Layers of Subjectivity

Layers of Subjectivity

Key Terms

  • Subjectivity
  • Intersubjectivity
  • I – Consciousness
  • Layers of Subjectivity
  • Symbolic Interactionism
  • Phenomenology
  • Transcendental Phenomenology
  • Social Phenomenology
  • Individual and Collective Intentionality
  • Consciousness
  • Meaning
  • Subjectivity as Process
  • We-Subjectivity
  • Relational Phenomenology
  • Phenomenological Sociology
  • Relational Consciousness
  • Phenomenal Consciousness
  • Transcendental Consciousness
  • Panch Kosha Theory
  • Seven Chakras
  • Tri Loka
  • 14 Bhuvan
  • Tri Kala
  • Subject as Freedom
  • Layers of Consciousness
  • Transcendental Subjectivity
  • Contents of Consciousness

Researchers

  • Daya Krishna
  • K C Bhattacharyya
  • Balslev, Anindita Niyogi
  • P.R. Costello
  • Rorty, AmÉlie Oksenberg
  • Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814)
  • Merleau-Ponty
  • Husserl
  • Elise Coquereau-Saouma
  • Jay Garfield
  • Nalini Bhushan
  • I. Kant
  • Ken Wilber

Layers of Subjectivity

( Source: Subject as Freedom/KC Bhattacharyya)

  • Bodily Subjectivity
  • Psychic Subjectivity
  • Spiritual Subjectivity

On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Source: On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

Source: Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge

My Related Posts

You can search for these posts using Search Posts feature in the right sidebar.

  • The Concept of the Absolute and Its Alternative Forms
  • Brahman: Absolute Consciousness in Advait (Non Dual) Vedanta Philosophy
  • Transcendental Self in Kant and Shankara
  • Ether in Kant and Akasa in Prasastapada: Philosophy in comparative perspective
  • God, Space and Nature
  • Purush – The Cosmic Man
  • The Transcendental Self
  • Truth, Beauty, and Goodness
  • Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber
  • The Aesthetics of Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Third and Higher Order Cybernetics
  • The Good, the True, and the Beautiful 
  • Cyber-Semiotics: Why Information is not enough
  • Meta Integral Theories: Integral Theory, Critical Realism, and Complex Thought 
  • From Individual to Collective Intentionality
  • Individual Self, Relational Self, and Collective Self
  • Individual, Relational, and Collective Reflexivity
  • Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism
  • Self and Other: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity
  • Semiotics and Systems
  • Process Physics, Process Philosophy
  • Intersubjectivity in Buddhism
  • Lifeworld, System, and Intersubjectivity: Jurgen Habermas’ Communication Theory of Society
  • Levels of Human Psychological Development in Integral Spiral Dynamics
  • Phenomenological Sociology
  • Charles Sanders Peirce’s Continuum
  • The Great Chain of Being
  • On Holons and Holarchy
  • Networks and Hierarchies
  • Boundaries and Networks
  • Boundaries and Relational Sociology

Key Sources of Research

‘Chapter Five On the Meaning of the Word ‘I’ and the Layers of Subjectivity’, 

Balslev, Anindita Niyogi, 

Aham: I: The Enigma of I-consciousness (Delhi, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 26 Sept. 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198089513.003.0006, accessed 5 May 2024.

https://academic.oup.com/book/7657/chapter-abstract/152697489?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Abstract

This chapter shows the kind of difficulties philosophers face while ascertaining the meaning and the referent of the word ‘I’. While a general overview is presented of the linguistic analysis of the word ‘I’ both from Indian and Western philosophical sources, focus is made on the view of K.C. Bhattacharya, on his remarkable analysis of the various layers of subjectivity while he explores the meaning of the pronoun in first person singular number.

Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)

‘The Vanishing Subject: The Many Faces of Subjectivity’, 

Rorty, AmÉlie Oksenberg, 

in Joao Biehl, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman (eds), Subjectivity: Ethnographic Investigations (Oakland, CA, 2007; online edn, California Scholarship Online, 24 May 2012), https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520247925.003.0002, accessed 5 May 2024.

https://academic.oup.com/california-scholarship-online/book/13179/chapter-abstract/166465308?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Layers in Husserl’s phenomenology: On meaning and intersubjectivity

January 2012
Authors:
P.R. Costello

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303758304_Layers_in_Husserl’s_phenomenology_On_meaning_and_intersubjectivity

Subjectivity

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/psychology/subjectivity

Edmund Husserl on Our Layers of Consciousness

How we interact with the objective world is a deeply subjective individual experience

Douglas Giles, PhD

Subjectivity Viewed as a Process.

Mensch, James (2021).

Research in Phenomenology 51 (3):325-350.

https://brill.com/view/journals/rip/51/3/article-p325_1.xml?language=en

Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity

By Thomas Metzinger

 Aham: I: The Enigma of I-consciousness 

Balslev, Anindita Niyogi,

(Delhi, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 26 Sept. 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198089513.001.0001, accessed 17 Apr. 2024.

The subjectivity of self and its ontology: From the world–brain relation to the point of view in the world

Georg Northoff and David Smith

Theory & Psychology 2023 33:4, 485-514

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09593543221080120

Layers In Husserl’s Phenomenology: On Meaning and Intersubjectivity.

Costello, Peter R..

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442661097

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.3138/9781442661097/html#Chicago

“We-Subjectivity”:
Husserl on Community and Communal Constitution

Ronald McIntyre / California State University, Northridge

From Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl, ed. by Christel Fricke and Dagfinn Føllesdal, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2012, pp. 61-92.

SENSE, NONSENSE, and SUBJECTIVITY

MARKUS GABRIEL

Culture, tools, and subjectivity: The (re)construction of self.

Haste, H. (2014).

In T. Magioglou, Culture and political psychology: A societal perspective (pp. 27–48). IAP Information Age Publishing.

Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity

Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
1990
Online ISBN:
9780511624827
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511624827

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fichtes-theory-of-subjectivity/BECDE485884B4241416FB7918C793686#fndtn-information

This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte’s notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant’s accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argued that the subject has a self-positing structure which distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an activity rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhouser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self’s autonomy, or self-determination.

Intersubjectivity

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity

Self models

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Self_models

Husserl: Intersubjectivity

https://philpapers.org/browse/husserl-intersubjectivity

The Identities of Persons (Topics in Philosophy) (Volume 3)

by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty

  • University of California Press (November 15, 1976)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Paperback ‏ : ‎ 340 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9780520033092
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0520033092

Merleau-Ponty: The Self as Embodied Subjectivity

Consciousness, Higher-Order Theories of,

Brown, Richard.

2019, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V051-1.

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,

https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/consciousness-higher-order-theories-of/v-1.

Article Summary

Higher-order theories are theories of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the property of there being something that it is like for one to have an experience. Something that it is like from the point of view of the organism. According to the higher-order approach, an organism is phenomenally conscious just in case it has an appropriate kind of inner awareness of itself as being in some mental state or other. So, when one consciously believes that Kentucky is south New York one is aware of oneself as believing that Kentucky is south of New York. Similarly, when one consciously sees red, or experiences fear, one is aware of oneself as seeing red or being afraid.

The relevant kind of inner awareness is what distinguishes the various kinds of higher-order theories. One might think that the right kind of inner awareness would be a kind of inner perception. Yet contemporary psychology and neuroscience do not seem to support the idea of a kind of inner sense. We do, in addition, become aware of things by thinking about them as being present. This has inspired the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, which was first explicitly developed in the 1990s.

There are many different kinds of higher-order thought theories. One version, the Relational Model, claims that the first-order state is transformed into a phenomenally conscious state when one becomes aware of that very state via having a higher-order thought. In addition, there are Joint-Determination Models which hold that the higher-order content and first-order content are part of the same mental state. These come in at least two varieties: the Same-Order Model and the Split-Level Model. These are distinguished by how they respond to worries about misrepresentation. In addition, there are Non-relational models which hold that the relevant higher-order state determines what it is like for one to have a conscious experience. Finally, there are non-standard higher-order theories that appeal to acquaintance or mental quotation.

Levels of Consciousness

https://www.barrettacademy.com/levels-of-consciousness

The Problem of Meaning and K.C. Bhattacharyya.pdf

Sharma, K. (1981).

Indian Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):457.

Original Description: 

This document discusses K.C. Bhattacharyya’s views on the problem of meaning and how they compare to analytical philosophers like Strawson and Russell. It summarizes that for Bhattacharyya, the subject cannot be meant by words like “I” as it has no objective content and varies between speakers, while objects are meant entities referred to by general terms. Strawson argues expressions only have reference in context of utterance, with “I” uniquely referring to the speaker, but for Bhattacharyya “I” expresses rather than refers to the subject. Overall, the document examines Bhattacharyya and analytical philosophers’ differing views on reference and meaning regarding subjective and objective contents.

Self and Subjectivity in Colonial India: AC Mukerji and KC Bhattcharyya

Nalini Bhushan and Jay L Garfield

Solving Kant’s Problem: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Self-Knowledge*

Jay L. Garfield

CONCEPT OF ‘SUBJECT AS FREEDOM’ IN K.C. BHATTACHARYA’S PHILOSOPHY

International Res Jour Managt Socio Human

2019, isara solutions

https://doi.org/10.32804/IRJMSH

https://www.academia.edu/43344947/CONCEPT_OF_SUBJECT_AS_FREEDOM_IN_K_C_BHATTACHARYA_S_PHILOSOPHY

The Concept of Freedom and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya *

D.P. Chattopadhyaya
Book
The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy
Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2023
Imprint Routledge
Pages 26
eBook ISBN 9781003153320

https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003153320-18/concept-freedom-krishna-chandra-bhattacharyya-chattopadhyaya

ABSTRACT 

D.P. Chattopadhyaya’s (DPC’s) chapter aims to cover the concept of freedom in K.C. Bhattacharyya (KCB). “Unlike most of the contemporary approaches to freedom”, DPC suggests, “KCB’s approach is not mainly social, ethical or aesthetic. … His concept of freedom is basically ontological or metaphysical. Its dimensions range from the physical via the somatological and the psychological to the psychical and the spiritual. … [H]e describes the disclosive process of freedom in the world, in our relation to the world of objects, within the contexts of psychological and psychical subjectivity, and beyond them”. DPC identifies a conversation in KCB’s writings between three approaches or systems of freedom: the Vedāntic, Kantian and phenomenological approaches. He discusses these three trajectories and their amalgamation in KCB. DPC further depicts KCB’s phenomenological process of inwardization toward the subject as freedom. He touches on the role of the body in this process, and explains that “our body-feeling starts getting resolved into psychic feeling. This is a sort of anti-projective or regressive ‘withdrawal’ of consciousness within a deeper layer of itself. The feeling of detachment or disengagement from the object, in this case from the body, provides us the ‘first’ or an inarticulate taste of freedom”.

On Exploration of Subjectivity in Advaita Vedanta

Anindita N. Balslev, Aarhus Universitet

https://arcjournal.library.mcgill.ca/article/download/544/565

The Notion of Subjectivity: A Comparative study between Søren Kierkegaard and K.C. Bhattacharya

Papori Boruah

Guest Faculty Department of Philosophy Kumar Bhaskar Varma Sanskrit & Ancient Studies University, Nalbari, India

Online International Interdisciplinary Research Journal, {Bi-Monthly}, ISSN 2249-9598, Volume-08, Issue-02, Mar-Apr 2018 Issue

Click to access 38.pdf

FUNDAMENTALS OF K.C. BHATTACHARYYA’s Philosophy

BY: D.K. BHATTACHARYA

OVERVIEW
The Fundamentals of K.C. Bhattacharyya’s Philosophy is the only exhaustive exposition of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s seminal philosophical ideas. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, son of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, had the opportunity of a prolonged critical exposure to this unique tradition. This monograph deals with Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s epistemic and metaphysical line of thought from the definite to the indefinite, from the objective level to the higher levels of subjectivity, and from association to dissociation or freedom leading to an alternation between knowledge and freedom. Both definiteness and indefiniteness have been identified. The two, however, do not have a coordinate status. There is an alternation between them. One and the same situation could be alternatively understood as definite or as indefinite. This leads to Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s well-known philosophical position of “Alternative Standpoints”.
The indefinite has to be made definite through layers of transcendental knowledge. The absolute-as-transcendental-knowledge is related to the understanding of the absolute-as-transcendental-will. “The predatory outlook of the scientific intellect” has been referred to and insightful correctives have been offered. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s style of writing is commensurate with the rigour and subtlety of his philosophy. The uninitiated requires a roadmap. This need is amply fulfilled by the present work. The monograph focuses on epistemology and metaphysics.
The insights gained through this faithful commentary will help advanced readers to develop their own philosophical pursuits and the beginner will receive a good grounding.

CONTENTS
Editor’s Note
Preface
Introduction by Shefali Moitra

  1. The Definite and the Indefinite
  2. The Indefinite as Subjective
  3. Subjectivity as Freedom
  4. Truth Freedom and Value
    as Alternative Absolutes
    Index

Feeling for Freedom: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Rasa.

Lopes, Dominic McIver (2019).

British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (4):465-477.

“Second Persons and the Constitution of the First Person”

Garfield, Jay L.,

(2019). Philosophy: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA.
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/phi_facpubs/34

https://scholarworks.smith.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&&context=phi_facpubs&&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fscholar.google.com%252Fscholar%253Fstart%253D90%2526q%253DThe%252BProblem%252Bof%252BMeaning%252Band%252BK.C.%252BBhattacharyya%2526hl%253Den%2526as_sdt%253D0%252C47#search=%22Problem%20Meaning%20K.C.%20Bhattacharyya%22

“Vidyā and Avidyā: Simultaneous and Coterminous? — A Holographic Model to Illuminate the Advaita Debate.

Kaplan, Stephen.

” Philosophy East and West, vol. 57 no. 2, 2007, p. 178-203. Project MUSEhttps://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2007.0019.

https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/5/article/213605/pdf

Phenomenology of Consciousness in Ādi Śamkara and Edmund Husserl,

Surya Kanta Maharana (2009)

Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 9:1, 1-12, DOI: 10.1080/20797222.2009.11433987

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20797222.2009.11433987

Māyā and Mokṣa: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s Spiritual Philosophy as a Vedāntin Critique of Kant.” 

Bhushan, Nalini and Jay L. Garfield.

Philosophy East and West, vol. 74 no. 1, 2024, p. 3-25. Project MUSEhttps://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2024.a918467.

Abstract

Subject As Freedom (1930) is correctly regarded as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s magnum opus. But this text relies on a set of ideas and develops from a set of concerns that KCB develops more explicitly in essays written both before and after that text, which might be regarded as its intellectual bookends. These ideas are important and fascinating in their own right. They also illuminate KCB’s engagement with Kant and with the Vedānta tradition as well as his understanding of freedom itself, including its soteriological dimension. These two essays are” Sankara’s Doctrine of Māyā”(1930) and” The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance”(1936). We explore KCB’s conception of philosophy and its relation to spiritual practice through a close reading of these two essays.

Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta

By William M. Indich

reprint
Publisher Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1995
ISBN 8120812514, 9788120812512
Length 153 pages

On the nature of Consciousness Intentionality and Reflexivity with Special Reference to Vedanta and Phenomenology

M Chakraborty, A Nataraju – 2016

Science and Religion: East and West

edited by Yiftach Fehige

Between Abhinavagupta and Daya Krishna: Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya on the Problem of Other Minds 

ByNalini BhushanJay L. Garfield

BookThe Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy

Edition 1st Edition

First Published 2023

Imprint Routledge

Pages 11

eBook ISBN 9781003153320

The self and the structure of the personality: An overview of Sri Aurobindo’s topography of consciousness.

Cornelissen, M. (2018).

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 37 (1). http://dx.doi.org/
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2018.37.1.63

https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/ijts-transpersonalstudies/vol37/iss1/8/

A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Ken Wilber

Lincoln, Nebraska

The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1979, Vol. 11, No.1 

Process, Structure, and Form: An Evolutionary Transpersonal Psychology of Consciousness

Allan Combs

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

https://www.academia.edu/75545151/Process_Structure_and_Form_An_Evolutionary_Transpersonal_Psychology_of_Consciousness

The Aesthetics of Charles Sanders Peirce

The Aesthetics of Charles Sanders Peirce

Key Terms

  • Truth, Beauty, and Goodness
  • Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic
  • Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics
  • Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness
  • Monadic, Dyadic, Triadic
  • One, Two, Three
  • Values
  • Norms
  • Ideals
  • Axiology
  • Plato
  • Ken Wilber
  • Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Integral Theory
  • Cybersemiotics
  • Critical Realism
  • Winfried Nöth
  • Soren Brier
  • Summum Bonum
  • Transcendental Values
  • Agathotopia
  • Trichotomic
  • Tripartite
  • Tri-Loka
  • Tri-Guna
  • Tri-Murti
  • Tri-Dosha
  • Tri-Bhuvan
  • Tri-Kala
  • Tri-Veni
  • Sat Chit Anand
  • Satyam Shivam Sundaram
  • Theoretical Ethics
  • Practical Ethics
  • Ethical Reasoning
  • Pragmatism
  • Aesthetical Goodness
  • James Jakób Liszka 
  • Vincent G. Potter

Source: The Agathotopia of Charles Sanders Peirce

The term Agathotopia applied to the set of thoughts and to the semiotic doctrine of Peirce was the theme of the PUC/SP Philosophy doctorate thesis in 2008, in which occasion we defended this attribution to the vast, complex and original system that dialogs in a very particular format with systems previous to it: occidental Greeks (mainly Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics), and Medievals (specially Duns Scoto and the oriental Arab Avicenna), moderns (specially Descartes), and others closer to him in time and history of philosophy, such as the British Spencer, the Germans Kant, Schelling and Hegel, whether all of them because they also contemplated the cosmology and the anthropology in their phenomenological, epistemological and ontological principals, whether because they sought harmony or questioned the relationship between the universal and the individual, the ideal and the real, the general and the particular, the mind and matter, whether they deal with metaphysics, mathematics and logic and even, whether because they contemplated the Goodness — Beauty, Good and Real, the classical triadic relation found by Peirce in the Normative sciences and in the Summum Bonum (Bacha 1998 2003; Engel-Tiercelin 1993; Parker 2003; Pfeifer 1971; Santaella 2000; Silveira 2003/2007; Sini 2006)

Source: Theatre at the Birth of Semiotics: Charles Sanders Peirce, François Delsarte, and Steele Mackaye

Source: Theatre at the Birth of Semiotics: Charles Sanders Peirce, François Delsarte, and Steele Mackaye

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Value

Values as Norms in the Normative Sciences

The 19th-century philosophy of value emerged from economics, esthetics, and ethics (Rescher, 2017, pp. 8-9). Both Lotze and Hartmann developed their theories of value mainly in the domains of ethics and aesthetics.

For Peirce, aesthetics and ethics are only the first two of three philosophical sciences of values. The third is logic. The three constitute a triad of sciences that Peirce established within his general system of the sciences under the designation “normative sciences”. Peirce did not claim to be the inventor of the term but attributed it to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834): “The word normative was invented in the school of Schleiermacher. The majority of writers who make use of it tell us that there are three normative sciences, logic, esthetics, and ethics, the doctrines of the true, the beautiful, and the good, a triad of ideals which has been recognized since antiquity” (“Ultimate Goods”, CP 1.575, 1902). The broader framework of this triad is Peirce’s general classification of the branches of philosophy as follows:

Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena. Now Reality is an affair of Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation between Secondness and Firstness. (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.121)

Phenomenology is not concerned with norms or values since its “business is simply to draw up an inventory of appearances without going into any investigation of their truth” (“Why Study Logic”, CP 2.120, 1902). Metaphysics is not concerned with values either since it is “that branch of philosophy which inquires into what is real […] regardless of whether anybody thinks it is true or not” (“Reason’s Conscience”, NEM 4:192, 1904).

Normative science, by contrast, is concerned with value insofar as it is “the science of the approvable and unapprovable, or better the blameable and the unblameable”, Peirce wrote in 1905 (“Adirondack Summer School Lectures”, MS 1334: 36-37). Although formulations such as these suggest dualisms, Peirce argues that it is a “widely spread misconception” to believe that the aim of the normative sciences is to decide

what is good and what bad, logically, ethically, and esthetically; or what degree of goodness a given description of phenomenon attains. Were this the case, normative science would be, in a certain sense, mathematical, since it would deal entirely with a question of quantity. But I am strongly inclined to think that this view will not sustain critical examination. Logic classifies arguments, and in doing so recognizes different kinds of truth. In ethics, too, qualities of good are admitted by the great majority of moralists. As for esthetics, in that field qualitative differences appear to be so prominent that, abstracted from them, it is impossible to say that there is any appearance which is not esthetically good. (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.127, 1903)

Instead of dualisms, Peirce’s normative sciences study “the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”, CP 5.123, 1903). Ends are “the essential object of normative science” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”, CP 5.130, 1903). The ends differ in each of the three normative sciences. “Esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something”, a formulation which shows that logic meant semiotics (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.120-150, 1903).

Yet, dualisms cannot be entirely ignored in value judgments. However, whereas ends and ideals pertain to the category of thirdness, dualisms are a matter of secondness, the category of conflict and confrontation. Peirce solves this clash between his two phenomenological categories in the normative sciences by recognizing it as a phenomenon of secondness in thirdness. Opposites, such as good vs. bad, are phenomena of secondness, even though we encounter them in the domain of thirdness concerned with final causes. Dualisms are most apparent in ethics, “the study of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared to adopt” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.130, 1903). Logic is less concerned with dualisms. “Every [moral] pronouncement between Good and Bad certainly comes under Category the Second; and for that reason such pronouncement comes out in the voice of conscience with an absoluteness of duality which we do not find even in logic” (“Lectures on Pragmatism IV: The Reality of Thirdness”, CP 5.111, 1903; my emphasis).

In aesthetics, however, Peirce argues, dualisms and value judgments become altogether superfluous since “there is no such thing as positive esthetic badness; and since by goodness we chiefly in this discussion mean merely the absence of badness, or faultlessness, there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.131, 1903). Pure esthetics, as Peirce conceives it, is not a science concerned with values. As Peirce sees it, “There is no such thing as positive esthetic badness; and since by goodness we chiefly in this discussion mean merely the absence of badness, or faultlessness, there will be no such thing as esthetic goodness” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.132, 1903).

Thus, pure aesthetics can do without dualisms. It is a domain of pure thirdness without any secondness. “I venture to think that the esthetic state of mind is purest when perfectly naive without any critical pronouncement, and that the esthetic critic founds his judgments upon the result of throwing himself back into such a pure naive state—and the best critic is the man who has trained himself to do this the most perfectly” (“Lectures on Pragmatism IV: The Reality of Thirdness”, CP 5.111, 1903). Consequently, Peirce even has doubts whether pure esthetics, as he conceives it, should still count as a “normative” science at all. In addition to his doubts concerning the disappearance of value judgments in aesthetics, there are his doubts as to the applicability of the notion of “ends” in pure aesthetics, “because an end—the essential object of normative science—is germane to a voluntary act in a primary way in which it is germane to nothing else. For that reason I have some lingering doubt as to there being any true normative science of the beautiful” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”, CP 5.130, 1903).

Source: Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Value

Normative Judgments as Value Judgements Guided by the Ideal of the Summum Bonum

The sense in which the normative sciences deal with values is the sense in which their norms, according to Peirce, are ideals, guided neither by necessary laws nor by dualism, but by “norms, or rules which need not, but which ought, to be followed” (“Why Study Logic?” CP 2.156, 1902).

Ends, for Peirce, are final causes (Santaella, 1999), and philosophical final causes are ideals, which imply ultimate values. The norms of logic, according to Peirce, consist in “the control of thinking with a view to its conformity to a standard or ideal” (“Basis of Pragmatism”, CP 1.573, 1906). The norms of ethics have their “root in the nature of the human soul, whether as a decree of reason, or what constitutes man’s happiness, or in some other department of human nature” (“Why Study Logic?” CP 2.156, 1902). In aesthetics, the norm is the ultimate value of the ideal of a summum bonum [highest good as a goal]. “Within this principle is wrapped up the answer to the question, what being is, and what, therefore, its modes must be. It is absolutely impossible that the word ‘Being’ should bear any meaning whatever except with reference to the summum bonum” (“Partial Synopsis of a Proposed Work in Logic”, CP 2.116, 1902).

The values of the three normative sciences are interrelated in a way that the ultimate value of aesthetics, i.e., its summum bonum, is the supreme value of all. Since “esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason” (“A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic”, CP 1.191, 1903), its values of firstness are then, so to speak, passed on to the secondness of ethics and the thirdness of logic. “Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in determining the summum bonum. It is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for its principles” (ibid.).

The conception of an aesthetics that embodies an ultimate ideal that is also valid for ethics and logic is the distinctive mark of Peirce’s axiology. Ethics is founded on aesthetics insofar as self-controlled ethical conduct cannot find its justification in its moral judgements as such. It needs to find some ulterior justification for its values, and this ulterior value is the supreme one of the summum bonum. The reason why the values of logic are based on the ones of ethics are that “a logical reasoner is a reasoner who exercises great self-control in his intellectual operations; and therefore the logically good is simply a particular species of the morally good” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”, CP 5.130, 1903). In this way, logic, being based on ethics, which in turn is based on aesthetics, is also based on the ideals of the summum bonum.

An ultimate end of action deliberately adopted—that is to say, reasonably adopted— must be a state of things that reasonably recommends itself in itself aside from any ulterior consideration. It must be an admirable ideal, having the only kind of goodness that such an ideal can have; namely, esthetic goodness. From this point of view the morally good appears as a particular species of the esthetically good. (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”; CP 5.130, 1903)

Ultimately, the normative sciences are thus not only guided by three different kinds of value. At their root is only one, which is the supreme value for all. “The morally good will be the esthetically good specially determined by a peculiar superadded element; and the logically good will be the morally good specially determined by a special superadded element. […] In order to analyze the nature of the logically good, we must first gain clear apprehensions of the nature of the esthetically good and especially that of the morally good” (“Lecture on Pragmatism V: The Three Kinds of Goodness”, CP 5.131, 1903).

Source: The Origin and Growth of Peirce’s Ethics

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On Aesthetics

On Beauty

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Signs

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Key Sources of Research

Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Philip L. Campbell

Prepared by
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

SAND2011-5583 August 2011

The Origin and Growth of Peirce’s Ethics

A Categorical Analysis

Rachel Herdy

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], VI-2 | 2014, Online since 24 December 2014, connection on 23 September 2022. 

URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1060; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1060

https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1060

“The Aesthetics of Charles S. Peirce.” 

Smith, C. M.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31, no. 1 (1972): 21–29. https://doi.org/10.2307/429607.

Charles S. Peirce: On norms and ideals 

Potter, V. G. (1997). 

(2nd ed).

New York: Fordham University Press.

TRANSCENDENT ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF C.S. PEIRCE’S ARCHITECTONIC SYSTEM

PIOTR JANIK

University School of Philosophy and Education Ignatianum, Krakow, Poland

https://philarchive.org/archive/JANTAI-5

Aesthetic Experience in the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce 

Codruța Hainic

Department of Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

e-mail: codrutap4@gmail.com

AGATHOS, Volume 10, Issue 2 (19): 19-32

https://www.academia.edu/44612899/Aesthetic_Experience_in_the_Semiotics_of_Charles_S_Peirce

Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Value

Winfried Nöth

Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Brazil

Language and Semiotic Studies Vol. 7 No. 3 Autumn 2021

Click to access f613b082-3b13-42aa-827c-952694c94830.pdf

The ‘Summum Bonum’ in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce

David Elmer Pfeifer

Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1971)

The agathotopia of charles sanders Peirce

Maria Augusta Nogueira Machado Dib 

international center of Peirce studies [*]

Proceedings of the 10th World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS/AIS)

Universidade da Coruña (España / Spain), 2012.

ISBN: 978-84-9749-522-6 Pp. 1337-1348

Theatre at the Birth of Semiotics: Charles Sanders Peirce, François Delsarte, and Steele Mackaye

Iris Smith Fischer

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 49, No. 3 2013

https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/24750/Fischer_2013.pdf?sequence=1

The “Infinity” of the Transcendental Properties of God

Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences

(Routledge Studies in American Philosophy) 1st Edition 2021 

by  James Jakób Liszka 

ISBN-13: 978-0367746001

ISBN-10: 036774600X

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

EDITED BY

CHARLES HARTSHORNE AND
PAUL WEISS

VOLUME I PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY

CAMBRIDGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1931

Charles Sanders Peirce: Architectonic Philosophy

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Charles S. Peirce on Esthetics and Ethics A Bibliography

Kelly A. Parker

Department of Philosophy Grand Valley State University Allendale, Michigan 49401 USA email: parkerk@gvsu.edu

11 May 1999; PDF formatting and minor revisions 4 March 2002

Click to access CSP_norm_bib.pdf

Charles Sanders Peirce

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy SEP

First published Fri Jun 22, 2001; substantive revision Thu Feb 11, 2021

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/

Peirce’s Esthetics: A Taste for Signs in Art

Author(s): Martin Lefebvre
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 319-344

Published by: Indiana University Press

‘Charles Peirce on Ethics’

Liszka, James, 

 in Cornelis de Waal, and Krysztof Piotr Skowronski (eds), 

The Normative Thought of Charles S. Peirce,

American Philosophy (FUP) (New York, NY,  2012; online edn, Fordham Scholarship Online, 24 Jan. 2013), 

https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823242443.003.0003, 

accessed 24 Sept. 2022.

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The Normative Thought of Charles S. Peirce

de Waal, Cornelis, and Krysztof Piotr Skowronski (eds),

American Philosophy (FUP) (New York, NY, 2012; online edn, Fordham Scholarship Online, 24 Jan. 2013),

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Problems at the Intersection of Aesthetics and Ethics

Seth Vannatta (Morgan State University)

Response Journal, 2016

https://responsejournal.net/issue/2016-08/article/problems-intersection-aesthetics-and-ethics

Continuity and Inheritance: Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Work of C.S. Peirce

John Kaag

THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE EP2

Selected Philosophical Writings

VOLUME 2 (1893-1913)

THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE EP1

Selected Philosophical Writings
VOLUME 1
(1867-1893)
edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel
Indiana University Press

Peirce’s Conception of Metaphysics 

Joshua David Black

Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield

PhD Thesis, May 2017

Pragmatism

First published Sat Aug 16, 2008; substantive revision Tue Apr 6, 2021

SEP Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/

Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives 

Vincent G. Potter

Published: 1 January 1996

Online ISBN: 9780823284832

Print ISBN:  9780823216154

Publisher: Fordham University Press

https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823216154.001.0001

Peirce’s esthetics as a science of ideal ends

A estética de Peirce como uma ciência dos fins ideais

James J. Liszka

Senior Scholar – The Institute for Ethics in Public Life

State University of New York – College at Plattsburgh – USA

James.Liszka@plattsburgh.edu

Cognitio, São Paulo, v. 18, n. 2, p. 205-229, jul./dez. 2017

http://dx.doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i2p205-229