Relation and Negation in Indian Philosophy
Key Terms
- Para consistent logic
- Non-classical logic
- Paradoxes
- Contradictions
- Catuskoti
- Saptabhangi
- Tetralemma
- Trilemma
- Dilemma
- Buddhist logic
- Unanswerable questions
- Nagarjuna
- Mula madhya maka karika
- Truth predicate
- Para consistency
- First Degree Entailment
- Many-valued logic
- Relational semantics
- Nyaya
- Navya Nyaya
- Neti Neti
- Logic
- Indian Philosophy
- Hindu Logic
- Jaina Logic
- Principle of the Excluded Fifth
- Principle of the Excluded Third
- Nasidya Sukta
- Relation
- Negation
Researchers
- Kalidas Bhattacharyya
- Purushottama Bilimoria
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna
- Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
- George Bosworth Burch
- Graham Priest
- J. F. Staal
- Westerhoff, Jan
- Gunaratne, R. D.
- Rahlwes, Chris
- Ruegg, D.S.
A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Source: A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Source: A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Source: A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Source: A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Source: The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
Source: Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
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Key Sources of Research
Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara, Krishnamurti: Negation as a Spiritual Exercise.
Tubali, S. (2023).
In: The Transformative Philosophical Dialogue. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures,
vol 41. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40074-2_11
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-40074-2_11
Abstract
To gain a deeper insight into the role that negation played in the Krishnamurti dialogue, I compare it to two well-researched negation-based philosophies. The first is Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist philosophy of the ‘middle way’ (madhyamaka), in particular his most prominent work The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā). The second is the eighth-century Śaṅkara’s Hindu system of Advaita Vedānta, mainly his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and his independent work A Thousand Teachings(Upadeśasāhasrī). I start by introducing the Buddha’s imponderables and the way that Nāgārjuna developed these segments of the Buddha’s Dharma into the system of the middle way (madhyamaka). In this section, I demonstrate the transformative nature of this system, based on the original text as well as scholarly sources. The next section is dedicated to the presentation of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta as a negative philosophy and to the ways in which his method corresponds to and stands in contrast to Nāgārjuna’s negation. Finally, I highlight the uniqueness of Krishnamurti’s dialectical negation: while the two classical paragons of the negative approach practised by Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara are tools for the elimination of metaphysical views and epistemological approaches, Krishnamurti’s is a psychological and post-traditional negation whose aim is to do away with past, knowledge, and authority. More generally, I argue that, as a feature of the transformative dialogue, negation is a spiritual exercise that prepares for a particular experience and facilitates it: the discussant’s ability to perceive reality with naked eyes and a bare mind.
Notes
- I shall return to Sañjaya’s form of negation in the following section.
- It is worth mentioning that the scriptures that inspired Nāgārjuna’s and Śaṅkara’s practices of negation – the Buddha’s Dharma talks in the Pāli Canon and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, as well as a significant number of other Upaniṣads – had also been largely narrated in the explicit form of a dialogue.
- This reading of the text is supported by Nāgārjuna scholars such as Jay L. Garfield (for example, 1995: 209; Garfield and Priest 2003: 11).
- For a contrary view, see Raju (1954: 703), who perceives Nāgārjuna’s and Śaṅkara’s negation (particularly, their use of four-cornered negation) as ‘a principle expressive of ultimate reality’.
- See, for instance, the debate between Stafford L. Betty (1983: 123–138, 1984: 447–450) and David Loy (1984: 437–445).
- In Śaṅkara’s case, as I will show in the second section, all metaphysical claims but one.
- However, the logical gulf separating Indian thought from Western logical traditions seems to be gradually being bridged as a result of efforts initially made by twentieth-century Western philosophers in response to logical paradoxes. Two important developments have been the emergence of paraconsistent logic, which accommodates inconsistency in a controlled way, viewing inconsistent information as potentially informative, and the subsequent modern form of dialetheism (“two-way truth”), which transcends the law of non-contradiction by maintaining that there are indeed true contradictions (Priest et al. 2022a, b).
- We know of Sañjaya only through early Buddhist literature which refers to him critically (Jayatilleke 1963: 135).
- Jayatilleke (ibid., 138) maintains that this formula was not only Sañjaya’s, but was shared by all classical Indian sceptical schools of thought.
- The Brahmajāla Sutta contains a thorough negation of sixty-two views that prevailed among recluses in the time of the Buddha.
- Or ‘eel-wrigglers’, a term which should be understood as either denoting verbal jugglery or as an analogy that likens sceptics to eels that constantly squirm about in the water and are difficult to get hold of (Jayatilleke 1963: 122).
- .Jones (2016: 13) convincingly unveils the reasoning behind the Buddha’s strategy of negation in the Vacchagotta dialogue.
- This brings us back to negation as a practice among mystics who tend to defend their experiences as ‘ineffable’. Blackwood (1963: 202–206) suggests that it is not that mystics argue that all descriptive statements are false, but rather that all descriptive statements are ‘inapplicable or inappropriate’ when it comes to their transcendent realizations. Thus, mystics simply disregard syntactic and logical rules, such as the law of non-contradiction, which are only relevant as long as one wishes to ‘make learning possible’ (ibid., 207–209).
- See also Ganeri’s (2013a: 51–53) useful point that the Buddha’s negation in the Vacchagotta dialogue was not to keep secret knowledge in his fist but to ensure that he would not impart knowledge that is unnecessary and therefore ultimately harmful. Thus, using negation he could challenge the premise of the question itself (ibid. 53).
- Nāgārjuna clearly deems the refutation of all views the centrepiece of the Buddha’s Dharma, since he concludes his work by praising Gautama Buddha for teaching the ‘true doctrine which leads to the relinquishing of all views’ (XXVII: 30).
- In this sense, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is in line with the general tendency of some forms of Indian and Buddhist debate to value reasoning and argumentation not only for their truth-preserving and truth-validating properties, but also for their ability to promote truth (Ganeri 2013a: 125).
- With the word ‘trans-logical’ I also indicate that contrary to Betty’s qualm (1984: 448), the ladder of logic is not a mere apparatus that one ought to kick out from beneath oneself after climbing up it, but a form of discriminating wisdom on which one builds.
- This is stated cautiously, since certain forms of South Asian argumentation, including four-cornered negation and Nāgārjuna’s use of it, can help Western thought to accept other forms of logic and thus to arrive at broader logical formulas.
- In the collective memory of mainstream Hinduism, Śaṅkara is honoured as a philosopher-saint whose efforts to give a coherent structure to disparate Hindu beliefs and practices have safeguarded Hinduism from the challenges posed by the rise of Buddhism (Shearer 2017: xiii). There are also substantial examples of criticism of Buddhist views in Śaṅkara’s works (e.g. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya II.2.18–32).
- Shearer (2017: xxiii) considers Śaṅkara’s employment of relentless reasoning, logic, and dialectic a part of his methodological toolkit (upāya, or useful means), which is only utilized to either defend or advance the radical cognitive insight (jñāna) which lies at the core of the Advaitin perspective of non-dualism. Thus, Shearer concludes, Śaṅkara is not a philosopher since he does not maintain a consistent conceptual position and does not believe that truth can be proven or brought about by any of these methodological tools (ibid.). This brings us back to the concept of transformative philosophers.
- Raju (1954: 704), who contrasts Śaṅkara’s negation with that of Nāgārjuna, mentions that while śūnya in Sanskrit means both the mathematical and metaphysical zero, another word employed by the Sanskrit writers to describe the mathematical zero is Pūrṇa, which means the full rather than the empty.
- Raju (1954: 709–710) effectively classifies Nāgārjuna’s conception of fourfold negation as ‘metaphysical relativism’ and Śaṅkara’s negation as ‘metaphysical absolutism and phenomenal relativism’.
- For a supportive view, see King (1957: 112–113), who concludes that Nāgārjuna’s outer scepticism is intended to serve his inner truth.
- Since Krishnamurti is not as philosophically coherent as Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara, this should be stated with reservation: while his dialogical negation generally avoids affirmative assertions about the ultimate truth, Krishnamurti’s diaries, biographies, and public discourses include numerous contradictory descriptions of the nature of the already existing reality (see Chap. 8).
- This distinction will be elaborated on in the concluding chapter.
- Nevertheless, Krishnamurti mainly abandoned this structure only in his close group discussions and one-on-one conversations. His public discourse generally retained the traditional guru–student dialogue.
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Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy.
Bilimoria, P.
Log. Univers. 11, 13–33 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-017-0161-8
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11787-017-0161-8
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Silence and Contradiction in the Jaina Saptabhaṅgī
Draft Version
Forthcoming in Journal of Indian Philosophy
Chris Rahlwes
“The Problem of ‘Negation’ in Indian Philosophy.”
Tripathi, Chhote Lal.
East and West 27, no. 1/4 (1977): 345–55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29756390.
Negation and Negative Facts in Western and Indian Logic
NS Dravid
Nagpur
The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation
The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyaya Philosophy
Bimal Krishnal Matilal
ISBN 9780674606500
Publication date: 01/01/1968
DAYA KRISHNA ON SOME INDIAN THEORIES OF NEGATION: A CRITIQUE
Sen, Prabal Kumar
Philosophy east & west, 2013-10, Vol.63 (4), p.543-561
The Splendour of Negation: R. S. Bhatnagar Revisited with a Buddhist Tinge.
Sebastian CD.
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 2020;37(3):343–60. doi: 10.1007/s40961-020-00214-6. Epub 2020 Jul 25. PMCID: PMC7382565.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7382565/
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Raju, P. T. (1954).
Review of Metaphysics 7 (4):694 – 713.
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Semantics of Nothingness: Bhartrhari’s Philosophy of Negation – I
Sthaneshwar Timalsina
sthaneshwar.timalsina@ifrc.in’
The linguistic philosophy of Bhartrhari needs to be addressed in his milieu. His speculations about the nature of language and his analysis of Sanskrit both transcend the boundaries of language and relate to metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology.
Indology | 14-12-2017
https://indiafacts.org/semantics-nothingness-bhartrharis-philosophy-negation-1/
Semantics of Nothingness: Bhartrhari’s Philosophy of Negation – II
Semantics of Nothingness: Bhartrhari’s Philosophy of Negation – II
“Indian Tradition and Negation.”
Upadhyaya, K. N.
Philosophy East and West 38, no. 3 (1988): 281–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/1398867.
ON THE CONCEPTS OF RELATION AND NEGATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
by Kalidas Bhattacharya (Author)
(Calcutta Sanskrit College research series ; no. 109)
Unknown Binding – January 1, 1977
‘Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover from it?’,
Bhushan, Nalini, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (eds),
in Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (eds), Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna (New York, 2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 27 May 2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199795550.003.0010, accessed 17 May 2024.
NAGARJUNA’S REASONING WITH NON-IMPLICATIVE NEGATIONS
SAROJ KANTA KAR
THREE ABSOLUTES AND FOUR TYPES OF NEGATION
INTEGRATING KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA’S INSIGHTS?
By Stephen Kaplan
Book
The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy
Edition 1st Edition
First Published 2023
Imprint Routledge
Pages 14
eBook ISBN 9781003153320
STUDY ON FOUR LOGICAL ALTERNATIVES (CATUṢKOṬI AND CATUṢKOṬI-VINIRMUKTA) IN INDIAN MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL
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Cyril Welch
ABHAVA : NEGATION IN LOGIC, REAL NON-EXISTENT, AND A DISTINCTIVE PRAMANA IN THE MIMAMSA
Purushottama Bilimoria PhD
2008, Logic Navya Nyaya and Applications Homage to Bimak Krishna Matilal
THINKING NEGATION IN EARLY HINDUISM AND CLASSICAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Purushottama Bilimoria PhD
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-017-0161-8
Publication Date: 2017
Publication Name: Logica Universalis
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11787-017-0161-8
NEGATION AND THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN THOUGHT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 December 2009
J. F. Staal
PART 19 – NEGATION IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA
https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/a-history-of-indian-philosophy-volume-1/d/doc209826.html
BASHAM, KOSAMBI, AND THE NEGATION OF NEGATION
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
https://www.academia.edu/11965736/Basham_Kosambi_and_the_Negation_of_Negation
Negation in Indian Philosophy
Encyclopedia
Negative facts in classical Indian philosophy
DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-F049-1
Article Summary
Like their European counterparts, the philosophers of classical India were interested in the problem of negative facts. A negative fact may be thought of, at the outset at least, as a state of affairs that corresponds to a negative statement, such as ‘Mr Smith is not in this room.’ The question that perplexed the philosophers of India was: How does someone, say Ms Jones, know that Mr Smith is not in the room? There are essentially four possible metaphysical positions to account for what it is that Ms Jones knows when, after entering a room, she comes to know that her friend is not present there. Each of the positions has been adopted and defended by certain classical Indian philosophers. On the one hand, some take the absence of the friend from the room as a brute, negative fact. Of these, some hold knowledge of this fact to be perceptual, while others hold it to be inferential. On the other hand, some hold that the absence of the friend from the room has no real ontic status at all, and believe that what there really is in the situation is just the sum of all the things present in the office. These latter philosophers hold that knowledge of one’s friend’s absence is just knowledge of what is present, though some believe the knowledge results from perception, while others believe it to result from inference. These four positions were maintained by, respectively, the Nyāya philosopher Jayanta, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara, and the Buddhist Dharmakīrti.
The Negation of Self in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
Sean M. Smith
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa
Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-india/
Nāgārjuna’s Negation.
Rahlwes, C.
J Indian Philos 50, 307–344 (2022).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-022-09505-5
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-022-09505-5
Abstract
The logical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s (c. 200 CE) catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma or four-corners) has remained a heated topic for logicians in Western academia for nearly a century. At the heart of the catuṣkoṭi, the four corners’ formalization typically appears as: A, Not A (¬A), Both (A &¬A), and Neither (¬[A∨¬A]). The pulse of the controversy is the repetition of negations (¬) in the catuṣkoṭi. Westerhoff argues that Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā uses two different negations: paryudāsa (nominal or implicative negation) and prasajya-pratiṣedha (verbal or non-implicative negation). This paper builds off Westerhoff’s account and presents some subtleties of Nāgārjuna’s use of these negations regarding their scope. This is achieved through an analysis of the Sanskrit and Tibetan Madhyamaka commentarial tradition and through a grammatical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s use of na (not) and a(n)- (non-) within a diverse variety of the catuṣkoṭi within the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.
Westerhoff, J. (2006).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 34, 367–395.
Immediate Negation.
Kreutz, A. (2021).
History and Philosophy of Logic, 42(4), 398–410. https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2021.1928851
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2021.1928851
What happened to the third and fourth lemmas in tibet?
Tillemans, T. (2015).
Journal of Buddhist Philosophy, 1, 24–38.
The uses of the four positions of the “Catuṣkoṭi” and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Ruegg, D. S. (1977).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 5(1/2), 1–71.
The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy.
Copi, Irving M. (1972).
Philosophy East and West 22 (2):221-226.
https://philarchive.org/rec/MATTND-2
Negation in Intuitionistic Logic and Navya Nyaya
BANI SENGUPTA
PUBLISHER: RADHA PUBLICATIONS, DELHI
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
EDITION: 2001
ISBN: 9788174872104
PAGES: 124
https://www.exoticindiaart.com/book/details/negation-in-intuitionistic-logic-and-navya-nyaya-uah154/
RECAPTURE, TRANSPARENCY, NEGATION AND A LOGIC FOR THE CATUSKOTI
ADRIAN KREUTZ
Comparative Philosophy Volume 10, No. 1 (2019): 67-92
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / http://www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100108
‘The Role of Negation in Nāgārjuna’s Arguments’,
Westerhoff, Jan,
Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction (New York, 2009; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 May 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375213.003.0003, accessed 17 May 2024.
https://academic.oup.com/book/9039/chapter-abstract/155552008?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Paradox and Negation in the Upanishads, Buddhism and the Advaita Vedanta of Sankaracarya (India)
Thompson, Heather. California Institute of Integral Studies
ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1982. 8400050.
Negation
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negation/
Contradiction, Negation, and the Catuṣkoṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka
Chih-chiang Hu
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09554-4
Three kinds of affirmation and two kinds of negation in Buddhist philosophy.
Kajiyama, Y. (1973).
Wiener Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Südaisiens Und Archiv Für Indische Philosophie,17, 161–174.
The Mādhyamika “Catuṣkoṭi” or Tetralemma.
Chakravarti, S. S., & Chakrabarti, S. S. (1980).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 8(3), 303–306.
The use of four-cornered negation and the denial of the law of excluded middle in Nāgārjuna’s logic.
Mohanta, D. (2010).
In A. Schumann’s (Ed.), Logic in religious discourse(pp. 44–53). Berlin: De Gruyter.
The logic of The Catuskoti.
Priest, G. (2010).
Comparative Philosophy, 1(2), 24–54.Google Scholar
None of the above: The Catuṣkoṭi in Indian Buddhist logic.
Priest, G. (2015).
In M. C. Jean-Yves Beziau, and Some Dutta (Eds.), New direction in paraconsistent logic (pp. 517–527).London: Springer.
OBJECT CONTENT AND RELATION
Publication Category Philosophers of Modern India
Publication Author Kalidas Bhattacharyya
Publication Language English
Publisher Name Das Gupta & Co.Ltd.
Publication Place Calcutta
No. of Pages 167
This book by Kalidas Bhattacharyya considers the relation between Consciousness and it’s Object. Once we ask the question “Is there anything intermediate between consciousness and object?”, we come up with the answer “Content”. Now, what is this Content and is there such an intermediate thing between Consciousness and Object? This is a question that needs to be answered. This book explores the relationship between Objects and Consciousness via the idea of Content. The book is divided into two chapters. This first chapter is on “Object and Content”. The second is on “Relation”. The first chapter deals with:
- Analysis of Thought and Memory
- Analysis of Perception: Idealism and Realism
- Analysis of Perception – Illusion as to Judgment
- Some Theories of Illusion Examined
- Content and Object as Alternatives
- Criterion of Reality
- Real and Non-Real Appearances
The second chapter deals with
- The Notion of Relation
- Classification of Relations
- The So-called Puzzles of Relation
- Relation – Is it Subjective, Objective or Dialectical?
- External and Internal Relation
- Some Theories of Relation
Two Indian dialectical logics: saptabhangi and catuskoti.
Schang, Fabien (2010).
Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (1):45-75.
https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTID-9
None of the Above: The Catuṣkoṭi in Indian Buddhist Logic.
Authors: Graham Priest
In book: New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic (pp.517-527)
January 2015
DOI:10.1007/978-81-322-2719-9_24
The uses of the four positions of the Catuskoti and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1977).
Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1-2):1-71.
Nāgārjuna’s Negation.
Rahlwes, Chris (2022).
Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (2):307-344.
A Grammarian’s View of Negation: Nāgeśa’s Paramalaghumañjūs.ā on Nañartha.
Lowe, John J. & Benson, James W. (2023).
Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):49-75.
The logic of the catuskoti.
Priest, Graham (2010).
Comparative Philosophy 1 (2):24-54.
Nāgārjuna’s Negation.
Rahlwes, Chris (2022).
Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (2):307-344.
Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.
Westerhoff, Jan (2006).
Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (4):367-395.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23497268
Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy.
Bilimoria, Purushottama (2017).
Logica Universalis 11 (1):13-33.
The uses of the four positions of the Catuskoti and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Ruegg, D.S.
J Indian Philos 5, 1–71 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00200712
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00200712
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Two Indian Dialectical Logics: saptabhangi and catuskoti
Fabien Schang
2011, Studies in Logic: Logic and Philosophy Today
https://www.academia.edu/42017816/Two_Indian_Dialectical_Logics_saptabhangi_and_catuskoti
https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTID-9
A Many-valued Modal Interpretation for Catuskoti
Liu Jingxian
A Vedic Touch To Logic In Indian Thought – Part One
SUBHASH KAK
Oct 09, 2016,
https://swarajyamag.com/culture/a-vedic-touch-to-logic-in-the-indian-thought
A Vedic Touch To Logic In Indian Thought – Part Two
Oct 09, 2016,
https://swarajyamag.com/culture/a-vedic-touch-to-logic-in-indian-thought-part-two
“Understanding Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.”
Gunaratne, R. D.
Philosophy East and West 36, no. 3 (1986): 213–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/1398772.
The Deconstructionist Interpretation of Nagarjuna’s Catuskoti∗
Shi, Ruyuan (Chien-Yuan Hsu) PhD candidate, the Dep. of Religious Studies, the University of Calgary, Canada Sessional instructor, Mount Royal University, Canada
Logic in Indian Thought
2009, Chapter In Logic in Religious Discourse, Ontos Verlag
Does a Table Have Buddha-Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But Not in Words or Signs: Reply to Siderits
Yasuo Deguchi
Kyoto University
Jay L. Garfield
Smith College, jgarfield@smith.edu
Graham Priest
University of Melbourne
Nagarjuna
IEP
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.
Priest, G . (2008).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Doxographical Appropriation of Na ̄ga ̄rjuna’s Catus.kot.i in Chinese Sanlun and Tiantai Thought
Hans Rudolf Kantor
2021
Graduate Institute of Asian Humanities, Huafan University, New Taipei City 223011, Taiwan; kantorsan@hotmail.com
Religions 12: 912. https://doi.org/10.3390/ rel12110912
Graham Priest on Buddhism and logic
by Massimo Pigliucci
CONTRADICTION AND RECURSION IN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY:
FROM CATUṢKOṬI TO KŌAN
adrian Kreutz (university of aMsterdaM)
Nāgārjuna’s Catuskoti
A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuskoti and the No-thesis View
2020, History and Philosophy of Logic (link)
The central thesis of Buddhism is emptiness, a view saying that all entities have no essence Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catuṣkoṭi and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which (a) substance is a basic categorical concept; (b) substances have svabhāva, and (c) names and sentences have svabhāva.
“The Logical Form of Catuṣkoṭi: A New Solution.”
Gunaratne, R. D.
Philosophy East and West 30, no. 2 (1980): 211–39. https://doi.org/10.2307/1398848.
The mādhyamika catuko i or tetralemma.
Chakravarti, S.S.
J Indian Philos8, 303–306 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166298
“Understanding Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.”
Gunaratne, R. D.
Philosophy East and West 36, no. 3 (1986): 213–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/1398772.
The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuskoti.
Priest, Graham (2018).
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/129/515/965/5553059
Extract
If Euthyphro and Agrippa secured places in the history of philosophy for the dilemma and trilemma, Nāgārjuna did so for the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi in Sanskrit). Even though this second-century Indian thinker did not invent the argumentative pattern in which the four alternatives of a position, its negation, both, or neither are considered, it became inextricably linked up with his philosophical approach, and Nāgārjuna (and the philosophical school of Madhyamaka he founded) plays a central role in Graham Priest’s ‘essay on Buddhist metaphysics and the catuṣkoṭi’. The book might remind readers of his landmark 2002 Beyond the Limits of Thought; even though the historical and conceptual scope in the present volume is narrower, many of the key features are still there: a chronological exposition following along with the history of philosophy, a focus on dialetheism in different manifestations, and descriptions of various formal constructions (in the present case drawn primarily from non-classical logic and graph theory) to elucidate complex and often quite obscure ideas of past masters.
Abstract
The book charts the development of Buddhist metaphysics, drawing on texts which include those of Nagarjuna and Dogen. The development is viewed through the lens of the Catuṣkoṭi At its simplest, and as it appears in the earliest texts, this is a logical/metaphysical principle which says that every claim is true, false, both, or neither; but the principle itself evolves, assuming new forms as the metaphysics develops. An important step in the evolution incorporates ineffability. Such things make no sense from the perspective of a logic which endorses the principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction, which are standard fare in Western logic. However, the book shows how one can make sense of them by applying the techniques of contemporary non-classical logic, such as those of First Degree Entailment, and plurivalent logic. An important issue that emerges as the book develops is the notion of non-duality and its transcendence. This allows many of the threads of the book to be drawn together at its end. All matters are explained, as far as possible, in a way that is accessible to those with no knowledge of Buddhist philosophy or contemporary non-classical logic.
Paraconsistent Logic
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/
Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency
Volume 18 of Outstanding Contributions to Logic
Editors Can Başkent, Thomas Macaulay Ferguson
Publisher Springer Nature, 2020
ISBN 3030253651, 9783030253653
Length 704 pages
Chains of Being: Infinite Regress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation
Author Ross P. Cameron
Publisher Oxford University Press, 2022
ISBN 0192596195, 9780192596192
Length 256 pages
A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind
Author Roy Sorensen
Publisher Oxford University Press, 2003
ISBN 0190289317, 9780190289317
Length 416 pages
What are Paradoxes?
CHRISTOPHER COWIE
Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2023
https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.48
Published online by Cambridge University Press
“The Paradox of Negation in Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy.”
Patel, Kartikeya C.
Asian Philosophy 4, no. 1 (1994): 17–32. doi:10.1080/09552369408575386.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552369408575386
In Contradiction
Author Graham Priest
Edition 2
Publisher Clarendon Press, 2006
ISBN 0191532487, 9780191532481
Length 352 pages
Dialetheism
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
One: Being an Investigation Into the Unity of Reality and of Its Parts, Including the Singular Object which is Nothingness
Author Graham Priest
Edition illustrated
Publisher OUP Oxford, 2014
ISBN 0199688257, 9780199688258
Length 252 pages
The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays.
GRAHAM PRIEST, JC BEALL, and BRADLEY ARMOUR-GARB, editors.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. ISBN 0-19-926517-8. Pp. xii + 443., Philosophia Mathematica, Volume 13, Issue 2, June 2005, Page 235, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nki019
What is a Contradiction?
Patrick Grim
Reflexivity: From Paradox to Consciousness
Authors Nicholas Rescher, Patrick Grim
Edition illustrated
Publisher Walter de Gruyter, 2013
ISBN 3110320185, 9783110320183
Length 190 pages
“Jaina Logic: A Contemporary Perspective.”
Priest, Graham.
History and Philosophy of Logic 29, no. 3 (2008): 263–78. doi:10.1080/01445340701690233.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340701690233
Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism
JONARDON GANERI
Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool
Revised 2 October 2002
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 23 (2002), 267±281
https://philarchive.org/archive/JONJLA
Jaina Philosophy
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/jaina-philosophy/
Seven-Valued Logic in Jain Philosophy
International Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 4, Issue 1, February 1964
George Bosworth Burch
Pages 68-93
https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq19644140
A History of Indian Logic (ancient, Mediæval and Modern Schools.)
Author Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
Publisher Calcutta University, 1921
Original from Princeton University
Digitized Nov 20, 2008
Length 648 pages
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.188696
History of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic, Volume 6
History of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic, Satis Chandra Vidvabhusana
Issue 1 of University studies, University of Calcutta
Author Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
Publisher Calcutta University, 1909
Original from the University of Michigan
Digitized Feb 19, 2008
Length 100 pages
Possibilities as the foundation of reasoning
P. Johnson-Laird, P. Johnson-Laird, Marco Ragni
Published in Cognition 1 December 2019
Psychology
“Saptabhaṅgī: The Jaina Theory of Sevenfold Predication: A Logical Analysis.”
Jain, Pragati.
Philosophy East and West 50, no. 3 (2000): 385–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400181.
“Anekāntavāda and Dialogic Identity Construction”
Barbato, Melanie. 2019.
Religions 10, no. 12: 642. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10120642
https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/12/642
Hindu Logic As Preserved in China and Japan
Publications of the University of Pennsylvania Series in Philosophy Series
Author Sadajiro Sugiura
Editor Edgar Singer
Publisher CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015
ISBN 1514745216, 9781514745212
Length 114 pages
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Fallacies of Inference: Some Reflections.
Kukkamalla, Bhima Kumar (2020).
Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 37 (3):403-419.
Logic in Classical Indian Philosophy
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-india/
Buddhist Logic (2 volumes)
by TH. Stcherbatsky (Author)
Publisher : Motilal Banarsidass Pub; First Edition (December 17, 2008)
Language : English
Hardcover : 1030 pages
ISBN-10 : 8120810198
ISBN-13 : 978-8120810198
Buddhist logic reveals itself as the culminating point of a long course of Indian philosophic history. Its birth, its growth and its decline run parallel with the birth, the growth and the decline of Indian civilisation. The time has come to reconsider the subject of Buddhist logic in its historical connections. This is done in these two volumes. In the copious notes the literary renderings are given where needed. This will enable the reader to fully appreciate the sometimes enormous distance which lies between the words of the Sanskrit phrasing and their philosophic meaning rendered according to our habits of thought. The notes also contain a philosophic comment of the translated texts. The first volume contains a historical sketch as well as a synthetical reconstruction of the whole edifice of the final shape of Buddhist philosophy. The second volume contains the material as well as the justification for this reconstruction.
Content:
Preface, Abbreviations, Introduction, Part I – Reality and Knowledge (pramanya-vada), Part II-The Sensible world, Ch. 1 The theory of Instantaneous being (ksanika-vada),Ch. II Causation (pratitya-samutpada), Ch. III. Sense-Perception (pratyaksam), Ch. IV – Ultimate reality (paramartha-sat), Part III-The constructed world, Ch. I-Judgment, Ch. II – Inference, Ch. III – Syllogism (pararthanumanam), Ch. IV. Logical Fallacies, Part IV – Negation, Ch. I-The negative judgment, Ch. II. – The Law of Contradiction, Ch. III-Universals, Ch. IV. Dialectic, Part V-Reality of the External World, Conclusion, Indices, Appendix, Addenda et corrigenda. Preface, Appendices, Indices, Errata
Introduction to the Non-dualism Approach in Hinduism and its Connection to Other Religions and Philosophies
Sriram Ganapathi Subramanian S2GANAPA@UWATERLOO.CA Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
Benyamin Ghojogh BGHOJOGH@UWATERLOO.CA Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
https://philarchive.org/archive/SUBITT
Self and World: Major Aspects of Indian Philosophy.
Patel, Ramesh N. (2020).
Beavercreek, OH, USA: Lok Sangrah Prakashan.
https://philpapers.org/rec/PATSAW-3
Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy
Second Revised Edition
edited by Piotr Balcerowicz
References:
1. Vidyahhusana, Satis Chandra. A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools. Calcutta University, 1921.
2. S. S. Barlingay. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic. Delhi: National Publishing House, 1965.
3. D. C. Guha. Navya Nyaya System of Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
4. Nandita Bandyopadhyay. The Concept of Logical Fallacies. Delhi: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1977.
5. B. K. Matilal. The Navya Nyaya Doctrine of Negation. Michigan: Harvard University Press, 1968.
6. S. R. Bhatt. Buddhist Epistemology. USA: Greenwood Press, 2000.
7. B. K. Matilal. Logic, Language and Reality. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008.
8. Sastri, Kuppuswami.S. A Primer of Indian Logic: According To
Annambhatta’s Tarkasamgraha. Madras: Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, 1951.
How Do Theories of Cognition and Consciousness in Ancient Indian Thought Systems Relate to Current Western Theorizing and Research?
Peter Sedlmeier1 *and Kunchapudi Srinivas2
Institut für Psychologie, Technische Universität Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany, 2 Department of Philosophy, Pondicherry
University, Puducherry, India
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4791389/
Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy
SEP
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-india/
Logic, Language, and Reality: An Introduction To Indian Philosophical Studies
by Matilal, Bimal Krishna
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.461051
Absence: An Indo-Analytic Inquiry
December 2016 Sophia 55(4)
DOI:10.1007/s11841-016-0547-8
Anand Jayprakash Vaidya
San Jose State University
Purushottama Bilimoria
University of California, Berkeley and San Francisco State University
Jayshankar L. Shaw
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305482510_Absence_An_Indo-Analytic_Inquiry
Abstract
Two of the most important contributions that Bimal Krishna Matilal made to comparative philosophy derive from his (1968) doctoral dissertation The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy and his (1986) classic: Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowing. In this essay, we aim to carry forward the work of Bimal K. Matilal by showing how ideas in classical Indian philosophy concerning absence and perception are relevant to recent debates in analytic philosophy. In particular, we focus on the recent debate in the philosophy of perception centering on the perception of absence. In her Seeing Absence, Anya Farennikova (2013) argues for the thesis that we literally see absences. Her thesis is quite novel within the contexts of the traditions that she engages: analytical philosophy of perception, phenomenology, and cognitive neuroscience. In those traditions there is hardly any exploration of the epistemology of absence. By contrast, this is not the case in classical Indian philosophy where the debate over the ontological and epistemological status of absence (abhāva) is longstanding and quite engaging. In what follows, we engage Farennikova’s arguments, and those of John-Rémy Martin and Jérome Dokic in their (2013) response to her work, through the use of classical Indian philosophers and their twentieth century proponents. Using the work of Matilal (1968, 1986), Bilimoria (2015) and Shaw (2016) we show that there are several engaging ideas that can be taken from Indian philosophy into the terrain explored by Farennikova, and Martin & Dokic. Our aim is to provide an updated comparative engagement on absence and its perception for the purposes of enhancing future discussions within analytic philosophy. However, we do not aim to merely show this by focusing on the history of primary texts or on twentieth century commentary on primary texts. Instead, we hope to show that the living tradition of Indian philosophy that Matilal embodied carries forward in his students and colleagues as they revive and extend Indian philosophy.
Negation (Abha¯va), Non-existents, and a Distinctive pramana in the Nya¯ya-Mı¯ma¯ṃsa
January 2016
DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-17873-8_12
Authors:
Purushottama Bilimoria
University of California, Berkeley and San Francisco State University
Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something? An Essay in the Comparative Metaphysic of Nonbeing
October 2019
DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-18148-2_13
In book: Considering Religions, Rights and Bioethics: For Max Charlesworth (pp.175-197)
Authors:
Purushottama Bilimoria
University of California, Berkeley
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257761935_Why_Is_There_Nothing_Rather_Than_Something
Abstract
This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral ‘zero’ (śūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., ‘In the beginning was neither non-being what nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?’ ṚgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. (This chapter is to be read in tandem with two aligned papers that have appeared since the first publication of this chapter (see above), namely, ‘Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy’ (Bilimoria 2017); and ‘Negation (Abhāva), Non-existents, and a Distinctive Pramāṇa in the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā’ (Bilimoria 2016)).
Catuṣkoṭi
Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catuṣkoṭi
Neti-Neti or Apophatic Theology: Knowledge Obtained by Negation
The Transformative Philosophical Dialogue: From Classical Dialogues to Jiddu Krishnamurti’s Method
Volume 41 of Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures
Author Shai Tubali
Publisher Springer Nature, 2023
ISBN 3031400747, 9783031400742
Length 258 pages
Logic: A Short Introduction
Collection of 6 Youtube Videos on introduction to Logic.
Graham Priest
Professor at CUNY, NYC
History of Indian Philosophy
Routledge History of World Philosophies
Editor Purushottama Bilimoria
Edition illustrated, reprint
Publisher Routledge, 2017
ISBN 1317356179, 9781317356172
Length 638 pages
Chapter 6 – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of Relation
Reality of Relation
Different types of Relation
Saṃyoga (Conjunction)
Samavāya
Viśeṣaṇatā Sambandha (Attributive Relation)
Vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandha (Non-Occurrent-Exacting Relation)
https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/essay/nyaya-vaisheshika-categories-study/d/doc1149907.html
Relations in Indian Philosophy
(Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series) (English and Sanskrit Edition) Hardcover – January 1, 1993
Sanskrit Edition by V. N. Jha (Editor)
ISBN-10 : 817030329X
ISBN-13 : 978-8170303299
Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications.
https://philpapers.org/rec/JHARII
Contributed research papers presented at the National Seminar on Relations in Indian Philosophy, held during 25th-27th March 1991 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona.
https://www.exoticindiaart.com/book/details/relations-in-indian-philosophy-old-and-rare-book-nas077/
The present volume contains 17 articles presented and discussed at the National Seminar on Relations in Indian Philosophy which was held on 25th to 27th March, 1991, at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona. The papers focusses on nature of a relation, the role played by a relation in generating a cognition, the role played by a relation in creating a precise language of philosophical and logical communication. and the philosophical implication of a relation. Any philosophical analysis requires clear idea about these aspects of a relation. The studies included here cover a very wide range of philosophical and logical literature in Sanskrit. Although the main source of information has been the literature on Pracina-Nyaya and Navya-Nyaya, some articles also have taken into account the position of relation and the problems of relation in other systems of Indian Philosophy. There are views on relation being Ontological facts and also there are views which deny the Ontological reality of a relation. The discussions in this volume in- corporate both the ranges.
Preface
The present volume contains 17 articles presented and discussed at the National Seminar on Relations in Indian Philosophy which was held on 25th to 27th March, 1991 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona.
It gives me pleasure to present these articles in the hands of scholars of Indology, Logic and Philosophy. Briefly speaking, focus has been put in these papers on the following aspects.
1. Nature of a relation.
2. The role played by a relation in generating a cognition.
3, The role played by a relation in creating a precise language of philosophical and logical communication.
4. The Philosophical implication of a relation.
Any Philosophical analysis requires clear idea about these aspects of a relation. The studies included here cover a very wide range of philosophical and logical literature in Sanskrit. Although the main source of information has been the literature on Pracina Nyaya and Navya-Nyaya, some articles also have taken into account the position of relation and the problems of relation in other systems of Indian Philosophy. As can be seen, there are views on relations being Ontological facts and also there are views which deny the Ontological reality of a relation. The discussions in this volume incorporate both the ranges.
The Navya-Nyaya system of Indian Logic started paying more attention to the problem of relation because it was the necessity of the time. There was a great need for evolving a precise language of communication for logical and philosophical discussions. The Indian logicians realised that this cannot be achieved without introducing the idea of delimitations through property and relations and this is why they had to pay more attention to the discussion on relations. I wish that the readers will read this volume with the perspective presented above.
I thank the Indian Books Centre, New Delhi for undertaking the publication of this volume. I am sure, the scholars in the field will highly appreciate this venture.
The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy
N S Dravid
Nagpur
Problem of Relations in Indian Philosophy
Author Sarita Gupta
Publisher Eastern Book Linkers, 1984
Original from the University of Michigan
Digitized Jun 8, 2006
Length 111 pages
Quantum Entanglement and the Philosophy of Relations – Jaina Perspective
- By Prof Sisir Roy
- August 2017
Causation In Indian Philosophy
Apu Sutradhar
Guest Lecturer, Department of Philosophy,
A.B.N Seal College, Cooch Behar, W.B, India.
IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 23, Issue 9, Ver. 3 (September. 2018) 35-39
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
http://www.iosrjournals.org
Causation, Indian theories of
Perrett, Roy W.
DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-F055-1
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/causation-indian-theories-of/v-1
Article Summary
Causation was acknowledged as one of the central problems in Indian philosophy. The classical Indian philosophers’ concern with the problem basically arose from two sources: first, the cosmogonic speculations of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, with their search for some simple unitary cause for the origin of this complex universe; and second, the Vedic concern with ritual action (karman) and the causal mechanisms by which such actions bring about their unseen, but purportedly cosmic, effects. Once the goal of liberation (mokṣa) came to be accepted as the highest value, these two strands of thought entwined to generate intense interest in the notion of causation. The systematic philosophers of the classical and medieval periods criticized and defended competing theories of causation. These theories were motivated partly by a desire to guarantee the efficacy of action and hence the possibility of attaining liberation, partly by a desire to understand the nature of the world and hence how to negotiate our way in it so as to attain liberation.
Indian philosophers extensively discussed a number of issues relating to causation, including the nature of the causal relation, the definitions of cause and effect, and classifications of kinds of causes. Typically they stressed the importance of the material cause, rather than (as in Western philosophy) the efficient cause. In India only the Cārvāka materialists denied causation or took it to be subjective. This is unsurprising given that a concern with demonstrating the possibility of liberation motivated the theories of causation, for only the Cārvākas denied this possibility. The orthodox Hindu philosophers and the heterodox Buddhists and Jainas all accepted both the possibility of liberation and the reality of causation, though they differed sharply (and polemically) about the details.
The Indian theories of causation are traditionally classified by reference to the question of whether the effect is a mode of the cause. According to this taxonomy there are two principal theories of causation. One is the identity theory (satkāryavāda), which holds that the effect is identical with the cause, a manifestation of what is potential in the cause. This is the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view, though that school’s particular version of it is sometimes called transformation theory (pariṇāmavāda). Advaita Vedānta holds an appearance theory (vivartavāda), which is often considered a variant of the identity theory. According to the appearance theory effects are mere appearances of the underlying reality, Brahman. Since only Brahman truly exists, this theory is also sometimes called satkāraṇavāda (the theory that the cause is real but the effect is not).
The other principal theory of causation is the nonidentity theory (asatkāryavāda), which denies that the effect pre-exists in its cause and claims instead that the effect is an altogether new entity. Both adherents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists are usually classified as nonidentity theorists, but they differ on many important details. One of these is whether the cause continues to exist after the appearance of the effect: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claims it does, the Buddhists mostly claim it does not.
Finally, some philosophers try to take the middle ground and claim that an effect is both identical and nonidentical with its cause. This is the position of the Jainas and of some theistic schools of Vedānta.
“ANĀDITVA OR BEGINNINGLESSNESS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.”
Tola, Fernando, and Carmen Dragonetti.
Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 61, no. 1/4 (1980): 1–20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41691856.
Six Systems of Indian Philosophy
By Sanjeev Nayyar
https://www.esamskriti.com/e/Spirituality/Philosophy/Six-Systems-Of-Indian-Philosophy-1.aspx
Theory of Error and Nyāya Philosophy: A Conceptual Analysis
Gobinda Bhattacharjee
PhD Research Scholar,
Department of Philosophy,
Tripura University, Suryamaninagar – 799022, Tripura, INDIA
2021 IJRAR September 2021, Volume 8, Issue 3
http://www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
https://philarchive.org/archive/BHATOE
A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy
Author Beni Madhab Barua
Publisher University of Calcutta, 1921
Original from Princeton University
Digitized Oct 9, 2008
Length 444 pages
Indian Philosophy Volume 1
Volume 1 of Indian Philosophy
Author Jadunath Sinha
Publisher Motilal Banarsidass, 2016
ISBN 8120836510, 9788120836518
Length 944 pages
Indian Philosophy Volume 2
Volume 2 of Indian Philosophy
Author Jadunath Sinha
Publisher Motilal Banarsidass, 2016
ISBN 8120836529, 9788120836525
Length 762 pages
Indian Philosophy Volume 3
Volume 3 of Indian Philosophy
Author Jadunath Sinha
Publisher Motilal Banarsidass, 2016
ISBN 8120836537, 9788120836532
Length 487 pages
Viewpoints which Matter 