the creation of the idea of the Tiantai lineage, see: Linda Penkower, “In the Beginning … Guanding 灌顶 (561-632) and the Creation of Early Tiantai”
Source: The Lotus Sutra / James Shields
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A crucial feature of Tiantai (天台) Buddhist thought certainly is its elaboration on the hidden and visible, called “root and traces” (ben ji 本跡), as the concept of non-duality (bu er 不二) of these opposites is part of what constitutes the highest level of Buddhist doctrine in Tiantai doxography, called “round/ perfect teaching” (yuanjiao 圓教). Such elaboration is inextricably bound up with paradoxical discourse, which functions as a linguistic strategy in Tiantai practice of liberating the mind from its self-induced deceptions.
Observation of paradoxes in the elaboration on the hidden and visible could be called practice qua doctrinal exegesis, because Tiantai masters try to integrate self-referential observation in mind-contemplation (guanxin 觀心) with interpretation of sūtra and śāstra. For Tiantai Buddhists, the ultimate meaning of the Buddhadharma (fofa 佛法) itself is independent from speech and script and only accessible to the liberated mind, yet it cannot fully be comprehended and displayed apart from the transmission of the canonical word. To observe the paradox in non-duality of the hidden and visible is what triggers practice qua doctrinal exegesis and entails liberation (jietuo 解脫) according to the “round/ perfect teaching.”
The article traces the formation of paradoxical discourse in Chinese Madhyamaka, particularly referencing the Tiantai elaboration on the hidden and visible and its diverse sources of inspiration, which includes both Chinese indigenous traditions of thought (Daoism and Xuanxue) and translated sūtraand śāstra literature from India.
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From the early 9th century a new orientation emerged in Japanese Buddhism that emphasized specific Tantric, or Vajrayāna characteristics of both doctrine and practice. While elements of the Vajrayāna (vehicle of the diamond/thunderbolt) Buddhist traditions of mature Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism were present in Japan in the 8th century, it was only in the new Buddhist schools of Tendai and Shingon that related practices recently imported from China were specifically identified as “esoteric” in nature and as different from the other schools of Buddhism that were newly designated as “exoteric” by these schools. The first to promote this distinction was the monk Kūkai, founder of the Shingon school. His contemporary Saichō, who founded the Tendai school, placed himself and several of his disciples under Kūkai’s tutelage to learn what the latter had brought back from an intensive study period in China. Yet Saichō’s approach was to place the esoteric teachings and practices on a par with his Tendai teachings, derived primarily from the Chinese Tiantai school. His difference from Kūkai on this matter drove both an eventual end to their cooperative relationship and, after Saichō’s death, innovations by Tendai school exegetes that aimed to reconcile the differences. The combined force of Tendai esotericism (Taimitsu) and Shingon esotericism (Tōmitsu) impacted greatly the development of subsequent centuries of Japanese Buddhism. The three major schools of Buddhism that dominated during the Nara period (710–794)—Sanron, Hossō, and Kegon—all incorporated esoteric elements into their practice during the Heian period (794–1185). By the time of the Kamakura period (1185–1333), when the new forms of Zen, pure land, and Nichiren Buddhism emerged, the esoteric paradigm was so ingrained in Japanese Buddhist thought that even though esoteric practice was at times explicitly criticized by the new schools, much of its worldview was implicitly affirmed.
Central to Japanese esoteric Buddhism is the understanding that through engaging in the ritual practices of reciting mantra, practicing symbolic hand gestures known as mudra, and imagining one’s self and all beings as being intrinsically awakened (one meaning of the term mandala), one can achieve the enlightened stage of buddhahood within one lifetime. These three are called the “practices of the three mysteries” (sanmitsu gyō三密業), through which a practitioner is able to unite with the enlightened energy of the cosmic buddha’s body, speech, and mind. More than anything else, it was this cosmological framework that influenced the development of many later Buddhist practices. Fundamental to this model was the affirmation that every living being is intrinsically endowed with the latent qualities of buddhahood. This concept of “original enlightenment” (hongaku本覚) framed an immanental, holistic vision that recognized the real presence of nirvāṇa (freedom, liberation) in the midst of one’s experience of saṃsāra (the cyclic world of ignorant suffering). The unfolding of various doctrinal and ritual means of articulating and verifying a practitioner’s intrinsic state of enlightenment spurred novel theological systems, artistic creativity of many forms, as well as sociopolitical opportunities for aristocrats who sought to invoke the buddha’s power for various mundane needs. Tendai and Shingon monks alike contributed to this growth in a myriad of ways.
A Brief History of the T’ien-t’ai School and Tendai Shu
Nichiren was ordained and trained as a Tendai monk, so much of his teachings and arguments are incomprehensible without at least a rudimentary understanding of T’ien-t’ai Buddhism. In this chapter I provide a brief history of the T’ien-t’ai school in China and Japan. In the next two chapters I will cover the T’ien-t’ai teachings relating to the classification of the Buddha’s teachings and the various practices of meditation that Nichiren alludes to throughout Kanjin Honzon-shō.
In the 6th century, the Chinese monk Chih-i (538-597) established a teaching center on Mt. T’ien-t’ai. He was later known as the Great Master T’ien-t’ai, founder of the school of the same name. Chih-i was a great scholar and meditator who wanted to systematize all the seemingly contradictory teachings that had been translated into Chinese. To do this, he classified the Buddha’s teachings into five flavors and eight categories of teaching. Chih-i was a practitioner as well as a scholar. He put equal emphasis on meditation practice and doctrine in order to create a balanced system whereby doctrine would inform practice and practice would actualize doctrine. The concept of the “3,000 worlds in a single thought-moment” that is discussed at the beginning of Kanjin Honzon-shō was part of his explanation of the sudden and perfect method of tranquility and insight meditation. He also spoke of awakening in terms of realizing the unity of the three truths of emptiness, provisional existence, and the Middle Way in order to clarify the true meaning of the teachings of the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and Nāgārjuna’s (2nd-3rd century) teachings regarding emptiness, causality, and the Middle Way. He derived the unity of the three truths from a line in Nāgārjuna’s major work, Verses on the Middle Way: “Whatever is dependently co-arisen/That is explained to be emptiness./That, being a dependent designation,/Is itself the middle way.” (Garfield, p. 304) Chih-i taught that these three truths could be realized through a “threefold contemplation” cutting through the “three kinds of delusion” and giving rise to the “three kinds of wisdom.” Ultimately, Chih-i taught that the three truths are simply different aspects of the one true nature of reality that can be realized in a single moment of insight.
Chih-i lost his parents when he was seventeen years old, during the turbulent end of the Southern Liang Dynasty (502-557). Soon after, he sought ordination as a Buddhist monk. In 560 CE, Chih-i visited Nan-yüeh Hui-ssu (515-577) on Mount Ta-su, and studied the Lotus Sūtra under him, and, as a result of intense practice, he was said to have attained awaking through this phrase of the “Medicine King Chapter” of the Lotus Sūtra: “The Buddhas of those worlds praised him, saying simultaneously, ‘Excellent, excellent, good man! All you did was a true endeavor. You made an offering to us according to the true Dharma.’” (Murano 1974, p. 301) His awakening was certified by Hui-ssu. With the recommendation of Hui-ssu, Chih-i left Mount Ta-su and went to Chin-ling and stayed at Wa-kuan-ssu where he lectured to clergy and laity over a period of eight years. During this time he greatly impressed the literati and monks whom he came in contact with.
There are several well-known monks that are associated with Chih-i, such as Fa-chi, who was skilled in meditation, Fa-lang, who was the great master in the San-lun tradition, and Pao-ch’iung and Ching-shao, who were distinguished monks in the capital Chin-ling. It is recorded in the Pieh-chuan that these monks either challenged Chih-i with the knowledge of contemplation or with engagement of doctrinal debate, but all of them ended up gaining great admiration and respect for Chih-i’s knowledge and wisdom and his power of contemplation. (Shen Vol. I, p. 14)
However, because of an anti-Buddhist movement by the Northern Chou dynasty, Chih-i retired to Mount T’ien-t’ai in 575 CE at the age of 39. He undertook dhūta practice at the Flower Peak of the mountain, and lectured at Hsiu-ch’an Temple. In 585 CE, at the age of 48, Chih-i returned to Chin-ling, the capital of the Ch’en dynasty, at the request of several district lords and governors. In 587 CE, he gave lectures on the Lotus Sūtra, which were later compiled as The Words and Phrases of the Lotus Sūtra. To avoid the conquest of the Ch’en dynasty by the Sui dynasty, Chih-i stayed at Mount Lu and the town of Ch’ang-sha. In 591 CE, he was invited by Prince Kuang (later known as Yang-ti), and went to Yang-chou. He granted bodhisattva precepts to the prince and received the honorific name “Chih-che” from him. He established Yü-ch’üan Temple in Ching-chou and expounded The Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra in 593 CE and The Great Concentration and Insight in 594 CE. He returned to Mount T’ien-t’ai in 595 CE. Two years later, in 597 CE, while he was on the way to see Prince Kuang, he became sick and died.
Chih-i upheld the Lotus Sūtra as the most profound teaching of the Buddha. In terms of practice he emphasized the sudden and perfect method of tranquility and insight, but also utilized elaborate repentance ceremonies and devotional Pure Land practices. In his teachings, Chih-i drew upon the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise attributed to Nāgārjuna that had been translated (or perhaps written) by Kumārajīva, the Larger Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and the Nirvāna Sūtra in order to expound a comprehensive system of Buddhist teaching and practice. Chih-i’s three major works were the aforementioned Words and Phrases of the Lotus Sūtra, the Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra, and the Great Concentration and Insight. These three works were actually based on notes taken from his lectures that were compiled and edited by Chih-i’s disciple Kuan-ting (561-632; aka Chang-an).
Before Chih-i there had been a lot of debate about the true meaning of the Buddha’s teachings due to the contradictions found between the various sūtras and commentaries coming from India. Starting in the late 5th century, various attempts were made to reconcile the many teachings that were being translated. By Chih-i’s time there were the so-called three schools of the south and seven schools of the north that each presented a different system for classifying the sūtras. These were not schools in the sense of sects or monastic orders but rather differing schools of thought propounded by different monks. These schools arranged the sūtras into such categories as sudden, gradual, and indeterminate. Many of these schools favored the Flower Garland Sūtra or the Nirvāna Sūtra as the ultimate teaching of the Buddha. Chih-i critiqued these systems and presented his own system in the Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra of the five flavors and eight teachings that showed how the teaching and practice of the other sūtras all led up to the Lotus Sūtra as the definitive expression of the Buddha’s ultimate teaching.
The school Chih-i founded was named the T’ien-t’ai School after the mountain where he resided. Though Chih-i was the founder and first patriarch, Nāgārjuna is sometimes considered the honorary first patriarch because so much of the T’ien-t’ai teachings are based upon the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise. Hui-wen (n.d.), the teacher of Hui-ssu is then considered the second patriarch, Hui-ssu the third, and Chih-i the fourth. Sometimes it is Hui-wen who is considered the honorary first patriarch of the school, making Hui-ssu the second and Chih-i the third. The T’ien-t’ai School declined during the 7th and 8th centuries due to the rise of the Dharma Characteristics, Flower Garland, and Zen schools that overshadowed the T’ien-t’ai School in terms of prestige and royal patronage. The T’ien-t’ai school was briefly revived during the time of Chan-jan (711-782; aka Miao-lê), the school’s sixth patriarch (if Chih-i is considered the first). Chan-jan wrote commentaries on Chih-i’s three major writings that Nichiren quoted almost as often as Chih-i himself. Unfortunately, the persecution of Buddhism by the Emperor Wu-tsung in 845 was the end of the great scholastic schools of Buddhism in China. After that, the Zen and Pure Land Buddhism dominated Chinese Buddhism.
The T’ien-tai teachings were first brought to Japan by Chien-chen (J. Ganjin; 688-763), who was also a T’ien-t’ai monk as well as a Vinaya master. Saicho (767-822; known posthumously as Dengyō) later studied these teachings and was greatly intrigued by them. In 788 Saichō established a temple (later named Enryakuji by Emperor Saga in 823) on Mt. Hiei to study and practice away from the world. The world, however, came to him. In 794 the capital of Japan moved from Nara to Kyoto, right at the foot of Mt. Hiei. In 797, Saichō came to the attention of the emperor and he was given a post at court. Beginning in 798, Saichō gave annual lectures on the Lotus Sūtra at Mt. Hiei that were attended by monks from the Nara schools. His reputation grew and in 802, Saichō was invited to lecture on the three major works of Chih-i at Takaosanji temple in Kyoto attended by 14 prestigious monks of the six schools of Nara. Paul Groner said of this occasion, “The many years which Saichō had devoted to the study of Tendai texts must have enabled him to make a strong and lasting impression at the lectures.” (Groner, p. 36)
In 804, Saichō was able to travel to China to learn more about T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and other teachings and bring back more reliable texts. He could not speak Chinese but was able to read it and had to rely on interpreters. He was able to study with Tao-sui (n.d.), the seventh patriarch of the T’ien-t’ai school, and Hsing-man (n.d.), a monk who had been a student of Miao-lê. From the former, Saichō received the bodhisattva precepts of the Brahma Net Sūtra (allegedly translated by Kumārajīva though many scholars believe it is a Chinese creation). He also received the teachings of the minor Zen branch known as the Ox Head School from a monk named Hsiu-jan (who may or may not have been a disciple of the Zen Master Ma-tsu Tao-i (709-788). He also received esoteric Buddhist initiations and teachings from a monk named Shun-hsiao (n.d.) and other esoteric practitioners, though his study of these teachings was not as deep as he would have liked.
After only eight and a half months, Saichō returned to Japan in 805 and began the establishment of the Tendai Shū on Mt. Hiei. The Tendai Shū was originally set up to be a comprehensive school of Buddhism that utilized all teachings and methods of practice united by the perfect teaching of the Lotus Sūtra as taught by Chih-i. This synthesis of teachings and practices was called “enmitsuzenkai.” “En” means “Perfect” and refers to the perfect teaching of the Lotus Sūtra. “Mitsu” means “esoteric” or “secret” and refers to esoteric Buddhism. “Zen” refers to the practice of meditation. “Kai” means “precepts” and refers to Saichō’s concern with the establishment of the Mahāyāna precepts. Saichō established two tracks of practice: one track was for the practice of esoteric Buddhism, while the other was for the practice of the T’ien-t’ai method of concentration and insight.
Saichō also worked to establish a Mahāyāna precept platform on Mt. Hiei for the conferral of Mahāyāna precepts from the Brahma Net Sūtra on his disciples so that Mahāyāna monastics could have a Mahāyāna precept lineage. Though the Brahma Net Sūtra precepts had been conferred upon monks and householders in both China and Japan before this, they had never been used in place of the Dharmaguptaka precepts, nor had there ever been a separate precept platform (kaidan) for their conferral. This was an unprecedented innovation that aroused the opposition of the six schools of Nara. The controversy raged throughout Saichō’s life, but a week after his death in 822 the court finally granted permission for Mt. Hiei to have a Mahāyāna precept platform and it was finally constructed in 827.
Saichō also got involved in doctrinal controversies with monks of the Nara schools, in particular with a monk named Tokuitsu (c. 780-842) of the Dharma Characteristics School who insisted that the One Vehicle teaching of the Lotus Sūtra was only a provisional teaching whereas the three vehicles teaching was the definitive truth. Tokuitsu’s rationale was based upon the teaching of the “five mutually distinctive natures.” In his view, not all people are capable of attaining buddhahood, so some should settle for the lesser goals of the two vehicles, while those who are able should take up the bodhisattva vehicle. The One Vehicle was taught for those who are able to take any of the three vehicles to encourage them to take up the buddha vehicle. Saichō vigorously argued that this was not the case. The Buddha taught the One Vehicle for all beings because all beings are capable of attaining buddhahood. This debate was carried out in the form of essays and treatises. According to Paul Groner, “Tendai scholars have often claimed that Saichō decisively won the debate.” (Ibid, p. 95)
Something should also be said about the relationship between Saichō and Kūkai (774-835; known posthumously as Kōbō), the founder of the True Word School in Japan. They first met when they were traveling to China together in 804. Kūkai returned to Japan in 806 after having studied and received the authority to teach esoteric Buddhism. He established the Shingon Shū or True Word School on Mt. Kōya in 816. For many years Saichō and Kūkai were friends. In 809, Kūkai had gone to Mt. Hiei to learn about the T’ien-t’ai teachings from Saichō. In turn, Saichō inquired about the esoteric teachings, borrowing texts and even receiving an esoteric initiation from Kūkai in 812. Unfortunately, their relationship soured in later years, as one of Saichō’s disciples defected to the True Word School and Kūkai refused to lend texts and insisted that Saichō become his disciple if he wished to study True Word teachings. They also had fundamental disagreements over the relative importance of the Lotus Sūtra and esoteric Buddhism. Not surprisingly, Kūkai compared the Lotus Sūtra and T’ien-t’ai teachings unfavorably with the True Word sūtras, teachings, and practices. By 816, the two monks were no longer corresponding with each other.
After the passing of both Saichō and Kūkai, the successive patriarchs of the Tendai school on Mt. Hiei developed Tendai esotericism to bolster the popularity of their school. Ennin (794-864; aka Jikaku), the third chief priest, and Enchin (814-891; aka Chishō), the fifth, were particularly responsible for bringing esoteric Buddhism to the fore in the Tendai school and even for making it more important than the Lotus Sūtra. Because of this, Nichiren would in his later years accuse them of having turned the Tendai School into the True Word School in all but name, thus leading to the neglect of the Lotus Sūtra within the Tendai School itself. Nichiren would express his critiques of Kūkai, Jikaku, and Chishō in his later writings such as the Senji-shō (Selecting the Right Time) and Hōon-ō (Essay on Gratitude).
Pure Land Buddhism also developed in the Tendai School. Saichō himself aspired to rebirth in the Pure Land, but it was Ennin who established the Jōgyō Zammai-dō (Hall for Walking Meditation) in 849. This hall was dedicated to the practice of the constant walking meditation taught in the Great Concentration and Insight of Chih-i which featured the chanting of nembutsu. After that, Pure Land devotion became an important part of Tendai Buddhism. By Nichiren’s time, many Tendai temples had become centers for the practice of Hōnen’s (1133-1212) exclusive nembutsu version of Pure Land Buddhism.
Zen Buddhism in Japan also had its origins in Tendai temples. Eisai (1141-1215) was a Tendai monk who tried to propagate Rinzai Zen practice as part of the Tendai School. He established Jufuku-ji in Kamakura in 1200 and Kennin-ji temple in Kyoto. These temples were initially meant to be Tendai temples where Rinzai Zen would be practiced. However, by Nichiren’s day they had become pure Rinzai Zen temples run by monks such as Lan-chi Tao-lung (1213-1278; J. Rankei Dōryū) who had come from Sung China to Japan in 1246 at the invitation of Hōjō Tokiyori (1227-1263) and was installed as the abbot of Kennin-ji in 1259.
In his writings, Nichiren speaks of Chih-i and Saichō defeating their contemporaries in debates. However, rather than engaging in formal debates, Chih-i and Saichō gave lectures and wrote essays and corresponded with fellow monks. They did, nevertheless, win the respect of their contemporaries, both monks and literati, for their insightful scholarship and depth of spiritual cultivation. As a Tendai reformer, Nichiren was alarmed that the Tendai temples were being converted into centers of True Word, Pure Land, and Zen practice. He lamented what he saw as the neglect of the teachings of Chih-i, Miao-lê, and Saichō and hoped to restore the heritage of the T’ien-t’ai School. More importantly, Nichiren was determined to carry forward the legacy of the T’ien-t’ai School by sharing the teaching and practice of the Lotus Sūtra, the Buddha’s highest teaching, with all people.
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According to Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism there are eight kinds of discernment: (1) sight-consciousness, (2) hearing-consciousness, (3) smell-consciousness, (4) taste-consciousness, (5) touch-consciousness, (6) mind-consciousness, (7) Mano-consciousness, and (8) Alaya-consciousness.
Alaya-vinnana (storehouse consciousness) refers to a level of subliminal mental processes that occur uninterruptedly throughout one’s life and may continue in to multiple lifetimes and scientists identify this as the sub-conscious.
Source: Yogacara Buddhism / MN Zen Center
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Source: Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school
Indian Yogacara
Maitreya Nath
Gandhara (Afghanistan) Brahmin Boys Asanga and Vasubandhu
Sthiramati
Paramartha
Bodhiruci
Vijñaptimātra
Vijñānavāda
ālayavijñāna
mind only (citta-matra)
idea/impressions (vijñapti-matra)
three self-natures (trisvabhāva)
warehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna)
Storehouse consciousness
overturning the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti)
the theory of eight consciousnesses
Amalavijñānam
Dignaga
Dhamapala
Silabhadra
Dharma Nature
Tathagatagarbha
Third Turning of Dharma Chakra
Source: Making Sense of Mind Only: Why Yogacara Buddhism Matters
Through engaging, contemporary examples, Making Sense of Mind Only reveals the Yogacara school of Indian Buddhism as a coherent system of ideas and practices for the path to liberation, contextualizing its key texts and rendering them accessible and relevant.
The Yogacara, or Yoga Practice, school is one of the two schools of Mahayana Buddhism that developed in the early centuries of the common era. Though it arose in India, Mahayana Buddhism now flourishes in China, Tibet, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. While the other major Mahayana tradition, the Madhyamaka (Middle Way), focuses on the concept of emptiness—that all phenomena lack an intrinsic essence—the Yogacara school focuses on the cognitive processes whereby we impute such essences. Through everyday examples and analogues in cognitive science, author William Waldron makes Yogacara’s core teachings—on the three turnings of the Dharma wheel, the three natures, the storehouse consciousness, and mere perception—accessible to a broad audience. In contrast to the common characterization of Yogacara as philosophical idealism, Waldron presents Yogacara Buddhism on its own terms, as a coherent system of ideas and practices, with dependent arising its guiding principle.
The first half of Making Sense of Mind Only explores the historical context for Yogacara’s development. Waldron examines early Buddhist texts that show how our affective and cognitive processes shape the way objects and worlds appear to us, and how we erroneously grasp onto them as essentially real—perpetuating the habits that bind us to samsara. He then analyzes the early Madhyamaka critique of essences.
This context sets the stage for the book’s second half, an examination of how Yogacara texts such as the Samdhinirmocana Sutra and Asanga’s Stages of Yogic Practice (Yogacarabhumi) build upon these earlier ideas by arguing that our constructive processes also occur unconsciously. Not only do we collectively, yet mostly unknowingly, construct shared realities or cultures, our shared worlds are also mediated through the storehouse consciousness (alayavijñana) functioning as a cultural unconscious. Vasubandhu’s Twenty Verses argues that we can learn to recognize such objects and worlds as “mere perceptions” (vijñaptimatra) and thereby abandon our enchantment with the products of our own cognitive processes. Finally, Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena from Their Ultimate Nature (Dharmadharmatavibhaga) elegantly lays out the Mahayana path to this transformation.
Source: ‘Yogācāra: Indian Buddhist Origins’
This chapter provides a historical overview of Yogācāra in India, including its place in Indian Buddhist doxography; its representative thinkers and commentators from the fourth through to the eleventh centuries, as well as important Yogācāra scholars from the Tibetan tradition; the school’s main scriptural sources (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra; Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra; Abhidharma-samuccaya; Abhidharma-kośa; Mahāyāna-saṃgraha; Madhyānta-vibhāga; Viṃśikā; Triṃśikā); key doctrines (such as buddhahood; seeds; base consciousness; five sense consciousnesses; mental factors; three wheels; three natures; dependent arising; idealism); Yogācāra psychology and meditation theory; and Yogācāra soteriology and hermeneutics.
Source: Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts.
The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda. [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only or manifestation only, the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind, and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures”. [3.] It has been asserted that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapaṭala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasaṁgraha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.
Source: Vasubandhu’s consciousness trilogy: a Yogacara Buddhist process idealism
This work is a philosophical investigation into Vasubandhu’s consciousness trilogy, comprised by the Trisvabhāva-Nirdeśa (“Instruction on the Threefold Own-State-of-Being,”) and the Vijñaptimātra-Kārikas (“Verses on Consciousness-Occasion,”) divided into the Viṃśika-Kārikas (“Twenty Verses”) and the Triṃśika-Kārikas (“Thirty Verses.”) Although early Indian Yogācāra Buddhism was once non-controversially described as a form of absolute ontological idealism, challengers have urged predominately psycho-epistemological readings of Yogācārin works. However, neither an exclusively metaphysical or exclusively epistemological reading is warranted; the more interesting and difficult case is that these themes are necessarily interwoven throughout the early Yogācāra canon, including the consciousness trilogy. While Vasubandhu’s position in the trilogy is indeed idealist and monist, this does not entail a rejection of objectivity. Functions are substituted for substances in ontological discussions. The ālayavijñāna (“storehouse-consciousness”) concept is developed so that it can serve the explanatory function of material cause. In this way much apparent logical tension is diffused, and a more complete picture of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra emerges.
Source: ‘Buddhism, Yogacara school of’
Yogācāra is one of the two schools of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Its founding is ascribed to two brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, but its basic tenets and doctrines were already in circulation for at least a century before the brothers lived. In order to overcome the ignorance that prevented one from attaining liberation from the karmic rounds of birth and death, Yogācāra focused on the processes involved in cognition. Their sustained attention to issues such as cognition, consciousness, perception and epistemology, coupled with claims such as ‘external objects do not exist’ has led some to misinterpret Yogācāra as a form of metaphysical idealism. They did not focus on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogācāra claims consciousness is only conventionally real), but rather because it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to eliminate.
Yogācāra introduced several important new doctrines to Buddhism, including vijñaptimātra, three self-natures, three turnings of the dharma-wheel and a system of eight consciousnesses. Their close scrutiny of cognition spawned two important developments: an elaborate psychological therapeutic system mapping out the problems in cognition with antidotes to correct them and an earnest epistemological endeavour that led to some of the most sophisticated work on perception and logic ever engaged in by Buddhists or Indians.
Although the founding of Yogācāra is traditionally ascribed to two half-brothers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (fourth–fifth century bc), most of its fundamental doctrines had already appeared in a number of scriptures a century or more earlier, most notably the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Elucidating the Hidden Connections) (third–fourth century bc). Among the key Yogācāra concepts introduced in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra are the notions of ’only-cognition’ (vijñaptimātra), three self-natures (trisvabhāva), warehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), overturning the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) and the theory of eight consciousnesses.
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra proclaimed its teachings to be the third turning of the wheel of dharma. Buddha lived around sixth–fifth century bc, but Mahāyāna Sūtra did not begin to appear probably until five hundred years later. New Mahāyāna Sūtra continued to be composed for many centuries. Indian Mahāyānists treated these Sūtras as documents which recorded actual discourses of the Buddha. By the third or fourth century a wide and sometimes incommensurate range of Buddhist doctrines had emerged, but whichever doctrines appeared in Sūtras could be ascribed to the authority of Buddha himself. According to the earliest Pāli Sutta, when Buddha became enlightened he turned the wheel of dharma, that is, began to teach the path to enlightenment. While Buddhists had always maintained that Buddha had geared specific teachings to the specific capacities of specific audiences, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra established the idea that Buddha had taught significantly different doctrines to different audiences according to their levels of understanding; and that these different doctrines led from provisional antidotes (pratipakṣa) for certain wrong views up to a comprehensive teaching that finally made explicit what was only implicit in the earlier teachings. In its view, the first two turnings of the wheel – the teachings of the Four Noble Truths in Nikāya and Abhidharma Buddhism and the teachings of the Madhyamaka school, respectively – had expressed the dharma through incomplete formulations that required further elucidation (neyārtha) to be properly understood and thus effective. The first turning, by emphasizing entities (such as dharmas and aggregates) while ’hiding’ emptiness, might lead one to hold a substantialistic view; the second turning, by emphasizing negation while ’hiding’ the positive qualities of the dharma, might be misconstrued as nihilism. The third turning was a middle way between these extremes that finally made everything explicit and definitive (nīthartha). In order to leave nothing hidden, the Yogācārins embarked on a massive, systematic synthesis of all the Buddhist teachings that had preceded them, scrutinizing and evaluating them down to the most trivial details in an attempt to formulate the definitive Buddhist teaching. Stated another way, to be effective all of Buddhism required a Yogācārin reinterpretation. Innovations in abhidharma analysis, logic, cosmology, meditation methods, psychology, philosophy and ethics are among their most important contributions. Asaṅga’s magnum opus, the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), is a comprehensive encyclopedia of Buddhist terms and models, mapped out according to his Yogācārin view of how one progresses along the stages of the path to enlightenment.
Chinese Yogacara
Old Yogacara
Northern Dilun
Southern Dilun
Shelun
Later Yogacara
Faxiang
Dharma Characteristics
Weishi (Consciousnesss – Only)
Fa-hsiang school of China
Hsüan-tsang and K’uei-chi
The great monk Genjō (Xuanzang in Chinese; 596–664)
his eminent disciple Kiki, also known as Jion Daishi (Guiji in Chinese; 632–682).
Dignaga
Dhamapala
Silabhadra
Xuanzang (602-664)
Kuiji (632- 682)
Huizho
Zhizhou
Consciousnesss – Shi
Mind – Xin
Meta Consciousness
9th level Consciousness – Amala
One Consciousness Only – Weidushi
Faxiang zong – Zong of Dharma Characteristics
Faxing zong – Zong of Dharma Nature
Source: Yogācāra Buddhism in China
Yogācāra Buddhism in China is divided into two stages. The early stage is represented by the schools of Dilun and Shelun, while the late stage is known as the school of Faxiang (dharma-characteristic) or Weishi (consciousness-only). Besides upholding the traditional Yogācāra teachings of store-consciousness, three natures, and consciousness-only, Chinese Yogācāras also had some interesting contributions to the relationship between the theories of mind and of Buddha-nature, to the analysis of the structure of consciousness, and to the classification of objects.
Source: 4. Indian transplants: tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra
A dispute at the start of the sixth century presaged a conflict that would take the Chinese Buddhists more than two centuries to settle. Two Indian monks collaborated on a translation of Vasubandhu’s Daśabhūmikasūutra śāstra (Treatise on the Ten Stages Sutra; in Chinese, Shidijing lun, or Dilun for short). The Dilun described the ten stages through which a bodhisattva proceeded on the way to nirvāṇa, and Vasubandhu’s exposition of it highlighted aspects most in accord with the tenets of the Yogācāra school (see Buddhism, Yogācāra school of; Vasubandhu). While translating, an irreconcilable difference of interpretation broke out between the two translators, Bodhiruci and Ratnamati. Bodhiruci’s reading followed a relatively orthodox Yogācāra line, while Ratnamati’s interpretation leaned heavily toward a Buddhist ideology only beginning to receive attention in China, tathāgatagarbha thought. Bodhiruci went on to translate roughly forty additional texts, and was later embraced by both the Huayan and Pure Land traditions as one of their early influences (see §§8, 10). Ratnamati later collaborated with several other translators on a number of other texts. Both sides attempted to ground their positions on interpretations of key texts, especially the Dilun. The Yogācāra versus Yogācāra-tathāgatagarbha conflict became one of the critical debates amongst sixth and seventh century Chinese Buddhists.
Yogācāra focused on the mind and distinguished eight types of consciousness: five sensory consciousnesses; an empirical organizer of sensory data (mano-vijñāna); a self-absorbed, appropriative consciousness (manas); and the eighth, a warehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) that retained the karmic impressions of past experiences and coloured new experiences on the basis of that previous conditioning. The eighth consciousness was also the fundamental consciousness. Each individual is constituted by the karmic stream of one’s own ālaya-vijñāna, that is, one’s karmic conditioning. Since, like a stream, the ālaya-vijñāna is reconfigured each moment in response to constantly changing conditions, it is not a permanent self, although, being nothing more than a sequential chain of causes and effects, it provides sufficient stability for an individual to maintain a sense of continuity. According to classical Yogācāra texts, the mind (that is, ālaya-vijñāna and the mental events associated with it) is the problem, and enlightenment results from bringing this consciousness to an end, replacing it with the Great Mirror Cognition (ādarśa-jñāna); instead of discriminating consciousness, one has direct immediate cognition of things just as they are, as impartially and comprehensively as a mirror. This type of enlightenment occurs during the eighth stage according to the Dilun and other texts.
The term tathāgatagarbha (in Chinese, rulaizang) derives from two words: tathāgata (Chinese, rulai) is an epithet of the Buddha, meaning either ‘thus come’ or ‘thus gone’; garbha means embryo, womb or matrix, and was translated into Chinese as zang, meaning ‘repository’. In its earliest appearances in Buddhist texts, tathāgatagarbha (repository of buddhahood) signified the inherent capacity of humans (and sometimes other sentient beings) to achieve buddhahood. Over time the concept expanded and came to signify the original pristine pure ontological Buddha-ness intrinsic in all things, a pure nature that is obscured or covered over by defilements (Sanskrit, kleśa; Chinese fannao), that is, mental, cognitive, psychological, moral and emotional obstructions. It was treated as a synonym for Buddha-nature, though Buddha-nature dynamically understood as engaged in a struggle against defilements and impurities. In Chinese Buddhism especially, the soteriological goal consisted in a return to or recovering of that original nature by overcoming or eliminating the defilements. The battle between the pure and impure, light and dark, enlightenment and ignorance, good and evil and so on, took on such epic proportions in Chinese Buddhist literature that some scholars have compared it to Zoroastrian or Manichean themes, though evidence for the influence of those religions on Buddhist thought has been more suggestive than definitive (see Manicheism; Zoroastrianism).
In their classical formulations the ālaya-vijñāna and tathāgatagarbha were distinct items differing from each other in important ways – for instance, enlightenment entailed bringing the ālaya-vijñāna to an end, while it meant actualizing the tathāgatagarbha; the ālaya-vijñāna functioned as the karmic mechanism par excellence, while tathāgatagarbha was considered the antipode to all karmic defilements. Nonetheless some Buddhist texts, such as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, conflated the two. Those identifying the two argued that the ālaya-vijñāna, like tathāgatagarbha, was pure and its purity became permanently established after enlightenment. Those opposing the conflation countered that the ālaya-vijñānawas itself defiled and needed to be eliminated in order to reach enlightenment. For the conflators, tathāgatagarbha was identified with Buddha-nature and with mind (xin) (see Xin). Mind was considered pure, eternal, and the ontological ground of reality (Dharma-dhātu), while defiled thought-instants (nian) that engaged in delusionary false discriminations had to be eliminated. Once nian were eliminated, the true, pure nature of the mind would brilliantly shine forth, like the sun coming out from behind the clouds.
A third view was added when Paramārtha, another Indian translator with his own unique interpretation of Yogācāra, arrived in the middle of the sixth century. For his followers the most important of his translations was the She dasheng lun (Sanskrit title, Mahāyānasaṃgraha), or Shelun, a quasi-systematic exposition of Yogācāra theory by one its founders, Asaṅga. In some of his translations he added a ninth consciousness beyond the usual eight, a ‘pure consciousness’ that would pervade unhindered once the defiled ālaya-vijñāna was destroyed. His translations, which sometimes took liberties with the Sanskrit originals, offered a more sophisticated version of the conflation theory.
Source: Quick Overview of the Faxiang School 法相宗
Called the Weishi 唯識 (Sanskrit, Vijñaptimātra; consciousness-only) school by its Chinese proponents, and the Faxiang 法相 (dharma characteristics) school by its opponents, this was the third major introduction of Yogācāra Buddhism into China. Competing versions of Yogācāra had dominated Chinese Buddhism since the beginning of the sixth century, first with the Northern and Southern Dilun 地論schools, which followed, respectively, the opposing interpretations by Bodhiruci 菩提流支and Ratnamati 勒那摩提 of the Dilun (Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Shidi jing 十地經 [Sanskrit, Daśabhūmika-sūtra] called Daśabhūmika-sūtra-śāstra [Chinese, Shidi jing lun 十地經論], T.26.1522). Thereafter, a different brand of Yogācāra was introduced by the translator Paramārtha 真諦 (499-569) in the mid-sixth century. Disputes between these three schools (the two Dilun schools and Paramārtha’s school), as well as various hybrids of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha thought, had become so pervasive by the time of Xuanzang 玄奘 (ca. 600-664) that he traveled to India in 629 believing that texts as yet unavailable in China would settle the discrepancies. Instead he found that the Indian understanding of Yogācāra differed in many fundamentals-doctrinally and methodologically-from what had developed in China, and on his return to China in 645 he attempted to narrow the differences by translating over seventy texts and introducing Buddhist logic.
Because the novel teachings Xuanzang conveyed represented Indian Buddhist orthodoxy and because the Chinese emperor lavished extravagant patronage on him, Xuanzang quickly became the preeminent East Asian Buddhist of his generation, attracting students from Korea and Japan, as well as China. Two of his disciples, the Korean monk Wŏnch’ŭk 圓測 (613-696) and the Chinese monk Kuiji 窺基 (632-682), bitterly competed to succeed Xuanzang upon his death, their rivalry largely centering on divergent interpretations of the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only), a commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (Thirty Verses) that, according to tradition, Kuiji helped Xuanzang compile and translate from ten Sanskrit commentaries. Kuiji is considered by tradition to be the first patriarch of the Weishi (or Faxiang) school.
Kuiji wrote many commentaries, such as on:
the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra ( 說無垢稱經疏, T.38.1782)
the Heart Sūtra ( 般若波羅蜜多心經幽贊, T.33.1710 – English translation by Heng-ching Shih and Dan Lusthaus, A Comprehensive Commentary on the Heart Sutra, Numata Center, Berkeley, 2001),
the Diamond Sūtra (T.33.1700 and T.40.1816),
the Lotus Sūtra (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra)( 妙法蓮華經玄贊, T.34.1723),
Amitābha and Maitreya Sūtras (T.37.1757; T.37.1758; T.38.1772),
Vasubandhu’s One Hundred Dharmas Treatise ( 大乘百法明門論解, T.44.1836),
Sthiramati’s Commentary on Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya ( 雜集論述記, ZZ.74.603),
and on Buddhist logic ( 因明入正理論疏, T.44.1840);
but his commentaries on the Cheng weishi lun1 and an original treatise on Yogācāra, Fayuan yilin chang 大乘法苑義林章 (Essays on the Forest of Meanings in the Mahāyāna Dharma Garden, T.45.1861), became the cornerstones of the Weishi school.
Hui Zhao 惠沼 (650-714), the second patriarch, and Zhi Zhou 智周 (668-723), the third patriarch, wrote commentaries on the Fayuan yulin chang, the Lotus Sūtra, and the Madhyāntavibhāga; they also wrote treatises on Buddhist logic and commentaries on the Cheng weishi lun.2 After Zhi Zhou, Faxiang’s influence declined in China, though its texts continued to be studied by other schools. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Faxiang enjoyed a revival among Chinese philosophers such as Yang Wenhui (1837-1911), Ouyang Jingwu (1871-1943), Taixu (1890-1947), and Xiong Shili (1883-1968), who sought a bridge between native philosophy and Western philosophy, especially in the field of epistemology.
Faxiang (Korean: Pŏpsang; Japanese: Hossō) was influential in Korea during the Unified Silla (668-935) and Koryŏ dynasties (935-1392), but faded with the decline of Buddhism in the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910). Similarly, Hossō, initially transmitted to Japan from China and Korea, was prominent during the Nara period (710-784), but withered under attack in the Heian period (794-1185) from rival Tendai and Shingon schools. The Hossō monk Ryōhen 良逼 (1194-1252) rebutted those attacks in his Kanjin Kakumushō 觀心覺夢鈔 (Précis on Contemplating the Mind and Awakening from the Dream), but Hossō, though surviving, declined nonetheless.
Most East Asian Buddhist schools, along with Faxiang, accepted many standard Yogācāra doctrines, such as the eight consciousnesses, three natures, and mind-only, though each school quibbled about specifics. The two doctrines that drew the most attacks were the Faxiang rejection of tathāgatagarbha ideology for being too metaphysically substantialistic and the Faxiang doctrine of five seed-families (Sanskrit, pañcagotras; Chinese, wu xing 五姓), which held that one’s potential for awakening was determined by the good seeds already in one’s consciousness stream. Practitioners of the Hīnayāna, pratyekabuddha, and Mahāyāna paths, as well as those who were undecided about practice, could fulfill these paths only by bringing the respective seeds of whichever path they contained to fruition. A fifth seed-family, icchantika, being devoid of the requisite seeds, can never and would never desire to achieve awakening. Since the other East Asian Buddhist schools held that all beings possess buddha-nature incipiently as tathāgatagarbha, and thus all have the potential for awakening, they found the icchantika doctrine unacceptable. However, Faxiang did not treat the icchantika as an ontological category or predestination theory; it only referred to someone incorrigible, someone who, in recent lives, remains impervious to the teachings of Buddhism. Anyone desiring enlightenment, by definition, cannot be an icchantika.
Bibliography
Lusthaus, Dan. Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun.. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
Sponberg, Alan. “The Vijñaptimātratā Buddhism of the Chinese Monk K’uei-chi (A.D. 632-682).” Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver: 1979.
Weinstein, Stanley. “The Kanjin Kakumushō.” Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 1965.
Notes
1. 成唯識論述記, T.43.1830; 成唯識論掌中樞要, T.43.1831; 成唯識論料簡, ZZ.76.927; and the partially extant 成唯識論別抄, ZZ.77.866.[back]
2. Hui Zhao’s extant work, 成唯識論了義燈 (T.43.1832), a commentary on the Cheng Weishi lun (CWSL), offers details on the feud between Kuiji and Wŏnch’ŭk over interpretation of the CWSL and the right to succeed Xuanzang. Zhi Zhao’s extant writings include:
成唯識論演祕, T.43.1833 (Commentary on the CWSL)
大乘入道次第, T.45.1864 (Introduction to the Mahāyāna Path)
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Source: TRANSFORMING CONSCIOUSNESS: YOGACARA THOUGHT IN MODERN CHINA
Japanese Yogacara
One of the eight earliest Buddhist schools, Hossō (Faxiang in Chinese; Dharmalakshana in Sanskrit) was founded by the great monk Genjō (Xuanzang in Chinese; 596–664) and his eminent disciple Kiki, also known as Jion Daishi (Guiji in Chinese; 632–682).
The Todai-ji Temple (meaning Great Eastern Temple) is a key Buddhist landmark of Nara. It dates from the period when Mahayana [1] Buddhism first started to arrive in Japan via China and Korea at the start of the 7th century CE. [2] The most prominent early converts were the Empress Suiko (592-628 CE) and Prince Shotoku (573-621 CE). Nara also witnessed the period of the ‘Six Sects’ covering the debates between the Jojitsu, Kusha, Ritsu, Sanron, Hosso and Kegon sects [3], and this Todai-ji Temple served as the administrative temple covering all six Buddhist schools in Japan.
Source:
Kohfuku-ji is the main temple of the Hossō-shū Buddhist sect, inspired by the Chinese school Weishizong “pure consciousness”, known as Faxiang, introduced in Japan at the end of 7nd or at the beginning of 8nd century. The Hōsso School is based on the doctrine of pure consciousness, the deepest stratum of consciousness that holds the possibility of becoming a Buddha. It aims to perceive the true nature of things whose discovery leads to enlightenment.
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
This paper examines the influence of writings by Silla Yogācāra Buddhists on the formation of orthodox interpretations within the Hossō tradition, Japanese Yogācāra. Part One considers the frequency of citations of Silla masters and their texts in principal Hossō writings and suggests several implications of this. Some of the Silla writings used by Hossō thinkers in support of their views were specifically condemned by the Chinese Faxiang tradition. This contradicts descriptions by Gyōnen and other historians of Hossō as an imported copy of Faxiang. Part Two of the article assesses four points of argument between the Nara Hossō Northern Temple (Kōfukuji) tradition and Nara Hossō Southern Temple (Gangōji) tradition. It is shown that these disputes persisted for centuries in Japanese Yogācāra and that the two traditions used Silla interpretations in opposing ways. Many prominent Hossō authorities relied on Silla texts that challenge Faxiang understandings of epistemology, ontology, and logic.
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
Source: “Early Japanese Hossō in Relation to Silla Yogācāra in Disputes between Nara’s Northern and Southern Temple Traditions.”
One of the Six Schools of Nara Buddhism in Japan.this school consisted of scholar-monks whose primary concern was the texts and doctrines of the Fa-hsiang school of China (of which Hossō is the Japanese pronunciation). Their philosophy was also known as yuishiki, or ‘consciousness-only’, because of its fundamental belief that all of reality, including both the objective world and the subjective mind that regards it, are but evolutions of consciousness according to karma. The school was transmitted to Japan by Japanese clerics who studied in China with Fa-hsiang masters such as Hsüan-tsang and K’uei-chi, and became one of the most powerful of the six Nara schools. See also citta-mātra; yogācāra; vijñapti-mātra.
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Living Yogacara: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism
Paperback – June 9, 2009 by Tagawa Shun’ei (Author), A. Charles Muller (Translator)
The Yogācāra (practitioners of yoga) school, also known as citta-mātra (mind-only), or vijñānavāda(consciousness school), is one of two major schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhist thought, which flourished in classical India from the 3rd–4th century CE to the 9th century CE. It is important both for the way it synthesized and developed all aspects of contemporaneous Mahāyāna Buddhism, as well as for its historical influence on subsequent forms of Buddhism both inside and outside of India. Its encyclopedic aims led Yogācārins first to outline the “practice of yoga,” which combined Abhidharmic modes of analyzing mental processes with the Mādhyamikan notion of emptiness, and, second, to systematize the Mahayana path system and developing notions of buddhahood. Both of these syntheses—philosophical analyses of mental processes and systematization of the Buddhist path and goal—were very influential in later Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist history, while only the second—systematizing the Buddhist path and goal—attained similar importance in Tibet. Understanding the whole of Yogācāra is a challenge commensurate with its ambitious aims; accordingly, there are still no comprehensive treatments of Yogācāra in Western languages. Moreover, a huge gulf still exists between works that are relatively accessible to nonspecialists and those written for and by specialists. Academic interest in the school has been increasing since the 1990s, however, partly as a result of increased historical knowledge about and interaction between South and East Asian forms of Buddhism, and partly in response to the many venues for dialogue between Yogācāra and modern thought.
General Overviews
Though Yogācāra is an elaborate scholastic school, it purports to describe everyday experience, however deluded, as well as its transformation through the practice of yoga to the ultimate state of buddhahood. In accessible terms, Nhât Hanh 2006 and Tagawa 2009 show how Yogācāra analyses of mind elucidate everyday experience and their transformations. Davidson 1985 illustrates, more technically, the multiple systems whereby Yogācārins conceived of such transformation, while Nagao and Kawamura 1991 addresses the various philosophical, interpretive, and historical issues these practices raised. Potter 1999 contains useful synopses of most Buddhist texts from the formative period of Yogācāra. Lusthaus (What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra) provides an excellent and succinct outline of classical Indian Yogācāra while arguing against the standard interpretation of Yogācāra as metaphysical idealism—an interpretation whose history in Western scholarship he reconstructs in Lusthaus 1999. General Bibliography on Yogācāra and especially Powers 1991 can be consulted for further sources.
Davidson, R. M. Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Āśraya parivṛtti/parāvṛtti among the Yogācāra. PhD diss., Berkeley: University of California, 1985. The only work that effectively encompasses the various dimensions of classical Yogācāra systems of transformation in its Indian historical milieu. It assumes some background on the part of the reader.
Lusthaus, Dan. “What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra.”A succinct summary of Yogācāra along with the clearest argument against its standard interpretation as a form of metaphysical idealism.
Lusthaus, Dan. “A Brief Retrospective of Western Yogācāra Scholarship in the 20th Century.” Paper presented at the 11th International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, 26–31 July 1999. A useful overview of Western scholarship on Yogācāra during the 20th century. Includes references. Available online.
Nagao Gajin, and Leslie S. Kawamura, trans. Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies: Collected Papers of G. M. Nagao. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. A collection of seminal essays by one of Japan’s leading Yogācāra specialists. A great place for graduate students to begin, especially those interested in philological issues.
Nhât Hanh, Thich. Understanding Our Mind. Berkeley, CA: Parallax, 2006. A simple, though not simplistic, introduction to the major concepts of Yogācāra from the point of view of a leading Buddhist teacher and monk. Accessible, although somewhat repetitious.
Potter, Karl, ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Buddhist Philosophy. Vols. 8–9. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999. A useful collection of detailed outlines of Buddhist philosophical texts from roughly 100 to 350 CE, a period that encompasses the classical texts of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It includes a long introduction contextualizing the development of Yogācāra doctrines within the larger world of Indian Buddhist thought.
Powers, John. The Yogācāra School of Buddhism: A Bibliography. ATLA Bibliography Series 27. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1991. The most comprehensive bibliography in English. It includes references to all the important editions of Yogācāra texts in their Sanskrit originals and Tibetan and Chinese translations, their modern critical editions, as well as works by traditional Tibetan and modern scholars from around the globe. Lists no publications beyond 1991.
Tagawa Shun’ei. Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism.Translated by Charles Muller. Boston: WisdomPublications, 2009. A nontechnical introduction to the basic ideas of Yogācāra, heavily influenced by East Asian perspectives. Accessible and engaging.
Vasubandhu’s “Three Natures” A Practitioner’s Guide for Liberation
This dissertation seeks to locate the place of Taehyon (ca. 8th century CE), a Silla Korean Yogacara monk, within the broader East Asian Buddhist tradition. My task is not confined solely to a narrow study of Taehyon’s thought and career, but is principally concerned with understanding the wider contours of the East Asian Yogacara tradition itself and how these contours are reflected in Taehyon’s extant oeuvre. There are problems in determining Taehyon’s doctrinal position within the traditional paradigms of East Asian Yogacara tradition, that is, the bifurcations of Tathagatagarbha and Yogacara; Old and New Yogacara; the One Vehicle and Three Vehicles; and the Dharma Nature and Dharma Characteristics schools. Taehyon’s extant works contain doctrines drawn from across these various divides, and his doctrinal positions therefore do not precisely fit any of these traditional paradigms. In order to address this issue, this dissertation examines how these bifurcations originated and evolved over time, across the geographical expanse of the East Asian Yogacara tradition. The chapters of the dissertation discuss in largely chronological order the theoretical problems involved in these bifurcations within Yogacara and proposes possible resolutions to these problems, by focusing on the works of such major Buddhist exegetes as Paramartha (499-569), Ji (632-682), Wonhyo (617-686), Fazang (643-712), and, finally, Taehyon.
Into the Mirror is a call to cultivate wisdom and compassion—right within this world of illusion—and an insightful challenge to the rampant materialism of modernity. Andy Karr presents accessible and powerful methods to accomplish this through investigating the way our minds construct our worlds.
Combining contemporary Western inquiries with classical Buddhist investigations into the nature of mind, Karr invites the reader to make a personal, experiential journey through study, contemplation, and meditation. He presents a series of contemplative practices from Mahayana Buddhism, starting with the Middle Way teachings on emptiness and interdependence, through Yogachara’s subtle understanding of nonduality, to the view that buddha nature is already within us to be revealed rather than something external to be acquired.
Quarks of Consciousness and the Representation of the Rose: Philosophy of Science Meets the Vaiśeṣika-Vaibhāṣika-Vijñaptimātra Dialectic in Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā.
Philadelphia, Pa. : American Theological Library Association ATLA bibliography series ; no.27 ISBN : 0810825023
Being as Consciousness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism
Authors Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti Editors Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti Publisher Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2004 ISBN 8120819675, 9788120819672 Length 270 pages
Mādhyamika and Yogācāra A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies
By Gadjin M. Nagao Edited by Leslie S. Kawamura
Subjects: Buddhism Series: SUNY series in Buddhist Studies Paperback : 9780791401873, 304 pages, January 1991 Hardcover : 9780791401866, 304 pages, January 1991
The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism
Author Chhote Lal Tripathi Publisher Bharat-Bharati, 1972 Original from the University of Virginia Digitized Aug 1, 2007 Length 396 pages
Referents and Objects: A Parallel between General Semantics and Yogācāra Buddhism
Rowe, Thomas
(2018). Institute of General Semantics, ETC: A Review of General Semantics, July/October 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3821619
A striking and specific parallel occurs between the “two crucial negative premises” identified by Alfred Korzybski and the two approaches to emptiness in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.
Korzybski: Let us repeat the two crucial negative premises as established firmly by all human experience: (1) Words are not the things we are speaking about; and (2) There is no such thing as an object in absolute isolation.
The Yogācāra Emptinesses: 1. An object’s absence of being established by way of its own character as a referent of terminology or of a conceptual consciousness. 2. The emptiness of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects existing as different substantial entities.
Readings on Yogacara Buddhism
AUTHOR: A. K. CHATTERJEE PUBLISHER: BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY LANGUAGE: SANSKRIT EDITION: 1971
Making Sense of Mind Only: Why Yogacara Buddhism Matters
(Paperback)
By William S. Waldron
ISBN: 9781614297260 ISBN-10: 1614297266 Publisher: Wisdom Publications Publication Date: November 7th, 2023 Pages: 384 Language: English
Xuanzang’s journey to the West — and back to Chang’an
The Buddhist monk Xuanzang covered 10,000 miles on foot and horseback, from China to India, and passed through parts of what are today Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal. When he returned home, he received a hero’s welcome.
The Consciousness-Only (vijñapti-mātra) School of Chinese Buddhism is a transmission and development of the Consciousness-Only School of Indian Buddhism. Controversies exist regarding to what extent the Indian version was reshaped in China. Historically speaking, there were three major phases of the transmission of Indian Consciousness-Only doctrines: (1) early 6th century, represented by Bodhiruci; (2) mid-6th century, represented by Paramārtha (499-569); (3) mid-7th century, represented by Xuanzang (602?-664) and his disciples, who compiled the Cheng weishi lun (*Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi) and were later regarded as orthodox. One of the major differences between the Consciousness-Only doctrine transmitted by Paramārtha and that by Xuanzang lies in their reception of Tathāgatagarbha thought. According to Paramārtha, all sentient beings share the Dharma-body of the Buddha and can be properly designated as “Buddha-containing” (tathāgata-garbha), but Xuanzang recognizes the existence of the icchantika-s, namely, a group of sentient beings who will never be enlightened and become Buddhas.
Gimello 1976 remains a reliable introduction. Lusthaus 2002 is controversial in its interpretation of the Consciousness-Only doctrine of Xuanzang and Kuiji as phenomenology instead of as idealism.
The research explores the interplay between causality and the notion of time in Yogācāra Buddhism. There has been a long debate over whether time is an objective reality with independent ontological status or, in contrast, a subjective experience that is dependent on mind. Until now, the two sides have failed to provide a clear and complete explanation of our temporal conception of things. A similar situation can be identified in the development of the notion of time in Indian philosophy. The concept of time (kāla) in the Indian tradition has evolved from cosmological speculations and the notion of divine power as developed in the Upanisads, where time is identified with Brahman (God), which is postulated as the ultimate ground of existence. On the other hand, in Buddhist philosophy our temporal conception of things is explained with our psychological experience. The limited investigation into the teachings of Yogācāra Buddhism has created a vacuum in our knowledge of the concept of time as understood by this particular Buddhist tradition. The thesis argues that concepts of time in Yogācāra are closely linked with its spiritual practice and its explanation for temporal experience as it occurs in the internal mind. It is the Vijñānavāda theory of causality that mediates between mind and spiritual practice. Here, time is defined as a nominal designation for an uninterrupted series of causal activities. When causality links with the flowing stream of time in the past, present and future, it creates the impression of a linear relation between the cause and the arising of the effect. In this thesis, primary sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese are presented in order to show that there are doctrinal materials to support that it is around this central theme on which Yogācāra discussion on time hinger. The thesis demonstrates that the study of time in Yogācāra is divided into three strata: staring from the soteriological investigation by Maitreya and Asanga then developed into phenomenological inquiry in Vasubandhu’s idealistic position, and completed in the epistemological system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This research is intended to fill a gap in the study of the Buddhist concept of time and to provide a possible resolution to the contemporary debate over the nature of temporal notions by examining it from the religious and philosophical perspectives found in Yogācāra Buddhism.
YOGACARA VASUBANDHU’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEALISM
A BUDDHIST THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
SHRUTI KAPUR
THIS BOOK IS A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF YOGACARA VASUBANDHU AND THAT OF THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHER EDMUND HUSSERL HAVING THE FOCUS ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEEPLY INNER NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR MIND. IT ASSERTS THAT THE YOGACARA PHILOSOPHY IS MUCH RICHER AND COMPREHENSIVE THAN THE WESTERN PHENOMENOLOGY, PARTICULARLY THE HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY.
ISBN: 9788124611586 Year Of Publication: 2022 Edition: 1st Publisher: D.K. Printworld Pvt. Ltd.
The Doctrine of Momentariness in Sarvastivada School
Four Kinds of Sarvastivadins
Dharmatrata
Ghosaka
Vasumitra
Buddhadeva
Sautrantika (Darstantika) School
Doctrines Propounded by the Sautrantikas
The Doctrine of Momentariness
The Theory of Seed (Bīja)
A Glance at the Three Different Philosophical Perspectives of Vasubandhu
Vasubandhu: A Sarvastivada–Vaibhasika and Sautrantika
Vasubandhu: A Yogacara–Vijnanavadin
A Philosophical Debate between Yogacara Vasubandhu and the Buddhist Realists
Preamble
Objection 1: Spatial Regularity (Desa-niyama)
Reply
Objection 2: Temporal Regularity (Kala-niyama)
Reply
Objection 3: Public Shareability and Causal Continuity (Santana-niyama)
Reply
Objection 4: Functional Causal Action
(Krtya-kriya-niyama)
Reply
An Evaluation of Vasubandhu’s Arguments
Vaibhasika’s Realist Response
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Vaibhasika’s Realist Response
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Vaibhasika’s Realist Response
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Vaibhasika’s Realist Response
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Sautrantika Position
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Objection
Sautrantika Reply
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Sautrantika Reply
Yogacara Vasubandhu’s Response
Upapadukasattvadesana
Abhipraya
Prayojana
Badhaka-pramana
Agama Badha
Yukti Badha
Discourse on the Twelve Sense Spheres (Ayatana) Abhipraya
Sautrantika Questions
Vasubandhu Explains Ayatana Desana
Vijnaptimatrata Desana
Nature and Modes of Consciousness in the Trimsika
Introduction
Significant Key Questions
Meaning and Classification of Consciousness (Vijnana) Traditional Buddhist Classification: Early Abhidharma Classification of Consciousness by Yogacarin Asanga and Vasubandhu
Three-layered Structure of Consciousness
Storehouse Consciousness (Alaya-vijnana): The First Transformation
Etymological Roots of Alaya
Various Translations of Alaya-vijnana
Three Interpretations of Alaya-vijnana
Four Aspects of Alaya
Nature of the Five Omnipresent Factors
Svarupa/Svabhāva of Alaya-vijnana
Contribution of Alaya-vijnana Principle to Vijnanavada
Alaya-vijnana: Its Active and Passive Modes
Cessation (Nivr̥tti) of Alaya-vijnana
Alaya-Vijnana vs Absolute Flow of Consciousness
Thinking Consciousness (Mano–nama-vijnana): The Second Transformation
Four Aspects of Ego Consciousness
Cessation (Nivrtti) of Klista-manovijnana
Active Consciousness (Pravr̥tti–vijnana): The Third Transformation
Mind and Mental Concommitants (Citta and Caitta or Caitasika)
Metaphors of “River” and “Ocean”
Reciprocal Relationship between Alaya–vijnana and Pravrtti–vijnana
The Internal Consciousness (Manovijnana)
Refutation of Eternalism (Sasvatanta)
Criticism of Externalist Realist
Refutation of Annihilationism
(Ucchedanta, Apavadanta)
Vasubandhu’s Theory of Trisvabhava
Introduction
The Three Natures of Consciousness (Trisvabhāva)
The Imagined Nature (Parikalpita Svabhava)
The Dependent Nature (Paratantra Svabhava)
The Consummate Nature (Pariniṣpanna Svabhava)
Interrelatedness between the Three Natures of Consciousness
Theory of Trilaksana in the Sandhinirmocanasutra
Simile of the Classical Indian Roadside Magic Show
Vasubandhu Explains Nihsvabhavata
Vasubandhu’s Tri-nihsvabhava Theory
The Path of Purification or Perfection (Ksanti)
Laksana Nihsvabhavata
Utpatti Nihsvabhavata
Paramartha Nihsvabhavata
5.Variety of Idealism: Western and Indian
What Is idealism?
Mind-boggling Views of Idealism
Plato’s Idealism
Descartes’ Problematic Idealism
Metaphysical Theory
Privileged Epistemic Position of Mind
Wax Analogy: Melting of the External Object
Representation Theory of Sense Perception
External Things: “A Great Propensity to Believe” Argument
Berkeley’s Idealism
What Is the Treatise All About?
Argument against Materialism
The Master Argument
Rejection of the Theory of Abstraction
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
Husserl’s Direct Realism-cum-Transcendental Idealism
Realist-Idealist Controversy about Husserl
Transcendental Idealism of Vedanta
Synthesis of Realism and Idealism in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
Sankara’s Strong Sense of Philosophical Idealism
Phenomenology of Consciousness: A Comparative Study of Yogacara Vasubandhu and Husserl
Is Yogacara Vasubandhu a Phenomenologist?
What Does Phenomenology Mean?
Human Life as an Embodied Consciousness
Vasubandhu’s Thought-continuity and Methodology
Denial of the Duality within Experience
Two-tiered Hermeneutic Strategy
Vijnapti Matra and Nirvanic Freedom
The Problem of Temporal Synthesis and Continuity
Vasubandhu
Phenomenological Modes of Consciousness
Husserl on Temporal Synthesis and Continuity
Conclusion: A Critical Estimate
Bibliography
Index
IS IT ALL IN MY HEAD? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MIND-ONLY SCHOOL, PART 1: MIND-ONLY IN CONTEXT
Yogacara Buddhism has frequently been mislabelled by scholars as a form of philosophical idealism. Hence it is usually asserted that Yogacara claims that mind or consciousness is the only reality and that the aim of Yogacara practice is the transformation of a defiled, empirical mind/consciousness into a true mind. This interpretation totally distorts Yogacara’s actual intent, which is summarized in the Sanskrit term vijnapti-matra . I seek to demonstrate that vijnapti-matra does not mean that mind alone is real, but rather that all human problematics are produced by and in the closure of psycho-linguistic conditioning; mind is the problem, not the solution. ;Since proper understanding of Yogacara depends on correctly contextualizing its doctrines, the evolution of key concepts–such as karma, the privileging of the cognitive domain , the ‘closured-actuality’ and ‘exceeding-reference-actuality’ , etc.–has been traced from early Buddhism through the development of Mahayana, to the interpretation given these notions in the Yogacara schools. A strong epistemological affinity between Yogacara and the Phenomenologies of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is also discussed and analyzed. ;When, during the seventh century, Hsuan-tsang composed the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, a compilation and translation into Chinese of ten Sanskrit commentaries on Vasubandhu’s Trimsika , he intended it as a corrective on the errant interpretations of Yogacara then prevalent in China. In order to recover the authentic Yogacara position, sections of the text have been translated and analyzed. Appendices include charts of the seventy-five and one-hundred dharmas, and a translation of the first chapter of the Madhyanta Vibhaga
Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China
The Western roots of many aspects of modern Chinese thought have been well documented. Far less well understood, and still largely overlooked, are the influence and significance of the main exemplar of Indian thought in modern China: Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy. This situation is all the more anomalous given that the revival of Yogācāra thought among leading Chinese intellectuals in the first three decades of the twentieth century played a decisive role in shaping how they engaged with major currents in modern Chinese thought: empirical science; “mind science” or psychology; evolutionary theory; Hegelian and Kantian philosophy; logic; and the place of Confucian thought in a modernizing China. The influence and legacy of Indian thought have been ignored in conventional accounts of China’s modern intellectual history. This volume sets out to achieve three goals. The first is to explain why this Indian philosophical system proved to be so attractive to influential Chinese intellectuals at the very moment in Chinese history when traditional knowledge systems and schemes of knowledge compartmentalization were being confronted by radically new knowledge systems introduced from the West. The next goal is to demonstrate how the revival of Yogācāra thought informed Chinese responses to the challenges of modernity, in particular modern science and logic. The third goal is to highlight how Yogācāra thought shaped a major current in modern Chinese philosophy: New Confucianism.
‘Teaching Yogācāra Buddhism Using Cognitive Science’,
Waldron, William S.,
in Todd Lewis, and Gary deAngelis (eds), Teaching Buddhism: New Insights on Understanding and Presenting the Traditions, AAR Teaching Religious Studies (New York, 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Oct. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199373093.003.0003, accessed 10 July 2023.
In his Madhyamakāvatāra, Chandrakirti also offered refutations of a number of Buddhist views such as those of the vijñānavāda (“consciousness doctrine”) or yogācāra school. Chandrakirti understood this tradition as positing a kind of subjective idealism. According to Chandrakirti, the yogācāra school fails to fully understand the empty nature of consciousness since they ontologically privilege consciousness over its objects. However, according to Chandrakirti, both are equally empty and neither have any ontological primacy or ultimate existence. Thus, for Chandrakirti, yogācāra fails to appreciate how everything, including consciousness, is conditioned and empty.
Chandrakirti also examines and refutes the basic theories of yogācāra, including the theory of the three natures and the theory of the storehouse consciousness. Chandrakirti cites the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra in order to argue that the storehouse consciousness is a provisional teaching of indirect meaning (neyartha). He also critiques the yogācāra denial of an external object (bāhyārtha, bahirartha) of knowledge and the yogācāra theory of ‘self-awareness’ (svasamvedana, svasamvitti).
Furthermore, Chandrakirti interprets the various statements in the Mahayana sutras which seem to promote idealism in a different way than the yogācāra school. According to Chandrakirti, sutra teachings which state that “all is mind” and the like were taught by the Buddha as a way to counter the idea that our sufferings are caused by external forces and actors. According to Chandrakirti, to counter this wrong view and to help people understand that suffering mainly arises due to the way we understand our experience, the Buddha taught that all is mind (citta-matra) or idea/impressions (vijñapti-matra). Chandrakirti argues that it is a mistake to take this literally as an ontological statement and to conclude that only consciousness exists.
Vasubandhu’s consciousness trilogy: a Yogacara Buddhist process idealism
the Faculty of the Graduate School University of Missouri-Columbia Doctor of Philosophy Thesis By MELANIE K. JOHNSON-MOXLEY Dr. Bina Gupta, Dissertation Supervisor MAY 2008
The Western roots of many aspects of modern Chinese thought have been well documented. Far less well understood, and still largely overlooked, is the influence and significance of the main exemplar of Indian thought in modern China: Yogacara Buddhist thought. This situation is all the more anomalous given that the revival of Yogacara thought amongst leading Chinese intellectuals in the first three decades of the twentieth century played a decisive role in shaping major currents in modern Chinese thought. Furthermore, the legacies of the revival of Yogacara thought in key areas of contemporary thought (New Confucianism, in particular) are ongoing. This Project has three broad aims: 1. It will explain why this Indian philosophical system proved to be so attractive to influential Chinese intellectuals at the very moment in Chinese history when traditional knowledge systems and schemes of knowledge compartmentalization were being confronted by radically new knowledge systems introduced from the West. 2. It will demonstrate how the revival of Yogacara thought informed early Chinese responses to the challenges of modernity and shaped major currents in modern Chinese thought and philosophy. 3. It will show how the legacies of sustained critical engagement with Yogacara thought in contemporary China “New Confucianism, in particular” remain vibrant, ongoing and ripe with possibility. The Project undertakes to achieve these aims this by coordinating and drawing on the combined resources of a unique body of expertise in a highly innovative collaborative undertaking. The Project involves the collaboration of a network of twelve specialists around the globe: Australia, the Netherlands, Taiwan, USA, Canada and China. It brings together the expertise of scholars of Buddhism (covering Indian, Tibetan, Chinese, Korean and Japanese traditions of Buddhism) and scholars of Chinese intellectual history. A specialist of modern Japanese ethics has been added to provide a point of comparison helping the team to contextualize its findings within a larger East Asian Framework.
An Outline of the Yogacara-Vijñanavada School of Indian Buddhism Part One.
Source: Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
References
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An Introduction to Japanese Buddhist Sects (inc. History; Development of Mahayana Buddhism; Ancient Sects Jojitsu & Sanron; Kusha; Hosso; Ritsu; Kegon; Tendai; Shingon; Nichiren; Zen ]; etc)
Armstrong, R C ( Robert Cornell ); Preface By Ketha A Armstrong; Introduction By John Line
Published by Canada (likely Regina, SK.) Privately Printed for Mrs Robery Cornell Armstrong (printer – The Hunter Rose Co. ), 1950, 1st Edition, First Printing, Regina, Saskatchewan, 1950
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE TWELVE JAPANESE BUDDHIST SECTS.
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL JAPANESE BY BUNYIU NANJIO, M. A. OXON; MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, LONDON; LECTURER ON THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE IN THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY. TOKYO.
“This temple is the Shingon sect in Japan!!” “Because this temple is the Jodo sect of Buddhism, the principal idol is Amida Nyorai (Amitabha Tathagata).”
Have you not watched such a sentence in guide sites? (I also write such a sentence frequently in this Blog.)
However, do you know the sects and the characteristic of the Japanese chaitya well?
I didn’t know that…
This is no good.
Therefore, I checked the sects of the Buddhism of Japan and these characteristic.
Contents:
A sect and characteristic of the Japanese Buddhism
Characteristic of each sects
1.A sect and characteristic of the Japanese Buddhism
Attention : Also note that the views and impressions here are those of individuals.
A denomination of representative Buddhism called “13 sects of Japanese Buddhism” was in Japan by 1940 before the Religious Corporation Act promulgation. (It becomes “18 sects of Japanese Buddhism” now.)
I made the list of the characteristic of each denomination.
2.Characteristic of each sects
The large classification of the denomination of the Japanese Buddhism is the following six denominations.
Nara Buddhism line(Nanto Rokushu, or the Six Sects of Nara)
Esoteric Buddhism line
Jodo line
Zenshu (Zen Buddhism) line
Hokke(Nichiren) Buddhism line
Other
●Nara Buddhism line(Nanto Rokushu, or the Six Sects of Nara)
Nanto Rokushu’ (also called ‘Nanto Rikushu’) is the general term of the six Buddhist sects which flourished mainly in Heijo-kyo (the capital of Japan in the Nara period) in the Nara period.
Sanron sect
Jojitsu sect
Hosso sect
Kusha sect
Kegon sect
Ritsu sect
Shotoku Sect
・Sanron sect
・Thought that the essence of all existence is “空(Ku)”. (空:くう, 梵: śūnyatā) ・”空(Ku)” is thought of Buddhism regarded as “This world continues changing.”. (a belief in Buddhism in which everything is regarded as relative)
・Thought that the essence of all existence is “空(Ku)”. (空:くう, 梵: śūnyatā) ・”空(Ku)” is thought of Buddhism regarded as “This world continues changing.”. (a belief in Buddhism in which everything is regarded as relative)
Theory of this sect : “We can enter Nirvana by doing long ascetic practices”. Theory of this sect : “to practice various kinds of Buddhistic austerities”.
・A theory of this sect is a philosophical, difficult theory. (For example, “One is others, and others are one”) ・The theory of this sect is not to think but to feel.
・This sect attaches great importance to religious precepts of the Buddhism called “律(Ritsu)”. ・”律(Ritsu)” is a way of thinking called “a rule of the group are important”. (This attitudes parallel a current Japanese education in many points.)
The esoteric Buddhism means “secret teaching”. And this denomination is generally a denomination of the secret religion of the Mahayanist Buddhism.
Tendai sect
Shingon sect
・Tendai sect
・This sect is the position of the university of the Japanese Buddhism. ・This sect produced the initiator of many other denominations. ・This sect thinks that “Mikkyo(Esoteric Buddhism)” is the same as “Kenkyo(exoteric Buddhism)”. ・Nara has few temples of the Tendai sect. This is because Saicho which is an initiator of this sect was on bad terms with a temple of Nara.
・This sect is the position of the college of the Japanese Buddhism. ・This sect thinks that “Mikkyo(Esoteric Buddhism)” and “Kenkyo(exoteric Buddhism)” are different. ・This sect thinks that a sect except this sect is a part of this sect.
Jodo-kyo is a teaching for people to become Buddha in the Land of Bliss of Amitabha Buddha.
Yuzu-Nenbutsu sect
Jodo sect
Jodo-Shinshu sect
Ji sect
・Yuzu-Nenbutsu sect
・Theory of this sect : “All for one and one and one for all” ・The word of “融通(Yuzu)” have a meaning as “helps each other”. ・Theory of this sect : Let’s make the action of chanting a prayer to Amida Buddha ten times in a day.
・Theory of this sect : We can go to Paradise if we advocate a prayer to Buddha (Namu Amida Butsu). ・This sect attaches great importance to a prayer to Buddha very much. ・I think that it is influence of this sect and Jodo-Shinshu sect that a Japanese advocates a prayer to Buddha frequently.
伝来(Introduction)：1175 本山(Head Temple)：Chion-in Temple (Kyoto) 宗祖(Sect founder)：Honen 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：Amida Nyorai(Amitabha Tathagata) 経典(Main Sutra)：Jodosanbu-kyo(Three Sutras of the Pure Land)
・Jodo-Shinshu sect
・Theory of this sect : Even if we do not demand the help, Buddha helps us. ・This is a way of thinking of Tarikihongan (salvation by faith in Amitabha). (Therefore let’s advocate a prayer to Buddha to thank Buddha.)
伝来(Introduction)：1224 本山(Head Temple)：- 宗祖(Sect founder)：Shinran 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：Amida Nyorai(Amitabha Tathagata) 経典(Main Sutra)：Jodosanbu-kyo(Three Sutras of the Pure Land)
・時宗
・Theory of this sect : We must not advocate a prayer to Buddha to demand a result. (Let’s advocate a prayer to Buddha earnestly without thinking anything.) ・A thought that all the everyday life is the end of the life. (Therefore let’s always advocate prayers to Buddha not to be sorry.)
伝来(Introduction)：1274 本山(Head Temple)：Shojoko-ji Temple (Kanagawa) 宗祖(Sect founder)：Ippen 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：Amida Nyorai(Amitabha Tathagata) 経典(Main Sutra)：Jodosanbu-kyo(Three Sutras of the Pure Land)
●Zenshu (Zen Buddhism) line
The Zen Buddhism is a denomination of Buddhism training ourselves using the Zen meditation.
Rinzai sect
Soto sect
Fuke sect
Obaku sect
・Rinzai sect
・Theory of this sect : to reach the stage of spiritual awakening after getting a delusion out of one’s head (State of the Zen) ・The way of thinking that all life coexists. (Therefore the principal idol is not appointed in this sect in particular.)
伝来(Introduction)：1191 本山(Head Temple)：Myoshin-ji Temple (Kyoto) and others 宗祖(Sect founder)：Minnan Eisai 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：None Specified 経典(Main Sutra)：None Specified
・Soto sect
・Theory of this sect : We must not advocate a prayer to Buddha to demand a result. ・We must not be particular about a spiritual awakening.
・The basic theory of this sect is the same as “Rinzai sect”. ・This sect has a custom to advocate a prayer to Buddha in Chinese. ・An initiator of this sect is the person who introduced kidney beans to Japan.
Hokkeshu(Nichiren) sect is one of the denomination of Buddhism. Its fundamental sutra is only Lotus Sutra.
Nichiren sect
・Nichiren sect
・This sect regarded the Lotus sutra as the supreme dharma. (Other sects are not recognized.) ・It is a commoner in the world of the Buddhism even if it is the Emperor.
伝来(Introduction)：1253 本山(Head Temple)：Kuon-ji Temple (Yamanashi) 宗祖(Sect founder)：Nichiren 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：Shaka Nyorai(Gautama Buddha), Great Mandala(Maha Mandala) 経典(Main Sutra)：Lotus Sutra
●Other
Shugenshu sect(Shugendo sect)
・Shugenshu sect(Shugendo sect)
・This sect was developed as an mountain religion unique to Japan through incorporation of Shinto religion, Buddhism, Taoism, and so forth. ・The practitioner of austerities of this sect is called Yamabushi (Buddhist monk). ・Yamabushi is a practitioner of Shugendo (Japanese mountain asceticism/shamanism incorporating Shinto and Buddhist concepts) who earnestly walks in the mountains as an ascetic practice.
伝来(Introduction)：Nara period 本山(Head Temple)：Kimpusen-ji Temple (Nara) and others 宗祖(Sect founder)：En no Gyoja(En no Ozunu) 主な本尊(Main principal idol)：Zao Gongen 経典(Main Sutra)：None Specified
How did you like it?
The Japanese Buddhism is really profound.
Have a nice trip! XD
<Let’s search the sightseeing information of Kansai in Japan on ‘Japan’s Travel Manual‘!!> <This site introduces the easiest way to get Japanese (Kansai) sightseeing spots to you.>
the commentaries of Ch’eng-kuan and Tsung-mi on Tu-shun’s Fa-chieh-kuan-men.
Mereology
Gandavyuha-sutra
Daśabhūmika-sūtra
Phenomena and principle
Six aspects and ten mysteries
The four dharma-dhātus
the dharma-dhātu of phenomena
the dharma-dhātu of principle
the dharma-dhātu of non-obstruction of phenomena and principle
the dharma-dhātu of non-obstruction of phenomena
One true dharma-dhātu
The cosmogonic map for Buddhist practice
ālayavijñāna
Key Teachers
Du Shun
Zhiyan
Fazang
Chengguan, the ‘fourth’ Huayan patriarch
Zongmi
Li Tongxuan (635–730)
Source: Huayan Buddhism / MNZencenter
Source: Reflecting Mirrors Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism
Source:Huayan Buddhism and the Phenomenal Universe of the Flower Ornament Sutra
Huayan Buddhism and the Phenomenal Universe of the Flower Ornament Sutra
Taigen Dan Leighton From the fall 2006 “Buddhadharma” magazine
Chinese Huayan Buddhism is considered by many Buddhist scholars to be one of the highpoints of Mahayana thought, or even of world philosophy. The Huayan worldview – which emphasizes interconnectedness and employs provocative holographic metaphors such as Indra’s Net – is a fascinating, illuminating resource that can be very useful to contemporary Buddhist practitioners, even though very few know much about it. It was hardly predominant in ancient times either. The major Huayan commentators were active in China for a relatively brief period – from the sixth to ninth century – and their profound, dense, and challenging writings were never widely read. Furthermore, the school they established in China never achieved any lengthy institutional prominence, and Huayan barely survives formally today in Japan as the Kegon school. Nevertheless, Huayan – with its intricate dialectical philosophy – provides the philosophical underpinning for Zen and much of the rest of popular East Asian Buddhism, and of its offshoots in the West. As a result, Huayan perspectives, and the practical instructions that grow out of them, have an enduring influence and applicability to modern Buddhist practice.
The Flower Ornament Sutra
The starting point for Huayan Buddhism is the extravagant, lengthy Flower Ornament Sutra, or Avatamsaka Sutra in Sanskrit, considered the most elevated scripture by the Huayan school. (Avatamsaka is translated as Huayan in Chinese, which is read as Kegon in Japanese.) The Chinese Huayan school features intricate, didactic philosophical speculations illustrated with fascinating metaphors, inspired by this sutra. Yet the Flower Ornament Sutra itself is a very different type of literature. It consists of highly sumptuous visions that offer a systematic presentation of the stages of development and unfolding of the practice activities of bodhisattvas, enlightening beings functioning in the world to promote awakening and ease suffering. This sutra is sometimes described as the very first awareness of Shakyamuni Buddha upon his great enlightenment, too lofty for anyone else at that time to hear. Over 1600 pages in Thomas Cleary’s translation, the Flower Ornament Sutrais a samadhi text, designed to inspire luminous visions and exalted experiences of mind and reality through its use of lush psychedelic, evocative imagery.
Because of the book’s length, but also because of its unique quality as a text, most practitioners need some guidance as to how to read the Flower Ornament Sutra, which may seem impenetrable at first glance. This is not a book to read to gain intellectual comprehension. Rather, the cumulative impact of the profusion of its imagery inspires heightened states of samadhi, or concentrated, meditative awareness. This effect can best be appreciated by bathing in the imagery, as if listening to a symphony, rather than trying to decipher a textbook. Reciting it aloud, by oneself or together with a small circle of practice friends, is a traditional approach.
This extensive sutra also need not be read in its entirety to experience its impact. Of the thirty-nine chapters of the sutra, two stand out as inspiring, independent sutras in their own right. One is the chapter on the Ten Stages or Grounds (Dasabhumika Sutra in Sanskrit), one of the earliest Mahayana sutras, which details the ten stages of development of bodhisattvas before buddhahood, even the first of which is quite lofty. The other separate sutra is the final chapter, the Entry into the Realm of Reality (Gandhavyuha Sutra in Sanskrit), which relates the journey of the pilgrim Sudhana to a sequence of fifty-three different bodhisattva teachers. These great bodhisattvas present a democratic vision of Dharma, as they include women and men, laypeople and priests, beggars and kings and queens. The chapter culminates with Sudhana’s entry into the inconceivably vast tower of Maitreya Bodhisattva, the next future Buddha, a lofty mind-boggling episode that even the special effects wizardry of George Lucas and his colleagues could not begin to capture. Maitreya’s tower, as extensive as all of space, contains a vast number of equally spacious towers overflowing with amazing sights, each without interfering with the space of any of the others.
Although these two sutras within a sutra stand out, any chapter of the larger Flower Ornament Sutra can serve as an entryway to its awareness, because of the holographic quality of the text, in which each part in itself fully exemplifies the entirety of the whole. This interfusion of the particular with the totality becomes the heart of the Huayan philosophy and practice. The larger sutra is replete with myriad buddhas and bodhisattvas, described as filling every grass-tip or atom. But the primary Buddha of the Flower Ornament Sutra is Vairocana, the Reality Body Buddha (Dharmakaya in Sanskrit) whose body is the equivalent of the entire phenomenal universe, which is known in Buddhism as the Dharmadhatu. Vairocana is also the primary buddha in many mandalas in Vajrayana, or tantric Buddhism. The heroic bodhisattva most prominently featured in the sutra is Samantabhadra (Puxian in Chinese; Fugen in Japanese), whose name means “Universal Virtue.” Often depicted riding an elephant, Samantabhadra with his calm dignity specializes in performing devotional observances and artistic, aesthetic expressions of the sacredness. He also resolutely practices the Bodhisattva Vow through accomplishing many varieties of helpful projects, all aimed at benefiting all beings and engaging all the societal systems of the world. As a result, Samantabhadra can serve as a great encouragement and resource both for artists and for modern “engaged” Buddhism and its renewal of Buddhist societal ethics.
The Fourfold Dharmadhatu
Inspired by this Flower Ornament Sutra, the Chinese Huayan teachers were able to articulate a profound dialectical vision that is a part of the foundation for all East Asian Buddhism. The basic teaching of this philosophy of interconnectedness is the Fourfold Dharmadhatu. The first two of these four aspects of Huayan reality clarify the two fundamental aspects of spiritual practice, and indeed of our whole lives: the universal and the particular. These first two aspects have also been described with the terms ultimate and phenomenal, absolute and relative, real and apparent, or sameness and difference.
The ultimate, absolute reality – the first part of the fourfold dharmadhatu – is glimpsed in introspective meditation; the practice of turning the attention within can serve to deepen awareness of the universal truth. In many religious traditions, seeing the universal oneness or reality is considered the goal of spiritual awareness and practice. But in Huayan Buddhism and in all East Asian Mahayana thereafter, the bodhisattva’s integration of that awareness back into ordinary, everyday activities and reality, into the particular – the second part of the fourfold dharmadhatu – is of crucial importance. As the eighth century Chan master Shitou (Sekito in Japanese) declared, “Merging with sameness is still not enlightenment.” Seeing the oneness of the Universal is only half of the practice, if that. The relevance of this insight must be realized and expressed in the realm of the relative particularities and diversities of our world.
The third aspect of the Huayan fourfold dharmadhatu is the mutual, non-obstructing interpenetration of the universal and particular. Admittedly, this is difficult to take in at first, but with patience we can see that universal truth can only exist in the context of some particular situation. There can be no abstract universal truth apart from its active presence in the particular circumstance of some specific causal condition. Also, every individual particular context, when fully examined, completely expresses the total universal truth. Moreover, the particular being or event and its universal aspect completely interact and coincide without hindering each other.
Based on this integration of universal and particular, the fourth part of the fourfold dharmadhatu is the mutual, non-obstructing interpenetration of the particular with other particulars, in which each particular entity or event can be fully present and complementary to any other particular. Viewed from the vantage point of deep interconnectedness, particular beings do not need to obstruct each other, but rather can harmonize and be mutually revealing. This has significant implications for how we can see our world as a field of complementary entities, rather than a world of competitive and conflicting beings.
Indra’s Net
A frequently cited expression of this vision of reality is the simile of Indra’s Net from the Avatamsaka Sutra, which was further elaborated by the Huayan teachers. The whole universe is seen as a multidimensional net, and at every point where the strands of the net meet jewels are set. Each jewel reflects the light reflected in the jewels around it, and each of those jewels in turn reflects the lights from all the jewels around them, and so on, forever. In this way each jewel, or each particular entity or event, including each person, ultimately reflects and expresses the radiance of the entire universe. All of totality can be seen in each of its parts.
Huayan teaching features a range of holographic samadhi instructions drawn from the Flower Ornament Sutra. These practices help clear away limited preconceptions, foster fresh perspectives on reality, and expand mental capacities by expressing our deep interconnectedness.
One example is the “lion emergence” samadhi, in which upon every single hair tip abide numerous buddha lands containing a vast array of buddhas, bodhisattvas, and liberating teachings. Another model is the “ocean mirror” or “ocean seal” samadhi. In this image, awareness is like the vast ocean surface, reflecting and confirming in detail all phenomena of the entire universe. Waves of phenomena may arise on the surface of the ocean, distorting its ability to mirror plainly. But when the waves subside as the water calms and clears, the ocean mirror again reflects all clearly. Our individual minds are like this, often disturbed by turbulence, but also capable of settling serenely to reflect clear awareness.
The Golden Lion and the Hall of Mirrors
Fazang (643-712), the third of the five patriarchs of the Huayan school, was a brilliant teacher who might be considered the true founder of the school. He was particularly adept at devising models and metaphors to readily illustrate the profound Huayan truths to people.
Fazang once taught the powerful Empress Wu, a dedicated patron and student of Buddhism, using as a metaphor a golden lion sitting nearby them in her palace. He explained the non-obstructing interpenetration of the universal and particular by describing in detail how the gold, like the universal principle, pervaded the object completely, but that its particular unique form was that of a lion. We can see it either as gold or as a lion. But each part of the golden lion is completely gold, and each part is also completely part of the lion.
Another time, Fazang illustrated the Huayan teachings for Empress Wu by constructing a hall of mirrors, placing mirrors on the ceiling, floor, four walls, and the four corners of a room. In the center he placed a Buddha image with a lamp next to it. Standing in this room, the empress could see that in the reflection of any one mirror clearly reflected the reflections from all of the other mirrors, including the specific reflection of the Buddha image in each one. This fully demonstrated the unobstructed interpenetration of the particular and the totality, with each one contained in all, and with all contained in each one. Moreover, it showed the non-obstructed interpenetration of each particular mirror with each of the others.
Along with these more accessible models, Fazang and the other Huayan masters, such as the fourth patriarch Chengguan (738-839), developed many intricate philosophical descriptions of various aspects of interconnectedness, such as the ten-fold causes for realization of totality, the non-obstruction of space and of time, and the ten non-obstructions of totality. These various conceptual presentations require lengthier study and dialectics to fully appreciate and benefit from. However, they do not contain new and separate teachings; rather they expand on and elaborate the Huayan dialectical philosophy of the interconnectedness of totality with all individual beings.
Implications for Practice
The Huayan teachings present splendorous, inspiring visions of the wonders of the universal reality, far beyond the limited perspectives caught within the physical details and conditioned awareness of our everyday life. This teaching first of all encourages the possibility of a fresh, deeper way of seeing our world and its wonders. With the encouragement of these teachings, we can sense levels of spiritual interconnection with others and with the wholeness of reality that lift us beyond our ordinary attachments and prejudices. Such vision can help to heal our individual confusion, grasping, and sense of sadness or loss.
But beyond this deeper connection with wholeness, the Huayan teachings also offer guidance for more complete balance in practice. The emphasis on integration of glimpses into the ultimate with the particular problems and challenges of our everyday situations can help practitioners not get caught up in blissful absorption in awareness of ultimate reality. Attachment to the ultimate is considered the most dangerous attachment. But attending to the conventional realities of our world with some sense of the omnipresence of the totality helps to balance our practice, and can also further inform our deeper sense of wholeness.
Among the Huayan tools for bringing the universal into our everyday experience are gathas, or verses, which include many practice instructions to be used as enlightening reminders in all kinds of everyday situations. Specifically, the eleventh chapter of the Flower Ornament Sutra, called “Purifying Practice,” includes one hundred forty distinct verses to be used to encourage mindfulness in particular circumstances. Some of the following situations are cited: awakening from sleep; before, during, and after eating; seeing a large tree, flowing water, flowers blooming, a lake, or a bridge; entering a house; giving or receiving a gift; meeting teachers, or many various other kinds of people; or proceeding on straight, winding, or hilly roads.
All the verses use the situation mentioned to encourage mindfulness and as reminders of the fundamental intention to help ourself and others more fully express compassion and wisdom, as in the following example:
Seeing grateful people They should wish that all beings Be able to know the blessings Of the Buddhas and enlightening beings.
Historically, a selection of these verses has been recited in East Asian monasteries as rituals before and after bathing, brushing teeth, taking meals, or while doing begging rounds. A number of present-day teachers, such as Thich Nhat Hanh and Robert Aitken Roshi, have rewritten such verses for everyday mindful awareness, bringing them into our contemporary contexts such as when driving on the freeway or using the telephone.
Huayan models of interconnectedness point to the experience of wholeness that is one of the great joys of zazen. From the perspective of zazen, meditation practice is not about attaining some special, new state of mind or being, but rather of fully realizing the inner dignity of this present body and mind. Huayan further explicates the importance of the relationship of wholeness to everyday activities, matching the central emphasis of Zen training on expressing clear awareness amid ordinary conduct.
Huayan in Chan and Zen
The strong influence of Huayan on Chan and Zen was initiated in the person of Zongmi (780-841), the fifth Huayan patriarch, who was also a Chan master descended from the famous Chinese Chan Sixth patriarch, Huineng. A prolific scholar, Zongmi commented extensively on aspects of the Flower Ornament Sutra and Huayan teaching, but also wrote insightfully on many Chan issues. Much of what we know about the historical realities of early ninth century Chan is from Zongmi’s writings. In his teachings, Zongmi synthesized not only Chan and Huayan, but also integrated native Chinese Confucian and Daoist traditions in an understanding that strongly influenced all subsequent Chinese Buddhism.
The Huayan Fourfold Dharmadhatu is the direct inspiration and starting point for the important Zen teaching of the Five Ranks by Dongshan (806-869), the founder of the Caodong Chan lineage, later brought to Japan as Soto Zen by Dogen (1200-1253). The five ranks or degrees teachings, which detail the five aspects of unfolding of the relationship between the universal and particular, became the philosophical foundation for Zen. This was not only true in the Soto school; Linji (Rinzai in Japanese) also developed teachings that echoed the Fourfold Dharmadhatu. Hakuin (1686-1769), the great Japanese founder of modern Rinzai Zen, also commented on the Five Ranks, which remain one of the highest stages in the koan curriculum of modern Rinzai Zen.
Huayan in Japan
The Japanese Kegon school is descended from the Chinese Huayan. One of the six early Nara schools from seventh century Japan, Kegon is a very small school today. But Kegon is still known for its Todaiji temple in Nara, home of the largest wooden building in the world, and the largest bronze statue, the “Great Buddha,” which depicts Vairocana, the Dharmakaya Buddha.
Probably the best-known Japanese Kegon teacher is the passionately devotional Myoe (1173-1232), a fascinating figure who has recently drawn attention from Western scholars for his forty-year dream journal, celebrated by modern Jungian psychologists. Myoe made considerable efforts to develop practical applications of the Huayan teachings and the Flower Ornament Sutra. For example, he presented his own dreams and meditative visions in terms of understandings from Huayan teachings, and he encouraged others to use Avatamsaka visions to support and clarify their own practice.
Myoe was also a Shingon (Japanese Vajrayana) priest. Among his numerous other colorful activities, as an ardent young monk he cut off his ear like Van Gogh to demonstrate his sincerity, and he is often depicted doing zazen on his sitting platform up in a tree at the temple where he taught.
Huayan in the West
Apart from its power to inform and illuminate meditation practice, Huayan philosophy is highly relevant to Buddhism’s potential contribution to environmental and ecological thinking. The dynamics of the mutual relationship of universal and particular in Huayan has already been influential in the modern deep ecology movement in its clear expression of the interrelationship of the total global environment to the well-being of particular ecological niches.
The implications of this interconnectedness and the importance of the bodhisattva’s responsibility in Huayan is also a great encouragement and resource for modern Engaged Buddhism and Buddhist societal ethics. This can be seen, for example, through the main Avatamsakabodhisattva Samantabhadra, who engages in specific projects for worldly benefit through his dedicated practice of Vow as applied to benefiting all beings and all the societal systems of the world.
Huayan models of the interconnectedness of totality also have implications for modern science. Especially in cutting-edge realms of physics such as string theory, Huayan visions may provide inspirations for clarifying the dynamic interactions of various dimensions of reality.
Given how much Huayan Buddhism has to offer contemporary practitioners seeking to deepen their experience and understanding, even in realms outside of practice, it is fortunate that more material about this ancient teaching is becoming available. We can perhaps look forward to a renaissance of this profound teaching of interconnectedness in response to the pressing needs of our day.
Source: Huayan Buddhism / Chinaconnectu
Source: 5. Pure Land, Hua-yan and Tantric Buddhism
Hua-yan Buddhism
The Hua-yan school is based on a collection of Mahayana sutras called the avatamsaka (flower wreath). Although most of these scriptures have been lost, some remain, notably the dhasabhumika and gandavyuha Sutras. The Hua- yan’s philosophies were primarily systematised by Fa-zang (643-712). Perhaps the most important teaching is that of “interpenetration”. This principle of interpenetration is illustrated by the Hindu myth of “Indra’s net”.
Indra’s net [Edited excerpt from Sangharakshita’s lecture: “the Universal Perspective of Mahayana Buddhism”]
According to mythology which Buddhism inherited from Hinduism, Indra is the King of the Gods. He is said to dwell in the “heaven of the thirty-three gods”. And Indra possesses a number of treasures. Amongst these treasures is a net made entirely of jewels. This net has the extraordinary characteristic that each and every one of its jewels reflects all the other jewels. In other words each jewel reflects the rest of the net; and all the other jewels are reflected in that individual jewel. All in each, and each in all.
The gandhavyuha sutra, which is so important to the Hua-yan school, says the whole universe with everything in it is like Indra’s net of jewels. The universe consists of innumerable phenomena of various kinds, just as Indra’s net consists of innumerable jewels of all shapes and sizes. From the standpoint of the highest spiritual experience all the phenomena of the universe, whether great or small, near or distant, all mutually reflect one another; in a sense they even contain one another. All contain each, and each contains all. This truth applies throughout space and also throughout time. Space and time are, in effect, transcended, because everything that happens is happening now, and everything that is happening anywhere is happening here.
Of course we usually we do not think of the universe like this, or experience it like this. We usually think of the things that make up the world as irreducibly distinct from one another. And we usually experience the universe as consisting of things that are completely distinct from one another.
There is a very popular scriptural saying that is quoted in mahayana Buddhist countries again and again, and which enters deeply into their literature.. Eventually it even influences their everyday life. And this saying is that “every grain of dust in the universe contains all the Buddhafields” (ie. all the worlds throughout space and time). This might seem a rather bizarre and exotic insight, but we have something rather like it in a verse by the English poet, painter and visionary William Blake. He must have had a glimpse of this reality when he wrote:
To see a world in a grain of sand, And Heaven in a wild flower, Hold the universe in the palm of one’s hand, And eternity in an hour.
Although this is a very popular verse of English literature, some people may not take it very seriously. They tend to think of these lines as just a flight of poetic fancy. But Blake was not just a poet, he was also a visionary, and this verse of his expresses a realization that in essence is not very different from that of Indra’s net.
The various teachings of Buddhism are also like Indra’s net. They comprise a number of different paths, teachings and practices, all of which are interconnected. They all reflect one another each gives you a clue to all the others. Each is contained in all the others.
Source: THE PROBLEMATIC OF WHOLE – PART AND THE HORIZON OF THE ENLIGHTENED IN HUAYAN BUDDHISM
Source: “Dharmadhātu: An Introduction to Hua-Yen Buddhism.”
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Key Sources of Research
The Vedic metaphor of Indra’s Net
The metaphor of Indra’s net, with its poetic description of the indivisibility of the universe, captures the essence of Hinduism’s vibrant and open spirit.
A Jewel in Indra’s Net: The Letter Sent by Fazang in China to Ŭisang in Korea
Volume 8 of Italian School of East Asian Studies occasional papers Occasional papers
Author Antonino Forte Edition illustrated Publisher Italian School of East Asian Studies, 2000 Original from the University of Michigan Digitized Jul 1, 2009 ISBN 4900793167, 9784900793163 Length 105 pages
The Chintamani Crystal Matrix: Quantum Intention and the Wish-Fulfilling Gem
By Johndennis Govert, Hapi Hara
Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism
Volume 151 of Asiatische Forschungen, ISSN 0571-320X Editor Imre Hamar Edition illustrated Publisher Harrassowitz, 2007 Original from the University of Michigan Digitized Jul 1, 2009 ISBN 344705509X, 9783447055093 Length 410 pages
A study of the relations between the doctrine of Huayan Buddhism and the legends surrounding some of the Huayan school patriarchs in China, Korea, and Japan.
Did Huayan’s teachings influence Dōgen’s Thought ? : Dōgen’s Treatment of Huayan Concepts of Mind-Only and One-and-Allness (Part 1 : The Intellectual relationship Between Dōgen and Huayan).
Skanda, The Multifaceted God: Skanda in Korean Buddhism and Beyond
위태천의 다양한 변모: 한국불교 그리고 보다 넓은 아시아적 관점에서 김수정 Sujung Kim 드포대학교 종교학과 부교수 Associate Professor of Religious Studies, DePauw University 31 March 2021. pp. 51-96
The Huayan school is a form of Buddhism that reflects unique East Asian understanding and interpretation of Indian Buddhism. It flourished the most in China during the Tang dynasty when the renowned “five patriarchs” of the school, Du Shun, Zhiyan, Fazang, Chengguan, and Zongmi, were active. One of the best-known concepts of Huayan Buddhism is “dependent arising of the dharma-dhatu” often translated as “realm of reality.” In the Avatamsaka-sutra, the Buddha preaches at three human locales, and four heavenly realms. All chapters of the sutra revolve around two central topics: eulogy of the Buddha’s unique abilities, and description of the bodhisattva’s career. There is a story about Zhiyan meeting a strange monk, who advised him to meditate in seclusion on the six aspects of the Dasabhumika-sutra. Another notable example of the Huayan school’s comprehensive and creative systematization of Buddhist teachings is the doctrine of “ten mysterious gates.”
Drawing on a panjiao similar to that of Zhiyi, the Huayan school chose the Huayan Sutra (Sanskrit title Avataṃsaka Sutra, Chinese Huayan jing) for its foundational scripture. What immediately differentiates Huayan from typically Indian approaches is that instead of concentrating on a diagnosis of the human problem, and exhorting and prescribing solutions for it, Huayan immediately begins from the point of view of enlightenment. In other words, its discourse represents a nirvanic perspective rather than a samsaric perspective. Instead of detailing the steps that would lead one from ignorance to enlightenment, Huayan immediately endeavours to describe how everything looks through enlightened eyes.
Like Tiantai, Huayan offers a totalistic, encompassing ‘round’ view. A lived world as constituted through a form of life experience is called a dharma-dhātu. Chengguan, the ‘fourth’ Huayan patriarch, described four types of dharma-dhātus, each successively encompassing its predecessors. The first is shi, which means ‘event’, ‘affair’ or ‘thing’. This is the realm where things are experienced as discrete individual items. The second is called li (principle), which in Chinese usage usually implies the principal metaphysical order that subtends events as well as the rational principles that explicate that order. Often li is used by Buddhists as a synonym for emptiness. The first sustained analysis based on the relation of li and shi was undertaken by the Korean monk Wônhyo in his commentary on the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna, which influenced early Huayan thinkers like Fazang. The li–shi model went on to become an important analytic tool for all sorts of East Asian philosophers, not just Buddhists. In the realm of li, one clearly sees the principles that relate shi to each other, but the principles are more important than the individual events. In the third realm, one sees the mutual interpenetration or ‘non-obstruction’ of li and shi (lishi wu’ai). Rather than seeing events while being oblivious to principle, or concentrating on principle while ignoring events, in this realm events are seen as instantiations of principle, and principle is nothing more than the order by which events relate to each other.
In the fourth and culminating dharma-dhātu, one sees the mutual interpenetration and non-obstruction of all events (shishi wu’ai). In this realm, everything is causally related to everything else. Huayan illustrates this with the image of Indra’s net, a vast net that encompasses the universe. A special jewel is found at the intersection of every horizontal and vertical weave in the net, special because each jewel reflects every other jewel in the net, so that looking into any one jewel, one sees them all. Every event or thing can disclose the whole universe because all mutually interpenetrate each other without barriers or obstruction.
This form of nondualism is not monistic because shishi wu’ai does not obliterate the distinctions between things, but rather insists that everything is connected to everything else without losing distinctiveness. Identity and difference, in this view, are merely two sides of the same coin, which, though a single coin, still has two distinct sides that should not be confused for each other. Mutual interpenetration is temporal as well as spatial; past, present and future mutually interpenetrate. Hence according to Huayan, to enter the path towards final enlightenment is, in an important sense, to have already arrived at that destination.
One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness (Oxford, 2014; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 May 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688258.003.0011, accessed 29 June 2023.
Mereology concerns part-whole relations, which is to say that mereological discussions focus on (1) the relation between the parts of a whole and the whole of which they’re a part, and (2) the relations between the parts within a whole. But mereological discussions extend beyond mere articulation of mereological axioms. Mereologies—or part-whole theories—play a central role in many aspects of metaphysics. While this has been the case since the time of the Stoics, there has recently been a noteworthy revival of interest in mereology. Some are interested in mereology out of a genuine interest in the field itself, whereas others turn to it to find a toolkit to help them tackle problems that arise in other discussions, as many problems, it turns out, feature a mereological component. Mereology has, for instance, played a key role in motivating a variety of views. Do, for instance, any two objects “mereologically fuse” to form a further object? Some cases seem clear, like the molecules in my body and me; other more gerrymandered cases, like your nose and the Eiffel Tower, seem less clear. Our mereological views here—whether we want to be mereological nihilists, universalists, or restricted composition theorists—will, at a minimum, play a crucial role in forming our ontological commitments. Also notice that while mereological discussion typically focuses on material entities, sometimes our interests gravitate toward the mereological structure of space-time regions, or to the relations that hold between regions and the objects that occupy them, or to the mereology of such entities as events. Mereology has its fingers in many pies. But no matter how we might want to answer mereological concerns, we might further wonder if this is putting the cart before the horse. That is, should mereology take priority? Or should we work out which metaphysical theses we want to defend, and then determine which mereological principles best serve our ends? Different authors take different position here. This article highlights many of the key mereological concepts and principles, but it also outlines some of the fundamental problems that confront philosophers who think about mereology. The article also focuses on philosophical issues, rather than formal ones. For the sake of accessibility, this article avoids technical presentations of, for instance, mereological axioms. It’s also noteworthy that there is a nontrivial contribution to mereology from non-English writers, especially from Eastern Europe.
General Overviews
While there are no introductory textbooks on mereology, there are a number of good introductions, surveys, and general overviews of the field. Varzi 2016 stands out in this regard, as it is detailed, up-to-date, extensive, and clearly written. Simons 1987 assumes little on the part of the reader, and is worth reading in its entirety given the central place it holds in contemporary discussions of mereology. In addition, the introductory chapters of the anthologies on mereology can play the right role for readers interested in particular topics; for example, those unfamiliar with mereology who have a particular interest in locative relations would find the introduction to Kleinschmidt 2014 (cited under Anthologies) a good place to start.
Simons, Peter. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. The first three chapters of this contemporary locus classicus on parthood act as an excellent introduction to mereology.
Varzi, Achille. “Appendix: Formal Theories of Parthood.” In Mereology and the Sciences. Edited by Claudio Calosi and Pierluigi Graziani, 259–370. Berlin: Springer, 2014. This is a succinct technical overview of many mereological principles and the ways in which they’re connected. A valuable reference to have on hand.
Varzi, Achille. “Mereology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2016. Surveys the range of standard mereological principles, with an emphasis on the contemporary, and gradually introduces formal presentations. Varzi also highlights the controversies and problems in the process. A comprehensive introduction, with an extensive bibliography.
Hua-Yen – Buddhism and Daoism in Dialogue
The interpenetration of phenomena as the noumenon
A revolutionary move: phenomena restored to respectability
“To Be is To Inter-Be”: Thich Nhat Hanh on Interdependent Arising
MIRJA ANNALENA HOLST AUV, Vietnam (mianho@gmx.de)
The “Thought of Enlightenment” in Fa-tsang’s Hua-yen Buddhism
Dale S. Wright
The Prevalence of Huayan-Chan 華嚴禪 Buddhism in the Regions of Northern Chinaduring the 11th Century
Focusing on Chinese Language Texts from the Song, Liao and Xixia (Tangut) Kingdoms
WANG Song 王頌 Professor, Peking University, Beijing, China wangsong_pku@163.com
Journal of Chan Buddhism 1 (2019) 146–177
Exegesis-Philosophy Interplay:
Introduction to Fazang’s 法藏 (643-712) Commentary on the Huayan jing 華嚴經 (60 juans) [Skt. Avataṃsaka Sūtra; Flower Garland Sūtra] — the Huayan jing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記 [Record of Investigating the Mystery of the Huayan jing]
by Weiyu Lin
The University of British Columbia (V ancouver)
July 2021
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Source: The Three Major Traditions of Buddhism: A Comprehensive Overview
Buddhism is one of the world’s major religions and has been practiced for over two and a half thousand years. It was founded by Siddhartha Gautama, who became known as the Buddha, meaning “enlightened one.” Today, there are three main traditions of Buddhism in the world: Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana.
Theravada Buddhism
Theravada Buddhism is the oldest and most traditional form of Buddhism. It is commonly practiced in Southeast Asia, including countries such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar. Theravada Buddhism focuses on individual enlightenment, with a strong emphasis on meditation and self-discipline. The teachings of the Buddha are considered to be the ultimate authority in Theravada Buddhism, and the goal of the practitioner is to become an arhat, or fully enlightened being. The Pali Canon, a collection of texts in the Pali language, is the primary source of teachings in Theravada Buddhism.
Mahayana Buddhism
Mahayana Buddhism is a more liberal and diverse tradition that developed in East Asia, including China, Japan, and Korea. Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes compassion and the idea that all sentient beings have the potential to become enlightened. The goal of a Mahayana practitioner is to become a bodhisattva, someone who has attained enlightenment but chooses to stay in the cycle of rebirth to help others achieve enlightenment. Mahayana Buddhism is characterized by the use of rituals and devotional practices, and it has a rich and complex system of philosophy and cosmology. The Mahayana sutras, a collection of scriptures, are considered the primary source of teachings in Mahayana Buddhism.
Vajrayana Buddhism
Vajrayana Buddhism, also known as Tantric Buddhism, is the third and newest tradition of Buddhism. It is commonly practiced in Tibet, Bhutan, and Nepal, and it emphasizes the use of meditation, visualization, and ritual to attain enlightenment. Vajrayana Buddhism incorporates elements of Hinduism and indigenous shamanistic practices and is known for its elaborate rituals and the use of mantras, mudras, and mandalas. The goal of a Vajrayana practitioner is to attain Buddhahood in one lifetime, and the Vajrayana teachings are transmitted through a system of guru-disciple relationships.
While there are differences between the three traditions of Buddhism, they all share a common belief in the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path, which are the foundational teachings of Buddhism. The Four Noble Truths state that suffering is a universal experience, the cause of suffering is craving and attachment, there is a way to end suffering, and the path to the end of suffering is the Eightfold Path, which includes right understanding, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration.
In conclusion, Buddhism is a rich and diverse religion with a long history and a wide range of practices and beliefs. The three traditions of Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana each offer a unique approach to achieving enlightenment, but they all share a common goal of reducing suffering and cultivating compassion. Whether you are interested in meditation, philosophy, or ritual, there is a form of Buddhism that can provide a path towards greater wisdom, peace, and understanding.
Key Terms
Theravada
Mahayana
Yogacara
Madhyamaka
Vajrayana
From its origin in India, Buddhism has spread to many parts of the world. It has become a world religion.
India
Nepal
Bhutan
Tibet
Mongolia
China
Korea
Japan
Vietnam
Sri Lanka
Myanmar (Burma)
Thailand
Cambodia
Laos
Europe
North America
In this post, I only outline schools of Buddhism in the following countries.
India, Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea.
Chinese Buddhism
Tiantai
Huayan
Chan
Source: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy
Chinese Buddhist philosophy primarily results from traditional Chinese Buddhist thinkers’ efforts to inherit, reinterpret, and develop theories and thoughts in various Chinese translations of Indian Mahayana scriptures and treatises. Five Chinese Buddhist schools or traditions are of philosophical significance: the Three-Treatise school, the Consciousness-Only school, the Tiantai school, the Huayan school, and Chinese Zen (Chan) Buddhism. Among them, the Three-Treatise and Consciousness-Only schools are the Chinese descendants of, respectively, Indian Madhyamaka and Yogācāra; however, both have all but disappeared after the Tang dynasty (618−907). The other three schools, Tiantai, Huayan, and Zen/Chan, are indigenous and can be seen as philosophically the most representative traditions of Chinese Buddhism. Considerably owing to the influence of Chinese thought and culture, Chinese Buddhist way of thinking is fundamentally nondualistic in character, emphasizing, more than Indian Mahayana does, the mutual sameness and interpenetration of the ultimate and the conventional. The thinking tends to be somewhat nondiscursive, involving holistic views expressed in paradoxical language, with particular concern on the practical. Meanwhile, Tathāgatagarbha thought receives much attention among Chinese Buddhist thinkers, and the widespread conviction is that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and can attain Buddhahood.
Source: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: Buddhist Schools/Quest for Wisdom
Chinese philosophy as a way of life: Buddhist schools
11 ― From: Rappard, H. van (2009). Walking Two Roads ― Accord and Separation In Chinese and Western Thought. Amsterdam: VU University Press. pp. 125-135.
Like the other Buddhist schools developed in China except for Chan the Huayan school was based on one particular sutra, the Avatamsaka sutra. Its Chinese name is Huayan or Flower Garland.
Translated in the fifth century, it was systematised by the third patriarch, Fazang (643-712). Because of its subtlety the Huayan school is often called the philosophical apex of Chinese Buddhism. It is also characteristically Chinese, which comes to the fore in its views on the relation between shi, variously rendered as objects, phenomena, form, or appearance, and li, principle, or reality.
In line with Mahayana Buddhism at large, Huayan holds that the phenomena, the things and events in the world that are perceived by the senses are interdependent or empty. This is so because, being conditioned by other phenomena they lack independent or intrinsic self-natures. There is nothing in them that really stands on its own as it were, no really independent or absolute core.
As Fazang said,
“Observe that all things are born from causes and conditions, and so have no individual reality, and hence are ultimately empty”.[2]
Shrine to a statue of the Eleven-Headed Guanyin[3]
In the breath-taking vistas conveyed by the Huayan sutra all phenomena are fully dependent on and related to each other.
Put thus however, the message of the Huayan school might seem to be no more than a pretty straightforward Buddhism and there would be little reason to call it a philosophical apex. But this qualification is easier to understand once it is understood that the sutra does not depict the world as seen by ordinary mortals but by a Buddha and that from such a perspective all phenomena in the universe interpenetrate. The Huayan is particularly famous for just this theme.
As seen by a Buddha, the world
“is one of infinite interpenetration. Inside everything is everything else. And yet all things are not confused”.[4]
A candle and a Buddha statue placed surrounded by mirrors
Such a perspective is difficult to appreciate and it is not surprising that Fazang, who had easy access to the court, found himself faced with an exasperated empress Wu (627-705) when he tried to explain the intricacies of the Huayan. But he was a good teacher with a characteristically Chinese knack of bringing highly abstract topics down to earth.
Recognising the difficulties experienced by the empress, Fazang had a candle and a Buddha statue placed surrounded by mirrors. When the candle was lit, the statue was reflected in every mirror, while each of these reflections were reflected in all the other mirrors so that in any one mirror were the reflections of all the others.
A 3D rendering of Indra’s net[5]
The background of this artful didactic device is found in the Huayan doctrine of Indra’s net, which would be less easy to replicate in one’s bathroom and considerably more expensive because it concerns a net of jewels. In Indra’s net each jewel reflects all the other jewels but the reflections of all the jewels in each individual jewel also contain the reflections of all the other jewels, ad infinitum. This illustrates the interpenetration of all things.
We are used to taking things purely at face value; a chair is a chair and that is all there is to it. We do not realise that it has been produced and that for this to happen trees have been cut, wood has been worked and other materials and energy have been used and that once manufactured, it has been transported to the shop where I bought it. And all this has been done by loggers, factory workers, drivers, sales persons and others, who required the services of yet other people such as mechanics and caterers in order to do their jobs. But then, all these people have been brought into existence by their parents, who themselves …
There is simply no end to what has gone into this particular chair. Even the simplest chair, in other words, is not an independent reality. Having come into existence because of numerous causes, it exists as the nexus of all of them. Applied along such lines,
Indra’s net provides an
“instrument for the achievement of balance and depth in understanding and, moreover, for the avoidance of one-sided views”.[6]
The Three Worthies of Huayan, Dazu Rock Carvings[7]
There is yet more to our chair. It may be seen as an economic object, a status symbol and a piece of furniture, and perhaps also as an antiquity or firewood. But each of these perspectives by itself elicits no more than one aspect of its totality, while the other perspectives are hidden.
Yet, the Huayan school insists,
“the display of this by no means annihilates that. On the contrary, at the very moment when this is displayed, all the infinite that’s are simultaneously and secretly established without the slightest hindrance or obstruction. It is a great pity that the human mind can only function in a one-at-a-time, from-one-level pattern, thus deprived of the opportunity of seeing the infinite versions of a given thing at once”.[8]
The mirror metaphor: not bound by a specific perspective
The Huayan school teaches us to be ‘round’, that is, not bound by a specific perspective. The obstacle that stands in the way of a round view is our ego,
“a persistent tendency to cling to a small, enclosed self and its interests. Its essence is to exclude, its function is to separate”.[9]
Fazang’s mirrors teach several things. The mirroring process takes place directly, not mediated by something else. A mirror mirrors, and when it does, it does so fully and completely ―
“it goes after nothing and welcomes nothing, it responds but does not store’.[10]
Aerial view of Huayan Temple, Datong[11]
This exemplifies the unimpeded interconnection of the phenomena that the sutra speaks of. But not only the Huayan sutra; unimpeded interconnection is found in all Buddhist schools in one way or another.
The mirror metaphor conveys the primordial accord and mutual resonance of things in the world. And also, if scratched or dirty a mirror won’t be able to function adequately and the image shown cannot but be partial and distorted. This demonstrates the disturbing role of the volitional intentions (fourth aggregate), which by and large come down to the Buddhist conception of the ego.
Whenever ego, self, or I interferes, as it cannot but do being itself the interfering volitional intention, the mirroring is disturbed and one-sided. But when the isolating sense of I is gone, awareness of the all pervading interconnection between all things arises.
The Huayan school has expressed this Buddhist insight as
“one in all and all in one’, and ‘one is all and all is one’.
Indra’s net has demonstrated the Huayan view of the relation between the phenomena as interdependent and interpenetrating without however, cancelling them out. Although their relativity is stressed, the phenomena do by no means disappear in an impenetrable fog of mutual dependence and interpenetration. This could be summarised by saying that the sutra sees the phenomena as separate yet identical, and at the same time as identical, yet separate.
Having dealt with the phenomena-phenomena level we are still left with the phenomena-principle level.
The metaphor of the golden lion
Lions pair, Bingling Si — photo Joke Koppius
How does li fit into the overall Huayan picture? In order to help empress Wu understand this dimension of the unimpeded interconnection propounded by his school, the resourceful Fazang thought of yet another didactic devise, the metaphor of the golden lion. In this metaphor gold symbolises the principle (li) and the lion a phenomenon or form (shi).
The relation between principle and form may be explained as follows. While the principle as such is formless it is inherent in all forms. Gold may be shaped into the form of a lion. But since the lion is merely a form it has no reality of its own ― it is entirely gold. Hence, the existence of the lion is wholly dependent on the existence of gold. No gold, no lion; without the principle there can be no phenomena or forms.
On the other hand, since the lion represents the form of the gold the latter cannot exist without the former. Thus, form reveals principle, and gold and lion co-exist harmoniously. Although they are merged together this impedes neither from being itself.
“One can see the golden lion as a lion, and one can see it as gold, and one can see both, and one can see neither. When the mutual conditioning of gold and lion is in harmony, the dichotomy of Li and Shih is gone; words are useless, the mind is at rest. Reality is appearance, appearance is reality. The gold is the lion, the lion is the gold”.[12]
In other words, just as the relation between the phenomena among themselves the relation between phenomena and principle is one of identity yet separation, and separation yet identity. Li and shi are mutually conditioned.
The metaphor of the golden lion also demonstrates why the Huayan school qualifies as a characteristically Chinese school of Buddhist philosophy.
The reason is that the principle (li) is not located in a separate world, a higher metaphysical or over-world if you please, but is conceived as inherent in the phenomena (shi). The principle operates and is to be found in this world.
Although it is often taken as propounding a purely intellectual Buddhism, what Huayan wants to convey is not just to cognitively understand the interconnection of all phenomena, and phenomena and principle but to actually live this insight.
Chan
Bodhidharma came from the West
Porcelain statuette Bodhidharma[13]
For all its lofty images and breathtaking scope the Buddhism of the Huayan school appeared to be highly Chinese in its concreteness. Nevertheless, in this respect the Chan school goes even further. This is probably the reason why it is often called the most Chinese form of Buddhism.
The earliest beginnings of the Chan school are foggy. When it began to emerge, Buddhism had already had four or five centuries to take root in Chinese soil and was solidly established.
There seems thus to have been little reason for an Indian meditation master to come from the West and set himself up as yet another teacher. But this is what the tradition tells us about Bodhidharma, a largely legendary character about whom nothing is known but who is assumed to have died in 532 at a ripe old age, which most accounts put at 150. He is said to have used not a single word in transmitting his teaching.
The oft-quoted stanza attributed to him was not formulated until the Tang dynasty. It runs as follows,
“A special transmission outside the teachings; Not standing on words and letters. Directly pointing to the human heart, Seeing into its nature and awakening.”[14]
When Chan began to be organised as an independent school it needed a history which would align it with the tradition of the already established Buddhist schools. It is not surprising therefore that a retrospective quality pervades the Chan tradition, McRae notes. Studying Chan history one deals
“not so much in facts and events as in legends and reconstructions, not so much with accomplishments and contributions as with attributions and legacies”.[15]
Bodhidharma the twenty eighth Indian patriarch and the first patriarch of Chan
Consequently, Bodhidharma went down in history as the twenty eighth Indian patriarch and the first patriarch of Chan.
After Bodhidharma four successive patriarchs seem to have carried on the tender Chan school: Huike (487-593), Sengcan (d. 606), Daoxin (580-635/651), and Hongren (602-675), who are traditionally presented as an unbroken line of master-disciple relationships although there is much historical uncertainty on this score.
This also applies to the third patriarch, Sengcan who has become known as the author of On trust in the heart(Xin xin ming) although it was probably produced during the Tang dynasty.
But from a practice point of view there is little reason to worry about Chan’s historical uncertainties. In view of what has been said about the tendency of the heart-mind to incline to either of two sides it is more pertinent to note Sengcan counsel about picking and choosing.
The first four lines of Trust in the heart run as follows,
“The Perfect Way is only difficult for those who pick and choose; Do not like, do not dislike; all will then be clear. Make a hairbreadth difference, and Heaven and Earth are set apart; If you want the truth to stand clear before you, never be for or against.”[16]
Not only is this yet another instance of the injunction to avoid one sidedness but it can also be argued that however different they may seem, ultimately the teachings of Chan and Huayan amount to the same: one must be ‘round’. To be round is to be free from specific points of view and limited perspectives. Not inclining toward any perspective, things are seen from all perspectives at once. Recall that the Huayan school is based on an orientation toward totality.
“Totality is a great harmony of the co-existence of all [perspectives]”.[17]
What is the Buddha?
Chang exemplifies this with the Chan story of a monk who asked Mazu what the Buddha was and on hearing the answer, ‘your mind is Buddha’, gained enlightenment. But after many years he was informed that Mazu had changed his teaching to ‘neither mind nor Buddha’.
The monk said,
“Let him have his neither mind nor Buddha, I still hold my ‘mind is Buddha’”.
Being informed of this reaction, Mazu was pleased and said that the monk had ripened.[18]
The monk had ripened to roundness because he was obviously not stuck in one point of view and did not become confused by Mazu’s change to another perspective.
Tang dynasty: Buddhism an exceedingly rich and powerful high church
By the time of the Tang dynasty Buddhism had developed a well entrenched position in Chinese society, amounting in fact to an exceedingly rich and powerful high church, maintained by the government at enormous expense. Its dignitaries enjoyed a wealth of privileges, such as exemption from forced labour and taxation, and when engaged in economic activities did not feel above charging usurious rates.
Systematic persecution
There had been protests before but in 845 this incited systematic persecution of the Buddhist church. Nearly 5000 temples were destroyed (along with a number of Nestorian and Zoroastrian ones for good measure), some 250,000 monks and nuns were forced to return to lay life, and properties were confiscated.
Although the anti-Buddhist regulations were already reversed after one year, only the Pure Land and Chan schools survived, the latter becoming the dominant school of Chinese Buddhism. None of the other schools ever recovered.
Although it did not emerge completely unscathed from the persecutions, Chan is the only school that was never interfered with by the government. One reason is political. In the early days the patriarchs and their students lived tough itinerant lives that were unlikely to attract much official attention.
Although this changed during the fourth patriarch, the monasteries that came to be established tended to be simple and located in remote places, while the monks earned their own livelihood instead of begging. Also important was that the governors of the out-laying regions where many monasteries were found were often of foreign origin and therefore treated rather off-handily by the central government. They did not feel much inclined therefore to obey its decrees. Moreover, many were Chan students themselves.
The Diamond sutra
Chinese translation of the Diamond Sutra[19]
According to the sutra bearing his name, the sixth patriarch, Huineng (638-713) and his widowed mother suffered extreme poverty. One day, while he was selling firewood, he happened to hear one of his customers read parts of the Diamond sutra. We are told that his eyes were opened immediately, which prompted him to try and find the fifth patriarch.
Hungren, the fifth patriarch
The fifth patriarch carrying a hoe — Muxi[20]
But Huineng’s first encounter with Hungren was not all that encouraging. He was told that a barbarian from the south like him could never become a Buddha. Undaunted, the allegedly uneducated boy quoted from the Diamond sutra that
“although my barbarian’s body and your body are not the same, what difference is there in our Buddha nature?”.[21]
The fifth patriarch got the message but decided to keep silent and put Huineng on the humble job of threshing rice, which prompted him, the tradition has it, to wear a heavy stone around the waist to add weight. Receiving no specific instruction, the poor, illiterate, slight boy worked in the threshing shed for eight months. It must have been a fruitful period.
The succession
One day, the fifth patriarch, getting old and wanting to settle his succession asked the monks to produce a verse. The one who presented the deepest insight would become his successor. Since they were all convinced that this could only concern the head monk none of them even bothered to try and compose a verse.
The head monk himself however, was hesitant about his insight and waited until the dark of the night to brush his verse on the wall of a corridor without anyone else knowing about it.
“The body is the Tree of Awakening, The heart a bright mirror; Always wipe it carefully So that no dust can settle.”[22]
Next morning, having read it all the monks thought this was a splendid verse and that the succession had been settled. The fifth patriarch too judged it to be fine. The head monk’s verse became the talk of the monastery and eventually also reached Huineng in the threshing shed.
Huineng, the sixth patriarch
Having had one of the monks read it to him, he asked him to write the following verse next to it,
“There is no Tree of Awakening; The bright mirror has no stand; When all is emptiness [in later works: From the beginning not a thing is] Where then could dust settle?”[23]
The Sixth Patriarch Huineng[24]
Because he feared to arouse the jealousy of the monks, the fifth patriarch handed Huineng the patriarchal robe in the middle of the night and urged him to flee south. Nevertheless, the sixth patriarch was pursued and finally overtaken by a monk, who asked him for the robe. Without a moment of hesitation Huineng handed this sign of transmission over. But on finding that it was too heavy for him, the monk had a change of heart asked for instruction.
For a number of years, Huineng ripened in South China. On his re-emergence he started teaching and soon afterwards had gathered a couple of thousand monks and laymen. After a fairly short teaching period, on his deathbed, he detailed the Chan practice.
“If you are only peacefully calm and quiet, without motion, without stillness, without birth, without destruction, without coming, without going, without judgments of right and wrong, without staying and without going ― this then is the Great Way”.[25]
Clearly, there is nothing here that does not fit in with the practice of self-cultivation as presented in the Mean and the Daoist classics.
The four teachers
Although their relations with the sixth patriarch are again uncertain, traditionally the line of his successors is formed by Mazu (709-788), Baizhang, Huangbo (d. 847), and Linji (d. 867).
The four teachers are represented in the Chan literature by collections of stories, discourses, and sayings, in which the lofty heritage of India has been put in pretty straightforward colloquial Chinese called baihua (white language), conveying stunningly concrete and outright physical ways of teaching.
Understanding of gongan
Ten Verses on Oxherding (1278)[26]
Indeed, countless stories testify to the perplexing speed with which the Chan masters reacted to the doubts and questions of students struggling to escape from their incessant deliberations. In the 1950s, when Chan began to become known in the West, it tended to an unfortunate popularity with hippies and New Agers because of its apparently unconventional teachers, aggravated by an understanding of gongan, better known by their Japanese name of koan, as mysterious riddles and mind busters.
However, it is not exotic pedagogical devises that abound in the exchanges between teacher and student. The teachers simply reacted to the demands of the situation that had been set up by the perplexed student and, following the lines laid down by Bodhidharma’s verse, did so in an disconcertingly direct way.
Hence, the shouting and beating, but also the humorous paradoxes and nonsensicalities ― virtually everything was used to shock the student out of his inclinations. Looked at thus, the seemingly irate behaviour of the Chan teachers, although not rational in the sense of reasoned-out, does stand to reason. Moreover, as Jullien points out, the seeds of this indicative way of teaching may already be found in Confucius and his followers.[27]
Analects by Confucius[28]
It should be realised that Confucius too, did not teach an abstract truth but tried to guide human conduct towards accord with the present moment. Quite like other Chinese teachers we have met Confucius did not teach a creed ― he just indicated the Way.
As he said,
“Only one who bursts with eagerness do I instruct; only one who bubbles with excitement, do I enlighten. If I hold up one corner and a man cannot come back to me with the other three, I do not continue the lesson”
Analects Bk. VII, 8.
Since Confucius did by no means try to convert the student it was of the essence that the latter was enabled to find the Way by his own lights. Just a few words or, better still, a silent pointing should therefore suffice. True enough, many instances of Chan teaching seem pretty drastic (see story below) but does that make them basically different from the indicative approach taken by Confucius?
“Ummon was not satisfied with his knowledge of Buddhism which had been gained from books, and came to Bokuju to have a final settlement of the intellectual balance-sheet with him. Seeing Ummon approach the gate, Bokuju shut it in his face. Ummon could not understand what it all meant, but he knocked and a voice came from within: ‘Who are you? My name is Ummon. I come from Chih-hsing. What do you want? I am unable to see into the ground of my being and most earnestly wish to be enlightened.’ Bokuju opened the gate, looked at Ummon, and then closed it. Not knowing what to do, Ummon went away. This was a great riddle, indeed, and some time later he came back to Bokuju. But he was treated in the same way as before. When Ummon came for a third time to Bokuju’s gate, his mind was firmly made up, by whatever means, to have a talk with the master. This time as soon as the gate was opened he squeezed himself through the opening. The intruder was at once seized by the chest and the master demanded: ‘Speak! Speak!’ Ummon was bewildered and hesitated. Bokuju, however, lost no time in pushing him out of the gate again, saying, ‘You good-for-nothing fellow!’ As the heavy gate swung shut, it caught one of Ummon’s legs, and he cried out: ‘Oh! Oh!’ But this opened his eyes to the significance of the whole proceeding.”[29]
The teaching of Linji
Rinzai (Linji)[30]
In the teaching of Linji, Chan probably attained its zenith as the most Chinese form of Buddhism. From his rough, utterly down to earth sayings Linji comes to the fore as a ‘true man’. This expression was first used by Zhuangzi. The true man is nothing special, except that by virtue of having neither rank nor status he eludes qualification. Confucius would not have liked this because in traditional China everyone had a rank in the social hierarchy. But like many Hellenistic philosophers the Chan people of old were what the ancient Greeks called atopoi (unclassifiable).
To live in the present moment
Above all however, Linji emerges as someone who lived in the present moment. If, as he counselled, the heart-mind is set at rest, there is no inclination or intention and thus, there is no going beyond the ‘now’.
“Followers of the Way, if you know that fundamentally there is nothing to seek, you have settled your affairs …
… Just put your heart at rest and seek nothing outside. When things come towards you, look at them clearly. Have faith in the one who is functioning at this moment, and all things of themselves become empty … Thus, (smoothly) functioning in response to the moment, what are you lacking….
… He who stands clearly revealed and distinct before your eyes, listening to the Dharma, this Independent Man of the Way lacks nothing at all … When the attitude of your heart does not change from moment to moment, this is called the living patriarch. For if it changes, then your essential nature and your actions come apart. But when your heart does not differ, there is also no difference between your essential nature and your actions …
I tell you this: There is no Buddha, no Dharma, no training and no realization. What are you so hotly chasing? … What are you lacking? Followers of the Way, the one functioning right before your eyes, he is not different from the Buddhas and patriarchs ….”[31]
Notes
[1] Source: Avatamsaka Sutra, vol. 12, frontispiece in gold and silver text on indigo blue paper, mid 14th century [2] Cleary, 1983, p. 23 [3] Source: Shrine to a statue of the Eleven-Headed Guanyin in the Drum Tower of Qita Temple (Yingzhou) [4] Williams, 1989, p. 124 [5] Source: A 3D rendering of Indra’s net [6] Cleary, 1983, p. 38 [7] Source: The Three Worthies of Huayan, Dazu Rock Carvings on Mount Baoding [8] Chang, 1972, pp. 127-128 [9] Chang, 1972, p. 26 [10] Watson, 1968, p. 97 [11] Source: Aerial view of Huayan Temple, Datong, built during the Jin dynasty (1115–1234) [12] Chang, 1975, pp. 99-100 [13] Source: A Dehua ware porcelain statuette of Bodhidharma from the late Ming dynasty, 17th century [14] Adapted from Schloegl, 1975, p. 14 [15] McRae, 2003, pp. 14-15 [16] Translation Waley, in Conze et al., 1990, p. 295 [17] Chang, 1972, p. 135 [18] Chang, 1972, p. 131 [19] Source: Chinese translation of the ‘Diamond Sutra’. The frontispiece to the world’s earliest dated printed book. This consists of a scroll, over 16 feet long, made up of a long series of printed pages. Printed in China in 868 CE, it was found in the Dunhuang Caves in 1907 (cave 17). [20] Source: The fifth Chan patriarch carrying a hoe — Muxi. The poem referring to the motif, signed Wu-I. H. Marjeyama Collection. [21] Yampolsky, 1967, p. 128 [22] Adapted from Schloegl, 1975, p. 15 [23] Adapted from Schloegl, 1975, p. 15 [24] Souece: The Sixth Patriarch Huineng, carrying a rod across his shoulder. Southern Song Dynasty, 13th century. (Gotoh Museum), Tokyo. [25] Yampolsky, 1967, p. 181 [26] Source: Ten Verses on Oxherding (1278) [27] Jullien, 2000, pp. 199, 270 [28] Source: Analects by Confucius [29] Suzuki, 1962, pp. 197-198 [30] Source: portrait of Rinzai (Linji) [31] Schloegl, 1976, pp. 28, 33-34, 37-38, 44-45
Japanese Buddhism
Jojitsu
Zen
Shingon
Jodo
Nichiren
Kegon
Sanron
Hosso
Kusha
Ritsu
Tendai
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: THE ESSENTIALS OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Source: The Shortest History of Japanese Philosophy
It was only in the sixth century, at the beginning of the Asuka Period (538–710), that writing was introduced to Japan. Before that nothing was written down so, we assume, there was probably not a great deal of philosophical activity. What there was can hardly be called philosophy: it was an animistic spirituality that centred around the idea that everything in the universe is connected by a spiritual force or energy called musubi, manifestations of which were called kami, a rough translation of which is ‘gods’ but it is more accurate to describe them as spirits. National treasures could be kami, as could awesome natural features like Mt. Fuji and the sun, phenomena like hurricanes, venerated individuals like emperors and great warriors, and supernatural beings like the ‘gods of the earthly realm’, called kunitsukami, or the heavenly deities from the Japanese creation myths, called amatsukami, like Izanagi and Izanami, the (respective) male and female creators of the world. This spiritual, arguably religious, tradition was Shintō, though many don’t like to call it Shintō because they think ‘Shintō as we know it’ didn’t turn up until way later. They acknowledge that Shintō came out of whatever this was, though, and that its core tenets were present from earliest times, so there really is no harm in just calling it Shintō for the sake of simplicity.
It was the introduction of Buddhism in 552 that represents the beginning of Japanese intellectual history.
It was the introduction of Buddhism in 552, however, that represents the beginning of Japanese intellectual history. As the story goes, King Seong of the Korean Kingdom of Baekje sent a diplomatic mission to the Japanese Emperor Kinmei containing Buddhist artefacts and scriptures, Buddhism having reached the Korean Peninsula from China much earlier. At a similar time, merchants, monks and scholars began to emigrate to Japan from Korea, bringing with them Confucian texts from which the Japanese learnt to read and write. The language of the Japanese court was, therefore, Chinese; it would not be for hundreds of years until the Japanese could write their own language.
The first written document in Japanese history was the Seventeen-Article Constitution written by the pseudo-historical Prince Shōtoku in 604. Though it’s called a constitution (kenpō in Japanese), it is little more than a set of highfalutin moral aphorisms without much practical application. Most of the articles are pretty hollow, when it comes down to it, saying things like “let us cease from wrath, and refrain from angry looks” and “give clear appreciation to merit and demerit”. Many were clearly ignored, like the injunction that “decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone”. In fact, the only articles that look like constitutional laws are the sixteenth, which mandates corvée labour in the winter months rather than in the summer, and the twelfth, which prohibits provincial governors from levying taxes. That makes the document a lot more interesting philosophically than politically or legally.
The heart of the constitution is a politico-ethical philosophy of harmony expressed in the first sentence: “Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honoured”. The rest of the document is a means to achieving this harmonious ideal, which includes the reverence of Buddhism (officiating it as the state religion), absolute obedience to the imperial commands, and the cessation of ‘wrath’ and ‘angry looks’ – which is probably a call to the end of the civil war which had dominated the sixth century which Shōtoku and his clan had come out of on top.
Prince Shotoku with Two Princes by Kano Osanobu (1842).
The heart of the constitution is a politico-ethical philosophy of harmony.
Shōtoku was a statesman, not a philosopher prince. What puts the Shōtoku Constitution at the beginning of the history of Japanese philosophy is that it sets the scene for everything that comes after it because it is syncretic. What that means is that it is a synthesis of various intellectual sources; in this case, of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintō – and arguably Taoism and Legalism too. They are mixed in the constitution in two ways. The first is that different articles are inspired by different sources, such as the obviously Buddhist urge to cease from gluttony and abandon covetous desires and the clearly Confucian expectation that ministers will act with propriety (li in Chinese, rei in Japanese).
The second way the document is syncretic is through the creation of new theories combining different intellectual traditions. The harmonious ideal is the best example of this, the statement that “harmony is to be valued” coming from Confucius’ Analects but, unlike in Confucianism, harmony is not to be obtained through ceremonial propriety alone, but through personal moral development, which has a source in Buddhism, and through natural balance, which comes not only from Confucianism but from Shintō and Taoism too.
For the next two hundred years there were still no Japanese philosophers. Buddhism continued to flow into Japan, increasingly dominating intellectual life. There was a great proliferation of temples sponsored by the imperial household and the elite families like the Soga and the Fujiwara. A monastic social class began to emerge which was closely connected with the aristocracy, their sons entering the priesthood and monks serving as teachers and advisors for the aristocrats. However, as Buddhism became increasingly united with Japanese politics, it began to divide on doctrinal grounds into different sects and, by the time of the Nara Period (710–794), Japanese Buddhism was defined by the Six Nara Schools. They were Ritsu, Kusha, Jōjitsu, Sanron, Hossō and Kegon. The first three of these belong to the Hīnayāna tradition of Buddhism and the others are Mahāyāna.
Rather than focusing on transcendent metaphysics, Japanese Buddhism leant into aesthetic practice grounded in phenomenal reality.
The distinction between Hīnayāna, or ‘small vehicle’, and Mahāyāna, or ‘great vehicle’, Buddhism was a construct of the Mahāyānists. Hīnayāna Buddhists believe in an impersonal path to enlightenment, hinged on self-restraint, introspection, and a gradual detachment from worldly emotions. Mahāyānists, on the other hand, advocate for a communal approach to enlightenment, emphasizing empathy, compassion, and interpersonal connections. The latter dominated Japanese Buddhism, distinguished by its distinctive heuristic methods that democratize access to enlightenment. This shift towards a more egalitarian ethos is a defining feature in the historical evolution of Japanese Buddhism, setting it apart from its Chinese counterpart. Rather than focusing on transcendent metaphysics, Japanese Buddhism leant into aesthetic practice grounded in phenomenal reality.
Another important idea of the Mahāyānists was the Buddha’s embodiments. The historical buddha is the individual buddha that was Siddhārtha Gautama (or Shakyamuni, in Japanese). The celestial buddha refers to eternal celestial beings who’ve never been human. They can be understood as personifications of various aspects of the enlightened mind, and their purpose is to aid sentient beings on their path to enlightenment. The third is the cosmic buddha, which is the universal principle whose presence permeates everything. Japanese Buddhism emphasized the cosmic buddha over the other two, which is perfectly consistent with its phenomenalistic bent: because the buddha is in everything, enlightenment can be found in everything; to attain buddhahood is to experience everything as it really is.
All Six Nara Schools were exoteric, which meant that their teachings were accessible to anybody willing to put the effort into understanding them through scriptural study and adherence to established doctrines and rituals. Two opponents to this orthodoxy emerged at the beginning of the ninth century. They were Saichō and Kūkai, who brought esotericism to Japan from China, which focussed on the transmission of teachings from masters to their disciples through secret rituals, advanced meditation techniques, visualization practices, and sacred utterances called mantras to attain enlightenment.
Saichō founded Japanese Tendai Buddhism and established the influential temple complex of Enryakuji at Mt. Hiei. He was trained by the Chinese Tiantai philosopher Daosui, ‘Tendai’ being the Japanese translation of ‘Tientai’, but Tientai was exoteric. Allegedly, whilst waiting for his ship to arrive and take him back to Japan, Saichō visited Yuezhou (modern Shaoxing) where he learnt about esoteric Buddhism which he would incorporate into the Tendai school. Saichō happened upon esotericism, but Kūkai was specifically trained in it by the Chinese Tangmi monk Huiguo, returning to Japan to father Shingon Buddhism which was esoteric through and through.
Eight Patriarchs of the Shingon Sect of Buddhism: Kukai
When Kūkai returned to Japan, Saichō befriended him, copying his esoteric texts and receiving instructions on rituals. Both abandoned the capital at Nara for the mountains. The Nara Schools were predominantly intellectual and often academic in nature, whereas Saichō and Kūkai were considerably more religious in the sense of combining intellectual and practical Buddhist pursuits. Saichō would send students to Kūkai for instruction when he set up residence in Kyoto at Mt. Takao, but the relationship between the two eventually soured as competition between their sects increased.
Shingon and Tendai defined Buddhism in the Heian Period (794–1185), but it was one specific topic which consumed mediaeval Japanese philosophy, and that was the Original Enlightenment Debates. The doctrine of original enlightenment is the idea that everything originally or inherently has within it the germ of buddhahood, and that everything can eventually attain enlightenment.
The doctrine of original enlightenment is the idea that everything originally or inherently has within it the germ of buddhahood…
The topic became a major point of disputation, especially between Saichō and the Hossō monk Tokuitsu, which grew into a four year long doctrinal debate that would become one of the most important in the history of Japanese Buddhism. Saichō propounded universal buddhahood, which was the view that all beings will ultimately become buddhas, which he thought to be an ideal expounded in the Lotus Sūtra. Tokuitsu, on the contrary, championed the Yogācāra division of men into five categories of different latent potential, one of which being those for whom buddhahood is hopeless, meaning that it could not be the case that all being will ultimately attain buddhahood. It was Saichō’s promotion of universal buddhahood that won this philosophical feud.
Original enlightenment discussions later developed from the basic claim that everything has the potential to become a buddha to a more radical position of absolute nonduality in which everything is connected together as part of one buddha reality. They took Mahāyāna phenomenalism to its logical extremes, eradicating any distinction between the phenomenal world and the ultimate reality of enlightenment. Ryōgen and Kakuun, both tenth century Tendai monks, would even come to accept plants as within the realm of buddhahood, a topic which was broached earlier in China in the seventh century by Jicang and later, in the eighth century, by Zhanran. It became a common aphorism to say that “the grasses, trees, mountains, and rivers all attain buddhahood”, and that “the worldly passions are precisely enlightenment”.
Eventually the idea of original enlightenment reached its apex in concluding not only that everything has within it the potential to become buddha, but that all beings are already enlightened as buddha. In Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism there was the idea that the mundane world is simply buddha reality misunderstood; that there is no mysterious buddha behind reality. Buddha nature is reality as it is experienced; all we have to do is correctly interpret our experience. Japanese Buddhism went a step further though to say that buddha nature is nothing but reality as it is experienced.
The rise of Pure Land Buddhism was an explicit rejection of original enlightenment. It centred on the achievement of rebirth in the Pure Land – a magical realm in which it is easier to achieve enlightenment than in this world. Pure Land Buddhists thought that they were in the final of the Three Ages of Buddhism: the Degenerate Age of the Buddhist Law, or mappō. The first two were the Age of the Right Buddhist Law, or shōbō, which was the first millennium after the death of the Buddha in which his disciples upheld his teachings, and the Age of Semblance Buddhist Law, or zōhō, which was the next millennium where his teachings were practiced. Following them was ten thousand years in which the Buddha’s teachings would decline. In the degenerate age, it’s thought by Pure Land Buddhists that they must rely on the ‘other-power’ of a buddha to escort them to enlightenment. Because their current era and everything in it was corrupted and that, far from everything already being buddha just as they are, buddhahood could no longer be achieved through ‘self-power’.
The rise of Pure Land Buddhism was an explicit rejection of original enlightenment.
The buddha relied on by Japanese Pure Land Buddhists was Amida. The main practice that Pure Land Buddists taught was ‘mindfulness of the Buddha’. Brought to Japan in the ninth century by Ennin (known posthumously as Jikaku Daishi), it was the repetition of the name of Amida (called nianfo in Chinese and the nembutsu in Japanese). The phrase normally recited is “Namu-Amida-Butsu” which means “I take refuge in Amida Buddha”. The twelfth century monk Hōnen, originally of the Tendai sect, decided that the religious goal of achieving buddhahood was no longer possible in the degenerate age and announced that the nembutsu and rebirth in the Pure Land was the only way of attaining enlightenment. He thereby became the founder of Pure Land Buddhism.
Even more radical, though, was True Pure Land Buddhism which was characterized by the absolute primacy of faith in Amida Buddha. Shinran, one of Hōnen’s disciples and founder of the new sect, completely gave up all monastic practice, relying wholly on his faith in Amida. He thought that true faith is bestowed upon a believer and does not arise from within them, and interpreted the nembutsu as nothing more than an expression of thanks or praise for this endowment. In the fifteenth century, thanks to the efforts of Rennyo, hailed as the ‘restorer of the sect’, True Pure Land grew to be the largest and most influential Buddhist sect in Japan, which it remains today.
Still more radical was the Pure Land sect called Jishū, founded by the twelfth century itinerant monk Ippen. Whereas Shinran maintained the primacy of faith for rebirth in the Pure Land, Ippen taught that not even faith was necessary for salvation; simply chanting the nembutsu alone was sufficient.
Pure Land Buddhism was one of the Kamakura New Religions; new Buddhist movements that emerged in Japan during the Kamakura Period (1185–1333). The other two were Nichiren Buddhism and Zen.
Like Pure Land Buddhists, the thirteenth century Tendai monk Nichiren tried to tackle the challenges to attaining enlightenment associated with the degenerate age. The Kamakura Period was stricken by civil war, so most Buddhist schools of this period accepted the idea that Japan had entered the degenerate age but differed in their solutions to this malaise. Nichiren did not think that entrusting oneself to Amida Buddha was the correct course of action. Instead, what he declared was exclusive reliance on the Lotus Sūtra. Rather than “Namu-Amida-Butsu”, his followers chanted “Namu-Myōhō-Renge-Kyō”, meaning “Devotion to the Mystic Law of the Lotus Sūtra”. His first concern was to restore Tendai Buddhism to an exclusive reliance on the Lotus Sūtra, and then to convert the entire nation to this belief. He therefore sought to make Buddhist theory practical and actionable so laymen could manifest buddhahood within their lifetime without committing themselves to monkhood and decades of dedicated study.
Nichiren studied all ten schools of Japanese Buddhism over a period of two decades.
Nichiren studied all ten schools of Japanese Buddhism over a period of two decades. He doubted the efficacy of the nembutsu, which he had been practicing, and therefore sought other means to attain enlightenment. He began his study at the Tendai temple on Mt. Kiyosumi in 1233 and it was there that he returned in 1253 to present his findings after twenty years; that it was the Lotus Sūtra on which they all ought to rely for enlightenment. However, he left the temple after only a short while and established himself in Kamakura. Between 1254 and 1260, half the population perished due to a succession of calamities; drought, earthquakes, epidemic, famine, fire, storms and the like. Nichiren claimed that these were the result of the mass adoption of Pure Land teachings. In 1260, he submitted a tract On Securing the Peace of the Land Through the Propagation of True Buddhism to the regent of the Kamakura Shōgunate, Hōjō Tokiyori, in which he attacked Pure Land Buddhism as a sinister cult and stated the need to embrace the Lotus Sūtra. If the shōgunate did not heed his advice, Nichiren predicted, further calamities would befall the nation, including a foreign invasion, which did in fact occur just over a decade later with the Mongol Invasion of Japan in 1274. The petition was ignored, though, and instead brought the other Buddhist schools down upon Nichiren. Ironically, one year after Nichiren submitted his remonstration to the shōgunate, it was he who was expelled from the capital.
He spent most of his life in three exiles in total. In his lifetime, ‘Nichiren Buddhism’ was unified under him. After his death, however, it fragmented massively into six sects, each following one of the six senior priests Nichiren had named to uphold his teachings: Nikkō, Nisshō, Nichirō, Nikō, Nitchō, and Nichiji.
Zen Buddhism, the most significant of the Kamakura New Religions, traces its origins back to an episode known as the Flower Sermon. In this legendary event, Shakyamuni Buddha stood before his disciples ready to give a sermon. However, he didn’t say anything and instead held up a white flower. This left his disciples scratching their heads, except for Mahākāśyapa (who lived in either the sixth or the fifth century BCE), known in Japanese as Daikashō or Makakashō. He alone smiled, supposedly signifying his understanding. This silent exchange symbolized the transmission of profound wisdom beyond language, which the Buddha acknowledged, saying, “The subtle Dharma Gate does not rest on words or letters but is a special transmission outside of the scriptures. This I entrust to Mahākāśyapa”. Thus Mahākāśyapa earned his place as the inaugural figure in a lineage of twenty-eight Indian patriarchs, marking the birth of Zen Buddhism.
It was from China where it was called ‘Chan’ that Zen Buddhism came to Japan.
It was from China where it was called ‘Chan’ that Zen Buddhism came to Japan. Indian Buddhism was transmitted to China in the first century via the Silk Road where it underwent a process of Sinification as it was accommodated into Chinese culture. Of course, it was translated into Chinese from Sanskrit by scholars such as Kumārajīva and Buddhabhadra in the fourth and early fifth centuries, but it was also synthesized with Taoism and other native Chinese sensibilities in the same way that Confucianism and Buddhism were synthesized with Shintō in Japan.
Zen was established in Japan as an independent school called Daruma in the twelfth century by Dainichibō Nōnin. A Tendai monk, Nōnin encountered Zen texts that had made their way from China and were in the possession of the Tendai School. Inspired by these writings, he initiated his own solitary Zen practice and, in 1189, he sent two of his disciples to the Chan master Zhuoan Deguang with a letter outlining his revelations. Nōnin received back a letter certifying that he had awakened without a master but, because of his nonstandard spiritual bloodline, having awoken without a master, the Daruma School was thought of as teaching an unorthodox, syncretic ‘mixed Zen’ rather than a ‘pure Zen’ like in China. The school was short lived, however, for in 1194 the government shut it down at the Tendai School’s request.
The Rinzai school of Zen lasted much longer, however. In 1168, Myōan Eisai went to China where he studied Tientai Buddhism for two decades. He went again in 1187, this time learning about Chan from the Linji School. Upon his return in 1191, he established in his native land a Linji branch, in Japanese called Rinzai, and built the first Japanese Zen temple. Eisai never renounced his status as a Tendai monk, however; practicing in multiple schools was common within Mediaeval Buddhism. It remained for later masters to establish a pure Zen that was not an admixture of the doctrines of various Japanese Buddhist schools.
Dōgen thought that meditation isn’t about seeking answers. Instead, to meditate is to fully engage with the process of life itself.
The other main Zen school that was established in the Kamakura Period was the Sōtō School – the Japanese equivalent of the Chinese Caodong School of Chan. Sōtō Zen was brought to Japan by Dōgen in 1227 who had studied in China under Tiantong Rujing. Upon his return, he initially settled at Kennin-ji, but was driven out of Kyoto in 1230 by Tendai monks because of his extreme opinions about seated meditation and the primacy of Zen. For Dōgen, practice and enlightenment are not two separate stages but are fundamentally intertwined. To practice is to be enlightened, and enlightenment is nothing more than practice. His philosophy was deeply experiential and emphasized the importance of personal experience and direct understanding. He believed that the intellect could become an obstacle – even intellectual ‘understanding’ – if it led away from the immediate experience of reality. Dōgen thought that meditation isn’t about seeking answers. Instead, to meditate is to fully engage with the process of life itself.
The key difference between Zen and other Buddhist schools is that Zen instruction is based upon the ‘dharma transmission’ of a master to his disciples rather than upon doctrinal texts. That’s why Nōnin was considered an unusual case and his school impure; because he had awoken without a master. The principal practical difference between Sōtō and Rinzai Zen is that, in the former, meditation took the form of ‘just sitting’, or shikan taza, whereas the Rinzai sect employed riddles and metaphors known as kōan to reach enlightenment. In terms of doctrinal differences, the main one was their difference in understanding ‘non-thinking’, which was the aim of meditation. Rinzai began by negating discriminative thinking and went on to negate self-centred thinking; Sōtō, on the other hand, first eliminated self-centred thinking which they judged to be part of a later stage of negating all discriminative thought.
Buddhism had been closely connected to the political power structures in Japan since it was first introduced to the country, enjoying patronage from the ruling elites, which included the imperial family, the shōgunate, and the aristocracy. Fierce competition between the sects meant that they became increasingly militarized throughout the Muromachi Period (1336–1573), developing their own armies of warrior monks known as sōhei. Conflict between them came to a head in 1467 when the Ōnin War kicked off in Kyoto over who would succeed Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshimasa, commencing a century and a half of civil war known as the Sengoku Period (1467–1615).
Onin War (1467-1477). The Battle of Onin by Utagawa Yoshitora.
Tendai Buddhism had powerful armies of warrior monks; Pure Land Buddhism, however, amassed the Japanese citizenry. It had a broad following among the common people in Japan because of its egalitarian teachings. Unlike other sects, it taught that all people could attain salvation simply by expressing faith in Amida Buddha, and that complex rituals and ascetic practices were unnecessary. Faced with harsh conditions and heavy taxation, leagues of Pure Land Buddhists – both monks and laymen – rose up against the shōgunate and local feudal lords known as daimyo in peasant revolts throughout Japan called Ikkō-ikki. They formed self-governing communities, often centred around fortified temples, and at times they were even able to seize control of entire provinces.
However, more than a century of perpetual warfare had dire effects for Buddhism. The rampant violence often targeted Buddhist institutions, leading to the destruction of temples and the loss of religious texts and artefacts. This violence disrupted the Buddhist monastic system, eroding its economic base and diminishing its influence over society. What is more, the inability of Buddhism to prevent or mitigate the ongoing violence led to a crisis of faith among many Japanese. The Buddhist teachings, which emphasized impermanence and suffering, offered little solace or practical guidance in a time of social unrest.
The rampant violence often targeted Buddhist institutions, leading to the destruction of temples and the loss of religious texts and artefacts.
The death knell of Buddhist influence was sounded when Oda Nobunaga, the ‘Great Unifier’ of Japan who would bring the warring states period to a close, moved against the militant Buddhist sects who posed a threat to his authority. He first targeted the Tendai centre at Mt. Hiei in 1571, burning down the temple complex and slaughtering thousands of monks and civilians in the process. He then turned to the destruction of the Pure Land Ikkō-ikki, assaulting their fortress at Nagashima, setting it ablaze. Not one of its twenty thousand inhabitants survived. The other major fortress, the Ishiyama Hongan-ji, held out for eleven years, making it the longest siege in Japanese history, but the Abbot Kōsa was persuaded to surrender in 1580.
This crushed any potential for Buddhism to remain a powerful political force in Japan, bringing to a close the Buddhist Phase of the history of Japanese philosophy. This left a philosophical vacuum in the intellectual landscape. What would fill it was an ancient Chinese philosophy with a brand new finish.
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B.V.E. Hyde is a researcher with polymathic interests in philosophy, history, sociology and Japanology. He is currently employed as a philosopher of science and an ethicist, but has an enduring interest in Far Eastern philosophy. Some of his books on the topic (if a publisher will get around to accepting them) include The Tale of the Japanese Mind, a whistlestop tour of the history of Japanese philosophy, Lectures on Japanese Philosophy, an introduction to and overview of the subject, and a Commentary on the Shōtoku Constitution, which is a reference book much more academic than the other two. You can follow him on Twitter (@bvehyde) to stay up to date with his publications.
Source: Korean Buddhism has its own unique characteristics different from other countries
A brief review of Korean Buddhim
Korean Buddhism is distinguished from other forms of Buddhism by its attempt to resolve what it sees as inconsistencies in Mahayana Buddhism.
According to Wikipedia and various Korean reference materials, early Korean monks believed that the traditions they received from foreign countries were internally inconsistent.
To address this, they developed a new holistic approach to Buddhism.
This approach is characteristic of virtually all major Korean thinkers, and has resulted in a distinct variation of Buddhism, which is called Tongbulgyo (“interpenetrated Buddhism”), a form that sought to harmonize all disputes (a principle called hwajaeng 和諍) by Korean scholars.
Korean Buddhist thinkers refined their predecessors’ ideas into a distinct form.
As it now stands, Korean Buddhism consists mostly of the Seon Lineage, primarily represented by the Jogye and Taego Orders.
The Korean Seon has a strong relationship with other Mahayana traditions that bear the imprint of Chan teachings as well as the closely related Zen.
Other sects, such as the modern revival of the Cheontae lineage, the Jingak Order (a modern esoteric sect), and the newly formed Won, have also attracted sizable followings.
Korean Buddhism has contributed much to East Asian Buddhism, especially to early Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan schools of Buddhist thought.
When Buddhism was originally introduced to Korea from Former Qin in 372, about 800 years after the death of the historical Buddha, shamanism was the indigenous religion.
As it was not seen to conflict with the rites of nature worship, Buddhism was allowed by adherents of Shamanism to be blended into their religion.
Thus, the mountains that were believed by shamanists to be the residence of spirits in pre-Buddhist times later became the sites of Buddhist temples.
Though it initially enjoyed wide acceptance, even being supported as the state ideology during the Goryeo period, Buddhism in Korea suffered extreme repression during the Joseon era, which lasted over five hundred years.
During this period, Neo-Confucianism overcame the prior dominance of Buddhism.
Only after Buddhist monks helped repel the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–98) did the persecution of Buddhists stop.
Buddhism in Korea remained subdued until the end of the Joseon period, when its position was strengthened somewhat by the colonial period, which lasted from 1910 to 1945.
However, these Buddhist monks did not only put an end to Japanese rule in 1945, but they also asserted their specific and separate religious identity by reforming their traditions and practices.
They laid the foundation for many Buddhist societies, and the younger generation of monks came up with the ideology of Mingung Pulgyo, or “Buddhism for the people.” The importance of this ideology is that it was coined by the monks who focused on common men’s daily issues.
After World War II, the Seon school of Korean Buddhism once again gained acceptance.
A 2005 government survey indicated that about a quarter of South Koreans identified as Buddhist.
However, the actual number of Buddhists in South Korea is ambiguous as there is no exact or exclusive criterion by which Buddhists can be identified, unlike the Christian population.
With Buddhism’s incorporation into traditional Korean culture, it is now considered a philosophy and cultural background rather than a formal religion.
As a result, many people outside of the practicing population are deeply influenced by these traditions.
Thus, when counting secular believers or those influenced by the faith while not following other religions, the number of Buddhists in South Korea is considered to be much larger.
Similarly, in officially atheist North Korea, while Buddhists officially account for 4.5% of the population, a much larger number (over 70%) of the population are influenced by Buddhist philosophies and customs.
Buddhism in the Three Kingdoms:
When Buddhism was introduced to Korea in the 4th century CE, the Korean peninsula was politically subdivided into three kingdoms: Goguryeo in the north (which included territory currently in Russia and China), Baekje in the southwest, and Silla in the southeast.
There is concrete evidence of an earlier introduction of Buddhism than traditionally believed. A mid-4th century tomb, unearthed near Pyongyang, is found to incorporate Buddhist motifs in its ceiling decoration.
Korean Buddhist monks traveled to China or India in order to study Buddhism in the late Three Kingdoms Period, especially in the 6th century. In 526, The monk Gyeomik from Baekje traveled via the southern sea route to India to learn Sanskrit and study the Vinaya.
The monk Paya (562–613?) from Goguryeo is said to have studied under the Tiantai master Zhiyi. Other Korean monks of the period brought back numerous scriptures from abroad and conducted missionary activity throughout Korea.
Several schools of thought developed in Korea during these early times:
the Samlon (三論宗) or East Asian Mādhyamaka school focused on Mādhyamaka doctrine
the Gyeyul (戒律宗, or Vinaya in Sanskrit) school was mainly concerned with the study and implementation of śīla or “moral discipline”
the Yeolban (涅槃宗, or Nirvāna in Sanskrit) school based in the themes of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra
the Wonyung (圓融宗, or Yuanrong in Chinese) school formed toward the end of the Three Kingdoms Period. This school lead to the actualization of the metaphysics of interpenetration as found in the Avatamsaka Sutra and was considered the premier school, especially among the educated aristocracy.
the Hwaeom (華嚴宗 or Huayan school) was the longest lasting of the “imported” schools. It had strong ties with the Beopseong (法性宗), an indigenous Korean school of thought.
The date of the first mission from Korea to Japan is unclear, but it is reported that a second detachment of scholars was sent to Japan upon invitation by the Japanese rulers in 577.
The strong Korean influence on the development of Buddhism in Japan continued through the Unified Silla period. It was not until the 8th century that independent study by Japanese monks began in significant numbers.
Goguryeo period:
In 372, the monk Sundo (順道, pinyin: Shùndào) was sent by Fu Jian (337–385) (苻堅) of Former Qin to the court of the King Sosurim of Goguryeo. He brought texts and statues (possibly of Maitreya, who was popular in Buddhism in Central Asia), and the Goguryeo royalty and their subjects quickly accepted his teachings.
Buddhism in China was in a rudimentary form, consisting of the law of cause and effect and the search for happiness. This had much in common with the predominant Shamanism, which likely led to the quick assimilation of Buddhism by the people of Goguryeo.
Early Buddhism in Silla developed under the influence of Goguryeo. Some monks from Goguryeo came to Silla and preached among the people, making a few converts.
In 551, Hyeryang (惠亮), a Goguryeo monk was appointed the first National Patriarch of Silla. He first presided over the “Hundred-Seat Dharma Assembly” and the “Dharma of Eight Prohibitions”.
Baekje period:
In 384, the Indian monk Marananta arrived in Baekje and the royal family received the strain of Buddhism that he brought.
King Asin of Baekje proclaimed, “people should believe in Buddhism and seek happiness.” In 526, the Baekje monk Gyeomik (겸익, 謙益) traveled directly to Central India and came back with a collection of Vinaya texts, accompanied by the Indian monk Paedalta (Sanskrit: Vedatta).
After returning to Baekje, Gyeomik translated the Buddhist scriptures in Sanskrit into seventy-two volumes.
The Gyeyul school in Baekje was established by Gyeomik about a century earlier than its counterpart in China. As a result of his work, he is regarded as the father of Vinaya studies in Korea.
Silla period:
Buddhism did not enter the kingdom of Silla until the 5th century.
The common people were first attracted to Buddhism here, but there was resistance among the aristocrats.
In 527, however, a prominent court official named Ichadon presented himself to King Beopheung of Silla and announced he had become Buddhist.
The king had him beheaded, but when the executioner cut off his head, it is said that milk poured out instead of blood.
Paintings of this are in the temple at Haeinsa and a stone monument honoring his martyrdom is in the National Museum of Kyongju.
During the reign of the next king, Jinheung of Silla, the growth of Buddhism was encouraged and eventually recognized as the national religion of Silla.
Selected young men were physically and spiritually trained at Hwarangdo according to Buddhist principles regarding one’s ability to defend the kingdom.
King Jinheung later became a monk himself.
The monk Jajang (慈藏) is credited with having been a major force in the adoption of Buddhism as a national religion.
Jajang is also known for his participation in the founding of the Korean monastic sangha.
Another great scholar to emerge from the Silla Period was Wonhyo.
He renounced his religious life to better serve the people and even married a princess for a short time, with whom he had a son.
He wrote many treatises and his philosophy centered on the unity and interrelatedness of all things.
He set off to China to study Buddhism with a close friend, Uisang, but only made it part of the way there.
According to legend, Wonhyo awoke one night very thirsty. He found a container with cool water, which he drank before returning to sleep.
The next morning he saw that the container from which he had drunk was a human skull and he realized that enlightenment depended on the mind. He saw no reason to continue to China, so he returned home.
Uisang continued to China and after studying for ten years, offered a poem to his master in the shape of a seal that geometrically represents infinity. The poem contained the essence of the Avatamsaka Sutra.
Buddhism was so successful during this period that many kings converted and several cities were renamed after famous places during the time of the Buddha.
Unified Silla (668–935):
In 668, the kingdom of Silla succeeded in unifying the whole Korean peninsula, giving rise to a period of political stability that lasted for about one hundred years under Unified Silla. This led to a high point in scholarly studies of Buddhism in Korea.
The most popular areas of study were Wonyung, Yusik (Ch. 唯識; Weishi) or East Asian Yogācāra, Jeongto or Pure Land Buddhism, and the indigenous Korean Beopseong (“Dharma-nature school”).
Wonhyo taught the Pure Land practice of yeombul, which would become very popular amongst both scholars and laypeople, and has had a lasting influence on Buddhist thought in Korea.
His work, which attempts a synthesis of the seemingly divergent strands of Indian and Chinese Buddhist doctrines, makes use of the Essence-Function (體用 che-yong) framework, which was popular in native East Asian philosophical schools.
His work was instrumental in the development of the dominant school of Korean Buddhist thought, known variously as Beopseong, Haedong (海東, “Korean”) and later as Jungdo (中道, “Middle Way”)
Wonhyo’s friend Uisang (義湘) went to Chang’an, where he studied under Huayan patriarchs Zhiyan (智儼; 600–668) and Fazang (法藏; 643–712).
When he returned after twenty years, his work contributed to Hwaeom Buddhism and became the predominant doctrinal influence on Korean Buddhism together with Wonhyo’s tongbulgyo thought.
Hwaeom principles were deeply assimilated into the Korean meditation-based Seon school, where they made a profound effect on its basic attitudes.
Influences from Silla Buddhism in general, and from these two philosophers in particular crept backwards into Chinese Buddhism.
Wonhyo’s commentaries were very important in shaping the thought of the preeminent Chinese Buddhist philosopher Fazang, and Woncheuk’s commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra had a strong influence in Tibetan Buddhism.
The intellectual developments of Silla Buddhism brought with them significant cultural achievements in many areas, including painting, literature, sculpture, and architecture.
During this period, many large and beautiful temples were built. Two crowning achievements were the temple Bulguksa and the cave-retreat of Seokguram (石窟庵).
Bulguksa was famous for its jeweled pagodas, while Seokguram was known for the beauty of its stone sculpture.
Current situation:
The Seon school, which is dominated by the Jogye order in terms of the number of clergy and adherents, practices disciplined traditional Seon practice at a number of major mountain monasteries in Korea, often under the direction of highly regarded masters.
The Taego order, though it has more temples than the Jogye Order, is second in size in terms of the number of clergy and adherents and, in addition to Seon meditation, keeps traditional Buddhist arts alive, such as ritual dance.
Modern Seon practice is not far removed in its content from the original practice of Jinul, who introduced the integrated combination of the practice of Gwanhwa meditation and the study of selected Buddhist texts.
The Korean sangha life is markedly itinerant for monks and nuns pursuing Seon meditation training: while each monk or nun has a “home” monastery, he or she will regularly travel throughout the mountains, staying as long as he or she wishes, studying and teaching in the style of the temple that is housing them.
The Korean monastic training system has seen a steadily increasing influx of Western practitioner-aspirants in the second half of the twentieth century.
It must be noted, however, that the vast majority of Korean monks and nuns do not spend 20 or 30 years in the mountains pursuing Seon training in a form recognizable to westerners.
Most Korean monks and nuns receive a traditional academic education in addition to ritual training, which is not necessarily in a formal ritual training program.
Those who do spend time in meditation in the mountains may do so for a few years and then essentially return to the life of a parish priest.
The four schools of Tibetan Buddhism are Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, and Gelug or Gelugpa.
Nyingma (founded in 8th century)
Kagyu (founded in the early 11th century)
Sakya (founded in 1073)
Gelug (founded in 1409)
The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism.
The Nyingma or “ancient” tradition is the oldest of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Often referred to as “the ancient translation school”, it was founded in the eighth century following the first translations of Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit to Tibetan.
Around 760, the Tibetan king Trisong Detsen invited two Buddhist masters from the Indian subcontinent, Padmasambhava and Shantarakshita, to the “Land of Snows” to bring Buddhism to the Tibetan people. Thus began a massive translation project of all Buddhist texts into the newly created Tibetan language.
The legendary Vajrayana master Padmasambhava, who Tibetans call Guru Rinpoche, is considered the founder of Tibetan Buddhism. He supervised the translation of the tantras (the esoteric teachings of the Buddha) while Shantarakshita, abbot of the great Buddhist Nalanda University, supervised the translation of the sutras (oral teachings of the Buddha).
Together they founded the first monastery in Tibet, Samye, which became the main centre for Buddhist teaching in Tibet for around three centuries.
The Nyingma tradition classifies the Buddhist teachings into nine yanas or vehicles. The first three vehicles are common to all schools of Buddhism, the next three are common to all schools of Tantric Buddhism, and the last three are exclusive to the Nyingma tradition. The highest is known as Dzogchen or the Great Perfection.
Unlike the other schools, the Nyingma traditionally had no centralized authority or a single head of the lineage. However, since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the Nyingma school has had representatives.
Here is a list of the 8 representatives of the Nyingma school since this practice began in the 1960s:
Dudjom Rinpoche (c. 1904–1987), served from the 1960s until his death.
Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche (c. 1910–1991), served from 1987 until his death.
Penor (Pema Norbu) Rinpoche (1932–2009) served from 1991 until retirement in 2003.
Mindrolling Trichen Rinpoche (c. 1930–2008), served from 2003 until his death.
Trulshik Rinpoche (1923–2011), selected after Chatral Rinpoche declined the position.
Taklung Tsetrul Rinpoche (1926-2015), appointed head in 2012 and passed away in Bodhgaya in 2015
Kathok Getse Rinpoche (1954-2018), passed away ten months after being named to a three-year term as the supreme head of the Nyingma school.
Dzogchen Rinpoche Jigme Losel Wangpo was selected in January 2019 as the eighth head of the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism by the heads of the principal monasteries of the Nyingma tradition.
The Kagyu School of Tibetan Buddhism
The Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism gets its name from the Tibetan བཀའ་བརྒྱུད། meaning “oral lineage” or “whispered transmission”. While it traces its origin back to Buddha Shakyamuni, the most important source for the specific practices of the Kagyu order is the great Indian yogi Tilopa (988-1069).
The practices were passed orally from teacher to disciple through a series of great masters. The transmission lineage of the “Five Founding Masters” of the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism is as follows:
Tilopa (988-1069), the Indian yogi who experienced the original transmission of the Mahamudra
Naropa (1016–1100), the Indian scholar-yogi who perfected the methods of accelerated enlightenment described in his Six Yogas of Naropa
Marpa (1012–1097), the first Tibetan in the lineage, known as the great translator for his work translating the Vajrayana and Mahamudra texts into Old Tibetan
Milarepa (1052–1135), the poet and greatest yogi of Tibet who overcame Marpa’s reluctance to teach and attained enlightenment in a single lifetime
Gampopa (1079–1153), Milarepa’s most important student, who integrated Atisha’s Kadam teachings and Tilopa’s Mahamudra teaching to establish the Kagyu lineage.
The Kagyu lineage practices have a special focus on the tantric teachings of the Vajrayana and Mahamudra teachings. Some of the most distinguished works of the Kagyu Tibetan masters are the works of Marpa, the Vajra Songs of Milarepa, the Collected Works of Gampopa, of the Karmapas, of Drikhung Kyöppa Jigten Sumgön, and of Drukpa Kunkhyen Pema Karpo.
In the Kagyu school, there are a large number of independent sub-schools and lineages.
The Sakya School of Tibetan Buddhism
The Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism dates to the 11th century. The name comes from the Tibetan ས་སྐྱ་ meaning “pale earth” describing the grey landscape near Shigatse, Tibet where the Sakya Monastery – the first monastery of this tradition and the seat of the Sakya School – was built in 1073.
The Sakya tradition developed during the second period of translation of Buddhist scripture from Sanskrit into Tibetan and was founded by Drogmi, a famous scholar and translator who had studied under Naropa and other great Indian masters.
The heart of the Sakya lineage teaching and practice is Lamdre, The Path and Its Fruit, a comprehensive and structured meditation path in Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhism.
The head of Sakya School is the “Sakya Trizin” (“the holder of the Sakya throne”), who is always drawn from the male line of the Khön family. It was previously a lifetime position that rotated between the two branches of that lineage, the Phuntsok Potrang and the Dolma Potrang. The previous head of the Sakya School, His Holiness Ngawang Kunga Thekchen Palbar Samphel Ganggi Gyalpo, was born in 1945 in Tsedong, Tibet and served as Sakya Trizin from 1958 to 2017. It has now become a three-year position that rotates between the next generation of trained male offspring of those two families.
The Gelugpa School of Tibetan Buddhism
The Gelug or Gelugpa (དགེ་ལུགས་པ་) school is the newest and largest school of Tibetan Buddhism. Its story begins with Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), one of the period’s foremost authorities of Tibetan Buddhism who studied under Sakya, Kagyu, and Nyingma masters.
Tsongkhapa, the most renowned teacher of his time, founded Ganden Monastery in 1409 and, though he emphasized a strong monastic sangha, he did not announce a new monastic order. Following his death, his followers established the Gelug (“the virtuous tradition”) school. The Gelug school was also called “New Kadam” for its revival of the Kadam school founded by Atisha.
The Throne-Holder of Ganden (Ganden Tripa) is the official head of the Gelug school, a position that rotates between the heads of the two Gelug tantric colleges. Its most influential figure is the Dalai Lama, who is a monk of the Gelug tradition, but as the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet for over fifty years has always represented all Tibetans.
The Dalai Lamas are considered manifestations of Avalokiteshvara or Chenrezig, the Bodhisattva of Compassion and the patron saint of Tibet. Bodhisattvas are enlightened beings who have chosen to be continuously reborn to end the suffering of sentient beings.
The current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is the 14th reincarnation. He was born in 1935, two years after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama encourages non-sectarianism.
The central teachings of the Gelug School are the lamrim (stages of the path to enlightenment) teachings of Tsongkhapa, based on the teachings of the 11th-century Indian master Atisha.
Source: “BRIEF GUIDE TO MAJOR SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM.”
Brief Guide to Major Schools of Buddhism
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Buddhism is not a monolithic tradition. As it spread through Asia over more than two millennia, it divided into several sects, each with its own liturgies, rituals, and canon of scriptures. There are also doctrinal disagreements. However, all are founded on the same basic teachings of the historical Buddha.
Buddhism can be divided into two major schools: Theravada and Mahayana. Today, Theravada is the dominant form of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma (Myanmar) and Laos. Mahayana is dominant in China, Japan, Taiwan, Tibet, Nepal, Mongolia, Korea and most of Vietnam.
You will sometimes hear there are three major schools of Buddhism, the third being Vajrayana. Vajrayana is associated with Tibetan Buddhism as well as a Japanese school called Shingon. But Vajrayana is founded on Mahayana philosophy and is more accurately understood as an extension of Mahayana. Further, you can find elements of Vajrayana in many schools of Mahayana beside Tibetan and Shingon.
Note that if you come across a discussion of schools of Buddhism called Sthaviravada or Hinayana, most of the time this refers to Theravada.
Anatta – The Doctrinal Divide Between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhist Schools
The basic doctrinal difference that divides Theravada from Mahayana is an interpretation of anatta, the teaching that there is no soul or self. The self that seems to inhabit our bodies continuously through our lives is an illusion. All schools of Buddhism support this teaching.
However, Mahayana Buddhism takes anatta further and teaches a doctrine called shunyata, or emptiness. According to Mahayana, all phenomena take identity to us only in relation to other phenomena and cannot be said to either exist or not exist. The difference in interpretation of anatta impacts how many other doctrines are understood.
If you are scratching your head at this point, you are not alone. These are extremely difficult doctrines to understand, and many will tell you they cannot be understood by intellect alone. If you’re a beginner there’s not much point spinning your wheels over which school is right. Practice awhile, and come to your own conclusions as you gain more understanding.
If you are new to Buddhism, the most obvious difference you might see is that in Theravada, the ideal of practice is the arhat, the individual who has realized enlightenment. In Mahayana, the ideal of practice is the enlightened being who is dedicated to bringing all beings to enlightenment.
Divisions of Theravada
In Asia, there is a bigger difference between monastic and lay Theravada Buddhism than among different orders or sects of Theravada Buddhism. Monks meditate, study and teach; laypeople, on the whole (there are exceptions), do not. Laypeople practice by supporting the monasteries with alms, donations, chants, and prayers. They are encouraged to keep the five precepts and observe uposatha days.
In the West, those who come to Theravada as adults — as opposed to growing up with it in an ethnic Asian community — most commonly practice Vipassana or “insight” meditation and study the Pali Canon, which is the main body of scripture for Theravada. The more traditional monastic-lay symbiosis found in Asia hasn’t yet emerged among non-ethnic-Asian Western practitioners.
There are a number of different Theravada monastic orders in Asia. There are also beliefs and practices associated with Buddhism, often taken from local folk cultures, that are found in some parts of Southeast Asia but not others. But compared to Mahayana, Theravada is relatively homogenous.
Divisions of Mahayana
The distinctions among different sects of Mahayana Buddhism are so pronounced they might seem to be entirely different religions, yet they are all built on the same philosophical and doctrinal foundation.
The doctrinal differences tend to be minor compared to differences in practice, such as meditation, ritual, and chanting. Most people who come to Mahayana choose a school because its practices resonate well with them.
Here are some of the Mahayana traditions you are most likely to find in the West, but it is not an exhaustive list, and there are many variations and sub-sects. There are also traditions that combine elements of more than one sect. The practices described are all long-established means to enable practitioners to actualize the Buddha’s teaching.
Amitabha or Amida Buddhism also called Pure Land Buddhism. Pure Land emphasizes faithful devotion to the Buddha Amitabha. By the grace of Amitabha, one may be reborn in the Pure Land, where enlightenment may be realized and Nirvana is close at hand. The most distinctive practice of Pure Land Buddhism, called Nianfo in Chinese and Nembutsu in Japanese, is the mindful recitation of Amitabha’s name.
Nichiren Buddhism is a Japanese tradition that has gained a large following in the West. It emphasizes a mindful chanting practice that evokes the mystical power of the Lotus Sutra to bring all beings to enlightenment. Probably the largest Nichiren group in the West is Soka Gakkai International (SGI), a lay organization, but there are others.
Tendai is less widespread in the West than many other traditions but is a long-established Mahayana tradition in Asia. Tendai offers a number of meditation and other practices to enable enlightenment.
Tibetan Buddhism has gained a huge following in the West in recent years. There are four major schools and many sub-schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism combines meditation with ritual, chanting, and other practices. The most distinctive feature of Tibetan Buddhism is tantra or deity yoga. This is most simply translated as “a means to enlightenment through identity with tantric deities.”
Zen is the Japanese name of Chan, a sect that originated in 6th century China. Chan Buddhism also spread to Korea and Vietnam. The most basic practice of Zen is a mindful, silent meditation practice called zazen in Japanese. Zen has been predominantly a monastic school for most of its history, although there is a long tradition of lay practice also.
Not every temple you might visit will fit neatly into one of these sectarian niches. It’s not at all unusual to find temples that combine practices of more than one tradition, for example. There are many sects not listed, and those that are listed come in many denominations.
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All Mahayana schools adopt some version of the Two Truths theory, with one exception: the Tiantai school, which alone among all Buddhist schools moves from the Two Truths epistemology to a Three Truths model of truth. The Three Truths are actually three different ways of looking at any object or state. Each implies the other two, and each is one way to describe the whole of that object, including its other two aspects. This cup is a cup: that is provisional truth, conventional truth, local coherence. This cup is not a cup: that is ultimate truth, its emptiness, its global incoherence. To be a cup is not to be a cup: that is its Centrality, its Non-duality, its Absoluteness. This cup is all things, all possible ways of being, all universes, as this cup.
The Buddhist idea of two “truths” (Pāli: sacca; Sanskrit: satya) refers to the idea that there is a “conventional” (Pāli: sammuti; Sanskrit: saṃvṛti) truth that must be distinguished from the “ultimate” (Pāli: paramattha; Sanskrit: paramārtha) truth. The two truths distinction may have emerged initially as a hermeneutic device which later interpreters employed to reconcile apparent inconsistencies among statements in the Buddhist scriptures. The two truths doctrine nevertheless came to hold a central philosophical position in Buddhist semantics, ontology, epistemology, and soteriology in the majority of philosophical schools including Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Madhyamaka.
Emptiness is a central concept in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy; however, it has multiple meanings. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the most prominent meanings of emptiness in Mahāyāna Buddhism and highlight some important interpretive disputes. This chapter is also an exercise in comparative philosophizing; it discusses similarities between the emptiness concept and some Western philosophical ideas. The Madhyamaka assertion that all things are empty means that they are all dependently originating; they lack or are empty of autonomous existence because they are reliant on causes to bring them into and sustain their existence. Another concept of emptiness occurs in the buddha-nature teaching. The chapter presents Yogācāra as a form of ontological idealism, which claims that the external world of objects is actually a creation of the mind. It explains that the concept of emptiness in Mahāyāna Buddhism is contested and open to a variety of interpretations.
This chapter examines the six forms that the teaching of emptiness takes in Zen. Before doing this, the chapter comments briefly on Zen’s relation to the doctrinal sources upon which it critically and creatively draws. The Zen tradition understands itself to be based on Śākyamuni Buddha’s profoundest teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which has been passed down not through texts and doctrines but by way of face-to-face acknowledgment of awakening. The six rubrics which the notion of emptiness is used in the Zen tradition are lack of ownbeing, formlessness of ultimate reality, distinctionless state of meditative consciousness, no-mind in the action of non-action, emptiness (or emptying) of emptiness, and emptiness of words. Each of the six rubrics contains a cluster of closely related teachings. Moreover, there are certainly many interconnections, and arguably some tensions, among the rubrics.
Chinese Buddhist Philosophy.
Ziporyn, Brook (2011).
In The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy. Ed. Jay Garfield and William Edelglass. New York: Oxford University Press, 68– 81.
Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jeweled Net of Indra.
Cook, Francis H. (1977).
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
The culminating philosophy and practice for Buddhist traditions in Tibet is what is found in tantra, or Vajrayāna. Yet Tibet is unique in the Buddhist world in that it is a place where not only the traditions of tantra are practiced, but where the epistemological traditions of valid cognition and what came to be known as Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka also took root. This chapter briefly surveys a range of ways in which Madhyamaka is represented in Tibet. Madhyamaka takes the place of the highest philosophical view among Tibetan Buddhist sects, and seeing how different traditions formulate the view of Madhyamaka is an important part of understanding how these traditions relate to tantra and negotiate the relationship between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. Vajrayāna in Tibet is pantheist to the core, for, in its most profound expressions all dualities between the divine and the world are radically undone.
Iconographic imagery in the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Tantric (i.e., Vajrayāna) tradition is replete with polymorphic symbolic forms. Tantric texts themselves are multivalent, addressing astronomy, astrology, cosmology, history, embryology, physiology, pharmacology, alchemy, botany, philosophy, and sexuality. The Sr? Kaālacakra, a medieval Indo-Tibetan manuscript of great import, describes ritual visualization sequences in which practitioners visualize elaborate manidiala designs and deified yab-yum (father-mother) consort couples. The Kālacakra system is the preeminent conduit for the globalization of Tibetan Buddhism, and contemporary enactments of its initiation ceremony incorporate a variety of aesthetic genres, including sand manidiala construction and ritual dance.
Practical Applications of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and Madhyamaka in the Kālacakra Tantric Tradition.
The Kālacakra tradition positions itself in the philosophical system of Madhyamaka, from whose perspective it criticizes the doctrinal tenets of Hindu philosophical schools and of Buddhist schools other than Madhyamaka. The concept of emptiness is the most essential tenet of the Kālacakratantra practice. Before analyzing the practical applications of the doctrine of emptiness in the Kālacakra tantric tradition, it may be useful to examine first the ways in which emptiness is defined and explained in this tantric system. Diverse manners of explaining emptiness result from the various contexts in which this tradition applies and actualizes the doctrine of emptiness. In conclusion, one can say that the sole purpose of the intricate system of the Kālacakratantra’s yogic practices is to awaken the yogi to the gnosis of emptiness. The tantra’s expositions on emptiness are adopted from the Perfection of Wisdom literature and from Madyamaka.
Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics, Vol. 3
Deepen your understanding of meaning and truth with the third volume of the Dalai Lama’s esteemed series Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics.
Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics compiles classical Buddhist explorations of the nature of the material world, the human mind, reason, and liberation, and puts them into context for the modern reader. This ambitious four-volume series-a major resource for the history of ideas and especially the history of science and philosophy-has been conceived by and compiled under the visionary supervision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama himself. It is his view that the exploratory thinking of the great masters of classical India still has much that is of interest to us today, whether we are Buddhist or not. These volumes make those insights accessible.
In this third volume the focus turns to exploring the philosophical schools of India. The practice of presenting the views of various schools of philosophy dates back to the first millennium in India, when proponents of competing traditions would arrange the diverse sets of philosophical positions in a hierarchy culminating in their own school’s superior tenets. Centuries later, relying on the Indian Buddhist treatises, Tibet developed its own tradition of works on tenets (grub mtha’), often centered on the four schools of Buddhist philosophy, using them to demonstrate the philosophical evolution within their own tradition, and within individual practitioners, as they progressed through increasingly more subtle expressions of the true reality.
The present work follows in this venerable tradition, but with a modern twist. Like its predecessors, it presents the views of seven non-Buddhist schools, those of the Samkhya, Vaisesika, Nyaya, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Jaina, and Lokayata, followed by the Buddhist Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Cittamatra, and Madhyamaka schools, arranging them like steps on a ladder to the profound. But rather than following in the sharply polemical approach of its ancient predecessors, it strives to survey each tradition authentically, relying on and citing the texts sacred to each, allowing the different traditions to speak for themselves. What, it asks, are the basic components of the world we experience? What is the nature of their ultimate reality? And how can we come to experience that for ourselves? See how the rich spiritual traditions of India approached these key questions, where they agreed, and how they evolved through dialogue and debate.
This presentation of philosophical schools is introduced by His Holiness and is accompanied by an extensive introduction and survey by Professor Donald Lopez Jr. of the University of Michigan, who is uniquely qualified to communicate the scope and significance of this literary and spiritual heritage to modern readers.
A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
By Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon
By Arthur Berriedale Keith
The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy
By Jan Westerhoff
Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN 9780198732662.
Reviewed by Ethan Mills, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Dr. R. Gopalakrisnan, M.A., Ph.D. Professor and Head, (Retired), Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, Chennai—600 005 +91 98411 71138 Email: gopalki_rls@yahoo.com
Nagarjuna is one of the most famous Buddhist philosophers and was even considered as the greatest Buddhist philosopher after Lord Buddha himself. According to Buddhist tradition, Nagarjuna was the founder of the Madhyamika School. Madhamaka School is one of the important schools where Buddhist monks and disciples are preached and taught about Mahayana Buddhism. It is said that Nagarjuna together with his disciple Aryadeva founded this famous school and Mahayana Buddhismthus became popular and famous. One of the greatest achievements of Nagarjuna was his work on the Middle Way. He wrote “Mula-Madhyamaka-karika” for Madhyamaka School which is also known as “Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way”. The Mula-Madhyamaka-karika is considered as the best-known work of Nagarjuna. In Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna is depicted as the “titanic figure” and also depicted as Buddhist monk with naga characteristics. Many Buddhist scholars have praised him for his influence in the foundation of Mahayana Buddhism. According to Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna was born in a Brahmin family and became Buddhist monk later.
Nagarjuna’s Philosophy
Nagarjuna was considered as the most important philosopher after Gautama Buddha in the history of Mahayana Buddhism. One of the most important philosophies that Nagarjuna contributed to Buddhism was the concept of Sunyata. The sunyata simply means “emptiness” and Nagarjuna concept of Sunyata was about bringing together main Buddhist doctrines. Nagarjuna particularly tried to bring Buddhist doctrines such as Anatman “not-self” and Pratityasamutpada “dependent origination”. According to Nagarjuna’s Concept on Sunyata, all sentient beings cannot exist independently thus these sentient beings are without any self-nature. Another greatest philosophy proposed by Nagarjuna was the concept of Two Truths. According toNagarjuna, there are two truths or two levels of reality in Buddha’s teachings. Thus, the concept of Two Truths was the key things in the development of Two Truths Doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism. The Two levels of reality or Truths represent two types of truths in Buddhist Course. These two truths are relative truth and absolute truth. The relative truth is also known as the commonsensical truth and the relative truth describes the experience in the concrete world or life. The absolute truth is also known as the ultimate truth and the absolute truth refers to the reality of Sunyata.
Nagarjuna as Friend of Nagas
The legend of Nagas can be found in the myths of Hinduism as well as Buddhism. Nagas are the snake beings and according to Buddhist tradition, they are from the unseen realms. According to legend related to Nagarjuna, nagas were keeping and protecting sutras that contained the teachings of Buddha and they are hiding these sutras from mankind. Nagas entrusted these sutras to Nagarjuna and asked him to take the sutras back to the human realm. The sutras entrusted to Nagarjuna were called Wisdom Sutras and Nagarjuna collected these sutras under the Prajnaparamita Sutra (Perfection of Wisdom). That’s why Nagarjuna is remembered for his work on Wisdom Sutras.
Madhyamaka School
Madhyamaka School is the school that refers to Mahayana Buddhist School that is based on the philosophy of Nagarjuna on Middle Way.
““Whatever is dependent arising; We declared that to be emptiness. That is dependent designation And is itself the middle way.””
– Nagarjuna
According to Madhyamaka, all phenomena are dependent and are empty and without essence. They have no independent reality of their own.
An Account of the Philsophical Schools of Buddhism
Honen, Pure Land Buddhism, Japan
by Jayaram V
Prior to the emergence of Mahayana school and its expansion beyond the borders of the Indian subcontinent, Buddhism developed along many paths. After the passing away of the Buddha, for the next few centuries, several schools of Buddhism emerged in in ancient India on account of differences in the interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha.
Although their total number was actually said to be 25 or 26, Buddhist tradition recognizes only 18 early schools formed between 5th century B.C.E and 4th century C.E. Of them presently the Theravada school only survives. The list of the 18 schools is provided below1
In the beginning there were only two schools, the Mahasanghikas and the Sthaviras. The former further split into
Branch-Mahasanghikas
Ekavyavaharins
Lokottaravadins
Bahusrutiyas
Nityavadins
Caityakas
Purvasailikas
Uttarasailikas
The Sthaviras were further split into
Haimavatas
Sarvastivadins
Hetuvadins
Vatsiputriyas
Dharmadesakas
Bhadrayanikas
Sammitiyas
Bahudesakas
Dharmadesakas
Bhadravarsikas
All the eighteen schools are grouped under Sravakayana branch of Hinayana (the smaller vehicle). In course of time there developed in Buddhism four major lines of thought namely the Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas, the Yogacaras and the Madhyamikas. The Vaibhasikas, who are also known as “existential dualists” interpreted existential reality in terms of experiential knowledge arising out of contact with substances, some of which they considered as transitory and some as eternal.
The Sautrantikas, who based their knowledge on the sutras, distinguished reality into that which was real and existing and that which was real but non-existing. The acknowledged the existence of phenomenal world but considered it to be transient. The Yogacara school, which is also called the vijnanavada school, held the opinion that the whole world was an ideal. They argued that all phenomena existed because of consciousness and that the illusion of existence was a fabrication of the mind or consciousness alone.
The school recognized various levels or gradations within consciousness created by the activity of the senses and the mind. The Madhyamika philosophy was based on the original teachings of the Buddha and the middle path suggested by him. One of the chief proponents of this school was Nagarjuna whose interpretation of reality borders on skepticism or agnosticism. This school had to major branches, the Svatantrikas and the Prasangikas.
Although there are essentially at present two major branches of Buddhism, namely Mahayana and Hinayana, Buddhism developed several local characteristics in each geographical area where it spread. Thus today Buddhism goes by several names such as Tibetan Buddhism, Burmese Buddhism, Sri Lankan Buddhism, Thai Buddhism, Korean Buddhism, Cambodian Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, Japanese Buddhism and so on.
1. This classification is based on the Buddhist Philosophy In Theory and Practice by Herbert V.Guenther 1971, Penguin Books
Although the ideas and literature of many different forms of Buddhism reached China – including Sarvāstivāda, Mahīśāsika, Saṃmitīya, Dharmaguptaka, Sautrāntika and others – only Madhyamaka and Yogācāra developed Chinese schools and lineages. Madhyamaka disappeared as an independent school after Jizang, but its influence and the preeminence of Nāgārjuna never abated. The sixth century was basically a battleground of competing Yogācāric theories.
In the seventh century the famous Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang (600–64) spent sixteen years travelling in Central Asia and India. He returned to China in 645 and translated seventy-four works. Due in part to his accomplishments as a traveller and translator, and in part to the eminent favour bestowed on him by the Chinese emperor upon his return, Xuanzang became the most prominent East Asian Buddhist of his generation. He promoted an orthodox form of Yogācāra as it was then being practised in India, and students flocked to him from Japan and Korea as well as China. Not everyone was enamoured of the Buddhist ideology he had brought back. Zhiyan (602–68), who would later be considered one of the patriarchs of the Huayan school, was openly critical of Xuanzang’s teachings, and Fazang had joined Xuanzang’s translation committee late in Xuanzang’s life, only to quit in disgust at Xuanzang’s ‘distorted’ views. While in India, Xuanzang had discovered how far Chinese Buddhism had deviated from its Indian source, and his translations and teachings were deliberate attempts to bring Chinese Buddhism back in line with Indian teachings. The ideas he opposed (primarily but not exclusively those that had been promoted by Paramārtha’s school) were already deeply entrenched in Chinese Buddhist thinking. While he was alive his pre-eminence made him unassailable, but once he died his detractors attacked his successor, Kuiji (632–82), and successfully returned Chinese and East Asian Buddhism to the trajectory established by the conflationists. (Wônch’ūk, a Korean student of Xuanzang, was a rival of Kuiji who fared better with the revivalists since he attempted to harmonize the teachings of Paramārtha and Xuanzang.) The underlying ideology of this resurgence, which reached its intellectual apex over the course of the Tang and Song Dynasties (sixth–twelfth centuries), was neatly summarized by the label ‘dharma-nature’ (faxing), that is, the metaphysical ground of Buddha-nature quadharma-dhātuqua mind-nature quatathāgatagarbha. Fazang argued that orthodox Yogācāra only understood dharma characteristics (faxiang), that is, phenomenal appearances, but not the deeper underlying metaphysical reality, ‘dharma-nature’. After Fazang, all the Sinitic Buddhist schools considered themselves dharma-nature schools; Yogācāra and sometimes Sanlun were considered merely dharma characteristics schools.
Four dharma-nature schools emerged. Each school eventually compiled a list of its patriarchs through whom its teachings were believed to have been transmitted. Modern scholarship in Japan and the West has shown that these lineages were usually forged long after the fact, and frequently were erroneous or distorted the actual historical events. For instance, while Huiyuan was an active promoter of the Sarvāstivādin teachings introduced during his time by Sanghadeva and Buddhabhadra, the later Pure Land schools dubbed him their initial Chinese patriarch on the basis of his alleged participation in Amitābha rituals, allegations that were probably first concocted during the Tang Dynasty. Similarly, the lineage of six Chan patriarchs from Bodhidharma to Huineng is unlikely; the Huayan lineage (Du Shun to Zhiyan to Fazang to Chengguan) was largely an invention of the ‘fourth’ patriarch, Chengguan: his predecessors were unaware that they were starting a new lineage and rather thought that they were reviving the true old-time religion of Paramārtha. It was also during the Tang dynasty that Tantra briefly passed through China, from whence it was brought to Japan and became firmly established as the Shingon school.
The entry explores the introduction and development of Buddhist philosophy in China, with a focus on the classical systems that became dominant during the medieval period and continue to shape modern conceptions of Buddhist theory and practice. It covers the main traditions of Mahāyāna doctrine, initially developed in India, which were transmitted into China together with other aspects of Buddhism: Madhyamaka (Middle Way), Yogācāra (Yoga Practice), and Tathāgatagarbha (Embryo of Buddhahood). The translation, study, and exegesis of canonical texts that expound these central doctrines gave rise to a number of distinct Chinese schools, which represent discrete traditions of Buddhist philosophy. Some of the early schools are usually described as Chinese versions of Indian systems of Buddhist philosophy. For instance, Shelun, Dilun, and Faxiang are closely associated with Yogācāra philosophy, while Sanlun is said to be a Chinese version of Madhyamaka. In contrast, during the late medieval period (from the late sixth to the tenth century) there was the emergence of uniquely Chinese systems of Buddhist philosophy, which were subsequently exported to other parts of East Asia. The last two sections of the entry describe the two most notable philosophical systems of that kind, developed by the Tiantai and the Huayan schools, which represent the pinnacles of ingenious philosophical thinking within Chinese Buddhism.
Mahayana Maha Ati (Dzogchen) tradition of Buddhism
eighteen schools, the division of the Buddhist community in India in the first three centuries following the death of the Buddha in c. 483 BC. Although texts speak of the “18 schools,” the lists differ considerably; and more than 30 names are mentioned in various chronicles.
The first division in the Buddhist community occurred as a result of the second council, said to have been held 100 years after the Buddha’s death, at Vaisali (Bihar state), when the Acariyavadins (followers of the traditional teaching) split away from the Sthaviravadins (followers of the Way of the Elders) and formed their own school, known as the Mahasanghikas. The Mahasanghikas’s views on the nature of the Buddha and the arhat (“saint”) foreshadowed the development of the Mahayana form of Buddhism. Further subdivisions of the Mahasanghikas over the next seven centuries included the Lokottaravadins, the Ekavyavaharikas, and the Kaukkutikas.
A subdivision within the Sthaviravadins emerged in the 3rd century BC, when the Sarvastivadins (followers of the Doctrine That All Is Real) broke away from the Vibhajyavadins (Those Who Make Distinctions). Other prominent offshoots of the Sthaviravadins were the Sammatiyas and the Vatsiputriyas, both known for their theory of pudgala (“person”); the Sautrantikas, who recognized the authority of the sutras (words of the Buddha) but not of the Abhidharma, the more schematic part of the canon; the Mahisasakas and the Dharmaguptas, whose names probably reflect their place of origin and founding teacher; and the Theravadins (Pali form of Sthaviravadins), the school that traveled to Sri Lanka and gave origin to the modern Theravadins, now prevalent in Sri Lanka, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Cambodia.
All the Tibetan schools emerged from the Mahayana School of Buddhism, which is also the dominant form of Buddhism in China, Korea and Japan. Theravada (Hinayana) is the dominant school in southern India, Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka. The emergence and development of competing sects in Tibetan Buddhism is best viewed as a struggle between the clerical side of Buddhism, with its emphasis and textual study, and the Tantric side, which emphasizes shaman-style rituals and techniques. Each Tibetan school addresses this struggle and in most cases emphasizes either the clerical side or the Tantric side over the other.
All the different schools struggled for dominance as they emerged. But for the most part the ones that remain today complement one another; don’t compete and try to remain in harmony. All of the “Four Major Schools of Tibetan Buddhism” follow the core beliefs of Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths and other teachings. Each school traces its founding in Tibet to a particular person, who in turn is connected to a particular tradition in India.
There are four principal schools within modern Tibetan Buddhism: 1) Nyingmapa founded by Padmasambhava, 2) Kagyupa, founded by Tilopa (988-1069), 3) Sakyapa created by Gonchok Gyelpo (1034-1102) and his son Gunga Nyingpo (1092-1158), 4) Gelugpa (The Virtuous School, Yellow Hat) founded by Tsong Khapa Lobsang Drakpa (also called Je Rinpoche) (1357 – 1419) and headed by the Dalai Lama.
The Nyingmapa Order is the oldest, dating back to the 8th century. The Kagyupa order and the Sakyapa order emerged around the same time in the 11th century. The Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) order emerged in the 15th century as a purer form of Buddhism at a time when the other schools were regarded as corrupt. It became the dominant school in the 17th century. The previously thought-to-be-defunct Tibetan Buddhist school of Jonang turns out to be very much alive in Dzamthang.
The Gelugpa order is often called the Yellow Hat school while the Kagyupa is called the White Hat or Red Hat school. The hats refer to the elaborate crescent-shaped hats worn by followers during ceremonies. The Chinese originated the terms to help them sort out the different schools in easy-to-remember terms, the same reason the terms are widely used by foreigners today. Sometimes the Red Hat term is used to describe all non-Yellow Hat schools. The term Black Hats refers to the Karma Kagyupa, a suborder of the Kagyupa school. This is because the leader of the Karma Kagyupa, the Karmapa Lama, is often referred to as the Black-Hat Lama because that is the color of his ceremonial hat.
The Nyingmapa Order traces its origins to Guru Rinpoche, an Indian sage who arrived in Tibet in the 8th or 9th century, and King Songtsen Gampo (630-649), who helped to establish Buddhism in Tibet. See Above
In the 11th century Tibetan Buddhism became stronger and more politicized. The power of the ruling monks increased and the religion splintered into several sects. This period was marked by fierce rivalry between sects: first between the Kagyupa order established by Milarepa (1040-1123) and the Sakyapa order which emerged in 1073 from the Sakya monastery, a monastery funded by the Kon family, and later between Yellow, Red and Black Hat schools.
In the 13th century, with the help of Mongolian supporters, the Sakyapa school took control of much of Tibet. The Mongols under Genghis Khan had raided Tibet but converted to Tibetan Buddhism after a meeting between Genghis Khan’s grandson, Kokonor, and the head of the Sakya monastery. Sakyapa rule lasted for about 100 years. Three secular dynasties — the Phgmogru, the Ripung and the Tsangpa — followed between the years 1354 and 1642, when the Yellow Hat (Gelugpa) school emerged as the dominant order.
Gelupa (Yellow Hat) School and the Fifth Dalai Lama
Fifth Dalai Lama
The Yellow Hats (Gelupa) emerged in the 15th century. They were given a big boost in the 16th century when the Mongols decided to support them. The school became preeminent in the middle of the 17th century, through the efforts of Mongolian supporters and Tibetan supporters inspired by the charismatic 5th Dalai Lama. The Yellow Hats took control of the central plateau and maintained control until British and Chinese incursions into Tibet in 19th century.
The 5th Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (1617-82) is regarded as the greatest of the Dalai Lamas. Born in Chongye in the Yarlung Valley, he unified Tibet and set the precedent for future Dalai Lamas. He was the first Dalai Lama to exercise temporal power and ruled benevolently as both a spiritual and political leader and initiated construction of the Potala palace. In paintings he wears a yellow hat and holds a thunderbolt in his right hand and a bell in his left hand. He is sometimes shown holding a lotus flower, a Wheel of Law or another sacred object.
See Yellow Hats, Below
Nyingmapa (Red Hats)
Nyingmapa (or Nyingma) is the oldest of the Tibetan Buddhist schools and the second largest school of Tibetan Buddhism. The Nyingma school is based primarily on the teachings of Padmasambhava, called Guru Rinpoche, “Beloved Master,” who is the founder of Nyingmapa and revered by the Nyingma school as the “second Buddha.” Featured Nyingmapa monasteries in Tibet include: Samye Monastery, Mindroling Monastery and Dorje Drak Monastery. It is said Nyingmapa was founded by Padmasambhava and is recognized in the West for the teachings of the Tibetan Book of the Dead.
Sometimes referred to among Tibetans as the Old School, the Nyingmapa Order was surpassed by the other major orders in the 11th century and remained in villages under shaman-like figures until the rebirth of Buddhism, also in the 11th century, when it experienced a revival after the “discovery” of hidden texts and “power places” visited by Guru Rinpoche revealed in Tantric visions by Nyingmapa masters.The Nyingmapa Order was never centralized and organized to the extent of the others and was considered too extremist. The Nyingmapa order was given a lift by the 5th Dalai Lama, who encouraged the expansion of the Mindroling and Dorje Drak monasteries, in U, which became the main Nyingmapa monasteries.
The Nyingmapa Order places great importance on the Dzogchen, or Great Perfection, teachings, which deeply influenced the other schools but is largely sneered at by them today. Dzogchen philosophy argues that there was a state of purity that existed at the beginning of time that pre-dated the duality of enlightenment and earthly living and this offers a Tantric shortcut to nirvana.
Padmascambhava’s system of Vajrayana or Tantric Buddhism was synthesized by Longchenpa in the 14th century. Along with tantric practices, Nyingma emphasizes revealed teachings attributed to Padmasambhava plus the “great completion” or Dzogchen doctrines, also known as ati-yoga (extraordinary yoga). It also makes wide use of shamanistic practices and local divinities borrowed from the indigenous, pre-Buddhist Bon religion. Nyingma monks are not generally required to be celibate. The most recent head of the Nyingma tradition was Mindrolling Trichen, who died in 2008. A successor has not been named.
Kagyupa (White Hats)
Marpa Kagyupa (“Whispered Transmission”) is the third largest school of Tibetan Buddhism. It was founded by Tilopa (988-1069) and important teachers include Naropa, Marpa, and Milarepa. Some trace Kagyupa’s origin back to Marpa the Translator,(1012-1123), a married Tibetan yogi famous for his Tantric power, and Milarepa (1040-1123). One of Milarepa’s disciples, Gampopa (1079-1153) established a number of monasteries. The Kagyupa order initially emphasized the Tantric side of Tibetan Buddhism over the clerical, textual side. As it became more organized it emphasized the textual, clerical side more and became hierarchal, and at this stage was accused of placing to much power in the hands of lamas and being corrupt Over time several Kagyupa suborders emerged. The most well known of these is the Karma Kagyupa (see Below). Others include the Drigungpa and Taglungpa schools, which are based respectively at the Drigung Til and Talung Monasteries in U.
Kagyupa teachings were brought to Tibet by Marpa in the 11th century. He was a Tibetan householder who traveled to India to study under the master yogin Naropa and gather Buddhist scriptures. Marpa’s most important student was Milarepa, to whom Marpa passed on his teachings only after subjecting him to trials of the utmost difficulty. In the 12th century, the physician Gampopa synthesized the teachings of Marpa and Milarepa into an independent school. As its name indicates, this school of Tibetan Buddhism places particular value on the transmission of teachings from teacher to disciple. It also stresses the more severe practices of hatha yoga. The central teaching is the “great seal” (mahamudra), which is a realization of emptiness, freedom from samsara and the inspearability of these two. The basic practice of mahamudra is “dwelling in peace,” and it has thus been called the “Tibetan Zen.” Also central to the Kagyupa schools are the Six Doctrines of Naropa (Naro Chödrug), which are meditation techniques that partially coincide with the teachings of the Tibetan Book of the Dead.
The Kagyupa tradition is headed by the Karmapa Lama. The current head is the Seventeenth Gyalwa Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, who was born in 1985 in the Lhathok region of Tibet. Important Kagyupa teachers include Naropa, Marpa, and Milarepa. Some accounts name Marpa “The Translator” (1012-1099) as the founder of the Kagyu school, while other accounts name as the founder Gampopa (1084-1161), also known as Dagpo Lhaje, who was a student of Marpa’s disciple Milarepa. Kagyu is best known for its system of meditation and practice called Mahamudra.
Karmapa (Black Hats)
The Black Hat school is properly known as Kagyu Karma or Karmapa. It is a suborder of the Kagyupa (Red Hat) order and is led by the Karmapa Lama. It was once Tibet’s most politically powerful school but it was supplanted by the Yellow Hats of the Dalai Lama 350 years ago.
The Kagyo Karma order is credited with inaugurating the tradition of passing on leadership through the reincarnations of lamas when Dusim Khyenpa (1110-93), the abbot of Tsurphu Monastery, announced he would keep his position after death in a reincarnated form as someone else.
The Black Crown is the symbol of authority of the Karmapa Lama. Said to have been woven from the hair of female angels, it was presented to the 5th Karmapa by the Chinese emperor Yong-le in the 15th century. The 16th Karmapa Lama deposited it at Rumtek Monestray in Sikkim.
Tsurphu Monastery (70 kilometers northwest of Lhasa in Gurum in Doilungdêqên District) is a 12th century monastery in the Drowolung valley in central Tibet. It is the traditional seat of the Karmapa Lama, the head of the Karma Kagyu (Black Hat) lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. The last Karampa Lama was enthroned in a ceremony here. See NEAR LHASA factsanddetails.com
Sakyapa
Sakya Pandita Sakyapa is today the smallest of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism. It is named for the Sakya (“Gray Earth”) monastery in sourthern Tibet. In 1073, Khon Konchok Gyelpo (1034-l102) built Sakya Monastery in southern Tibet. His son and successor, Sakya Kunga Nyingpo (1092-1158)., founded the Sakya school. The abbots in the Sakya Monastery were devoted to the transmission of a cycle of Vajrayana central teaching and practice called Lamdrey, or “path and goal”, the systemization of Tantric teachings, and Buddhist logic.
The Sakya school had great political influence in the 13th and 14th centuries. Sakya teachers converted the Mongol leaders Godan Khan and Kublai Khan to Buddhism. Over time, the Sakya school gave rise expanded to two subsects called the Ngor lineage and the Tsar lineage. Sakya, Ngor and Tsar constitute the three schools (Sa-Ngor-Tsar-gsum) of the Sakya tradition. The headquarters of the Sakya sect today are at Rajpur in Uttar Pradesh, India. The current head is Ngawang Kunga Theckchen Rimpoche (b. 1945). Featured monasteries of Sakyapa in Tibet: Sakya Monastery
The Sakyapa Order emerged in the 11th and 12th centuries at monasteries where Indian Buddhist texts were being studied and translated into Tibetan. Its most well known figure was Kunga Pandita (1182-1251), who is often called Sakya Pandita (literally “Scholar for Sakya”). Regarded as manifestation of Jampelyang (Manjushri), the Bodhisattva of Insight, he served as a spiritual advisor for Kublai Khan and was involved in Chinese, Tibetan and Mongol politics.
The Sakyapa Order emphasizes the clerical-textual side of Tibetan Buddhism over Tantrism. It has largely been overshadowed by the Yellow Hat and Red Hat orders but remains alive today. Important Sakyapa lamas include Sakya Trizin, Ngawang Kunga, (head of the Sakyapa order), Chigye Trichen Rinpoche (head of the Tsarpa suborder) and Ludhing Khenpo Rnpoche (head of the Ngorpa suborder).
The Sakyapa Order established a number of monasteries that stressed the study of Buddhist scriptures. Among those who studied there was Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) school.
Gelugpa (The Yellow Hats)
The Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) order is the youngest school of Tibetan Buddhism, but is today the largest and the most important. It is lead by the Dalai Lama and was founded by Tsongkhapa (also called Je Rinpoche) (1357-1419), a lama who established a monastery at Ganden. Tsongkhapa attracted a number of followers who were disgusted by the corrupt rule of the Sakyapa and Kagyupa orders. After his death his followers established more monasteries and their movement came to be called the Gelugpa (“Virtuous”) order and the their leaders, the Dalai Lama. Featured Gelugpa monasteries in Tibet include: Drepung Monastery, Sera Monastery, Ganden Monastery, Tashilunpo Monastery.
Gelugpa practices are centered on achieving concentration through meditation and arousing the bodhisattva within. Three large monasteries were quickly established near Lhasa: at Dga’ldan (Ganden) in 1409, ‘Bras-spungs (Drepung) in 1416, and Se-ra in 1419. The abbots of the ‘Bras-spungs monastery first received the title Dalai Lama in 1578. The Gelugpa school has held political leadership of Tibet since the Dalai Lamas were made heads of state by the Mongol leader Güüshi Khan in 1642.
The Yellow Hats have dominated Tibetan Buddhism since the 17th century, when they pushed their rivals, the Black Hats, from power with the help of a Mongol prince. The Mongols coined the name Dalai Lama and helped the Yellow Hats gain dominance over the their rivals. The Red Hats have also traditionally been rivals of the Yellow Hats. The yellow hats are worn with red robes by monks during religious ceremonies. The hats look like large yellow bird claws or crescent moons and are worn with the concave side facing forward.
Tsong Kapa, Founder of the Yellow Hats
Tsong Kapa
Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) is the founder of the Yellow Hat order. He was a reformist monk who preached monastic discipline and doctrinal purity and called for a return to conservative doctrines. He called for stricter rules that prohibited monks from getting married (some did before then) and drinking wine.
Tsongkhapa is one of Tibet’s greatest scholars. He “enforced strict monastic discipline, restored celibacy and the prohibition of alcohol and meat, established a higher standard of learning for monks, and, while continuing to respect the Vajrayana tradition of esotericism that was prevalent in Tibet, allowed Tantric and magical rites only in moderation.” The first Gelug monastery, Ganden, was also built by Tsongkhapa in 1409.
Tsongkhapa is regarded as a manifestation of Jampelyan (Manjushri), the Bodhisattva of Wisdom. In paintings he is usually pictured with a yellow hat, holding two lotus flowers with his hands in the “teaching” mudra. He is often portrayed in a triad with his two main disciples, Kenrud Je and Gyastab Je.
Tsongkapa was born in Kokonor near present-day Xining in Qinghai Province. He left home at 17 and studied at all the major schools that existed in his time, but was particularly taken by the Sakyapa and Kadampa orders.
After moving to Netang (the home of the Ganden monetary) near Lhasa, his mother wrote him and asked him to return. He wrote her saying he couldn’t but, according to legend, around the same he wrote the letter, a pipal tree miraculously sprang up at his birthplace in Xining, the same way a Bodhi tree arose on the place where Buddha received the enlightenment. Taer monastery was established there in 1560. At Netamg Tsongkapa had a vison with the Indian scholar Atisha in it. The Ganden monastery was established there. The nephew of Tsongkhapa became the first Dalai Lama
Yellow Hat and Red Hat Beliefs
The Yellow Hat school emphasizes the scholarly approach to Buddhism and advocates following the traditional monastic code as a means of reaching nirvana. The Yellow Hats are regarded as a strict school. Their monks are known for their martial arts skills. By contrast its main rivals, the Red Hat school, emphasize a more Tantric approach.
Some have compared the Yellow Hats to Catholics and the Red Hats to Calvinists because the Yellow Hats donned colorful robes, lived in grand palaces, conducted elaborate ceremonies and put a great emphasis on following religious doctrines and texta like the Catholics while Red Hats are austere and mystical and look to the inner self rather than doctrines and books for answers.
The Yellow Hats are greatly influenced by the teachings of Atisha. They merged Mahayana doctrine with Tantric practices, while emphasizing scholarly study. The group does not condemn Tantric practices but argues that they take years to master and should not be viewed merely as shortcuts to enlightenment and nirvana.
Shugden
Some Yellow Hat Tibetan Buddhists, known as Shungdens, revere an avenging angel called Dorje Shugden. Mainstream Tibetan Buddhists and the Dalai Lama regard them as cultish and divisive. Shugden worship is particularly big around Litang.
The Shugdens have been called the Taliban of Tibetan Buddhism because of their extreme views. Dorje Shugden is regarded as a vengeful protector god. He is often depicted as a sword-wielding warrior who wears a necklace of human heads and rides a snow lion through boiling blood. The Dalai Lama has been trying to discourage worship of Dorje Shugden since he first appeared in the 1600s.
Dorje Shugden is the renamed spirit of Tukla Dragpa Gyaltsen, a powerful 17th-century monk who challenged the 5th Dalai Lama and was murdered’suffocated to death by having ceremonial silk scarves stuffed down his throat — in his palace in 1656 by a close aide of the Dalai Lama. The name Dorge Shugen (“hurler of thunderbolts”) — is reference to his great power.
A senior monk named Kelsang Gyatso established a new Dorje Shugden order in England in 1991 and called it the New Kadampa Tradition (NKT). Followers of this school believe that the Dalai Lama is a traitor for being too compromising with China and too friendly with the Red Hat school (the Shugdens consider it a sin to talk to members of the Red Hat school or touch their religious objects).
Criticism the Shugdens
In 1996, the Dalai Lama denounced the NKT of being a dangerous and greedy commercial cult and warned followers of Tibetan Buddhism to stay clear of them. Two decades earlier he stop praying to the spirit of Dorje Shugden because he believed its negative energy worked against him and he was told by the oracle that Shugden was really an “evil spirit.”
The NKT is believed to be behind the murder of close associates of the Dalai Lama (SEE Above). Police believe the Dalai Lama’s condemnation of the NKT may have been the motive for the murder.
The NKT has also been accused of bilking its followers out of large amounts of money. One of it newsletters told followers” “if you are in the market for some merit (and who isn’t) here is a perfect opportunity” and then said buying a $4,800 NKT shrine cabinet, $3,200 NKT Buddha statue and a $48 tea-cup and saucer with mark of a senior monk were easy ways in which people could earn lots of merit..
Serthar Buddhist Institute
Serthar (Sertar) — a place in the remote, barren 13,000-foot-high Larung valley in the Tibetan region of western Sichuan — is the home of a unique Buddhist community. Founded in 1980 by Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, who claims to be a reincarnation of the teacher of the previous Dalai Lama, the community boasted 10,000 followers who lived in spartan log cabins and mud huts, making it the largest group of its kind in the Tibetan regions. Most of the members were Tibetans but there were 1,000 ethnic Chinese members in the group.
The community was called Larung Gar (Gars means encampment) and Serthar Buddhist Institute. Located near the border with Tibet and Qinghai Province and 500 miles from the nearest city, it was surrounded by towering mountains and reached by dirt road Before the Buddhists arrived no one lived in the valley.
Larung was not a monastery. Its members included nuns, red-robed monks, scholars and laymen and women. It was not associated with any of the Tibetan schools. Doctrines from all three of the major Tibetan Buddhist schools are taught. The group was tolerated for while because Jigme Phuntosg went out of his way not to do anything to offend Beijing. Even so the “evil cult” law passed to combat Falun Gong in 2000 was used to crack down on the group, because it had grown so large and was perceived as a threat.
In 2001, armed police evicted hundreds of Tibetan nuns, monks and scholars from the Serthar. Houses were burned down and people who were evicted were forced to sign documents denouncing the Dalai Lama and threatened with arrest if they returned. Some nuns threatened to commit suicide rather than leave. The aim was not to close the community but to limit its size. See Places.
After the crackdown the community managed to survive. Many monks who were ordered to leave simply walked down te road and turned around and returned, sneaking past police. Members seemed to not care about the risks. After the crack down new members showed up. Their resistance called into question Beijing’s ability to crush religious and dissident groups.
As of early 2004, there were about 3,000 people at Serthar. Jogme Phuntsok continued to meet with small groups of students until his death in January 2004.
Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, National Geographic, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, Lonely Planet Guides, Compton’s Encyclopedia and various books and other publications.
Numerous Buddhist Acts emerged after the mid-11th century, including the Nyingma, Gatang, Sagya, Gagyu, Zhigyed, Gyoyul, Gyonang, Kodrag and Xalhu sects. The latter five were rather weak owing to the lack of political support. They were thus forced to join force or were otherwise annexed by other sects, and as individual entities fell into the oblivion of the long flow of history. The following five sects enjoyed impressive popularity:
Nyingma Sect. The sect, founded in the 11th century, is also known as the Red Sect and is the oldest sect of Tibetan Buddhism. The sect paid great attention to absorbing the fine points of the Bon religion and, at the same time, did its best to locate Buddhist sutras secreted away when Darma moved to suppress Buddhism. Based on its practice of Buddhism deeply rooted in the Tubo Kingdom of the 8th century, the sect called itself Nyingma, a word meaning ancient and old in the Tibetan language. Monks of the Nyingma Sect wore red hats, hence the name the Red Sect. The Red Sect mainly advocates the study of Tantrism. Its theory was strongly influenced by Han Chine language Buddhism, and is quite similar with the theory of Ch’an School of Buddhism in China’s hinterland. Today, the Red Sect is not only active in Tibetaninhabited areas in Ghina, but also in India, Bhuttan, Nepal, Belgium, Greece and France, as well as in the Unite States.
Gatang Sect. The Gatang Sect, founded in 1056, primarily advocated the study of Exoteric teachings, with later emphasis on Tantrism. In the Tibetan language, Ga refers to the teachings of Buddha, with tang meaning instruction. The combination Gatang thus refers to advising people to accept Buddhism based on the teachings of Buddha. Its doctrines were promoted far and wide and thus exerted great influence on various Tibetan Buddhist sects. However, along with the rise of the Gelug Sect in the 15th century, the Gatang Sect dissolved with its monks and monasteries merging with the former.
Sagya Sect. Sagya means “white land” in the Tibetan language. The Sagya Sect, founded in 1703, derived its name from the fact that the Sagya Monastery, the sect’s most important monastery, is grayish white in color. Enclosures in the sect’s monasteries are painted with red, white and black stripes, which respectively symbolize the Wisdom Buddha, the Goddess of Mercy and the Diamond Hand Buddha. Hence, the sect is also known as the Stripe Sect. The ever increasing influence of the sect and the expansion of feudal forces throughout its formation led to the increasing fame of the “five Sagya Sect Forefathers”. The Fourth Forefather Sapan Gonggar Gyaincain was summoned to Liangzhou in 1247 by the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) ruler to dialup matters concerning Tibet pledging allegiance to the Yuan Dynasty. This was followed by Sapan bringing various feudal forces in Tibet under control of the Mongols. Following the death of Sapan, Pagan, the Fifth Forefather of the Sagya Sect, emerged as a high-ranking official in the Yuan court. Pagba Was granted honorary titles such as “State Tutor”, ”Imperial Tutor” and ”Great Treasure Prince of Dharma.” Thereafter, the Sagya Sect emerged as the Yuan Dynasty representative in Tibet. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) , Gonggar Zhaxi, an eminent monk with the Sagya Sect, journeyed to Nanjing, capital of the Ming Dynasty, to pay homage to Emperor Yongle. Gongar was granted an honorary title as the “Mahayana Prince of Dharma”, one of the three Princes of Dharma.
Gagyu Sect. The Gagyu Sect, founded in the 11th century, stresses the study of Tantrism and advocates that Tantrist tenets be passed down orally from one generation to another. Hence the name Gagyu, which in the Tibetan language means “passing down orally.” Marba and Milha Riba, the founders of the Gagyu Sect, wore white monk robes when practicing Buddhism , leading to the name White Sect. In the early years, the White Sect was divided into the Xangba Gagyu which declined in the 14th and to 15th centuries, and the Tabo Gagyu. The Tabo Gagyu was powerful and its branch sects were either in power in their respective localities or otherwise dominant amongst feudal forces.
Gelug Sect. The Gelug Sect, founded in 1409, was the most famous Buddhist sect in Tibetan history dating to the 15th century. The sect was founded during the reform of Tibetan Buddhism initiated by Zongkapa. Zongkapa himself was born at a time when the Pagmo Zhuba replaced the Sagya Regime in power. At that time, upper-class monks involved in political and economic power struggle led a decadent life, and rapidly lost popularity with society. Faced with this situation, Zongkapa called for efforts to follow Buddhist tenets. He proceeded to undertake lecture tours in many areas and wrote books accusing decadent monks of failing to abide by Buddhist tenets. Zongkapa spared no effort to press ahead with Buddhist reform. For example, in the first month of 1409 according to Tibetan calendar, Zongkapa initiated the Grand Summons Ceremony in Lhasa’s Jokhang Monastery. The ceremony remains in practice even today. This effort was closely followed by the construction of the famous Gandain Monastery and the founding of the Gelug Sect which was famous for its strict adherence to commandments. The Tibetan language meaning of Gelug is “commandments”. Zongkapa and his followers wore yellow hats, and thus the Gelug Sect is also known as the Yellow Sect. Since its founding, the Yellow Sect has built the Zhaibung, Sera, Tashilhungpo, Tar and Labrang monasteries, which join the Gandain Monastery as the six major monasteries of the Gelug Sect. The Yellow Sect is also known for formation of the two largest Living Buddha reincarnation systems – the Dalai and Bainqen systems.
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Throughout the history of mankind, people have been occupied with the pursuit of understanding their environment, themselves, and the nature of whatever reality may exist beyond. The answer to these questions has evolved into two great philosophies, which are usually designated by the geographical division of East and West. Western philosophy looks outward to external data, while Eastern philosophy turns inward to internal experience; one method is based primarily on dialectics and discursive deductive speculation, while the other is based on introspection and direct intuitive insight.
In this work Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, PhD, provides Western students with an easily understandable view of the seven schools of Eastern philosophy traditionally studied in India:
Each school of Eastern philosophical thought is explained in accord with the strict standards of tradition and scholarship, allowing Western readers to achieve a proper understanding of Eastern wisdom. See what the Eastern view on life’s deepest questions has to offer you. Purchase your copy of Seven Systems of Eastern Philosophy today.
About the Author
Pandit Rajmani Tigunait, PhD, is a modern-day master and living link to the unbroken Himalayan Tradition. He is the successor to Sri Swami Rama, Himalayan yogic master and the founder of the Himalayan Institute. As a leading voice of YogaInternational.com and the author of 15 books, Pandit Tigunait offers practical guidance on applying yogic and tantric wisdom to modern life. Over the past 35 years he has touched innumerable lives around the world as a teacher, humanitarian, and visionary spiritual leader. You can view more of his teaching on the Himalayan Institute Wisdom Library.
Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness
Author Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche Editor S. K. Hookham Translated by S. K. Hookham Edition 3 Publisher CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016 ISBN 153740900X, 9781537409009 Length 122 pages
Tathagatagarbha — Buddha Nature — is a central concept of Mahayana Buddhism crucial to all the living practice traditions of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. Its relationship to the concept of emptiness has been a subject of controversy for seven hundred years. Dr. Hookam’s work investigates the divergent interpretations of these concepts and the way the Tibetan tradition is resolving them.
In particular she does this with reference to the only surviving Indian commentary on the Tathagatagarbha doctrine, the Ratnagotravibhaga. This text addresses itself directly to the issue of how to relate the doctrine of emptiness (the illusory nature of the world) to that of the truly existing, changeless Absolute (the Buddha Nature).
This is the first work by a Western writer to present an analysis of the Shentong tradition based on previously untranslated sources. The Shentong view rests on meditative experience that is inaccessible to the conceptualizing mind. It is deeply rooted in the sutra tradition of Indian Buddhism and is central to an understanding of the Mahamudra and Dzogchen traditions and Tantric practice among Kagyupas and Hyingmapas.
Acknowledgments
Yogin Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso’s Spontaneous Verses on the Subject of Rangtong and Shentong
1: General Introduction
The Omniscient Dolpopa’s Prayer that Unties the Vajra Word Knots
Section One—The Issues
2: Introduction to the Rangtong-Shentong Distinction
2.1 The Origin and Significance of Buddhist Commentarial Traditions 2.2 The Rangtong/Shentong Distinction 2.3 The Meaning of Rangtong 2.4 The Meaning of Shentong 2.5 The Importance of the Rangtong-Shentong Distinction
3: Emptiness from the Shentong Point of View
3.1 Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness 3.2 The Final Stage—Shentong (Yogacara Madhyamaka) 3.3 No Shentong Without a Proper Understanding of Rangtong 3.4 Problems of Definitions of Terms
4: The Shentong View of Absolute Reality
4.1 Buddhajnana 4.2 Inseparable Qualities
i. Inseparable Qualities of the Dharmakaya ii. The Concept of Uncompoundedness iii. Inseparability and the Spontaneous Existence of the Buddha Qualities
4.3 Buddha Activity
5: Means of Apprehending Absolute Reality
5.1 Faith
i. Faith and Buddhajnana ii. Faith and Direct Experience iii. Direct Experience as Valid Cognition
5.2 Non-conceptuality (nisprapanca)
i. Nisprapanca as Awareness Experienced in Meditation ii. Nisprapanca as Freedom from Extremes iii. Nisprapanca as Non-conceptuality in the RGV [1.9] iv. Nisprapanca in the Tantras
5.3 The Two Realities and the Two Visions
i. Satya ii. Paramarthasatya iii. Samvrtisatya iv. Ultimate Reality is not Dependent Arising v. Own Nature and Other Nature (Svabhava and Parabhava ) vi. The Two Realities Inseparable vii. The Two Senses of Manifestation and Emptiness viii. The Importance of the Distinction ix. The Relationship Between the Two Realities x. The Two Visions—Precisely What Is and the Extent of What Is (Yathavadbhavikata and Yavadbhavikata )
6: The Nature of Beings
6.1 Base, Path and Fruit 6.2 Tathagatagarbha
i. The Shentong and Rangtong Approaches Compared ii. The Term “Tathagatagarbha”
6.3 Self 6.4 Gotra
i. The ‘Cut-off’ Gotra and the Three Yanas ii. Gotra as both Cause and Emptiness
7: The Third Dharmacakra: Neyartha or Nitartha
7.1 The Third Dharmacakra
i. The Three Dharmacakras ii. The Third Dharmacakra as Nitartha iii. Kongtrul’s Distinction Between the Two Kinds of Nitartha Sutra of the Third Dharmacakra iv. Dolpopa’s Analysis v. The Third Dharmacakra is Not Cittamatra
7.2 Neyartha and Nitartha
i. Rangtong Explanations of Neyartha and Nitartha ii. The Terms “Neyartha” and “Nitartha” iii. The Ratnagotravibhaga —Neyartha or Nitartha?
Section Two—Historical Background 8: The Shentong Tradition
8.1 The Jonangpas
i. The Jonangpa Lineage ii. Some Opponents and Supporters of Shentong iii. The Mountain Dharma—Ocean of Nitartha (Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, RC) iv. Comparison With Later Shentongpas v. The Essence of the Controversy vi. Shentong is Secret Oral Instruction
8.2 Sources of Shentong
i. The Tibetan Inheritance ii. Some of Dolpopa’s Indian Sources of Shentong iii. Other Views on the Indian Sources of Shentong iv. The Brhattika v. Nagarjuna’s Stotra and Karikas vi. How Shentong Relates to Later Developments of Buddhism in India vii. The Term “Great Madhyamaka” viii. Tantric Shentong
8.3 Kongtrul and the Rimay Tradition
i. Kongtrul ii. The Rimay Tradition
9: Traditions of Interpretation of the RGV and RGVV
9.1 Introduction to the Ratnagotravibhaga and Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya and Associated Traditions.
i. Authorship and Rediscovery ii. Maitreya iii. The Importance of the Maitreya-Asanga Connection iv. The RGV as a Synthesis of the Tathagatagarbha Sutras and the Prajnaparamita Sutras v. The Vyakhya (RGVV) vi. Transmission to Tibet
9.2 Matters Arising from the Introduction to Kongtrul’s Commentary on the RGV.
i. The Two Tibetan Transmission Lineages of the RGV ii. Questions Arising from Kongtrul’s Commentary iii. Other Commentators Not Mentioned in the Initial Praises iv. Gampopa and the Sutra and Tantra Mahamudra v. Rangjung Dorje and the Mahamudra-Dzogchen Synthesis
Section Three—A Shentong Interpretation of the RGV and RGVV and a Translation of Kongtru!’s Introduction to His RGV Commentary
10: A Shentong Interpretation of the RGV and RGVV—A Paraphrase With Comments
10.1 The Title and its Implications 10.2 General Introduction to the Seven Vajra Bases 10.3 Vajra Bases 1–3: The Three Jewels 10.4 Vajra Base 4: The Dhatu (Element)
Causes and Conditions for Purification The Four Paradoxes The Three Reasons The Element Arranged in Ten Points The Nine Examples The Essence of the Doctrine The Purpose of the Instruction
10.5 Vajra Base 5: Enlightenment 10.6 Vajra Base 6: Qualities 10.7 Vajra Base 7: Activity 10.8 The Benefits
11: Translation of the Introduction to Kongtrul’s RGV Commentary 12: Conclusion Appendix 1: Works by Western Scholars Appendix 2: Prakrtisunyata, Svabhavasunyata and Parabhavasunyata in Rangtong and Shentong Terms Appendix 3: Further Details on the Three Svabhava and the Three Kinds of Emptiness as Found in the SNS Appendix 4: The Sandhinirmocanasutra: Résumé Appendix 5: Some Points of Comparison Between Rangtong Commentators on RGV Appendix 6: The Five Dharmas of Maitreya Abbreviations Notes Conventions Used Glossary of Terms Bibliography Index
A BUDDHA WITHIN: THE TATHAGATAGARBHASUTRA
THE EARLIEST EXPOSITION OF THE BUDDHA-NATURE TEACHING IN INDIA
MICHAEL ZIMMERMANN
The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology
This book brings together perspectives of leading international Tibetan studies scholars on the subject of zhentong or “other-emptiness.” Defined as the emptiness of everything other than the continuous luminous awareness that is one’s own enlightened nature, this distinctive philosophical and contemplative presentation of emptiness is quite different from rangtong—emptiness that lacks independent existence, which has had a strong influence on the dissemination of Buddhist philosophy in the West. Important topics are addressed, including the history, literature, and philosophy of emptiness that have contributed to zhentong thinking in Tibet from the thirteenth century until today. The contributors examine a wide range of views on zhentong from each of the major orders of Tibetan Buddhism, highlighting the key Tibetan thinkers in the zhentong philosophical tradition. Also discussed are the early formulations of buddhanature, interpretations of cosmic time, polemical debates about emptiness in Tibet, the zhentong view of contemplation, and creative innovations of thought in Tibetan Buddhism. Highly accessible and informative, this book can be used as a scholarly resource as well as a textbook for teaching graduate and undergraduate courses on Buddhist philosophy.
Michael R. Sheehy is Director of Scholarship at the Contemplative Sciences Center and Research Assistant Professor in Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia. Klaus-Dieter Mathes is Professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, Austria. His books include A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Gö Lotsāwa’s Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga and A Fine Blend of Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka: Maitrīpa’s Collection of Texts on Non-conceptual Realization (Amanasikāra).
Acknowledgments
Introduction: The Philosophical Grounds and Literary History of Zhentong Klaus-Dieter Mathes and Michael R. Sheehy
*Bodhigarbha: Preliminary Notes on an Early Dzokchen Family of Buddha-Nature Concepts David Higgins
On the Inclusion of Chomden Rikpai Raldri in Transmission Lineages of Zhentong Tsering Wangchuk
The Dharma of the Perfect Eon: Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen’s Hermeneutics of Time and the Jonang Doxography of Zhentong Madhyamaka Michael R. Sheehy
Buddha-Nature in Garungpa Lhai Gyaltsen’s Lamp That Illuminates the Expanse of Reality and among Tibetan Intellectuals Dorje Nyingcha
Zhentong Views in the Karma Kagyu Order Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Buddha-Nature: “Natural Awareness Endowed with Buddha Qualities” as Expounded by Zhamar Kacho Wangpo Martina Draszczyk
“There Are No Dharmas Apart from the Dharma-Sphere”: Shakya Chokden’s Interpretation of the Dharma-Sphere Yaroslav Komarovski
Tāranātha’s Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning: Comparing the Views of the Two Zhentong Masters Dolpopa and Shakya Chokden Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Zhentong Traces in the Nyingma Tradition: Two Texts from Mindroling Matthew T. Kapstein
Zhentong as Yogācāra: Mipam’s Madhyamaka Synthesis Douglas Duckworth
Where Buddhas and Siddhas Meet: Mipam’s Yuganaddhavāda Philosophy Dorji Wangchuk
Along the Middle Path in the Quest for Wisdom: The Great Madhyamaka in Rime Discourses Marc-Henri Deroche
The Zhentong Lion Roars: Dzamtang Khenpo Lodro Drakpa and the Jonang Scholastic Renaissance Michael R. Sheehy
Translation from Tibetan by Brigitte Lause under guidance from Acharya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen. The section on Rangtong Madhyamaka was provided by Miguel Sawaya. Edited by blaze mason September 2021
काली तारा महाविद्या षोडशी भुवनेश्वरी। भैरवी छिन्नमस्ता च विद्या धूमावती तथा। बगला सिद्ध विद्या च मातंगी कमलात्मिका एता दशमहाविद्याः सिद्धविद्या प्रकीर्तिताः॥
Kali Tara Mahavidya Shorashi Bhuvaneshwari Bhairavi Chinnamasta cha Vidya Dhumavati Tatha Vagala Sidhdhavidya cha Matangi Kamalatmika Iti Das Mahavidya Sidhdhavidya Prakirtita
Source: Dus Mahavidyas
Key Terms
Kali Maa
Durga
Parvati
Parvati – Durga – Kali
8 – 16 – 64
Shiva – Rudra – Bhairav
10 – 18 – 64
Expansion of Series
Sun, Moon, and Earth
Series to Chamunda
Series to Kali
Kali Kul
Sri Kul
Dasa Avatars of Vishnu
Dasa Maha Vidyas
Aspects of Maa Kali
Bhadra Kali
Great Knowledge
Wisdom Goddesses
Terrible and Beautiful
Evolution of Soul
Evolution of Nature
Angry and Peaceful
Shakti
Shaktism
Tantra Science
Mothers
Dik Pals
Ten Directions
9 Planets
Sri Vidya
Ten Maha Vidyas
The 10 Mahavidyas are usually named in the following sequence:
Kali
Tara
Tripura Sundari
Bhuvaneshvari
Bhairavi
Chhinnamasta
Dhumavati
Bagalamukhi
Matangi
Kamala
Source: The Ten Great Cosmic Powers (Dasa Mahavidyas)
Chapter 1 Disciplines of Knowledge
He had studied the Vedas. Like all vaidiks of his time he took to priesthood and was eking out a living. Driven by poverty he approached someone to teach him a Mantra for getting rich quickly. Having got the Mantra, he took his seat in the front courtyard of his house and began practicing the repetition of the Mantra. Two hours would have passed and the Vaidik saw a beggar woman at attempt to drive her away as he did not want his japa to be interrupted by some words spoken in between. The beggar woman who was in tatters stooped down, patiently untied the knots of a bundle of rags, took out the small coins kept there and before the Vaidik knew what she was doing, threw the coins at his feet. The Vaidik naturally was taken aback and began to remonstrate. “Why, you have been asking for this for the past two hours” said she and went her way. The Vaidik stopped repeating his Mantra in sheer disgust and vowed that never again would he go after such pursuits.
This incident which happened years ago is quoted here for the flood of light it throws on certain basic principles of Tantra Shastra. Evidently, the man contacted with the help of the formula given to him an entity or a spirit, a low class of deity which caught hold of the human vehicle of the beggar woman and within two hours made her part with the pittance she had in favour of the man. The deity responded quickly, as being in the lower rungs of the cosmic ladder nearest to the earth-plane it was within easy reach of human beings; and its power was limited to grant only so much of money to the one who called for its assistance.
The Tantra recognizes the one Supreme Deity presiding over everything as the Highest, at the same time admitting the existence as the Highest, at the same time admitting the existence of various Gods and Goddesses. In the words of Sri Kapali Sastriar: “The sages of the Tantra do not see any inconsistency in the position, for they recognise that this creation is not a unitary system but a gradation of worlds spread over a rising tier of consciousness and planes and the various Gods and Goddesses are higher beings, powers and entities, deriving their authority from the Supreme to take their part and act or preside over their spheres of domain. There is a regular hierarchy of Gods some of whom are far above the highest heavens of human reach. But there are also Gods and Goddesses closer to the human level. They are more readily accessible to those who aspire to them and in some cases the seeker on the Tantric path looks to the aid and lead of these deities in his effort. They are endowed with capacities and powers beyond normal human possibility, but they are not all for that reason divine in nature. There are higher and lower classes of them, UCCA and ksudra devatas. Those that are nearest to the earthplane, swarming in the vital world overtopping the physical, are usually of the latter type. They respond very readily to the approaches of those who seek their help but they do so mainly for their own purpose, namely, to get hold of the particular human vehicle and convert it into a centre for their activity on the earth. They may and do answer the call of the seeker in the beginning but in the end they let him down, rather roughly, once their purpose is fulfilled. The seeker is misled; his inner progress comes to a standstill if it does not end in disaster. The Kshudra Devatas mislead the seeker with petty glamorous gifts, induce a false sense of progress and siddhi, prevent the dawn of real jnana which would expose their whole game and succeed in enslaving the man for their purpose at the cost of his soul which is betrayed into misadventure”.
Bu there are also entities of a higher order, benevolent deities, Uccha Devatas and as they occupy higher levels, the seeker has to make an effort to ascent to them. But they take the seeker on the path steadily and safely and ultimately do him the utmost good. There are still higher deities with cosmic functionings nearer to the Supreme Cosmic Godhead who presides over the myriad worlds that are created. Then at the top of this pyramidal structure of the cosmos spreading over an ascending tier of consciousness, at the summit of the innumerable levels and planes of existence there are certain cardinal Godheads, so many facets of the One truth, the Supreme Deity that correspond to the Brahman of the Upanishads. The spiritual disciplines leading to such cardinal Deities are known as Brahma Vidyas. These are also popular as Maha Vidyas, the great paths of discipline or Siddha Vidyas, the lines of quest where fulfillment is assured.
The Sanskrit word vidya is formed from the root vid to know or to understand. Vidya means learning or knowledge and also denotes the way to understanding, the path of knowledge, the Teaching. The mystics, all over the world, in their quest for the highest knowledge followed certain paths, undertook certain disciplines which were kept secret and were revealed only in the esoteric hierarchy of master and disciple. In India, the Upanishads, the repository of ancient wisdom and secret knowledge, mention in the body of their texts certain Vidyas, disciplines of knowledge. It has to be remembered that the Upanishads are not merely texts outlining the philosophical speculations of our ancient seers, as popularly held, but also manuals of Sadhana, practical guide-books on spiritual quest. These are the records of jottings of the reaching the ancient seekers had from their masters, an aid-memoire to remember the direct realizations they had in pursuing various disciplines of knowledge in their Sadhana. Likewise in the Tantra which is acclaimed as the great Sadhana Shastra, a practical manual, we find the great disciplines of knowledge, Maha Vidyas, occupying an important place. Especially where the Supreme is adored as the Great Primordial Goddess, the Tantra classifies the disciplines leading to the cardinal Deities as dasa maha vidyas, the ten great paths of knowledge. These cardinal deities are the ten outstanding personalities of the Divine Mother. Their great names are: Kali, Tara, Tripurasundari, Bhuvaneshwari, Tripura Bhairavi, Chinnamasta, Dhumavati, Bahalamukhi, Matangi and Kamalatmika.
What may be the precise significance of classifying the Vidyas into ten will be a difficult question to answer. But we can indicate the following: The Supreme Mother is the Transcendent Absolute ineffable immutable. In the act of creation, she subjects herself to time and space. Though the space is actually one vast stretch, for our grasp and understanding, we demarcate the indivisible and infinite Space into ten directions, east, west, south, north, south-east, south-west, north-east, north-west, above and below. Similarly the one infinite Mother is delineated as ten outstanding personalities. Again, knowledge is one and the consciousness is one and the same everywhere. But it is grasped and understood in ten different ways by the ten senses, skin, eye, ear, tongue, nose, mouth, foot, hand, anus and genital. Likewise, the one Truth is sensed in its ten different facets; the Divine Mother is adored and approached as the ten cosmic Personalities, Dasa Maha Vidyas. Each of these ten great Vidyas is a Brahma Vidya. The Sadhaka of any one of these Vidyas attains ultimately, if his aspiration is such, the supreme purpose of life, parama purusartha viz, self-realisation and God-realisation, realizing the Goddess as not different from one’s self. All these Vidyas are benevolent deities of the highest order and so do the utmost good to the seeker of the Vidya. For anyone who takes to any of these ten Vidyas, the Sadhana proceeds on sound lines and is safe and sure. It is not necessary at the beginning for the aspirant to have as his goal the highest aim of life. His aim most probably is the fulfillment of his immediate wants and for that he approaches the Deity. Once an aspirant takes to the Deity, the Deity takes upon itself the Sadhana. This is the characteristic of these Maha Vidyas. Whatever the seeker desires the Divine Mother fulfils it. In the process his devotion to the Deity becomes stronger and stronger and he learns to look upon the Deity for even the most trivial things in life, seeks its guidance at every step and knows to wait on its grace. There starts a living concourse, a concrete intimacy between the devotee and the Deity which is so absorbing and so enthralling that all desires, all aims of the devotee with which he started the Sadhana pale into significance. The whole perspective becomes different and there comes about a change in the attitude of the Sadhaka to life and things. There come about visible signs of communion, concrete evidences of contact, irresistible proofs of the Presence and the unmistakable touches of the Divine’s gracious hand in every happening and in every circumstance. What were at one time miracles become now common-place things and the whole life becomes a happy hastening towards the Supreme Goal.
Thus nothing short of Self-Realisation, atma saksatkara is the goal of the Vidyas. Of course much depends on the seeker and on his active participation, But even if the seeker stops in the middle of the path, he does not come to any harm. Only his progress is delayed. In the Sadhana there are many pitfalls. The baser emotions may hold sway or the ego may interfere at each stage. Once an aspirant has taken to any of these ten Vidyas, he has to succeed ultimately. He may fail in the present birth. The Vidya will make him take the thread of the Sadhana in the next birth and will continue to give the necessary push to the soul of the aspirant on its onward march. Even one step forward in the path of these Vidyas goes a long way towards the Goal. Nothing goes in vain. In fact, the Tantra categorically declares that only those who have been sufficiently prepared in the previous births can approach the precincts of these Vidyas. For them alone are these well-proven carefully laid-out paths. They are the chosen ones, the men with a mission, the indefatigable toilers on the uphill path of these disciplines of knowledge.
Because all these Vidyas lead to the ultimate Reality, it does not mean that they are all one and the same. Each Vidya is distinct and distinguishable from the Other. Each is a particular Cosmic function and each leads to a special realization of the One Reality. The might of Kali, the sound-force of Tara, the beauty and bliss of Sundari, the vast vision of Bhuvaneshwari, the effulgent charm of Bhairavi, the striking force of Chinnamasta, the silent inertness of Dhumavati, the paralysing power of Bagalamukhi, the expressive play of Matangi and the concord and harmony of Kamalatmika are the various characteristics, the distinct manifestations of the Supreme Consciousness that has made this creation possible. The Tantra says that the Supreme can be realised at these various points. According to one’s ability and aptitude, one realises the great Goddess, becomes identified with her in her might, in her striking force, in her paralysing power or in her beauty and bliss, in her concord and harmony. If one wants to bathe in a river, one cannot bathe in the whole river; one has to bathe at a spot. Similarly if an aspirant wants to reach the Divine, circumscribed as he is by his receptivity and capacity, he chooses one particular path, takes up for adoration one aspect of the Divine. As his pursuit is exclusive, his progress is quick and his approach becomes direct. Ultimately he attains a perfect identification with the Divine.
But it is not the intention of the Tantra to limit the capacity of the individual to a particular realisation however perfect it may be. It is true that there are ten Maha Vidyas directly leading to the Supreme Truth, ten chalked out paths, safe and sure to have an immediate and direct approach. For instance if one takes to the Sadhana of the Maha Vidya, Chinnamasta, ultimately one attains a perfect identification with the Supreme. All the same it is a partial identification for Chinnamasta is one facet of the many-faceted Supreme. Not a particular realisation, but a global realisation is required to attain the Total Divine. Pursuing our analogy of bathing in a river, if one wants to have conception of the ebb and flow, the eddies and currents of a river one has to bathe at various spots in the river. This is exactly what one does when one takes a holy bath in a sacred place. For instance, in Kashi, baths in so many bathing ghats are prescribed in order that the bather may have a full realisation of the grandeur of the Divine Ganges. Similarly in these ten great disciplines of knowledge, the seeker can aspire for an integral knowledge and he may, depending on his capacity, come nearer the Total Divine, by having as many realisations as he can.
In fact, the Tantra which is justly famous as a science of synthesis holds that one Maha Vidya leads its Sadhaka to another depending on the need and aspiration of the Sadhaka. The worshipper of Kali has a unique realisation of the Divine, the Terrible. At the same time, the realisation of the Divine, the Auspiscious is available to him if he understands the concept of bhadra kali. Then he goes on to appreciate the correspondence between the other two Vidyas, Tripurasundari and Tripurabhairavi, Tripura the beautiful and Tripura the terrific. In the Sundari Vidya itself worship is prescribed for Mantrini and Dandanatha, the attendants of Lalita Tripurasundari. Mantrini is Syamala or Matangi and Dandanatha corresponds to Bagalamukhi.
Thus the Vidya of Tripurasundari brings to the aspirant the realisations pertaining to the Vidyas of Matangi and Bagalamukhi.
Here a word of caution is necessary. When it is said that the Vidyas of Matangi and Bagalamukhi are implied in the Vidya of Sundari, the human mind immediately jumps to the conclusion that the Vidya of Sundari is superior to the other two Vidyas. The mind of man subject to the limitations of time and space can understand anything only in relation to time and space. Any new knowledge is immediately related to the old, classified and docketed as anterior or posterior, higher or lower. We reiterate that each of the ten Vidyas leads the seeker to the Supreme Reality. Each is great in its own right and each is equal in all respects to each of the other nine Vidyas. The practices of certain disciplines are widely prevalent, others are less known. For that matter they are not less important.
Again, an integral realisation is possible in these Vidyas because though they are distince and unique, they have among themselves many characteristics in common. Kali, Chinnamasta, Dhumavati and Bagalamukhi have the common characteristics of Power and Force, active or dormant. Sundari Bhuvaneshwari, Bhairavi, Matangi and Kamalatmika share the qualities of Light, Delight and Beauty. Tara has certain characteristics of Kali and certain others of Sundari and is correlated to Bhairavi, Bagalamukhi and Matangi in the aspect of Sound-Force expressed or impeded. Thus the ten Maha Vidyas fall into three broad divisions of discipline. The Veda lauds three Goddesses, producers of delight, tisro devir mayobhuvah. The Upanishads mention the One unborn, red, white and dark ajam ekam lohita sukla krsnam. The Tantras speak of Kali, the dark, Tara the white and Sundari the red.
In this ancient land, for ages the worship of these great mighty Personalities of the Mother has been prevalent. The other Vidyas have been practised but they have not come into the lime light. In the southern part of India the Vidya of Sundari, Sri Vidya, has been much in vogue. In the far north and north-west, in Tibet and in Kashmir adoration of Tara is popular. In the north-east parts of the country, especially in Bengal, the cult of Kali is famous. Thus the whole of India is full of adoration for the Divine Mother and the spirit of India has been eternally sustained by the Force Supreme, para sakti. The might of Kali, the wisdom of Tara and the beauty of Sundari have forged and fashioned this ancient race where the first man, the offspring of manu, the thinker, dared to peer with his earthly eyes into the portals of the Beyond.
We shall now take up for the study the respective Vidyas.
You wont find any puranic lore for the relation between these Vidyas and Avatharas but the logic of putting the Dasamahavidya with the Dasavataram is related thru perception and thru the Tanric interpretation. If watched carefully one can find the theory of evolution in the Dasaavathara. The same way the Dasamahavidyas represent the evolution of the Soul.
The First Avatara in an 100% aquatic fish and the Last is the Man of Purnathvam(complete) – Kalki. – from a fish to a complete man..
Similarly as Nirguna Swaroopi, she is Kali of Darness; As Saguna roopi she is Sundari of ultimate Gnana(wisdom)
A sloka from Lalita Sahasranama says “karanguli nakhotpanna Narayana dasa kritih” that from the nails of the ten fingers of the Devi emerged the ten manifestations of Narayana as Dasavataram.
The ten manifestations of devi as Kali, Tara, Tripurasundari, Bhairavi, Bhagalamuki, CHinnamasta, Doomavati, Kamala, Bhuvaneswari and Matangi embody a whole range of attitudes gracious and awesome, benign and destructive. The same force called “Shakti” is the motivational force for the ten incarnations of Vishnu.
She is Vishnu and He is Devi; There is no difference between them.
These comparisons only mean that Amba’s being non-different from Narayana and need not be taken literally.
Todala Tantra equates Vishnu‟s ten incarnations with the ten Mahavidyas as follows: “Shri Devi said: Lord of Gods, Guru of the universe, tell me of the ten avatars. Now I want to hear of this, tell me of their true nature. Paramesvara, reveal to me which avatar goes with which Devi. “Shri Shiva said: Tara Devi is the blue form, Bagala is the tortoise incarnation, Dhumavati is the boar, Chinnamasta is Nrisimha, Bhuvaneshvari is Vamana, Matangi is the Rama form, Tripura is Jamadagni, Bhairavi is Balabhadra, Mahalakshmi is Buddha, and Durga is the Kalki form. BhagavatÌ Kali is the Krishna murti.” (Todalatantra 10)
The worship of these is also prescribed as an astrological remedy – for the 9 planets and the Lagna as follows: Kali for Saturn, Tara for Jupiter, Maha Tripura Sundari (or Shodasi-Sri Vidya) for Mercury, Bhuvaneshvari for Moon, Chinnamasta for Rahu, Bhairavi for Lagna, Dhumavati for Ketu, Bagalamukhi for Mars, Matangi for Sun, and Kamala for Venus.
) on bimba (
) and pratibimba (
) in His Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana–sūtra.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū), 59: 1272– 1280.
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Viewpoints which Matter 
