Charles Sanders Peirce’s Continuum

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Continuum

Key Terms

  • Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Continumm
  • Continuity
  • Continua
  • Cantor’s Continua
  • Triadic Logic
  • Trivalent Logic
  • Three Valued Logic
  • Multi Valued Logic
  • Modality
  • Bivalent Logic
  • Cosmology
  • Infinite
  • Infinitesimal
  • Perception
  • Potentiality
  • Principle of Continuity
  • Realism
  • Synechism
  • Topology
  • Principle of Excluded Middle
  • Nested Continua Model

Continuity, Continuum, and Continua

  • What is Continuity, Continuum and Continua?
  • History of Continuum and Continua
  • Varieties of Continuum
  • Peirce’s Continuum
  • Continuum East and west
  • Peirce’s Nested Continua
  • Continuous and Discrete
  • Parts and No Parts (Whole)
  • Category Theory
  • Set Theory
  • Peirce’s Theory of Collections
  • Peirce’s Diagrams and Existential Graphs
  • Indivisibility
  • Number Theory and Mathematical Continuum
  • Topical/Topological Continuum
  • Cantor / Dedekind Continuum
  • Intuitive Continuum
  • Primordial Continuum
  • Large Set Theoretic Continuum
  • Category Theoretic Continuum
  • Sheaf Continuum
  • Euclidean Geometry
  • Non Euclidean Geometry
  • Archimedean Geometry
  • Non Archimedean Geometry
  • Complex Numbers and Fractals
  • Non Archimedean Systems
  • Nonstandard (Robinsonian) Continuum
  • Nilpotent Infinitesimalist Continuum
  • Point Free Continuum
  • Mereology
  • Mereotopology

History of Continua

Source: The History of Continua: Philosophical and Mathematical Perspectives

Mathematical and philosophical thought about continuity has changed considerably over the ages. Aristotle insisted that continuous substances are not composed of points, and that they can only be divided into parts potentially; a continuum is a unified whole. The most dominant account today, traced to Cantor and Dedekind, is in stark contrast with this, taking a continuum to be composed of infinitely many points. The opening chapters cover the ancient and medieval worlds: the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, and a recently discovered manuscript by Bradwardine. In the early modern period, mathematicians developed the calculus the rise of infinitesimal techniques, thus transforming the notion of continuity. The main figures treated here include Galileo, Cavalieri, Leibniz, and Kant. In the early party of the nineteenth century, Bolzano was one of the first important mathematicians and philosophers to insist that continua are composed of points, and he made a heroic attempt to come to grips with the underlying issues concerning the infinite. The two figures most responsible for the contemporary hegemony concerning continuity are Cantor and Dedekind. Each is treated, along with precursors and influences in both mathematics and philosophy. The next chapters provide analyses of figures like du Bois-Reymond, Weyl, Brouwer, Peirce, and Whitehead. The final four chapters each focus on a more or less contemporary take on continuity that is outside the Dedekind–Cantor hegemony: a predicative approach, accounts that do not take continua to be composed of points, constructive approaches, and non-Archimedean accounts that make essential use of infinitesimals.

Keywords: continuity,  Aristotle,  infinity,  infinitesimal,  Dedekind,  Cantor,  pointintuitionism,  Archimedean,  indivisibles

Key Scholars

  • Plato
  • Aristotle
  • Parmenides
  • Zeno
  • Alexander of Aphrodisias
  • Thomas Bradwardine
  • Bernard Bolzano
  • Galileo Galilei
  • Bonaventura Cavalieri
  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
  • Cauchey
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Georg Cantor
  • Richard Dedekind
  • Paul du Bois-Reymond
  • Hermann Weyl
  • Giuseppi Veronese
  • L. E. J. Brouwer
  • Alfred NorthWhitehead
  • Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Abraham Robinson

20th/21st Century Scholars

  • Matthew E. Moore
  • John L. Bell
  • Jerome Havenel
  • Fernando Zalamea
  • Gary Slater
  • Peter Ochs
  • Francesco Bellucci
  • Jon Alan Schmidt
  • D. A. Anapolitanos
  • D. Christopoulou
  • Robert Lane
  • Teppei Hayashi
  • Philip Ehrlich
  • Geoffrey Hellman
  • Stewart Shapiro
  • Marc Champagne

Varieties of Continua

Source: Varieties of Continua: From Regions to Points and Back

  • Ancient Atomism
  • Aristotle
  • Dedekind Cantor
  • Non Standard Analysis
  • Intuitionistic Analysis
  • Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis
  • Point based Predicative Analysis
  • Point Free Geometry and Analysis

Source: CONTEMPORARY INFINITESIMALIST THEORIES OF CONTINUA AND THEIR LATE 19TH- AND EARLY 20TH-CENTURY FORERUNNERS

  • Real Number System = Arithematic Continuum
  • Geometric Linear Continuum
  • Cantor Dedekind Axiom
  • Constructivist & Predicativist Theories
  • Infinitesimal Theories
    • Alain Connes’s Noncommutative (Differential) Geometry
    • Nonstandard Analysis
    • Nilpotent Infinitesimalist approaches to portions of differential geometry
    • Theory of Surreal Numbers
Emergence of Non Archimedean Systems of Magnitudes
  • Non archimedean geometry of G. Veronese
  • Tullio Levi-Civita
  • David Hilbert
  • Celebrated algebraico -set-theoretic work of Hans Hahn
  • du Bois-Reymond on the rates of growth of real functions
  • G. H. Hardy
  • Felix Hausdorff
Nonstandard Theories of Continua
  • Archimedean Axiom
  • Veronese’s Theory of Continua
  • Hahn’s non archimedean generalizations of the archimedean arithmetic continuum
  • Pantachies of du Bois-Reymond and Hausdorff
  • Elementary Continua
  • Nonstandard (Robinsonian) Continua
  • The absolute arithmetic continuum: Conway’s system of Surreal Numbers
  • Hjelmslev’s Nilpotent Infinitesimalist Continuum
  • Infinitesimalist Approches to differential geometry of Smooth Manifolds and their underlying continua
  • Invertible and Nilpotent infinitesimals afterthoughts

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Continuum

Evolution of Peirce’s Continuum

Source: Peirce on Continuity (Chapter 8 of Book by Vincent G Potter)

  • Pre Cantorian Until 1884
  • Cantorian 1884 – 1894
  • Kantistic 1895 – 1908
  • Post Cantorian 1908 – 1911

Source: Peirce’s Clarifications of Continuity / Jerome Havenel – Five Periods

  • Anti Nominalistic Period (1868 – 1884)
  • Cantorian Period (1884 – 1892)
  • Infinitesimal Period (1892 – 1897)
  • Super Multitudinous Period (1897 – 1907)
  • Topological Period (1908 – 1913)

Source: Logic of Relations and Diagrammatic Reasoning / Note 24

Scholars have explained how “continuity” is fundamental to Peirce’s mature philosophy; see Hookway (1985), Stjernfelt (2007) and Zalamea (2010). Moore (2015) evaluates Peirce’s description from a mathematical point of view. Dauben (1982) presents in some detail Peirce’s conception of the continuum from the point of view of set theory.

Source: The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought

A comprehensive and systematic reconstruction of the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, perhaps America’s most far-ranging and original philosopher, which reveals the unity of his complex and influential body of thought. 

We are still in the early stages of understanding the thought of C. S. Peirce (1839-1914). Although much good work has been done in isolated areas, relatively little considers the Peircean system as a whole. Peirce made it his life’s work to construct a scientifically sophisticated and logically rigorous philosophical system, culminating in a realist epistemology and a metaphysical theory (“synechism”) that postulates the connectedness of all things in a universal evolutionary process. 

In The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought, Kelly Parker shows how the principle of continuity functions in phenomenology and semeiotics, the two most novel and important of Peirce’s philosophical sciences, which mediate between mathematics and metaphysics. Parker argues that Peirce’s concept of continuity is the central organizing theme of the entire Peircean philosophical corpus. He explains how Peirce’s unique conception of the mathematical continuum shapes the broad sweep of his thought, extending from mathematics to metaphysics and in religion. He thus provides a convenient and useful overview of Peirce’s philosophical system, situating it within the history of ideas and mapping interconnections among the diverse areas of Peirce’s work. 

This challenging yet helpful book adopts an innovative approach to achieve the ambitious goal of more fully understanding the interrelationship of all the elements in the entire corpus of Peirce’s writings. Given Peirce’s importance in fields ranging from philosophy to mathematics to literary and cultural studies, this new book should appeal to all who seek a fuller, unified understanding of the career and overarching contributions of Peirce, one of the key figures in the American philosophical tradition.

Source: Peirce’s Logic of continuity: a conceptual and mathematical approach to the continuum and the existential graphs

Peirce’s logic of continuity is explored from a double perspective: (i) Peirce’s original understanding of the continuum, alternative to Cantor’s analytical Real line, (ii) Peirce’s original construction of a topological logic – the existential graphs – alternative to the algebraic presentation of propositional and first-order calculi. Peirce’s general architectonics, oriented to back-and-forth hierarchical crossings between the global and the local, is reflected with great care both in the continuum and the existential graphs.

Source: Two New Gestures on Peirce’s Continuum and the Existential Graphs: Plurality of Pragmatic Imagination

Source: Two New Gestures on Peirce’s Continuum and the Existential Graphs: Plurality of Pragmatic Imagination

Source: Two New Gestures on Peirce’s Continuum and the Existential Graphs: Plurality of Pragmatic Imagination

Source: Two New Gestures on Peirce’s Continuum and the Existential Graphs: Plurality of Pragmatic Imagination

Source: Does Continuity Allow For Emergence?

The present paper proposes an emergentist reading of Peirce, with special reference to his concept of evolution. Although the author never adopts the word “emergence” in a technical manner, it will be demonstrated that the core problem of emergence lies at the heart of his evolutionary doctrine, generally displayed by the interplay of his three well-known categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Indeed, although the Classical pragmatists most quoted in connection to emergentism are Dewey and Mead (and William James to some degree), scholars have recently suggested some emergentist readings of Peirce’s thought (cf. above all Tiercelin 1998, Quieroz & El-Hani 2006, Rose 2016), in particular with regard to semiotic process and cosmogony. Exploring further the path opened by those researches, the present paper aims to clarify the theoretical problem of emergent evolution from a pragmatist perspective and especially to illustrate Peirce’s emergentist standpoint. In order to reach this goal, the article is divided into four parts: after (1) a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on emergence, (2) I give a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists, (3) with a special focus on the common roots of the British Emergentists and Peirce on evolution. Finally, (4) I offer an emergentist reading of Peirce’s theory of evolution. In particular, I show how his strong emphasis on chance and the “growth” of the universe go together with his arch-stone of synechism (that is his theory of continuity), through what he calls agapasm.

C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation

Source: C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation

The writings of the American pragmatist thinker Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) provide resources for a hermeneutical model called the nested continua model of religious interpretation. A diagrammatic demonstration of iconic relational logic akin to Peirce’s Existential Graphs, the nested continua model is rendered as a series of concentric circles graphed upon a two-dimensional plane. When faced with some problem of interpretation, one may draw discrete markings that signify that problem’s logical distinctions, then represent in the form of circles successive contexts by which these distinctions may be examined in relation to one another, arranged ordinally at relative degrees of specificity and vagueness, aesthetic intensity, and concrete reasonableness. Drawing from Peter Ochs’s Scriptural Reasoning model of interfaith dialogue and Robert C. Neville’s axiology of thinking—each of which makes creative use of Peirce’s logic—this project aims to achieve an analytical unity between these two thinkers’ projects, which can then be addressed to further theological ends. The model hinges between diagrammatic and ameliorative functions, honing its logic to disclose contexts in which its theological or metaphysical claims might, if needed, be revised. These are claims made from a particular identity in a particular cultural context, but the logical rules upon which the claims are based are accessible to all. The book’s aims are to reconcile Neville’s and Ochs’s insights, explore the means by which phenomenal experience becomes encoded in texts and practices, and expand the capacity for comparing the texts and practices of one community with those of another.

Source: C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation / Review Notre Dame

Gary Slater has produced a highly original and intellectually sophisticated argument intended to develop resources in Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy for the purposes of contemporary philosophical theology. Toward that end, Slater articulates a “nested continua model” for religious interpretation early in the book, one indebted to Peirce’s “Existential Graphs,” a system of diagrams designed to provide a visual representation of the process of human reasoning. Although it has been the subject of considerable discussion, nevertheless, very few scholars have developed practical applications for Peirce’s system of graphs. Peter Ochs is an exception, having adapted Peirce’s logic for specifically theological purposes in an important book published in 1998. One of the valuable secondary contributions of Slater’s project is his successful attempt to place Ochs’ “postliberal” deliberations in productive conversation with Robert Neville’s straightforwardly liberal theology. (Along with Robert Corrington and Hermann Deuser, Ochs and Neville have been the most prominent and influential contemporary theological interpreters of Peirce’s philosophy.) As a result, Slater is able to formulate a perspective that combines a nuanced historicism with a robust metaphysics — a combination rare enough to be noteworthy.

The complexities of the nested continua model are unpacked at some length early in the book, initially in the Introduction and then with greater detail toward the end of the first chapter. This model involves the use of inscriptions drawn on a two-dimensional graph, both as specific markings and as a series of concentric circles. On Slater’s account, the model can be used in a variety of ways. Inspired by Neville’s metaphysical speculations, a point marked at the center of the graph would represent “absolute firstness,” the creative source of everything determinate in the universe. Emanating from this point, a series of nested circles can be imagined as portraying realities further and further removed from the act of creation, so that eternity would be represented by the space beyond the outermost circle. Each circle is a continuum, nested within continua of greater generality and “emerging” from those more determinate realities that it enframes. Using the model to illustrate the very different kind of analysis with which Ochs is preoccupied, each circle can also be regarded as supplying an interpretive framework for understanding everything that it contains, even as each framework is itself rendered meaningful by the broader contexts in which it is embedded. Slater observes that any two things that might be distinguished from each other can be marked on the graph as “A” and “B”; any circle drawn around them (“C”) signifies a rule of reasoning useful for interpreting these things. “The power of the model,” Slater suggests, “consists in its claim that any problem or interpretive framework can be graphed, and that the logical form for doing so — ‘A’ relates to ‘B’ with respect to some ‘C’ — remains consistent across all levels of generality” (p. 13).

In the second chapter Slater delineates the intellectual resources from which the nested continua model was developed, most of them Peircean in origin. Some of the difficulty in fully evaluating Slater’s project can be linked to certain unresolved problems in Peirce’s philosophy. Although Slater’s model is inspired by Peirce’s Existential Graphs, it should be noted that Peirce began to develop that iconic system of logic only late in his career; when he died this work remained sketchy, the Gamma graphs (devoted to modal logic) having never been completed. Peirce’s logical deliberations, moreover, were informed by his study of the topology of Johann Listing, a 19th century mathematician whose approach to the subject differs dramatically from that of later 20th and 21st century topologists. Similarly, Peirce’s concept of the infinitesimal, appropriated by Slater for multiple purposes (including his account of how continua emerge one from another), was never fully developed, leaning on the earlier work of his father Benjamin and only vaguely anticipating the way in which this concept would later be employed by Abraham Robinson in his formulation of non-standard analysis (in the 1960’s). Surely Peirce’s investigations in logic, topology and the mathematics of the infinitesimal must be regarded as unfinished business.

It should be noted that Peirce regarded any two-dimensional graph as being inadequate for the purposes of his modal logic. For the Gamma system, not a single “sheet of assertion,” but rather a three-dimensional “book of sheets, tacked together at points” would be required. This conclusion is consistent with Peirce’s critique of Josiah Royce’s map metaphor, articulated in his review of the latter’s Gifford Lectures on The World and the Individual; that map would have to be conceived as only a “section” of some three-dimensional projection. Slater himself recognizes this limitation of his model, admitting that “change itself cannot be rendered on the graph, which is after all a two-dimensional space” (p. 103). His choice is to work within this limitation rather than attempt to develop the model, thus understanding change “in terms of infinitesimal emergence.” He further admits that this move involves leaning on a concept of “emergence” that “Peirce himself did not use” (p. 85).

Whatever the limitations of Slater’s nested continua model, the ingenuity displayed in his articulation of it is impressive. Moreover, he is careful to modestly circumscribe claims about its potential usefulness, insisting that its employment ought to be understood as only a starting point for any theological inquiry (p. 209). Early on, he describes it as “a kind of abductive Petri dish” for the purpose of testing various theological hypotheses (p. 75). It facilitates a process of experimental thinking and the clarification of vague ideas, especially in the early stages of inquiry. Rather than constituting a full-blown theological method, then, Slater envisions the graphing as playing a key but limited role in such a method.

On my evaluation, the general utility of the model (as with Peirce’s existential graphs) consists in its pronounced ability to direct attention for the purpose of making certain inferences (what Slater typically refers to as “willful awareness”), thus displaying the crucial role that attention plays in all forms of human reasoning. (Consider Slater’s insightful discussion of “Prescisive and Habit-Conditioned Reasoning” on pages 79-82 — although I think that Slater conflates “prescision” with “hypostatic abstraction” in a way that he might be more careful to avoid.) The iconic features of the model also enable Slater to avoid the pitfalls of what he refers to as “linguistic determinism” (p. 122); unlike certain contemporary neo-pragmatists, Slater is disinclined to reduce semiosis to language, or limit interpretation to verbal behavior.

With regard to particular uses of the model here, there are also some moments of extraordinary insight, highly original ideas that would be well worth developing. One consists in Slater’s use of the nested continua model as an analytical tool to safeguard against metaphysical absolutism or idolatry, playing on the contrast in the model between “translucent” and “opaque” circles of interpretation. Another, toward the end of the book, involves his establishing a link between love and “singular evil” via the Scotistic concept of haecceity (pp. 193-98); since both presuppose an awareness of the radically individual character of things it makes sense on his account to describe such evil as a kind of “love gone wrong.” This is nicely done. There are also tantalizing suggestions about a type of “Thirdness” that might be shown to function “as the ultimate logical interpretant with regard to prayer” (p. 157; although the promise to develop this suggestion in a later chapter is only partially redeemed).

However one might evaluate the virtues or shortcomings of Slater’s logical model, on my reading, the significance of this book can by no means be reduced to such an evaluation. For example, the discussion and critique of theological supersessionism is thoughtful and illuminating, even while it is not linked closely enough to the nested continua model to demonstrate how or even that the model is required for the purposes of this discussion. Slater’s recognition that theological reflection takes multiple forms and so cannot be reduced to a set of responses to problematic beliefs or situations mirrors his nuanced interpretation of Peirce’s philosophy. While careful to note that Peirce’s full-blown theory of inquiry is capacious enough to embrace both the early “stimulus of doubt” account and the later portrayal of musement, Slater wisely avoids driving any kind of deep wedge between Peirce’s initial pragmatism and his eventual “pragmaticism.” The summary of key intellectual influences on Peirce’s philosophy in the book’s first chapter is a model of clarity. And since Peirce wrote very little about the topic, Slater’s creative gesturing “Toward a Peircean Philosophy of History” in chapter three deserves careful consideration

As already indicated, Slater’s attempt to mediate between the contrasting philosophical and theological perspectives articulated by Ochs and Neville represents a significant achievement. His sensitive reading of these two important but sometimes neglected interpreters of Peirce is scattered throughout the book, but forms the bulk of chapters four and five. Ochs’ portrayal of “scriptural reasoning” as an historically conditioned mode of “repair” and Neville’s account of all human thought as being intrinsically and essentially “axiological” represent a challenging subject matter rendered lucid by Slater’s treatment.

Yet Slater’s attention is by no means limited to the work of these two figures. He provides perhaps the most comprehensive overview to date of the scholarly conversation devoted to Peirce’s relevance for theology and religious studies. This overview extends back to the pioneering labors of John E. Smith, includes discussion of Corrington’s “ecstatic naturalism” as well as my own investigations in “theosemiotic,” and then proceeds to incorporate insights gleaned from the work of a small group of younger scholars (such as Leon Niemoczynski, Anette Ejsing, Abraham Robinson and Brandon Daniel-Hughes) who are presently shaping that conversation in new and interesting ways. With the publication of this book, Gary Slater now occupies a prominent place in this latter group. His voice is an original one, his scholarly range impressive (so that his reading of pragmatism registers points of view as disparate as those of Robert Brandom and Sandra Rosenthal). The bold creativity of his model is likely to attract the attention of numerous readers. The insightful application of that model to important issues in the study of religion should both sustain and reward such attention.

Source: A Visual Model of Peirce’s 66 Classes of Signs Unravels His Late Proposal of Enlarging Semiotic Theory

Source: A Less Simplistic Metaphysics: Peirce’s Layered Theory of Meaning as a Layered Theory of Being

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Continuum East and West

THE CONTINUUM EAST AND WEST Peter G. Jones
Philosophy Pathways, 185, May 2014

This essay examines the relationship between mysticism, for which Buddhism’s Middle Way doctrine would serve here as a defining example, and what, for want of better word, we call ‘Western’ philosophy. This is an issue of general interest to philosophers, since sooner or later in our investigations we must all decide whether the ‘Western’ kind of philosophy makes more or less sense to us than the ‘Eastern’ kind.

One obstacle we face in trying to make this decision is the difficulty of discerning clearly the defining characteristics of the two philosophies, those features that lead us to make such a final and definite distinction between them in the first place. We commonly speak of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ philosophy, but are not so commonly able to say quite what we mean by this. The relevant issues are profound, mind-bending and probably inexhaustible. They need not be complicated, and they are often quite simple, but they are always immensely challenging.

One of these simple (stripped of the details) yet challenging issues would be the true nature of the continuum. The discussion that follows outlines the view of physicist, mathematician and philosopher Hermann Weyl. Weyl makes a careful distinction between the ‘arithmetical’ continuum, the continuum conceived of as an extended object, as it must be for the real numbers and space-time, and the ‘intuitive’ continuum, the empirical continuum of experience, which is not extended, and he demonstrates that when we set out to define what we mean by ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ philosophy, the foundations of analysis would be a good place to start. The interconnectedness of all the relevant issues at a foundational level, for all roads lead to Rome, means that we may as well start where we like, but mathematics takes us immediately to what might be the most clearly discernable and easily described difference between the two philosophies and worldviews, perhaps also the most general and profound, namely their entirely different conceptions of the continuum.

As there is just one source for each author quoted here I have not added numbered references but just tried to make it clear who is talking. Italics are always original.

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In The Continuum: A Critical Examination of the Foundations of Analysis, Hermann Weyl points out that the extended space-time of physics and ordinary perception is, in the same way as the number line, a construction of reason and not intuitively or empirically given. He addresses a problem that arises in different guises but with an equal vengeance in religion, physics, mathematics and metaphysics. It is the problem of modelling a continuum as an extended series of discrete locations or ‘things’, as we do must do for the number line, geometry and arithmetic, space and time, and even for our very concept of the continuum, when a series of discrete locations or ‘things’ is exactly and precisely what a continuum is not.

A continuum cannot be extended as a series of points or moments for the reasons Weyl gives below, and yet it must be in order for anything to be extended in space and time. This causes a problem in philosophy. It would be a ‘first-order’ metaphysical problem or ‘antinomy’, a straight choice between two ideas neither of which work. It would be closely connected with the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, of how small we can make an angel before it becomes the ‘ghost of a departed quantity’. The various problems and paradoxes to which the intellectually-constructed continuum of the arithmetical line gives rise has no impact on the usefulness of mathematics, which is wholly dependent on this conception, but it indicates that the continuum of space-time is not an equivalent case and is, rather, a true continuum. As such, it would not be a set of locations but a unity. A unity has no parts. This would suggest that space and time are conceptual imputations and that Reality, whatever is truly and independently-real amongst all the smoke and mirrors, is not in fact extended. This is a difficult idea but not a new one, and it is widely popular in religion. When theoretical physicists say ‘distance is arbitrary’, perhaps they are suggesting something similar. It might at least help to explain how a Big Bang can appear to have occurred before there is, was or ever will be a time or a place for it to have happened. For an ultimate view it would not have happened. If the continuum cannot have parts then all co-ordinate systems are emergent.

Here is Tobias Dantzig, a mathematician admired by Einstein, introducing the issues.

Herein I see the genesis of the conflict between geometrical intuition, from which our physical concepts derive, and the logic of arithmetic. The harmony of the universe knows only one musical form – the legato; while the symphony of numbers knows only its opposite, – the staccato. All attempts to reconcile this discrepancy are based on the hope that an accelerated staccato may appear to our senses as legato. Yet our intellect will always brand such attempts as deceptions and reject such theories as an insult, as a metaphysics that purports to explain away a concept by resolving it into its opposite.

While a series of points serves perfectly well for the continuum of the number line and arithmetic, on examination it is a paradoxical idea that must be rejected in both metaphysics and physics as a model of space-time. The continuum of physics is, at this time, extended as a series of points and moments, and as such no sense can be made of it. Viewed as a real phenomenon a continuum so-defined would either be paradoxical or fail to qualify for the name. We have every right to define the continuum for mathematics as we currently do, and if our idea is paradoxical then it is only a problem when we investigate the foundations of analysis. When we define the continuum for mathematics we are not making a claim about the nature of Reality. Elsewhere it would be a different matter. In metaphysics we certainly cannot adopt a priori an arithmetical definition of the continuum. Insofar as it relates to metaphysics this might be the central message of Weyl’s book. At the same time, physics and ordinary perception are heavily theory-laden, dangerously so. Our usual everyday theory is that time and space are extended in just the same way as is the number line, such that space- and time-points can be represented as locations in an extended co-ordinate system. But is there any evidence that space and time are extended objects? What is it that our wristwatch is actually measuring? Are we quite sure that our usual theory of extension, for which space-time would be a ‘classical’ or Newtonian phenomenon, is fundamentally correct? Is it a metaphysical conjecture, a testable scientific theory, something we know from experience or a highly evolved misinterpretation? For our Western tradition of philosophy this would be a famously undecidable problem. Here the continuum appears to be paradoxical, for it cannot be extended ex hypothesis, and yet, by some magic, it is. Or it seems to be. For the Eastern tradition this everyday theory of space-time would be testable and it would fail the tests, being refutable in logic and falsifiable in experience. The continuum would be a unity, just as its name implies.

Weyl reduces the conceptually extended continuum of mathematics and traditional physics to what he calls the ‘true’ or ‘intuitive’ continuum, where the latter is carefully distinguished from the former. The intuitive continuum, the continuum as we experience it, is not extended as a series of moments or points. We do not experience time and space as consisting of moments and points, or, if we do, it is only ever the same moment and point. We are always here and now. What is more, there is actually something very odd about the idea that space and time are ‘grainy’ in this way. The length of ten thousand points would be equal to the length of one point, for a start, so no amount of points would be sufficient to construct basic geometry, let alone a piano. In the same way, no amount of moments would be sufficient to account for motion and change. Space and time are explanatory theories, Weyl proposes, generated by reason and imagination, not empirical phenomena.

For an orthodox view of space-time here is a passage from Wikipedia from the entry for Hermann Minkowsky.

This new reality was that space and time, as physical constructs, have to be combined into a new mathematical/physical entity called ‘space-time’, because the equations of relativity show that both the space and time coordinates of any event must get mixed together by the mathematics, in order to accurately describe what we see. Because space consists of 3 dimensions, and time is 1- dimensional, space-time must, therefore, be a 4-dimensional object. It is believed to be a ‘continuum’ because so far as we know, there are no missing points in space or instants in time, and both can be subdivided without any apparent limit in size or duration. So, physicists now routinely consider our world to be embedded in this 4-dimensional Space-Time continuum, and all events, places, moments in history, actions and so on are described in terms of their location in Space-Time.

Dantzig explores the origins of this co-ordinate system.

The notion of equal-greater-less precedes the number concept. We learn to compare before we lean to evaluate. Arithmetic does not begin with numbers; it begins with criteria. Having learnt to apply these criteria of equal-greater-less, man’s next step was to devise models for each type of plurality. These models are deposited in his memory very much as the standard meter is deposited at the Bureau of Longitudes in Paris. One, two, three, four, five …; we could just as well have said: I,

wings, clover, legs, hand … and, for all we know, the latter preceded our present form.

He goes on to observe that the staccato of the numbers is not empirical or intuitive, but a superimposition.

It is possible to assign to any point on a line a unique real number, and, conversely, any real number can be represented in a unique manner by a point on the line.

This is the famous Dedekind-Cantor axiom. This proposition, by sanctifying the tacit assumption on which analytical geometry had operated for over two hundred years, became the fundamental axiom of this discipline. It defines a new mathematical being, the arithmetical line. Henceforth the line – and consequently the plane, and space – ceases to be an intuitive notion and is reduced to being a mere carrier of numbers.

In the following passage Dantzig notes the paradoxical nature of the arithmetical line. This matters little in mathematics, but when the arithmetical line is taken to be a model of the true continuum it renders Reality paradoxical and causes philosophical havoc, in particular a deep rift between two quite different traditions of philosophy.

The axiom of Dedekind – “if all points of a straight line fall into two classes, such that every point of the first class lies to the left of any point of the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions” – this axiom is just a skilful paraphrase of the fundamental property we attribute to time. Our intuition permits us, by an act of the mind, to sever all time into the two classes, the past and the future, which are mutually exclusive and yet together comprise all of time, eternity: The now is the partition which separates all the past from all the future; any instant of the past was once a now, any instant of the future will be a now anon, and so any instant may itself act as such a partition. To be sure, of the past we know only disparate instants, yet, by an act of the mind we fill out the gaps; we conceive that between any two instants – no matter how closely these may be associated in our memory – there were other instants, and we postulate the same compactness for the future. This is what we mean by the flow of time.

Furthermore, paradoxical though this may seem, the present is truly irrational in the Dedekind sense of the word, for while it acts as partition it is neither a part of the past nor a part of the future. Indeed, in an arithmetic based on pure time, if such an arithmetic was at all possible, it is the irrational which would be taken as a matter of course, while all the painstaking efforts of our logic would be directed toward establishing the existence of rational numbers.

In other words, the Dedekind sense of the word ‘present’ is irrational. Space-time cannot have the properties he assigns to the number line unless the Cosmos is irrational. This is the problem addressed by Weyl. He deals with it by making a clear distinction between the intuitive or experienced continuum, the intuition of the continuum that for all of us is an empirical phenomenon, and the intellectually constructed faux-continuum of Dedekind’s arithmetical line. They could hardly be more different.

To the criticism that the intuition of the continuum in no way contains those logical principles on which we must rely for the exact definition of the concept “real number,” we respond that the conceptual world of mathematics is so foreign to what the intuitive continuum presents to us that the demand for coincidence between the two must be dismissed as absurd.

He points out that the usefulness of the arithmetical line has no bearing on its plausibility as a model of the space-time continuum.

Whichever view of the relation of mathematics to nature one takes, there is no independent physical conception of the continuum on offer in all this, since all the mathematics is filtered through the real number system (or Hilbertian geometry as a surrogate). Moreover, I don’t see that any argument can be made from the enormously successful applications of mathematics in natural science to the conclusion that one or another of the mathematical conceptions of the continuum surveyed above is uniquely singled out as the “real one”. In any case, the work on the reach of predicative mathematics cited at the end of the preceding section shows that the properties of the continuum needed for its applications in natural science do not require it to have a definite reality in the platonistic sense.

Here is extract from an essay on Weyl and the continuum by John Bell.

…Weyl regards the experienced continuous flow of phenomenal time as constituting an insuperable barrier to the whole enterprise of representing this continuum in terms of individual points, and even to the characterization of “individual temporal point” itself. As he says,

“The view of a flow consisting of points and, therefore, also dissolving into points turns out to be mistaken: precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the flowing from point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually enduring present can continually slip away into the receding past.

Each one of us, at every moment, directly experiences the true character of this temporal continuity. But, because of the genuine primitiveness of phenomenal time, we cannot put our experiences into words. So we shall content ourselves with the following description. What I am conscious of is for me both a being-now and,

in its essence, something which, with its temporal position, slips away. In this way there arises the persisting factual extent, something ever new which endures and changes in consciousness.”

We see here that an examination of the foundations of analysis leads us immediately into the realms of psychology, physics, metaphysics, religion, consciousness studies and more. Bell continues.

Weyl sums up what he thinks can be affirmed about “objectively presented time”— by which I take it he means “phenomenal time described in an objective manner”— in the following two assertions, which he claims apply equally, mutatis mutandis, to every intuitively given continuum, in particular, to the continuum of spatial extension:

1. An individual point in it is non-independent, i.e., is pure nothingness when taken by itself, and exists only as a “point of transition” (which, of course, can in no way be understood mathematically);

2. It is due to the essence of time (and not to contingent imperfections in our medium) that a fixed temporal point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approximate, never an exact determination is possible.

The fact that single points in a true continuum “cannot be exhibited” arises, Weyl continues, from the fact that they are not genuine individuals and so cannot be characterized by their properties. In the physical world they are never defined absolutely, but only in terms of a coordinate system, which, in an arresting metaphor, Weyl describes as “the unavoidable residue of the eradication of the ego.”

In particular, he found compelling the fact that the Brouwerian continuum is not the union of two disjoint nonempty parts— that it is, in a word, indecomposable. “A genuine continuum,” Weyl says, “cannot be divided into separate fragments.” In later publications he expresses this more colourfully by quoting Anaxagoras to the effect that a continuum “defies the chopping off of its parts with a hatchet.”

Weyl’s book on the continuum delves little further into metaphysical issues than is necessary for his examination of analysis. Elsewhere he says more, and we find a clear connection between his mathematico-philosophical views and Buddhism’s theory of emptiness and doctrine of dependent origination. As far as it goes his book on the continuum could be read as a mathematical explanation of the universe of the perennial philosophy, and of how it differs from that of the Western tradition in at least one vital respect. Bell makes the correlation clear.

In The Open World (1932), Weyl provides an eloquent formulation of his philosophical outlook, which quickly moves beyond its initial echoes of Schopenhauer:

“The beginning of all philosophical thought is the realization that the perceptual world is but an image, a vision, a phenomenon of our consciousness; our consciousness does not directly grasp a transcendental real world which is as it appears. The tension between subject and object is no doubt reflected in our conscious acts, for example, in sense perceptions. Nevertheless, from the purely epistemological point of view, no objection can be made to a phenomenalism which would like to limit science to the description of what is “immediately given to consciousness”. The postulation of the real ego, of the thou and of the world, is a metaphysical matter, not judgment, but an act of acknowledgment and belief.

But this belief is after all the soul of all knowledge. It was an error of idealism to assume that the phenomena of consciousness guarantee the reality of the ego in an essentially different and somehow more certain way than the reality of the external world; in the transition from consciousness to reality the ego, the thou and the world rise into existence indissolubly connected and, as it were, at one stroke.”

Any comparison of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ approaches to philosophy must eventually end up here, examining the question of whether the continuum of space-time is arithmetical and paradoxical, or whether it would make more sense to say that spatio-temporal extension is an interpretation of appearances, a relationship between appearances, and not an empirical or even truly real phenomenon. Whichever way we decide this question, an examination of these issues will reveal a clear and crucial difference of opinion between East and West over the ultimate nature of Reality.

It is absurdly misleading to use the words ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ to describe two philosophical camps, and really it is dualism and nondualism that we are comparing here, both of which appear all over the world. Whatever words we use, mathematics can help us to pin down our definitions in important respects.

Weyl summarises his view as follows.

The category of the natural numbers can supply the foundation of a mathematical discipline. But perhaps the continuum cannot, since it fails to satisfy the requirements [mentioned in Chapter1]: as basic a notion as that of the point in the continuum lacks the required support in intuition. It is to the credit of Bergson’s philosophy to have pointed out forcefully this deep division between the world of mathematical concepts

and the immediately experienced continuity of phenomenal time.

The view of a flow consisting of points and, therefore, also dissolving into points turns out to be false. Precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the flowing from point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually enduring present can continually slip away into the receding past….

…When our experience has turned into a real process in a real world and our phenomenal time has spread itself out over this world and assumed a cosmic dimension, we are not satisfied with replacing the continuum by the exact concept of the real numbers, in spite of the essential and undeniable inexactness arising from what is given. For, as always, there is more at work here than heavy-handed schematizing or cognitive economizing devised for fulfilling our practical tasks and objectives. Here we discover genuine reason which lays bare the “Logos” dwelling in reality (just as purely as is possible for this consciousness which cannot “leap over its own shadow”). But to discuss this further cannot be our business here. Certainly, the intuitive and the mathematical continuum do not coincide; a deep chasm is fixed between them….

…The reflections contained in this section are, of course, only a slightly illuminating surrogate for a genuine philosophy of the continuum. But since no penetrating treatment of this topic is at hand and since our task is mathematical rather than epistemological, the matter can rest there.

For a book on analysis it would have been inappropriate for Weyl to say more about this. If we are examining the pivotal questions on which Eastern and Western philosophies are divided, however, then the matter cannot rest here. The former philosophy makes a claim about the continuum that is denied point-blank by the latter. It may still be true that ‘no penetrating treatment of this topic is at hand’, at least outside of the ‘mystical’ literature, but this would not reflect on the importance of this topic across all of philosophy, and it need not prevent us from forming a view on which of these two philosophical approaches gives the most plausible description of space and time.

Is space-time extended or is it a continuum? Weyl suggest that we cannot have it both ways. Nagarjuna’s Middle Way Buddhism, which is infuriatingly stubborn when it comes to endorsing extreme views on any topic, would say that the question is not quite answerable in this straightforward form. There would be a sense in which it is neither and a sense in which it is both. There is not a straightforward disagreement between East and West on the answer to this question, therefore, with the two sides adopting equal and opposite views. All the same, it seems true to say that the very different answers they give to this question reveal one of the most crucial and far-reaching differences between these two traditions of philosophical thought.

Bibliography

Bell, John L, ‘Hermann Weyl on intuition and the continuum’.

Click to access Hermann%20Weyl.pdf

Dantzig, Tobias, Number – The Language of Science, (Pearson Education 2005 (1930)

Weyl, Hermann, The Continuum: A Critical Examination of the Foundations of Analysis, Dover (1987)

My Related Posts

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Visual Logic: Diagrams and Existential Graphs

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Signs

The Aesthetics of Charles Sanders Peirce

Indra’s Net: On Interconnectedness

The Great Chain of Being

Maha Vakyas: Great Aphorisms in Vedanta

On Synchronicity

Key Sources of Research

Implications of Synechism: Continuity and Second-Order Vagueness

Implicações do Sinequismo: Lógica Triádica e Vagueza de Segunda Ordem

Marco Annoni

Università di Pisa – Italia

marcoabrema@hotmail.com

COGNI TI O-ESTUDOS: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia

Centro de Estudos do Pragmatismo – Programa de Estudos Pós-Graduados em Filosofia – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo

São Paulo, Volume 3, Número 2, p. 096- 108, TEXTO 11/3.2, julho/dezembro, 2006

https://www.academia.edu/1965259/Implications_of_Synechism_Continuity_and_Second_Order_Vagueness

Continuity as vagueness: The mathematical antecedents of Peirce’s semiotics*

PETER OCHS

Semiotica 96-3/4 (1993), 231-255 0037-1998/93/0096-0231

https://www.academia.edu/19870302/Continuity_as_vagueness_The_mathematical_antecedents_of_Peirces_semiotics

Peirce and Brouwer

Conor Mayo-Wilson

September 5, 2011

https://www.academia.edu/954648/Peirce_and_Brouwer

Peirce, Leibniz, and the threshold of pragmatism

Francesco Bellucci

Semiotica 2013; 195: 331 – 355
DOI 10.1515/sem-2013-0030

Dynamical Interpretation of Leibniz’s Continuum

Vassil VIDINSKY*

Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the
Continuum

D. A. Anapolitanos and D. Christopoulou*

*Corresponding author: D. Christopoulou, Assistant Professor Mathematics Department, Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece, E-mail: chrdemet@yahoo.gr
D. A. Anapolitanos, History and Philosophy of Science Department, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece, E-mail: danap@phs.uoa.gr

Metaphysica 2020; aop

https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-0008

https://www.academia.edu/44132364/Peirce_and_Leibniz_on_Continuity_and_the_Continuum_with_D_Anapolitanos_

Peirce’s Topological Concepts

Jérôme Havenel

Draft version of the book chapter published in
New Essays on Peirce’s Philosophy of Mathematics,
Matthew E. Moore ed, Open Court, 2010

Peirce’s Logic of Continuity

A Conceptual and Mathematical Approach

Fernando Zalamea

Book

https://www.academia.edu/31948393/ZalameaPeirceCont_pdf

Peirce’s Clarifications of Continuity

Jérôme Havenel

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal
in American Philosophy, Volume 44, Number 1, Winter 2008,
pp. 86-133 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.1353/csp.0.0001

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236774797_Peirce%27s_Clarifications_of_Continuity

«Peirce’s meditations on continuity: from transitivity to topology»,

Havenel, J. (2015).

en: Zalemea, Fernando y Oostra, Arnold (eds).

Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana. Vol. 7,. Bogotá: Editorial Nomos, pp. 101-126.

Peirce’s Continuous Predicates

FRANCESCO BELLUCCI

Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society

A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy · April 2013
DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.49.2.178

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259734578_Peirce%27s_Continuous_Predicates

“Peirce’s Definitions of Continuity”

Potter, V. G.; Shields, S. J. (1977):

Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, v. 13, n. 1, pp. 20-34.

Synechism: the Keystone of Peirce’s Metaphysics

Joseph Esposito

http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/esposito-joseph-synechism-keystone-peirce’s-metaphysics

Peirce’s Logic of continuity: a conceptual and mathematical approach to the continuum and the existential graphs.

Zalamea, F. (2012).

Boston: Docent Press.

«Leibniz on Continuity»,

Arthur, R. (1986).

en: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science, Science Association, Vol. 1986, Volume One: Contributed Papers, pp. 107-115

«Continuity in Leibniz’s Mature Metaphysics»,

Crockett, T. (May, 1999).

en: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 94, No. 1/2, Selected Papers Presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting 1998, pp. 119-138.

«Peirce and Leibniz»,

Fisch, M. (Jul.-Sep. 1972).

en: Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 33, No. 3, Festschrift for Philip P. Wiener, pp. 485-496

The idea of continuity in the philosphies of Leibniz and Peirce.

Flórez Restrepo, J. A., & Arias Cardona, J. E. (2022).

Pensamiento. Revista De Investigación E Información Filosófica, 78(298 S. Esp), 841-861. https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v78.i298.y2022.030

https://revistas.comillas.edu/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/10977

“On Peirce’s Discovery of Cantor’s Theorem.”

Moore, Matthew E. 2007.

Cognitio 8: 223–48.

“Peirce’s Cantor.”

Moore, Matthew E. 2011.

in New Essays on Peirce’s Mathematical Philosophy, ed. Matthew E. Moore. Chicago: Open Court.

“Peirce on Cantor’s Paradox and the Continuum.” 

Myrvold, Wayne C. 1995.

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31 (3): 508–41.

PATTERNHOOD, CORRELATION, AND GENERALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF PATTERNS

Jimmy Jericho Aames

Master of Arts Thesis
in the Department of Philosophy
Indiana University
July 2016

https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/10896/Thesis%2007052016.pdf?sequence=1

Peirce-Related Papers

Bibliography

Indiana University

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ABOUTCSP.HTM

Charles Sanders Peirce

Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce

Peirce’s “Extreme” Realism and Supermultitudinous Conception of Continuity

Jimmy Aames

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis

Department of Philosophy MAE-mail:  jjaames@iupui.edu

2015

https://www.academia.edu/12635422/Peirces_Extreme_Realism_and_Supermultitudinous_Conception_of_Continuity

Peirce on Continuity: Vindication of Universals against Nominalism

Paniel Reyes Cardenas

2014, Hannah, Patricia (Ed),An Anthology of Philosophical Studies 8

https://www.academia.edu/7005464/Peirce_on_Continuity_Vindication_of_Universals_against_Nominalism

Mathematical Structuralism, Continuity and Peirce’s Diagrammatic Reasoning

Paniel Reyes Cardenas

https://www.academia.edu/1540932/Mathematical_Structuralism_Continuity_and_Peirces_Diagrammatic_Reasoning

Bateson and Peirce on the Pattern that Connects and the Sacred

Søren Brier

2008, A Legacy for Living Systems

https://www.academia.edu/725104/Bateson_and_Peirce_on_the_Pattern_that_Connects_and_the_Sacred

Philosophy of Mathematics
Selected Writings
Charles S. Peirce

Edited by
Matthew E. Moore

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS 2010

Bloomington and Indianapolis

Peirce and the Continuum from a Philosophical Point of View.

Zink, J. (2001).

In: Schuster, P., Berger, U., Osswald, H. (eds) Reuniting the Antipodes — Constructive and Nonstandard Views of the Continuum. Synthese Library, vol 306. Springer, Dordrecht.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9757-9_25

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9757-9_25

Peirce’s Topical Continuum: A “Thicker” Theory

Jon Alan Schmidt

TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 56, No. 1 (2020) • doi: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.56.1.04

https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHPTC-2

Charles Sanders Peirce and the Principle of Bivalence

Robert Lane

1998

https://www.academia.edu/660658/Charles_Sanders_Peirce_and_the_Principle_of_Bivalence


The genesis of the Peircean continuum

Matthew E. Moore
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (3):425 – 469 (2007)

Peirce’s topical theory of continuity.

Moore, Matthew E. (2015).

Synthese 192 (4):1-17.

Peirce’s Triadic Logic Revisited

Lane, Robert (1999).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (2):284 – 311.

Peirce’s Graphs—The Continuity Interpretation.

Zeman, J. Jay (1968).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 4 (3):144 – 154.

Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature.

Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra (1997).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (3):646 – 678.

Questions concerning Peirce’s Agapic Continuity.

Staab, Janice M. (1999).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1):157 – 176.

Peirce’s Definitions of Continuity and the Concept of Possibility.

Noble, N. A. Brian (1989).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 25 (2):149 – 174.

Peirce’s Potential Continuity and Pure Geometry.

Hudry, Jean-Louis (2004).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40 (2):229 – 243.

The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought.

Colapietro, Vincent (1999).

The Personalist Forum 15 (2):432-437.

Continuity and Inheritance: Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” and the Work of C. S. Peirce.

Kaag, John (2005).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):515 – 540.

Peirce’s evolutionary logic: Continuity, indeterminacy, and the natural order.

Alborn, Timothy L. (1989).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 25 (1):1 – 28.

Peirce’s mathematical-logical approach to discrete collections and the premonition of continuity.

Rebello Cardoso, Helio (2012).

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (1-2):11-28.

The Peircean Continuum

Vargas, Francisco, and Matthew E. Moore, 

in Stewart Shapiro, and Geoffrey Hellman (eds), The History of Continua: Philosophical and Mathematical Perspectives (Oxford, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Dec. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809647.003.0014, accessed 31 Mar. 2023.

The History of Continua: Philosophical and Mathematical Perspectives 

Shapiro, Stewart, and Geoffrey Hellman (eds), 

(Oxford, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Dec. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809647.001.0001, accessed 31 Mar. 2023.

Peirce’s Topological Concepts

Jérôme Havenel

Draft version of the book chapter published in New Essays on Peirce’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Matthew E. Moore ed, Open Court, 2010.

https://www.academia.edu/25930950/Peirces_Topological_Concepts_Jerome_Havenel

A Category-Theoretic Reading of Peirce’s System: Pragmaticism, Continuity, and Existential Graphs.

Zalamea, Fernando. 2010.

In New Essays on Peirce’s Mathematical Philosophy, edited by Matthew E. Moore, pp. 203–233. Chicago: Open Court.

STEVIN NUMBERS AND REALITY

KARIN USADI KATZ AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ

2012

DISSERTATIONS ON PEIRCE

Indiana University

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/dissabs/diss.htm

The Continuum:
History, Mathematics, and Philosophy

by
Teppei Hayashi

A THESIS
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
CALGARY, ALBERTA December, 2017

New Essays on Peirce’s Mathematical Philosophy


Matthew E. Moore (ed.), New Essays on Peirce’s Mathematical Philosophy, Open Court, 2010, ISBN 9780812696813.

PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM

METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

FERNANDO ZALAMEA

“Modern Topology and Peirce’s Theory of the Continuum.” 

Johanson, Arnold.

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37, no. 1 (2001): 1–12. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320822.

C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation

Slater, Gary

Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs (Oxford, 2015; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Dec. 2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198753230.001.0001, accessed 2 Apr. 2023.

True Continuity and Analytical Continuity

In Continuity, discontinuity and negotiation of meaning in distributed virtual environments

Patrick John Coppock

https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/coppock/Solomon/Solomon-True.html

C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation


Gary Slater, C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2015, 242pp., $110.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198753230.

Reviewed by Michael L. Raposa, Lehigh University
2016.06.07

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Department of Philosophy
100 Malloy Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA
ndpr@nd.edu

https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/c-s-peirce-and-the-nested-continua-model-of-religious-interpretation/

On the relations between Georg Cantor and Richard Dedekind.

Ferreirós, J. (1993). 

Historia Mathematica, 20, 343-363.

“The mathematical continuum: A haunting problematic,”

de Freitas, Liz (2018)

The Mathematics Enthusiast: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 9.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54870/1551-3440.1421
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/tme/vol15/iss1/9

Continuity and infinitesimals.

Bell, J.L. (2013). 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continuity/

The continuous, the discrete and the infinitesimal in philosophy and mathematics.

John L. Bell

Switzerland: Springer, 2019, 313+xvii pp,

The Continuous and the Infinitesimal in Mathematics and Philosophy


John Lane Bell
Polimetrica s.a.s., 2005

The Continuum and the Evolution of the Concept of Real Number

John L. Bell

Department of Philosophy

The University of Western Ontario

jbell@uwo.ca

Varieties of Continua: From Regions to Points and Back.

Hellman, G, and S. Shapiro (2018). 

Oxford University Press.

The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a Contemporary Perspective 

White, M. J. (1992). 

Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Varieties of Synechism: Peirce and James on Mind–World Continuity.

Calcaterra, Rosa M. (2011).

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25 (4):412-424.

Review of Gary Slater, C. S. Pierce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation

C. S. Peirce and the Nested Continua Model of Religious Interpretation. Gary Slater. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 242 pp.

Brandon Daniel-Hughes
John Abbott College

THE JOURNAL OF SCRIPTURAL REASONING

The Continuity of Continuity:
A Theme in Leibniz, Peirce and Quine

Begoña Ilarregui y Jaime Nubiola
Universidad de Navarra

Publicado en Leibniz und Europa, VI. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, 361-371.
Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft e. V. Hannover., 1994.

https://www.unav.es/users/Articulo13.html

THE ABSOLUTE ARITHMETIC CONTINUUM AND THE UNIFICATION OF ALL NUMBERS GREAT AND SMALL

PHILIP EHRLICH

The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic

Volume 00, Number 0, XXX 0000

Click to access Ehrlich.pdf

DIVERGENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE CONTINUUM IN 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY MATHEMATICS AND PHILOSOPHY

JOHN L. BELL


Towards a classifification of continuity and on the emergence of generality

Daniel Rosiak
DePaul University, drosiak@depaul.edu

Department of Philosophy
College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences DePaul University
Chicago,IL

December, 2019

PEIRCE’S PLACE IN MATHEMATICS

BY JOSEPH W. DAUBEN

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, HERBERT H. LEHMAN COLLEGE, AND
Ph.D. PROGRAM IN HISTORY, THE GRADUATE CENTER,
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, NY 10036

HISTORIA MATHEMATICA 9 (1982) 311-325

CONTEMPORARY INFINITESIMALIST THEORIES OF CONTINUA AND THEIR LATE 19TH- AND EARLY 20TH-CENTURY FORERUNNERS

PHILIP EHRLICH

‘One, Two, Three:Fundamental Categories of Thought and Nature,

Charles Sanders Peirce

Three Infinitesimalist Theories of Continua

Philip Ehrlich

“The Absolute Arithmetic Continuum and its Peircean Counterpart”

P . Ehrlich,

in New Essays on Peirce’ s Mathematical Philosophy, edited by Matthew Moore, Open Court Press (forthcoming).

Charles S. Peirce’s Idea of Ultimate Reality and Meaning Related to Humanity’s Ultimate Future as seen through Scientific Inquiry

Noel E. Boulting, Mid-Kent College o fHigher and Further Education, Chatham, Kent, England

https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.16.1-2.9

THE SACRED DEPTHS OF NATURE
AN ONTOLOGY OF THE POSSIBLE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE AND HEIDEGGER

Leon J. Niemoczynski
B.A., East Stroudsburg University, 2001 M.A., West Chester University, 2004

Department of Philosophy
in the Graduate School Southern Illinois University Carbondale May 2009

The Completeness of the Real Line

Matthew E. Moore

Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College. E–mail: matthewm@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Crítica (Méx., D.F.) vol.39 no.117 Ciudad de México dic. 2007

“Logique et mathématique du Continu chez Charles Sanders Peirce”,

Havenel, Jérôme, 2006,

Doctoral Thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

https://www.theses.fr/2006EHES0079

A Less Simplistic Metaphysics: Peirce’s Layered Theory of Meaning as a Layered Theory of Being

Marc Champagne
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

December 2015

Sign Systems Studies 43(4):523-552
DOI:10.12697/SSS.2015.43A10

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310446520_A_Less_Simplistic_Metaphysics_Peirce%27s_Layered_Theory_of_Meaning_as_a_Layered_Theory_of_Being

VIRTUAL LOGIC–THE COMBINATORIAL HIERARCHY: ‘ONE, TWO, THREE, INFINITY!’

Author: Kauffman, Louis
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 19, Number 3, 2012, pp. 83-91(9)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/chk/2012/00000019/00000003/art00006

6.3 ONE, TWO, THREE … ETERNITY

Subchapter in book

Cyber Semiotics: Why Information is not enough

Soren Brier

Peirce’s Prepunctual Continuum

MATTHEW MOORE

CUADERNOS DE SISTEMÁTICA PEIRCEANA
Número 7 – 2015
CENTRO DE SISTEMÁTICA PEIRCEANA
CSP

Time and the Continuum. An Introduction to the Problem(s)

Marcello Garibbo
University of Siegen

Philosophy Kitchen #13 — Anno 7 — Settembre 2020 — ISSN: 2385-1945 — Il Tempo e il Continuo.

Is Synechism Necessary?

Matthew Moore

Cognitio, Sao Paulo, Vol 14, No 1, 2013

Continuity of Space and Theories of Intersections

from Euclid to Leibniz

Vincenzo De Risi

Brouwer and Weyl: The Phenomenology and mathematics of the intuitive continumm

M Van Atten; D Van Dalen; R Tieszen

Infinitesimals and the continuum

John L. Bell

A formalization of forcing and the unprovability of the continumm Hypothesis

Jesse Michael Han; Floris Van Doorn

Peirce’s Conception of Metaphysics

Joshua David Black

Phd Thesis 2017

Peirce’s Triadic Logic : Continuity, Modality, and L

Odland, Brent C.

MS Thesis, 2020

University of Calgary

on the structure of continua

G T Whyburn

Potential infinity and intuitiontic Logic

Oystein Linnebo, Stewart Shapiro and Geoffrey Hellman

Conceptions of the continuum

Solomon Feferman

2009

the continuum east and west

Peter G Jones

Philosophy Pathways, 185, May 2014

https://philarchive.org/archive/JONTCE

Cauchey’s Continuum

Karin Katz and Mikhail Katz

Dicisigns: Peirce’s Semiotic Doctrine of Propositions

Synthese, Vol 192, No 4, 2015

Real Numbers, Generalizations of the Reals, and Theories of Continua

Time and the continuum

Lambalgen and Pinosio

Indefinite Divisibility

Jeffrey Sanford Russell

Inconsistent Boundaries

Zach Weber and AJ Cotnoir

Peirce’s mathematical logical approach to discrete collections and the premonition of Continuity

Helio Rebello

Cantor, Peirce and the True Continuum

Peirce and Cantor on Continuity

Stephen Gardner

https://www.academia.edu/3721816/Peirce_and_Cantor_on_Continuity

Charles Peirce on the Continuity of Thought

Dinh Huyen My

BS Thesis 2021

Charles University

william James psychology and ontology of continuity

Michela Bella

Toward a clarity of the extreme value theorem

Karin Katz

Mikhail Katz

Taras Kudryk

Time, Modality and three valued logic in Peirce and Lukasiewicz

Jose Renato Salatiel

Continuity and Mathematical Ontology in Aristotle

Keren Wilson Shatalov

The classical Continuum without points

Geoffrey Hellman and Stewart Shapiro

what is Categorical Structuralism?

Geoffrey Hellman

euclid’s geometry is just in our mind, rather than describing the real world

Arturo Tozzi

James Peters

The logic of Kant’s Temporal Continuum

Riccardo Pinosio

Varieties of Logic

Stewart Shapiro

Philosophical Aspects of Peirce’s Trivalent Logic

Jose Renato Salatiel

Philosophical problem of relations according to Peirce: Alliances towards an ontology of relations regarding two aspects of Synechism

Helio Rebello Cardoso Jr

Thein Spinelli Farraz

Are points (Necessarily) unextended?

Philip Ehrlich

C. S. Peirce and Aristotle on Time

Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou

Applied Communicology in Org PR and R&D: Peirce on Synechism, Fuller on Synergetics, Gordon on Synectics, and Alinsky on Socialism

Richard Lanigan

The Continuity Debate: Dedekind, Cantor, Du Bois-Reymond, and Peirce on Continuity and Infinitesimals


Alison Walsh, Benjamin Lee Buckley
Docent Press, 2012

‘Hermann Weyl on intuition and the continuum’.

Bell, John L. (2000).

Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):259-273.

Click to access Hermann%20Weyl.pdf

A Primer of Infinitesimal Analysis.

Bell, John L. (1998).

Cambridge University Press.

The Continuum: A Critical Examination of the Foundations of Analysis 

Weyl, Hermann, 

Dover (1987)

Brouwer and Weyl: The Phenomenology and Mathematics of the Intuitive Continuumt

M. Atten, D. Dalen, R. Tieszen
Published 1 April 2001

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Brouwer-and-Weyl%3A-The-Phenomenology-and-Mathematics-Atten-Dalen/bde9d5572ce8952be18ff3abc9f6160be7d768d4

Hermann Weyl’s intuitionistic mathematics. 

D. van Dalen.

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 1:145–169, 1995.

Mystic, geometer, and intuitionist. The life of L.E.J. Brouwer.

1: The dawning revolution.

D. van Dalen. 

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.

The Continuity of Being: C.S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Synechism

by Brian Kemple

Epoché Philosophy Monthly

Issue #19 January 2019

https://epochemagazine.org/19/the-continuity-of-being-c-s-peirces-philosophy-of-synechism/

The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought

by Kelly A. Parker

Book 1998

The Concept of Continuity in Charles Peirce’s Synechism.

Benedict, George Allen (1973).

Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo

Peirce’s topical theory of continuity

Authors: Matthew E. Moore

April 2013 Synthese 192(4)

DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0337-6

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272036759_Peirce%27s_topical_theory_of_continuity

“Peirce’s logic of continuity: Existential graphs and non-Cantorian continuum.” 

Fernando Zalamea. 

Rev. Mod. Log. 9 (1-2) 115 – 162, November 2001 – November 2003.

https://projecteuclid.org/journals/review-of-modern-logic/volume-9/issue-1-2/Peirces-logic-of-continuity–Existential-graphs-and-non-Cantorian/rml/1081173838.full

Peirce’s Logic of Continuity: A Conceptual and Mathematical Approach

Fernando Zalamea

Book 2012

ISBN/EAN13: 0983700494 / 9780983700494

One, two, three . . . continuity: C.S. Peirce and the nature of the continuum

Author: Robertson, R.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2, 1 January 2001, pp. 7-24(18)

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/chk/2001/00000008/f0020001/74?crawler=true

Does Continuity Allow For Emergence?

An Emergentist Reading Of Peirce’s Evolutionary Thought

Maria Regina Brioschi

https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1647

https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1647

Peirce´s pragmatic meanings of mind and synechism

Lucia Santaella 
Full professor-Graduate program in Communication and Semiotics São Paulo Catholic University; member of the Advisory Board of the Peirce Edition Project 

lbraga@pucsp.br

https://www.pucsp.br/~lbraga/epap_peir4.htm

Feeling Our Way Forward: Continuity and Discontinuity Within the Cosmic Process, 

Joseph A. Bracken S.J. (2010) 

Theology and Science, 8:3, 319-331, DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2010.492625

Continuity and Inheritance: Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Work of C.S. Peirce

John Kaag

Varieties of Synechism: Peirce and James on Mind–World Continuity. 

Rosa M. Calcaterra;

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1 October 2011; 25 (4): 412–424. doi: https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.25.4.0412

Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives. 

8 Peirce on Continuity

Potter, Vincent G. 

New York: Fordham University Press, 2019., doi:10.1353/book.67375.

https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/93/oa_monograph/chapter/2379541

Diagrams, Visual Imagination, and Continuity in Peirce’s Philosophy of Mathematics

by Vitaly Kiryushchenko

2023

THEORIES OF CONTINUITY AND INFINITESIMALS: FOUR PHILOSOPHERS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Lisa Keele

Doctor of Philosophy Thesis
in the Department of Philosophy,
Indiana University
May 2008

ProQuest Dissertations Publishing,  2008. 3319910.

TWO NEW GESTURES
ON PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM AND THE EXISTENTIAL GRAPHS

Fernando Zalamea (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

77 Lebenswelt, 13 (2018)

Two New Gestures
on Peirce’s Continuum
and the Existential Graphs: Plurality of Pragmatic Imagination

Fernando Zalamea
Departamento de Matemáticas Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Associazione Pragma – 10th Anniversary Università degli Studi di Milano
October 18 2017

Click to access Milano(Ottobre2017).pdf

‘Logic of Relations and Diagrammatic Reasoning: Structuralist Elements in the Work of Charles Sanders Peirce’, 

Carter, Jessica, 

in Erich H. Reck, and Georg Schiemer (eds), The Prehistory of Mathematical Structuralism (New York, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 June 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190641221.003.0010, accessed 12 Apr. 2023.

https://academic.oup.com/book/41041/chapter/349349072

Peirce on continuity and his critique of Cantor and Dedekind.

Dauben, J. W. (1981).

In K. L. Ketner, J. M. Ransdell, C. Eisele, M. H. Fisch, and C. S. Hardwick (eds.), Graduate Studies Texas Tech University, pp. 93-98. Texas Tech Press.

The Peircean Continuum

Francisco Vargas

Matthew E. Moore

In book: The History of Continua (pp.328-346)

December 2020
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198809647.003.0014

Advances in Peircean Mathematics

The Colombian School

Edited by: Fernando Zalamea
Volume 7 in the series Peirceana
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717631

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110717631/html

Charles Peirce and Modern Science

T L Short

Cambridge University Press
Online publication date: October 2022
Print publication year: 2022
Online ISBN: 9781009223508
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009223508

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/charles-peirce-and-modern-science/A61CC6B9EBE0259AD8D83B2B85A82511

Peirce’s Theory of Signs

T L Short

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Online publication date: July 2009
Print publication year: 2007
Online ISBN: 9780511498350
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498350

The Practical Peirce: An Introduction to the Triadic Continuum Implemented as a Computer Data Structure

Author John Zuchero
Publisher iUniverse, 2007
ISBN 0595441122, 9780595441129

The Triadic Continuum is the invention of Jane Mazzagatti, a mathematician and software engineer. Mazzagatti came upon the idea for this new computer data structure, which is based on the work of Charles Peirce, while working on a project for Unisys Corporation. This same structure has proven commercially valuable in the efficient way it stores and allows for the analysis of large datasets. However, while learning about the nature of the structure she discovered more far-reaching implications to areas other than computer science. Charles Peirce was fascinated with how the mind reasons and with all of the scientific and philosophical implications of the mechanisms of how the brain records experience, constructs memories, and accesses previously stored experience and knowledge. Mazzagatti believes that she has rediscovered the structure of the Triadic Continuum, which is the foundation of many of Peirce’s key theories dealing with human reasoning and the logic of thought.
In this book the author, who worked with Mazzagatti writing patents for the invention, explains how this structure is unlike any other computer data structure or type of Artificial Intelligence-but more importantly why this structure may very well be a model for human cognition.

A Calculus for Self Reference, Autopoiesis, and Indications

A Calculus for Self Reference, Autopoiesis, and Indications

Source: FIVE TYPES OF SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY

Bunge’s three types of systems philosophies are expanded to five:

  • atomism (the world is an aggregate of elements, without wholes; to be understood by analysis),
  • holism (ultimate reality is a whole without parts, except as illusory manifestations; apprehended intuitively),
  • emergentism (parts exist together and their relations, connections, and organized interaction constitute wholes that continue to depend upon them for their existence and nature; understood first analytically and then synthetically),
  • structuralism (the universe is a whole within which all systems and their processes exist as depending parts; understanding can be aided by creative deduction),
  • and organicism (every existing system has both parts and whole, and is part of a larger whole, etc.; understanding the nature of whole-part polarities is a clue to understanding the nature of systems.

How these five types correlated with theories of conceptual systems and methodologies is also sketched.

Source: https://www.uboeschenstein.ch/texte/spencer-brown.html

Any indication implies duality, we cannot produce a thing without coproducing what it is not, and every duality implies triplicity: what the thing is, what it isn’t, and the boundary between them. Thus you cannot indicate anything without defining two states, and you cannot define two states without creating three elements. None of these exists in reality, or separately from the others

Key Terms

  • G. Spencer Brown
  • Self-indication
  • Self-reference
  • Self-referential systems
  • Calculus of Indications
  • Paradoxes
  • Autonomy
  • F. Varela
  • Dirk Baecker
  • Calculus for Self Reference
  • Calculus for Autopoiesis
  • Laws of Form
  • Distinctions
  • Indications
  • L H Kauffman
  • H Maturana
  • Athanasios Karafillidis
  • Lambda Calculus
  • Alanzo Church
  • Diamond Calculus
  • William Bricken

A Calculus for Indication

George Spencer-Brown

Source: https://www.uboeschenstein.ch/texte/spencer-brown.html

George Spencer Brown
Laws of Form
Cognizer Co.
1994 Limited Edition

Preface to the 1994 Limited Edition
page VII

A generation has grown up since Laws of Form was first published in English. Human awareness has changed in the meantime, and what could not be said then it can be said now. In particular, I can now refer to the falseness of current scientific doctrine, what I call scientific duplicity: that appearance and reality are somehow different.

Since there is no means, other than appearance, for studying reality, they are definitely the same. 

But the scientist not only supposes they are different, and that he is „gradually finding out“ the one by means of the other; he supposes also that awareness (which he mistakenly confuses with consciousness) of the reality-apperance is something that is different again; and that the universe might have „existed“ for „billions of years“ amid total unawareness of what was going on.  

This I shall have two call scientific triplicity. Again by definition, there can be no appearance that is not an awareness of appearance, and, of course, no awareness that is not an appearance of awareness. And since the scale of real-unreal cannot apply to appearance in general (as it can distinguish, for example, between real and toy soldiers), whatever appears, as appearance, must be equally real and unreal.

Reversing the false distinctions, we arrive at what I call the triple identity, notably the definitional identity of reality, appearance, and awareness. It is remarkable how all the „building blocks“ of existence appear as triunions. (Compare the so-called „divine trinity“ of Christianity, which is merely a summary of our perception of how to construct the formation of any thing whatever.) It ist he triunion that apparently provides the magic inflatory principle that makes it all seem like it’s really there.

The word „there“ supplies the trick. There exists and reality in no „where“ fort he „there“ to be. Nor is there any „when“. All these are constructions of imagination, inventions of apparently stable formations for the apparent appearances. Hence another expression of the triple identity: the identity of imaginability, possibility, and actuality.

The universe is simply what would appear if it could.  

Its laws are the laws of the possible, called by Sakyamuni the links of conditioned coproduction, called by me the calculus of indications. Each teaches exactly the same teaching, how what cannot possibly be anything comes to appear as if it were something. Since there is only one way this can happen, the teaching is always the same. Unfortunately, human beings have a childish propensity to turn what ever they learn into religions, and when this happens the original teaching is corrupted.

A thing is not possible unless it is imaginable, and we could never confirm that it was possible unless it appeared in actuality. Thus what is possible will always be found to exist, and its actual existence (for exemple helium, carbon 60) will be discovered soon after its possibility has been imagined. What exists is formally constructed by postulating the imagination of a hypothetical being that is supposed to perceive it, and different beings will bring about the construction of different existences. (Not only physical existence, but all creation is subject to the same law.) A totally different being will construct a completely different existence: „The world of the happy is altogether different from the world of the unhappy“. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 1922

„We“ make an existence by taking apart the elements of a triple identity. The existence ceases when we put them together again

Sakyamuni, the only other author who evidently discovered these laws, remarked in this context, „Existence is duality: nonexistence is non-duality. (The more a being cultivates consciousness at the expense of awareness, the stupider it becomes. Western civilisation has promoted consciousness and neglected awareness almost to the point of complete idiocy. I have had to spend the greater part of a lifetime undoing and reversing the destructive ravages of my one-sided education.)

Any indication implies duality, we cannot produce a thing without coproducing what it is not, and every duality implies triplicity: what the thing is, what it isn’t, and the boundary between them. Thus you cannot indicate anything without defining two states, and you cannot define two states without creating three elements. None of these exists in reality, or separately from the others.  

In reality there never was, never could be, and never will be anything at all. There! You always knew with its. No other answer makes sense.

All I teach is the consequences of there being nothing. The perennial mistake of Western philosophers has been to suppose, with no justification whatever, that nothing cannot have any consequences. (The idea that the creation must be a consequence of „something“ is moronic. No thing can have any consequence whatever. If there were originally something, it would poison the whole creative process. Only nothing is unstable enough to give origin to endless concatenations of different appearances.) On the contrary: not only it can: it must. And one of the consequences of there being nothing is the inevitable appearance of „all this“. No problem!

Page XXIX: A Note on the Mathematical Approach

The theme of this book is that the universe comes into being when a space is severed to or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn any where we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet.

Although all forms, and thus all universities, are possible, and any particular form is mutable, it becomes evident that the laws relating such forms of the same in any universe. It is this sameness, the idea that we can find a reality which is independent of how the universe actually appears, that lends such fascination to the study of mathematics. That mathematics, in common with other art forms, can lead us beyond ordinary existence, and can show us something of the structure in which all creation hangs together, is no new idea but mathematical texts generally begin the story somewhere in the middle, leaving the reader to pick up the thread as best he can. Here the story is traced from the beginning.

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

Source: Laws of Form / 1994 Limited Edition

A Calculus for Self Reference

Francisco Varela

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081077508960828

An extension of the calculus of indications (of G. Spencer Brown) is presented to encompass all occurrences of self-referential situations. This is done through the introduction of a third state in the form of indication, a state seen to arise autonomously by self-indication. The new extended calculus is fully developed, and some of its consequences for systems, logic and epistemology are discussed.

A Calculus for Autopoiesis

Dirk Baecker

This paper looks once more at the understanding and definition of autopoiesis as developed by Humberto R. Maturana, Francisco J. Varela, and Ricardo Uribe (Varela/Maturana/Uribe 1974; Maturana 1981; Maturana/Varela 1980; Varela 1979a). We will not go into the philology of comparing the different versions of the understanding and definition of autopoiesis, into the different attempts to get its record straight, or into the question whether not only living but also social systems may be considered autopoietic by well-defined criteria (Zeleny 1981; Zeleny/Hufford 1992; Fleischaker 1992; Geyer 1992; Bourgine/Stewart 2004; Luisi 2003). We will instead focus on just one question: whether George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form (2008) presents us with a possibility of translating Maturana’s definition into a kind of a calculus. Francisco J. Varela tried to do this, only to discover that he had to add a further autonomous state to the calculus of indications to make it fit for modeling self reference (Varela 1975, 1979b). We share criticism of this attempt that addresses the idea that the distinction itself, in the form identical to the observer (Spencer-Brown 2008: 63) is already the autonomous state Varela thought he needed to introduce (Kauffman 1978; Varga von Kibéd 1989).

Instead of going into this extended discussion at this point, we turn to another discussion on social systems as autopoietic systems that establish and unfold their own paradox into a play with their distinctions, frames, and values that equals their iterative reproduction (Luhmann 1990a, 1992; Hutter 1979: 194-200, 1989: 28-33, 1990). That is, we look again at Maturana’s emphasis on components, networks, and boundaries and try to figure out how thisemphasis can translate into an understanding of form that knows about self-reference, paradox, and play.

My Related Posts

Autocatalysis, Autopoiesis and Relational Biology

Cybernetics, Autopoiesis, and Social Systems Theory

Reflexivity, Recursion, and Self Reference

Society as Communication: Social Systems Theory of Niklas Luhmann

Boundaries and Relational Sociology

Networks, Narratives, and Interaction

Semiotic Boundaries

Social and Symbolic Boundaries

Boundaries and Distinctions

Boundaries and Networks

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Visual Logic: Diagrams and Existential Graphs

Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Recursive Vision of Gregory Bateson

Knot Theory and Recursion: Louis H. Kauffman

Frames, Communication, and Public Policymaking

Key Sources of Research

Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity

edited by S.J. Bartlett, P. Suber

A Calculus for Autopoiesis

Baecker, Dirk,

(June 1, 2012).

in: Dirk Baecker und Birger P. Priddat (eds.), Ökonomie der Werte: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Michael Hutter, Marburg: Metropolis, 2013, 249-267,

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2073362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2073362

A CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE

J. FRANCISCO & G. VARELA (1975) 

International Journal of General Systems, 2:1, 5-24, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077508960828

Click to access VarelaCSR.pdf

Click to access varela_calculus.pdf

THE ARITHMETIC OF CLOSURE

FRANCISCO J. VARELA & JOSEPH A. GOGUEN (1978) 

Journal of Cybernetics, 8:3-4, 291-324, 

DOI: 10.1080/01969727808927587

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01969727808927587?src=recsys

SYSTEMS AND DISTINCTIONS; DUALITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY

JOSEPH A. GOGUEN & FRANCISCO J. VARELA (1979) 

International Journal of General Systems, 5:1, 31-43, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077908960886

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081077908960886?src=recsys

NETWORK SYNTHESIS AND VARELA’S CALCULU 

LOUIS H. KAUFFMAN (1978) 

International Journal of General Systems, 4:3, 179-187, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077808960682

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081077808960682

ISOMORPHISMS OF SPENCER-BROWN’S LAWS OF FORM AND VARELA’S CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE

DANIEL G. SCHWARTZ (1981) 

International Journal of General Systems,6:4, 239-255, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081078108934802

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081078108934802

FIVE TYPES OF SYSTEMS PHILOSOPHY

ARCHIE J. BAHM (1981) 

International Journal of General Systems, 6:4, 233-237, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081078108934801

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081078108934801?src=recsys

LAWS OF FORM AND FINITE AUTOMATA 

PETER TURNEY (1986) 

International Journal of General Systems, 12:4, 307-318, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081078608934939

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081078608934939?src=recsys

FLAWS OF FORM

PAUL CULL & WILLIAM FRANK (1979) 

International Journal of General Systems, 5:4, 201-211, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077908547450

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03081077908547450?src=recsys

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS TO FRANCISCO VARELA’ S CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE, 

RICHARD HERBERT HOWE & HEINZ VON FOERSTER (1975) 

International Journal of General Systems, 2:1, 1-3, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077508960827

ON THE LAWS OF FORM

ROBERT A. ORCHARD (1975) 

International Journal of General Systems, 2:2, 99-106, 

DOI: 10.1080/03081077508547493

EPISTEMOLOGY, SEMANTICS, AND SELF-REFERENCE, 

ANNETTA PEDRETTI (1980) 

Journal of Cybernetics, 10:4, 313-339, 

DOI: 10.1080/01969728008927652

Snakes all the Way Down: Varela’s Calculus for Self-Reference and the Praxis of Paradise

André Reichel

First published: 14 October 2011

https://doi.org/10.1002/sres.1105

Systems Research and Behavioral Science

Volume 28, Issue 6
Special Issue: Autopoiesis, Systems Thinking and Systemic Practice: The Contribution of Francisco Varela
November/December 2011
Pages 646-662

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/sres.1105

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227670222_Snakes_all_the_Way_Down_Varela%27s_Calculus_for_Self-Reference_and_the_Praxis_of_Paradise

Self-Reference and Time According to G. Spencer-Brown

Andreas Kull

Max-Planck-Institut fu ̈r Extraterrestrische Physik

D-85740 Garching, Germany

http://sfile-pull.f-static.com/image/users/112431/ftp/my_files/sbrown.pdf?id=11014655

A Note on the Possibility of Self-Reference in Mathematics

Arieh Lev

Mathematical Work of Francisco Varela

Louis H. Kauffman • University of Illinois at Chicago, USA • kauffman/at/uic.edu

Constructivist Foundations

Volume 13 · Number 1 · Pages 11–17

2017

 http://constructivist.info/13/1/011

Virtual logic — the calculus of indications

Author: Kauffman, L.H.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 5, Number 1, 1 January 1998, pp. 63-68(6)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Virtual logic – self-reference and the calculus of indications

Author: Kauffman, L.H.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 5, Number 2, 1 February 1998, pp. 75-82(8)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/chk/1998/00000005/00000002/11

Virtual Logic — symbolic logic and the calculus of indications

Author: Kauffman, L.H.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 5, Number 3, 1 March 1998, pp. 63-70(8)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263247376_Virtual_Logic_–_symbolic_logic_and_the_calculus_of_indications

Peirce and Spencer-Brown: history and synergies in cybersemiotics

Authors: Kauffman, L.H.; Brier, S.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2, 1 January 2001, pp. 3-5(3)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Peirce’s Existential Graphs

Author: Kauffman, Louis
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 18, Numbers 1-2, 2011, pp. 49-81(33)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Virtual Logic–Number and Imagination

Author: Kauffman, Louis
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 18, Numbers 3-4, 2011, pp. 187-196(10)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

An Esoteric Guide to Spencer-Brown’s Laws Of Form

Author: Miller, S.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 21, Number 4, 2014, pp. 31-67(37)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Gregory Bateson, Heterarchies, and the Topology of Recursion

Author: Harries-Jones, Peter
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 12, Numbers 1-2, 2005, pp. 168-174(7)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Virtual Logic–Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis

Author: Kauffman, L.H.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 21, Number 3, 2014, pp. 63-74(12)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Ontopoiesis, Autopoiesis, and a Calculus Intended for Self-Reference

Randolph T Dible

https://www.academia.edu/36670762/Ontopoiesis_Autopoiesis_and_a_Calculus_Intended_for_Self_Reference

SELFREFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGYAND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

by

Steven James Bartlett

website: http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet

Structural Reflexivity and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference

Rohan French

university of groningen

rohan.french@gmail.com

ERGO Volume 3, No. 05, 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.005

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0003.005/–structural-reflexivity-and-the-paradoxes-of-self-reference?rgn=main;view=fulltext

Self-Reference

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/

A Calculus for Autopoiesis

Baecker, Dirk,

(June 1, 2012).

in: Dirk Baecker und Birger P. Priddat (eds.), Ökonomie der Werte: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Michael Hutter, Marburg: Metropolis, 2013, 249-267,

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2073362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2073362

Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela

EVAN THOMPSON

Canada Research Chair in Cognitive Science and the Embodied Mind, Department of Philosophy, York University (E-mail: evant@yorku.ca)

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 381–398, 2004.

George Spencer-Brown’s laws of form fifty years on: why we should be giving it more attention in mathematics education

Steven Watson University of Cambridge

MATHEMATICS TEACHING RESEARCH JOURNAL

Special Issue on Philosophy of Mathematics Education Summer 2020 Vol 12 no 2

SECOND ORDER CYBERNETICS

Ranulph Glanville,

CybernEthics Research, UK and Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Australia

A Formal Theory of Calculus of Indication

Tadao Ishii

George Spencer Brown
Laws of Form (Calculus of Indications)

Dr. Randall Whitaker

Website

http://www.enolagaia.com/GSB.html#LoF

Working the Form: George Spencer-Brown and the Mark of Distinction

  • June 2015

Dirk Baecker

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278210110_Working_the_Form_George_Spencer-Brown_and_the_Mark_of_Distinction

“Spencer-Brown, Peirce, Girard, and the Origin of Logic.” 

Rosa, António Machuco.

Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 22 (2015): 65–88. https://doi.org/10.14321/contagion.22.1.0065.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/contagion.22.1.0065

The Brown-4 Indicational Calculus

Arthur M. Collings

Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Vol. 24 (2017), nos. 3-4, pp. 75-101

Triplicity in Spencer-Brown, Lacan, and Poe

Don Kunze
Department of Architecture, Penn State University

SPACE IS THE PLACE: THE LAWS OF FORM AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 

Michael Schiltz

Thesis Eleven, Number 88, February 2007: 8–30

SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

DOI: 10.1177/0725513607072452

Distinction is Sufficient

William Bricken

March 2017

Click to access DistinctionIsSufficient.180327.pdf

Bayesian inference and the world mind

John O. Campbell

Comment: Socializing a Calculus

The Emergence of a Theory of Social Forms and a Sociological Notation

Athanasios Karafillidis

Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Vol. 20, nos. 3-4, PP· 108-141

Click to access Karafillidis_Socializing.pdf

Shape of things to come: From the ‘laws of form’ to management in the post-growth economy

André Reichel

Ephemera 2017

http://www.ephemerajournal.org

volume 17(1): 89-118

AN ESOTERIC GUIDE TO SPENCER-BROWN’S LAWS OF FORM 

Seth T. Miller, PhD Cand.

Laws of Form

George Spencer Brown

1969

Click to access Spencer-Brown,%20George%20-%20Laws%20of%20Form.pdf

Introduction

Neocybernetic Emergence

bruce clarke and mark b. n. hansen

SEMIOTIC ABSTRACTIONS
IN THE THEORIES OF GOTTHARD GÜNTHER AND GEORGE SPENCER BROWN

By Rudolf Matzka, Munich, May 1993

Diamond Calculus of Formation of Forms

A calculus of dynamic complexions of distinctions as an interplay of worlds and distinctions

Rudolf Kaehr Dr.phil

ISSN 2041-4358

https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/35498897/diamond-calculus-of-formation-of-forms-thinkart-lab

Click to access rk_Diamond-Calculus-of-Formation-of-Forms_2011.pdf

Iconic Arithmetic: Simple Sensual Postsymbolic

THE DESIGN OF MATHEMATICS FOR HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

William Bricken,Ph.D.

Catjects

Dirk Baecker

Universität Witten/Herdecke

dirk.baecker@uni-wh.de

https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/73mht/

Some-thing from No-thing: G. Spencer-brown’s Laws of Form

Roth, S., Heidingsfelder, M., Clausen, L. and Laursen, K.B. (2021), “Editorial Note”, 

Roth, S.Heidingsfelder, M.Clausen, L. and Laursen, K.B. (Ed.) George Spencer Brown’s “Design with the NOR”: With Related Essays, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 1-5. 

https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-83982-610-820211001

A Sociological Reading of George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form

Baecker, Dirk,

(January 4, 2021).

Louis H Kauffman, Andrew Compton, Leon Conrad, Fred Cummins, Randolph Dible, Graham Ellsbury, and Florian Grote (eds.), Laws of Form – A Fiftieth Anniversary,

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678663

Descriptions as Distinctions George Spencer Brown’s Calculus of Indications as a Basis for Mitterer’s Non-dualistic Descriptions

March 2013

Constructivist Foundations 8(2):202-209
Authors: Patricia Ene

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292484884_Descriptions_as_Distinctions_George_Spencer_Brown%27s_Calculus_of_Indications_as_a_Basis_for_Mitterer%27s_Non-dualistic_Descriptions

Mathematics and Models for Autopoiesis

John Mingers 1995

In: Self-Producing Systems. Contemporary Systems Thinking. Springer, Boston, MA.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-1022-6_4

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4899-1022-6_4

Lecture by Louis Kauffman on work of F Varela

Mind and Life Europe

2021

Life and Work of Francisco Varela: Amy Cohen Varela | Ouroboros Seminars 2021 | Varela 20/30

Mind and Life Europe

Playlist 1 of 14

On the application of the Calculus of Indications (George Spencer-Brown)

Leon Conrad

Laws of Form Course – An Introduction to George Spencer-Brown’s ‘Laws of Form’

Leon Conrad

Playlist of 18 Videos

Live webinar with the Dalai Lama: “Dialogue for a Better World – Remembering Francisco Varela”

Mind and Life Europe

2022

Keynote: Explorations in Laws of Form — Louis H Kauffman

Kunstforum Den Haag

An Ontological Interpretation of Laws of Form — Randolph Dible

Spencer-Brown Form

https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Spencer-BrownForm.html

Laws of Form – An Exploration in Mathematics and Foundations

by Louis H. Kauffman UIC

Click to access Laws.pdf

George Spencer Brown

https://www.uboeschenstein.ch/texte/spencer-brown.html

George Spencer Brown’s “Design with the NOR”: With Related Essays

Edited by
PROF STEFFEN ROTH
La Rochelle Business School, France

University of Turku, Finland

PROF MARKUS HEIDINGSFELDER
Xiamen University Malaysia, Malaysia

MR LARS CLAUSEN
UCL University College, Denmark

University of Flensburg, Germany

DR KLAUS BRØND LAURSEN
University of Aarhus, Denmark

2021

https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/978-1-83982-610-820211013/full/pdf?title=prelims

A Calculus of Negation in Communication

Dirk Baecker

Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Vol. 24 (2017), nos. 3-4, pp. 17-27

Distinction and the Foundations of Arithmetic

Thomas J. McFarlane 
thomasmc@stanfordalumni.org
December 2001
First revision October 2007
Second revision March 2011

http://www.integralscience.org/lot.html

THE ARITHMETIC AND ALGEBRA OF GEORGE SPENCER-BROWN

R.W. SHARPE

The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce

Louis H. Kauffman

Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Vol.8, no.1–2, 2001, pp. 79–110

Click to access CHK.pdf

Foreword: Laws of Form

Louis H. Kauffman

Cybernetics and Human Knowing. Vol. 24 (2017), nos. 3-4, pp. 5-15

Peirce and Spencer-Brown: History and Synergies in Cybersemiotics


Louis H. Kauffman, Soren Brier
Imprint Academic, 2007

The Mathematics of Boundaries: A Beginning

William Bricken

william@wbricken.com

In: Barker-Plummer, D., Cox, R., Swoboda, N. (eds) Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Diagrams 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4045. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

https://doi.org/10.1007/11783183_8

Click to access 05-pubs.pdf

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11783183_8

Syntactic Variety in Boundary Logic

William Bricken

Click to access 01syntactic-variety.pdf

Laws of Form: A Fiftieth Anniversary (Hardcover)

By Louis H. Kauffman (Editor), Fred Cummins (Editor), Randolph Dible (Editor)

https://www.booksonb.com/book/9789811247422

Form and Medium: A Mathematical Reconstruction

Author: Michael Schiltz

Date published: August 2003

http://www.imageandnarrative.be/inarchive/mediumtheory/michaelschiltz.htm

System as Difference

Niklas Luhmann

Logical Graphs

https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

On the Curious Calculi of Wittgenstein and Spencer Brown

Authors
Gregory Landini
University of Iowa
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v6i10.3400

JHAP Vol. 6 No. 10 (2018)

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3400

Additional Resources

Source: A CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE

(2002) Book reviews and abstractsInternational Journal of General Systems 31:1, pages 97-110. 

Christian Borch. (2000) Former, der kommer i form—om Luhmann og Spencer-BrownDistinktion: Journal of Social Theory 1:1, pages 105-122. 

Cliff Joslyn. (1995) Semantic control systemsWorld Futures 45:1-4, pages 87-123. 

TAKUHEI SHIMOGAWA, YASUHIKO TAKAHARA. (1994) RECONSTRUCTION OF G. SPENCER BROWN’S THEMEInternational Journal of General Systems 23:1, pages 1-21. 

Gary C. Berkowitz, David R. Greenberg, Charles A. White. (1991) MULTIPLICITY AND INDETERMINACY IN THE DYNAMICS OF FORMAL INDICATIONAL AUTOMATACybernetics and Systems 22:3, pages 237-263. 

Gary C. Berkowitz, David R. Greenberg, Charles A. White. (1988) AN APPROACH TO A MATHEMATICS OF PHENOMENA: CANONICAL ASPECTS OF REENTRANT FORM EIGENBEHAVIOR IN THE EXTENDED CALCULUS OF INDICATIONSCybernetics and Systems 19:2, pages 123-167. 

PETER TURNEY. (1986) LAWS OF FORM AND FINITE AUTOMATAInternational Journal of General Systems 12:4, pages 307-318. 

(1982) Letters to the EditorInternational Journal of General Systems 8:3, pages 181-181. 

LOUIS H. KAUFFMAN, DAVID M. SOLZMAN. (1981) Letter to the EditorInternational Journal of General Systems 7:4, pages 257-259. 

GERRIT BROEKSTRA. (1981) C-ANALYSIS OF C-STRUCTURES: REPRESENTATION AND EVALUATION OF RECONSTRUCTION HYPOTHESES BY INFORMATION MEASURES†‡International Journal of General Systems 7:1, pages 33-61. 

DANIEL G. SCHWARTZ. (1981) ISOMORPHISMS OF SPENCER-BROWN’S LAWS OF FORM AND VARELA’S CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCEInternational Journal of General Systems 6:4, pages 239-255. 

Julia T. Wood, W. Barnett Pearce. (1980) Sexists, racists, and other classes of classifiers: Form and function of “…Ist” accusationsQuarterly Journal of Speech 66:3, pages 239-250. 

GORDON PASK. (1979) CONSCIOUSNESSJournal of Cybernetics 9:3, pages 211-258. 

PAUL CULL, WILLIAM FRANK. (1979) FLAWS OF FORMInternational Journal of General Systems 5:4, pages 201-211. 

CLAUDE FAUCHEUX, SPYROS MAKRIDAKIS. (1979) AUTOMATION OR AUTONOMY IN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNInternational Journal of General Systems 5:4, pages 213-220. 

LOUIS H. KAUFFMAN. (1978) NETWORK SYNTHESIS AND VARELA’S CALCULUSInternational Journal of General Systems4:3, pages 179-187. 

ROBERT A. ORCHARD. (1975) ON THE LAWS OF FORMInternational Journal of General Systems 2:2, pages 99-106. 

ROBERT A. ORCHARD. (1975) ON THE LAWS OF FORMInternational Journal of General Systems 2:1, pages 99-106. 

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Evan Thompson. 2009. Life and Mind. Emergence and Embodiment, pages 77-93. 

Michael Schiltz. 2009. Space Is the Place. Emergence and Embodiment, pages 157-178. 

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Sergio Biggemann, Francis Buttle. (2007) The effects of previous episodes in business‐to‐business interaction. Management Research News 30:6, pages 396-408. 
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Loet Leydesdorff. (2006) The biological metaphor of a second‐order observer and the sociological discourse. Kybernetes 35:3/4, pages 531-546. 
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Giorgio Nardone, and Claudette Portelli. (2005) When the diagnosis “invents” the illness. Kybernetes 34:3/4, pages 365-372. 
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Dirk Baecker. 2005. Das Prinzip der Autopoiesis. Schlüsselwerke der Systemtheorie, pages 281-289. 

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Dirk Baecker. 2005. Das Prinzip der Unterscheidung. Schlüsselwerke der Systemtheorie, pages 173-190. 

Niklas Luhmann. 2005. Die Weisung Gottes als Form der Freiheit. Soziologische Aufklärung 5, pages 75-91. 

Niklas Luhmann. 2005. Das Erkenntnisprogramm des Konstruktivismus und die unbekannt bleibende Realität. Soziologische Aufklärung 5, pages 31-57. 

W. Cameron. (2001) Autopoiesis, agency and accident: criteria for the attribution of life. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 18:6, pages 447-459. 
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CLIFF JOSLYN. (2000) Levels of Control and Closure in Complex Semiotic Systems. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 901:1, pages 67-74. 
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Peter Cholak. (1999) 1998–1999 Winter Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5:02, pages 273-283. 
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Allan K. Beavis. (1999) Observing educational administrators: paradoxical reflections. Journal of Educational Administration 37:1, pages 8-22. 
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John Paterson, Gunther Teubner. (1998) Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis. Social & Legal Studies 7:4, pages 451-486. 
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Gerhard Wagner. (1997) The End of Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27:4, pages 387-409. 
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M. Bounias, A. Bonaly. (1997) The topology of perceptive functions as a corollary of the theorem of existence in closed spaces. Biosystems 42:2-3, pages 191-205. 
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Andreas Kull. 1997. Self-Reference and Time According to Spencer-Brown. Time, Temporality, Now, pages 71-79. 

Søren Brier. (1996) From second-order cybernetics to cybersemiotics: A semiotic re-entry into the second-order cybernetics of Heinz von Foerster. Systems Research 13:3, pages 229-244. 
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William M. Bricken. 1995. Distinction networks. KI-95: Advances in Artificial Intelligence, pages 35-48. 

Francis A. Buttle. (1994) The Co‐ordinated Management of Meaning: A Case Exemplar of a New Consumer Research Technology. European Journal of Marketing 28:8/9, pages 76-99. 
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Yukio-Pegio Gunji. (1992) The form of life. I. It is possible but not necessary. Applied Mathematics and Computation47:2-3, pages 267-288. 
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Gordon Pask. 1992. Correspondence, Consensus, Coherence and the Rape of Democracy. New Perspectives on Cybernetics, pages 221-232. 

Yukio Gunji, Takashi Nakamura. (1991) Time reverse automata patterns generated by Spencer-Brown’s modulator: invertibility based on autopoiesis. Biosystems 25:3, pages 151-177. 
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Joseph A. Goguen, Francisco J. Varela. 1991. Systems and Distinctions; Duality and Complementarity. Facets of Systems Science, pages 293-302. 

Christiane Floyd. 1989. Softwareentwicklung als Realitätskonstruktion. Software-Entwicklung, pages 1-20. 

Gabriella Balestra, Alexis Tsoukias. 1989. Preparing an intelligent interface for the use of multicriteria outranking methods. Improving Decision Making in Organisations, pages 575-584. 

Czesław Mesjasz. (1988) Applications of Systems Modelling in Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 25:3, pages 291-334. 
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Gerald D. Erickson. (1988) AGAINST THE GRAIN: DECENTERING FAMILY THERAPY. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 14:3, pages 225-236. 
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G. Kampis. (1988) A Note on Information and Mental Models. Kybernetes 17:4, pages 34-40. 
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Jim Birch. (1987) Waiting Without Purpose: A Discourse on The Tao of PoohAustralian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy 8:3, pages 143-148. 
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1987. References. Communication Theory, pages 341-353. 

Niklas Luhmann. 1987. Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft. Soziologische Aufklärung 4, pages 67-73. 

Niklas Luhmann. 1987. Der Wohlfahrtsstaat zwischen Evolution und Rationalität. Soziologische Aufklärung 4, pages 104-116. 

Gunnar Hedlund. (1986) The hypermodern MNC—A heterarchy?. Human Resource Management 25:1, pages 9-35. 
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Niklas Luhmann. 1986. „Distinctions Directrices“. Kultur und Gesellschaft, pages 145-161. 

Vladimir A. Lefebvre. 1986. Second Order Cybernetics in the Soviet Union and the West. Power, Autonomy, Utopia, pages 123-131. 

Jean Louis Le Moigne. (1985) Towards new epistemological foundations for information systems. Systems Research2:3, pages 247-251. 
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Gerard De Zeeuw. (1985) Problems of increasing competence. Systems Research 2:1, pages 13-19. 
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Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce, Karl Tomm. 1985. A Dialectical View of Personal Change. The Social Construction of the Person, pages 203-224. 

J. Scott Fraser. (1984) PARADOX AND ORTHODOX: FOLIE À DEUX?*. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 10:4, pages 361-372. 
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H. von Foerster. 1984. Principles of Self-Organization — In a Socio-Managerial Context. Self-Organization and Management of Social Systems, pages 2-24. 

Brian R. Gaines. (1983) Precise past—fuzzy future. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 19:1, pages 117-134. 
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VERNON E. CRONEN, KENNETH M. JOHNSON, JOHN W. LANNAMANN. (1982) Paradoxes, Double Binds, and Reflexive Loops: An Alternative Theoretical Perspective. Family Process 21:1, pages 91-112. 
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Stein Bråten. 1982. Simulation and self-organization of mind. La philosophie contemporaine / Contemporary philosophy, pages 189-218. 

Paul F. Dell. (1981) Paradox Redux. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 7:2, pages 127-134. 
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Dell. (1981) MORE THOUGHTS ON PARADOX: REJOINDER BY DELL. Family Process 20:1, pages 47-51. 
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Niklas Luhmann. 1981. Vorbemerkungen zu einer Theorie sozialer Systeme. Soziologische Aufklärung 3, pages 11-24. 

Niklas Luhmann. 1981. Die Ausdifferenzierung von Erkenntnisgewinn: Zur Genese von Wissenschaft. Wissenssoziologie, pages 102-139. 

Gordon Pask. (1980) Developments in conversation theory—Part 1. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 13:4, pages 357-411. 
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Brian R. Gaines, Mildred L.G. Shaw. (1980) New directions in the analysis and interactive elicitation of personal construct systems. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 13:1, pages 81-116. 
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R.H. ANDERTON. (1980) WHITHER CYBERNETICS: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. Kybernetes 9:4, pages 289-293. 
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Laurence D Richards. (1980) Cybernetics and the management science process. Omega 8:1, pages 71-80. 
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WILLIAM R. TAYLOR. (1979) Using Systems Theory to Organize Confusion. Family Process 18:4, pages 479-488. 
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BRADFORD P. KEENEY. (1979) Ecosystemic Epistemology: An Alternative Paradigm for Diagnosis. Family Process 18:2, pages 117-129. 
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L. Raphael Troncale. 1978. Linkage Propositions between Fifty Principal Systems Concepts. Applied General Systems Research, pages 29-52. 

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V. Pinkava. (1977) On the nature of some logical paradoxes. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 9:4, pages 383-398. 
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Pfade individueller Konstruktionen und deren Überwindung. Individuelle Pfade im Management, pages 53-178.

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Visual Logic: Diagrams and Existential Graphs

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Visual Logic: Diagrams and Existential Graphs

Source: Toward an Integrated History and Philosophy of Diagrammatic Practices

Source:

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Key Terms

  • Diagrams
  • Existential graphs
  • Conceptual graphs
  • Aristotle
  • Euclid
  • George Boole (1854)
  • Gottlob Frege (1879)
  • Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Giuseppe Peano (1889)
  • Semantic Networks
  • Triadic logic
  • Multivalent logic 
  • Bivalent Logic
  • Trivalent Logic
  • Induction, Deduction, Abduction
  • Alpha, Beta, Gamma Graphs
  • Logical Graphs
  • Logicality
  • Diagrammatic Logic
  • Diagrammatology
  • Euler Diagrams
  • Venn Diagrams
  • Sets and Tables
  • Knots and Nets
  • Logic
  • Diagrams
  • Peirce
  • Alpha Graphs
  • Propositional Logic
  • Multi-Model Reasoning
  • Symbolic Logic
  • Modal Logic
  • History of Logic
  • Boolean Algebra (B)
  • Kripke Semantics
  • Peirce Algebras
  • Algebraic Logic
  • Relation Algebras (R)
  • Logics of Programs
  • Knowledge Representation
  • Set and Relations
  • Peirce’s Logic of Relatives
  • First Order Logic
  • Discursive Reasoning
  • Diagrammatic Reasoning
  • Sets, Supersets, Subsets
  • Set Theory
  • Cognitive Maps
  • Mental Models
  • Higraphs
  • George Boole’s Algebra of Logic
  • Augustus De Morgan’s Logic of Relations
  • John Venn
  • Sheet of Assertion
  • Predicate Calculus
  • Heterogeneous Logic
  • Graphs, Diagrams, Maps, Networks, Frames
  • Monadic, Dyadic, Triadic
  • Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness
  • Speech Act Logic
  • Temporal Logic
  • First Order Predicate Logic
  • Second Order Predicate Logic
  • Formal (Deductive) Logic
  • Peirce’s Continuum
  • Hyperproof Software
  • String Diagrams Calculus

Key Scholars

  • John F. Sowa
  • Priscila Lena Farias
  • Joao Queiroz
  • Frederik Stjernfelt
  • L H Kauffman
  • Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
  • Sun-Joo Shin
  • Francesco Bellucci
  • Silvia De Toffoli
  • Eric Morgan Hammer

Visual Logic Diagrams

  • Existential Graphs
  • Euler Diagrams
  • Venn Diagrams
  • Hasse Diagrams
  • Marlo Diagrams
  • Knots Diagrams
  • Feynman Diagrams
  • Carroll Diagrams
  • Euclidean Diagrams
  • Commutative Diagrams
  • Spider Diagrams
  • String Diagrams

Source: WHO’S AFRAID OF MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?

Source: Euler vs Hasse Diagrams for Reasoning About Sets: A Cognitive Approach

Source: WHAT ARE MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?

Source: WHAT ARE MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?

Source: Peirce’s Tutorial on Existential Graphs

Source: The Semiotics of Spider Diagrams

Source: The Semiotics of Spider Diagrams

Source: Introduction: Diagrammatical reasoning and Peircean logic representations

Source: Introduction: Diagrammatical reasoning and Peircean logic representations

Source: Introduction: Diagrammatical reasoning and Peircean logic representations

Source: Introduction: Diagrammatical reasoning and Peircean logic representations

Source: General Introduction to Logic of the Future

Source: Challenges and Opportunities for Existential Graphs

Source: Peirce on Logical Diagrams

Source: Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning

Source: Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning

Source: Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning

Alpha, Beta, and Gamma Graphs

Source:

Source:

Source:

Source:

Source: The Logic of Peirce Algebras

Algebras of the form ( B, R, : ) were introduced by Brink (1981) as Boolean modules. Sources for Peirce algebras are Brink, Britz and Schmidt (1994) and Schmidt (1993).

Unlike the one-sorted language of relation algebras, the algebraic language of Peirce algebras has two sorts of terms: one interpreted in B, the other in R. Terms of the first sort are called set terms, terms of the second sort relation terms. Identities between set terms are called set identities; identities between relation terms are relation identities.

Brink et al. (1994) link Peirce algebras to dynamic algebras. Like Peirce algebras these are two-sorted algebras of sets and relations, but their relations are organized in a Kleene algebra, not in a relation algebra. It may be shown that any join-complete Peirce algebra gives rise to a dynamic algebra.

Another class of algebras closely related to Peirce algebras, is the class of extended relation algebras studied by Suppes (1976). Roughly, these are term- definably equivalent with Peirce algebras in which the sortal distinctions have been dropped.

Source: A diagrammatic reasoning system for the description logic ALC

Diagrammatic reasoning is a tradition of visual logic that allows sentences that are equivalent to first order logic to be written in a visual or structural form: usually for improved usability. A calculus for the diagram can then be defined that allows well-formed formulas to be derived. This calculus is intended in the analog of logical inference. Description logics (DLs) have become a popular knowledge representation and processing language. DLs correspond to decidable fragments of first order logic; their notation is in the style of symbolic, variable-free formulas. Moreover, DLs are equipped with table au theorem provers that are proven to be sound and complete. Although DLs have roots in diagrammatic languages (such as semantic networks), they are elaborated in a purely symbolic manner. This paper discusses how DLs can be equivalently represented in terms of a diagrammatic reasoning system. First, existing diagrammatic reasoning systems, namely spider- and constraint diagrams, as well as existential and conceptual graphs, are investigated to determine if they are compatible with DLs. It turns out that Peirce’s existential graphs are better suited for this purpose than the alternatives we examine. The paper then redevelops the DL ALC, which is the smallest propositional DL, by means of labeled trees, and provides a diagrammatic representation for these trees in the style of Peircean graphs. We provide a calculus based on C.S. Peirce’s calculus for existential graphs and prove the soundness and completeness of the calculus. The calculus acts on labeled trees, but can be best understood as a diagrammatic calculus whose rules modify the Peircean-style representation of ALC.

Source: Derik Hawley / Logic in Pictures

Just as “discursive” reasoning has been given formal analysis through the methods of formal logic and formal language theory, graph theory provides a framework by means of which “diagrammatic” reasoning can be given such a formal treatment. Just as formal logic replaces words with abstract symbols, Graph theory replaces icons and arrows in a diagram with abstract entities called vertices and arcs. This allows the formal properties of the symbolism to be examined without the intervention of any aspects of the conception which is conveyed by the symbol affecting the inference. Formal logic treats inference as a set of operations that deal only with the operations on the symbols themselves, and does not examine the inference that involves associations based upon the conceptions conveyed by the symbols. There are certain advantages to such a treatment. Formal logic provides a framework where the examination of the validity of an argument can be examined without the intervening effects of connotations and emotions. The formal examination results in a knowledge of whether or not the premises of an argument are sufficient evidence for the conclusion. This is a useful thing for it provides us with a method of examining our own opinions and those of others.

The study of logic has, with one exception, dealt only with “discursive” symbolisms. It has examined the ways in which the discursive symbolisms can be formalized using different systems. Historically, one can divide the set of logic systems into three categories. First there is the Aristotelian Logic system, secondly there are propositional systems and finally there are the modern quantified, relational logics (which include first and second order logic). Each of these developments attempts to improve the range of arguments that can be given formal treatment. However, there has never been an attempt to deal with “diagrammatic symbols” and provide a framework for the examination of the sorts of inferences that involve the formal aspects of diagrammatic symbols. By using graph theory we can examine diagrammatic symbolisms in a manner such that they can undergo the same formal scrutiny that discursive reasoning can be given in formal logic.

In this chapter I will be giving an introduction to graph theory and a few examples of the manner in which graph theory can be applied to diagrammatic reasoning. I will then sketch a method by which Peirce’s existential graphs can be translated into graph theory.

Source: Diagrams 2018

Diagrams 2018 Accepted Tutorials

Diagrams 2018 has six scheduled tutorials (subject to change):

Picturing Quantum Processes: A First Course in Quantum Theory and Diagrammatic Reasoning
Presenters: Aleks Kissinger and Bob Coecke
Time: 09:00 – 10:30

Description: We provide a self-contained introduction to quantum theory using a unique diagrammatic language. Far from simple visual aids, the diagrams we use are mathematical objects in their own right, which allow us to develop from first principles a completely rigorous treatment of ‘textbook’ quantum theory. Additionally, the diagrammatic treatment eliminates the need for the typical prerequisites of a standard course on the subject, making it suitable for a multi-disciplinary audience with no prior knowledge in physics or advanced mathematics.

By subscribing to a diagrammatic treatment of quantum theory we place emphasis on quantum processes, rather than individual systems, and study how uniquely quantum features arise as processes compose and interact across time and space. We introduce the notion of a process theory, and from this develop the notions of pure and mixed quantum maps, measurements and classical data, quantum teleportation and cryptography, models of quantum computation, quantum algorithms, and quantum non-locality. The primary mode of calculation in this tutorial is diagram transformations, where simple local identities on diagrams are used to explain and derive the behaviour of many kinds of quantum processes.

This tutorial roughly follows a new textbook published by Cambridge University Press in 2017 with the same title.

Diagrams in Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics: Image and Intuition
Presenter: Ofra Rechter
Time: 11:00 – 12:30

Description: Kant’s notion of an image (Bild) is at play in the examples of mathematical construction from both geometry and arithmetic that are considered in the Critique of Pure Reason. Pre-Critical texts distinguish linguistic signs from mathematical sensible means for cognition, geometrical figures and signs in numeral systems, but the Critical philosophy raises the question of what the operation signs signify. In this tutorial we articulate the
central problems about Kant’s epistemology of mathematics from the vantage point of the problematic of pure intuition as an intuition of images that instantiate mathematical concepts. Our point of departure is that a phenomenological aspect of the use made of geometrical figures in mathematical reasoning in Kant also underpins the role of numeral types in the construction of the elementary arithmetic. But, the manipulation of images in calculation or arithmetical reasoning cannot simply be a geometry of numerical signs for Kant. An attractive proposal by Michael Friedman associates the mathematical operations with what Kant calls schemata (and, thereby, via the imagination, both with time and space– the forms of sensibility, and with the intellectual synthesis under the categories). This seems to work quite neatly when the operations in question are only Euclidean postulates. Can the proposal be extended to arithmetic? to address this question we will isolate a problem that is distinctive of Kant’s philosophy of arithmetic: an inherent ambiguity in his account between successive addition as a species of synthesis and the primitive recursive binary operation of addition. By showing that the appeal to images serves Kant in bridging this ambiguity, the epistemological and the ontological accounts of a mathematical object of intuition are distinguished. Finally, time permitting, we will indicate how this result also contributes to resolving a dispute over mathematical intuition and the Kantian roots of Finitism between Charles Parsons and William Tait.

Carroll diagrams: design and manipulation
Presenter: Amirouche Moktefi
Time: 14:00 – 15:30

Description: The use of diagrams in logic is old. Euler and Venn schemes are among the most popular. Carroll diagrams are less known but are occasionally mentioned in recent literature. The objective of this tutorial is to expose the working of Carrol’s diagrams and their significance from a triple perspective: historical, mathematical and philosophical. The diagrams are exposed, worked out and compared to Euler-Venn diagrams. These schemes are used to solve the problem of elimination which was widely addressed by early mathematical logicians in Boole’s footsteps. Logicians worked on a general method for finding the conclusion that is to be drawn from any number of premises containing any number of terms. For this purpose, they designed symbolic, visual and mechanical devices. The significance of Venn and Carroll diagrams is better understood within this historical context. The development of logic notably created the need for complex diagrams to represent n terms, rather than merely 3. Several methods to construct diagrams for n terms, with different strategies, are discussed. Finally, the philosophical significance of Carroll diagrams is discussed in relation to the use of transfer rules. This practice is connected to recent philosophical debates on the role of diagrams in mathematical practice.

Were “super-turing” diagrammatic reasoning competences ancient products of biological evolution?
Presenter: Aaron Sloman
Time: 14:00 – 15:30

Description: I’ll give a highly interactive introduction to aspects of the Turing-inspired Meta-Morphogenesis project, focusing on conjectures about evolutionary processes leading to the amazing discoveries in topology and geometry by ancient mathematicians, and corresponding competences of young humans and other intelligent animals, suggesting brain processes very different from anything currently understood in AI or neuroscience. A conjectured “super-turing membrane machine” will be sketched along with requirements for further development. Whether this can be implemented as a virtual machine running on digital computing machinery is not yet clear. The tutorial will be highly interactive with many different examples discussed in detail, depending on interests of participants, e.g. examples of reasoning about affordances, using “diagrams in the mind”. More details can be found here.

Using verbal protocols to support diagram design
Presenter: Thora Tenbrink
Time: 16:00 – 17:30

Description: How do we know what people perceive in a diagram? A diagram can be an excellent medium for communication of complex facts and relationships. Users may be able to learn a lot just from a quick glance at a well-designed diagram. Unfortunately, what users take from a diagram may not always be the same as what its designers intended to communicate. This can have enormous consequences, ranging from misinterpretation of research outputs to false representation in the media, to the point of misguided policy decisions coming from miscommunication of central research insights.

In this tutorial, we will look at the use of verbal protocols as a tool in diagram design. The way people talk about a diagram can reveal a lot about how they understand it, what they misinterpret, and what kinds of design features could be amended to enhance clarity, ensuring successful communication.

The tutorial will start by looking at the kinds of problems that frequently arise in diagram interpretation, such as cognitive biases, misinterpretations, and effects of lack of expertise. Following a brief discussion of the value of verbal protocols in this area, we will turn to the practical aspects of verbal protocol data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

Peirce on Diagrammatic Reasoning and Semeiotic
Presenters: Javier Legris and Cassiano Rodrigues
Time: 16:00 – 17:30

Description: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is one of the “grounding fathers” of mathematical logic, having developed all of the key formal results of modern logic. Starting from Boole’s algebra of logic and De Morgan’s logic of relations, Peirce developed his own system of quantifiers and relative predicates. Due to philosophical reasons, he became dissatisfied with algebraic notation for logic, developing a diagrammatic logical system of Existential Graphs. Regarding it as his masterpiece in logic, Peirce called it the logic of the future. For Peirce, all necessary reasoning is diagrammatic. Generalizing, we can say all logical inferences can be interpreted as diagrammatic experimentations upon signs. This is why Peirce thinks of logic as “semeiotic”, a general and “quasi-necessary” doctrine of signs inquiring into their active role as conveyers of meaning.

The tutorial will present Peirce’s logic and philosophy of logic, focusing more on the arguments supporting some of Peirce’s most original ideas. His distinction between logic and mathematics will be hinted at, aiming at showing why creativity and discovery have an important place in Peirce’s thought.

Specific topics: Relatives, illation, and semeiotic; quantifiers; existential graphs; theorematic and corollarial deductions; Peirce’s refusal of logicism; Notes on bibliography and current research.

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Source:

Source: A less simplistic metaphysics: Peirce’s layered theory of meaning as a layered theory of being

Source: PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM: A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

Source: Interdisciplinary Aspects of Cognition

Computation: From Mathematics to Computer Science

Hofstadter’s 800-page bestseller [25] aims to show how self-reference, which essentially corresponds to the mathematical notion of recursion, is the basis of self-awareness. Hofstadter considers the diagonal argument used by Kurt Godel to prove his two incompleteness theorems: the use of a property that refer to itself to prove that (1) there is no axiomatic system capable to prove all properties of the arithmetic and (2) no consistent axiomatic system which includes Peano arithmetic can prove its own consistency.

G ̈odel’s results may be seen as an evidence that there is no objective reality and that there are questions that cannot have an answer. Hofstadter writes in the preface to the 20th-anniversary edition of his book: ‘Something very strange thus emerges from the G ̈odelian loop: the revelation of the causal power of meaning in a rule-bound but meaning-free universe. […] When and only when such a loop arises in a brain or in any other substrate, is a person — a unique new “I” — brought into being.’ This means that symbolic computation, especially through recursion, potentially allows meaning to emerge from the manipulation of meaningless symbols, up to the complexity of human reasoning. The fact that recursion is the fundamental mathematical tool in mechanising reasoning is not a surprise for a computer scientist. After all, programming languages used in artificial intelligence, either Lisp-like functional languages or Prolog-like declarative languages, heavily exploit recursion.

My Related Posts

Knot Theory and Recursion: Louis H. Kauffman

Dialogs and Dialectics

Semiotics and Systems

Semiotic Self and Dialogic Self

Paradoxes, Contradictions, and Dialectics in Organizations

Reflexivity, Recursion, and Self Reference

Narrative Psychology: Language, Meaning, and Self

Resource Flows: Material Flow Accounting (MFA), Life Cycle Analysis (LCA), Input Output Networks and other methods

System Archetypes: Stories that Repeat

From Systems to Complex Systems

Micro Motives, Macro Behavior: Agent Based Modeling in Economics

Gantt Chart Simulation for Stock Flow Consistent Production Schedules

Production and Distribution Planning : Strategic, Global, and Integrated

Portfolio Planning Models for Corporate Strategic Planning

What are Problem Structuring Methods?

Measuring Globalization: Global Multi Region Input Output Data Bases (G-MRIO)

Stock Flow Consistent Input Output Models (SFCIO)

Stock-Flow Consistent Modeling

Stock Flow Consistent Models for Ecological Economics

Global Flow of Funds: Statistical Data Matrix across National Boundaries

Phillips Machine: Hydraulic Flows and Macroeconomics

Balance Sheet Economics – Financial Input-Output Analysis (using Asset Liability Matrices) – Update March 2018

Foundations of Balance Sheet Economics

Contagion in Financial (Balance sheets) Networks

Balance Sheets, Financial Interconnectedness, and Financial Stability – G20 Data Gaps Initiative

The Strength of Weak Ties

Credit Chains and Production Networks

Supply Chain Finance (SCF) / Financial Supply Chain Management (F-SCM)

Network Economics of Block Chain and Distributed Ledger Technology

Currency Credit Networks of International Banks

Multiplex Financial Networks

Intra Industry Trade and International Production and Distribution Networks

Systems Biology: Biological Networks, Network Motifs, Switches and Oscillators

Global Financial Safety Net: Regional Reserve Pools and Currency Swap Networks of Central Banks

Evolving Networks of Regional RTGS Payment and Settlement Systems

Structure and Evolution of EFT Payment Networks in the USA, India, and China

Networks and Hierarchies

Hierarchy Theory in Biology, Ecology and Evolution

Key Sources of Research

Natural logic is diagrammatic reasoning about mental models

John F.Sowa

Kyndi Inc, San Mateo, CA

Available online 15 April 2020, Version of Record 15 April 2020.

Procedia Computer Science
Volume 169, 2020, Pages 31-45

Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in Peirce

By Frederik Stjernfelt

Semiotics, Schemata, Diagrams, and Graphs: A New Form of Diagrammatic Kantism by Peirce

CLAUDIO PAOLUCCI

Graphs as Images vs. Graphs as Diagrams: A Problem at the Intersection of Semiotics and Didactics

MICHAEL MAY

Two Dogmas of Diagrammatic Reasoning: A View from Existential Graphs

AHTI-VEIKKO PIETARINEN AND FRANCESCO BELLUCCI

Peirce on Perception and Reasoning

From Icons to Logic

Edited by

Kathleen A. Hull and Richard Kenneth Atkins

Routledge Studics in American Philosophy

2017

ISBN: 978-1-138-21501-6 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-44464-2 (ebk)

From Existential Graphs to Conceptual Graphs

John F. Sowa

VivoMind Research, LLC

The Philosophical Psychology of Charles S. Peirce

Claudia Cristalli

UCL PhD Thesis

Interdisciplinary Aspects of Cognition

Antonio Cerone1,4, Siamac Fazli1, Kathy L. Malone2, and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen3,4

1 Department of Computer Science, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
{antonio.cerone,siamac.fazli}@nu.edu.kz

2 Graduate School of Education, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
kathy.malone@nu.edu.kz

3 Department of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
ahtiveikko.pietarinen@nu.edu.kz

4 Intelligence, Robotics and Cognition Cluster, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

Diagrams 2021

2021. Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: 12th International Conference,

Virtual, September 28–30, 2021, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2

The Beauty of Graphs

  • January 2018

DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-91376-6_2

  • In book: Diagrammatic Representation and Inference (pp.9-12)

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen 1,2

1Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

ahti-veikko.pietarinen@ttu.ee

2Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325185161_The_Beauty_of_Graphs

General Introduction to Logic of the Future 

Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko.

Volume 2 The 1903 Lowell Lectures, edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2021, pp. 1-14.

 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110740462-001

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110740462-001/pdf

Why Images Cannot be Arguments, But Moving Ones Might

Marc Champagne1 · Ahti‐Veikko Pietarinen2

Argumentation 2019

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-019-09484-0

IDEAS IN ACTION

PROCEEDINGS OF THE APPLYING PEIRCE CONFERENCE

Nordic Studies in Pragmatism 1

Edited by
Mats Bergman,
Sami Paavola, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Henrik Rydenfelt

Nordic Pragmatism Network, Helsinki 2010

Challenges and Opportunities for Existential Graphs

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

University of Helsinki 2010

Page 288, Previous Reference


Peirce’s Diagrammatic Logic and the Opposition between Logic as Calculus vs. Logic as Universal Language

Legris Javier
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1095-1114 (2017)

DOI 10.17990/RPF/2017_73_3_1095.

https://www.publicacoesfacfil.pt/product.php?id_product=1058

The Logic of Peirce Algebras

MAARTEN DE RIJKE

Department of Software Technology, CW1,P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Email: mdr@cwi.nl

Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 4: 227-250, 1995.

Peirce’s Diagrammatic Solutions to ‘Peirce’s Puzzle’


Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: 12th International Conference, Diagrams 2021, Virtual, September 28–30, 2021,

Proceedings Sep 2021 Pages 246–250

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2_23

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2_23

A diagrammatic reasoning system for the description logic ALC

Frithjof Dau,

Peter Eklund

Journal of Visual Languages and Computing

Volume 19 Issue 5 October, 2008 pp 539–573

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvlc.2007.12.003

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.jvlc.2007.12.003

Two papers on existential graphs by Charles Peirce 

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

2014

Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0498-y

ON THE SUPREME BEAUTY OF LOGICAL GRAPHS

AHTI-VEIKKO PIETARINEN

Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana 8

2016

Peirce and diagrams: two contributors to an actual discussion review each other

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

Frederik Stjernfelt

Synthese

DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0658-8

 https://www.academia.edu/17249725/Peirce_and_Diagrams?from=cover_page

Peirce’s Dragon Logic of 1901.

Ma, M., Pietarinen, A.-V.:

Preprint (2019)

Chapter 1
Mutual Insights on Peirce and Husserl 

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Mohammad Shafiei and Frederik Stjernfelt

Diagrammatic reasoning. Some notes on Charles S. Peirce and Friedrich A. Lange. 

Bellucci, F. (2013).

History and Philosophy of Logic 34(4), 293-305.

DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2013.777991

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2013.777991

Logische Studien: Ein Beitrag Zur Neubegrundung Der Formalen Logik Und Der Erkenntnisstheorie.

Lange, F. A. (1877). 

Iserlohn: J. Baedeker.

Logic of the Future: Writings on Existential Graphs. 

Peirce, C. S. (2019-). 

Ed. By A.-V. Pietarinen, 

Peirceana Vols.1-3. Mouton De Gruyter.

Peirce and Diagrams: Peirce and Husserl in Professor Stjernfelt’s Diagrammatology. 

Pietarinen, A.-V. (2015).

Synthese 192, 1073-1088. 10.1007/s11229-015-0658-8

Is there a General Diagram Concept?

Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016).

In Krämer, S. & C. Ljundberg (eds.), Thinking in Diagrams: The Semiotic Basis of Human Cognition,

Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 121-138.

The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce.

Roberts, D. D. (1973). 

The Hague: Mouton.

Diagrammatology. An investigation on the borderlines of phenomenology, ontology, and semiotics.

Stjernfelt, F. (2007). 

Synthese Library 336. Dordrecht: Springer.

An Examination of Diagrammatic Representations, Graph Theory and Logic

Derik Hawley

MA Thesis

University of Waterloo

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1994

Existential Graphs: What a Diagrammatic Logic of Cognition Might Look Like

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

History and Philosophy of Logic
Volume 32, 2011 – Issue 3 Pages 265-281
https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2011.555506

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2011.555506

EXISTENTIAL GRAPHS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS: PART I. ALPHA.

BELLUCCI, F., & PIETARINEN, A. (2016).

The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9(2), 209-237.

doi:10.1017/S1755020315000362

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic/article/existential-graphs-as-an-instrument-of-logical-analysis-part-i-alpha/9C4689940BDC5B17F739C34A87C2B77F

Peirce’s Contributions to Possible-Worlds Semantics. 

Pietarinen, AV.

Stud Logica 82, 345–369 (2006).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-006-8102-1

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11225-006-8102-1

Peirce and the logical status of diagrams, 

Sun-joo Shin (1994) 

History and Philosophy of Logic, 15:1, 45-68, 

DOI: 10.1080/01445349408837224

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445349408837224

Martin Gardner. Logic machines and diagrams.

Mays, W. (1959).

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York-Toronto-London 1958, ix 157 pp. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24(1), 78-79. doi:10.2307/2964627

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/martin-gardner-logic-machines-and-diagrams-mcgrawhill-book-company-inc-new-yorktorontolondon1958-ix-157-pp/8A32703B5F50C8E093F5C51AEF6E76DB

Euler’s visual logic

Eric Hammer & Sun-Joo Shin (1998) 

History and Philosophy of Logic, 19:1, 1-29, DOI: 10.1080/01445349808837293

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445349808837293

“Peirce on Logical Diagrams.” 

Hammer, Eric.

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31, no. 4 (1995): 807–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320573.

The Iconic Logic of Peirce’s Graphs

by Sun-Joo Shin

Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2002. x + 208.

“What is a Logical Diagram?” 

Catherine Legg

Diagrams

First published Tue Aug 28, 2001; substantive revision Thu Dec 13, 2018

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/diagrams/

Diagrams 2018

Diagrammatic Representation and Inference

10th International Conference, Diagrams 2018, Edinburgh, UK, June 18-22, 2018, Proceedings

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-91376-6

http://www.diagrams-conference.org/2018/index.html%3Fp=320.html

SetVR 2020

International Workshop on Set Visualization and Reasoning

August 2020, Tallinn, Estonia

(co-located with Diagrams 2020)

https://sites.google.com/site/setvr2kn/current-workshop

DIAGRAMS 2020

11th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Diagrams, 24-28 August 2020

Home

http://link.springer.com/openurl.asp?genre=issue&issn=0302-9743&volume=12169

Diagrams 2022

Diagrammatic Representation and Inference

13th International Conference, Diagrams 2022, Rome, Italy, September 14–16, 2022, Proceedings

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-15146-0

Home

Existential Graphs

MS 514 by Charles Sanders Peirce

with commentary by John F. Sowa

http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

A Survey of Venn Diagrams 

Frank Ruskey and Mark Weston
Department of Computer Science
University of Victoria
Victoria, B.C. V8W 3P6
CANADA

https://www.combinatorics.org/files/Surveys/ds5/VennEJC.html

THE WORK OF EDWARD TUFTE AND GRAPHICS PRESS

GRAPHICS PRESS LLC  P.O. BOX 430  CHESHIRE, CT 06410  800 822-2454

https://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/

Forms and Roles of Diagrams in Knot Theory 

Silvia De Toffoli • Valeria Giardino

Erkenn (2014) 79:829–842
DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9568-7

WHAT ARE MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS? 

Silvia De Toffoli

Forthcoming in Synthese

The Aesthetics of Science: Beauty, Imagination and Understanding

edited by Milena Ivanova, Steven French

How Do Feynman Diagrams Work?. 

James Robert Brown;

Perspectives on Science 2018; 26 (4): 423–442.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00281

https://direct.mit.edu/posc/article/26/4/423/15455/How-Do-Feynman-Diagrams-Work

Feynman Diagrams: Modeling between Physics and Mathematics. 

Michael Stöltzner;

Perspectives on Science 2018; 26 (4): 482–500.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00284

Feynman diagrams

From complexity to simplicity and back 

Robert Harlander

R. Harlander
TTK, RWTH Aachen University
Tel.: +49-241-80-27045
Fax: +49-241-80-22187
E-mail: harlander@physik.rwth-aachen.de

Click to access harlander.pdf

From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets

Synthese volume 196, pages 2715–2736 (2019)

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1558-x

WHO’S AFRAID OF MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?

Silvia De Toffoli

Penultimate version (21 January 2022) // Forthcoming in Philosophers’ Imprint

‘CHASING’ THE DIAGRAM—THE USE OF VISUALIZATIONS IN ALGEBRAIC REASONING

SILVIA DE TOFFOLI

Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

450 SERRA MALL, STANFORD CA 94305, USA

E-mail: silviadt@stanford.edu

THE REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC Volume 10, Number 1, March 2017

Aligning logical and psychological perspectives on Diagrammatic Reasoning

Keith Stenning
Human Communication Research Centre􏰄 Edinburgh University

Oliver Lemon
Dept􏰆 of Computer Science􏰄 Manchester University

https://web-archive.southampton.ac.uk/cogprints.org/820/2/lemon.ps

The forgotten individual: diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics. 

Shin, SJ.

Synthese 186, 149–168 (2012).

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0075-1

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-012-0075-1

“Introduction: Diagrammatical reasoning and Peircean logic representations” 

Queiroz, João and Stjernfelt, Frederik.

Semiotica vol. 2011, no. 186, 2011, pp. 1-4. 

https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.2011.043

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/semi.2011.043/html#Chicago

https://philarchive.org/archive/QUEIDR

Images, diagrams, and narratives: Charles S. Peirce’s epistemological theory of mental diagrams

Markus Arnold

Semiotica vol. 2011, no. 186, 2011, pp. 5-20. 

https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.2011.044

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/semi.2011.044/html

Peirce’s Graphs—The Continuity Interpretation. 

Zeman, J. J. (1968).

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society4(3), 144–154. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319551

Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning

P. N. Johnson-Laird

Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA Email: phil@princeton.edu

THINKING AND REASONING, 2002, 8(1), 69–95

DOI: 10.1080/13546780143000099

Click to access 2002peirce.pdf

One, two, three . . . continuity: C.S. Peirce and the nature of the continuum

Author: Robertson, R.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2, 1 January 2001, pp. 7-24(18)

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/chk/2001/00000008/f0020001/74

Peirce and Spencer-Brown: history and synergies in cybersemiotics

L.H, Kauffman & Brier, Søren. (2001).

Cybernetics & Human Knowing. 8. 3-5.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233652405_Peirce_and_Spencer-Brown_history_and_synergies_in_cybersemiotics

Peirce and Spencer-Brown on Probability, Chance, and Lawfulness

Author: Martin, J.L.
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 22, Number 1, 2015, pp. 9-33(25)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce

Louis H. Kauffman1

Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Vol.8, no.1–2, 2001, pp. 79–110

Virtual Logic–The Combinatorial Hierarchy: ‘One, Two, Three, Infinity!’

Author: Kauffman, Louis
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 19, Number 3, 2012, pp. 83-91(9)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/chk/2012/00000019/00000003/art00006

A (Cybernetic) Musing: Cybernetics and Circularities

Author: Glanville, Ranulph
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 19, Number 4, 2012, pp. 105-116(12)
Publisher: Imprint Academic


6.3 One, Two, Three … Eternity

Subchapter in book

Cyber Semiotics: Why Information is not enough

Soren Brier

C. S. Peirce’s Complementary and Transdisciplinary Conception of Science and Religion

Author: Brier, Soeren
Source: Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Volume 19, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pp. 59-94(36)
Publisher: Imprint Academic

Squaring the unknown:

The generalization of logic according to G. Boole, A. De Morgan, and C. S. Peirce

Cassiano Terra Rodrigues

South American Journal of Logic

Vol. 3, n. 2, pp. 415–481, 2017 ISSN: 2446-6719

Mathematical modal logic: A view of its evolution

Robert Goldblatt

Centre for Logic, Language and Computation, Victoria University, P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand

Available online 26 November 2003.

Journal of Applied Logic
Volume 1, Issues 5–6, October 2003, Pages 309-392

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1570868303000089

A less simplistic metaphysics: Peirce’s layered theory of meaning as a layered theory of being

Marc Champagne

Department of Philosophy, Trent University 1600 West Bank Drive, Peterborough K9J 7B8, Canada e-mail: marcchampagne@trentu.ca

Peirce’s Existential Graphs — Readings and Links

Dr. Frithjof Dau

http://www.dr-dau.net/eg_readings.shtml

The Graphical Logic of C. S. Peirce 

 J. J. Zeman:   

Existential Graphs

MS 514 by Charles Sanders Peirce

with commentary by John F. Sowa

http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

Peirce’s Tutorial on Existential Graphs

 John F. Sowa

Semiotica 2011 (186):347-394 (2011)

https://philpapers.org/rec/SOWPTO

Peirce’s Deductive Logic

First published Fri Dec 15, 1995; substantive revision Fri May 20, 2022

SEP Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-logic/

Diagrams and alien ways of thinking 

Marc Champagne

Department of Philosophy, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 12666, 72 Avenue, Surrey, B.C., V3W 2M8, Canada

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 75 (2019) 12–22

https://philarchive.org/archive/CHADAA-6

Existential Graphs: What a Diagrammatic Logic of Cognition Might Look Like

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Pages 265-281 | Received 11 Mar 2010, Accepted 06 Jan 2011, Published online: 03 Aug 2011

History and Philosophy of Logic
Volume 32, 2011 – Issue 3


https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2011.555506

The Philosophical Context of Peirce’s Existential Graphs

Mary Keeler
University of Washington, Seattle 

http://www.welchco.com/02/14/01/60/00/05/1501.HTM

Possibilities in Peirce’s Existential Graphs for Logic Education

Adam Vile and Simon Polovina

GR&ND

South Bank University

Semiotics, Schemata, Diagrams, and Graphs: A New Form of Diagrammatic Kantism by Peirce

Claudio Paolucci
University of Bologna

April 2017

In book: Peirce on Perception and Reasoning. From Icons to Logic.

Hull, K. and Atkins, K. (eds.), Routledge Studies in American Philosophy (pp.74-85)Publisher: Routledge

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340447952_Semiotics_Schemata_Diagrams_and_Graphs_A_New_Form_of_Diagrammatic_Kantism_by_Peirce

From Existential Graphs to Conceptual Graphs

John Sowa
VivoMind Resarch, LLC

January 2013

International Journal of Conceptual Structures and Smart Applications 1(1):39-72
DOI:10.4018/ijcssa.2013010103

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273861229_From_Existential_Graphs_to_Conceptual_Graphs

“75. Visualizing Reason”. 

Farias, Priscila L..

Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition,

edited by Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sorensen, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014, pp. 483-486. 

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781614516415.483

Existential Graphs and Cognition

Caterina Clivio (Columbia University, USA) and Marcel Danesi (University of Toronto, Canada)

Source Title: Empirical Research on Semiotics and Visual Rhetoric
2018 |Pages: 9
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-5622-0.ch004

https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/existential-graphs-and-cognition/197978

Toward an Integrated History and Philosophy of Diagrammatic Practices

Chiara Ambrosio
Department of Science and Technology Studies UCL

c.ambrosio@ucl.ac.uk

Mathematical Logic with Diagrams Based on the Existential Graphs of Peirce

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Mathematical-Logic-with-Diagrams-Based-on-the-of-Dau/41b054650b2889dbf15b596661318a7cba61dd20

Click to access egs.pdf

Diagrams as Centerpiece of a Peircean Epistemology

Frederik Stjernfelt

DIAGRAMMATIC THOUGHT: TWO FORMS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM IN C.S. PEIRCE AND GILLES DELEUZE 

Kamini Vellodi

PARRHESIA NUMBER 19 • 2014 • 79-95

Charles Sanders Peirce: Logic

IEP

The Semiotics of Spider Diagrams

Jim Burton and John Howse

PEIRCE’S CONTINUUM

A METHODOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL APPROACH

FERNANDO ZALAMEA

Adventures in Diagrammatic Reasoning—A Few Notes

FROM THE SERIES: Graphic Ethnography on the Rise

By  Elizabeth A. Povinelli

July 28, 2022

https://culanth.org/fieldsights/adventures-in-diagrammatic-reasoning-a-few-notes

1 Introduction

Andre Freitas

Click to access diagrammatic_quality_semiotica_2019.pdf

Dimensions of Peircean diagrammaticality

Frederik Stjernfelt
Aalborg University

March 2019

Semiotica 2019 (228)
DOI:10.1515/sem-2018-0119

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331961372_Dimensions_of_Peircean_diagrammaticality

Moving Pictures of Thought
Diagrams as Centerpiece of a Peircean Epistemology

Originally, “Diagrams as Centerpiece in a Peircean Epistemology”, in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Summer, 2000, vol. XXXVI, no. 3, 357-92.

In its adapted version, ch. 4 of Diagrammatology. An Investigation in Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics, Dordrecht 2007: Springer Verlag, 89-116.

Click to access Diagrams%20as%20Centerpiece.%202000%3A2007.pdf



Graphs as Images vs. Graphs as Diagrams

A Problem at the Intersection of Semiotics and Didactics

By Michael May
Book
Peirce on Perception and Reasoning
Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2017
Imprint Routledge
Pages 12
eBook ISBN 9781315444642

Diagrams

First published Tue Aug 28, 2001; substantive revision Tue Sep 17, 2013

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive

https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2015/entries/diagrams/

Diagrammatic Immanence

Category Theory and Philosophy

Rocco Gangle

2016

Edinburgh University Press Ltd

Existential Graphs as Ontographic Media

Daniela Wentz
2019, Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung

https://www.academia.edu/63635014/Existential_Graphs_as_Ontographic_Media

On diagrams for Peirces 10, 28, and 66 classes of signs

Semiotica 2003(147):165-184
DOI:10.1515/semi.2003.089

Priscila Lena Farias
University of São Paulo

Joao Queiroz
Federal University of Juiz de Fora

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs

On the Diversity of Signs in Human Interaction

Jack Sidnell

https://www.academia.edu/36164894/On_the_Diversity_of_Signs_in_Human_Interaction


Semiosis as an Emergent Process

João Queiroz & Charbel Niño El-Hani

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):78-116 (2006)

https://philpapers.org/rec/QUESAA-2


Towards a multi-level approach to the emergence of meaning processes in living systems

João Queiroz & Charbel Niño El-Hani

Acta Biotheoretica 54 (3):179-206 (2006)

https://philpapers.org/rec/QUETAM

Semiotics and Intelligent Systems Development

Ricardo Gudwin

Joao Queiroz

Book 2006

https://www.academia.edu/377806/Semiotics_and_Intelligent_Systems_Development

Images, diagrams, and metaphors: hypoicons in the context of Peirce’s sixty-six-fold classification of signs

Priscila Farias & João Queiroz

Semiotica 2006 (162):287-307 (2006)

https://philpapers.org/rec/FARIDA

10cubes and 3N3: Using interactive diagrams to investigate Charles Peirces classifications of signs

Priscila Farias & João Queiroz

Semiotica 2004 (151):41-63 (2004)

https://philarchive.org/rec/FARCAN?all_versions=1


Notes for a dynamic diagram of Charles Peirce’s classifications of signs

Priscila Farias & João Queiroz
Semiotica 131 (1-2):19-44 (2000)

https://philpapers.org/rec/FARNFA

Bibliography: Advanced Issues on Cognitive Science and Semiotics

Farias, Priscilla & Queiroz, Joao
Year: 2006
Place: Berlin
Publisher: Shaker Verlag
ISBN: 978-3-8322-56

http://www.commens.org/bibliography/edited_collection/farias-priscilla-queiroz-joao-2006-advanced-issues-cognitive-science

On Peirce’s diagrammatic models for ten classes of signs

Priscila Lena Farias* and João Queiroz

Semiotica 2014; 202: 657 – 671

􏰀

􏰁􏰂􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰆 􏰇􏰄􏰈􏰆􏰃􏰈􏰉 􏰊􏰈􏰋􏰌􏰍􏰋􏰍􏰎 􏰏􏰐􏰃 􏰑􏰃􏰒􏰓􏰄􏰌􏰈􏰂􏰒 􏰔􏰐􏰆􏰄􏰌 􏰈􏰅􏰓 􏰊􏰕 􏰁􏰕 􏰑􏰒􏰄􏰃􏰌􏰒􏰖􏰎 􏰁􏰗􏰎􏰂􏰒􏰉 􏰘􏰒􏰂􏰈

A String Diagram Calculus for Predicate Logic and C. S. Peirce’s System Beta􏰙􏰒􏰃􏰈􏰋􏰓􏰄􏰅􏰒 􏰘􏰃􏰈􏰓􏰗 􏰈􏰅􏰓 􏰚􏰐 􏰓􏰓 􏰛􏰕 􏰚􏰃􏰄􏰉􏰜􏰋􏰒

􏰀􏰜􏰎􏰂􏰃􏰈􏰌􏰂G Brady and T H Trimble

1998

http://people.cs.uchicago.edu/~brady/beta98.ps

LOGICAL REASONING WITH DIAGRAMS

edited by GERARD ALLWEIN and JON BARWISE

Oxford University Press

1996

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􏰁􏰂􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰆 􏰇􏰄􏰈􏰆􏰃􏰈􏰉 􏰊􏰈􏰋􏰌􏰍􏰋􏰍􏰎 􏰏􏰐􏰃 􏰑􏰃􏰒􏰓􏰄􏰌􏰈􏰂􏰒 􏰔􏰐􏰆􏰄􏰌 􏰈􏰅􏰓 􏰊􏰕 􏰁􏰕 􏰑􏰒􏰄􏰃􏰌􏰒􏰖􏰎 􏰁􏰗􏰎􏰂􏰒􏰉 􏰘􏰒􏰂􏰈
􏰙􏰒􏰃􏰈􏰋􏰓􏰄􏰅􏰒 􏰘􏰃􏰈􏰓􏰗 􏰈􏰅􏰓 􏰚􏰐 􏰓􏰓 􏰛􏰕 􏰚􏰃􏰄􏰉􏰜􏰋􏰒
􏰝􏰞􏰞􏰟 􏰠􏰐􏰡􏰒􏰉􏰜 􏰒􏰃 􏰟􏰢 􏰃􏰒􏰡􏰄􏰎􏰒􏰓 􏰣􏰤􏰤􏰤 􏰥􏰍􏰅􏰒
􏰀􏰜􏰎􏰂􏰃􏰈􏰌􏰂
􏰣􏰣

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􏰁􏰂􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰆 􏰇􏰄􏰈􏰆􏰃􏰈􏰉 􏰊􏰈􏰋􏰌􏰍􏰋􏰍􏰎 􏰏􏰐􏰃 􏰑􏰃􏰒􏰓􏰄􏰌􏰈􏰂􏰒 􏰔􏰐􏰆􏰄􏰌 􏰈􏰅􏰓 􏰊􏰕 􏰁􏰕 􏰑􏰒􏰄􏰃􏰌􏰒􏰖􏰎 􏰁􏰗􏰎􏰂􏰒􏰉 􏰘􏰒􏰂􏰈

Peirce and Value Theory: On Peircian Ethics and Aesthetics


Herman Parret
John Benjamins Publishing, 1994 – 381 pages

Image Schemas and Conceptual Blending in Diagrammatic Reasoning: The Case of Hasse Diagrams

  • September 2021

DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2_31

  • In book: Diagrammatic Representation and Inference, 12th International Conference, Diagrams 2021, Virtual, September 28–30, 2021, Proceedings (pp.297-314)

Dimitra Bourou

Marco Schorlemmer

Enric Plaza

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354725645_Image_Schemas_and_Conceptual_Blending_in_Diagrammatic_Reasoning_The_Case_of_Hasse_Diagrams

Euler vs Hasse Diagrams for Reasoning About Sets: A Cognitive Approach

September 2022

DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-15146-0_13

In book: Diagrammatic Representation and Inference (pp.151-167)

Dimitra Bourou
Marco Schorlemmer
Enric Plaza
Spanish National Research Council

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-15146-0_13

PEIRCE’S THEORY OF ESTHETICS AND NORMATIVE SCIENCE

SEIDENSTICKER, WILLIAM DAVID. 
 Fordham University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing,  1968. 6902610.

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Signs

Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Signs

Key Terms

  • Semiotics
  • Semeiotics
  • Pragmatics
  • Charles Sanders Peirce’s Triadic Theory of Sign
  • Charles Sanders Peirce’s Theory of Categories
  • Saussure’s Dyadic Theory of Semiotics
  • Set of Categories
    • Relations – Monadic, Dyadic, Triadic
    • Categories – Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
  • Trichotomies
    • 3 Trichotomies – 10 Classes of Sign
    • 6 Trichotomies – 28 Classes of Sign
    • 10 Trichotomies – 66 Classes of Sign
  • Classes of Signs
    • Representamen: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign 
    • Interpretant: Rheme, Dicent, Argument
    • Object: Icon, Index, Symbol
  • Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)
  • Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
  • Louis Hjemslev (1899-1965)
  • Charles Morris (1901-1979)
  • Max Bense (1910 – 1990)
  • Roman Jakobsen (1896- 1982)
  • Roland Barthes (1915-1980)
  • Umberto Eco (1932-)
  • Graphical Thinking
  • Diagrammatical Reasoning
  • Existential Graphs
  • Speculative Grammar, Critical Logic, and Speculative Rhetoric
  • The Syllabus diagram
  • The Welby diagram

The Meaning of Meaning

Source: Semiosis and pragmatism: Toward a dynamic concept of meaning

Source: Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics / Gerard Deledalle

Source: The Biological Substrate of Icons, Indexes, and Symbols in Animal Communication: A Neurosemiotic Analysis of Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls

Source: The Biological Substrate of Icons, Indexes, and Symbols in Animal Communication: A Neurosemiotic Analysis of Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls

Categories

  • Firstness
  • Secondness
  • Thirdness

Source: A Visual Model of Peirce’s 66 Classes of Signs Unravels His Late Proposal of Enlarging Semiotic Theory

The Semiotic Triangle

Source: A SEMIOTIC THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 

The Semiotic Relationship

Source: The Biosemiotic Approach in Biology: Theoretical Bases and Applied Models

Trichotomies

  • S – Sign Itself
  • S-O – Sign and Object Relation
  • S-I – Sign and Interpretant Relation

Source: A Visual Model of Peirce’s 66 Classes of Signs Unravels His Late Proposal of Enlarging Semiotic Theory

10 Sign Trichotomies

Source: A Visual Model of Peirce’s 66 Classes of Signs Unravels His Late Proposal of Enlarging Semiotic Theory

Relations

  • Monadic
  • Dyadic
  • Triadic

10 Classes of Sign

  • Representamen: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign 
  • Interpretant: Rheme, Dicent, Argument
  • Object: Icon, Index, Symbol

Source: Notes for a Dynamic Diagram of Charles Peirce’s Classifications of Signs

Source: Notes for a Dynamic Diagram of Charles Peirce’s Classifications of Signs

Source: Notes for a Dynamic Diagram of Charles Peirce’s Classifications of Signs

Source: Notes for a Dynamic Diagram of Charles Peirce’s Classifications of Signs

28 Classes of Sign

Source: On diagrams for Peirce’s 10, 28 and 66 classes of signs

66 Classes of Signs

Source: On diagrams for Peirce’s 10, 28 and 66 classes of signs

Source: Images, diagrams and metaphors: hypoicons in the context of Peirce’s 66- fold classification of signs

Source: A Foundational Mindset: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness

Truth, Beauty and Goodness

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Source: From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Peirce’s universal categories:

A phenomenological take on gesture semiotics

Source: Peirce’s universal categories: On their potential for gesture theory and multimodal analysis

This section serves to lay out some of the main tenets concerning Peirce’s UCs that seem particularly pertinent for gesture theory and analysis. Due to limits of space, the following discussion will not be able to do justice to either the semiotic complexity of the phenomena at hand, or the extensive literature on the topic (e.g. Colapietro 2001 and Colapietro 2008; Farias and Queiroz 2006 and Farias and Queiroz 2017; Liszka 1996; Nöth 2016; Oehler 1987; Pape 1990 and Pape 2015; Sonesson 2013 and Sonesson 2016; Stjernfelt 2007 and Stjernfelt 2014; West and Anderson 2016). More specific aspects and illustrations of how the UCs and gestures may elucidate one another will be presented throughout the paper.

Among the three strands of philosophy Peirce devised, phenomenology (as the first) is especially relevant for the study of gestures. It “contemplates phenomena as they are, simply opens its eyes and describes what it sees … stating what it finds in all phenomena alike (5.37)” (Potter 1967: 10). Against this backdrop, Peirce’s three Universal Categories Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are defined as one-place, two-place, and three-place (monadic, dyadic, and triadic) relations, and have the status of heuristic principles (e.g. CP; EP 1; EP 2; SS). All perceivable and imaginable phenomena may be described and discerned into different kinds with the help of the UCs; they are irreducible, omnipresent, and interdependent (Potter 1967: 14). The UCs “roughly correspond to three modes of being: possibility, actuality, and law (1.23)” (Potter 1967: 11), or, “three states of mind,” namely, feeling, acting, and thinking (EP 2: 4–5).

Firstness pertains to possibility, e.g. of meaning or behavior, mere qualities of being, feeling, and sensation. Taken by itself, it is positively what it is, e.g. a quality of “redness,” but not existent, as it needs to be instantiated in relation to a second (EP 2: 267–271). Secondness is the realm of actual existence, experience, action and reaction, facts, and forces (EP 2: 267–271). Thirdness is the domain of rules, general laws, symbols, regularities, and habits; it thus allows predictions of what may happen based on acquired knowledge and patterns of experience (EP 2: 267–271). It may govern, to some degree, Secondness, such as in ruling the actual use of signs. A sign can only act as a sign in Thirdness, that is, if all three correlates interact (CP 2.228): a representamen (e.g. the cupped hand in Figure 1), its object (e.g. the category main verbs), and its interpretant (e.g. the gesture’s meaning arising in the mind of the student).

The UCs underpin the three trichotomies pertaining to Peirce’s sign model as well as the corresponding classes of signs (e.g. Farias and Queiroz 2006 and Farias and Queiroz 2017; Sonesson 2013), the most prominent of which, presented in Table 1, will be addressed one by one in the ensuing sections.

Peirce’s UCs are vague and general in nature; both characteristics – especially the former – resonate with some of the properties of many gestures. The UCs’ vagueness derives, according to Colapietro (2008: 40), from their being “semeiotically or experientially indeterminate”: “A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of completing its determination (CP 5.505)” (2008: 40). This is to a certain extent true of many gestural signs which typically need other signs, namely, speech signs, other gestures, and additional facets of experience to assume their context-dependent function. Peirce (CP 1.355) introduced three metaphors to characterize the vagueness of the UCs which bring to the fore their very own Firstness. Being utterly sensorial, these metaphors strike a chord with multi-sensory perception and experience and, therefore, also with bodily semiotics: moods (affective experience), tones (auditory experience) and tints (visual experience). Gestures are, as will be shown below, susceptible to articulate such experiential qualities (Colapietro 2001: 205–207, 209; Mittelberg 2013a).

This strong emphasis on experience goes hand in hand with embodied, experiential accounts of cognition, language, and culture (e.g. Gallagher 2005; Gibbs 2006; Krois et al. 2007). In a similar vein, the present view highlights gestures’ potential to mediate between “outward experience” with the world (physical engagement), “inward experience” (imaginative involvement; Colapietro 2008: 41), aesthetic experience (Potter 1967), as well as intersubjective experience. Our bodies and their gestures naturally participate in our making sense of the manifold phenomena we constantly encounter and interpret (Merleau-Ponty 1962). By the same token, gestures genuinely participate in multimodal acts of situated meaning-making and make thus inner thoughts and affective states palpable (e.g. Mittelberg 2013a; Müller 2017).

Since Secondness is comparably easy to seize (not only) in bodily semiotics (e.g. Potter 1967: 12),3 my main intent is to illustrate how spontaneous gestures may not only embody Firstness in a particularly intuitive way, but also the Peircean idea of habit as a form of Thirdness, brought about by repeated, similar instantiations of Secondness (e.g. Sonesson 2016). Different kinds of habits, corresponding to the three states of mind mentioned above, play a central role in the present account of gesture semiotics: habits of feeling (Firstness), action (Secondness), and thought (Thirdness; Nöth 2016; see contributions in West and Anderson 2016 on Peirce’s notion of habit). A central aim of this undertaking is to provide further evidence that spontaneous gestures are more patterned and principled than it might seem at first sight (e.g. Müller et al. 2013 and Müller et al. 2014).

Source: Peirce’s universal categories: On their potential for gesture theory and multimodal analysis

Why Triadic?

Source: Why Triadic?
Challenges to the Structure of Peirce’s Semiotic

This was written when I was first getting into the semiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce. Re-reading it going on fifteen years later, I notice one glaring misreading of Peirce: Firstness is more or less indeterminate or determinate, not more or less vague or precise; only with Peirce’s category of Thirdness can we speak of vagueness versus precision (and then there’s also vagueness versus generality). I’m not going to revise and correct: if you’re a logician, you can make the correction as you read, and it has no bearing on the validity of my argument; if you’re not a logician, I leave the distinction between indeterminateness and vagueness as “an exercise for the reader.”

Introduction

Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn around and say: “You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.” In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man’s information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word’s information.
…Thus my language is the sum total of myself.

–C.S.Peirce, “Man, a Sign,” 18681

With these words, American scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) summarized his early views on the role of the sign in human existence. In the years that followed, Peirce’s interests were to range across fields as diverse as formal logic, mathematics, grammar and rhetoric, psychology, physics, chemistry, biology, geodetics, and philosophy. In not a few of these fields he made original contributions. But the unifying theme throughout remained for Peirce that of the role of signs.
How can each of these areas– or any area– of human activity be seen as an example of human communities and the signs they use “reciprocally educating each other”? What if everything experienced– indeed, everything experienceable– be viewed as constituted by the interplay of ordered networks of signs? It was in grappling with such questions that Peirce gradually developed his “semeiotic,” and eventually became known as one of the founders of the present-day field of semiotics.

Yet to the first-time reader Peirce’s thought may seem almost impenetrable. T.L. Short has put it well: “Let us journey into darkest semeiotica… immense, obscure, crabbed with dense tangles, and never before traversed.”2 One reason for the obscurity of Peirce’s thought is that he spent most of his career in relative isolation in scientific and geodetic work, and so did not benefit from constant critical interaction with colleagues who might otherwise have pressed him to clarify his thought and terminology.3 Peirce’s voluminous writings, few of which ever saw print during his own lifetime, have been reduced to something like a state of order in his posthumous Collected Papers; but the result is still rambling, repetitious, and filled with obscurities and inconsistencies as a result of the revision and growth of Peirce’s thought over the years. Well might the reader be advised to bring pith helmet and machete to the study of Peirce’s semiotic!

Nonetheless, one aspect of Peirce’s semiotic stands out sharply even to the casual reader: the ubiquity of triadic structures. Three universal categories underlie Peircean semiotics; Peirce’s sign involves three elements; Peircean subdivisions and classifications are often threefold. Why triadic? What does Peirce accomplish that could not equally well be carried out via the simpler dyadic sign? And why should as few as three categories suffice to embrace all of human experience? Peirce himself was acutely aware that he was open to charges of “triadomany,” and defended himself on the pragmatic grounds that his method, flexibly applied, yielded fruitful insights into the world we dwell in.4

Criticism of Peircean semiotics on this fundamental point, and suggestions for either a tetradic or a dyadic revision of Peirce, have been not uncommon. In this paper I shall examine and respond to several of the arguments which have been put forth. In so doing, I hope to identify some of the key issues at stake. But to accomplish this requires that we first have some basic understanding of Peirce’s semiotic. So I begin with a brief sketch thereof.

An Overview of Some Aspects of Peircean Semiotics

Semiotics, under a Peircean view, may be understood as an attempt to see all knowledge and experience as a structured system of signs in dynamic interaction with one another. The most familiar example of such a system of signs is human language. But Peircean semiotics is not restricted to this narrow model. Language, thought, emotion, sense perception, formal logic, mathematics, physical action, and human existence itself are only a few of the processes which can be seen as special cases of the Peircean sign.

And this sign can be generalized even further: Peirce saw a sort of low-grade semiosis in action not only in all living organisms but even in the regularity of nature itself. In line with his tendency to see continuity wherever he looked, Peirce saw distinctions, but no absolute separation, between the processes of human existence and the processes of nature. To posit any such separation would to Peirce violate what he often called his cardinal rule of thought: “Thou shalt not block the path of inquiry.”5

Since Peirce’s sign is completely general, his semiotic purports to yield an ontology, under which the universe as a whole, and each thing which lies or could lie within it, is a sign. In particular, the human being is a sign.6

Yet Peirce’s semiotic can be trained on any phenomenon as a supple and subtle method of analysis to yield often surprisingly detailed and concrete insights. This “double-barrelled” combination of complete generality and concrete particularity arises out of the correspondingly “double-barrelled” nature of the three universal categories on which Peirce’s semiotic is built– categories which Peirce called Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.

A universal category is a factor which is found to be present in every phenomenon, “one [category] being perhaps more prominent in one aspect of that phenomenon than another but all of them belonging to every phenomenon.” (5.43) Thus, Peirce’s claim is that his categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, in one way or another and to one degree or another, appear in every phenomenon which one could possibly encounter.

The “double-barrelled” nature of the categories derives from the fact that each category can be described both from a formal, combinatoric, logical viewpoint, and from a material, descriptive, phenomenological perspective. These logical and phenomenological aspects can be taken as, so to speak, two sides of the same coin (1.417-421).

Firstness, in its logical aspect, is monadic. It is whatever is what it is by itself, without comparison or relationship to anything else; independent of any “there,” pure spontaneous, original, sui generis. Peirce correlates Firstness with the structure of abductive thought, and with the discernment of qualities in the logical structure of the act of perception. Phenomenologically, Firstness is any possible quality of feeling taken by itself, whether “the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a fine mathematical demonstration, the quality of the feeling of love, etc.” (1.304; cf. 1.302-321, 1.422-426, 2.619-644, 5.41-44)

Imagine that state which sometimes comes over a person on the brink of sleep, when on the edge of consciousness a quality springs unbidden into the fading awareness and fills it without division or distinction: “nothing at all but a violet color,” or “an eternally sounding and unvarying” musical note. Such a quality– or rather, the possibility of such a quality– is a near approach to sheer Firstness (1.305). As embodied in experience, an instance of Firstness may be very broad and general– for example, the entire Gestalt, sensory and mental, which an entire landscape or story or historical period evokes in one– or it may be very particular– for example, that quality pertaining to that fifth rung on the bannister of the staircase, with the funny little horsehead-shaped chip out of the paint on one side of it.7

Secondness, in its logical aspect, is dyadic. It is a First as it stands over against a Second, regardless of any Third; being in relationship to an Other; the action of cause-and-effect, stimulus-and-response, action-and-reaction. Peirce also relates Secondness to inductive thought and its extrapolation from individual cases, and to the imputation of individual existence to substances in the structure of the act of perception. In its phenomenological aspect, Secondness presents itself as brute fact, as struggle and opposition, shock, surprise, effort and resistance. It is the hard, uncontrolled givenness which we encounter in experience. (Cf. 1.317, 1.441-470, 2.669-693, 5.45-58)

Peirce’s favorite example of Secondness is that of trying to open a door that is stuck:

Standing on the outside of a door that is slightly ajar, you put your hand upon the knob to open and enter it. You experience an unseen, silent resistance. You put your shoulder against the door and, gathering your forces, put forth a tremendous effort. (1.320)
Or imagine the steady tone of a musical note, which is suddenly cut short: the tone is an instance of Firstness, as is the silence which follows. But the transition between them is a moment of Secondness (1.332). Secondness is the hard, here-and-now facticity which makes an object an actual individual and not just a bundle of potential qualities (1.436). A vision of the cosmos, à la nineteenth-century physics, as a mere collection of hard billiard ball atoms bouncing and colliding mechanically with one another, is a vision of a world of sheer Secondness.8
Thirdness, in its logical aspect, is triadic. It is a First bound together in relationship with a Second by the mediation of a Third: “The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third.” (1.357) It is combination, pattern, structure, mediation, continuity. A monad can form no combination with another; two dyads can join together only to form another dyad (think of two lengths of pipe screwed together); but triads can combine into arbitrarily complex structures (think of a tinkertoy set, or the colored plastic beads in a chemistry class which can snap together to form models of molecules).9 Thus, argues Peirce, there is from the logical side no need for a category of Fourthness.10 Peirce equates Thirdness with the structure of hypothetical or “abductive” thought, and with the conjunction into an organic unity in the act of perception of imputed individual entities and the qualities attributed to them. (Cf. 1.471-520, 1.551, 2.694-794, 5.171-174, 5.590-604)

In its phenomenological aspect, Thirdness is continuity, process, growth, and development; it manifests itself in law, regularity, generality. It is rationality, intelligibility, predictability; the formation, correction, and refinement of habit; most importantly, it is representation and signification: “A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces or modifies… That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning (the sign itself); and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant.” (1.339) Each sign is such a semiotic triad, composed of object, sign (or “representamen”), and interpretant. (Cf. 1.337-353, 1.471-520, 5.59-119).

Each sign has to it the hypothetical, “if-then” status of Thirdness; Firstness is potential, Secondness actual, Thirdness conditional; Firstness can be, Secondness is, Thirdness would be (given appropriate conditions).11

A sign is a continuous, dynamic process, since the interpretant to which a sign interprets an object is ipso facto itself a further sign of the same object. Peirce spells this out precisely in a formal definition:

A Sign… is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (2.242)
This formal definition, which embodies a logical structure known as direct recursion, implies that the semiotic process can be seen, in the ideal, as a mathematically continuous progression from a selected sign to a selected interpretant along a mediating temporal continuum.12
Peirce supplies his categories with several other twists important to an understanding of his semiotic. Among these is the approximativeness of the categories. Due both to the hypothetical nature of thought, and to the obstreperousness of reality, Peirce stresses that his three categories are to be seen as only an approximation to reality as experienced, a model subject to growth and revision, though, thought Peirce, a relatively good model as is (1.301).

Not unconnected with this approximativeness (cf. 1.528) are what Peirce calls the degenerate categories. In addition to genuine Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Peircean semiotics works with a degenerate Secondness and two degrees of degenerate Thirdness. It must be confessed that Peirce is at his most obscure when discussing his degenerate categories: sometimes he describes them in terms of subcategories among his classes of signs, in places he defines them as the Firstness of Secondness and the Firstness and Secondness of Thirdness, at times he speaks of them in terms of combinatoric decomposition (Cf. 1.521-544, 2.265, 5.66-76). I believe we can give an interpretation, faithful to Peirce, which accommodates these diverse factors, as follows.

Degenerate Secondness is, logically speaking, a dyad more or less decomposed into a pair of monads, or instances of Firstness. From fully degenerate Secondness there runs an ordered sequence or “catena” of successively stronger levels of degenerate Secondness which in the limit converges to genuine Secondness. Phenomenologically speaking, one can think of the less than fully dynamic existence of one item relative to another– for example, consider the quality of red and the quality of scarlet simply juxtaposed to one another (1.462). A slightly stronger example would be the actual existence of two actual pennies distinct from one another (1.465).13

The first degree of degenerate Thirdness (“first-degenerate Thirdness”) is, logically speaking, a triad more or less fully decomposed into a congeries of dyads. This decomposition is in practice usually only approximate: most first-degenerate signs will fall somewhere on a graded continuum between the ideal endpoints of fully genuine Thirdness and fully first-degenerate Thirdness (Cf. 2.230-232, 8.376). Phenomenological examples, which can be made more precise under Peirce’s division of signs, vary as widely as an object which one has selected by pointing it out (2.248), a remark uttered without further explanation (2.251), or an individual instance of a sign (2.245). In the limit, a pure world of first-degenerate signs would approximate to, for example, a stream of consciousness composed of sheer events and brute facts: think of the rapid-fire barrage of sound bites, remarks, and incidents on the evening network news!

The second degree of degenerate Thirdness (“second-degenerate Thirdness”) is, logically speaking, a triad more or less fully decomposed into a congeries of monads. Again, this usually only approximate condition can be thought of as continuously variable between genuine Thirdness and full decomposition. Some phenomenological examples, again clarifiable under the division of signs, would be a photograph (2.247), the possibility of red as a warning of danger (2.244), or the general idea of geometric diagrams (2.250). In the extreme, a pure world of second-degenerate signs would approximate to, for example, a stream of consciousness made up of a montage of images, feelings, and sounds: imagine the experience of watching a rock video on MTV!

Note that first-degenerate Thirdness itself can undergo continuous partial decomposition into second-degeneracy; thus, a sign can embody a mixture of genuine Thirdness, first-degenerate Thirdness, and second-degenerate Thirdness in various proportions.14

We must also note the vagueness of Peirce’s categories. Firstness and Thirdness can be more or less vague; Secondness alone is always precise. (5.446-450)

Firstness can be vague as one can “pin down” a quality only more or less approximately in terms of Firstness alone (cf. 6.224). Given two flowers seen a minute apart, how close is the redness of the first flower to the redness of the second? One may be able to form a fairly good offhand judgment– but in terms of 1o alone it will not be altogether precise. Thus the redness of either flower has a penumbra of vagueness to it.

Likewise, Thirdness is more or less vague as meaning must be at least slightly indefinite in order to function at all (cf. 5.447, 6.326, 6.494-499). For example, the word “chair” is of the nature of a general law, instantiated in each object which is capable of being appropriately termed a “chair.” The word must have some free play in it– must be applicable to a more or less broad and fuzzy-boundaried class of entities– if it is to be meaningful. And the same holds true of any more complex sign, be it a statement, an argument, a ritual, a belief system, a human being, or the wide world itself.

Indeed, the more common or important a sign, the more vague it will tend to be. Thus, as Peirce often remarks (cf. 6.494), one’s deepest feelings, one’s deepest beliefs, one’s concept of God will all tend to be very vague indeed. This vagueness is not to be confused with the inchoate: for such signs to become more finely articulated by becoming richer in semiotic structure is one thing, but for them to become precise by the simple abolition of vagueness would be to empty them of meaning: language reduced to sheer Secondness!

The human being as a sign stripped of all vagueness would be, under a Peircean view, no longer a sign, but a mere algorithm: an object, a thing of mere Secondness, an “It.” For Secondness alone is never vague, its precision the precision of a world of billiard ball atoms in mechanical collision.15

Important to the interplay of Peirce’s categories is their varying intensity. The intensity of Firstness can vary since a quality of feeling may be experienced at varying levels of consciousness or attention– though of course one can compare such instances of Firstness and judge them of different intensities only through Secondness and Thirdness (1.310, 6.222). Likewise degenerate Secondness, as a congeries of monads, may vary in intensity (2.283). And the intensity of Thirdness may vary as the representamen has only one “degree of freedom” in its relationship to object and interpretant, and so is relatively a First (cf. 2.242).

Important here also is the hierarchical nature of the categories. Secondness may be conceived apart from explicit attention to Thirdness, and Firstness apart from conscious supposition of either Secondness or Thirdness, but Secondness only manifests itself through Thirdness, and Firstness only through Secondness and Thirdness (1.549-554). Thus, “though it is easy to distinguish the three categories from one another, it is extremely difficult accurately and sharply to distinguish each from other conceptions so as to hold it in its purity and yet in its full meaning.” (1.353)

Peirce applies his three categories to his sign to divide it into subcategories. His division of signs begins by considering which of the three categories predominates in the sign (representamen) itself; in the sign-object relationship; and in the sign-interpretant relationship.

According to the first trichotomy, if Firstness predominates in the representamen, we have a Qualisign, “a [potential] quality which is a Sign”; if Secondness, a Sinsign, “an actual existent thing or event which is a sign”; if Thirdness, a Legisign, “a law that is a sign,” whether conventional or natural, and that acts through individual instantiations (hence Sinsigns) called Replicas (2.243-246).

According to the second trichotomy, if Firstness is most prominent in the sign-object relationship, the sign is an Icon, which denotes by qualitative resemblance (2.274-282); if Secondness, the sign is an Index, which refers to its object by dynamic (genuine) or existential (degenerate) relationship between sign and object (2.283-291, 305-306); if Thirdness, the sign is a Symbol, which signifies its object according to a general convention or habit (2.292-302, 307-308).

According to the third trichotomy, a sign-interpretant relationship characterized chiefly by Firstness is a Rheme or Term; by Secondness, a Dicisign or Proposition; by Thirdness, an Argument (2.250-253; cf. 2.92, 5.470ff.)

Under each trichotomy, a sign may be of not just a single type, but of two or all three types in varying degree (2.230, 265). And Peirce combines his three trichotomies to yield ten classes of signs according to the following diagram (2.264; “The lightly printed designations are superfluous”):

The boundaries are, again, approximations (cf. 8.376). Peirce’s division yields ten instead of twenty-seven (=3x3x3) classes because a trichotomy involving Secondness makes the sign first-degenerate; one involving Firstness, second-degenerate; and a genuine triad can subdivide again in the same manner as before, while each dyad of a first-degenerate triad subdivides by catenation, and the monads of a second-degenerate triad can subdivide no further (1.543): subdivision can never make a partially degenerate sign less degenerate than it already is.16

In his later work, Peirce expanded his division of signs to ten trichotomies yielding sixty-six classes of signs; but seeds of this expansion were present in his earlier recognition of an asymmetry in his semiotic triad. Object, representamen, and interpretant are what they are only in the context of their sign relationship. But within this context (as the division of signs indicates) the representamen is what it is (of the three) most nearly independently of the other two– that is, functions most nearly as a First– while the interpretant is the most complex, most nearly determined as a Third by object and representamen; and the object is of intermediate complexity, occurring either itself as an instance of Secondness or determined dyadically by precisely one of the other two (2.235-242).17

This observation led Peirce to divide interpretant and object according to his categories. The interpretant subdivides into immediate, dynamical, and final interpretant; the object into immediate and dynamical object.

The immediate object is the qualitative object as immediately presented to interpretant by sign: the object “as it seems.” The dynamical object is the object as it offers dynamic resistance or constraint to present representation and interpretation of it. together, immediate and dynamical object constitute a positive and negative “feedback loop” in semiosis which lies at the heart of Peirce’s fallibilism (1.8-14; 5.238-243, 473).

The immediate interpretant is the potential interpretant as immediately presented by the sign; the dynamical interpretant, the interpretant as it actually “shakes down” in process to determine an effect or habit-change; the final interpretant, the interpretant as it would finally turn out in the community of interpretation in an infinite long-run. Peirce’s teleology grows out of this division of the interpretant (4.536, 4.572, 5.475ff.)18

Peirce’s Sign: Why Triadic?

It should now be very clear that triads and trichotomies form the warp and woof of Peirce’s approach to semiotics. The debate over this triadicity has taken two divergent and incompatible avenues: proposals for a category of Fourthness which question the sufficiency of Peirce’s semiotic, and proposals for a reduction to dyadicity which would render the semiotic triad unnecessary.

“One, Two, Three… But Where Is the Fourth?”

At least three proposals have been made for a Peircean category of Fourthness: those of Donald Mertz, of Herbert Schneider and Carl Hausman, and of Carl Vaught.

Mertz’s proposal is the most easily disposed of. He examines Peirce’s argument for the irreducibility of triads, as illustrated in “A Guess at the Riddle”:

…the fact that A presents B with gift C, is a triple relation, and as such cannot possibly be resolved into any combination of dual relations. Indeed, the very idea of a combination involves that of thirdness, for a combination is something which is what it is owing to the parts which it brings into mutual relationship. (1.363)19
Mertz grants Peirce this argument, but denies Peirce’s claim that “the quadruple fact that A sells C to B for the price of D” can be reduced to “a compound of two facts: first that A makes with C a certain transaction, which we may name E; and second, that this transaction E is a sale of B for the price D.”20 Mertz notes correctly that Peirce would express this symbolically as R(A,C,E).R'(E,B,D) = S(A,C,B,D), but then asserts that the second fact should be expressed dyadically as E = T(B,D) so that, by substitution, R(A,C,T(B,D)) = S(A,C,B,D), an irreducibly tetradic relation. From another angle, Mertz states that no two of the triadic relations “1) A sells C to B, 2) C is sold to B for D, and 3) A sells C to D” can be conjoined to arrive at the original tetradic relationship. (It is neither here nor there, but puzzling: why does Mertz omit “A sells to B for a price D”?) Mertz concludes that Peirce was blinded to such arguments by his fascination with logical diagrams which Peirce named “existential graphs.”21
Mertz’s argument may be convincing on its own terms, but Mertz is manipulating Peirce’s polyads in ways which bear little resemblance to any way in which Peirce ever worked with them. In his first argument, Mertz is attempting to join a dyad with a triad without identifying which of the elements in the dyad is being joined to the triad. His second argument involves joining two triads by joining two elements in one with two elements in another. The former procedure has no precedent in Peirce, and the latter under Peirce’s methods ought to yield a dyad, not a tetrad as Mertz thinks Peirce would have expected. Since Mertz gives us no clue as to how his procedures relate to those of Peirce, we have no way of judging whether Mertz is doing anything really entailed by Peirce’s project, or whether Mertz is simply arriving at different conclusions because he is working out of different assumptions.22

A more detailed proposal for Fourthness comes from Herbert Schneider. Schneider concedes three categories to be adequate for dealing with cognitive processes, but argues for “importance” as a category of Fourthness. He notes that, for Peirce, any purpose or good has meaning only in relation to a completely general summum bonum. “No Kantian idealist could have stated this conception of moral science more formally.”23

Schneider observes this scheme does not accommodate norms which might apply “even in the absence of a summum bonum,” itches that call to be scratched for their own sake. Such norms he proposes as a phenomenological aspect of Fourthness: logical import is Thirdness, vital importance Fourthness. Satisfaction may comprise either the Thirdness of achievement or the Fourthness of satiety or contentment. The moral self-control of Thirdness in pursuit of an abstract summum bonum is only an abstract “intellectual framework” until it is taken up into the “concrete universal” of the moral self-criticism of Fourthness. Fourthness supplies what depth psychology, but not the Kantian “moral law within,” acknowledges.24

In logical terms, Fourthness would constitute a temporal sequence, though one which is an absolutely discontinuous string of points superimposed on the triadic continuum. Triadic semiosis is “prospective and cumulative”; tetradic semiosis adds a fourth factor which is non-cumulative, but “retrospective” along the hierarchy of categories, giving “meaningful individuality” to instances of Firstness. Since Firstness and Secondness “look ‘forward'” to Thirdness while Fourthness “looks back” to Firstness, Thirdness in a sense “governs” Fourthness while Fourthness provides the steam to “drive” Thirdness.25

Carl Hausman provisionally adopts Schneider’s scheme, applied to both ethics and aesthetics with “importance” or “value” as a possible category of Fourthness. Hausman notes that Schneider’s suggestion rejects “Peirce’s own principle that a highest good makes specific goods intelligible,” but that, quite regardless of this, Schneider puts a finger both on the problematic status of value in Peirce’s semiotic and on an apparent “special connection” between value and Firstness.26

Hausman turns to Peirce’s categorial classification of the sciences to investigate the relations among value and the categories. Peirce categorially divided philosophy into phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics, and normative science into aesthetics, ethics, and logic (1.186). Just as normative science rests on phenomenology and on the prior field of mathematics (within which two fields Peirce constructed his categories), so the categorial hierarchy is reflected in an order of dependence in which “ethics rest[s] on aesthetics, and logic on ethics,” all three but especially aesthetics dependent on phenomenology.27

All three sciences, according to Peirce, distinguish a kind of good and bad, “Logic in regard to representations of the truth, Ethics in regard to efforts of the will, and Esthetics in objects considered simply in their presentation,” with both logical and ethical goods presupposing esthetic good. Remarks Hausman: “This is why Peirce says that ethics must appeal to aesthetics for aid in determining the summum bonum.”28 Considered thus, value itself is not a fourth category. Rather, it seems related but not identical to the teleological thrust built into Peirce Thirdness, and bound up with the categorial hierarchy.29

Hausman notes that the categories can be related by what Peirce calls discrimination or distinction, prescission, and dissociation (1.353). We can prescind Firstness and Secondness from value, but neither value nor Thirdness from each other. Hausman speculates that value and Thirdness could be separated by “discrimination,” “so interdependent that they are co-present as mutual grounds for one another,” though this is difficult to determine since Peirce is none too clear as to what he meant by the term.30

I think that Schneider and Hausman are correct to point out the problematic place of value in Peirce’s thought. As Peirce himself was aware, as a natural scientist he devoted more attention to logic and less to ethics and aesthetics (2.120, 2.197).31 And I think the two are correct to note a connection between value and Firstness, though I consider Hausman’s attempt to bring value in tandem with Thirdness more economical than Schneider’s attempt at severing it altogether from Thirdness, and thus from a summum bonum. But I would concede Schneider’s point that Peirce’s account, as it stands, does justice better to the apollonian than to the dionysian side of human existence.

However Peirce, especially in his explorations of phenomenological Firstness (cf. 1.312-316) and his discussions of vagueness (cf. 6.494ff.), is far more sensitive to these issues than Schneider will grant. And a sequence of monads co-present with the semiotic “time line” which present themselves immediately and spontaneously in the interpretation of the sign ought to suggest a factor of the Peircean sign already familiar to us: the immediate interpretant.

Although Peirce is not explicit, the logical and phenomenological characteristics which Schneider attributes to Fourthness all fit well the spot the immediate interpretant occupies in Peirce’s semiotic. By its relation to dynamical and final interpretant, the immediate interpretant is certainly “related but not identical” to the teleological thrust of Thirdness. And energetic immediate interpretants would “give a meaningful individuality” to Firstness. Finally, if Hausman’s interpretation of “discrimination” is correct, then the immediate (unlike the dynamical or final) interpretant would indeed be related to the sign by discrimination.32

The most detailed proposal for Fourthness comes from Carl Vaught. Vaught points out that, phenomenologically, there is a similarity between things such as a left hand and a right hand which does not seem reducible to a combination of identity and difference. According to Peirce, most spatial relationships can be dealt with predominantly in terms of the Secondness of objects in dynamic interaction or relative location. Yet as Vaught notes, Peirce vacillated over whether right and left can be distinguished in terms of Secondness– for example, indexically (2.290)– or whether Thirdness must be invoked, as for example in what physicists call the “right-hand rule”:

Thus, your right hand is that hand which is toward the east, when you face north with your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference between right and left. (1.345)33
Vaught argues that not even Thirdness suffices to distinguish right from left, since the definitions of east, north, and zenith themselves presuppose a distinction between right and left. Right and left, Vaught concludes, embody a similarity irreducible to identity and difference.34
In a parallel manner, on the logical level, Peirce insisted that analogy is reducible to a combination of univocity and equivocity, and is not a mediating third between them (3.421, 3.483-485, 1.34). Thus, a four-term analogical relation would be reducible to a combination of simpler terms. But Vaught argues that just such irreducible analogical tetrads occur in Peircean semiosis.

For semiosis gives rise to a sequence of signs and interpretants, each at a slightly different moment in time, and as Peirce’s later distinction between immediate and dynamical object implies, the object itself is not static but constitutes a corresponding temporal sequence of objects in interaction with the sign/interpretant sequence. Within the vagueness inherent in Peircean semiosis then, says Vaught, lies precisely a similarity, irreducible to identity and difference, which embraces interpretant at t1, interpretant at t2, dynamical object at t1, and dynamical object at t2 in a tetradic analogical relationship which due to the vagueness is not precisely reducible to any combination of triads. As an example of this, consider a legisign which grows and develops over time: its form at any two instants can, under this proposed Fourthness, be seen as related by an irreducible analogical similarity. Likewise, the similarity between right and left can be seen only through a judgment of analogy.35

Vaught’s argument is both closely reasoned and richly textured, very much in the spirit of Peirce’s own approach. If similarity is not to be understood (as Peirce saw it) as reducible to some combination of univocity and equivocity, then Vaught’s argument is probably correct. But I think counter-arguments can be mounted on both logical and phenomenological fronts.

Logically, if the sequence of interpretants in Vaught’s argument on analogy are considered, not as a sequence of discrete frames in a movie film (as Vaught takes them), but rather as a genuinely continuous flow of interpretants (and likewise the flow of dynamical objects continuous), then the need for the four-term relationship vanishes and Thirdness suffices. The situation becomes logically similar to, and no more problematic than, an account of a continuous function in differential calculus.

On the phenomenological front, I note that mathematicians define the “orientation” or handedness of a space by dyadic and triadic arguments alone. The proof is rather technical, but it enables one to speak of left- or right-handedness in space (of three dimensions, or even more) without resort to any tetradic combinations and without any prior invocation of right or left.36

Greenlee’s Dyadic Revision of Peirce

Much of the controversy over a suggested dyadic reinterpretation of the Peircean sign revolves around Douglas Greenlee’s book, Peirce’s Concept of Sign. In a symposium on this book in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Greenlee responds to criticisms by Joseph Ransdell, Jarrett Brock, and John Fitzgerald. In a later article Vincent Colapietro attempts an evaluation of an positive response to Greenlee’s project.

“What is it for something to be a sign?”37 This, says Greenlee, was one of the key questions with which Peirce was struggling in his semiotic. But Greenlee finds problematic an important aspect of Peirce’s sign:

Peirce thinks of the sign as something which always points away from itself to an object. I go along with the idea that a sign always points away from itself. But I think it is a mistake to suppose that the pointing must always be to something referred to… What the sign always points to is that which interprets it– what Peirce calls its ‘interpretant.’38
Thus, though Peirce calls signification “only one of the two chief functions of signs” (8.373; cf. 2.341, 431-434), the other being representation, Greenlee claims his analysis will show only the former essential to the functioning of a sign.39
Greenlee finds the problem with Peirce coming to light in Peirce’s use of such terms as “refers to,” “represents,” and “stands for.” According to Peirce’s own concept of abduction, semiotic is to be seen as a source of revisable hypotheses to be explored and tested in experience, and not an a priori construct.40 And here it is that we encounter difficulties. For what does mathematics refer to? What is the object of logical connectives such as the conjunction “and”? The object of verbal commands? Of questions? Of music?41

Problems just as serious arise if we try to find a generalized meaning of the term “representation.” If “‘stands for’ means stands in place of or as a substitute for something else,” we exclude both self-referential signs (cf. 5.71) and habitual signs that mediate between expectation and response. The latter is a class that includes much of everyday human behavior. If we try to say that “the meaning of a word is what it stands for,” this collides with the “pragmatic maxim,” bound up with the teleology of Peirce’s final interpretant, that meaning “lies in the future,”42 since it would imply that all propositions, even those “about the past, are really about the future.” These considerations eliminate the possible solutions that signs are “representative because substitutive,” or “because they possess meaning” (a function of the sign-interpretant relation under Peirce’s semiotic).43

What positive solutions can be suggested? Looking at Peirce’s application of signs to human thought, Greenlee observes that Peirce’s rejection of “mental-material dualism” suggests an equivalence between thought-signs and signs in general; that Peirce’s distinction between actual and habitual notions (cf. replica and legisign) implies that “a sign may be an object actually cognized or the capacity to cognize”; and that Peirce’s three categories extend such cognization not just to “intellectual ends” but to “‘every sort of modification of consciousness– Attention, Sensation, and Understanding.'” (5.298)44

What Greenlee finds in all these characteristics of thought as sign, regardless of whether representation obtains, is a process of abstraction, “requiring a point of view in terms of which an object is relevant to the significance of the sign.”45 This point of view is the sieve (the interpretive grid, might we say?) through which it is selected by convention or agreement what is to be included in the process of signification.

“Now the chief semiotical question I want to raise for Peircean semiotic is whether abstraction is present in all signification.” If so, we have found a general characterization of something very like a Peircean sign, but of which representation is not a necessary feature. For, argues Greenlee, Peirce’s immediate object can carry all the freight that a sign characterized by abstraction requires its object to bear. When the sign is representative, the dynamical object may obtain; when not, then rather than construing as dynamical object the context in which the immediate object was expected (8.314; cf. 4.536), we can dispense with the dynamical object altogether. In either case, the immediate object can be interpreted in terms of direct or indirect “past experience as relevant to the interpretation of the present sign.”46

We can see that under Greenlee’s proposal the immediate object becomes that content of signs temporally prior to the present sign, which is relevant to the present sign-interpretant relationship. The entire semiotic process is collapsed down into the temporal continuum of signs and interpretants. The sign process may be considered as polyadic if we include each previous sign relevant to the interpretation of the present sign, but fundamentally the sign is now dyadic:

Instead of insisting on triadicity, Peirce’s semiotic should have insisted (a) simply on a differentiation of the sign from the dyadic causal relationship and (b) on the continuity of interpretation.47
The difference between sign and mere causation Greenlee finds in the fact that the sign is cumulative whereas mere cause-and-effect is not necessarily so, an implication of the infinite regress of Peirce’s formal recursive definition of the sign (2.274). This same formal definition construes continuity as continuity of interpretation, since every interpretant of a sign calls for a further interpretation of itself. In the potential of such continuing interpretation for establishing habitual rules of interpretation Greenlee locates the meaning of his dyadic sign, though under such a revision the final interpretant must become “actual rather than ideal,” provisional and not “destinate.”48
Greenlee also extends his reinterpretation to Peirce’s division of signs by offering dyadic interpretations of the trichotomy Peirce defined in terms of sign-object relationship. The icon becomes a sign of “exhibitive import,” displaying to its interpretant qualities and properties familiar from experience.49 The index becomes a sign capable of “forcing” attention by modifying habit in the interpretant.50 The symbol is more intractable: difficult to preserve distinct from the legisign under Greenlee’s approach, the symbol ends up as the factor of conventionality co-present with every class of signs.51

The general consensus of the Greenlee symposium is that Greenlee’s project is of value in its own right, but is not addressing the same set of issues which Peirce was trying to address.52 Ransdell and Brock remark that, in restricting semiotics to the subject matter of Peircean speculative grammar– namely, the meaning of signs– Greenlee so skews the scope of his inquiry as to make his conclusions almost inevitable.53

“Greenlee contends that anything can have meaning (can be a sign), but he holds that not everything does have meaning.” This, says Ransdell, is a crucial departure from Peirce, for it would mean that the world can be divided into signs and non-signs; that not everything incorporates Thirdness; and thus that “it ought to be at least possible to encounter a meaningless thing, something which does not, in fact, incorporate the relational structure in question.” (Hence, I take it, Greenlee’s distinction between dyadic signs and mere dyadic causation.) “But,” continues Ransdell, “no such experience is possible, on Peirce’s view… Peirce’s semiotic is not about a class of objects. It is about what it is to be an object.” Thus, objectification, signification, and interpretation are only different aspects of every phenomenon it is possible to encounter.54

Since Greenlee rejects this, he gives the immediate object priority over the dynamical object. But, note Ransdell and Fitzgerald, for Peirce the dynamical object had priority as that over against which sign and interpretant stand; a closer logical analysis is necessary to bring out “something internal to the sign which relates it to the thing or circumstances”; and Peirce saw imaginative or fictive semiosis, in which the focus is upon the immediate object, “as logically more complex than (as ‘parasitical’ upon) semiosis involving a real object.”55

I would add that it is hard to see, from within Greenlee’s system, what rationale there is for retaining the dynamical object at all, even in the case of representative signs, except perhaps as a code for a convention which distinguishes “real” signs from “fictive” signs. I take it this is what Ransdell is hinting at when he calls Greenlee’s proposal “a semiotic of ‘absolute’ idealism.”56

We can better understand this priority of the dynamical object for Peirce if we see that what was central for Peirce in the sign was not merely meaning (as for Greenlee) but communication and inference. For Peirce, note Brock and Ransdell, all semiosis is dialogical, the original model for object-sign-interpretant being the utterer-utterance-interpreter structure of human communication. But since Peirce early rejected Cartesian intuition and Kantian synthetic a prioris, he abstracted (not generalized, as does Greenlee) features of this process to allow for the entry into the sign-interpretant continuum of quasi-dialogical factors neither derivable from nor reducible to sign-interpretant processes alone, hence irreducible Third. Thus in Peirce’s view, says Ransdell, “The ultimate utterer of all signs– all interpretive phenomena– is reality itself.” And thus the key Peircean questions, says Brock, are “How does it contribute to explaining the possibility of inference and communication? How do… signs function in the context of inference and communication? Learning and discovery? …No such questions and no such answers can be found in Professor Greenlee’s book.”57

Vincent Colapietro continues the response, conceding that it is an unfortunate choice of terminology to say that “a sign represents an object,” since “represent” has connotations which are often but not always appropriate to the Peircean sign. To this degree, Greenlee has a point. But Peirce’s definition of the sign/object relationship (like that of the triad itself) is purely formal. This relationship can be made more specific in terms of the (again purely formal) division of signs, division of object into immediate or dynamical object, etc.58

What Colapietro stresses here is, I think, implicit in the logical/phenomenological “double-barrelledness” of Peirce’s categories. As we have seen, Greenlee misses the logical or formal aspect since he does not deal with inference, and since his emphasis on meaning seems to lead him toward a sort of psychologism (witness his attempted distinction between significative and causative dyads).

Colapietro responds to specific objections by arguing that a word such as “and” can be seen as an index of relatively low intensity;59 music, as a sign of the composer’s “musical ideas,” which are qualities of feeling (5.475); an imperative, as a sign whose dynamical object is the will of the speaker and whose energetic interpretant is the intended response (5.473).60

More generally, we can see how Peircean fallibilism, formally considered, is a factor in all signs, hence how all signs in some sense require both immediate and dynamical object:

The fact that all signs have dynamic objects and, hence, external constraints makes semiosis a fallible process: any sign is open to the possibility of missing its mark… [but] it is only on the condition that there is a mark that there is a possibility of missing the mark… Commands and notes of music, no less than paradigmatic cases of representational semiosis, involve such a possibility, precisely because they could be constrained by something outside of themselves.61
Or as Peirce himself put it in “Man, a Sign,” we only began to be aware of ourselves as selves, of the world as world, “when we first corrected ourselves”; that is, when the world around us first corrected us: for as in speech so in all semiosis, “men and words reciprocally educate each other… [and] thus my language is the sum total of myself.” (5.311, 313-314)

Concluding Observations

We are now in a position to evaluate the proposals for a tetradic or dyadic revision of Peirce’s triadic sign.

Two themes recur in the Fourthness arguments. One revolves around the understanding of continuity as it appears in Thirdness; the other involves areas in which one could wish Peirce had written more fully, or more clearly.

Schneider’s Fourthness constitutes a discontinuous sequence riding “piggyback” on the continuity of Thirdness. Hausman manages to find a place for value as a factor in Thirdness, but this value remains an event-by-event, case-by-case affair. Vaught locates the analogical tetrad in the minute interstices of the flow of semiosis.

Although (as I have argued with Vaught) a proper understanding of continuity goes a long way toward clarifying matters Peircean, it seems that in each instance these writers are striving for a structure intermediate between pure continuity and total disconnection, a structure which exhibits features of both. But, as I have argued in my exposition of Peirce, we already have precisely such a structure in the interplay within the sign of genuine Thirdness and the two degrees of degenerate Thirdness.62

Hausman is correct that Peirce devotes relatively less attention to aesthetics and ethics than to logic. Vaught detects genuine vacillations and inconsistencies in Peirce’s thought on analogy and on the similarity of certain spatial structures. And Schneider points out correctly that Peirce skews his account somewhat away from the dark, mysterious, irrational forces of the psyche which twentieth-century psychologists have made us take into account.

I think all these are valid areas for further Peircean inquiry. And certainly there is no end to the tangled inconsistencies in Peirce! By the approximativeness of Peirce’s own semiotic, a category of Fourthness may well emerge, but we could find this out only through such further inquiry. I think I have answered the proposals so far put forth, though I find it suggestive that they all hint at some sort of coincidentio oppositorum in which incommensurables can be reconciled, and the two potentially vague categories can precipitate out concretely without sacrificing spontaneity or becoming locked into the precision of Secondness. In such a direction, if any, I would suggest future Fourthness-hunters look.63

At the same time, though, I would suggest a second look at Peirce’s remarks on his semiotic meditative practice of “musement” (6.458-490), which resembles closely the sort of process just described. Peirce may seldom have spoken of anything like Schneider’s “depth psychology,” but one cannot read much of Peirce without being struck starkly by uncanny bass resonances in his tone of thought, like peals of distant thunder. It is this trait that so confounds some Peirce scholars who find him talking one moment like a hard-headed empiricist and the next like a New England transcendentalist mystic.64 In his discussion of musement, Peirce essays (in terms of his three categories) an explanation of this process and a reconciliation of these coincident opposites.65

Of Greenlee’s dyadic project there is little to say that has not already been said. It is clear that between Greenlee and Peirce there lies the chasm of a fundamental philosophical option. It is the choice which Peirce summed up by contrasting his own stance of “realism” with the several shades of what he called “nominalism.” (1.15-41, 5.77-107)

Which is prior– the immediate object we construct, or the dynamical object which, like Peirce’s jammed door, sticks without warning? What is the scope of our semiotic– everything humanly understood and experienced (so that the world of real signs equals the sum total of the actual), or everything humanly understandable and experienceable (so that the world of actual signs instantiates a broader continuum of the real)? These are the kinds of fundamental options which may be fruitfully discussed, but which we more often bring to than derive from the conversation.

I think Colapietro puts it well when he says that what is at stake here is that, under the dyadic option,

it is we who initiate the process of semiosis by taking up some stance toward a complex. In contrast, an implication of [the triadic option] is that, at least in some cases, we are not the initiators of but the respondents to a world which is always already meaningful to some degree.66

Appendix: A Brief Peircean Semiotic Glossary
(Note: I have striven here more for lucid brevity than for anything like precision. For precision please consult the body of the paper! Caveat lector!)

Argument: A sign which (as its name suggests) embodies a logical argument. Also called delome. Example: a syllogism.

Category: A factor present in some way, shape, or form in every conceivable phenomenon; in some phenomena, one of the categories may be predominant. See Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.

Catena: The “chain” of degrees by which relative existence approaches closer and closer to actual individual existence. Each “link” is one type of degenerate Secondness.

Degenerate Secondness: A dyad partially decomposed into a pair of monads: mere existence of a First relative to a Second. Example: two pennies lying in a row.

Degenerate Thirdness, First Degree of: A sign more or less decomposed into a mere collection of dyads or brute facts. Example: any course of events where “it’s just one thing after another.”

Degenerate Thirdness, Second Degree of: A sign more or less decomposed into a mere montage of monads or qualities. Example: a rock video; some surrealist paintings.

Dicisign: A sign which conveys a statement or piece of information. Also called proposition, pheme.

Dynamical Interpretant: The interpretant “as it actually is”; as it impacts on other signs and interpretants. See Teleology.

Dynamical Object: The object “as it really is”; as it constrains or corrects interpretations of itself. See Fallibilism.

Emotional Interpretant: The interpretant as it takes the form of a quality of feeling.

Energetic Interpretant: The interpretant as it takes the form of an action or event.

Fallibilism: The contention that all knowledge is provisional and fallible, though some knowledge is very highly probable, and a process of inquiry can help sort the wheat from the chaff. Fallibilism is grounded in the “feedback loop” between immediate and dynamical object.

Final Interpretant: The Interpretant “as it would be known really to be” at the end of an infinite process of inquiry, or in the light of an ideal future summum bonum. See teleology.

Firstness: One of Peirce’s three categories. Firstness is monadic: whatever is what it is by itself without reference to any Second; any possible quality of feeling.

Icon: A sign which in some way resembles its object. Example: a portrait.

Immediate Interpretant: The interpretant “as it seems”; as presented by the sign as a possibility of interpretation. See Teleology.

Immediate Object: The object “as it seems,” whether really so or not; the object as presented by the sign to the interpretant. See Fallibilism.

Index: A sign which is related to its object by actual cause-and-effect, or by existence relative to one another. Example: a weathervane as sign of wind direction; a finger pointing toward an object.

Interpretant: One of the three elements of the sign. The interpretant interprets the sign(representamen) as representing its object. Not to be confused with “interpreter”! A human being is an “interpreter,” made up of a great many interpretants (thoughts, habits, actions, feelings, etc.).

Legisign: A sign which functions as a habit, custom, or law, whether conventional or natural.

Logical Interpretant: The interpretant as it takes the form of a general habit of law.

Object: One of the three elements of the sign. The object is represented by the sign(representamen) to its interpretant

Qualisign: A sign which can take the form of a quality of feeling. Example: red as a warning of danger.

Representamen: See Sign(b).

Rheme: A sign which conveys a single word, concept, or feeling. Also called. term, seme.

Secondness: One of Peirce’s three categories. Secondness is dyadic; whatever is what it is by standing over against a Second, without reference to any Third; causation, brute fact, actual existence.

Sign: (a) The triad composed of object, sign(representamen), and interpretant. For Peirce, every conceivable experience is mediated through signs. (b) One of the three elements of the Sign(a). The Sign(b) is sometimes called the representamen. The Sign(b) (= representamen) represents the object to its interpretant. It is very important not to confuse sign in sense (a) with sign in sense (b): they are not at all the same thing! The former is a triad of three elements; the latter is one of those three elements.

Sinsign: A sign which takes the form of a single action, instance, or event.

Symbol: A sign which is related to its object by some habit or law, whether conventional or natural. Example: a written word as a sign of a sequence of spoken sounds.

Teleology: Peirce’s contention that everything within the semiotic process has purpose by orientation toward an ideal future summum bonum, in light of which every sign would be knowable for all that it really signifies. Peirce’s teleology is laid out in the structure of his immediate, dynamical, and final interpretant.

Thirdness: One of Peirce’s three categories. Thirdness is triadic: whatever is what it is in relation to a Second by the mediation of a Third; structure, regularity, law, habit, continuity, holding under appropriate conditions. For Peirce, Thirdness is equivalent to the semiotic sign of object, sign(representamen), and interpretant.

Ultimate Interpretant: An interpretant which does not have to serve as a further sign of its object in order to be meaningful. Example: a jump, break, or transition in the flow of events or in one’s attention.

Bibliography

Brock, Jarrett E. “Draft of a Critique of Greenlee’s Peirce’s Concept of Sign.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society (TCSPS), 12:111-26.

Colapietro, Vincent. “Is Peirce’s Theory of Signs Truly General?” TCSPS 23:205-35.

Fitzgerald, John J. “Ambiguity in Peirce’s Theory of Signs.” TCSPS 12:127-34.

Greenlee, Douglas. Peirce’s Concept of Sign. The Hague: Mouton, 1973.

Hartshorne, Charles, and Weiss, Paul, Editors, Volumes 1-6; Burks, Arthur W., Editor, Volumes 7-8. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-36, 1957-58.

Hausman, Carl R. “Value and the Peircean Categories.” TCSPS 15:203-23.

Mertz, Donald W. “Peirce: Logic, Categories, and Triads.” TCSPS 15:158-75.

Ransdell, Joseph. “Another Interpretation of Peirce’s Semiotic.” TCSPS 12:97-110.

Schneider, Herbert W. “Fourthness.” Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Wiener, Philip P., and Young, Frederic H., Editors. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Vaught, Carl G. “Semiotics and the Problem of Analogy: A Critique of Peirce’s Theory of Categories.” TCSPS 22:311-26.

Footnotes


1 In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (vol. 1-6), Arthur W. Burks (vols. 7-8) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-36, 1957-58), 5.313-314. My citations from the Collected Papers will, as is customary, indicate volume and paragraph number: for example, 5.314 signifies volume 5, paragraph 314.

2 T.L. Short, “Life Among the Legisigns,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society (TCSPS), 18:285.

3 Obviously, however, Peirce’s influence was substantial on many of those who knew him, such as Josiah Royce, William James, and John Dewey– as a result of which Peirce is known as one of the founders of American pragmatism, an honor to which Peirce responded by renaming his philosophy “pragmaticism,” a term “which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers”! (5.414)

Peirce’s connections with academia, after his 1859 graduation from Harvard, were limited to a few years spent teaching at Johns Hopkins (1880-84), and several lecture series delivered at Harvard around the turn of the century, arranged by William James in part to help Peirce out of financial straits. See also Max H. Fisch and Jackson I. Cope, “Peirce at the Johns Hopkins University,” Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 277-311.

4 1.568-572. Peirce confesses: “I fully admit that there is a not uncommon craze for trichotomies… I am not so afflicted; but I find myself obliged, for truth’s sake, to make such a large number of trichotomies that I could not [but] wonder if my readers, especially those of them who are in the way of knowing how common the malady is, should suspect, or even opine, that I am a victim of it.” (5.568)

5 Cf. 1.135. This tendency in Peirce has been labelled panpsychism, as by Hartshorne, “The Relativity of Nonrelativity,” Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, p. 218. But I think it would be equally correct to note here Peirce’s insistence that “there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous.” (1.316, emphasis supplied) Note that for Peirce this double-edged stance both entails an affirmation of straightforwardly “anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe” (1.316), and is grounded in a Darwinian argument that any organism which is to survive for long must exhibit some reasonable degree of congruence with the processes of nature, or lose out to some other organism better able to do so (1.374-399).

I think the best explanation of this two-sidedness in Peirce is the observation that for Peirce both mind and natural process are special cases of semiosis rather than vice versa, and so, though neither nature nor mind is reducible one to the other, properties of either may be abstracted and by analogy extended to the other.

This semiotic embracing of two alternatives on a single continuum by distinguishing but not separating them is, under the heading of “synechism” or “continuity,” one of the hallmarks of Peirce’s thought. Cf. 6.169-173.

6 This generality is for Peirce one of the differences between the “realism” of his semiotic, and the “tidal wave of nominalism.” Cf. 1.1-27.

7 Peirce’s Firstness seems in many ways a counterpart to traditional qualia, though a more helpful image to get a “feel” for Peirce would be to think, not of qualities hierarchically classified, more general and more particular, but rather of more and less finely nuanced qualities set-theoretically arranged “within” one another or “overlapping,” like the regions on a Venn diagram!

Peirce was less interested in the classification of qualities, and more in their subtle nuances: for example, the way the color scarlet resembles the blare of a trumpet, or an odor of frangipanni a personality (1.312-316). We are here in the realm of synaesthesia and creative metaphor– a note to which Peirce returns in one remark on metaphor and the origin of language (2.290, fn.).

8 As principle of individuation, Peirce’s Secondness is indebted to the Scotistic notion of hiccaeity.

As regards Secondness as “Otherness,” Peirce makes the etymological observation that the older English term for “second” was the word “other.”

9 Indeed– see 1.288-1.292– apparently the “snap-bead” model of molecules, which Peirce learned in his study of chemistry, was one crucial image in the formation of the logical aspect of his semiotic!

10 As I have argued elsewhere in some detail (cf. fn. 62), Peirce’s claim that Thirdness suffices is equivalent to the claim that semiosis can be built up according to a type of logical structure which mathematicians and computer scientists refer to as a “tree.” “Trees” can involve structures of an order higher than three, but as every computer programmer knows, any tree can be transformed into a functionally equivalent “binary tree” involving only triadic relationships. Cf. Peter Grogono, Programming in PASCAL (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978), pp. 249ff.

11 Note that the “must” of necessary being is absent from Peirce’s semiotic scheme. Peirce considered the application of “must-be’s” and “must-not-be’s” to anything short of God as one more sign of “nominalism”– cf. 2.18-77, esp. 2.28-30; “The Spirit of Cartesianism,” 5.264. Cf. also Peirce’s fallibilism, 5.587.

12 The argument runs more or less as follows: (1) In any sequence of related signs and interpretants, each element serves as both sign to interpretants following and as interpretant of signs preceding, but there can be no first or last element of the sequence. (2) As applied to any finite span in a sequence, statement (1) and direct recursion iterated infinitely many times imply that elements of the sequence converge (as an infinite subsequence) to either endpoint of the finite span. (3) Applying statement (2) to every possible span traversed by the sequence implies that the semiotic sequence is in fact a linear continuum.

Note that this recursive structure supplies an explicit and rigorous connection between the triadic sign and the continuity which is such an important feature of Peirce’s semiotic. An interesting sidelight is that Peirce’s most formal definition of the dyadic structure of Secondness (1.445-447) involves indirect recursion, though not in such a manner as to yield continuity.

13 This is my reading of Peirce’s most extensive treatment of degenerate Secondness in 1.441-1.470. Peirce analyzes the first eight levels of degenerate Secondness, giving a diagram of the first eight “steps” of the catena.

“Poietical dyads,” at the eighth step in the catena, are already within hailing distance of genuine Secondness, though in theory infinitely many steps along the catena still intervene. Another helpful “icon” might be to imagine the “steps” of this infinite catena converging to genuine Secondness as the sequence of points 0, 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, 31/32,… converges to 1.

14 My interpretation of the two degrees of degenerate Thirdness is based chiefly on Peirce’s discussions in 1.471-481, 2.283, 5.66-76. Peirce’s diagram of his division of signs, 8.376, may also, I think, serve usefully as an “icon” of the relationship among genuine, first-degenerate, and second-degenerate Thirdness.

15 Cf. Arthur W. Burks, “Man: Sign or Algorithm? a Rhetorical Analysis of Peirce’s Semiotics,” TCSPS 16:279-92.

The perceptive reader will see here the potential connections between Peircean semiotics and existentialism! A Peircean semiotic treatment of alienation would also obviously involve the degenerate categories. For a suggestive but not fully developed treatment of these connections, see Walker Percy, The Message in the Bottle (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1975).

Percy has also written, from a Peircean semiotic viewpoint, a chilling and carefully thought out fictional treatment of “the human being as a sign stripped of all vagueness” in his most recent novel, The Thanatos Syndrome (New York: Ivy Books, 1988).

16 My description of the matter here is much more clear and explicit than Peirce ever makes it. See also Gary Sanders, “Peirce’s Sixty-Six Signs?”, TCSPS 6:3-16.

17 This can also be an alternative approach to the division of signs. Peirce’s ten-class division was in place by some time in the 1890’s; his sixty-six class division dates from about 1906. Cf. 8.342-379.

18 Of course, any division of interpretant– immediate, dynamical, or final– can be an instance of any or all of the three categories. Peirce specifies the category which predominates in an interpretant by speaking of emotional, energetic, or logical interpretant. He also distinguishes an ultimate interpretant. Thus there are twelve kinds of interpretant altogether.

Peirce sometimes defines pragmatism as the pursuit of the (sic) ultimate final logical interpretant (5.475-476, 5.491). Any final interpretant is ultimate, but not all ultimate interpretants are final. A non-final ultimate interpretant (I believe) would be an at least partial discontinuity in the flow of semiosis– a jump or break in attention, a contoured structuring of consciousness, such as apparently emerges out of our experience of time (cf. 6.325)

19 Quoted in Donald W. Mertz, “Peirce: Logic, Categories, and Triads,” TCSPS 15:169.

20 1.363, in Mertz, p. 170.

21 Mertz, pp. 170-74. For Peirce’s account of his “logic of relatives,” see 3.456-552, esp. 3.483-487; and 4.307ff.

22 In this regard, I think Mertz could well consider more carefully why Peirce introduces his “existential graphs” into the argument. Peirce is not simply arguing in terms of propositional logic; his arguments overlap with what mathematicians today call “graph theory.” See my remarks, fn. 10, on “trees” and “binary trees.”

23 Herbert W. Schneider, “Fourthness,” Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, pp. 209-10.

24 Schneider, pp. 210-13.

25 Schneider, pp. 211-214.

26 Carl R. Hausman, “Value and the Peircean Categories,” TCSPS 15:207-09.

27 Hausman, pp. 209-10; cf. 2.198-199, 5.36, 5.122-132.

28 Hausman, pp. 21-13; cf. 5.36.

29 Hausman, pp. 214-16.

30 Hausman, pp. 216-21; cf. 1.353, 1.549.

31 For a succinct account of Peirce’s growing awareness on this point, see “Esthetics, Ethics, and the Summum Bonum,” in Thomas A. Goudge, The Thought of C.S. Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1969; orig. ed., University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 301-06.

32 According to Peirce’s later sixty-six-class division, final and even dynamical interpretant may be prescinded from immediate interpretant, much as Firstness may prescind from Secondness and Thirdness (cf. 8.337-340). That is, one can conceive of the interpretant without consciously positing final and dynamical interpretant, but not without supposing immediate interpretant.

33 Quoted in Carl G. Vaught, “Peirce’s Theory of Categories,” TCSPS 22:315-16. In physics classes, the “right-hand rule is usually taught to students as an indicator of the direction of rotation of the right thumb when right thumb, forefinger, and middle finger are held all at right angles to one another, and the hand is rotated with forefinger moving in the direction of middle finger. This is the “positive” direction of rotation, and an opposite rotation is designated “negative.”

An illustration of the point Vaught is making is the fact that Soviet physicists use a left-hand rule, which interchanges positive and negative as compared to their Western counterparts!

Compare also such terms as “clockwise” and “counter-clockwise,” or the older synonyms “with the sun” and “against the sun.”

34 Vaught, pp. 317-18.

35 Vaught, pp. 313, 318-25.

36 The argument requires in rigorous form some knowledge of vector spaces, mathematical induction, and finite group theory. But the basic argument runs as follows. On a line, we can arbitrarily select one of the two possible directions and call it “positive”; the other, “negative.” We can then extend this definition one dimension at a time by selecting one of the two directions along the nth coordinate axis as “positive” and joining it to the “positive” (n -1)-dimensional structure already established.

In Peircean terms, each act of selection is dyadic (more precisely, indexical); each act of joining is triadic. A final arbitrary indexical selection on the finished product gets us from “handedness” to “left-handedness” or “right-handedness.”

37 Douglas Greenlee, Peirce’s Concept of Sign (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 7.

38 Greenlee, p. 9.

39 Greenlee, pp. 13, 23-24.

40 Greenlee, p. 52f.

41 Greenlee, pp. 24, 51-52, 54, 56.

42 Greenlee, pp. 55-58. Cf. 5.6. Greenlee notes, p. 58, fn. 5, that some writers have proposed precisely such an interpretation of Peirce’s pragmatist theory of meaning.

43 Greenlee, pp. 59-61.

44 Greenlee, pp. 61-63.

45 Greenlee, p. 64.

46 Greenlee, pp. 64-69.

47 Greenlee, p. 111.

48 Greenlee, pp. 106-17, 122-23.

49 Greenlee, pp. 81-84.

50 Greenlee, pp. 86-92.

51 Greenlee, pp. 93-96.

52 Joseph Ransdell, “Another Interpretation of Peirce’s Semiotic,” TCSPS 12:97: “Greenlee’s discussion is pertinent and valuable for anyone interested in the idea of semiotic. But I do not think his account succeeds, in general, in conveying an adequate understanding of what Peirce’s semiotic is all about.”

Jarrett E. Brock, “Draft of a Critique of Greenlee’s Peirce’s Concept of Sign,” TCSPS 12:111: “Peirce’s intentions are sacrificed (ignored, neglected, excluded, distorted, misunderstood, refuted) whenever they conflict with Greenlee’s notion of a general theory of signs.”

John J. Fitzgerald, “Ambiguity in Peirce’s Theory of Signs,” TCSPS 12:132: “…the aim of Greenlee’s book seems to be to arrive at a definition of sign that will apply equally well in each instance. In so far as he takes that to be Peirce’s aim too, I think that the evidence is to the contrary.”

53 Ransdell, p. 98; Brock, pp. 111-12, 117.

54 Ransdell, pp. 98-99.

55 Ransdell, pp. 104-06; Fitzgerald, pp. 131-32. Ransdell, p. 105, states succinctly the connection between immediate and dynamical object which Greenlee rejects: The immediate object may truly represent the real object, but then it may not… But the real object is not to be thought of as an unknowable Ding an sich, screened from our view by its own manifestations, but rather as that which appears to us in the immediate object when our interpretation is correct.”

56 Ransdell, p. 106: “It was precisely on [this] question of the eliminability of the object that Royce and Peirce disagreed.” Ransdell quotes Peirce, 8.129: “The truth is, that Professor Royce is blind to a fact which all ordinary people will see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist’s opinion is that it is one thing to be and another thing to be represented.”

57 Ransdell, pp. 101-04; Brock, pp. 118-21.

58 Vincent Colapietro, “Is Peirce’s Theory of Signs Truly General?”, TCSPS 23:206-11.

59 Colapietro, p. 216. “Intensity” is my interpretation; Peirce’s term, which Colapietro cites from a manuscript, is “not sufficiently complete sign.”

60 Colapietro, pp. 217-218; cf. Fitzgerald, p. 132.

61 Colapietro, pp. 219-21.

62 Cf. the diagram in f. 14. One concrete example of such a structure can be met with in a semiotic analysis of phenomenal time– cf. Paul Burgess, “A Peircean Semiotic Analysis of Time, in Response to Richard Swinburne’s Arguments on God and Time,” paper for philosophical theology seminar.

Another good example would be the structure of immediate, dynamical, and final interpretant; cf. my response to Schneider and Hausman.

These structures bear a resemblance to certain constructions in point-set and geometric topology, a field of some interest to Peirce in its infancy around the turn of the century.

63 Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don Jackson, of the “Palo Alto” psychiatric research group, throw out further hints along these lines in their Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1967) when they discuss “aha!” insights, psychotherapeutic use of paradox, Zen koans, and the spontaneous transformation of interpretive viewpoint by which people can break out of emotional double binds and escalating disputes.

Watzlawick et al. seem indebted for their semiotics to Peirce and to Charles W. Morris.

64 Hence Goudge’s guiding thesis of “naturalism” versus “transcendentalism” in The Thought of C.S. Peirce. Hence also Arthur Burks’ attempt to strain out Peirce’s “rhetoric” in “Man: Sign or Algorithm?”

65 See Peirce’s “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” 6.452-493.

66 Colapietro, p. 227.

Peircean Semiotics: A Brief Introduction

Source: The Biosemiotic Approach in Biology: Theoretical Bases and Applied Models

Peirce is often considered the founder of modern semiotics (Weiss and Burks 1945, 386). Semiotics was defined by Peirce as “the doctrine of the essential and fundamental nature of all varieties of possible semioses” (CP 5:484). Semiotics describes and analyzes the structure of semiotic processes independently of their material bases, or of the conditions under which they can be observed: inside cells (cytosemiosis), among tissues and cell populations (vegetative semiosis), in animal communication (zoosemiosis), or in typically human activities (production of notations, metarepresentations, etc.). In other words, Peirce’s concept of semiotics concerns a theory of signs in its most general sense. Peirce conceived general semiotics much like a formal science as mathematics is (CP 2:227). However, semiotics finds the objects of its investigation in the sign’s concrete, natural environment and in “normal human experience” (CP 1:241).

Semiotics is subdivided into speculative grammar, critical logic, and speculative rhetoric (CP 2:229). The first division of this science is what interests us here. Its task is that of examining the “sign physiology of all kinds” (CP 2:83), that is, the concrete nature of signs as they emerge and develop, and the conditions that determine the sign’s further development, nature, and interpretation. It is the branch that investigates (1) the conditions to which any and every kind of sign must be submitted, (2) the sign itself, and (3) its true nature (CP 1:444). As one of its tasks, speculative grammar elaborates on the classifications of signs or, in other words, the diversity of sign types and how they merge with one another to create complex semiotic processes. For Houser, the logician “who concentrates on speculative grammar investigates representation relations (signs), seeks to work out the necessary and sufficient conditions for representing, and classifies the different possible kinds of representation” (1997, 9). Between 1867 and 1911, Peirce developed a model of signs as processes, actions, and relations, and also elaborated divisions of signs in order to describe different kinds of semiotic processes.

Peirce’s pragmatic model of meaning as the “action of signs” (semiosis) has had a deep impact (besides all branches of semiotics) on philosophy, psychology, theoretical biology, and cognitive sciences (see Freeman 1983; Fetzer 1997; Colapietro 1989; Tiercelin 1995; Hoffmeyer 1996; Deacon 1997; Freadman 2004; Hookway 2002). First and foremost, Peirce’s semiotics is grounded in a list of categories—namely, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness—which corresponds to an exhaustive system of hierarchically organized classes of relations (Houser 1997). This system makes up the formal foundation of Peirce’s philosophy (Parker 1998) and his model of semiotic action (Murphey 1993).

In brief, the categories can be defined as follows:

1. Firstness: what something is, without reference to anything else.
2. Secondness: what something is, in relation to something else, but without relation to any third entity.
3. Thirdness: what something is, insofar as it is capable of bringing a second entity into relation to a first one in the same way that it brings itself into relation to the first and the second entities.

Firstness is the category of vagueness and novelty: “firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of anything else. That can only be a possibility” (CP 1:25). Secondness is the category of reaction, opposition, and differentiation: “generally speaking genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon another, brute action. . . . I consider the idea of any dyadic relation not involving any third as an idea of secondness” (CP 8:330). Finally, Thirdness is the category of mediation, habit, generality, evolution, and conceptualization (CP 1:340).5

Semiosis and Information Processing

According to Peirce (CP 2:171, 2:274), any description of semiosis should necessarily treat it as a relation constituted by three irreducibly connected terms: sign-object-interpretant (S-O-I). Hereafter, we will refer to these terms of a triadic relation as S, O, and I, and to the triadic relation in itself, as “triad” (see figure 4.1). As the reader will note in figure 4.1, this triadic relationship communicates/conveys a form from the object to the interpretant through the sign (symbolized by the horizontal arrow). The other two arrows indicate that the form is conveyed from the object to the interpretant through a determination of the sign by the object, and a determination of the interpretant by the sign.

For Peirce, a sign is something that stands for something other than itself. Peirce defined signs in several different ways (Marty and Lang 1997), but here we will highlight the definitions that will be useful in our work. He conceived a sign as a “First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, so as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object” (CP 2:274; see also CP 2:303, 2:92, 1:541). The triadic relation between S, O, and I is regarded by Peirce as irreducible, in the sense that it is not decomposable into any simpler relation. Accordingly, the term “sign” was used by Peirce to designate the irreducible triadic process between S, O, and I, but he also used it to refer to the first term of this triadic relation. Some commentators have proposed that we should distinguish between the “sign in this strict sense” (representamen, or sign vehicle), when referring to the first term of the triad, and the “sign in a broad sense” (or sign process, sign as a whole) (e.g., Johansen 1993). Signs, conceived in the broad sense, are never alone.

In Peirce’s definitions, we find several clues to understand how signs act. Any sign is something that stands for something else (its object) in such a way that it ends up producing a third relational entity (an interpretant), which is the effect a sign produces on an interpreter. In the context of biosemiotics, an interpreter is a biosystem such as a cell or an organism. In many biological informational processes, sign interpretation results in a new sign within the interpreter, which refers to the same object to which the former sign refers, or ultimately in an action, which can lead to the termination of an informational process. That the interpretant is often another sign, created by the action of a previous sign, is clear in the following statement by Peirce: a sign is “anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on, ad infinitum” (CP 2:303).

Accordingly, it is important to bear in mind always that the interpretant is not necessarily the product of a process that amounts to “interpretation” in the sense that we use this term to account for human cognitive processes. As explained previously, the fundamental character of the interpretant in many biological processes is that it is a new sign produced by the action of a previous sign in such a manner that both share the same referent, and indeed, refer to it in a similar way.

One of the most remarkable characteristics of Peirce’s theory of signs is its commitment to a process philosophy. As a process thinker, it was quite natural that Peirce conceived semiosis as basically a process in which triads are systematically linked to one another so as to form a web (see Gomes et al. 2007). Peirce’s theory of signs has a remarkable dynamical nature. According to Merrell, “Peirce’s emphasis rests not on content, essence, or substance, but, more properly, on dynamics relations. Events, not things, are highlighted” (1995, 78). Thus, Hausman (1993) refers to the complex S-O-I as the focal factor of a dynamical process.

It is important not to lose sight of the distinction between the inter- preter, which is the system that interprets the sign, and the interpretant. The interpreter is described by Peirce as a “Quasi-mind” (CP 4:536), a description that demands, for its proper interpretation, a clear recognition of Peirce’s broad concept of mind (Ransdell 1977; Santaella-Braga 1994). It is not the case that only conscious beings can be interpreters in a Peircean framework. Rather, a translation machinery synthesizing proteins from a string of ribonucleic acid (RNA) or a membrane receptor recognizing a given hormone can be regarded as interpreters. A basic idea in a semiotic understanding of living systems is that these systems are interpreters of signs, that is, that they are constantly responding to selected signs in their surroundings. An interpreter is anything that carries on a sign process.

Thus, the interpreter does not have to be a conscious being, not even an organism, as it may be some part or subsystem within an organism, or a human-designed product. Nevertheless, because a sign process is itself an interpreter, the concept of interpreter appears to be secondary in Peirce’s semiotics, even though it can play a heuristic role in building some models of semiotic processes.

We also need to consider here Peirce’s distinctions regarding the nature of objects and interpretants, (For a review of these topics, see Savan 1988; Liszka 1990; Short 1996.) He distinguishes between the immediate and dynamical objects of a sign as follows:

We must distinguish between the Immediate Object—i.e., the Object as repre- sented in the sign—and . . . the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. (CP 8:314; emphasis in the original)

and:

We have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. (CP 4:536)

And we should also consider his distinction between three kinds of interpretants:

The Immediate Interpretant is the immediate pertinent possible effect in its unanalyzed primitive entirety. . . . The Dynamical Interpretant is the actual effect produced upon a given interpreter on a given occasion in a given stage of his consideration of the Sign. (MS 339d:546–547; emphasis in the original)

and:

The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. . . . The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS 110–111)

Let us first consider Peirce’s distinction between the immediate and the dynamical objects of a sign. The dynamical object is something in reality that determines the sign, but can be represented by the sign only in some of its aspects. These aspects that the sign represents are the immediate object, that is, the dynamical object in its semiotically available form, that is, as immediately given to the sign. In another words, the immediate object is the dynamical object as the sign represents it (this is what we mean by “semiotic availability”). Because the sign represents the dynamical object in some of its features only, never in its totality, it can simply indicate that object, and it is left to an interpreter to establish what is the dynamical object through the interpreter’s competence as a user of that sign, which, in turn, results from its previous experience and learning to become an interpreter.6 This is why Peirce claims that the interpreter should find out what the dynamical object is by collateral experience. The system that is causally affected by the sign should establish which dynamical object the sign indicates through processes that have been selected for in the evolutionary history of that kind of system. In the ontogenetic timescale, the system will acquire its semiotic competence—that is, its competence as a sign interpreter—through development.

Peirce defines the dynamical interpretant as the actual effect of a sign, while the immediate interpretant is its “range of interpretability”—the range of possible effects that a sign is able to produce (see Johansen 1993, 166–167). The dynamical interpretant is thus the instantiation of one of the possible effects included in the immediate interpretant. The final interpretant in a semiotic process is, in turn, the final state of this process, understood as a tendency being realized when a given chain of triads is triggered, but not determined or bound to happen, because other final states can follow from the semiotic process, as in the case, for instance, of misinterpretation. In one way or another, the final interpretant can be seen as temporally solving the instability that is included into the sign process.

Peirce (CP 8:177) writes that a sign determines an interpretant in some “actual” or “potential” mind (in other passages, a “Quasi-mind”; see CP 4:536). It is indeed possible to differentiate between “potential” and “effective” semiosis. Potential semiosis is defined as a triadically structured process that is not actually taking place, but has a disposition to take place at a given moment; that is, it could occur under the appropriate conditions. Effective semiosis, in turn, concerns a sign that, by being actualized, has an actual effect on the interpreter. Semiosis necessarily entails the instantiation of chains of triadic relations, as a sign in a given triad will lead to the production of an interpretant, which is, in turn, a new sign. Therefore, an interpretant is both the third term of a previous triad and the first term (sign) of a subsequent triad (Savan 1988; see figure 4.2). Here, we have a first transition accounting for the dynamical nature of semiosis, namely, the interpretant-sign (I-S) transition. By this “transition,” we simply mean that the same element that plays the role of the interpretant in a triad will play in a subsequent triad the role of the sign. After all, from a Peircean perspective, to perform sign processing and interpretation is to produce further (or, as Peirce says, more developed) signs.

Please also remember that the outline in this section is purely logical (or semiotic) and that within a particular physical, chemical, or biological system, the semiotic processes described here in general terms can be instantiated by different physical means, such as shifts in chemical con-

centrations or processes of molecular recognition. We will add this material aspect when we present our biosemiotic models.

When the I-S transition takes place, there is also a change in the occupant of the functional role of the immediate object (figure 4.2). When the interpretant becomes the sign of a new triad, the relation of reference to the same dynamical object depends on the fact that the new occupant of the role of immediate object stands for the same aspect of the dynamical object that the immediate object of a previous triad stood for. Thus, an object turns out to be a plural object via semiosis. We should stress, however, that instead of using the concept of reference in these models (as it is a highly debated and sometimes unclear concept that is not included in Peirce’s theory of signs), it might be good to replace this concept in future works by a concept internal to Peirce’s framework: the concept of ground.

As figure 4.2 shows, in a triad a given sign Sindicates a dynamical object by representing some aspect of it, the immediate object Oi. Through the triadic relation, an interpretant Iis produced in the semiotic system. This interpretant becomes the sign in a subsequent triadic relation, Si+1, which now indicates the same dynamical object. It should indicate this object through a new immediate object that corresponds to an aspect of the dynamical object represented in the sign. We now have a new occupant of the role of immediate object that stands for the same aspect of the dynamical object which was represented in the previous sign, Si. It is in this sense that there is a change in the occupant of the functional role of the immediate object, from Oin a previous triad to Oi+1 in a subsequent triad. Through the triadic relation, a further interpretant, Ii+1, will be produced, which will then become the sign in a new triad, Si+2, and thus successively, up to the end of that specific sign process.

Peirce also defines a sign as a medium for the communication of a form or habit embodied in the object to the interpretant (De Tienne 2003; Hulswit 2001; Bergman 2000), so as to constrain the interpretant as a sign or the interpreter’s behavior (figure 4.1):

A Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. . . . As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. . . . That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions. (MS 793:1–3) (See EP 2:544, n. 22, for a slightly different version.)

What is a form? There is a movement in Peirce’s writings from “form as firstness” to “form as thirdness.” Form is defined as having the “being of predicate” (EP 2:544), and it is also pragmatically formulated as a “conditional proposition” stating that certain things would happen under specific circumstances (EP 2:388). It is nothing like a thing (De Tienne 2003), but something that is embodied in the object (EP 2:544, n. 22) as a habit, a “rule of action” (CP 5:397), a “disposition” (CP 2:170), a “real potential” (EP 2:388) or, simply, a “permanence of some relation” (CP 1:415). Here, we would like to stress that the form communicated or conveyed from the object to the interpretant through the sign is not the particular shape of an object, or something alike, but a regularity, a habit that allows a given semiotic system to interpret that form as indicative of a particular class of entities, processes, or phenomena, and thus to answer to it in a similarly regular, lawful way. Otherwise, the semiotic system would not be really capable of interpretation.

The communication/conveyance of a form from the object to the interpretant constrains the behavior of an interpreter, in the sense that it brings about a constrained set of relations between the object and the interpretant through the mediation of the sign. We understand the “meaning” of a sign, thus, as an effect of the sign—conceived as a medium for the communication/conveyance of forms—on an interpreter by means of the triadic relation S-O-I. A meaning process can be thus defined as the action of a sign (semiosis).

In a Peircean approach, information can be strongly associated with the concepts of meaning and semiosis.7 Peirce spoke of signs as “conveyers,” as a “medium” (MS 793), as “embodying meaning.” Accordingly, in his theory, the notions of meaning, information, and semiosis intersect and overlap in different ways (see Johansen 1993). Peirce defined “meaning” as the consequence of the triadic relation between sign, object, and interpretant (S-O-I) as a whole (EP 2:429), and also in terms of different correlates of a triad—e.g., object (MS 11, EP 2:274), interpretant (EP 2:496, EP 2:499; CP 4:536; see Fitzgerald 1966, 84; Bergman 2000). In turn, Peirce defined “information” at least ordinarily (CP 2.418) and metaphysically (CP 2.418) as a connection between form and matter, and logically (W 1.276) as the product of the extension and intension of a concept (Debrock 1996).

In the passage quoted earlier from MS 793, Peirce defines a sign both as “a Medium for the communication of a Form” and as “a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines.” If we consider both definitions of a sign, we can say, then, that semiosis is a triadic process of communication/conveyance of a form from the object to the interpretant by the sign mediation. And we can also stipulate that semiosis is, in a Peircean framework, information. For this reason, we systematically refer to information as the communication/ conveyance of a form from O to I through S (Queiroz, Emmeche, and El-Hani. 2005; El-Hani, Queiroz, and Emmeche 2006; Queiroz and El-Hani 2006a, 2006b).

According to our interpretation of Peirce’s ideas, information has the nature of a process: it is a process of communicating a form to the interpretant and operates as a constraining influence on possible patterns of interpretative behavior. When applying this general semiotic approach to biological systems, information will most often be an interpreter-dependent process. It cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated (and actively distributed) communicational agent (potential or effective). It is interpreter-dependent in the sense that information triadically connects representation (sign), object, and an effect (interpretant) on the interpreter (which can be an organism or a part of an organism). In a biological system, information depends on both the interpreter and the object (in which the form communicated in information is embodied as a constraining factor of the interpretative process). Thus, a framework for thinking about information as a process can be constructed in Peircean terms by employing the following definitions:

• Information = semiosis: a triadic-dependent process through which a form embodied in the object in a regular way is communicated or conveyed to an interpretant through the mediation of a sign.


• Potential information = potential semiosis: a process of communicating or conveying a form from an object to an interpretant through the mediation of a sign that has a disposition to take place at a given moment, changing the state of the interpreter.

• Effective information = effective semiosis: the process by which a sign actually produces an effect (interpretant) on some system (an interpreter) by making the interpretant stand in a similar relation to the same object (the object of the sign) as that in which the sign itself stand. Thus, the sign mediates the relation between object and interpretant. The sign effectively communicates or conveys, in this way, a form from the object to the interpretant, changing the state of the interpreter.

Phenomenology, Esthetics, and Ethics as New Sciences of Theoretical Philosophy

Source: LIMITATIONS ON APPLYING PEIRCEAN SEMEIOTIC

BIOSEMIOTICS AS APPLIED OBJECTIVE ETHICS AND ESTHETICS RATHER THAN SEMEIOTIC

Until the first years of 20th century, Peirce thought that theoretical philosophy included only two subdisciplines, logic and metaphysics. The basic structure of the concept of sign as a logical concept was fixed under the conception that logic provided the most abstract positive science. However, in 1901-1903, Peirce’s conceptions about the philosophical sciences and his own main work changed. He found out that theoretical philosophy —that he was practicing himself— actually contains a couple of other sciences that he previously had not recognized it containing. According to this new conception, theoretical philosophy divides into three subdisciplines, to phenomenology (later also phaneroscopy), normative sciences, and metaphysics. Normative sciences divide further into three: to esthetics, ethics (renamed later as practics), and logic (or formal semeiotic). This addition of new sciences did not changed the hierarchical character of the classification of sciences — higher sciences should still be completely self-sufficient in relation to lower ones. Most importantly, logic with its logical concept of sign appeared no more as the most abstract of the positive sciences. Metaphysics was no more dependent merely on logic and mathematics, but it could now appeal to these new sciences too.

Phenomenology was abstracted as the most general of all positive sciences. The categories (firstness, secondness, thirdness) that were earlier derived as logical ones (as categories of thought) and applied in metaphysics (as categories of being, cf. CP 1.300, 1894) became now understood as primarily phenomenological ones. Logical, metaphysical, and other corresponding categories are only applications of these phenomenological ones. Any psychological, metaphysical, or logical refutation of anyone of these categories is only a refutation of that application, not of the phenomenological category in itself.

Phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) is a pre-normative science that merely describes the phaneron (or ‘universal phenomenon’). By phaneron, Peirce meant “the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not”(CP 1.284, 1905). It is a description of the most general elements (i.e. universal categories) that are included in any content of any mind. However, ‘mind’here (as usually in Peirce’s philosophy) does not refer merely to “an instantaneous state of consciousness”but also to the unconscious or implicit content of mind (EP 2:362, 1905). Consciousness is usually capable of concentrating only on one basic element of mind at a time: either 1. to its actual content, i.e. qualities of feeling (firstness)49, 2. to the existential event of change in that content, i.e. a sudden compulsive appearing of a new quality that replaces the old one (secondness), or 3. to its mediative character, its bringing something not present to mind, i.e. its reference to the future or past, which means some kind of experience of generality or continuity in time (thirdness). Phenomenology is in itself a study of phanera in their firstness, i.e. of what is common to all of them as they are. It is the study of categories, their degenerate forms, and their mutual relations. Normative sciences consider the general effects of phanera, their relation to ends (i.e. how they act upon us and how our action impacts upon them), treating thus phanera in their secondness. Metaphysics studies what is real in phanera, what they tell us about the reality in general — i.e. it studies phanera in their thirdness. (EP 2:197, 1903.) These new sciences appear in the similar sense ‘transcendental’as logic did in our earlier consideration (cf. Ch. 2.3).

The idea of three normative sciences: esthetics, ethics, and logic, is a classical one, but Peirce adopted it in a modified sense. He took all of them as theoretical sciences, not as Arts or as disciplines that aim at practical purposes (as justice). Earlier Peirce did not consider ethics and esthetics as the sciences of theoretical philosophy but — if sciences at all— either as practical ones (belonging to practical philosophy) or as psychical ones. But now they were abstracted from their conventional practical nature so that especially ethics should not be confused with the corresponding practical science.50 While logic was defined as a science of self-controlled thought, ethics was determined as the general science of self-controlled conduct. Because thinking is a species of conduct, logic appears as a kind of ethics of thought — ethics is thus a more abstract normative science than logic (e.g. EP 2:272, 1903). All the principles that will be found in ethics are the principles of logic as well, but not vice versa. The findings of logic do not bind ethical conceptions.

Source: LIMITATIONS ON APPLYING PEIRCEAN SEMEIOTIC

BIOSEMIOTICS AS APPLIED OBJECTIVE ETHICS AND ESTHETICS RATHER THAN SEMEIOTIC

Source: LIMITATIONS ON APPLYING PEIRCEAN SEMEIOTIC

BIOSEMIOTICS AS APPLIED OBJECTIVE ETHICS AND ESTHETICS RATHER THAN SEMEIOTIC

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Key Sources of Research

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

Queiroz, João

A Sign of Itself

Paul Ryan

A Visual Model of Peirce’s 66 Classes of Signs Unravels His Late Proposal of Enlarging Semiotic Theory

Priscila Borges

L. Magnani et al. (Eds.): Model-Based Reasoning in Science & Technology, SCI 314, pp. 221–237.

Chapter · September 2010 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15223-8_12

Visualizing triadic relations

Diagrams for Charles S. Peirce’s classifications of signs

Priscila Lena Farias & João Queiroz

Information Design Journal 23(2), 127–147 

© 2017 John Benjamins Publishing Company 

D O I : 10.1075/idj.23.2.03far

Peirce’s Other Ten-Class Typology

Tony Jappy

University of Perpignan Via Domitia, France

Language and Semiotic Studies

Vol. 7 No. 1 Spring 2021

Click to access 698b5db3-cfb9-44ee-b144-eab764b1e296.pdf

On Peirce’s diagrammatic models for ten classes of signs

DOI:10.1515/sem-2014-0038

Priscila Lena Farias

On Peirce’s Theory of Propositions: A Response to Hilpinen

Nathan Houser

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

Notes for a Dynamic Diagram of Charles Peirce’s Classifications of Signs

Priscila Farias and Queiroz, J. (2000)

Semiotica 131 (1/2), 19–44.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216760722_Notes_for_a_dynamic_diagram_of_Charles_Peirce%27s_classification_of_signs

“A New Approach to the Problem of the Order of the Ten Trichotomies and the Classification of Sixty-six Types of Signs in Peirce’s Late Speculative Grammar.” 

Restrepo, Jorge Alejandro Flórez and Juliana Acosta López de Mesa.

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, vol. 57 no. 3, 2021, p. 374-396. 

Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/845176.

On diagrams for Peirce’s 10, 28 and 66 classes of signs

PRISCILA FARIAS & JOÃO QUEIROZ

Semiotica. Volume 2003, Issue 147, Pages 165–184, ISSN (Online) 1613-3692, ISSN (Print) 0037-1998, DOI: 10.1515/semi.2003.089

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs

The Biological Substrate of Icons, Indexes, and Symbols in Animal Communication: A Neurosemiotic Analysis of Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls

João Queiroz and Sidarta Ribeiro

10cubes and 3N3: Using interactive diagrams to investigate Charles Peirce’s classifications of signs*

PRISCILA FARIAS and JOAO QUEIROZ

Semiotica 150–1/4 (2004),

Peirce,
Pragmatism, and
The Right Way of Thinking

Philip L. Campbell

Prepared by
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

SAND2011-5583 August 2011

From Signals to Knowledge and from Knowledge to Action: Peircean Semiotics and the Grounding of Cognition

Eduardo Camargo and Ricardo R. Gudwin

DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP

2021

gudwin@unicamp.br https://faculty.dca.fee.unicamp.br/gudwin

Peirce’s universal categories: On their potential for gesture theory and multimodal analysis

Irene Mittelberg
Semiotica 2019 (228):193-222 (2019)

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332064903_Peirce%27s_universal_categories_On_their_potential_for_gesture_theory_and_multimodal_analysis

Introduction to Cybersemiotics: A Transdisci0plinary Perspective

edited by Carlos Vidales, Søren Brier

SEMIOSIS AND PRAGMATISM: TOWARD A DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF MEANING

João Queiroz, Floyd Merrell

Research Group on History, Philosophy, and Biology Teaching, Institute of Biology, Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA), Brazil1 

e-mail: queiroz@gmail.com

Department of Foreign Languages and Literature Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA 

e-mail: fmerrell@purdue.edu

Sign Systems Studies 34.1, 2006

DOI: 10.12697/SSS.2006.34.1.02

Click to access Semiosis-and-pragmatism-Toward-a-dynamic-concept-of-meaning.pdf

The Semiotic Perspectives of Peirce and Saussure: A Brief Comparative Study

Halina Sendera

Mohd.Yakin

Andreas Totu

Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences
Volume 155, 6 November 2014, Pages 4-8

Naturalizing semiotics: The triadic sign of Charles Sanders Peirce as a systems property

Mogens Kilstrup 1

  • 1Metabolic Signaling and Regulation Group, DTU Systems Biology, Technical University of Denmark, Building 301, 2800 Kgs Lyngby, Denmark.

Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015 Dec;119(3):563-75.

doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.013. Epub 2015 Aug 12.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26276466/

Why Triadic?

Challenges to the Structure of Peirce’s Semiotic

Paul Burgess

http://www.paulburgess.org/triadic.html

Using Peircean Semiotics as the Grounding of Cognition †

Eduardo Camargo

and Ricardo Gudwin *

Department of Computer Engineering and Industrial Automation (DCA), School of Electrical and Computer Engineering (FEEC), State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas 13083-852, SP, Brazil; cepcamargo@gmail.com
Correspondence: gudwin@unicamp.br; Tel.: +55-19-99701-7522

† Presented at Philosophy and Computing Conference, IS4SI Summit 2021, Online, 12–19 September 2021.

Emergent Sign-Action

Classical Ballet As A Self-Organized And Temporally Distributed Semiotic Process

Pedro Atã and João Queiroz

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019

Translation Semiotics: The Disciplinary Essence

Mingyu Wang and Jing Li

Chinese Semiotic Studies 16(3): 399–418

DOI 10.1515/css-2020-0022

Click to access 050afcca8693c60dd4c524a46ed72648.pdf

Gesture studies and semiotics.

Mittelberg, Irene & Jennifer Hinnell. (2022, in press).

In Jamin Pelkey & Paul Cobley (eds), Semiotic Movements (Bloomsbury Semiotics 4). London: Bloomsbury Academic.

“Elements of Peircean phenomenology: From categories to signs by way of grounds” 

Sonesson, Göran.

Semiotica, vol. 2019, no. 228, 2019, pp. 259-285. 

https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0086

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/sem-2018-0086/html

Gestures as Diagrams from Peirce’s Mature Semeiotic

Leticia Vitral

Independent Researcher

leticiaavitral@gmail.org

João Queiroz

Institute of Arts and Design, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil*
joao.queiroz@ufjf.br

Metodo Vol. 9, n. 1 (2021)

DOI: 10.19079/metodo.9.1.237

The Biosemiotic Approach in Biology: Theoretical Bases and Applied Models

João Queiroz, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, and Charbel El-Hani

Information and Living Systems Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives Edited by George Terzis and Robert Arp

2011

Basics of Semiotics

John Deely

Tartu Semiotics Library 4

2005

Popularising Semiotics

Keyan G. Tomaselli and Arnold Shepperson 

The Centre for Cultural & Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa

CRT Vol 11 No 2 1991

Meaning in a material world
or
How to find out what linguists think about meaning

Nikolaus Ritt

An Approach to Computational Semiotics

Ricardo Gudwin and Fernando Gomide DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP

Caixa Postal 6101
13.083-970 Campinas – SP – Brasil
e-mails: gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br, gomide@dca.fee.unicamp.br

ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/gudwin/tt/1/11/111/isas97.pdf

Evaluating Intelligence:
A Computational Semiotics Perspective

Ricardo R. Gudwin,
Department of Computer Engineering and Industrial Automation – DCA Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering – FEEC
State University of Campinas – UNICAMP – Brasil gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br

A Computational Semiotics Approach for Soft Computing

Ricardo Gudwin and Fernando Gomide

DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP
Caixa Postal 6101
13.083-970 – Campinas, SP – Brasil
e-mails: gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br, gomide@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Semiotic Oriented Autonomous Intelligent Systems Engineering

Rodrigo Gonçalves Ricardo Gudwin 

rodrigo@dca.fee.unicamp.br

gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Department of Computer Engineering and Industrial Automation – DCA – Faculty of Electrical and Computer Engineering – FEEC – State University of Campinas – UNICAMP – Brazil

From Semiotics to Computational Semiotics

Ricardo R. Gudwin

DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP Cidade Universitária Zeferino Vaz S/N 13083-970 Campinas – SP – Brasil

e-mail: gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Synthetic Approach to Semiotic Artificial Creatures

Angelo Loula, State University of Campinas, Brazil

Ricardo Gudwin, State University of Campinas, Brazil

Sidarta Ribeiro, Duke University Medical School, USA

Ivan de Araújo, University of Oxford, UK

João Queiroz, State University of Campinos, Brazil

ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/gudwin/publications/rdbic2004.pdf

Synthetic approach of symbolic creatures

Angelo Loula, Ricardo Gudwin, João Queiroz
Dept. Computer Engineering
and Industrial Automation
FEEC – UNICAMP
Av. Albert Einstein, 400
Campinas – SP, Brasil 13083-970 

0angelocl@dca.fee.unicamp.br, 

gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br,

queirozj@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Sidarta Ribeiro
Dept. Neurobiology
Duke University Medical School Durham, NC, USA ribeiro@neuro.duke.edu

Ivan de Araújo
Dept. Experimental Psychology University of Oxford Oxford, UK ivan.araujo@psy.ox.ac.uk

Corresponding author: queirozj@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Special Issue on Computational Intelligence and Semiotics

S.E.E.D. Journal (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development

Queiroz, J. and Gudwin, R. (Guest Editors)

Computational Semiotics : An Approach for the Study of Intelligent Systems
Part I : Foundations

Ricardo Gudwin DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP

gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Fernando Gomide DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP

gomide@dca.fee.unicamp.br

ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/gudwin/publications/rep1_97.pdf

Computational Semiotics : A New Aproach for the Study of Intelligent System
Part II : Theory and Application

Ricardo Gudwin DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP gudwin@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Fernando Gomide DCA-FEEC-UNICAMP gomide@dca.fee.unicamp.br

Peirce And The Engineering Of Intelligent Systems

Ricardo R. Gudwin

ftp://ftp.dca.fee.unicamp.br/pub/docs/gudwin/publications/PeirceEngineeringIS2014.pdf

Peirce’s ten classes of Signs: modeling biosemiotic processes and Systems

João Queiroz

LIMITATIONS ON APPLYING PEIRCEAN SEMEIOTIC

BIOSEMIOTICS AS APPLIED OBJECTIVE ETHICS AND ESTHETICS RATHER THAN SEMEIOTIC

Tommi Vehkavaara*

Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Philosophy FIN-33014 University of Tampere, Finland

Journal of Biosemiotics
Volume 1, Number 1, pp. 269-308

2005

https://philarchive.org/archive/TOMLOA

Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics

Gerard Deledalle

A SEMIOTIC THEORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 

YUAN LI

Saint Mary’s College of California

Academy of Management Review 2017, Vol. 42, No. 3, 520–547. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2014.0274

Click to access A-Semiotic-Theory-of-Institutionalization.pdf

Peirce’s Existential Graphs — Readings and Links

Dr. Frithjof Dau

http://www.dr-dau.net/eg_readings.shtml

Existential Graphs as Ontographic Media

Daniela Wentz

https://www.ikkm-weimar.de/site/assets/files/8287/236676700Existential Graphs as Ontographic Media Daniela Wentz0101_zmk_19-1_15_wentz.pdf

Peirce’s Categories and Sign Studies

Vincent Colapietro

Moving Pictures of Thought
Diagrams as Centerpiece of a Peircean Epistemology

Originally, “Diagrams as Centerpiece in a Peircean Epistemology”, in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Summer, 2000, vol. XXXVI, no. 3, 357-92.

In its adapted version, ch. 4 of Diagrammatology. An Investigation in Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics, Dordrecht 2007: Springer Verlag, 89-116.

Click to access Diagrams%20as%20Centerpiece.%202000%3A2007.pdf

What Does Peirce’s Sign Theory Have To Say To Art History?

James Elkins

Click to access elkins-Peirce.pdf

Sign, Meaning, and Understanding in Victoria Welby and Charles S. Peirce

Susan Petrilli

Signs and Society

Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2015

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/679453

Schedule of Lectures for
“The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce”

Dr. Erik Curiel

erik.curiel@lmu.de

course website: http://strangebeautiful.com/lmu/2020-summer-peirce.html

Click to access lectures-lmu-peirce.pdf

Possibilities in Peirce’s Existential Graphs for Logic Education

Adam Vile and Simon Polovina

GR&ND

South Bank University

The Object of Signs in Charles S. Peirce’s Semiotic Theory

William W. West 

University of Rhode Island

MS Thesis 1977

Peirce’s Tutorial on Existential Graphs 

John F. Sowa

DIAGRAMMATIC THOUGHT: TWO FORMS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM IN C.S. PEIRCE AND GILLES DELEUZE 

Kamini Vellodi

PARRHESIA NUMBER 19 • 2014 • 79-95

THE EXISTENTIAL GRAPHS OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE

by

DON D. ROBERTS

1973 University of Waterloo

The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

Charles Sanders Peirce: Logic

IEP Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce

Louis H. Kauffman

Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Vol.8, no.1–2, 2001, pp. 79–110

Diagrams as Centerpiece of a Peircean Epistemology

Frederik Stjernfelt

TCPS, Summer 2000, Vol XXXVI, No 3

C. S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Sign: an Analysis of Depth and Complexity within Peircean Sign Types and Peircean Evolution Theory.

Torkild Leo Thellefsen

Department of Communication

Kroghstræde 3
9220 Aalborg Øst Denmark 

tlt@mail1.stofanet.dk

Peirce’s Theory of Signs

First published Fri Oct 13, 2006; substantive revision Thu Aug 4, 2022

SEP Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Images, diagrams and metaphors: hypoicons in the context of Peirce’s 66- fold classification of signs

Priscila FARIAS & João QUEIROZ

https://philarchive.org/archive/FARIDA

Diagrammatic thinking: Notes on Peirce’s semiotics and epistemology. 

Radford, L. (2008).

PNA, 3(1), 1-18.

Irreducible and complementary semiotic forms

Howard H Pattee

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SEMIOTIC: CHARLES PEIRCE AND CHARLES MORRIS

EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON University 0/ Notre Dame

AND KEVIN McMURTREY

The Criterion of Habit in Peirce’s Definitions of the Symbol

Author(s): Winfried Nöth
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 46, No. 1, A Symposium in Memory of Peter H. Hare / Joseph Palencik &amp; Russell Pryba, Guest Editors (Winter 2010), pp. 82- 93
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/TRA.2010.46.1.82&nbsp;.

The Life of Symbols and Other Legisigns: More than a Mere Metaphor?

Winfried Nöth

http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/73988/1/439.pdf.pdf#page=182

Dicent Symbols and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry

João Queiroz, Frederik Stjernfelt and Charbel Niño El-Hani

http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/73988/1/439.pdf.pdf#page=208

The riddle of the Sphinx answered: On how C. S. Peirce’s transdisciplinary semiotic philosophy of knowing links science and spirituality1

Søren Brier

C.S. Peirce’s Classification of Dyadic Relations: Exploring the Relevance for Logic and Mathematics

Jeffrey Downard

Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce

https://wikiless.org/wiki/Semiotic_theory_of_Charles_Sanders_Peirce?lang=en

A Foundational Mindset: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness

Peirce’s General Theory of Signs

CLARE THORNBURY

Institute of Education, University of London

Finding Meaning, Cultures Across Borders: International Dialogue between Philosophy and Psychology (2011): 49-57

Semiotics

https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/semiotics

Toward a Truly Pragmatic Theory of Signs: Reading Peirce’s Semeiotic in Light of Dewey’s Gloss

Vincent Colapietro

A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Defence of the Claim that his Pragmatism is Founded on his Theory of Categories

Siosifa Ika
University of Notre Dame Australia

PhD Thesis, 2002

https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1018&context=theses

The Natural History of Branching: Approaches to the Phenomenology of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness

Göran Sonesson, Lund University

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/673251

A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce

James Jakob Liszka

Peirce’s Theory of Signs

Jay Zeman

Click to access Zeman77.pdf

Semiotics and Semiosics:the Terminological Connotations and Conceptual Relations

Min Niu

1 School of Foreign Languages, Guizhou Minzu University, Guiyang, 550025, China 2 University of Shinawatra, Bangkok, 10400, Thailand
*E-mail: niumin810@163.com

International Journal of New Developments in Education
ISSN 2663-8169 Vol. 2, Issue 3: 04-13, DOI: 10.25236/IJNDE.2020.020302

Origin of Charles Sander Peirce’s model of triadic signs diagram?

https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/31094/origin-of-charles-sander-peirces-model-of-triadic-signs-diagram

The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism

C. K. OgdenIvor Armstrong Richards

Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1994 – 591 pagine

A Theory of Semiotics

Di Umberto Eco

Neo-semiotics: Introducing zeroness into Peircean semiotics may bridge the knowable and the unknowable

SungchulJi

Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy, Rutgers University, Piscataway, N.J, 08854, USA

Received 17 May 2017, Revised 1 September 2017, Accepted 5 September 2017, Available online 9 September 2017, Version of Record 19 December 2017.

Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology

Volume 131, December 2017, Pages 387-401

Integral Biomathics 2017: The Necessary Conjunction of Western and Eastern Thought Traditions for Exploring the Nature of Mind and Life
Edited by Plamen L. Simeonov, Arran Gare, Koichiro Matsuno, Abir U. Igamberdiev

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0079610717300858?via%3Dihub