Lifeworld, System, and Intersubjectivity: Jurgen Habermas’ Communication Theory of Society

Lifeworld, System, and Intersubjectivity: Jurgen Habermas’ Communication Theory of Society

Key Terms

  • John Dewey
  • George Herbert Mead
  • Theory of communicative Action
  • Social Interaction
  • Symbolic Interactionism
  • Action theory
  • Lifeworld phenomenology
  • Hermeneutic analysis
  • Conversational analysis
  • Ethnomethodology
  • Social constructivism
  • Dialogism
  • Discourse theory
  • Recognition theory
  • Objects relations theory
  • Communication
  • Language
  • Dialogical Intersubjectivity
  • Lifeworld vs System
  • Jürgen Habermas
  • Social theory
  • System
  • Lifeworld
  • Communication theory of society
  • Niklas Luhmann
  • Political power
  • Civil society
  • Dialogs
  • Dialectics
  • Self Culture Nature
  • Self Ritual Reality
  • Culture, Society, and Personality
  • First Person, Second Person, Third Person
  • AQAL Model of Ken wilber’s Integral Theory

Source: Intersubjectivity/ encyclopedia.com

Intersubjectivity

In its most general sense of that which occurs between or exists among conscious human actors, intersubjectivity is little more than a synonym for “the social.” As used by social scientists, however, intersubjectivity usually denotes some set of relations, meanings, structures, practices, experiences, or phenomena evident in human life that cannot be reduced to or comprehended entirely in terms of either subjectivity (concerning psychological states of individual actors) or objectivity (concerning brute empirical facts about the objective world). In this sense, the concept is usually intended to overcome an unproductive oscillation between methodological subjectivism and objectivism. The concept is especially predominant in social theories and theories of the self.

Although German idealist philosophers Johann Fichte (1762–1814) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) stressed the importance of intersubjectivity, the concept became influential in the twentieth century through the work of American social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931). Mead claimed that the development of cognitive, moral, and emotional capacities in human individuals is only possible to the extent that they take part in symbolically mediated interactions with other persons. For Mead, then, ontogenesis is essentially and irreducibly intersubjective. He also put forward a social theory explaining how social norms, shared meanings, and systems of morality arise from and concretize the general structures of reciprocal perspective-taking required for symbolic interaction. In short, he argued that intersubjectivity—understood specifically in terms of linguistically mediated, reflexively grasped social action—furnishes the key to understanding mind, self, and society.

Although the work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Ludwig Wittgenstein(1889–1951) was often more directly inspirational, Mead’s bold claim that self and society are irreducibly intersubjective has been rearticulated and supported by many distinct subsequent inter-subjectivist approaches. Action theory, symbolic interactionism, lifeworld phenomenology, hermeneutic analysis, conversational analysis, ethnomethodology, social constructivism, dialogism, discourse theory, recognition theory, and objects relations theory all take inter-subjectivity as central and irreducible. For example, Erving Goffman(1922–1982) insisted that we need a microanalysis of face-to-face interactions in order to properly understand the interpersonal interpretation, negotiation, and improvisation that constitute a society’s interaction order. While macro-and mesostructural phenomena may be important in setting the basic terms of interaction, social order according to Goffman is inexplicable without central reference to agents’ interpretations and strategies in actively developing their own action performances in everyday, interpersonal contexts. Harold Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists likewise insist that social order is only possible because of the strongly normative character of a society’s particular everyday interaction patterns and norms.

Widely diverse social theorists influenced by phenomenology also center their analyses in intersubjective phenomena and structures. Most prominently, Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) sought to show how the lifeworld of persons—the mostly taken-for-granted knowledge, knowhow, competences, norms, and behavioral patterns that are shared throughout a society—delimits and makes possible individual action and interaction. In particular, he sought to analyze the way in which the constitutive structures of any lifeworld shape social meanings and personal experiences, by attending to the lifeworld’s spatiotemporal, intentional, semantic, and role typifying and systematizing dimensions. Other theories analyze different aspects of the lifeworld: how experience and knowledge is embodied (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), the intersubjective construction of both social and natural reality (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann), the social construction of mind and mental concepts (Jeff Coulter), and the social power and inequalities involved in symbolic capital (Pierre Bourdieu). Finally, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the linguistic basis of the lifeworld, constructing a theory of society in terms of the variety of types of communicative interaction, the pragmatic presuppositions of using language in order to achieve shared understandings and action coordinations with others, and the role of communicative interaction for integrating society. While acknowledging that some types of social integration function independently of communicative action—paradig-matically economic and bureaucratic systems—Habermas claims that intersubjective communication is fundamental in, and irreplaceable for, human social life.

Diverse prominent theories of the self are united in supporting Mead’s claim that the self is developed and structured intersubjectively. Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) distinction between the different interpersonal attitudes involved in the I-Thou stance and the I-It stance leads to the insight that the development and maintenance of an integral sense of personal identity is fundamentally bound up with the capacity to interact with others from a performative attitude, rather than an objectivating one. Mead’s claim is also developed in diverse theories of the self: Habermas’s account of interactive competence and rational accountability, Axel Honneth’s and Charles Taylor’s theories of interpersonal recognition and identity development, Daniel Stern’s elucidation of the interpersonal world of infants, and psychoanalytic object-relations theories stressing the dependence of the ego on affective interpersonal bonds between self and significant others.

SEE ALSO Bourdieu, Pierre; Goffman, Erving; Habermas, Jürgen; Mead, George Herbert; Other, The

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benjamin, Jessica. 1988. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination. New York: Pantheon.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Trans. R. Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Buber, Martin. 1958. I and Thou. 2nd ed. Trans. Ronald G. Smith. New York: Scribner.

Coulter, Jeff. 1989. Mind in Action. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Goffman, Erving. 1983. The Interaction Order. American Sociological Review48 (1): 1–17.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Vol. 1 of The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity. In Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Trans. William Mark Hohengarten, 149-204. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Trans. Joel Anderson. Cambridge, MA: Polity.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. The Child’s Relations with Others. In The Primacy of Perception, and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie, 96-155. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson. Vol. 1 of Collected Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. I. Schutz. Vol. 3 of Collected Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schutz, Alfred. 1962. Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen. Vol. 2 of Collected Papers. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Stern, Daniel N. 1985. The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology. New York: Basic Books.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Winnicott, Donald Woods. 1964. The Child, the Family, and the Outside World.Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin.

Christopher F. Zurn

Source: JÜRGEN HABERMAS / SEP

Habermas distinguishes the “system” as those predefined situations, or modes of coordination, in which the demands of communicative action are relaxed in this way, within legally specified limits. The prime examples of systemic coordination are markets and bureaucracies. In these systemically structured contexts, nonlinguistic media take up the slack in coordinating actions, which proceeds on the basis of money and institutional power—these media do the talking, as it were, thus relieving actors of the demands of strongly communicative action. The term “lifeworld,” by contrast, refers to domains of action in which consensual modes of action coordination predominate. In fact, the distinction between lifeworld and system is better understood as an analytic one that identifies different aspects of social interaction and cooperation (1991b). “Lifeworld” then refers to the background resources, contexts, and dimensions of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the basis of mutual understanding: shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional orders that stabilize patterns of action, and personality structures acquired in family, church, neighborhood, and school (TCA 1: chap. 6; 1998b, chap. 4). 

Habermas’s system-lifeworld distinction has been criticized from a number of perspectives. Some have argued that the distinction oversimplifies the interpenetrating dynamics of social institutions (e.g., McCarthy 1991, 152–80). Others attacked the distinction as covertly ideological, concealing forms of patriarchal and economic domination (e.g., Fraser 1985). Habermas’s attempt to clarify the analytic character of the distinction only goes partway toward answering these criticisms (1991b).

Source: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY. A SYSTEM – LIFEWORLD COMPATIBILITY OR INCOMPATIBILITY?

3.5. System and Lifeworld

An important subtitle of Habermas’s theory is the concept of “lifeworld”. He used this concept inspired by Husserl (Brand, 1973, p. 143), who first used it in his work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, and then by Schütz, who brought a new interpretation to the concept. For Husserl, the world of life is a space that exists before theory / science (Schutz, 1962, p.120), includes all entities, arranged in space-time dimensions, and and is the “soil” for all socail human experience (Husserl, 1970; Schutz, 1970, s. 116).

Habermas, on the other hand, thinks that the interactions between people in the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) do not take place in the consciousness of individuals (Husserl 1969: 12), but in a common space. The lifeworld (Habermas, 1971). According to him, one of the places where the negative effects of rationalization underlying modernity, such as cultural transformation, are seen most intensely is the lifeworld, which is an area of interpersonal interaction. Habermas, who attaches great importance to this sphere as the area where social rationalization takes place through language, argues that this area is occupied by the system and its subsystems such as power and money (Habermas, 1984d, Vol II: 318) and shows that this space is not rationalized sufficiently in a communicative sense (Habermas, 1984e Vol. II: 119, 173).

Husserl explains the reason behind his development of the concept of the “lifeworld” as an effort to find a solution to the separation of the objective- scientific field from the subjective lifeworld as the cause of an increasing crisis of meaning in the field of European science.

Habermas, on the other hand, states that he developed the concept of the “lifeworld” against the possible invasion of the private sphere, where agreement- oriented communicative action is carried out, from the system and its subsystems such as power and economy, which operate with reason for success. Because the system and its subsystems has the possibility to occupy private space in conflict situations that prevent his success (Habermas, 1984f II,: 318-331).

This means that, with the concepts of System and Life world, Habermas tries to explain how a two-level social structure can coexist. This effort is in fact the duality such as individual-society, subject-object, theory-practice, nomothetic-idiographic, natural sciences, social sciences and structure-subject, which both philosophy and sociology have worked on and tried to overcome. These oppositions appear, for example, as the opposition of science and social sciences in the Enlightenment, as the opposition of the nation-state, individual- society in the French revolution, and as the product of human development in the technological field in the industrial revolution, the opposition of the acting and transforming subject and the object connected to it.

The opposition Habermas tries to overcome or balance is the opposition of the system, which is the field of material production, and the life world, which is opposed to it and consists of the private and public sphere* where symbolic production is realized. Taking these two concepts together and explaining their contrasts will make the meaning of these concepts for communicative action theory more visible.

Habermas, in his two-strucrured social theory, explains the duality of symbolic and material reproduction of society through the “lifeworld” and “system” concepts.

“System and lifeworld are each evolutionarily and structurally differentiated social spheres, subsystems or even sovereign territories that are either systemically or socially integrated” (Habermas, 1981: 140).

For the structure of modern, differentiated societies, this means that the system and lifeworld exist in them as concretely separated systems of action and can be set in relation to one another (in the sense of: boundaries, primacy, superiority / subordination, mutual penetration interpenetration, mediatization, colonization.

The economy and the state administration are systemically integrated, formally organized sub-systems of purposeful rational action, which are driven by money and power as media of action release. They serve the material reproduction, disturbances of the same are to be understood as system crises or control crises. These systems are subject to the imperatives of increasing complexity. People have official roles and must seek certain goals, even if sometimes with ethical restraints.

The lifeworld on the other hand is the daily world that we share with others. This includes all facets of life, apart from organised or institution-driven ones. For example, family life, culture and informal social exchange. It is the sphere within which we lead much of our social and individual life (Habermas, 1984g, Vol. II: 126). It’s based on a implicit foundation of shared values and understandings. that give us the ability to perform actions that we know others will understand. Thus daily actions that we produce in the lifeworld are generally communicative in nature (Cooke, 1998).

If one follows the thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld, reifying effects only arise when systemically established obligations impose oneself into the lifeworld.

“It is not the uncoupling of media-steered subsystems and of their organizational forms from the lifeworld that leads to the one-sided rationalization or reification of everyday communicative practice, but only the penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality into areas of action that resist being converted over to the media of money and power because they are specialized in cultural transmission, social integration, and child rearing, and remain dependent on mutual understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action” (Habermas, 1984h, Vol. II: 330).

Habermas’s goal with the rationalization of the lifeworld and the system is the rationalization of both in their own unique way. On the one hand, the structures of the system should become more complex by differentiating, on the other hand, the lifeworld should provide an environment for free and independent communication and ensure that the best arguments are accepted as a result of consensus. According to Habermas, this is a formulation that will ensure that the life-world and the system balance each other and will have a positive effect on their development.

Source: The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

Source: The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

Source: The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

Source: The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

Source: The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

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Key Sources of Research

On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action.

Habermas, Jürgen (2002).

MIT Press.

Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: A Study of Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan, and Habermas,

Author Roger Frie
Edition illustrated
Publisher Rowman & Littlefield, 1997
ISBN 0847684164, 9780847684168

Jürgen Habermas

SEP

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/#:~:text=Habermas%27s%20theory%20of%20communicative%20action,on%20which%20social%20cooperation%20depends.

Intersubjectivity

encyclopedia.com

https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/intersubjectivity

“TOWARD A RHETORIC OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY: INTRODUCING JÜRGEN HABERMAS.” 

Grady, Hugh H., and Susan Wells.

Journal of Advanced Composition 6 (1985): 33–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20865585.

Theory of Communicative Action Vol. II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason 

Jurgen Habermas

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987)

“Individuation Through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity”

Jurgen Habermas

in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, tr. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

Mind, Self and Society 

George H Mead

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934),

Basic Concepts in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action’, 

Baxter, Hugh, 

Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Redwood City, CA, 2011; online edn, Stanford Scholarship Online, 20 June 2013), https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0002, accessed 29 Aug. 2023.

Abstract

In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative Action and later in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the basic conception of society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. In addition, Habermas argues that in the course of social evolution, systems of economic and political action arise whereby action is coordinated by the consequences of self-interested action, rather than consensual understanding. This chapter explores Habermas’s idea of such “systems” based on his reading of Talcott Parsons. It also examines how Habermas integrates the lifeworld and system concepts into his model of system/lifeworld interchange. It argues that the critical model developed by Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action is more functionalist than straightforwardly normative.

‘System, Lifeworld, and Habermas’s “Communication Theory of Society”’, 

Baxter, Hugh, 

Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Redwood City, CA, 2011; online edn, Stanford Scholarship Online, 20 June 2013), https://doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0005, accessed 29 Aug. 2023.

https://academic.oup.com/stanford-scholarship-online/book/21022/chapter-abstract/180572956?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Abstract

In his Theory of Communication Action, Jürgen Habermas talks about a “reconstructive social theory which employs a dual perspective”—the perspective of “system” and “lifeworld.” Habermas’s proposed theory “should explain how the reconstructed normative self-understanding of modern legal orders connects with the social reality of highly complex societies.” In developing the “communication theory of society” in which his “discourse theory of law” is to be situated, Habermas departs from his earlier understanding of the relation between system and lifeworld. This chapter explores Habermas’s concepts of system and lifeworld as well as his communication theory of society. It considers his “model of the circulation of political power”, which presents the idea of “civil society” as an elaboration of the lifeworld’s “private sphere.” It also discusses Habermas’s reference to the three “structural components” (culture, society, and personality) and argues that his notion of “system” and “lifeworld” is similar to the post-Parsons “autopoietic” systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Finally, the chapter rejects the concept of lifeworld as separate social sphere.

Intersubjectivity and critical consciousness: Remarks on Habermas’s theory of communicative action.

Wagner, Gerhard & Zipprian, Heinz (1991).

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):49 – 62.

https://philpapers.org/rec/WAGIAC

‘Intersubjectivity – interactionist or discursive? Reflections on Habermas’ critique of Brandom’,

Strydom, P. (2006)

Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32(2), pp. 155-172. doi: 10.1177/0191453706061090

https://cora.ucc.ie/server/api/core/bitstreams/a5f61f06-1bb3-433c-b610-e8a48a950016/content

‘Intersubjectivist Theory and Leadership’, 

Fryer, Mick, 

Ethics and Organizational Leadership: Developing a Normative Model (Oxford, 2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 May 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590186.003.0005, accessed 30 Aug. 2023.

https://academic.oup.com/book/5664/chapter-abstract/148717682?redirectedFrom=fulltext

This chapter describes Jürgen Habermas’ approach to intersubjectivism, presenting his theories of communicative action and discourse ethics as a response to his own earlier call for a form of rationality that is suited to critical social theory. Some implications that Habermas’ ideas hold for leadership are considered. A number of practical and conceptual challenges to Habermas’ conclusions, which have been offered by writers who broadly share his intersubjectivist commitment, are outlined. These challenges are used to augment the understanding of intersubjectivist leadership already presented. The chapter ends with some general reflections concerning moral philosophy and leadership, which have been garnered from the three chapters of Part II.

A Habermasian perspective on joint meaning making online : what does it offer and what are the difficulties?

Hammond, Michael. (2015)

International Journal of Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning, 10 (3). pp. 223-237.

Click to access WRAP_Habermas%20essay.pdf

Habermas, Critical Theory and Selves-Directed Learning.

O’Donnell, David,

Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 23, No. 4-5, pp. 251-261, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=818364

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=818364

An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject: Communicative versus subject-centered reason.

Habermas, J. (1992a).

In D. Ingram & J. Simon-Ingram (Eds.), Critical theory: The essential readings (pp. 273-281). New York, NY: Paragon House.

From Kant to Hegel and back again – The move towards detranscendentalization. 

Habermas, J (1999).

European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2): 129-157.

Individuation through socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s theory of subjectivity.

Habermas, J. (1992b).

In Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays (pp. 149-204). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

On the logic of the social science.

Habermas, J. (1988). 

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society.

Habermas, J. (1989). 

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

The theory of communicative action, vol. I: Reason and the rationalization of society.

Habermas, J. (1984). 

Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 

Kant, I. (2012/1785). 

New York: Cambridge University Press.

The Public and Its Problem: Dewey, Habermas, and Levinas

Guoping Zhao
Oklahoma State University

MEAD, HABERMAS, AND LEVINAS: CULTIVATING SUBJECTIVITY IN EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

Guoping Zhao Oklahoma State University

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN EDUCATION – 2014/Volume 45

Key Theories of Jürgen Habermas

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on March 5, 2018

Literary Theory and Criticism

Habermas, Jürgen (1929–)

William Outhwaite, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Communicative Action

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/communicative-action

The basic categories of Habermas’s theory are, then, those of a broadly conceived sociological theory of action, which, however, also incorporates social historical and system-theoretical, as well as structuralist elements. Although he borrows some concepts from Talcott Parsons (Holmwood, 2009) and often mentions Niklas Luhmann, his conception is closer to those of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens (Outhwaite, 2015).

What Habermas (1987b: 553) stresses is that system theories and theories of action ‘isolate and overgeneralize’ aspects of modernity (system and lifeworld, respectively). When, here and elsewhere, he emphasizes the role of language, he does not intend to reduce “social action to the interpretive accomplishments of participants in communication … assimilating action to speech, interaction to conversation” (Habermas, 1987a: 143). This is rather the way in which action is ‘coordinated.’

Intersubjectivity and interculturality: a conceptual link

Author: Xiaodong Dai
Date: Jan. 2010
From: China Media Research(Vol. 6, Issue 1)
Publisher: Edmondson Intercultural Enterprises

Intersubjectivity reflects the condition of all human existence and constitutes the basis of social communication. Interculturality opens up new social space and constitutes the largest and most productive platform for intercultural dialogue. This paper attempts to define intersubjectivity and interculturality, interpret their implications and analyze how they interact with each other. Intersubjectivity refers to the interpersonal connection between individuals who are attuned to one another and construct social relations. The polysemic nature of intersubjectivity suggests that it not only embodies mutuality and consensuses but also disagreements and tensions. In like manner, interculturality refers to the complex connection between cultures whose members negotiate to reach agreements and achieve reciprocal interactions. It implies commonalities and similarities as well as differences, contrasts and conflicts. Intersubjectivity and interculturality share a similar structure, but have different operational mechanisms. The key difference lies in their frames of reference. With more exposure to other culture/cultures, communicators can broaden their horizons, reduce cultural distance and further transform intersubjectivity into interculturality. In establishing interculturality, they need to be open to other cultures and transcend monocultural ways of thinking. Key words: intersubjectivity, transformation, interculturality

Communication as analytical unit in Luhmann and Habermas

Sergio Pignuoli-Ocampo1

1Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas y Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. (CONICET-UBA-IIGG). spignuoli@conicet.gov.ar

Convergencia vol.24 no.73 Toluca ene./abr. 2017

Reconstructive Social Theory: Habermas, Bhaskar, and Caillé

  • 16th November 2016

This is a guest blog post by Professor Frederic Vandenberghe of Sociology in the Institute of Social and Political Studies at the State University of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. Frederic is a leading expert in the field of Critical Realism. He has been working on CR and the social sciences since 1994 when he completed his doctorate in Sociology from Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales. His work operates at the intersection of philosophy and sociology with a special interest in hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical realism. He recently published a series of essays in a book titled, “What’s Critical about Critical Realism? Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory”.  

This is Part 1 of 4 in a blog post series by Professor Frederic Vandenberghe on Reconstructive Sociology.

Critical Realism Network

Intersubjectivity and contemporary social theory: the everyday as critique.

Feather, H. (2000).

(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)

A Hybrid Human-Neurorobotics Approach to Primary Intersubjectivity via Active Inference. 

Chame HF, Ahmadi A and Tani J (2020)

Front. Psychol.11:584869. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.584869

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.584869/full

The Confluence of Intersubjectivity and Dialogue in Postmodern Organizational Workgroups

Shuster, D. J. (2006).

(Thesis, Concordia University, St. Paul). Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.csp.edu/cbt_graduate/1

Intersubjectivity: The fabric of social becoming. 

Crossley, N. (1996). 

London: Sage.

The roots of empathy: The shared manifold hypothesis and the neural basis of intersubjectivity. 

Gallese, V. (2003).

Psychopathology, 36, 171-180.

Toward a rhetoric of intersubjectivity: Introducing Jürgen Habermas. 

Grady, H. H. & Wells, S. (1985, June).

JAC. Retrieved March 25, 2005 at http://jac.gsu.edu/jac/6/Articles/3.htm

Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason (T. McCarthy, Trans.).

Habermas, J. (1981b).

In The theory of communicative action: Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon.

Preface.

In N. H. Harwood & M. Pines (Eds.). Self experiences in group: Intersubjective and self psychological pathways to human understanding. 

Harwood, N. H. (1998).

London: Jessica Kingsley.

Dialogue and the art of thinking together: A pioneering approach to communicating in business and in life. 

Issacs, W. (1999). 

New York: Doubleday.

Symbolic interaction and ethnographic research: Intersubjectivity and the study of human lived experience. 

Prus, R. C. (1996). 

Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Contexts and connections: An intersubjective systems approach to couples therapy. 

Shaddock, D. (2000). 

New York: Basic Books.

Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes 

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). 

(M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Intersubjectivity: A new way of thinking about evolutionary theory.

Wheeler, G. (2000, November).

[Presentation at] Evolutionary Theory: An Esalen Invitational Conference. Retrieved on March 25, 2005 at: http://www.esalenctr.org/display/confpage.cfm?confid=10&pageid=104&pgtype=1

Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: A response to the linguistic-pragmatic critique 

Zahavi, D. (2001a). 

(E. A. Behnke, Trans.)Athens, OH: Ohio UP.

Phenomenology and the problems of intersubjectivity.

Zahavi, D. (2001b).

In S. Crowell, L. Embree, & S. J. Julian (Eds.), The Reach of Reflection: Issues for Phenomenology’s Second Century. Purchased and downloaded at: http://www.electronpress.com

Individuation through socialization: George Herbert Mead‟s theory of subjectivity.

Habermas, J. (1995).

In J. Habermas (ed.), Postmetapysical Thinking. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 149-204.

Some further clarifications of the concept of communicative rationality.

Habermas, J. (1996).

In J. Habermas (ed.), On the Pragmatics of Communication. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. pp. 307-342.

Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.

Habermas, J. (1997). 

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Introduction: Realism after the Linguistic Turn.

Habermas, J. (2003).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (2008), Truth and Justification. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. pp. 1-51.

The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.

Goffman, E. (1971).

Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Reflections on the linguistic foundation of sociology: The Christian Gauss lecture.

Habermas, J. (1971).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (2001), On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 3-103.

Wahrheitstheorien.

Habermas, J. (1972).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (1984), Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 27-183.

Reflections on communicative pathology.

Habermas, J. (1974a).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (2001), On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 131-170.

Können komplexe Gesellschaften eine vernünftige Identität ausbilden?,

Habermas, J.(1974b).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (1976), Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 92-126.

Introduction: Some difficulties in the attempt to link theory and praxis.

Habermas, J. (1974c).

In J. Habermas (ed.), Theory and Practice. London: Heinemann. pp. 1-40. Forchtner Page |36

Towards a reconstruction of historical materialism.

Habermas, J. (1975).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (1979), Communication and the Evolution of Society. Heinemann: London. pp. 130- 177.

Habermas, J. (1976a). Überlegungen zum evolutionären Stellenwert des Rechts. In J. Habermas (ed.), Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. pp. 260-267.

What is Universal Pragmatics?

Habermas, J. (1976b).

In J. Habermas (ed.) (1979), Communication and the Evolution of Society. London: Heinemann. pp. 1-68.

A reply to my critics.

Habermas, J. (1982).

In J.B. Thompson and D. Held (eds.), Habermas: Critical Debates.

London/Basingstoke: MacMillan Press. pp. 219-283.

The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society.

Habermas, J. (1984).

London: Heinemann.

The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II: Lifeworld and System.

Habermas, J. (1987).

Cambridge: Polity Press.

The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures.

Habermas, J. (1990).

Cambridge: Polity Press.

The Gulf War: Catalyst for a new German normalcy.

Habermas, J. (1993).

In M. Pensky (ed.), The Past as Future. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 5-31.

Kollektive Lernprozesse: Studien zur Grundlegung einer Soziologischen Lerntheorie.

Miller, M. (1986). 

Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.

Some theoretical aspects of systematic learning.

Miller, M. (2002).

Click to access systemic_learning.pdf

Accessed 04.03.2007.

Jürgen Habermas’ Language- Philosophy and the Critical Study of Language

BERNHARD FORCHTNER Lancaster University b.forchtner@lancaster.ac.uk

Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines

2010

http://cadaad.net/ejournal Vol 4 (1): 18 – 37 ISSN: 1752-3079

The Social Construction of Reality,

Berger, L., and Luckmann, T. 

London: Penguin University Books, 1967.

Communication and the Evolution of Society,

Habermas, J. 

London: Heinemann, 1979.

The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas,

McCarthy, T. 

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1978.

A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms,

Ouchi, W. G.

Management Science (25:9), September 1979, pp. 833-848.

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language,

Searle, J. R. 

London: The Cambridge University Press, 1969.

“Reconstructing Freire, extending Habermas: The contribution of critical pedagogy to communicative action and the possibility of democracy.”

Blok, Joel,

(2004). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 3281.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/3281

Habermas and Ricœur on Recognition: Toward a New Social Humanism

Vinicio Busacchi

Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy University of Cagliari
Via Is Mirrionis 1 – 09100
Cagliari, Italy

International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 5, No. 2; February 2015

Click to access 2.pdf

The Phenomenology of the Social World,

Schütz, A. (1967).

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Symbolic Interactionism,

Blumer, H. (1969).

Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.

Intersubjectivity from Hegel to the Present,

Christian Lotz,

Michigan State University, Fall 2006

“Intersubjectivity: From mute eidos to verbose world being”

Whitmer, Barbara J.,

(1985). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5461.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5461

PHIL 310: Critical Social Theory

Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Actions: The Foundation of Sociological Theory

Instructor: Chris Latiolais

PHIL 310: Critical Social Theory

Kalamazoo College

https://philosophy.kzoo.edu/philosophy-syllabi/phil-310/

The system-lifeworld coupling imperative in Jürgen Habermas apropos his critique of Talcott Parsons.

VARGAS CAMPOS, Ronulfo. 

Comunicación [online]. 2021, vol.30, n.1, pp.17-32. ISSN 1659-3820.

Critical social philosophy, Honneth and the role of primary intersubjectivity

Somogy Varga and Shaun Gallagher 

European Journal of Social Theory 2012 15: 243 DOI: 10.1177/1368431011423606

The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or interaction? 

Gallagher S (2001)

Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 83–107.

How the Body Shapes the Mind.

Gallagher S (2005) 

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Two problems of intersubjectivity. 

Gallagher S (2009)

Journal of Consciousness Studies 16(6–8): 289–308.

The overextended mind. 

Gallagher S (2011)

Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici 113–15: 55–66.

Mental institutions. 

Gallagher S and Crisafi A (2009)

Topoi 28(1): 45–51.

Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice.

Gallagher S and Hutto D (2008).

In: Zlatev J, Racine T, Sinha C, and Itkonen E (eds) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 17–38.

The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies. 

Gallagher S and Meltzoff A N (1996)

Philosophical Psychology 9: 211–33.

The Phenomenological Mind.

Gallagher S and Zahavi D (2008) 

London: Routledge.

Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. 

De Jaegher H and Di Paolo E (2007)

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6(4): 485–507.

Minding the Body: Interacting Socially through Embodied Action.

Lindblom J (2007) 

Linko ̈ping: Linko ̈ping Studies in Science and Technology, Dissertation No. 1112.

Intersubjectivity before language: Three windows on preverbal sharing.

Meltzoff A N and Brooks R (2007)

In: Bra ̊ten S (ed.) On Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 149–74.

The self born in intersubjectivity: An infant communicating.

Trevarthen C (1993)

In: Neisser U (ed.) The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of Self-Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 121–73.

The concept and foundations of infant intersubjectivity.

Trevarthen C (1998)

In Bra ̊ten S (ed.) Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15–46.

Origins of musical identity: Evidence from infancy for musical social aware-ness.

Trevarthen C (2002)

In: MacDonald R A R, Hargreaves D J, and Miell D (eds) Musical Identities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21–38.

Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year.

Trevarthen C and Hubley P (1978)

In: Lock A (ed.) Action, Gesture, and Symbol: The Emergence of Language. New York: Cambridge University Press, 183–227.

Consciousness in infants.

Trevarthen C and Reddy V (2007)

In: Velman M and Schneider S (eds) A Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell, 41–57.

Critique of Positivism, Hermeneutics and Communicative Reason in Habermas

Paulo Vitorino Fontes

University of the Azores

META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. XIII, NO. 2 / DECEMBER 2021: 443-461, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org

Logic of Intersubjective Limits within Habermas’ Community
(or Why We Should Not Be a Unified Whole)

Tatiana Weiser

associate Professor, Russian Presidential academy of National economy and Public administration

address: Prospect vernadskogo, 82, Moscow, Russian Federation 119571
e-mail: tianavaizer@yandex.ru

Click to access RusSocRev_13_4_Special_05_Weiser.pdf

The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics

Robert Peter Badillo

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I. Culture and Values, Volume 13
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

Click to access I-13.pdf

The Philosophical Significance
of Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

By Simon SuSen

Sociological Analysis

Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 2009

Luhmann, Habermas, and the Theory of Communication

Loet Leydesdorff *
Science & Technology Dynamics, Department of Communication Studies
Oude Hoogstraat 24, 1012 EC Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Systems Research and Behavioral Science 17(3) (2000) 273-288 

https://www.leydesdorff.net/montreal.htm

CHAPTER 4
Habermas’s Communicative Rationality


Diversity and Transcultural Ethics

“Communication, Democratization, and Modernity: Critical Reflections on Habermas and Dewey,”

Published in edited version as Robert J. Antonio and Douglas Kellner,

Habermas, Pragmatism, and Critical Theory, special section of Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 15, Nr. 3 (Fall 1992), 277-298.

EMPATHY AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND OF SOCIAL LIFE: a reading of Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity

Frédéric Vandenberghe*

Sociedade e Estado, Brasília, v. 17, n. 2, p. 563-585, jul./dez. 2002

NEW SOCIAL PARADIGM: HABERMAS’S THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

UDC: 316.286:316.257

Ljubiša Mitrović

Faculty of Philosophy, Niš

UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ
The scientific journal FACTA UNIVERSITATIS
Series: Philosophy and Sociology Vol.2, No 6/2, 1999 pp. 217 – 223 

Editor of Special issue: Dragoljub B. Đorđević
Address: Univerzitetski trg 2, 18000 Niš, YU
Tel: +381 18 547-095, Fax: +381 18-547-950

“Foucault and Habermas.”

Ingram, David.

In The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (2nd revised edition), ed. G. Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 240-83.

Communicative versus Strategic Rationality: Habermas Theory of Communicative Action and the Social Brain.

Schaefer M, Heinze H-J, Rotte M, Denke C (2013)

PLoS ONE 8(5): e65111. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065111

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3666968/

Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Etherealization 

Reviewed by Eugene Rochberg-Halton, University of Notre Dame

Symbolic Interaction, Volume 12, Number 2, pages 333-360. 1989

https://philarchive.org/archive/HALROH-11

Intersubjectivity in the lifeworld

Meaning, cognition, and affect

Barbara Fultner | Denison University

Part of Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and emotion in intersubjectivity, consciousness and language
Edited by Ad Foolen, Ulrike M. Lüdtke, Timothy P. Racine and Jordan Zlatev
[Consciousness & Emotion Book Series 6] 2012
► pp. 197–220

Published online: 12 April 2012

DOI logo

https://doi.org/10.1075/ceb.6.08ful

https://benjamins.com/catalog/ceb.6.08ful

https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/books/9789027274915

Adequate accounts of intersubjectivity must recognise that it is a social, cognitive, and affective phenomenon. I draw on Jürgen Habermas’ formal-pragmatic theory of meaning and of the lifeworld as an alternative to phenomenological approaches. However, his conception of the lifeworld reflects a cognitivist bias. Intersubjectivity cannot be adequately conceptualised merely in terms of our mutual accountability and exchange or reasons; the affective dimension of our social interactions must also be recognised. I propose to redress this shortcoming by taking account of empirical research on intersubjectivity, joint attention, and attachment. This leads me to suggest supplementing the three Habermasian validity claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity with a fourth, a claim to attachment, which fits with understanding the earliest infant interactions in terms of altercentric participation. Since an adequate account of the social nature of linguistic communication must do justice not only to the lifeworld as a shared background of intelligibility, but also as a background against which differences in point of view are articulated, I conclude with a brief look at the ontogeny of perspective. Keywords: lifeworld; intersubjectivity; validity claims; attachment; cognition; affect; perspective; J. Habermas; M. Merleau-Ponty

https://benjamins.com/catalog/ceb.6

The close relationship between motion (bodily movement) and emotion (feelings) is not an etymological coincidence. While moving ourselves, we move others; in observing others move – we are moved ourselves. The fundamentally interpersonal nature of mind and language has recently received due attention, but the key role of (e)motion in this context has remained something of a blind spot. The present book rectifies this gap by gathering contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists and linguists working in the area. Framed by an introducing prologue and a summarizing epilogue (written by Colwyn Trevarthen, who brought the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity to a wider audience some 30 years ago) the volume elaborates a dynamical, active view of emotion, along with an affect-laden view of motion – and explores their significance for consciousness, intersubjectivity, and language. As such, it contributes to the emerging interdisciplinary field of mind science, transcending hitherto dominant computationalist and cognitivist approaches.

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY.

A SYSTEM – LIFEWORLD COMPATIBILITY OR INCOMPATIBILITY?

Öğretim Görevlisi AHMET KÜÇÜK

Düzce Üniversitesi, Yabancı Diller ABD

ahmetkucuk@duzce.edu.tr, 0000-0001-7802-7236

Doç. Dr. OSMAN ÖZKUL

Sakarya Üniversitesi, Sosyoloji ABD, 

oozkul@sakarya.edu.tr, 0000-0002-0418-7007

https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2063199

The problem of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy: Boundaries of the communicative approach

Oksana Somova & Pavel Vladimirov

Click to access coas.e-conf.06.08001s-text.pdf

Jürgen Habermas (1929—)

IEP

Networks, Narratives, and Interaction

Networks, Narratives, and Interaction

Bruner (1973: xi) described this duality as follows:“our knowledge of the world is not merely a mirroring or reflection of order and structure ‘out there,’ but consists rather of a construct or model that can, so to speak, be spun a bit ahead of things to predict how the world will be or might be”

Key Terms

  • Narratives
  • Culture
  • Psychology
  • Anthropology
  • Meaning
  • Meaning making
  • Networks
  • Boundaries
  • Folk Culture
  • Communication
  • Sensemaking
  • Active Learning
  • Karl Weick
  • Dirk Baecker
  • Jerome Bruner
  • Erving Goffman
  • George Spencer Brown
  • Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Social Interactions
  • Strategic Interactions
  • Cultural Psychology
  • Systems
  • Social Systems
  • Individual and Collective
  • Symbolic Interactions
  • Face Work
  • Face to Face
  • Micro Sociology
  • Drama
  • Kenneth Burke
  • Chain of Events
  • Sequence of Events
  • Time Space
  • Choices, Conflicts, Dilemmas
  • Constraints, Limits, Boundaries
  • Networks, Connections, Interaction
  • Social Simulation
  • Discrete Events
  • Scenes, Scenarios
  • Games and Dramas
  • Harmony
  • Colors, Tones
  • Interaction Rituals
  • Interaction Order
  • Ethnomethodology
  • LL and LR Quadrants in AQAL Model of Ken Wilber
  • Many Faces of Man
  • Backstage and Frontstage
  • Russell Ackoff’s Interaction Planning
  • Faces, Masks, and Rituals
  • Frame Analysis
  • Self and Others
  • Social Constructivism
  • Agent Based Modeling
  • Cellular Automata
  • Computational Sociology
  • Micro Motives and Macro Behavior
  • Conversations
  • Strategic Conversations
  • Boundaries and Distinctions
  • Networks and Boundaries

Jerome Bruner ON Narratives

Source: Chapter 1 Narrative Inquiry: From Story to Method

… Narrative as a mode of knowing 

In 1984 at an address to the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Jerome Bruner challenged the psychological community to consider the possibilities of narrative as one of two distinct and distinctive modes of thinking, namely the “paradigmatic” or logico-scientific mode and the narrative mode. For Bruner, each mode constituted a unique way of construing and constructing reality and of ordering experience. Importantly, neither of these modes was reducible to the other, as each was necessary in the development of human thought and action. Taking up these ideas in later writings, Bruner (1986) presents the narrative mode of meaning-making as one that “looks for particular conditions and is centred around the broader and more inclusive question of the meaning of experience” (p. 11), whilst the paradigmatic mode is characterised as one that is more concerned with establishing universal truth conditions.

Bruner has pursued the notion of “narrative” modes of thinking and explored the ways in which we draw on “narrative” modes of knowing as a learning process (1996a). For Bruner, we construct our understandings of the world “mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” (2003, p. 44). In earlier writings, he points to the power and import of narrative as a meaning-making process, commenting that “our capacity to render experience in terms of narrative is not just child’s play, but an instrument for making meaning that dominates much of life in culture – from soliloquies at bedtime to the weighing of testimony in our legal system” (1990, p. 97). Importantly, Bruner suggests that our “sensitivity” to narrative constitutes a major link between our “sense of self and our sense of others in the social world around us” (1986, p. 69) and is the mode through which we “create a version of the world” with which we can live (1996a, p. 39).

Bruner’s work in the field of cognitive psychology constitutes one way in which narrative has been conceptualised within scholarship and has led to the establishment of the field of narrative psychology. It is perhaps serendipitous that Bruner’s account of the narrative mode of thinking occurred at a time of growing interest in the ways in which narrative might be drawn upon for research and inquiry purposes. As educators and scholars took up the “call of stories” (Coles, 1989) to provide alternative means to explore, interrogate, interpret, and record experience, “it helped that the messenger was Bruner, an enormously powerful scholar with unusual cross-disciplinary knowledge, stature, and impact, who ventured to articulate what narrative could mean to the social sciences at large” (Bresler, 2006, p. 23). Crucially, Bruner’s work leads us to consider narrative as more than a means of presenting meaning and to consider the role of narrative and narrative forms in “re-presenting,” in the sense of constructing meaning, both individually and collectively. For Bruner, narrative operates simultaneously in both thought and action, shaping the ways in which we conceive and respond to our worlds. In short, all cognition, whatever its nature, relies upon representation, how we lay down our knowledge in a way to represent our experience of the world . . . representation is a process of construction, as it were, rather than of mere reflection of the world (Bruner, 1996b, p. 95).

Here, a narrative might become a “template for experience” (Bruner, 2002, p. 34) that works on the mind, modelling “not only its world but the minds seeking to give it its meanings” (p. 27). This move from narrative as “story presented” to narrative as a “form of meaning-making,” indeed, a form of “mind-making,” has played an important role in the development of narrative as a method of inquiry in the social sciences.

Source: INTRODUCTION: BRUNER’S WAY/ David Bakhurst and Stuart G. Shanker

Another reason why Bruner is an ideal focus is his role in two crucial paradigm shifts in twentieth-century psychology. In the 1950s, he was an instrumental figure in the cognitive revolution, which restored to psychology the inner life of the mind after decades of arid behaviourist objectivism. Cognitive psychology prospered and, in league with other fields, evolved into ‘cognitive science’, conceived as a systematic inter- disciplinary approach to the study of mind (see Gardner, 1985). Bruner, however, gradually grew more and more dissatisfied with what cognitivism had become. In 1990, he published Acts of Meaning, in which he argued that the cognitive revolution had betrayed the impulse that had brought it into being. The revolution’s principal concern, Bruner argued, had been to return the concept of meaning to the forefront of psychological theorizing. But cognitivism had become so enamoured of computational models of the mind that it had replaced behaviourism’s impoverished view of the person with one no better: human beings as information processors. In response, Bruner argued forcefully that meaning is not a given, but something made by human beings as they negotiate the world. Meaning is a cultural, not computational, phenomenon. And since meaning is the medium of the mental, culture is constitutive of mind.

In many ways, Bruner’s objection was familiar. It had often been lamented that mainstream psychology was individualistic and scientistic, representing minds as self-contained mental atoms and ignoring the social and cultural influences upon them. In the last decade, however, this well-known critique has really been gaining momentum. Besides Bruner, both Richard Shweder (1990) and Michael Cole (1996) have sounded the call for a new ‘cultural psychology’. Assorted versions of ‘constructionist’ and ‘discursive’ psychology have appeared on the scene, joining a veritable chorus of diverse voices urging that psychology treat the mind as a sociocultural phenomenon (e.g., Edwards and Potter, 1992; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Gergen, 1999). It is particularly striking that these voices no longer come exclusively from the margins. Just as the left/right divide is collapsing in political theory, so the dichotomy between mainstream ‘individualistic/scientistic/Cartesian’ psychology and radical ‘communitarian/interpretative/post-Cartesian’ psychology has become outmoded. Cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind now commonly acknowledge that no plausible account of the mind can be indifferent to the context in which we think and act, and some significant works have appeared devoted to the cultural origins, and social realization, of human mentality (e.g., Donald, 1991). A psychologist interested in culture is no longer a counter-cultural figure.

Source: The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach

From diverse sources it is possible to identify four features of a reframed narrativity particularly relevant for the social sciences:1) relationality of parts, 2) causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 4) temporality, sequence and place.43 Together, these dimensions suggest narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment. Unlike the attempt to produce meaning by placing an event in a specified category, narrativity precludes sense making of a singular isolated phenomenon. Narrativity demands that we discern the meaning of any single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events. Indeed, the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network of relationships (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices 4.4

Source: CHAPTER 2 SELF-MAKING AND WORLD-MAKING

Narrative accounts must have at least two characteristics. They should center upon people and their intentional states: their desires, beliefs, and so on; and they should focus on how these intentional states led to certain kinds of activities. Such an account should also be or appear to be order preserving, in the sense of preserving or appearing to preserve sequence — the sequential properties of which life itself consists or is supposed to consist. Now, in the nature of things, if these points are correct, autobiographies should be about the past, should be par excellence the genre (or set of genres) composed in the past tense. So just for fun, we decided to find out whether in fact autobiographies were all in the past tense — both the spontaneous ones we had collected and a sample of literary autobiographies.

We have never found a single one where past-tense verbs constituted more than 70 percent of the verbs used. Autobiographies are, to be sure, about the past; but what of the 30 percent or more of their sentences that are not in the past tense? I’m sure it will be apparent without all these statistics that autobiography is not only about the past, but is busily about the present as well. If it is to bring the protagonist up to the present, it must deal with the present as well as the past — and not just at the end of the account, as it were. That is one part of it. But there is another part that is more interesting. Most of the “present-tense” aspect of autobiography has to do with what students of narrative structure call “evaluation” — the task of placing those sequential events in terms of a meaningful context. Narrative, whether looked at from the more formalistic perspective of William Labov (1982) or the more literary, historical one of Barbara Herrnstein-Smith (1986), necessarily comprises two features: one of them is telling what happened to a cast of human beings with a view to the order in which things happened. That part is greatly aided by the devices of flashback, flashforward, and the rest. But a narrative must also answer the question “Why”, “Why is this worth telling, what is interesting about it?” Not everything that happened is worth telling about, and it is not always clear why what one tells merits telling. We are bored and offended by such accounts as“I got up in the morning, got out of bed, dressed and tied my shoes, shaved, had breakfast, went off to the office and saw a graduate student who had an idea for a thesis…”

The “why tell” function imposes something of great (and hidden) significance on narrative. Not only must a narrative be about a sequence of events over time, structured comprehensibly in terms of cultural canonicality, it must also contain something that endows it with exceptionality. We had better pause for a moment and explore what this criterion of exceptionality means for autobiography and, incidentally, why it creates such a spate of present-tense clauses in the writing of autobiography.

Source: CHAPTER 2 SELF-MAKING AND WORLD-MAKING

The object of narrative, then, is to demystify deviations. Narrative solves no problems. It simply locates them in such a way as to make them comprehensible. It does so by invoking the play of psychological states and of actions that transpire when human beings interact with each other and relates these to what can usually be expected to happen. I think that Kenneth Burke has a good deal to say about this “play of psychological states” in narrative, and I think it would help to examine his ideas. In his The Grammar of Motives, he introduces the idea of “dramatism” (Burke 1945). Burke noted that dramatism was created by the interplay of five elements (he refers to them as the Pentad). These comprise an Actor who commits an Action toward a Goal with the use of some Instrument in a particular Scene. Dramatism is created, he argues, when elements of the Pentad are out of balance, lose their appropriate “ratio”. This creates Trouble, an emergent sixth element. He has much to say about what leads to the breakdown in the ratios between the elements of the dramatistic pentad. For example, the Actor and the Scene don’t fit. Nora, for example: what in the world is the rebellious Nora in A Doll’s House doing in this banal doctor’s household? Or Oedipus taking his mother Jocasta unknowingly to wife. The “appropriate ratios”, of course, are given by the canonical stances of folk psychology toward the human condition. Dramatism constitutes their patterned violation. In a classically oral culture, the great myths that circulate are the archetypal forms of violation, and these become increasingly “smoothed” and formalized — even frozen — over time, as we know from the classic studies of Russian folktales published by Vladimir Propp (1986). In more mobile literary cultures, of course, the range and variation in such tales and stories greatly increases, matching the greater complexity and widened opportunities that accompany literacy. Genres develop, new forms emerge, variety increase — at least at first. It may well be that with the emergence of mass cultures and the new massifying media, new constraints on this variation occur, but that is a topic that would take us beyond the scope of this essay (see Feldman, in this volume).

Erving Goffman On Interactionism

Source: Wikipedia

Goffman was influenced by Herbert BlumerÉmile DurkheimSigmund FreudEverett HughesAlfred Radcliffe-BrownTalcott ParsonsAlfred SchützGeorg Simmel and W. Lloyd Warner. Hughes was the “most influential of his teachers”, according to Tom Burns.[1][3][22] Gary Alan Fine and Philip Manning have said that Goffman never engaged in serious dialogue with other theorists,[1] but his work has influenced and been discussed by numerous contemporary sociologists, including Anthony GiddensJürgen Habermas and Pierre Bourdieu.[23]

Though Goffman is often associated with the symbolic interaction school of sociological thought, he did not see himself as a representative of it, and so Fine and Manning conclude that he “does not easily fit within a specific school of sociological thought”.[1] His ideas are also “difficult to reduce to a number of key themes”; his work can be broadly described as developing “a comparative, qualitative sociology that aimed to produce generalizations about human behavior”.[23][24]

Goffman made substantial advances in the study of face-to-face interaction, elaborated the “dramaturgical approach” to human interaction, and developed numerous concepts that have had a massive influence, particularly in the field of the micro-sociology of everyday life.[23][25] Much of his work was about the organization of everyday behavior, a concept he termed “interaction order”.[23][26][27] He contributed to the sociological concept of framing (frame analysis),[28] to game theory (the concept of strategic interaction), and to the study of interactions and linguistics.[23] With regard to the latter, he argued that the activity of speaking must be seen as a social rather than a linguistic construct.[29] From a methodological perspective, Goffman often employed qualitative approaches, specifically ethnography, most famously in his study of social aspects of mental illness, in particular the functioning of total institutions.[23] Overall, his contributions are valued as an attempt to create a theory that bridges the agency-and-structuredivide—for popularizing social constructionismsymbolic interactionconversation analysis, ethnographic studies, and the study and importance of individual interactions.[30][31] His influence extended far beyond sociology: for example, his work provided the assumptions of much current research in language and social interaction within the discipline of communication.[32]

Goffman defined “impression management” as a person’s attempts to present an acceptable image to those around them, verbally or nonverbally.[33] This definition is based on Goffman’s idea that people see themselves as others view them, so they attempt to see themselves as if they are outside looking in.[33] Goffman was also dedicated to discovering the subtle ways humans present acceptable images by concealing information that may conflict with the images for a particular situation, such as concealing tattoos when applying for a job in which tattoos would be inappropriate, or hiding a bizarre obsession such as collecting/interacting with dolls, which society may see as abnormal.

Goffman broke from George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer in that while he did not reject the way people perceive themselves, he was more interested in the actual physical proximity or the “interaction order” that molds the self.[33] In other words, Goffman believed that impression management can be achieved only if the audience is in sync with a person’s self-perception. If the audience disagrees with the image someone is presenting then their self-presentation is interrupted. People present images of themselves based on how society thinks they should act in a particular situation. This decision how to act is based on the concept of definition of the situation. Definitions are all predetermined and people choose how they will act by choosing the proper behavior for the situation they are in. Goffman also draws from William Thomas for this concept. Thomas believed that people are born into a particular social class and that the definitions of the situations they will encounter have already been defined for them.[33] For instance. when an individual from an upper-class background goes to a black-tie affair, the definition of the situation is that they must mind their manners and act according to their class.

In 2007 by The Times Higher Education Guide listed Goffman as the sixth most-cited author in the humanities and social sciences, behind Anthony Giddens and ahead of Habermas.[2] His popularity with the general public has been attributed to his writing style, described as “sardonic, satiric, jokey”,[31] and as “ironic and self-consciously literary”,[34] and to its being more accessible than that of most academics.[35] His style has also been influential in academia, and is credited with popularizing a less formal style in academic publications.[31] Interestingly, if he is rightly so credited, he may by this means have contributed to a remodelling of the norms of academic behaviour, particularly of communicative action, arguably liberating intellectuals from social restraints unnatural to some of them.

His students included Carol Brooks Gardner, Charles Goodwin, Marjorie Goodwin, John Lofland, Gary Marx, Harvey SacksEmanuel Schegloff, David Sudnow and Eviatar Zerubavel.[1]

Despite his influence, according to Fine and Manning there are “remarkably few scholars who are continuing his work”, nor has there been a “Goffman school”; thus his impact on social theory has been simultaneously “great and modest”.[30] Fine and Manning attribute the lack of subsequent Goffman-style research and writing to the nature of his style, which they consider very difficult to duplicate (even “mimic-proof”), and also to his subjects’ not being widely valued in the social sciences.[3][30] Of his style, Fine and Manning remark that he tends to be seen either as a scholar whose style is difficult to reproduce, and therefore daunting to those who might wish to emulate it, or as a scholar whose work was transitional, bridging the work of the Chicago school and that of contemporary sociologists, and thus of less interest to sociologists than the classics of either of those groups.[24][30] Of his subjects, Fine and Manning observe that the topic of behavior in public places is often stigmatized as trivial and unworthy of serious scholarly attention.[30]

Nonetheless, Fine and Manning note that Goffman is “the most influential American sociologist of the twentieth century”.[36] Elliott and Turner see him as “a revered figure—an outlaw theorist who came to exemplify the best of the sociological imagination”, and “perhaps the first postmodern sociological theorist”.[14]

Source: Looking back on Goffman: The excavation continues

The “descent of the ego,” then, was witnessed by both Durkheim and Goffman in terms of the mechanisms at work in modem Western society whereby the tendencies toward an unbridled egoistic individualism are continually rebuffed (Chriss, 1993). MacCannell successfully makes the case for such a Durkheim-Goffman link through a semiotic sociology which resists the temptation of explaining in solely positivistic terms why it is that in modem Western society, imbued as it is with a strong ethic of individualism, we nevertheless see persons orienting their actions toward a perceived moral universe and the accommodation of the other. Like Durkheim and many of the great students of society from Plato to Hobbes, from Kant to Parsons, Goffman was ultimately concerned with the question, how is social order possible (Berger, 1973: 356; Collins, 1980: 173)?

Burns recognizes the Durkheim-Goffman link as well, but carries the analysis even further by comparing and contrasting Durkheim’s notion of social order with Goffman’s interaction order. Durkheim’s sui generis reality was society; Goffman’s is the encounters between individuals, or the social act itself. The moral order which pervades society and sustains individual conduct constitutes a “social fact” in both Durkheim’s and Goffman’s eyes. But Burns (1992) notes also that for Durkheim this order was·seen as durable and all-sustaining, whereas for Goffman “it was fragile, impermanent, full of unexpected holes, and in constant need of repair” (p.26).

my Related Posts

Boundaries and Relational Sociology

Boundaries and Distinctions

Boundaries and Networks

Society as Communication: Social Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann

Third and Higher Order Cybernetics

Autocatalysis, Autopoiesis and Relational Biology

Relational Turn in Economic Geography

Cybernetics, Autopoiesis, and Social Systems Theory

Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber

Systems and Organizational Cybernetics

A Unifying Model of Arts

Ratio Club: A Brief History of British Cyberneticians

Micro Motives, Macro Behavior: Agent Based Modeling in Economics

On Holons and Holarchy

Reflexivity, Recursion, and Self Reference

The Social Significance of Drama and Narrative Arts

Socio-Cybernetics and Constructivist Approaches

Drama Therapy: Self in Performance

Narrative Psychology: Language, Meaning, and Self

Psychology of Happiness: Value of Storytelling and Narrative Plays

Drama Theory: Choices, Conflicts and Dilemmas

Drama Theory: Acting Strategically

Key Sources of Research

The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology

edited by Jaan Valsiner

Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning

By Bradd Shore

Erving Goffman on Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erving_Goffman

On Face-Work
An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction

Erving Goffman
Pages 213-231 | Published online: 08 Nov 2016
https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1955.11023008

Chapter in Book Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face to Face Behavior

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00332747.1955.11023008

Click to access Goffman,%20Erving%20%27On%20Face-work%27.pdf

Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-To-Face Behavior

E. Goffman

Published 1967

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Interaction-Ritual%3A-Essays-on-Face-To-Face-Behavior-Goffman/976f5fcc01b26ec011790d419eb471eb7beb13f8

 

Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction.

Goffman, Erving. 1961

Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 

Goffman, Erving. 1959. 

New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Strategic interaction.

Goffman, Erving (1969), 

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience.

Goffman, E. (1974). 

New York: Harper & Row.

Sociology. Narrative psychology: Internet and resource guide. 

Hevern, V. W. (2004, Apr). 

Retrieved [3/15/2021] from the Le Moyne College Web site: http://web.lemoyne.edu/~hevern/nr-soc.html

http://web.lemoyne.edu/~hevern/narpsych/nr-soc.html

Narrative scenarios: Toward a culturally thick notion of narrative. 

Brockmeier, J. (2012). 

In J. Valsiner (Ed.), Oxford library of psychology. The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology (p. 439–467). Oxford University Press.

https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-04461-020

Erving Goffman

https://monoskop.org/Erving_Goffman

Looking back on Goffman: The excavation continues

James J. Chriss 

Cleveland State University

1993

Sociology & Criminology Faculty Publications. 98.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clsoc_crim_facpub/98

Beyond Goffman: Studies on Communication, Institution, and Social Interaction

1990

Erving Goffman: Exploring,the interaction order 

(1988)

Tom Burns’s Erving Goffman

(1992)

Chapter 1
Narrative Inquiry: From Story to Method

Troubling Certainty

Margaret S. Barrett and Sandra L. Stauffer

In Narrative Inquiry in Music Education

DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9862-8  

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

INTRODUCTION: BRUNER’S WAY

David Bakhurst and Stuart G. Shanker

In Jerome Bruner: Language, Culture, Self

Edited by
David Bakhurst and Stuart G. Shanker

Sage Publications, 2001

Analyzing Narratives and Story-Telling

Matti Hyvärinen

THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS

The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach

MARGARET R. SOMERS

Universityof Michigan

TheoryandSociety23: 605-649, 1994

https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/43649/11186_2004_Article_BF00992905.pdf?sequence=1

Cognitive–Linguistic and Constructivist Mnemonic Triggers in Teaching Based on Jerome Bruner’s Thinking

Jari Metsämuuronen1* and Pekka Räsänen2

  • 1Department of Pedagogy, NLA University College, Bergen, Norway
  • 2Niilo Mäki Institute, Jyväskylä, Finland

Front. Psychol., 12 December 2018 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02543

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02543/full

Storytelling and the Construction of Realities

Paul Stoller

Etnofoor Vol. 30, No. 2, Race-ism (2018), pp. 107-112 

The Construction of Identity in the Narratives of Romance and Comedy

Kevin Murray 

Texts of Identity In J.Shotter & K.Gergen (eds.)  London: Sage (1988)

The Construction of Identity in the Narratives of Romance and Comedy

Actual Minds, Possible Worlds

By Jerome S. BRUNER

The Narrative Construction of Reality

Jerome Bruner

Jerome Bruner Life as a Narrative

Polarising narrative and paradigmatic ways of knowing: exploring the spaces through narrative, stories and reflections of personal transition

CLEO91571

David Cleaver

cleaver@usq.edu.au University of Southern Queensland

Possibilities for Action: Narrative Understanding

Donald Polkinghorne

Fielding Graduate University

https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/NW/article/view/23789/27568

Two Modes of Thought

Jerome Bruner

Narrating the Self

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/ochs/articles/96narr_self.pdf?q=narrating-the-self

THE USES OF NARRATIVE IN ORGANIZATION RESEARCH

Barbara Czarniawska

Acts of meaning. 

Bruner, J. (1990). 

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Language learner stories and imagined identities

Margaret Early and Bonny Norton
Department of Language and Literacy Education, University of British Columbia

Narrative Rhetorics in Scenario Work: Sensemaking and Translation

Zhan Li
University of Southern California USA

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.431.411&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Chapter 2
Self-making and world-making

Jerome Bruner

In Narrative and Identity

Studies in Autobiography, Self and Culture

Jens Brockmeier
University of Toronto & Freie Universität Berlin

Donal Carbaugh
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

John Benjamins Publishing Company

A Grammar of Motives

By Kenneth Burke

Essays Toward a Symbolic of Motives, 1950–1955

By Kenneth Burke

A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES

Kenneth Burke

Click to access CaricatureofCourtshipKafkaCastleKennethBurke.pdf

A Calculus of Negation in Communication

Cybernetics & Human Knowing 24, 3–4 (2017), 17–27

Posted: 23 Jan 2018

Dirk Baecker

Witten/Herdecke University

Date Written: September 1, 2017

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102888

Working the Form: George Spencer-Brown and the Mark of Distinction*

Dirk Baecker

Universität Witten/Herdecke

dirk.baecker@uni-wh.de

Shape of things to come: From the ‘laws of form’ to management in the post-growth economy

André Reichel

http://www.ephemerajournal.org volume 17(1): 89-118

Click to access 17-1reichel.pdf

Systems, Network, and Culture

Dirk Baecker Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, Germany baecker@mac.com

Presented at the International Symposium “Relational Sociology: Transatlantic Impulses for the Social Sciences”, Berlin, September 25-26, 2008

Click to access baecker2.pdf

Organisations as distinction generating and processing systems: Niklas Luhmann’s contribution to organisation studies

David Seidl and Kai Helge Becker

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Niklas Luhmann
TRANSLATED BY John Bednarz, Jr., with Dirk Baecker FOREWORD BY Eva M. Knodt
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

Introduction to Systems Theory

Niklas Luhmann

Click to access Niklas_Luhmann_Introduction_to_System_Theory.pdf

Mysteries of cognition. Review of neocybernetics and narrative by bruce clarke.

Baecker D. (2015)

Constructivist Foundations 10(2): 261–263. http://constructivist.info/10/2/261

https://constructivist.info/10/2/261.baecker

The Communication of Meaning in Anticipatory Systems: A Simulation Study of the Dynamics of Intentionality in Social Interactions

Loet Leydesdorff

In: Daniel M. Dubois (Ed.) Proceedings of the 8th Intern. Conf. on Computing Anticipatory Systems CASYS’07, Liège, Belgium, 6-11 August 2007. Melville, NY: American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1051 (2008) pp. 33-49.

Why Systems?

Dirk Baecker

Universität Witten/Herdecke http://www.uni-wh.de/baecker

Theory Culture & Society 18 (2001), pp. 59-74

LAWS OF
FORM by GEORGE SPENCER-BROWN

In collaboration with the Liverpool University
and the Laws of Form 50th Anniversary Conference.
Alphabetum III
September 28 — December 31, 2019 West Den Haag, The Netherlands

Click to access Alphabetum_III_V8_ONLINE.pdf

Systems in Context
On the outcome of the Habermas/Luhmann
debate

Poul Kjaer

Niklas Luhmann and Organization Studies

Edited by
David Seidl and Kai Helge Becker

Click to access 9788763003049.pdf

A Note on Max Weber’s Unfinished Theory of Economy and Society

Dirk Baecker
Witten/Herdecke University, Germany dbaecker@uni-wh.de

The fractal geometry of Luhmann’s sociological theory or debugging systems theory

José Javier Blanco Rivero

CONICET/Centro de Historia Intelectual, National University of Quilmes, Roque Sáenz Peña 352, Bernal, Argentina

Technological Forecasting & Social Change 146 (2019) 31–40


Diamond Calculus of Formation of Forms

A calculus of dynamic complexions of distinctions as an interplay of worlds and distinctions

Archive-Number / Categories 3_01 / K06, K03
Publication Date 2011

Rudolf Kaehr (1942-2016)

Click to access rk_Diamond-Calculus-of-Formation-of-Forms_2011.pdf

ART AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

Niklas Luhmann

TRANSLATED BY EVA M. KNODT

Snakes all the Way Down: Varela’s Calculus for Self-Reference and the Praxis of Paradise

André Reichel*

European Center for Sustainability Research, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany

Systems Research and Behavioral Science Syst. Res. (2011)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sres.1105

Who Conceives of Society?

Ernst von Glasersfeld

University of Massachusetts evonglas@hughes.net

Constructivist Foundations 2008, vol. 3, no. 2 http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Click to access glasersfeld.pdf

Dramaturgy (sociology)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dramaturgy_(sociology)

Dramaturgy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dramaturgy

Beyond Bourdieu:
The Interactionist Foundations of Media Practice Theory

PETER LUNT University of Leicester, UK

International Journal of Communication 14(2020), 2946–2963

https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/11204/3104

Drama as Life: The Significance of Goffman’s Changing Use of the Theatrical Metaphor

Phil Manning

Sociological Theory Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 70-86 (17 pages) 

Published By: American Sociological Association 

https://doi.org/10.2307/201874https://www.jstor.org/stable/201874

RECONSTRUCTING THE SELF: A GOFFMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Simon Susen

In: H. F. Dahms & E. R. Lybeck (Eds.), Reconstructing Social Theory, History and Practice. Current Perspectives in Social Theory. (pp. 111-143). Bingley, UK: Emerald. ISBN 9781786354709

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b8ca/9e1bb2a4bdf97330c932fc75ea7f60253551.pdf?_ga=2.252111627.386639570.1616097397-89425557.1612485585

Mainstreaming Relational Sociology – Relational Analysis of Culture in Digithum

P. Baert. Published 2016

The Foundations of the Social: Between Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology

S. Susen. Published 2007

Language, self, and social order: A reformulation of Goffman and Sacks

A. RawlsPublished 1989SociologyHuman Studies

The Interaction Order: American Sociological Association, 1982 Presidential Address

Author(s): Erving Goffman

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 1-17 Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095141 .

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cc41/6add65c01434e70c1eff295ccf2c4d45ad49.pdf?_ga=2.51373867.386639570.1616097397-89425557.1612485585

Face and interaction

Michael Haugh

(2009): In Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini and Michael Haugh (eds.), Face, Communication and Social Interaction, Equinox, London, pp.1-30.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313098378_Face_and_Interaction

Public and private faces in web spaces – How Goffman’s work can be used to think about purchasing medicine online. 

Lisa Sugiura

Organizational Analysis: Goffman and Dramaturgy  

Peter K. Manning

The Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory, and Organization Studies: Contemporary Currents

Edited by Paul Adler, Paul du Gay, Glenn Morgan, and Mike Reed

Print Publication Date: Oct 2014

https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199671083.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199671083-e-012

Complete bibliography: Erving Goffman ́s writings

Persson, Anders

http://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/5499425/2438065

Chapter 1 THE PROGRAM OF INTERACTION RITUAL THEORY

Click to access s7769.pdf

A review of Jerome Bruner’s educational theory:

Its implications for studies in teaching and learning and active learning (secondary publication)

Koji MATSUMOTO

Faculty of Economics Nagoya Gakuin University

Click to access syakai_vol5401_11.pdf

The Use of Stories in Moral Development: New Psychological Reasons for an Old Education Method

DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.45.6.709

Narrative Understanding and Understanding Narrative

Sarah E. Worth

Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive): Vol. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/liberalarts_contempaesthetics/vol2/iss1/9

Narrative Psychology: Language, Meaning, and Self

Narrative Psychology: Language, Meaning, and Self

Key Terms

  • Connections
  • Relationships
  • Meaning
  • Language
  • Social Psychology
  • Social Constructivism
  • Ethnomethodology
  • Phenomenology
  • Postmodernism
  • Post Postmodernism
  • Humanistic Psychology
  • Self as Interactional Process
  • Hermenutics
  • Self and Social Structures
  • I and We
  • AQAL model of Ken Wilber
  • Integral Theory
  • Meta Integral Theories
  • Cyber Semiotics

Introducing Narrative Psychology

MICHELE L. CROSSLEY

Narrative Psychology and the Study of Self/Identity

Much of what is said in this article derives from my recent book, Introducing Narrative Psychology: Self, Trauma and the Construction of Meaning (Crossley, 2000a). In that book, I began with the age-old, perennial question. What is a self? Who am I? C.S. Lewis once commented: ‘There is one thing, and only one in the whole universe which we know more about than that we could learn from external observation. That one thing is ourselves. We have, so to speak, inside information, we are in the know’ (Lewis, 1952). But how true is this? Are we ‘in the know’ about ourselves?

It may seem obvious to turn towards psychology in order to throw light on these complex questions regarding self and identity. After all, most people are drawn towards the study of psychology because they are interested in the ‘human condition’, what makes us human, our loves, passions, hates and desires. But most of us find ourselves only a few months into a psychology degree when we realise that we are dealing with very little of this. Instead, you are enmeshed in statistics, principles of learning, cognition, abstract theories and theoretical models, all of which bear very little resemblance to anything you were originally interested in studying. Somewhat ironically, a great deal of contemporary psychology, supposedly an area devoted to the study of human beings, has become a totally ‘lifeless’ discipline. So where do we look, in the discipline of psychology, if we want to examine these questions of self and identity?

In Introducing Narrative Psychology, I suggested four main areas of psychology which address these issues. These included: i) experimentally based social psychology; ii)humanistic psychology; iii) psychoanalytic/ psychodynamic psychology; and iv) social constructivist approaches. Highlighting the limitations associated with each of these four areas, I opened the way for a new narrative psychology approach which, although influenced by these approaches (especially humanistic and social constructivist), had the potential to avoid the pitfalls endemic within them.

The Central Role of Language and Stories

Of particular importance to the formulation of a narrative psychology approach is recognition, derived from social constructivist approaches, of the central role played by language and stories in the process of self construction. As Crites (1986), wrote: ‘A self without a story contracts into the thinness of its personal pronoun.’ And Mair:

Stories are the womb of personhood. Stories make and break us. Stories sustain us in times of trouble and encourage us towards ends we would not otherwise envision. The more we shrink and harden our ways of telling, the more starved and constipated we become (Mair, 1989: 2)

‘Always in emergencies’, argued Broyard (1992: 21), ‘we invent narratives’:

We describe what is happening as if to confine the catastrophe. When people heard that I was ill, they inundated me with stories of their own illnesses, as well as the cases of friends. Storytelling seems to be a natural reaction to illness. People bleed stories and I’ve become a bloodbank of them (Broyard, 1992: 21)

Narrative as an ‘Organising Principle’ for Human Life

But it is not just the fact that people tell stories in making sense of themselves and others. A narrative psychological approach goes far deeper than that. For, central to this approach, is the development of a phenomenological understanding of the unique ‘order of meaning’ constitutive of human consciousness (see Crossley, 2000a; Polkinghorne, 1988). One of the main features of this ‘order of meaning’ is the experience of time and temporality. An understanding of temporality associated with the human realm of meaning is entirely different to that encountered in the natural sciences. This is because the human realm of meaning it is not related to a ‘thing’ or a ‘substance’ but to an ‘activity’ (Polkinghorne, 1988: 4). Everything experienced by human beings is made meaningful, understood and interpreted in relation to the primary dimension of ‘activity’ which incorporates both ‘time’ and ‘sequence’. In order to define and interpret ‘what’ exactly has happened on any particular occasion, the sequence of events is of extreme importance. Hence, a valid portrayal of the experience of selfhood necessitates an understanding of the inextricable connection between temporality and identity.

It is in accordance with these basic principles of temporality and connection that numerous authors such as MacIntyre (1981), Carr (1986) and Sarbin (1986) have put forward the idea that human psychology has an essentially narrative structure. Sarbin, for instance, proposes what he calls the ‘narratory principle’; this is the idea that human beings think, perceive, imagine, interact and make moral choices according to narrative structures. Sarbin uses the word narrative as coterminous with ‘story’:

A story is a symbolised account of actions of human beings that has a temporal dimension. The story has a beginning, middle, and an ending (or as Kermode (1967) suggests, the sense of an ending). The story is held together by recognisable patterns of events called plots. Central to the plot structure are human predicaments and attempted resolutions. (Sarbin, 1986: 3)

Sarbin treats narrative as the ‘organising principle for human action’. By this, he means that the concept of narrative can be used to help account for the observation that human beings always seek to impose structure on the flow of experience. Such a narrative principle invokes a humanisitic image of the self as a teller of stories, of heroes and villains, plots, and images of actors performing and engaging in dialogue with other actors.

Charles Taylor’s (1989) work is particularly important to the development of an understanding of self as intrinsically connected to temporality, interactions with others, and ultimately, morality. It is Taylor’s main contention that concepts of self and morality are inextricably intertwined – we are selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for me. To ask what I am in abstraction from self-interpretation makes no sense (Taylor, 1989: 34). Moreover, my self-interpretation can only be defined in relation to other people, an ‘interchange of speakers’. I cannot be a self on my own but only in relation to certain ‘interlocutors’ who are crucial to my language of self-understanding. In this sense, the self is constituted through ‘webs of interlocution’ in a ‘defining community’ (Taylor ibid, 39; see also Crossley, N., 1996). This connection between our sense of morality and sense of self, according to Taylor, means that one of our basic aspirations is the need to feel connected with what we see as ‘good’ or of crucial importance to us and our community. We have certain fundamental values which lead us to basic questions such as ‘what kind of life is worth living?’; ‘What constitutes a rich, meaningful life, as against an empty, meaningless one’? (Taylor ibid, 42).

A vision of ‘the good’ becomes available for people in any given culture by being given expression or articulation in some form or another. This articulation most often occurs through language and symbolic systems such as custom and ritual which reverberate with knowledge of connections and relationships across the generations. (Taylor ibid, 91). Such articulation brings us closer to the good as a moral source and gives it further power and potency. Stories have a tremendous force in this process insofar as they have the capacity to confer meaning and substance on peoples’ lives, to subtly influence their progression and orientation towards a particular ‘good’ (ibid, 97).

For example, cultures transmit to children knowledge of typical patterns of relationships, meanings and moralities in their myths, fairytales, histories and stories (see Bettelheim, 1976; Howard, 1991; Polkinghorne, 1988). And we are inculcated from a very early age to seeing connections between events, people and the world in a certain way through the stories and narratives told within our families (Langellier and Peterson, 1993; McAdams, 1993). Moreover, this process does not stop during childhood. As adolescents and adults we are exposed on a daily basis to TV dramas, soap operas, movie blockbusters and talk-shows, all of which play out, in the same way as the fairytale does for the child, eternal moral conflicts (see McLeod, 1997; Priest, 1996).

One of the central premises of a narrative psychological approach then, is of the essential and fundamental link between experiences of self, temporality, relationships with others and morality. We have a sense of who we are through a sense of where we stand in relation to ‘the good’. Hence, connections between notions of ‘the good’, understandings of the self, the kinds of stories and narratives through which we make sense of our lives, and conceptions of society, evolve together in ‘loose packages’ (Taylor ibid, 105).

Human Experience and Narrative Structure

Carr (1986) argues that the reality of human experience can be characterised as one which has a narrative or story-telling character (ibid, p.18). What would it be, he asks, to experience life as a ‘mere’ or ‘pure’ sequence of isolated events, one thing after another? In order to illustrate his thesis Carr draws upon phenomenological approaches such as Husserl’s theory of time consciousness which depicts the way in which humans ordinarily experience time. He basically makes a distinction between three levels of human experience: passive experience, active experience and experience of self/life. At each of these levels, human experience can be characterised by a complex temporal structure akin to the configuration of the storied form (see also Bruner, 1990; 1991). In the following exploration of human time consciousness, we will look at each of these experiential levels in turn.

According to Husserl, even as we encounter events at the most passive level (that is, when we are not consciously aware that we are encountering them), they are charged with the significance they derive from our anticipation of the future (‘protention’) and our memory of things past (‘retention’). His point is not that we have the capacity to project and remember but that we cannot even experience anything as happening, as present, except against the background of what it succeeds and what we anticipate will succeed it. Hence, when we experience time, we have no option but to experience it as an interrelated ‘configuration’ of past-present-future. Our experience automatically assumes temporally extended forms in which future, present and past mutually determine one another as parts of a whole. Husserl gives the example of a note in a melody. When we are listening to a melody we do not encounter notes in that melody as isolated elements or components. Rather, the note is encountered and ‘understood’ as part of a sequence as a whole. It only takes on ‘meaning’ in relation to the note that has preceded it and in anticipation of that which will succeed it. Hence the ‘presence’ of the note can only be encountered in relation to a mutually determined retentional- protentional structure. This kind of temporal experience is analogous to the Gestalt phenomena often discussed in relation to spatial perception.

Carr proceeds to argue that if this ‘configurational’ dimension is true of our most passive experiences, it is even more so true of our active lives in which we ‘explicitly consult past experience, envisage the future and view the present as a passage between the two’. Carr argues that the ‘means-end’ structure of action that we experience in everyday life is akin to the beginning-middle-end plot structure of narrative and thus, ‘the structure of action … is common to art and life’. This idea is also central to literary theorist Paul Ricouer’s notion that ‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 85). According to Ricoeur there are two sorts of time in every story told: on the one hand a discrete succession that is open and theoretically indefinite, for example, a series of incidents for which we can always pose the question, ‘and then? and then?’, much like a chronicle of events. The other sort of time is characterised by integration, culmination and closure owing to which the story receives a particular configuration. In this sense, composing a story involves drawing together a series of events in order that they make sense in relation to one another (Ricoeur, 1991: 121). We tend to experience activities, both short and long term, in relation to this latter mode, sometimes referred to by Ricoeur as the process of emplotment. The point is, our present activity only makes sense, and is framed in terms of, a vast array of interrelated memories from times past and anticipations of and for the future. Hence, the temporal configuration characteristic of narrative structure is akin not only to passive but also to active human experience.

If we can talk of narrative structure in connection with individual passive and active experiences, then the notion of a ‘life-story’ requires yet a further, more comprehensive grasp which brings separate ‘stories’ together, takes them all as ‘mine’ and establishes connections among them (Carr, 1986: 75). Although we have argued that there is a past-present-future temporal configuration (a narrative structure) at the level of passive and active experience, it is not difficult too see that at this more complex level (life as a whole), something special is required in the way of a reflexive (looking back) temporal grasp, to hold together the phases of these longer-term phenomena and preserve their coherence. This, of course, is the classic process of autobiography in which there is an attempt to envisage the coherence of a life through selection, organisation and presentation of its component parts. Some authors such as Kierkegaard (1987) have argued that it is through this process of autobiographical selection that we become ethical beings; in the telling of our life stories, we become responsible for our lives. Literary theorist Paul Ricoeur makes such responsibility central to his concept of ‘narrative identity’, arguing that the self only comes into being in the process of telling a life story (Ricoeur, 1986: 132).

It is important to point out here that we may be in danger of suggesting that in order to help us understand ourselves and our lives we actually need literary creations such as works of fiction, biography and autobiography. Indeed, Ricoeur, has been accused of placing too much emphasis on the role of ‘story’ as the instance where meaning is created, at the expense of ‘human life’ (Widdershoven, 1993). However, if we bring forth the conception of the narrative structure of human experience and action developed by Carr, we can see that the meaning created in the autobiographical act of reflection and that found within everyday experience and action, actually exist on a continuum rather than being radically discontinuous. In Carr’s terms ‘lives are told in being lived and lived in being told’ (ibid, p.61). The actions and sufferings of life can be viewed as a process of telling ourselves stories, listening to those stories and acting them out or living through them. Hence:

It is not the case that we first live and act and then afterward, seated around the fire as it were, tell about what we have done … The retrospective view of the narrator, with its capacity for seeing the whole in all its irony, is not an irreconcilable opposition to the agent’s view but is an extension and refinement of a viewpoint inherent in action itself … narration, intertwined as it is with action, (creates meaning) in the course of life itself, not merely after the fact, at the hands of authors, in the pages of books. (ibid, p.61)

When Carr refers to narration here, he is not just referring to the fact that a great deal of our everyday conversations are devoted to telling stories (although this is true). His point about narrative is more to do with its role in constituting the sense of the actions we engage in and the events we live through, its role in organising temporally and giving shape and coherence to the sequence of experiences we have as we are in the process of having them (ibid, p.62). Hence, the notion of narrative structure or the act of narrative structuring does not necessarily take on the form of explicit verbalisation. It refers more to the fact that, as the agent or subject of experience, I am constantly attempting to:

surmount time in exactly the way the storyteller does’. I constantly ‘attempt to dominate the flow of events by gathering them together in the forward-backward grasp of the narrative act … (ibid, p.62)

Carr further argues that our constant attempt to achieve a sense of structure and order in the course of our everyday activities and lives is firmly based on our practical orientation within the world. In order to get on in everyday life we need things to hang together, to make sense, to have some sense of connection. If, for instance, I found myself writing this paper and it bore very little resemblance to anything I had ever done before, I would have great difficulty pursuing it because I would be unable to see the point – why am I doing this? Where will it take me? Where do I go from here? And for the most part it is ‘normal’ for us to experience such narrative coherence in the sense that for most of us, for most of the time ‘things do, after all, make sense, hang together’ (ibid, p.90).

It is in this sense that Carr insists that everyday reality is permeated with narrative and that the human experience of time is one of configured time. ‘The narrative grasp of the story-teller’, he claims, ‘is not a leap beyond time but a way of being in time. It is no more alien to time than the curving banks are alien to the river or the potter’s hands to the clay’ (ibid, p.89). According to this perspective, literary stories such as fiction and autobiography do not in any sense ‘impose’ a structure and order on human action and life. Instead, they tend to reinforce and make more explicit the symbolisation that is already at work within a culture at the level of practical human action. The function of narratives such as autobiographies then, is simply to reveal structures or meanings that previously remained implicit or unrecognised, and thus to transform life and elevate it to another level.

But is Human Life Narratively Configured?

In characterising psychological life through the concept of narrative, however, are we not overplaying the significance played by the storied form in human experience? At the level of ‘personal’ experience, some researchers have argued that although human experience may bear some resemblance to the story, the idea that it takes on a narrative structure is mistaken. The core of this argument is that the coherent temporal unity lying at the heart of stories (the connection between beginning, middle and end) is something that is not at all intrinsic to real human events, real selves and real life. As literary theorist Frank Kermode argues, such ‘narrative properties cannot be ascribed to the real’ (cited in Wood, 1991: 160). The historian Louis Mink argues a similar point: ‘Stories are not lived but told … Life has no beginnings, middles and ends…Narrative qualities are transferred from art to life’ (cited in Wood, 1991: 161).

A related point is made by literary theorist Roland Barthes with regard to the selective capacity of the author of the story and his/her ability to create and determine coherence and order within the text. The literary text has a sense of structure and order because the elements and events making up the story have been ‘put there’ by the author. Disruptive elements have been ‘eliminated’. Life, in contrast to the careful manipulation of the story, cannot possibly have such a structure. Thus, it has been argued, whereas the story has an ‘implicit contract’ towards order, life has no such contract. (Bell, 1990: 174). In this sense, it is claimed, the story differs radically from ‘life’ insofar as in the latter, everything is ‘scrambled messages’, ‘chaos rather than order’ (see Carr cited in Wood, 1991: 161).

There is some truth to this argument. However, is it the case that life admits of no selection, that everything is ‘left in’, a vast array of ‘scrambled messages’? For example, Carr argues that our most basic capacity for attention and following through various activities or projects is premised on our capacity for selection. Hence, just like the author of the literary text, we partially determine the course of our own lives by selecting and omitting certain elements and events. As Carr argues:

Extraneous details are not left out but they are pushed into the background, saved for later, ranked in importance. And whose narrative voice is accomplishing all this? None but our own, of course. In planning our days and our lives we are composing the stories or the dramas we will act out and which will determine the focus of our attention and our endeavours, which will provide the principles for distinguishing foreground from background. (Carr cited in Wood, 1991: 165)

This may be story planning or plotting, but is it story-telling? ‘Most assuredly it is, quite literally, since we are constantly explaining ourselves to others. And finally each of us must count himself among his own audience since in explaining ourselves to others we are often trying to convince ourselves as well’ (Carr cited in Wood, 1991: 165). Hence, through the interrelated processes of story-plotting and story-telling we partially determine the stories of our lives.

The word ‘partial’ is important here, however, because we should not take this point – the self as a teller of her own story – too far. The critical arguments of theorists who dispute the analogy between ‘life’ and ‘narrative’ are important insofar as they emphasise the fact that, unlike the author of fiction, we do not totally create the materials we are to form. To a certain degree, we are stuck with what we have in the way of characters, capacities and circumstances. For instance, if a woman is married to a man who batters her every night when he comes in drunk from the pub, the fact that she secretly harbours fantasies of a white knight in shining armour coming to rescue her one day and that everything will turn out OK in the end, will have very little influence on her real life which is likely to be characterised by repeated abuse, dependency and further victimisation.

Likewise, just as we are unable to control the beginnings of our stories, so too are we unable, unlike the fictional author, to describe our already completed lives. Instead, we are in the middle of our lives and we cannot be sure how they will end. Hence, although I may have a plan to write my next book, I do not have any idea what may await me around the corner. As the old proverb goes, ‘There’s many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip’ (Crites, 1986: 166). All manner of things could happen to forestall my plan and render it irrelevant. For example, I may be made redundant, in which case I would probably feel there is little point in continuing to write a book. I may fall seriously ill and be rendered incapable of completing the project; or even if I remained capable, my goals and values may change in the face of confrontation with the possibility of death. I may have to rethink my aims and projects, change direction, and start a new story. Hence, the fact that we cannot wholly determine either the beginning or the end of our lives, suggests that our activities and projects do lack the formal order and coherence of literary stories. Life, unlike the story, does not have an ‘implicit contract’ towards order.

However, one of the main aims of a narrative psychological approach is to provide an alternative to certain social constructionist and postmodernist approaches which have considerably overplayed the disorderly, chaotic and variable nature of contemporary human experience (Crossley, 2000c). On a routine, daily basis, there is more order and coherence than such accounts suggest. This is nowhere more apparent than when we examine traumatising experiences, which have the capacity to painfully highlight the ‘normal’ state of narrative coherence which is routinely taken-for-granted and thus remains ‘unseen’ within the active experiencing of everyday existence.

Narrative Incoherence and the Breach of Trauma

One good example of disruptive traumatising experiences is that of chronic or serious illness. In recent years numerous studies of chronic illness have illustrated the potentially devastating impact they can have on a person’s life. This has been characterised as an ‘ontological assault’ in which some of the most basic, underlying existential assumptions that people hold about themselves and the world are thrown into disarray (Crossley, 2000b; Janoff Bulman, 1992; Kleinman, 1988; Taylor, S., 1989).

One of the most fundamental building blocks of the perceived world to be destroyed in the experience of chronic illness, is one’s basic sense of time. Many phenomenologically and existentially oriented writers have highlighted that time is basic and fundamental to an understanding of contemporary human existence insofar as our normal, routine temporal orientation is one of projecting into the future. It is important to make clear, however, that we are not necessarily consciously aware of the fact that we project into the future in this way. Our taken-for-granted assumptions about and towards time, are only made visible when a ‘shock’ or a ‘disruption’ occurs, throwing them into sharp relief (see Schutz, 1962; Garfinkel, 1984). The experience of chronic illness constitutes such a disruption. When a person receives a serious illness diagnosis, they are immediately shocked out of the complacency of the assumed futurity of their existence and their whole conception of themselves, their life and their world is likely to undergo radical changes. Frank (1995) uses the metaphor of ‘narrative wreckage’ to characterise such experiences.

In previous research, I have shown how much of the traumatic emotional and psychological impact of living with a HIV positive diagnosis can be traced back to the disturbance and disruption of this fundamentally experienced sense of ‘lived time’ (Davies, 1997). The threat of chaos, of meaninglessness, is evident in the following quote from Paula, a HIV positive woman I interviewed, whose husband, a haemophiliac had recently died from HIV infection. When I asked her about her plans for the future she said:

I don’t think of the future as in what is going to happen in a year’s time or whatever. My future seems to have stopped when Mark (her husband) died because I am on my own and I just live from day to day … I am only 28 and I feel as if I have been put in a shop and left there … It is as if I am stuck in a sort of bubble and nothing seems to, I can’t get out of it … it’s frightening to think that I am going to be like that until I die … It’s terrible when you have got no-one to talk to … that’s a large part of it now for me, it is the loneliness, especially of a night-time when the kids are in bed … I often keep the baby up just to keep me company, it is horrible, I shouldn’t because he needs his rest … but … if I do send him to bed, it is so silent, it is just me. Often I go to bed early because I can’t stand being on my own …

Paula’s comments make abundantly clear the ‘unmaking’ of her world, and highlight her previous taken-for-granted sense of identity and projection into the future.

Adapting to Trauma: Stories and Narrative Coherence

Research into the experience of chronic and serious illness illustrates the way in which our routine, ‘lived’ sense of time and identity is one of implicit connection and coherence. This sense is severely disrupted in the face of trauma and it is in such contexts that stories become important as a way of re- building a sense of connection and coherence. As the recent proliferation of autobiographies (especially in relation to diseases such as cancer and HIV/AIDS) and self-help groups suggests, for people suffering the trauma of illness, storytelling takes on a ‘renewed urgency’ (Mathieson and Stam, 1995: 284). Of course, such a narrative understanding bears a strong affinity with Freud’s work, which equated mental ill health with an ‘incoherent story’ and narrative breakdown. From this perspective, psychotherapy constituted an exercise in ‘story repair’ and, as Spence (1982) argued:

Freud made us aware of the persuasive power of a coherent narrative – in particular of the ways in which an aptly chosen reconstruction can fill the gap between two apparently unrelated events, and in the process, make sense out of nonsense. There seems no doubt but that a well constructed story possesses a kind of narrative truth that is real and immediate and carries an important significance for the process of therapeutic change.

Conclusion

This paper has aimed to introduce some of the main themes underpinning a narrative approach towards psychology. Drawing on some of dominant theories in this area, it has argued that human life carries within it a narrative structure to the extent that the the individual, at the level of tacit, phenomenological experience, is constantly projecting backwards and forwards in a manner that maintains a sense of coherence, unity, meaningfulness and identity. From this perspective, the characterisation of human experience as one of constant flux, variability and incoherence, as manifest in many discursive and postmodern approaches, fails to take sufficient account of the essential unity and integrity of everyday lived experience. In accordance with this theoretical perspective, it has been argued that the experience of traumatic events such as serious illness are instrumental in facilitating an appreciation of the way in which human life is routinely narratively configured. This is because the experience of traumatisation often serves to fundamentally disrupt the routine and orderly sense of existence, throwing into radical doubt our taken-for-granted assumptions about time, identity, meaning, and life itself. When this happens, it is possible to examine the way in which narratives become important in another sense. This is in terms of the way in which they are used to restore a sense of order and connection, and thus to re-establish a semblance of meaning in the life of the individual. Accordingly, narratives of illness are useful because they help to reveal structures or meanings that typically remain implicit or unrecognised, thus potentiating a transformation of life and elevation to another level.

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Key Sources of Research

Introduction to Narrative Psychology

Click to access Chapter_1_Michelle_Crossley.pdf

Narrative psychology and narrative analysis

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274889276_Chapter_6_Narrative_psychology_and_narrative_analysis