“Know thyself,” advised the oracle at Delphi. “Show thyself,” is the motto of today. The prevalence of selfies, sexting, Facebook pics and stories, tweets and Twitters, and new apps, all demonstrate the transition from a personal and private self to a public, even pubic, self.
This cult of the self may have emerged remotely from Delphi and Socrates but accelerated in the late 19th and 20th centuries with many philosophers, psychologists, and social psychologists, some of whom are mentioned here. These are now left behind by activists and the identity politics of gender, sexual orientation, gender orientation, and color. The front-page news in The New York Times recently (22 May) was the latest battle in the culture wars: bathrooms! We can fight about anything! — and everything, and we do.
Who are you? What are you? What is your self? Most people, in my limited research on this topic, tend to identify in three principal ways: their familial roles, or their occupational roles or the defining characteristics of their personality (warm, strong, a survivor, romantic, adventurer, nurturing were common responses). (Thomas Kuhn’s Twenty Statements Test is more scientific.) And if you really don’t know who and what you are, the are plenty of personality tests to tell you, and perhaps some frenemies to explain precisely what is wrong with you.
Some adopt a more existential vision. One respondent identified herself as “a butterfly” and as “a river. I have to keep moving or I’d die.” Active, but hopefully not all downhill. Performers are particularly demonstrative on the self. The Beatles: “I am the walrus” (A very strange self-concept, drawn from Lewis Carroll. “I am the emu” sounds much better). Michael Jackson: “I’m a lover, not a fighter.” Paul Simon: “I am a rock. I am an island.” (John Donne disagreed: “No man is an island.”) And Nietzsche: “I am… the Anti-Christ.” (1992:72.)
All sorts of different self-definitions and identities. All sorts of different people and types of people. What is also fascinating is how many people have tried to define this self, without too much agreement. It is elusive not least because it is constantly changing as we age, and enjoy or suffer different experiences: marriage, parenthood, promotion, job-change, sickness, disability, conversion, discrimination, lotto-winner, etc. Indeed the self is so mobile that Peg O’Connor described the self as a “unicorn” — “there is no authentic self. Identity is always a work in progress” (2014:50). One does have an identity, but it is fluid. You are not going to France or Indonesia in your gap year to “find yourself.” You are taking your self with you! Others believe it is a chameleon, for similar reasons. So this search for this unicorn-chameleon, albeit brief, looks useful, even fun.
1. Sigmund Freud: Self as Iceberg.
Influenced by Charcot’s work on hypnotism and especially post-hypnotic suggestion, Freud came to understand that there are two types of mental processes, conscious and unconscious. And the unconscious is not easily accessed, but it is possible in therapy through dreams (in The Interpretation of Dreams) and the analysis of symbolism, and through parapraxes (in The Psycho-Pathology of Everyday Life), which we now know as Freudian slips (verbal slips, slips of the pen or of the body, mislaying, misreading, forgetting, and errors generally). He gives numerous examples of these giveaways. These parapraxes are thought of as expressions of repressed psychic material. Also conversion: how psychic concerns can affect the physical self: a union, or communion, of mind and body. One friend said that whenever her husband was unfaithful, she got sick. They say that 90% of an iceberg is underwater. Freud suggested that much of the self is below consciousness, and that it was important to bring it to the conscious. Perhaps how much is below varies with degrees of repression.
Freud theorized the self far beyond the iceberg/unconscious to include the stages of psychosexual development (oral, anal, and phallic) and the stages of id, ego, and super-ego to include the many mechanisms of adaptation including fixation, regression, projection, repression, displacement, sublimation, transference, resistance (defense mechanisms), and more. While some of his contributions to self-understanding and to psychiatry have been contested, others have led to his being labeled among the top 10 intellectuals of the 20th century by Time magazine.
2. William James: Self as Multiple.
“A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.” But social selves may be contradictory, depending on the individuals. Your spouse will not have the same view of you as your ex-spouse. I think we can agree on that. And co-workers will not have the same image of him or her as the children do. But that is their concept of you, not your image of your self. So James does imply the possibility of contradictory, conflicting and multiple selves in the minds of others. Walt Whitman expressed this well: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well, then I contradict myself. / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)” As did American best-selling novelist Karin Slaughter. Here the protagonist, a rookie cop, debates shooting a villain:
The fifth Kate reared her ugly head. This Kate wanted darkness…Then the other Kates took over. She wasn’t sure which ones. The daughter? The widow? The cop? The whore? The real Kate, she wanted to think…The real Kate was a good person (2014:392).
So that makes six Kates in one; a double trinity, multiple personalities, and even conflicted and contradictory. Some of these images may be negative. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903) W.E.B. Du Bois pondered the question: “How does it feel to be a problem?” He explained that “being a problem is a strange experience – peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in boyhood and in Europe.” He added, “I remember well when the shadow swept across me. “ When as a “little thing” in school, a girl refused to accept his play visiting card. “Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others…shut out from their world by a vast veil.” Self as problem to self, and to others who create the problem.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. “One ever feels his two-ness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (ch. 1).
3. C.H. Cooley: Self as Looking-Glass
His couplet:
Each to each a looking-glass,
Reflects the other that doth pass.
The couplet reflects not only how poetic sociologists may be (don’t you love the “doth?”), but also their insight. Our idea of our selves is deeply influenced by what other people think of us or, strictly, what we think other people think of us. (True, the looking-glass is a flawed metaphor since it does not judge, unlike people.) This is especially true for our primary groups of intimate personal relations, the families of birth and our closest friendships. Significant others mirror us back to our selves, ranging from invective (crooked Hillary, crazy Bernie) to labelling (he’s a sexist, racist, fascist) to positive reinforcement (you’re the best) and high self-esteem to narcissism (I’m the best!). But there are many mirrors, all with different reflections, so figuring out who or what the self is would be tricky; indeed this self too would be multiple and contradictory.
Cooley perhaps under-estimated the degree to which we can refuse to internalize and can resist these looking-glass reflections which may problematize us, as Du Bois made clear. Distorting mirrors reflect us, badly. And much as mirrors may influence us, they do not determine us. One can fight back, resist the reflection, smash the mirror, as Frederick Douglass showed. Reflecting on his victory over an overseer when he was a slave, Douglass wrote: “The battle with Mr. Covey… was the turning point in my “life as a slave.”… I was a changed being after that fight. I was nothing before — I was a man now” (1962:143). A new self. Dramatic identity change.
4. G. H. Mead: Self as Structure
“The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience” (1967: 140). Mead reflects both James and Cooley, but perhaps goes beyond them in his emphasis that the self is not only a reflection but is essentially a product, and reflexive. One can think about other people’s ideas about oneself, and react against them, like Douglass, (the boomerang effect,) or double-down and reinforce them, (the self-fulfilling prophecy). Yet Mead distinguishes between the core, the “me”, as object, developed out of past experiences and understandings, and the “I,” the sometimes impulsive subject, generating new ideas and new selves. So the self is both both solid and fluid.
5. Abraham Maslow: Self as Flower
Maslow is well known for moving psychology away from Freud to Humanistic Psychology: “It is as if Freud supplied us with the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half.” (Not a very generous verdict!) He is also well-known for his “hierarchy of needs” which should be satisfied for optimal psychic health. The self in this view is like a flower, potentially growing into full bloom. The seven needs are: 1) physiological: warmth, food, etc. for the baby; 2) safety needs; 3) psychological needs: love, belonging; 4) esteem needs: self-satisfaction; 5) cognitive needs: education, skills; 6) aesthetic needs: harmony, order; 7) self-actualization: maturity, joy, creativity. The process is not automatic, like an elevator, but it can be linked to changes in the life cycle as discussed by Eric Erikson, Daniel Levinson, George Vaillant, and Gail Sheehy.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre: Self as Self-Creative
“Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.” (1957:15). Rejecting any traditional, essentialist idea of human nature, Sartre adds: “In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom” (p.23). To clarify: “You are nothing less than your life” (p.33) combining all your projects, actions, and choices. We are who and what we make our selves to be. We create our selves. If we persistently cheat, we become cheats. The meaning of our lives is the meaning we give it. Again: “Man makes himself” (p.43). There is a choice of ethics, and a freedom to choose, whether we want it or not. Hence his idea that “man is condemned to be free” (p.23). He insists that “life has no meaning a priori. Before you come alive, life is nothing; it’s up to you to give it a meaning…” (p.43). The self, in his view, is not an iceberg, nor a passive reflection, nor a flower that may grow; it is what we make it. But it is somewhat atomistic.
Two dissenting opinions are worth noting. Schopenhauer insists on luck as the prevailing wind. That would include the luck of parents, genetics, country of birth, status, war, plague, etc.: pure chance, no freedom there.
A man’s life is like the voyage of a ship, where luck…acts the part of the wind, and speeds the vessel on its way or drives it far out of its course. All that a man can do for himself is of little avail; like the rudder, which if worked hard and continuously, may help in the navigation of the ship; and yet all may be lost again by a sudden squall (n.d.:169)
He was a bit of a pessimist: “We are like lambs in a field, disporting ourselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey.” (n.d. 382)
The second opinion, of a physicist, is also deterministic, not luck but neurons, but less pessimistic:
We have 100 billion neurons in our brains, as many as there are stars in a galaxy, with an even more astronomical number of links and potential combinations through which they can interact… “We” are the process formed by this entire intricacy, not just by the little bit of it of which we are conscious (in Lapham, 2016:17).
7. Self as Onion
We might think of others, or ourselves, as like onions, layer upon layer, level upon level, or as a many-sided diamond, or like those Russian dolls, the matryoshka, one inside another, inside another. Someone might say: “I’ve never seen this side of you before!” (self as polygon). The novelist Dick Francis described this layering:
I was amazed by his compassion and felt I should have recognised earlier how many unexpected layers there were to Tremayne below the loud executive exterior: not just his love of horses, not just his need to be recorded, not even his disguised delight in Gareth [his son], but other, secret, unrevealed privacies…(1990:50).
But the funniest has to be Shrek. Ogres are like onions, not layer-cakes.
This model is indicated by the phrase “hidden depths” (wherein monsters may lurk) and reflects the notion that one may not really know someone, just the Goffmanesque presentations of the different selves acting in different roles and circumstances, which may be camouflage and masks. But the better one gets to know someone under very different circumstances, the more clearly one can see different selves emerging — or not. The self may be remarkably opaque, not only to the self, as Freud indicated, but also to others.
Two classic examples are Kim Philby and Bernie Madoff. They were not who they seemed to be. Shakespeare got it, as Julius Caesar mused: “One may smile and smile and be a villain.” And as Lady Macbeth instructed her husband: “Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under it.” It took years before investigators “uncovered” who Philby and Madoff were — and their double lives, double selves. “Uncovering” indicates the utility of this onion/layer metaphor.
In a less lethal application, spouses may take years to realize (and hopefully appreciate more and more) who and what their beloved “really” is. (Not as in the comic phrase: “deep down you’re shallow”). Onions do not have cores as dates and avocados do, so the metaphor is somewhat inadequate, but it does capture the layering.
Winston Churchill expressed this well speaking of Russia: “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” (Much like their nesting dolls.) Banyan in the Economist just applied exactly the same phrase to China (2 July 2016:36). The journalist Kim Barker wrote something similar about India: “India was a series of challenges wrapped up in a mystical blanket covered in an existential quandary” (2016:82-3). It seems that we do not know each other very well.
8. Self as Identity
Our self-concept is our identity, but identities are socially constructed according to cultural norms, which are not universal. Consider Barack Obama, widely described as the first black President of the USA, in accord with American norms, specifically in the tradition of the “one-drop” rule. But his mother was white. In accord with another possible rule, “one drop of white blood,” he would be considered white. He is really a shade of brown, anyway, and would be described as such in many other cultures, more sensitive to shades of color.
James McBride offers a classic example. His father was black, his mother white. He remarks about his 11 siblings: “We were all clearly black, of various shades of brown, some light brown, some medium brown, some very light-skinned, and all of us had curly hair” (1997:22). The usual confusion of chromatic and social color. The terms “black” and “white” are symbolic, cultural, and political. Malcolm X noted: “…when he says he’s white, he means he’s boss. That’s right. That’s what white means in this language.” (1966:163).
Then again, Rachel Dolezal exemplifies the issue of who defines us. The daughter of white parents, she identified as black, darkened her hair and her skin and passed as black for years, and worked for the NAACP; but when her parentage became known, her self-defined identity was largely rejected by others as a lie and a fraud. She defended herself insisting that her identity was not biological, but presumably political or psychological. Color identity is seemingly problematic.
Consider too how gender identities have suddenly been spotlighted, most publicly by Caitlin Jenner. We used to recognize two genders, biologically defined and immutable; now we recognize that they are psychologically defined and are mutable. India, however, recognizes three on visa applications. Other cultures also recognize three. As do some individuals who refuse to be labeled male or female. If even such apparently basic identities as color and gender are culturally constructed, not to mention age, beauty, and more, then so, clearly, are ideas of the self. Identity is slippery.
9 & 10. Self as Unicorn and Chameleon
In sum, the self is both unicorn and chameleon. From the fog or flashlight brilliance of identity, theorists we might conclude that the self is a unicorn since it is partly unknown, even unknowable because it is so below consciousness and “in progress”; and a chameleon because it is multiple, mutable, adaptable, and selective in presentation. These selves may be complementary, contradictory, or conflicted.
So while the self is constantly presented to numerous “friends,” it is itself both one and many: unicorn and chameleon, iceberg and onion, a mask and camouflage, a flower and what you create, a looking-glass and a distorting mirror, fluid, a work in progress, a polygon with hidden depths and many layers. Given all these ideas and models, I suspect that there are not many selves who are an “open book.” If nothing else, the self and other selves are: “Surprise!” “Know thyself” is hard enough. Know someone else… really?
Yet surely all this fixation with the self is a trifle unhealthy — me! me! me! — since it may vitiate against community, and concern with and for others: a cultural narcissism.
References
Barker, Kim 2016. Whiskey, Tango, Foxtrot. New York: Anchor.
Douglass, Frederick. 1962 [1892]. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass. London: Collier-Macmillan.
Du Bois, W.E.B. 1995 [1903]. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Signet.
Francis, Dick 1990. Long Shot. London: Michael Joseph.
Lapham, Lewis H. 2016 “Dame Fortune” Lapham’s Quarterly Summer 13-19.
McBride, James 1997. The Color of Water. A Black Man’s Tribute to his White Mother. New York: Riverhead Books.
Mead, G.H. 1967 [1934]. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich 1992 [1888]. Ecce Homo. Penguin Classics.
O’Connor, Peg 2014. “Searching for the Self, and Other Unicorns.” Psychology Today Nov/Dec 50-1.
Sartre, J-P. 1957. Existentialism and Human Emotions. New York: The Wisdom Library.
Schopenhauer, Arthur n.d. Essays. New York: Burt.
Slaughter, Karin 2014. Cop Town. New York: Delacorte.
X, Malcolm 1966. Malcolm X Speaks. New York: Grove Press.
Theories of Individual Social Development
Source: Ch 5: Theories of Individual Social Development
Freud’s Theory of the Id, Ego & Superego
Jean Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development
Carol Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development
George Herbert Mead: The Self, ”Me” & ”I”
Erikson’s Stages of Psychosocial Development: Theory & Examples
Freud’s Structure of Personality
Let’s talk about the id, the ego and the superego, the three parts of the structure of personality and a theory that was developed by Sigmund Freud. He’s probably someone you’ve heard of; he’s a pretty famous psychologist from the late 19th early 20th centuries. While his theory of personalities is outdated, it was monumental in influencing how we think about personality today.
When you think of Freud, you might think about going into therapy and lying down on a couch, telling your therapist about your problems. But if someone goes into therapy today, the therapist isn’t going to say ‘Oh, of course! Aha! It’s the id, the ego and the superego. They’re just not talking to each other right. Nevertheless, these three personality parts have entered the mainstream understanding of how we think about internal conflict.
Let’s think about an average person who’s pushed and pulled in lots of directions by different drives, like sex and food, but also ethics and a wish to maintain a healthy body. These drives are pushing them and pulling them in different directions, and maybe they’re not even aware.
This is the idea of internal conflict. It’s the conflict between basic desires (the id), morality and being a good person (the superego) and consciousness (the ego.)
The Id
So first let’s start with the id. This is an unconscious part of your personality. It is basically the childish and impulsive part of you that just does what it wants, and it wants things really intensely and doesn’t really think about the consequences. Freud describes this as operating on a pleasure principle, which essentially means what it sounds like, which is that it’s always seeking to try to increase pleasure and decrease pain.
Now, as an example of this, let’s say you come home and you find to your delight that your roommate has baked a cake. Your id would think ‘Oh! I want that cake right now! That looks delicious!’ You know your roommate’s not going to be happy if you eat it, so first, you eat a little piece of the corner, and then you have to cut yourself a slice so it doesn’t look disgusting, and then soon enough you’ve eaten the whole thing; it’s gone.
How did you manage to eat the whole cake? Blame your id for taking over. That’s what your id aims to do in life. It wants you to eat whole cakes because it wants you to increase pleasure. Cakes are going to make you feel good – why not eat the whole thing? Now, what it also wants to do is decrease pain. So let’s say you wake up the next morning and you think, ‘Oh no, I just ate a whole cake. That’s really bad, maybe I’ll get some exercise.’ You think to yourself about how you will go hiking in the mountains all day, and you tell yourself, ‘Alright, let’s get some exercise!’ No, your id says, ‘That’s not gonna happen; that’s gonna hurt. We don’t want to do that.’ So if you’re totally id driven, you’d basically eat the whole cake and then you would not go hiking the next day to burn off the calories. That’s the pleasure principle.
The Superego
Now, we usually don’t eat whole cakes and lay on the couch all day every day. What helps to control the rampaging id? There is another part of your personality that’s mainly unconscious, and it’s the superego. The superego is the part of you that’s super judgmental and moralizing and is always trying to get you to behave in a socially appropriate way. Now let’s see what the superego would do if you come home and you find the cake.
If the superego is in charge, you wouldn’t eat the cake at all. You’d still think it looks delicious and want to eat it, but the superego would say, ‘No, it’s my roommate’s cake. I’m not gonna eat this cake!’ Remember, the superego wants you to behave morally and appropriately, and it’s not that socially appropriate to eat other people’s baked goods.
But, let’s imagine that your id takes over, so you do eat the cake. The same thing happens: you eat a little bit, you eat a little bit more, and somehow you end up eating it all. But now your superego jumps back into action. What happens now that you already ate the cake? Guilt is what’s going to happen. Your superego makes you feel really guilty when you do things that are not socially appropriate.
What do you do now? If your superego is in control again, you would certainly go jogging, but you would also apologize to your roommate and bake them a new cake, maybe an even better one than before. The superego controls our sense of right and wrong. We feel bad when we do things that are wrong, and we feel good when we do things that are right, and that’s what the superego controls.
Piaget’s Stages of Cognitive Development
Introduction
Mark, a two-year-old, and Ally, an eight-year-old, are sitting at the table waiting for a snack. Their mom presents them each with a cup of juice, the same amount in each cup. Mark begins to cry and point, saying ‘You gave her more.’ Mark’s mom tries to reason with the young child, explaining that the same amount of juice is in each cup, but he is insistent that he is being treated unfairly. What is happening in this situation? In this lesson, we will learn about the stages of cognitive development while watching Mark proceed through infancy to adolescence.
Jean Piaget proposed stages of cognitive development through which children and adolescents proceed based on maturation and experience. They are: sensorimotor stage, preoperational stage, concrete operations and formal operations.
Sensorimotor Intelligence and Preoperational Thinking
The first two sequential stages deal with the cognitive development of infants and young children. They are sensorimotor intelligence and preoperational (prelogical) intelligence.
The sensorimotor intelligence stage occurs from birth to approximately 1-2 years. In the child’s first year, the processes of intelligence are both presymbolic and preverbal. For the infant, the meaning of an object involves what can be done with it. These actions include pushing, opening, pulling, closing and so forth. In the second year of life, the young child develops the identity of his or her own body and others in time and space. The infant develops action schemes, such as reaching for an object or grasping something or pulling it towards them. At this stage of development, Mark can pull a string to reach the object at the end of it. He can pull a blanket to get an out-of-reach toy and so on. Another example is Mark putting objects into his mouth to determine the shape and structure. This is something that many infants and young toddlers do.
Our next stage is preoperational thinking. This occurs from around 2-3 years to approximately 7 years of age. Partially logical thinking or thought begins during these years. For example, the child recognizes that water poured from one container to another is the same water. However, the child reasons only from one specific item of information to another and makes decisions based on perceptual cues. Preoperational thinking can and usually is illogical. For example, Mark, based on his perceptions, thought that the taller, slender glass had more juice in it than the shorter, wider glass that he received. In other words, perceptual cues, such as the height of the juice in the glass, dominate the child’s judgment. Also, children in this stage have difficulty accepting another person’s perspective or point of view. Piaget referred to this as egocentrism.
Concrete Operational and Formal Operational Thinking
The basic units of logical thinking are particular kinds of cognitive activity that Piaget referred to as operations. The two levels of logical thinking identified by Piaget are concrete operational and formal operational thinking.
The concrete operational stage occurs from around 7-8 years of age to 12-14 or older. Concrete operational thinking is linked to the direct manipulation of objects. It involves situations that require an understanding of simultaneous changes in multiple characteristics of objects. An example is flattening a ball of clay into a hot dog shape – as the shape becomes longer, it also becomes thinner.
The child at the level of concrete operational thinking can demonstrate the following:
A transformation in one feature or characteristic of a situation is exactly balanced by a transformation in another characteristic.
The essential nature of the object or data remains consistent.
The transformation in the object can be returned to the original form by an opposite or inverse action.
Let’s discuss these more specifically and put some terms in. The capability of recognizing the unchanging characteristic of an object is referred to as conservation. The child can demonstrate conservation by returning the object to its original form or organization. For example, Mark has a ball of clay. It’s first in a ball shape. He can flatten it out. He understands now that the same amount of clay exists whether it’s in the ball form or the flat form. This is conservation.
Moral Decision
At some point in your life, you’ve probably been faced with a moral dilemma. Consider this example: a father tells his daughter, Lauren, that she can have a bike if she saves enough money from her weekly allowance to pay for half of it. Finally, when Lauren tells her father she’s saved up all the money, her father gives her the other half and tells her to buy her bike. Lauren goes to the store to buy her bike and sees the one she’s been saving up for is on sale, so she will have money left over. She deliberates if she should return the extra money to her father or keep it and not tell him. They both kept their end of the agreement, so the extra money is a bonus surprise, but if she doesn’t tell him, it feels like she’s deceiving him.
Lawrence Kohlberg: Stages of Moral Development
Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was especially interested in how children develop their ability to make moral decisions like this one. He came up with several stages of moral development, which, though not without criticism from other psychologists, form a good starting point to think about these questions. It is important to remember that not everyone, even adults, necessarily make it into all of the higher stages.
Pre-Conventional Level
People first pass through two stages known collectively as the pre-conventional level. In the first stage, people are motivated by trying to avoid punishment; their actions are bad if they get punished and good if they don’t. In this stage, Lauren would give her father the money because she doesn’t want him to punish her.
At the second stage, people are motivated purely by self-interest. Lauren at this stage would likely keep the money, thinking that, even if she has the bike, she can’t use it unless she can buy a helmet.
Conventional Level
The next level of moral development, the conventional, also contains two stages. Adolescents typically operate at this level, as do some adults. In stage three, people make moral decisions based on getting people to like them. Lauren might decide to give her father the money because this will improve her relationship with him; but if her mother is upset that her father spent money they needed for bills, she might decide to give the money to her mother in order to be a ‘good girl’ in her eyes. Her decision would be based on whichever social relationship seemed most important.
In stage four, moral reasoning centers around maintaining a functioning society by recognizing that laws are more important than individual needs. In this stage, Lauren probably would give her father the extra money because not doing so, in her eyes, equates to stealing from her family.
Carol Gilligan: Moral Development
A community of moles gives shelter to a homeless porcupine. The moles, however, are constantly stabbed by the porcupine’s quills. What should they do?
This scenario was used to aid in the development of a theory that argued women and men may have differing paths to moral development. This lesson will introduce and apply that theory, developed by Carol Gilligan.
The field of moral development encompasses prosocial behavior, such as altruism, caring and helping, along with traits such as honesty, fairness, and respect. Many theories of moral development have been proposed, but this lesson will focus on the specific theory proposed by Psychologist Carol Gilligan.
Gilligan was a student of Developmental Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who introduced the theory of stages of moral development. Gilligan, however, felt as though her mentor’s theory did not adequately address the gender differences of moral development due to the fact that participants in Kohlberg’s study were predominately male and because his theory did not include the caring perspective.
Gilligan argued that males and females are often socialized differently, and females are more apt than males to stress interpersonal relationships and take responsibility for the well-being of others. Gilligan suggested this difference is due to the child’s relationship with the mother and that females are traditionally taught a moral perspective that focuses on community and caring about personal relationships.
Care-Based Morality & Justice-Based Morality
Gilligan proposed the Stages of the Ethics of Care theory, which addresses what makes actions ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Gilligan’s theory focused on both care-based morality and justice-based morality.
Care-based morality is based on the following principles:
Emphasizes interconnectedness and universality.
Acting justly means avoiding violence and helping those in need.
Care-based morality is thought to be more common in girls because of their connections to their mothers.
Because girls remain connected to their mothers, they are less inclined to worry about issues of fairness.
Justice-based morality is based on the following principles:
Views the world as being composed of autonomous individuals who interact with another.
Acting justly means avoiding inequality.
Is thought to be more common in boys because of their need to differentiate between themselves and their mothers.
Because they are separated from their mothers, boys become more concerned with the concept of inequality.
Returning to our mole/porcupine scenario, researchers found individuals approached the problem with two perspectives: justice-based morality or care-based morality. Gender differences were also evident.
Individuals with a justice-based perspective tend to see any dilemma as a conflict between different claims. The moles want one thing; the porcupine wants something incompatible. They can’t both have a valid claim on the burrow, so only one of them can be right. A solution to the dilemma is not a resolution of the conflict; it’s a verdict, in which one side gets everything and the other side gets nothing.
The care-based perspective approaches the problem differently. Rather than seeing all the parties as separate individuals with their own valid or invalid claims, it sees them as already in a difficult situation together. If there is a conflict between them, that is part of the problem. The point is not to decide the conflict one way or the other but to find a way to get around it or remove it. This perspective starts from the particular case and the actual people within it and hopes to find a solution that will not damage anyone. It will be ready to embrace compromise and creative solutions.
Researchers have found a tendency for males to adopt the justice perspective and for females to be more likely than males to adopt the caring perspective.
Stages of Ethics of Care
George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Self
In sociological conceptions of the Self, the development of the Self is examined in the context of social phenomena like socialization. George Herbert Mead, an American sociologist, pioneered an essential theory in sociology. The mentality is viewed by George Herbert Mead’s theory as an individual’s incorporation of the collective. Mead used a social process to describe the person and the mind. A person’s body takes in gestures and the collective sentiments of others and responds accordingly with other structured mindsets that are also absorbed by the human organism.
Mead’s theory of self refers to this as the “I” and the “me” phase. The “I” is the answer to the “me,” which is the interpersonal Self. Put another way, “I” is a person’s reaction to other people’s emotions, whereas “me” is the ordered set of those perceptions that one acquires. How one assumes one’s organization sees oneself is what one refers to as the “me,” which is the total of the “generalized other“. The “I” stands for a person’s feelings and instincts. Self-as-subject and self-as-object are synonymous in the “I.” The “I” is the one who knows, and the “me” is the one who is being understood. “I” and “me” are constantly interacting, and this interaction is what we refer to as the “stream of thought.” The human cognition concept is based on these processes, which go beyond the idea of selfhood in a restricted sense. Mead sees the internal debate between “I” and “me” as the thinking process.
Mead’s “I” and “me,” when viewed as a synthesis of the “I” and the “me,” reveal a profoundly social nature. In Mead’s view, a person’s place in a community is more important than individuality. Being aware of one’s self-consciousness can only come about when one has actively participated in various social roles.
According to Mead and Charles Cooley, the Self is determined by people’s social interactions. How one appears to others determines one’s social identity, or looking-glass self (a term coined by Cooley). In other words, the stage is attached to the concept of developing self. Cooley’s assertions about the social development of children formed the basis of this initial theory. People get the most direct feedback about themselves from the responses of others to their actions. This idea means that solitary activities cannot contribute to the development of the Self as it requires external interactions.
As per Cooley and Mead, self-identity is formed in three phases. First, people perceive how they look in the eyes of others. Additionally, individuals imagine how others judge them by relying on looks and how they display themselves. Finally, individuals perceive how others feel about them due to the moral judgments they create.
However, Heinz Kohut, a psychologist from the United States, proposed a bipolar self, which he claimed was composed of two processes of narcissistic brilliance, one of which contained goals and the other constituted ideals. The narcissistic Self, according to Kohut, seems to be the pinnacle of aspiration. He referred to the idealized parental image as the pole of standards. According to Kohut, the two poles of Self portray the regular advancement of a child’s psychic life.
On the other hand, according to Jungian theory, the Self is one of several archetypes. It’s a metaphor for a person’s entire mind, including their subconscious and conscious thoughts, defined by Jung as the procedure of combining one’s personality that leads to the Self.
What is the Role of Self in the Socialization Process?
In both Cooley and Mead’s view, a person’s identity is formed through self-socialization. For anyone to develop a precise self-image, self-socialization provides an opportunity to reflect and contend with themselves.
Developing an image of oneself predicated on how one thinks or appears to others is known as the “looking-glass self”. Through one’s reactions to a behavior, other people serve as a reflector, referring to others the image they project. In Mead’s view, the first step is to see oneself as others do.
Sociological theories of Self attempt to describe how social processes like socialization impact the growth of the Self. It is common to use the concept of “self-concept” to describe how an individual views, assesses and interprets their own identity. To have a notion of oneself is to be self-aware.
Mead believed that the Self is formed through the child’s interactions with those around them. The newborn child’s needs, including clothes and food, are pressing and must be met. The mother meets these needs, and the baby develops a strong emotional attachment to her and grows to rely heavily on her.
According to Mead’s theory, as the child grows older, they separate from their mother and must learn to submit to the mother’s authority over them. The child then repeats this for their dad. They distinguish the father from the mother before assimilating him into society. In this sense, the child’s number of significant others grows, and the child integrates the role of such others in their development. Using his own words, the child responds to them and behaves according to what they mean to the other individual.
Mead’s Theory of Self: Development of Self
Mead held the notion that humans form their self-images via connections with others. He contended that the Self results from society’s experience, which would be the part of a person’s personality that includes self-awareness or self-image. Mead laid out three concepts on how one’s Self grows:
Language
Symbols are exchanged in social interactions. According to Mead, language and other symbolic representations are uniquely human in how they carry sense. Therefore, the best way to understand others is to imagine the scenario from their point of view first. He formulated the term “taking the other’s role” to describe the way people perceive themselves concerning others. When children are in this phase, they begin to mimic their surroundings. Because of this, parents usually avoid using foul language in front of their children.
Play
At this stage, children assume and break the rules of structured games such as sports or freeze tag. Playing along with whatever rules they create throughout the game will be much more convenient than enforcing guidelines on them. Here, children pretend that they are the ones they love. As a result, they attempt to be their mothers and fathers when they role-play.
Forming Psychological Identities / Erik Erikson
What are Erikson’s stages of development? Learn about Erikson life stages, psychosocial development theory, and the history and contributions to the theory.
How do we develop an identity, or a sense of self? Psychologists have many theories. One, named Erik Erikson, believed that we work on constructing psychosocial identities throughout our whole lives. By ‘psychosocial,’ he meant an interplay between our inner, emotional lives (psycho), and our outer, social circumstances (social).
Erikson believed that as we grow and age, we pass through eight stages of development. He thought that each stage was defined by a specific conflict between a pair of opposing impulses or behaviors. The resolution (or inability to resolve) these conflicts affects our personalities and identities.
Erikson defines four childhood stages and three adult stages, bridged together by one stage of adolescence. We’ll go through each stage and define it by its central conflict, as well we give some examples of behaviors and patterns of thinking characteristic of the stage.
Oral-Sensory Stage
The first is the oral-sensory stage, encompassing the first year of life and defined by a conflict between trust and mistrust. Infants during this time learn to trust their parents if they’re reliably cared for and fed; if not, if they’re neglected or abused, they’ll develop mistrust instead. Infants at this stage either learn that they can trust others to fulfill their needs, or that they can’t, that the world is a dangerous and unreliable place.
Muscular-Anal Stage
The second stage is called muscular-anal and defined by the conflict between autonomy and shame and doubt. Parents who allow their toddlers, between the ages of about 1-3, to explore their surroundings and develop interests of their own help to foster a sense of autonomy. But parents who are too restrictive or cautious with their children can instead leave them with doubt about their abilities. Like learning mistrust instead of trust, this can have longstanding consequences.
Locomotor Stage
A related conflict between initiative and guilt defines the next stage, the locomotor stage. Children in this stage, between the ages of three and six, need to develop initiative, or independent decision-making, about planning and doing various activities. If they are not encouraged to do this, or if their efforts are dismissed, they may learn to feel guilt instead about their desire for independence.
Latency
The last childhood stage is called latency and is defined by a conflict between industry and inferiority. Children in this stage are between the ages of six and twelve, and during this time are starting to gain real adult skills like reading, writing and logic. If they’re encouraged, they’ll develop industry, or motivation to keep learning and practicing; they’ll start to want to be productive instead of just wanting to play. Children who aren’t encouraged to work hard at learning new skills will instead feel inferior and unmotivated.
Adolescence
Variations on the self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
Source: A pattern theory of self
My Related Posts
You can search for these posts using Search Posts feature in the right sidebar.
Geometry of Consciousness
From Individual to Collective Intentionality
Individual Self, Relational Self, and Collective Self
Individual, Relational, and Collective Reflexivity
Semiotic Self and Dialogic Self
Dialogs and Dialectics
Narrative Psychology: Language, Meaning, and Self
Levels of Human Psychological Development in Integral Spiral Dynamics
The Great Chain of Being
Cyber-Semiotics: Why Information is not enough
Truth, Beauty, and Goodness: Integral Theory of Ken Wilber
Self and Other: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity
Summary: Carol Dweck and others have Identified two implicit theories of intelligence. Those learners who have an “entity” theory view intelligence as being an unchangeable, fixed internal characteristic. Those who have an “incremental” theory believe that their intelligence is malleable and can be increased through effort.
Originators: Carol Dweck, based on over 30 years of research on belief systems, and their role in motivation and achievement.
Key Terms: entity theory, incremental theory
Self-Theories (Dweck)
Carol Dweck (currently at Indiana University) describes a series of empirically-based studies that investigate how people develop beliefs about themselves (i.e., self-theories) and how these self-theories create their psychological worlds, shaping thoughts, feelings and behaviors[1]. The theories reveal why some students are motivated to work harder, and why others fall into patterns of helplessness and are self-defeating. Dweck’s conclusions explore the implications for the concept of self-esteem, suggesting a rethinking of its role in motivation, and the conditions that foster it. She demonstrated empirically that students who hold an entity theory of intelligence are less likely to attempt challenging tasks and are at risk for academic underachievement[1][2].
Students carry two types of views on ability/intelligence:
Entity View – This view (those who are called “Entity theorists”) treats intelligence as fixed and stable. These students have a high desire to prove themselves to others; to be seen as smart and avoid looking unintelligent.
Incremental View – This view treats intelligence as malleable, fluid, and changeable. These students see satisfaction coming from the process of learning and often see opportunities to get better. They do not focus on what the outcome will say about them, but what they can attain from taking part in the venture.
Entity theorists are susceptible to learned helplessness because they may feel that circumstances are outside their control (i.e. there’s nothing that could have been done to make things better), thus they may give up easily. As a result, they may simply avoid situations or activities that they perceive to be challenging (perhaps through procrastination, absenteeism, etc.). Alternatively, they may purposely choose extremely difficult tasks so that they have an excuse for failure. Ultimately, they may stop trying altogether. Because success (or failure) is often linked to what is perceived as a fixed amount of intelligence rather than effort (e.g., the belief that “I did poorly because I’m not a smart person”), students may think that failure implies a natural lack of intelligence. Dweck found that students with a long history of success may be the most vulnerable for developing learned helplessness because they may buy into the entity view of intelligence more readily than those with less frequent success[1].
Those with an incremental view (“Incremental theorists”) when faced with failure, react differently: these students desire to master challenges, and therefore adopt a mastery-oriented pattern. They immediately began to consider various ways that they could approach the task differently, and they increase their efforts. Unlike Entity theorists, Incremental theorists believe that effort, through increased learning and strategy development, will actually increase their intelligence.
Carol Dweck’s book: Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. Dweck explains how to achieve success — and how approaching problems with a fixed vs. growth mindset makes a big difference. Praising intelligence and ability doesn’t foster self-esteem and lead to accomplishment, but may actually jeopardize success. This book is an excllent read for helping people motivate their children and reach one’s one personal and professional goals.
References
Dweck, C. S. (2000). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and development. Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. (2006). Mindset: The new psychology of success. Random House.
The Oxford Handbook of the Self is an interdisciplinary collection of articles that address questions across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience. Research on the topic of self has increased significantly in recent years in all of these areas. In philosophy and some areas of cognitive science, the emphasis on embodied cognition has fostered a renewed interest in rethinking personal identity, mind-body dualism, and overly Cartesian conceptions of self. Poststructuralist deconstructions of traditional metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity have led to debates about whether there are any grounds (moral if not metaphysical) for reconstructing the notion of self. Questions about whether selves actually exist or have an illusory status have been raised from perspectives as diverse as neuroscience, Buddhism, and narrative theory. With respect to self-agency, similar questions arise in experimental psychology. In addition, advances in developmental psychology have pushed to the forefront questions about the ontogenetic origin of self-experience, while studies of psychopathology suggest that concepts like self and agency are central to explaining important aspects of pathological experience. These and other issues motivate questions about how we understand, not only the self, but also how we understand ourselves in social and cultural contexts.
This article examines the historical conception of the words self and person in philosophical theory. It discusses John Locke’s definition of the self as the conscious thinking thing and the person as a thinking intelligent being. It describes the Platonist view of the self as spiritual substance and Aristotelian belief that the self is a hylomorphic substance. It also explores the relevant topics of Epicureanism atomism, Cartesian dualism, and the developmental and social origin of self-concepts.
“A Contrast of Individualistic and Social Theories of the Self”,
George Herbert Mead.
Section 29 in Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Edited by Charles W. Morris). Chicago: University of Chicago (1934): 222-226 .
Understand the difference between psychological and sociological theories of self-development
Explain the process of moral development
When we are born, we have a genetic makeup and biological traits. However, who we are as human beings develops through social interaction. Many scholars, both in the fields of psychology and in sociology, have described the process of self-development as a precursor to understanding how that “self” becomes socialized.
Psychological Perspectives on Self-Development
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was one of the most influential modern scientists to put forth a theory about how people develop a sense of self. He believed that personality and sexual development were closely linked, and he divided the maturation process into psychosexual stages: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital. He posited that people’s self-development is closely linked to early stages of development, like breastfeeding, toilet training, and sexual awareness (Freud 1905).
According to Freud, failure to properly engage in or disengage from a specific stage results in emotional and psychological consequences throughout adulthood. An adult with an oral fixation may indulge in overeating or binge drinking. An anal fixation may produce a neat freak (hence the term “anal retentive”), while a person stuck in the phallic stage may be promiscuous or emotionally immature. Although no solid empirical evidence supports Freud’s theory, his ideas continue to contribute to the work of scholars in a variety of disciplines.
Sociology or Psychology: What’s the Difference?
You might be wondering: if sociologists and psychologists are both interested in people and their behavior, how are these two disciplines different? What do they agree on, and where do their ideas diverge? The answers are complicated, but the distinction is important to scholars in both fields.
As a general difference, we might say that while both disciplines are interested in human behavior, psychologists are focused on how the mind influences that behavior, while sociologists study the role of society in shaping behavior. Psychologists are interested in people’s mental development and how their minds process their world. Sociologists are more likely to focus on how different aspects of society contribute to an individual’s relationship with his world. Another way to think of the difference is that psychologists tend to look inward (mental health, emotional processes), while sociologists tend to look outward (social institutions, cultural norms, interactions with others) to understand human behavior.
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the first to make this distinction in research, when he attributed differences in suicide rates among people to social causes (religious differences) rather than to psychological causes (like their mental wellbeing) (Durkheim 1897). Today, we see this same distinction. For example, a sociologist studying how a couple gets to the point of their first kiss on a date might focus her research on cultural norms for dating, social patterns of sexual activity over time, or how this process is different for seniors than for teens. A psychologist would more likely be interested in the person’s earliest sexual awareness or the mental processing of sexual desire.
Sometimes sociologists and psychologists have collaborated to increase knowledge. In recent decades, however, their fields have become more clearly separated as sociologists increasingly focus on large societal issues and patterns, while psychologists remain honed in on the human mind. Both disciplines make valuable contributions through different approaches that provide us with different types of useful insights.
Psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) created a theory of personality development based, in part, on the work of Freud. However, Erikson believed the personality continued to change over time and was never truly finished. His theory includes eight stages of development, beginning with birth and ending with death. According to Erikson, people move through these stages throughout their lives. In contrast to Freud’s focus on psychosexual stages and basic human urges, Erikson’s view of self-development gave credit to more social aspects, like the way we negotiate between our own base desires and what is socially accepted (Erikson 1982).
Jean Piaget (1896–1980) was a psychologist who specialized in child development who focused specifically on the role of social interactions in their development. He recognized that the development of self evolved through a negotiation between the world as it exists in one’s mind and the world that exists as it is experienced socially (Piaget 1954). All three of these thinkers have contributed to our modern understanding of self-development.
Sociological Theories of Self-Development
One of the pioneering contributors to sociological perspectives was Charles Cooley (1864–1929). He asserted that people’s self understanding is constructed, in part, by their perception of how others view them—a process termed “the looking glass self” (Cooley 1902).
Later, George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) studied the self, a person’s distinct identity that is developed through social interaction. In order to engage in this process of “self,” an individual has to be able to view him or herself through the eyes of others. That’s not an ability that we are born with (Mead 1934). Through socialization we learn to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes and look at the world through their perspective. This assists us in becoming self-aware, as we look at ourselves from the perspective of the “other.” The case of Danielle, for example, illustrates what happens when social interaction is absent from early experience: Danielle had no ability to see herself as others would see her. From Mead’s point of view, she had no “self.”
How do we go from being newborns to being humans with “selves?” Mead believed that there is a specific path of development that all people go through. During the preparatory stage, children are only capable of imitation: they have no ability to imagine how others see things. They copy the actions of people with whom they regularly interact, such as their caregivers. This is followed by the play stage, during which children begin to take on the role that one other person might have. Thus, children might try on a parent’s point of view by acting out “grownup” behavior, like playing “dress up” and acting out the “mom” role, or talking on a toy telephone the way they see their father do.
During the game stage, children learn to consider several roles at the same time and how those roles interact with each other. They learn to understand interactions involving different people with a variety of purposes. For example, a child at this stage is likely to be aware of the different responsibilities of people in a restaurant who together make for a smooth dining experience (someone seats you, another takes your order, someone else cooks the food, while yet another clears away dirty dishes).
Finally, children develop, understand, and learn the idea of the generalized other, the common behavioral expectations of general society. By this stage of development, an individual is able to imagine how he or she is viewed by one or many others—and thus, from a sociological perspective, to have a “self” (Mead 1934; Mead 1964).
Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development
Moral development is an important part of the socialization process. The term refers to the way people learn what society considered to be “good” and “bad,” which is important for a smoothly functioning society. Moral development prevents people from acting on unchecked urges, instead considering what is right for society and good for others. Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) was interested in how people learn to decide what is right and what is wrong. To understand this topic, he developed a theory of moral development that includes three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional.
In the preconventional stage, young children, who lack a higher level of cognitive ability, experience the world around them only through their senses. It isn’t until the teen years that the conventional theory develops, when youngsters become increasingly aware of others’ feelings and take those into consideration when determining what’s “good” and “bad.” The final stage, called postconventional, is when people begin to think of morality in abstract terms, such as Americans believing that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. At this stage, people also recognize that legality and morality do not always match up evenly (Kohlberg 1981). When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out in 2011 to protest government corruption, they were using postconventional morality. They understood that although their government was legal, it was not morally correct.
Gilligan’s Theory of Moral Development and Gender
Another sociologist, Carol Gilligan (1936–), recognized that Kohlberg’s theory might show gender bias since his research was only conducted on male subjects. Would females study subjects have responded differently? Would a female social scientist notice different patterns when analyzing the research? To answer the first question, she set out to study differences between how boys and girls developed morality. Gilligan’s research suggested that boys and girls do have different understandings of morality. Boys appeared to have a justice perspective, by placing emphasis on rules and laws. Girls, on the other hand, seem to have a care and responsibility perspective; they consider people’s reasons behind behavior that seems morally wrong.
While Gilligan is correct that Kohlberg’s research should have included both male and female subjects, her study has been scientifically discredited due to its small sample size. The results Gilligan noted in this study also have not been replicated by subsequent researchers. The differences Gilligan observed were not an issue of the development of morality, but an issue of socialization. Differences in behavior between males and females is the result of gender socialization that teaches boys and girls societal norms and behaviors expected of them based on their sex (see “What a Pretty Little Lady”).
Gilligan also recognized that Kohlberg’s theory rested on the assumption that the justice perspective was the right, or better, perspective. Gilligan, in contrast, theorized that neither perspective was “better”: the two norms of justice served different purposes. Ultimately, she explained that boys are socialized for a work environment where rules make operations run smoothly, while girls are socialized for a home environment where flexibility allows for harmony in caretaking and nurturing (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1990).
What a Pretty Little Lady!
“What a cute dress!” “I like the ribbons in your hair.” “Wow, you look so pretty today.”
According to Lisa Bloom, author of Think: Straight Talk for Women to Stay Smart in a Dumbed Down World, most of us use pleasantries like these when we first meet little girls. “So what?” you might ask.
Bloom asserts that we are too focused on the appearance of young girls, and as a result, our society is socializing them to believe that how they look is of vital importance. And Bloom may be on to something. How often do you tell a little boy how attractive his outfit is, how nice looking his shoes are, or how handsome he looks today? To support her assertions, Bloom cites, as one example, that about 50 percent of girls ages three to six worry about being fat (Bloom 2011). We’re talking about kindergarteners who are concerned about their body image. Sociologists are acutely interested in of this type of gender socialization, by which societal expectations of how boys and girls should be—how they should behave, what toys and colors they should like, and how important their attire is—are reinforced.
One solution to this type of gender socialization is being experimented with at the Egalia preschool in Sweden, where children develop in a genderless environment. All the children at Egalia are referred to with neutral terms like “friend” instead of “he” or “she.” Play areas and toys are consciously set up to eliminate any reinforcement of gender expectations (Haney 2011). Egalia strives to eliminate all societal gender norms from these children’s preschool world.
Extreme? Perhaps. So what is the middle ground? Bloom suggests that we start with simple steps: when introduced to a young girl, ask about her favorite book or what she likes. In short, engage with her mind … not her outward appearance (Bloom 2011).
Summary
Psychological theories of self-development have been broadened by sociologists who explicitly study the role of society and social interaction in self-development. Charles Cooley and George Mead both contributed significantly to the sociological understanding of the development of self. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan developed their ideas further and researched how our sense of morality develops. Gilligan added the dimension of gender differences to Kohlberg’s theory.
Section Quiz
Socialization, as a sociological term, describes:
how people interact during social situations
how people learn societal norms, beliefs, and values
a person’s internal mental state when in a group setting
the difference between introverts and extroverts
Answer
B
The Harlows’ study on rhesus monkeys showed that:
rhesus monkeys raised by other primate species are poorly socialized
monkeys can be adequately socialized by imitating humans
food is more important than social comfort
social comfort is more important than food
Answer
D
What occurs in Lawrence Kohlberg’s conventional level?
Children develop the ability to have abstract thoughts.
Morality is developed by pain and pleasure.
Children begin to consider what society considers moral and immoral.
Parental beliefs have no influence on children’s morality.
Answer
C
What did Carol Gilligan believe earlier researchers into morality had overlooked?
The justice perspective
Sympathetic reactions to moral situations
The perspective of females
How social environment affects how morality develops
Answer
C
What is one way to distinguish between psychology and sociology?
Psychology focuses on the mind, while sociology focuses on society.
Psychologists are interested in mental health, while sociologists are interested in societal functions.
Psychologists look inward to understand behavior while sociologists look outward.
All of the above
Answer
D
How did nearly complete isolation as a child affect Danielle’s verbal abilities?
She could not communicate at all.
She never learned words, but she did learn signs.
She could not understand much, but she could use gestures.
She could understand and use basic language like “yes” and “no.”
Answer
A
Short Answer
Think of a current issue or pattern that a sociologist might study. What types of questions would the sociologist ask, and what research methods might he employ? Now consider the questions and methods a psychologist might use to study the same issue. Comment on their different approaches.
Explain why it’s important to conduct research using both male and female participants. What sociological topics might show gender differences? Provide some examples to illustrate your ideas.
Further Research
Lawrence Kohlberg was most famous for his research using moral dilemmas. He presented dilemmas to boys and asked them how they would judge the situations. Visit http://openstax.org/l/Dilemma to read about Kohlberg’s most famous moral dilemma, known as the Heinz dilemma.
References
Cooley, Charles Horton. 1902. “The Looking Glass Self.” Pp. 179–185 in Human Nature and Social Order. New York: Scribner’s.
This dissertation is about the concept of self, specifically I seek to answer the question of what constitutes the self. To deal conceptually and theoretically with the concept of self is to consider what the nature of self is, how the self develops, and under what conditions. I explore the dialectical relationship between self and society at three levels, the complexity of social structure and its influence upon the formation of the self, the relationship between the self and the “generalized other,” and the relationship between the “I” and the “me.” The goal of the dissertation is a synthesis of theories of self which includes both a micro and a macro perspective. The model of self is based on Markus and Katayama’s (1994) Enculturation Model, modified extensively to include macro components. The model has four levels, moving from the social structure to the individual: collective reality, socio-psychological processes, local worlds, and habitual psychological tendencies. Part one and part two review symbolic interactionist theorists and structural Marxist theorists, respectively. Part three elaborates the model of self by plugging into the four levels each theorist, where appropriate. Marx’s base/superstructure conceptualization of social structure, Althusser’s materialist dialectic, and Mead’s conceptualization of mind are used to deal with collective reality. Althusser’s concept of “interpellation” is used to link the core ideologies associated with collective reality to socio-psychological practices occurring in the institutions of social structure. Stryker’s identity theory is used to connect social structure to the interaction networks in the local world, out of which individuals construct and identity and self. Lastly, all the theorists are brought together and their theories synthesized in the section dealing with habitual psychological tendencies.
How people define themselves in relation to others greatly influences how they think, feel, and behave, and is ultimately related to the construct of identity. Self-development is a continuous process throughout the lifespan; one’s sense of self may change, at least somewhat, throughout one’s life. Self-representation has important implications for socio-emotional functioning throughout the lifespan.
Philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910) was one of the first to postulate a theory of the self in The Principles of Psychology. James described two aspects of the self that he termed the “I Self” and “Me Self.” The I Self reflects what people see or perceive themselves doing in the physical world (e.g., recognizing that one is walking, eating, writing), whereas the Me Self is a more subjective and psychological phenomenon, referring to individuals’reflections about themselves (e.g. characterizing oneself as athletic, smart, cooperative). Other terms such as self-view, self-image, self-schema, and self-concept are also used to describe the self-referent thoughts characteristic of the Me Self. James further distinguished three components of the Me Self. These include: (1) the material self (e.g., tangible objects or possessions we collect for ourselves); (2) the social self (e.g., how we interact and portray ourselves within different groups, situations, or persons); and (3) the spiritual self (e.g., internal dispositions).
In the late twentieth century, researchers began to argue that the self is a cognitive and social construction. Cognitive perspectives suggest that one’s self-representation affects how one thinks about and gives meaning to experiences. Like James, psychologist Ulric Neisser distinguished between one’s self-representation connected to directly perceived experiences and that resulting from reflection on one’s experiences. The “ecological self,”connections of oneself to experiences in the physical environment, and the “interpersonal self,” connections of oneself to others through verbal or nonverbal communication, comprise direct perception of experience. Neisser proposed that these two types of self-representation develop early in infancy. Regarding reflections on one’s experiences, Neisser identified three types of self-representation that emerge in later infancy and childhood with cognitive and social maturation. The temporally “extended self”is based on memories of one’s past experiences and expectations for the future. The “private self”emerges with the understanding that one’s experiences are not directly perceived by others, but rather must be communicated to be shared. The “conceptual self,” one’s overarching theory or schema about oneself based on one’s reflection on experiences within social and cultural context, parallels terms such as self-concept and self-schema. In a 1977 article, psychologist Hazel Markus showed that one’s self-representation or self-schema guides information processing and influences one’s behavior.
As psychologist Roy Baumeister pointed out in Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self, because self-representation develops through one’s experience of the world, cultural and social factors are important in who we are and what we think about ourselves. Philosopher George Herbert Mead (in Mind, Self, and Society ) postulated that acquisition of self-representation emerges from socialization practices. Mead argued that individuals are socialized to adopt the values, standards, and norms of society through their ability to perceive what others and society would like them to be. Psychologists Tory Higgins, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman further suggested that self-representation includes ideas about who we are (actual self), who we potentially could be (ideal self), and who we should be (ought self), both from one’s own perspective and from one’s perception of valued others’ perspectives. Discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal self or ought self may result in depression or anxiety, respectively.
Attachment theory likewise demonstrates how the self is socially constructed and, in turn, affects how people evaluate themselves (i.e., their self-esteem). Thus, relationships with others play an important role in people’s self-representation and self-esteem. Psychologist John Bowlby focused on caregiver-child relationships. Securely attached children feel safe in the environment and are able to actively explore their surroundings. Through experiencing secure attachment to a consistent caregiver, children develop a belief that they are good and worthy of love. This forms the basis of self-esteem. In contrast, an insecure attachment, in which the child does not feel confident in the caregiver’s protection, may result in feeling unworthy of love, anxious and distressed, and relatively low self-esteem.
The beginnings of self-representation emerge early in infancy, with the recognition that one is a separate physical being from others. Self-representation development continues throughout adulthood. Because self-representation involves social and cognitive constructions, changes in self-representation occur with individuals’ cognitive and social development. Psychologist Susan Harter has conducted highly influential research on the developmental course of self-representation. Excerpts from Harter’s summary of self-representation development from early childhood through adolescence (Harter, 1988) are presented in the Table 1.
In addition to cognitive and social maturation, changes in one’s social context may be equally important influences on self-representation. For example, Susan Cross (in “Self-construals, Coping, and Stress in Cross-cultural Adaptation”) notes that cultural values influence self-development. As an individual moves from one cultural context (e.g., Eastern culture) to another (e.g., Western culture), changes in self-representation may emerge. Individuals can learn to adopt a self-representation that embraces multiple cultures.
SEE ALSOAttachment Theory; Bowlby, John; Child Development; Developmental Psychology; James, William; Mead, George Herbert; Mental Health;Psychology; Self-Awareness Theory; Self-Consciousness, Private vs. Public; Self-Guides; Self-Perception Theory; Self-Schemata; Social Psychology; Stages of Development
Table 1
Early childhood
Middle childhood
Adolescence
Content
specific examples of observable physical characteristics, behaviors, preferences, etc.
trait labels, focusing on abilities, interpersonal characteristics, and emotional attributes
abstractions about the self involving psychological constructs, focusing on different relationships and roles
Organization
little coherence, due to inability to logically organize single self-descriptors
logically organized, integrated within domains that are differentiated from one another
ability to construct a formal theory of the self in which all attributes across and within role domains are integrated and should be internally consistent
Stability over time
not stable over time
recognition of and interest in continuity of self-attributes over time
Intrapsychic conflict and confusion over contradictions and instability within the self, concern with creation of an integrated identity
Basis
fantasies and wishes dominate descriptions of behaviors and abilities
use of social comparison due to ability to simultaneously observe and evaluate the self in relation to others
intense focus on the opinions that significant others hold about the self, especially peers and close friends
Baumeister, Roy F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bowlby, John. 1969. Attachment and Loss. New York: Basic Books.
Cross, Susan. 1995. Self-construals, Coping, and Stress in Cross-cultural Adaptation. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26 (6): 673–697.
Harter, Susan. 1988. Developmental Processes in the Construction of the Self. In Integrative Processes and Socialization: Early to Middle Childhood, eds. Thomas D. Yawkey and James E. Johnson, 45–78. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Harter, Susan. 1999. The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective. New York: Guilford.
Higgins, Tory, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strauman. 1985. Self-concept Discrepancy Theory: A Psychological Model for Distinguishing Among Different Aspects of Depression and Anxiety. Social Cognition 3: 51–76.
James, William. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt.
Kanagawa, Chie, Susan Cross, and Hazel Rose Markus. 2001. Who Am I?: The Cultural Psychology of the Conceptual Self. Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin 27 (1): 90–103.
Markus, Hazel. 1977. Self-schemata and Processing Information about the Self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (2): 63–78.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Neisser, Ulric. 1988. Five Kinds of Self Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1): 35–59.
The popularity of such books as Frank McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes, Mary Karr’s The Liars’ Club, and Kathryn Harrison’s controversial The Kiss, has led columnists to call ours “the age of memoir.” And while some critics have derided the explosion of memoir as exhibitionistic and self-aggrandizing, literary theorists are now beginning to look seriously at this profusion of autobiographical literature. Informed by literary, scientific, and experiential concerns, How Our Lives Become Stories enhances knowledge of the complex forces that shape identity, and confronts the equally complex problems that arise when we write about who we think we are.
Using life writings as examples—including works by Christa Wolf, Art Spiegelman, Oliver Sacks, Henry Louis Gates, Melanie Thernstrom, and Philip Roth—Paul John Eakin draws on the latest research in neurology, cognitive science, memory studies, developmental psychology, and related fields to rethink the very nature of self-representation. After showing how the experience of living in one’s body shapes one’s identity, he explores relational and narrative modes of being, emphasizing social sources of identity, and demonstrating that the self and the story of the self are constantly evolving in relation to others. Eakin concludes by engaging the ethical issues raised by the conflict between the authorial impulse to life writing and a traditional, privacy-based ethics that such writings often violate.
Author / Editor information
Eakin Paul John :
Paul John Eakin is Ruth N. Halls Professor Emeritus of English at Indiana University. He is the author of How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves; The New England Girl: Cultural Ideals in Hawthorne, Stowe, Howells, and James; Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention; and Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography. He is the editor of The Ethics of Life Writing, also from Cornell; On Autobiography by Philippe Lejeune, and American Autobiography: Retrospect and Prospect.
Reviews
“In How Our Lives Become Stories, Paul John Eakin explains why he prefers ‘to think of self less as an entity and more as a kind of awareness in process.’… Eakin makes the ethics of reading integral to his project…. Eakin attends to those who are repelled by the ‘urge to confess’ and he talks about telling all as a cultural imperative that may, for example, be costly to the families of memoirists despite the therapeutic value such confessions might have. The ethics of privacy, the fact of relational lives, and the moral strictures that shadow autobiographical tellings bring Eakin to ask, ‘What is right and fair?’.”
“In this intriguing book, Paul John Eakin problematizes the notion of autobiography as ‘the story of the self’ and argues that in the act of narration one is engaged in a process of making a self…. How Our Lives Become Stories is a concise and engaging synopsis of the state of the art for anyone interested in the subject.”
Nancy K. Miller, author of Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs of a Parent’s Death:
“Paul John Eakin has accomplished here what many preach and few practice: a genuinely cross- disciplinary study. How Our Lives Become Stories is a fascinating account of the creation of an autobiographical self seen from the multiple vantage points of literature, philosophy, neurology, and psychology. Eakin shows the infinitely complex ways in which we become and remember who we are in our bodies and our brains. Equally important in this pioneering study is Eakin’s penetrating analysis of how as a culture we negotiate the changing boundaries of private and public life. How Our Lives Become Stories offers a subtle and intelligent guide to the ethical dilemmas of disclosure and confession, memory and narrative, that pervade contemporary American life. A book for our times.”
“This fascinating new book… offers an engaging introduction to identity and narrative…. This is a well-written, timely, and progressive book—a surprisingly rare mix.”
H. Porter Abbott, University of California, Santa Barbara:
“Paul John Eakin has always been a few steps ahead of the rest of us. Now, with How Our Lives Become Stories, he has contributed another indispensable reassessment of the field of autobiography, this time keyed to the disturbingly fluid sense of the self that has emerged from recent research throughout the cognitive sciences.”
Susanna Egan, University of British Columbia:
“Rethinking what he calls ‘registers of self and self-experience,’ Paul John Eakin once again offers new and necessary work in autobiography studies. A most accessible and engaging book, How Our Lives Become Stories draws on recent scholarship in neurology, cognitive sciences, memory studies, developmental psychology, cultural narratives, and ethics in order to demonstrate that ‘there are many stories of self to tell, and more than one self to tell them.’.”
“When we write about our lives, the complex work of constructing the story is intertwined with all that constitutes the process of identity formation. In this book, Eakin expertly guides us through the thorny terrain of research in neurology, developmental psychology, and memory theory and revisits philosophy and literary theory. By the end of the journey, we have a far richer understanding of how individuals construct their lives and how they tell the story of that construction, as well as a sense of the dynamic interplay between the two processes.”
The reflexive self and culture: a critique
Matthew Adams
Identity in Question
edited by Anthony Elliott, Paul du Gay
Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic
edited by Yoshihisa Kashima, Margaret Foddy, Michael Platow
Narrative Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity.
This paper aims to provide an overview of a narrative psychological approach towards the study of self and identity. The narrative psychological approach can be classified as broadly social constructionist insofar as it attempts to examine the cultural structuration of individual experience. However, building on recent criticism of certain social constructionist approaches (such as discourse analysis), it is argued that these approaches tend to lose touch with the phenomenological and experiential realities of everyday, practical life. Accordingly, they overplay the disorderly, chaotic, variable and flux-like nature of self-experience. Drawing on recent research on traumatizing experiences such as living with serious illness, this paper argues that the disruption and fragmentation manifest in such experiences serves as a useful means of highlighting the sense of unity, meaning and coherence (the `narrative configuration’) more commonly experienced on an everyday level. Moreover, when disorder and incoherence prevail, as in the case of trauma, narratives are used to rebuild the individual’s shattered sense of identity and meaning.
Self and social identity.
Brewer, M. B., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (2004).
Blackwell Publishing.
Handbook of Dialogical Self Theory
edited by Hubert J. M. Hermans, Thorsten Gieser
Subjectivity: Theories of the self from Freud to Haraway
What am I referring to when I say ‘I’? This little word is so easy to use in daily life, yet it has become the focus of intense theoretical debate. Where does my sense of self come from? Does it arise spontaneously or is it created by the media or society? Do I really know myself?
This concern with the self, with our subjectivity, is now our main point of reference in Western societies. How has it come to be so important? What are the different ways in which we can approach subjectivity?
Nick Mansfield explores how our understanding of our subjectivity has developed over the past century. He looks at the work of key modern and postmodern theorists, including Freud, Foucault, Nietzsche, Lacan, Kristeva, Deleuze and Guattari, and he shows how subjectivity is central to debates in contemporary culture, including gender, sexuality, ethnicity, postmodernism and technology.
I am who? No topic is more crucial to contemporary cultural theory than subjectivity, and Nick Mansfield has written what has long been lacking-a lucid, smart introduction to work in the field.
Professor Simon During, University of Melbourne
Effortlessly and with humour, passion and panache, Mansfield offers the reader a telling, trenchantly articulate d account of the complex enigma of the self, without resorting to reductively simple critical cliches.This book, in its graceful movements between disciplines, ideas, and areas of interest, deserves to become a benchmark for all such student introductions for some time to come.
Julian Wolfreys, University of Florida
Nick Mansfield is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University. He is co-author of Cultural Studies and the New Humanities (Oxford 1997) and author of Masochism: The art of power (Praeger 1997).
Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self
Nathan N. Cheeka § and Jonathan M. Cheekb aDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA; bDepartment of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA
Self and Identity · July 2018 DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2017.1412347
The broad concept of the self is fundamental to psychology, serving as an anchor by which we perceive and make sense of the world as well as how we relate to and think about others. This book develops creative points of view of the self which have not previously been reviewed, creating a web of interconnected concepts under the umbrella of the self.
The various contributions to this book discuss these concepts, such as self-regulation, self-concept, self-esteem, self-awareness, social comparison, and self-reference. All of them are related to the self, and all would justify a review of their own, yet none of them have up to this point. As a whole, the book develops these new, creative points of view of the self—the integral (primary) component of our experience as social beings.
Offering numerous perspectives on various aspects of the self which can foster new thinking and research, this timely and important book makes suggestions for future research that will spur additional lines of work by readers. This book was originally published as a special issue of Self and Identity.
Bower, M., and Gallagher, S. (in press). Bodily affectivity: prenoetic elements in enactive perception. Phenomenol. Mind.
Butterworth, G. (1998). A developmental-ecological perspective on Strawson’s ‘The self.’ J. Conscious. Stud. 5, 132–140.
Cole, J. (1997). On “being faceless”: selfhood and facial embodiment. J. Conscious. Stud. 4, 467–484.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The Emotions. Studies in Emotions and Social Interactions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 4, 14–21. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01417-5
Gallagher, S. (2012b). “First-person perspective and immunity to error through misidentification,” in Consciousness and Subjectivity, eds S. Miguens and G. Preyer (Frankfurt: Philosophical Analysis Ontos Publisher), 187–214.
Gallagher, S., and Marcel, A. J. (1999). The self in contextualized action. J. Conscious. Stud. 6, 4–30.
Gallagher, S., and Varga, S. (in press). Social constraints on the direct perception of emotions and intentions. Topoi.
Gallup, G. G., Anderson, J. R., and Platek, S. M. (2011). “Self-recognition,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 80–110.
Gazzaniga, M. S. (1998). The Mind’s Past. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gergen, K. J. (2011). “The social construction of self,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 633–653.
Gibson, E. (1993). “Ontogenesis of the perceived self,” in The Perceived Self, ed. U. Neisser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 25–42.
Gillihan, S. J., and Farah, M. J. (2005). Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Psychol. Bull. 131, 76–97. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.76
Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldscheider, A. (1894). Ueber den Schmerz in Physiologischer und Klinischer Hinsicht. Berlin: Hirschwald.
Grenanderm, U. (1994). General Pattern Theory. Oxford: Oxford Science Publications.
Hermans, H. J. M. (2011). “The dialogical self: a process of positioning in space and time,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 654–680.
Izard, C. E. (1972). Patterns of Emotions. A New Analysis of Anxiety and Depression. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Izard, C. E., Ackerman, B. P., Schoff, K. M., and Fine, S. E. (2000). “Self-organization of discrete emotions, emotion patterns, and emotion-cognition relations,” in Emotion, Development, and Self-Organization: Dynamic Systems Approaches to Emotional Development, eds S. E. Lewis, and I. Granic (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 15–36.
James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind 9, 188–205. doi:10.1093/d/os-IX.34.188
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover, 1950.
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., and Heatherton, T. F. (2002). Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 785–794. doi:10.1162/08989290260138672
Kelso, S. (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
LeDoux, J. (2002). The Synaptic Self: How the Brain Becomes Who We Are. New York: Penguin.
Legerstee, M. (1998). Mental and bodily awareness in infancy: consciousness of self-existence. J. Conscious. Stud. 5, 627–644.
Legrand, D., and Ruby, P. (2009). What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychol. Rev.116, 252–282. doi:10.1037/a0014172
Neisser, U. (1994). “Self-narratives: true and false,” in The Remembering Self: Construction and Accuracy in the Self-Narrative, eds U. Neisser, and R. Fivush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1–18.
Northoff, G., and Bermpohl, F. (2004). Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 8, 102–107. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., and Panksepp, J. (2006). Self-referential processing in our brain – a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. Neuroimage 31, 440–457. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002
Northoff, G., Qin, P., and Feinberg, T. E. (2011). Brain imaging of the self: conceptual, anatomical and methodological issues. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 52–63. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.011
Philippi, C. L., Feinstein, J. S., Khalsa, S. S., Damasio, A., Tranel, D., Landini, G., et al. (2012). Preserved self-awareness following extensive bilateral brain damage to the insula, anterior cingulate, and medial prefrontal cortices. PLoS ONE 7:e38413. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038413
Pickering, J. (1999). The self is a semiotic process. J. Conscious. Stud. 6, 31–47.
Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Qin, P., and Northoff, G. (2011). How is our self related to midline regions and the default-mode network? Neuroimage 57, 1221–1233. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.028
Sparks, G. G., Pellechia, M., and Irvine, C. (1999). The repressive coping style and fright reactions to mass media. Commun. Res. 26, 176–192. doi:10.1177/009365099026002004
Vogeley, K., and Gallagher, S. (2011). “The self in the brain,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 111–136.
Individual, Relational, and Collective Reflexivity
Key Terms
Reflexivity
Individual Reflexivity
Collective Reflexivity
Self Reference
Social Reflexivity
Socio Cybernetics
Autopoiesis
Cybernetics
Social Theory
Second Order Cybernetics
Third Order Cybernetics
Reflexivity and Psychology
Reflexivity and Sociology
Reflexivity and Anthropology
Reflexivity and Economics/Finance
Reflexivity and International Relations
Reflexivity in Qualitative Research
Reflexivity and Systems Science / Cybernetics
Reflection
Self Reflection
Self Knowledge
Self Awareness
Self Referential
Mindfulness
Self Organization
Self Correction
Feedback Loop
Cybernetic Loop
Unintended Consequences
Self Fulfilling Prophecy
Epistemological Circularity
Reflexive-Relational Logic
Circular-Dialectical Process
Auto Regulation
Subjectivity
Objectivity
Subject Object
Inter Subjectivity
Semiotic Self
Dialogical Self
Personal Reflexivity
Interpersonal Reflexivity
Methodological Reflexivity
Contextual Reflexivity
Internal Conversation
Complex Dialogical Interaction
RC51 of ISA
I and Me
We and Us
Meta Reflexivity
Relational Reflexivity
Relational Realism
Critical Realism
Relational Subject
Relational Sociology
Trichotomous Recursion.
Epistemic Reflexivity
Reflexive Dialogical Action Research
Self-other Reflexivity
Multi Frames
Multi Perspectivism
Positional Reflexivity
Institutional Reflexivity
Reflexivity Scholars
Pierre Bourdieu
Alvin Gouldner
Harold Garfinkel
Margaret Archer
Heinz Von Foerster
Victor Turner
Robert K. Merton ?
George Herbert Mead
Norbert Wiley
P Donati
Tobin Nellhaus
Charalambos Tsekeris
What is Reflexivity?
Source: A practical guide to reflexivity in qualitative research: AMEE Guide No. 149
What is reflexivity?
Many different definitions of reflexivity exist, and, as a result, researchers are often left unsure of what reflexivity is, let alone how to do it. To construct a comprehensive definition of reflexivity that both respected the variety of definitions available and appreciated the differences between them, we searched the qualitative methodological literature for publications focused explicitly on reflexivity. We then inductively analyzed them to identify congruences. Table 1 provides examples of some of the descriptions we encountered, which are incorporated in the definition provided below. We then synthesized these findings to develop the following comprehensive definition:
Reflexivity is a set of continuous, collaborative, and multifaceted practices through which researchers self- consciously critique, appraise, and evaluate how their subjectivity and context influence the research processes.
Source: A practical guide to reflexivity in qualitative research: AMEE Guide No. 149
Descriptions of Reflexivity
Source: Reflexivity, description and the analysis of social settings
The concept of ‘reflexivity’ has become an often-intoned mantra in contemporary social science, particulary, perhaps, sociology. This article, however, argues that the ‘blanket use’ of ‘reflexivity’ glosses over and confuses many different actual definitions and understandings of the concept – not least because the concept operates differently as a move within each of the divergent analytic ‘games’ that compose the overall discipline. One (among many other) crucial distinctions is that between ‘stipulative’ and ‘essential’ reflexivity – the former originating in part in G.H.Mead’s notions of the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’, and extended within current theories of reflexive modernity. This concept has been wrenched by professional social scientist from its mundane moorings and has been ‘elevated’ into an analytic technique of self interrogation. By contrast, ‘essential’ reflexivity, as adduced by ethnomethodological sociologists, remains resolutely emplaced in the domain of lay society-members’ ordinary sense-making practices: it here refers to the reciprocal, back-and-forth determinations of sense of members’ mundane descriptions of their specific circumstances and of the circumstances they describe – description and circumstance reflect upon each other during the sense-making practices. A brief example of essential reflexivity is given- reflexive formulations in ordinary conversations.
Source: REFLEXIVITY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL ACTION
The present paper constitutes a theoretical overview of the well-established, yet highly contested, concept of reflexivity as one of the main buzzwords in sociology throughout the last two centuries. Its central aim is to comprehensively describe and critically discuss the changing historical relationships between reflexivity, sociological knowledge and everyday social life. In a rather detailed way, it carefully discerns the complex scientific meaning-making of reflexivity, from phenomenology and ethnomethodology to contemporary critical theory and the sociology of science, and extensively elaborates on its various interconnections to social action. Within this analytic framework, reflexivity is particularly associated with issues of consciousness and meaning, as well as with systematic theoretical efforts of effectively transcending old subject-object or action-structure dualistic dichotomies.
Source: Reflexivity: A Concept and its Meanings for Practitioners Working with Children and Families
We were able to identify six themes that represented the participants’ conceptualisations of reflexivity in relation to their practice:
as self-reflection, distinct from reflection
as a way to combine objectivity and subjectivity
as a critical appraisal of action and knowledge creation, in the moment
reflexivity as a tool for practice/an introspective process
reflexivity as a learning tool/critical practice approach
as a process of critical reflection on policy (D’Cruz et al., 2004)
Defining Reflexivity
Source: “Outing” the Researcher: The Provenance, Process, and Practice of Reflexivity
Defining Reflexivity
Reflexivity can be defined as thoughtful, conscious self-awareness. Reflexive analysis in research encompasses continual evaluation of subjective responses, intersubjective dynamics, and the research process itself. It involves a shift in our understanding of data collection from something objective that is accomplished through detached scrutiny of “what I know and how I know it” to recognizing how we actively construct our knowledge. “The reflexive ethnographer does not simply report ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ but actively constructs interpretations of his or her experiences in the field and then questions how those interpretations came about” (Hertz, 1997, p. viii).
Callaway (1992) extended the notion with reference to gender politics:
Often condemned as apolitical, reflexivity, on the contrary can be seen as opening the way to a more radical consciousness of self in facing the political dimensions of fieldwork and constructing knowledge. Other factors intersecting with gender— such as nationality, race, ethnicity, class, and age—also affect the anthropologist’s field interactions and textual strategies. Reflexivity becomes a continuing mode of self-analysis and political awareness. (cited in Hertz, 1997, p. viii)
Reflexivity can often be confused with reflection—and, indeed, in much of the literature, these terms are used interchangeably. The concepts are perhaps best viewed on a continuum where both ends are acknowledged to be important across the stages of a project. At one end of the scale, reflection can be understood as “thinking about.” As a subject, I reflect on an object. The process is a distanced one— the thinking is about something else and it takes place after the event. At the other end of the scale, reflexivity taps into a more immediate, continuing, dynamic, and subjective self-awareness.
A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented; it is not given to me, but the reality of lived experience is there-for-me because I have a reflexive awareness of it, because I possess it immediately as belonging to me in some sense. Only in thought does it become objective. (Dilthey, 1985, cited in van Manen, 1990, p. 35)
Although actual (prereflective) lived experience can never be fully grasped in its immediate manifestation, with reflexive analysis, the researcher is aware of experiencing a world and moves back and forth in a kind of dialectic between experience and awareness. As Hertz (1997) put it, “To be reflexive is to have an ongoing conversation about the experience while simultaneously living in the moment” (p. viii). Having come to understand that the researcher, the world, and the researcher’s experience of the world are intertwined, the challenge is to identify that lived experience that resides in the space between subject and object. The researcher strives to capture some of the connections by which subject and object influence and constitute each other.
Theoretical Foundations
Methodological self-consciousness in the form of “confessional accounts” have been a common genre since the 1970s among ethnographers and anthropologists (Seale, 1999). In this kind of research, field-workers have been portrayed as infiltrating a group and then reporting authentically the experience of being an insider. The key process turns on transforming the personal experience data into public and accountable knowledge—hence the reflexive, methodological account. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) explain:
Transactions and the ideas that emerge from [the research process] . . . should be documented. The construction of analytic or methodological memoranda and working papers, and the consequent explication of working hypotheses, are of vital importance. It is important that the processes of exploration and abduction be documented and retrievable. (p. 191)
In less explicit ways, the provenance of the concept of reflexivity can also be found within other theoretical frameworks, including phenomenological, social constructionist, and psychodynamic theories and participative research approaches. Here, competing, sometimes contradictory, accounts of the rationale and practice of reflexivity are offered. Although it is possible to draw on several theoretical frameworks simultaneously, researchers who practice reflexivity tend to subscribe to particular visions and reject others. These fragmented origins contribute to the ambiguity of the concept. In the following discussion, my aim is to map this diverse territory, providing signposts for the uncertain researcher-explorer.
Phenomenologists focus on the way subject and object are enmeshed in prereflective existence. One key route to understanding is to reflexively interrogate our subjectivity as part of investigating how the subject is present in the object. In Gadamerian terms, reflexivity involves a positive evaluation of the researcher’s own experience to help him or her understand something of the fusion of horizons between subject and object (Outhwaite, 1985).
From this starting point, phenomenological philosophers such as Heidegger (1962) argued that each person will perceive the same phenomenon in a different way; each person brings to bear his or her lived experience, specific understandings, and historical background. This way of being-in-the-world means that researchers cannot help but bring their own involvement and fore-understandings into the research.
Applying these ideas, phenomenologists begin their research with the data of their experience; their own reflecting, intuiting, and thinking are used as primary evidence (Moustakas, 1994). They seek to “embrace their own humanness as the basis for psychological understanding” (Walsh, 1995, p. 335). Phenomenologists argue that researchers need to look within to attempt to disentangle perceptions and interpretations from the phenomenon being studied. “For phenomenology,” commented Giorgi (1994), “nothing can be accomplished without subjectivity, so its elimination is not the solution. Rather how the subject is present is what matters, and objectivity itself is an achievement of subjectivity” (p. 205). Understanding thus results from a dialectic between the researcher’s preunderstandings and the research process, between the self-interpreted constructions of the researcher and those of the participant.
Social constructionists draw on the notion of reflexivity to explain how individuals make sense of the social world and their place in it. Three strands of argument about the social dimension of reflexivity can be differentiated:
Mead (1934) considered reflexivity—the turning back of one’s social experience on oneself—central to becoming a person. Arguing from a symbolic interactionist perspective, he understood that individuals gain self-awareness in and through interactions with others.
Giddens (1991), following Harré’s (1983) notion of “identity projects,” argued that identity has become a reflexive project in our postmodern (or late modern) age. He discussed how the construction of self is turned to as a source of both interest and meaning.
Habermas focused on the capacity of humans to be reflexive agents and on how through reflecting on our own history (as individuals and as members of larger societies) we can change the course of history. He argued that the more we can understand how structural forces shape us, the more we can escape from those constraints (Giddens, 1985).
Social constructionists argue against taking an inward approach to subjectivity, in which individuals look into themselves “in an infinite regress of cognitive dispositions” (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 79). Instead, they invite the researcher to look outward into the realm of interaction, discourse, and shared meanings.
Social constructionists also emphasize that any qualitative research is a co-constituted account. They stress the need to explore the dynamics of the researcher- researched relationship, which is seen to fundamentally shape research results. A different researcher than the one involved will, they say, have a different relationship, responding differently, asking different questions, and prompting different replies. Social constructionists would also attend to the rhetorical function of the discourse being studied. The participants might be engaged in an exercise in presenting themselves to the interviewer, but the researcher is trying to persuade the wider academic community about the value of the research. Thus, reflexive analysis is necessary to examine the impact of the researcher and participants on each other and on the research. This is a complex undertaking; the distinction between the observer and observed is problematic given their “emerging relatedness in the interview situation as each observes the other observing” (Jorgenson, 1991, p. 210).
Psychodynamic theorists explore how unconscious processes structure relations between the researcher, the participants, and the data gathered. They recommend the use of both introspection and self-reflection (embracing a variety of psychoanalytic techniques, such as dream analysis and interpretation of fantasies) as research tools to enable researchers to become aware of the emotional investment they have in the research concerned. Such reflections are also assumed to provide data regarding the social/emotional world of the participant. Hunt (1989) provided an illustration of why the researcher might experience feelings of helplessness, loneliness, and alienation in the early stages of fieldwork. She recommended reflecting on possible links with past experience: For example, the culture shock experienced as an “outsider” might be related to childhood experience of the birth of a younger sibling.
Psychodynamic theorists emphasize the need for us to explore how conversation or text affects us and to reflect on what we bring to it ourselves. They see unconscious needs and transferences as structuring the relationship between researcher and participant. Equally, the participant’s transferences are seen to influence the stories they tell; the researcher might follow this up by asking “How does my participant’s story move me?” As Parker (1997) reminded us, “We need to be aware of ourselves as the dreamers . . . unlike instances of other people telling us their dreams, we understand and share, partially at least, at some level, the story” (p. 488).
Participative approaches to research are found within a broad range of methodologies, from humanistic new paradigm and cooperative inquiry research (Heron, 1996; Reason, 1988) to more sociological, discursive, and feminist research (e.g., Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, & Tindall, 1994; Potter & Wetherell 1995; Wilkinson, 1988). These wide-ranging research methodologies are linked by the way they seek to enlist participants as co-researchers. Recognizing research as a co-constituted account, adherents of participative research argue that the research participants also have the capacity to be reflexive beings: They can be co-opted into the research as co-researchers. At the very least, this involves participants in a reflexive dialogue during data analysis or evaluation. Smith (1994) cited an example of how using participants’ interpretations resulted in the researcher’s confronting, modifying, and honing his own interpretations. Co-operative inquiry (Heron, 1996) approaches, on the other hand, apply reflexivity more completely. Here, researchers, simultaneously participants in their own research, engage in cycles of mutual reflection and experience.
Another characteristic of such participative approaches is that researchers openly acknowledge tensions arising from different social positions in relation to such factors as class, gender, and race. As Wasserfall (1997) explained, “The use of reflexivity during fieldwork can mute the distance and alienation built into conventional notions of ‘objectivity’ or objectifying those who are studied. The research process becomes more mutual, as a strategy to deconstruct the author’s authority” (p. 152).
Researchers from these traditions are sensitive to the way they frame research questions, select participants, and interact with them to produce the observations and texts of analysis. Hertz (1997) argued,
Through personal accounting, researchers must become more aware of how their own positions and interests are imposed at all stages of the research process—from the questions they ask to those they ignore, from who they study to who they ignore, from problem formulation to analysis, representation, and writing—in order to produce less distorted accounts of the social world. (p. viii).
Reflexivity, then, can be understood in a multitude of ways according to which research traditions are adopted. It can be understood as a confessional account of methodology or as examining one’s own personal, possibly unconscious, reactions. It can also mean exploring the dynamics of the researcher-researched relationship and how the research is co-constituted. In practice, it has been applied at different levels. At a minimum level, it means acknowledging the existence of researcher bias and explicitly locating the researcher within the research process. At a more active level, it involves a more wholesale embracing of subjectivity, for example, by exploiting researcher’s/co-researcher’s reflective insights and by engaging in explicit, self-aware meta-analysis throughout the research process.
Types of Reflexivity
Personal
Interpersonal
Methodological
Contextual
Source: Japanese Reflexivity and Japanese Market
Source: Japanese Reflexivity and Japanese Market
Modes of Reflexivity
Source: Semiotic Scaffolding of the Social Self in Reflexivity and Friendship
Communicative reflexivity
Autonomous reflexivity
Meta-reflexivity
Fractured reflexivity
Source: Reflexivity / ISA / Archer
Source: Reflexivity, Recursion and Relationality in Organisational Research Processes
Source: Reflexivity, Recursion and Relationality in Organisational Research Processes
Source: Reflexivity in the transdisciplinary field of critical discourse studies
Four concepts of reflexivity
To clarify what a reflexive notion of critique for discourse studies might look like, I will draw upon four uses of the concept of reflexivity: (1) reflexivity as a general feature of interaction and subjectivity; (2) reflexivity as a methodological praxis in the social sciences; (3) reflexivity as a property of discursive and non-discursive systems; and (4) extended reflexivity as a key feature of late modernity. These four notions are distributed unequally among the different strands of discourse studies. Drawing on these four notions, I will amend the conceptual scheme for discourse studies discussed above with the concepts of reflexivity and reflexive loops.
Reflexivity as (1) a general principle of interaction and subjectivity is rather common in the pragmatist inspired approaches to discourse that can be found in the fields of linguistic pragmatics (Verschueren and Brisard, 2009: 33–35) and ethnomethodology-inspired conversation analysis (Psathas, 1998: 291; Titscher et al., 2000: 106). It is common in related disciplines such as interactional sociolinguistics or linguistic anthropology, but under-theorized in post-structuralist discourse theory. The notion of reflexivity as (2) a methodological stance or praxis is well known in sociological and anthropological discussions on the relationship between researchers and their research objects. Reflexivity is thereby conceptualized as a practical value that should be part and parcel of a sociological habitus. This ethical take on reflexivity is relatively rare in the more linguistically oriented approaches in discourse studies but did impact on the ethics of sociologically oriented discourse analysis and theory.
Reflexivity as (3) a property of discursive and non-discursive systems is hardly ever discussed explicitly in discourse analysis and theory. Nevertheless, there are interesting parallels between systems theory and discourse theory that merit closer attention. And last but not least, the concept of reflexivity as (4) a key feature of late modernity has been addressed from time to time in critical discourse analysis, but deserves closer attention if we are to understand how critical subjectivities can be established through discourse in our day and age. By exploring these four approaches to reflexivity, I will clear the ground for a more central place for reflexivity in the conceptual field of critical discourse studies.
Reflexivity and the Self
Source: Reflections on Reflexivity: Sociological Issues and Perspectives
Reflexivity also involves the inspiring novel conception of “internal conversation” (Archer, 2003) that theoretically describes the continuous self-confrontation of the individual, as well as its complex dialogical interaction with the (changing) social environment. It is therefore “the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 2007: 4). The sociological theorization of this “complex dialogical interaction” heavily draws from the famous school of American Pragmatism (mainly grounded on the original stimulating insights of John Dewey, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and George Herbert Mead).3
From a relational social epistemological analytic standpoint, the self (including the epistemological/philosophical or sociological self) is rather reflexively re-created; it is necessarily intertwined with the “real world” and dialectically re-constituted by the on-going, mutual, synergetic and (chaotic) self-organizing interaction of the ego (1) with the emergent social structures and (2) with the significant others (actual, imagined, or implied).4 The very existence (or appearance) of these “significant others” is completely integral to the evolutionary reflexive emergence of selfhood. Yet, in the original social interpretivist sense of George Herbert Mead, the “other” is not only the other (significant) person, “but another perspective: another way in which the world is judged or appreciated” (Natanson 1956: 64). The self thus appears neither as a mere “object” of knowledge, nor as an empirical ego, which somehow lacks autonomy, agency, imagination, choice, creativity, improvisation and spontaneity. In other words, the human subject is not passive, self-assured, atomistic, and narcissistically private any more (see e.g. Tsivacou, 2005; Cilliers and De Villiers, 2000; Briggs and Peat, 1999).5 The self-in-relation-with-others (methodological relationalism) is now clearly prevailing upon the old self-in-social-vacuum (methodological individualism) (Ho et al., 2001).
Instead of naively seeing subjectivity as an isolated, independent, self-contained and self-referred locus of individual experience (according to the classical Cartesian ego), the synthetic reflexive-relational logic, in the open spirit of Ludwig Binswanger (1963), fruitfully links it with objectivity and inter-subjectivity, through an (endless) uncertain circular-dialectical process, without however reducing ontological questions to epistemological ones (just as Kant did), or “facts” to performative descriptions and interpretations, symbolic categories and conceptual frameworks.
Within a relational-realist or reflexive- realist analytic framework, knowledge cannot and should not be erroneously confounded with the “recording and analysis of the ‘pre-notions’ (in Durkheim’s sense) that social agents engage in the construction of social reality; it must also encompass the social conditions of the production of these pre-constructions and of the social agents who produce them” (Bourdieu, 2003: 282).7
This is of course in line with Roy Bhaskar’s or Pierre Bourdieu’s stance of critical/relational realism, but not with Anthony Giddens’s ultra-activistic structuration theory, or with Berger/Luckmann’s subjectivistic accounts of social constructivism, which implicitly reproduce and naively celebrate the old tradition of phenomenological individualism.
Collective Reflexivity
Source: Relational Realism, Collective Reflexivity and Social Movements
Source: Relational Realism, Collective Reflexivity and Social Movements
Source: Relational Realism, Collective Reflexivity and Social Movements
Source: Relational Realism, Collective Reflexivity and Social Movements
Source: Collective reflexivity in social marketing through ethnographic film-making: The Yolngu story of tobacco in Yirrkala, Australia
Literature review and theoretical framework
On reflexivity
Researchers have identified how collective understandings emerge through contestation regarding discourse and framing (Daellenbach and Parkinson, 2017), a sense of imagined community (Cayla and Eckhardt, 2008) or social movements (Gurrieri et al., 2018; Varman and Belk, 2009). Although this article sits within these broader discussions of social relationality, our specific focus is on reflexivity in Indigenous and relational settings. This context reflects the complex and multi-stakeholder social marketing arrangements in which collective relationships and reflexive processes can have a discernible impact on how social issues and social change are understood (Hastings, 2003; Johansson et al., 2018).
Initial work on reflexivity in consumer research focused on individual notions of reflexivity (Thompson, 2002; Thompson et al., 1998). Researcher reflexivity involves a researcher reflecting on their subjective influences on the construction of meaning during research, and how this may influence and inform research outcomes (Jayasinghe, 2015). More recently, the concept of participant reflexivity has emerged (Yang, 2015), through which research participants are recognised as reflexive actors and encouraged to reflect and contribute towards interpretations and representations.
Consumer culture scholars have also drawn attention to reflexive processes in the sociocultural realm. Askegaard et al. (2009) present the concept of cultural reflexivity, a practice of conscious reflection upon one’s culture. Cultural reflexivity is a process through which consumers revisit and renegotiate their identity and status, consumption practices and acculturation to marketplaces (Askegaard and Eckhardt, 2012). Thompson et al. (2018) explain forms of consumer reflexivity as being critical, existential or reactive to uncover different relationships between consumer agency, social structures and identity goals and practices. Yet these conceptualisations still largely ground reflexivity as a personal endeavour, albeit one shaped by interactions between structure and agency (Beckett and Nayak, 2008).
Acknowledging the complex social and relational settings in which they operate (Hastings, 2003; Hastings and Saren, 2003), scholars are now focusing on reflexive processes that occur in collective contexts, within, between and across actors, and how these shape the framing and responses to social change issues (Casey et al., 2017; Gordon and Gurrieri, 2014). However, the conceptual underpinnings of collective notions of reflexivity are still not well understood in consumer research.
Collective reflexivity
Sociologists offer some conceptual tools that may help advance understanding. Archer (2013) asks whether we can conceive of ‘collective reflexivity’, a process of reflexive action at the interpersonal and intergroup relational level. This follows the line of Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) that multiple social actors related in a given field may engage in reflexivity. Donati (2011: 355) explains the concept of collective reflexivity as ‘the mental ability, shared by all (normal) people, to consider the influence of their relation(s) with others on to themselves and vice versa’. As such, an individual’s own behaviour is relational due to their immersion in a social world, and reflexive consciousness of the self is not something that occurs in and of itself and lacks any relations but is shaped by relations with other humans.
It follows that social relationality can and does structure the individual’s personal and social identity as well as agency – and this includes reflexive processes. This encourages us to acknowledge the personal I meeting the social realm in the form of Me, We and You during reflexive action (Archer, 2003). Therefore, considerations during a process of collective reflexivity may include questions of ‘Who am I?’, ‘Who are you?’ and ‘How should I act?’ at the individual level and ‘Who are we?’ and ‘How should we act?’ at the collective level. Donati (2016) argues that collective reflexivity can occur when there are relational ties between humans who are oriented towards collective objectives, such as a common purpose or achievement. Therefore, for collective reflexivity to occur, the symbol of We needs to be held in common to create a relational subject.
Donati and Archer (2015) explain how such social identity and meaning are developed through collective reflexivity. They argue that reflections become social – that is, relational – when each person in a collective reflects not only upon the I-relation but also upon the We-relation, creating collective reflexivity. This does not necessarily mean there needs to be an identical interpretation of We among members, but that there is a common purpose and collective dynamic within the network (Donati and Archer, 2015).
Through a process of collective reflexivity, it is argued that a person’s inner dialogue can acknowledge feedback emerging from the reflexivity of a network of social relations in which that person is involved. This collective reflexivity then creates expressions of solidarity – a mutually beneficial strengthening of the social ties between community members – and subsidiarity – heightened member goodwill through acts of devotion or service to the community. Fostering solidarity and subsidiarity are important in social marketing (Dann and Dann, 2016), particularly in Indigenous contexts (Johansson et al., 2018).
Examples of collective reflexivity may be found on the micro level (e.g. when considering the relationship of a couple), the meso level (civic associations and organisations) and the macro level (e.g. citizen–government relationships) (Donati, 2016). Donati (2008) points out that the most positive expression of solidarity and subsidiarity would be the orientation of the members of a social network to the common good – a key concern in social marketing (Gordon et al., 2016). Scholars from other social change disciplines have identified the potential for collective reflexivity in understanding reflexive processes in group settings (Lawrence, 2017; Nellhaus, 2017). In our research context, the common good may involve a shared and representative understanding of tobacco and a commitment to tackling tobacco-related health and social harms.
However, one criticism of collective reflexivity is that it limits an understating of relationality and the process of intercession between structure and agency to reflexive deliberations (Caetano, 2015). However, we agree with Caetano (2015) and Vogler (2016) that this is not a matter of discarding Archer’s (2013) idea that collective reflexivity concerns relationality of people, but rather it requires an acknowledgement that understanding reflexivity and social relations may require the integration of Archer’s (2013) concepts with other concepts such as process-relational theory (Cobb, 2007; Cooper, 2005) that are concerned with relationality. Our focus in this study is not to address the critiques of Archer’s ideas or to study relationality per se. Rather, we aim to focus on collective reflexive processes and the generation of relational goods and evils relevant to social marketing in Indigenous contexts in which joint action on social change is an imperative (Archer, 2013; Johansson et al., 2018). This leads us to consider how collective reflexivity may be facilitated. We argue here that ethnographic film-making can offer a useful pathway.
The nature of agency and the place of reflexivity have long been key issues in critical realism. In the early 1990s Roy Bhaskar described agency’s primary ontological constituents using phrases such as ‘embodied intentional causal agency’, ‘intentional embodied causally efficacious agency’, and most compactly, ‘intentional embodied agency’—a conceptualization central to this article (Bhaskar [1993] 2008, 47, 144, 146, 153, 164, 185, 258). Some years earlier he also observed that
The capacity for a reflexive self-monitoring of one’s own causal interventions in the world, to be aware of one’s own states of awareness during one’s activity (to monitor the monitoring of one’s activity), is intimately connected to our possession of a language (Bhaskar 1989, 81).
As that sentence suggests, attention has mainly focused on intentionality and reflexivity in terms that are wholly linguistic. That said, more recently Margaret S. Archer, who has examined agency and reflexivity extensively, emphasized that ‘Our human reflexivity is closely akin to our human embodiment’ (2007, 1), arguing for the body’s position as the fulcrum of the self/other distinction, its experiences of (and ability to navigate) the natural environment, its accumulation of skills and habits, its role in emotion, and similar functions. This is a crucial matter—but as I will explain, embodiment pervades cognition (both conscious and unconscious) far more deeply than she evidently realizes. Thus, within critical realism’s theory of agency, embodiment’s role in reflexivity needs to be further fleshed out.
Moreover, analyses of agents’ reflexivity have largely concerned the individual; study of collective (or group) agency and reflexivity has been less focal. Archer (2013) considers collective agents’ reflexivity in some of her writings, but her argument only covers collective reflexivity conducted through language. Communication through gesture, facial expressions and other physical movements, proximity, clothing, hairstyle and the like, alone or together with speech—that is, embodied communication—is left untouched. Yet communication between people in all its forms is a core part of how agents make their way in the world, and requires us to look beyond individuals and their internal cogitations.
In short, much less work has been done on collective reflexivity than individual reflexivity, and the discussions of reflexivity have treated only reflexivity exercised through discourse, not through the agent’s entire ontology. But if, as we saw in Bhaskar’s definition, agents have three major aspects—intentionality, causal efficacy and embodiment—we cannot assume reflexivity can occur via only one of the three; and if agents are fundamentally social, we cannot assume collective reflexivity is marginal or simply derivative from individual reflexivity. This is the issue I will be considering: the conjunction of collectivity, reflexivity and embodiment—in other words, collective reflexivity conducted not just by saying, but also by doing. As I will show, embodied collective reflexivity is a prominent part of many people’s lives and so must figure in our understanding of how society operates.
Reflexivity and recursion
An individual’s reflexivity is her deliberation on her own thoughts and activities in relation to the context in which they occur, her circumstances, and perhaps her options for future actions. Its structure is recursive. That generates complexities for conceptualizing embodied reflexivity, so further detail is warranted. Recursion refers to the application of a process or structure upon itself. One of its outcomes is self-similarity, in which a part is similar to the whole, and so it often embeds other instances of itself (e.g. a sentence can contain another sentence). In mathematics recursion is essential to numerous concepts and formulas. In geometry recursion produces fractals—shapes that are self-similar at every level of scale—which have garnered considerable attention since the 1970s partly because they accurately model various natural phenomena, such as the growth patterns of certain algae and the branching patterns of fern leaves and various trees. Simple branching rules apply to every branch in the same way: for instance, ‘each branch generates two new branches’; but notably, a recursive method could also be ‘the right-hand branch generates two branches, but the left only generates one’. In principle (and in mathematics), recursion can be infinite; in practice it meets with some boundary. In fractal art the boundary is simply the current technological limit for image resolution (in print or on screen); in biology the limits of, say, branching lie more in the confluence of the requirements for capillary action, resistance against wind and other forces, and so on. Recursions in other natural phenomena likewise face material limits.
In human culture, recursion has figured for centuries and even millennia, expressed especially in images of self-containment (such as microcosms, the matryoshka doll and the mise en abyme), and also in spirals and other designs. However, recursion occurs not only in reflexivity and imagery, but also in numerous areas of social activity. The Dictionary of Critical Realism identifies recursion as ‘a cardinal property of the human social world as such’, and describes emergence itself as a form of nested embeddedness (i.e. self-containment) (Hartwig 2007, 405). One can go further: under the transformational model of social activity, each moment of agential action occurs on the basis of pre-given structural enablements and constraints, and subsequently establishes the structural enablements and constraints for the next moment of activity, in a potentially endless helical cycle of social reproduction and/or transformation. This too is a mode of recursion.
Reflexivity in consciousness is a special type of recursion due to its emergent character, both caused and (potentially) causing. On the one hand, it is motivated, often arising from uncertainty and/or under-determination. As Archer puts it,
people are necessarily reflexive about their ‘context’ or ‘circumstances’ when they ask themselves quotidian questions (in internal or external conversation) such as: ‘What shall we have for dinner?’, ‘Do I need to visit the dentist?’, or ‘Can one of us get back from work in time to pick the kids up from school?’ (2013, 145).
In short, the motivations for reflexivity are questions. Asking a question about one’s answers or method of answering generates a new recursion of reflexivity.
On the other hand, unlike other forms of discourse and intentionality, an agent’s reflexivity is self-targeted: the agent herself is the object of reference and/or action. Where most recursion elaborates a product, reflexivity enfolds the producer. This is the specific recursion that makes thought or activity reflexive. Archer calls a person’s reflexivity an ‘internal conversation’, involving dialogic interchanges between the ‘I’ who is presently deliberating and a metaphorical ‘me’ representing the sedimented self who has arrived at the present point of deliberation, and also (or alternatively) between the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ representing the self who is coming into existence and might undertake one action or another (Archer 2003, 74–8, 95–116).1 Thus there is a dialectic in which one plays in turn both speaker and audience. The recursion involved in individual reflexivity would not be well described as a type of nested embeddedness; a more suitable image is the spiral—open and potentially ever-expanding, with each turn of the spiral motivated by a question.
It is clear enough that reflexivity about intentions depends on language, and consists of discursive (semiosic) activities. However, agents do not simply consist of their intentionality and their power of reflexivity in ‘internal conversation’: agency is also necessarily embodied and capable of taking action. We are whole beings, who emerged from natural processes. What, then, would reflexivity through entire bodies involve? What would count as embodied reflexivity?
Performatives
When agents seek causal efficacy, usually their motives are to bring about changes in the world, be it to get dinner on the table, secure social connections through gossip, or whatever else. Speech itself (including texts) is a type of action or way to do things. More precisely, as J. L. Austin argued, all utterances are speech acts, from the obvious like declarations that a meeting is adjourned, to the more subtle like logical proofs and truth claims: they accomplish or enact things. Austin’s term for speech acts is performatives.2
However, the very fact that agents incorporate self-awareness and embodiment into their causal efficacy means that their embodied intentional activities (and often their unintentional activities) bear meaning. My point is deeper than the adage, ‘Actions speak louder than words’: more, actions can in effect be utterances, sometimes via conventions, but also intrinsically. This is essential to the concept of embodiment I am forwarding. An everyday example is a hug, which (depending on the context) can communicate caring feelings such as ‘I’m happy to see you’, ‘I love you’ or ‘I’m sorry you feel bad’. At a more complex level, one can glimpse this understanding of embodiment from a moment in the film Vanilla Sky, when a character asserts that ‘when you sleep with someone, your body makes a promise whether you do or not’. The comprehensibility of this statement (whether or not one agrees with the sentiment) lies in an understanding of embodiment’s meaningfulness. But that meaningfulness is not (or not just) semiotic; it is also experiential, emotive and social. It infuses a person’s habits, their gestures and physical styles, the way they touch or do not touch others, the quality of their voice, their sense of timing, and many more aspects of comportment. It is also sedimented in the way they inhabit their body and inhabit the area around them—for example, some people ‘own’ a space as soon as they enter it while others seem to make themselves disappear.3 The meaningfulness of embodied activity can thus both express agency and influence its conduct, partly because embodiment is one of the conditions of possibility for agential action, and partly because, like any system of meaning, it has aspects that are constructed socially. Consequently, I expand the concept of performatives to embrace not only speech acts, but also acts that speak.
The recursive structure of embodied reflexivity must be different from the speech acts of an ‘internal conversation’ because there is a fundamental difference between the ‘spiral’ of discourse, in which the only causal power undergoing recursion is semiosis (principally language), versus the recursion of full agentiality, in which multiple causal powers are involved and are intrinsically interrelated—but do not necessarily recurse in the same way. ‘Intentional embodied causally efficacious agency’ describes a stratified structure that arose through natural and historical emergence. At its base is mere physical existence, a feature we share with stones and water, which provides the matrix of possibility for all else. From simple materiality emerged entities with the power to act upon the environment, a power all biological forms possess, and which transforms the living being’s physical composition into its body. Through their embodiment, life-forms obtain food, protect themselves from danger, and reproduce. Humans do many other things, of course, but this emergent ability to act upon the environment is the causal efficacy necessary for agency.
Finally, the emergent powers of intentionality and semiosis arose within humans; but intentionality would be nothing without the ability to act, which in turn depends on embodiment.
All three aspects of agency must be involved in the recursion required for embodied reflexivity. Due to the line of dependency and the different natures of these three characteristics, acts that speak—embodied performatives—require not only the recursion of all three layers of embodied intentional agency, but a recursive method that is governed by the relationship between them, namely stratification and emergence.
Reflexivity, complexity, and the nature of social science
Eric D. Beinhocker
Journal of Economic Methodology Volume 20, 2013 – Issue 4: Reflexivity and Economics: George Soros’s Theory of Reflexivity and the Methodology of Economic Science
Reflexivity: A Concept and its Meanings for Practitioners Working with Children and Families
By Heather D’Cruz, B.S.W., M.S.W., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in Social Work, School of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, Waterfront campus, Geelong, Victoria, Australia Philip Gillingham, B.A. (Hons), M.S.W., CQSW, Lecturer in Social Work, School of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, Waterfront campus, Geelong, Victoria, Australia Sebastien Melendez, B.S.W. (Hons), Social Worker, Bethany Community Support, North Geelong, Victoria, Australia
REFLEXIVITY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL ACTION
Charalambos Tsekeris, Nicos Katrivesis
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens, Greece Email: tsekeris@gmail.com University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece E-mail: nkatrive@uom.gr
FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History Vol. 7, No1, 2008, pp. 1 – 12
Igor Perko, University of Maribor, Faculty of Economics and Business, igor.perko@um.si Vladimir Lepskiy, Russian Academy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, lepsky@tm-net.ru
a Anesthesiology Department, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia
b Department of Educational Development and Research, School of Health Professions Education, Faculty of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
c Department of Medicine and Center for Health Professions Education, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland, USA
d Division of Education and Innovation, Department of Medicine and Scientist, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
The Research Committee 51 (ISA-RC51) of the International Sociological Association (ISA) is one of the more than fifty Research Committees which, along with a large number of national sociological associations, constitute the ISA.
The RC51 is oriented to promote the systemic perspective in the social sciences through sociocybernetics. This perspective integrates the general theory of systems, the cybernetics of first and second-order, and complexity sciences, with the aim to address complex social problems.
is an international peer-reviewed e-journal focusing on the multidisciplinary study of the scientific and philosophical foundations and applications of constructivism and related disciplines. The journal promotes constructivist discourse, i.e., interdisciplinary discussion and cooperation among researchers and theorists working in a great number of diverse fields including: Artificial Intelligence · Biology · Cognitive Science · Communication Science · Computer Science · Educational Research · Ethics · Linguistics · Mathematics · Media Studies · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychotherapy · Sociology.
Constructivist approaches covered in the journal include: 4E Cognition · Autopoietic Systems · Biology of Cognition · Constructionism · Enaction/Enactivism · First-Person Research · Neurophenomenology · Non-Dualizing Philosophy · Operative Constructivism · Personal Construct Psychology · Radical Constructivism · Second-Order Cybernetics.
The logic of the formation of third-order cybernetics is based on the transition from first-order cybernetics – “observable systems”, to second-order – “observing systems”, to third-order cybernetics – “self-developing poly-subject (reflexive-active) environments”. And also on the ascent from the paradigm “subject – object” to the paradigm “subject – subject” and then, in third-order cybernetics, to the paradigm of “subject – metasubject (self-developing poly-subject environment)”. Third-order cybernetics has its own specifics and also defines a paradigm (framework construction) that includes first and second order cybernetic paradigms, similar to post-non-classical scientific rationality.
What is required in third order cybernetics? Narrative arts such as Drama, Films, Literature, Stories, Novels as means of social reflexivity for providing ethical and moral grounds for social action & justice.
World Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics
18th Congress-WOSC2020
Moscow, 16th to 18th September 2020
1.5 Cybernetics of self-developing poly-subject (reflexive-active) environments: third-order cybernetics
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the development of socially-oriented types of cybernetics, the development of second-order cybernetics (S. Umpleby, V. Lepskiy, R. Vallée, S. Bozicnik & M. Mulej, T. Ivanuša and others). An urgent problem is the analysis of the foundations and models of different types of socially-oriented cybernetics. The focus of this section is third-order cybernetics developed in Russia.
Third-order cybernetics (V. Lepskiy, 1998) is formed on the basis of post-non-classical scientific rationality. The logic of the formation of third-order cybernetics is based on the transition from first-order cybernetics – “observable systems”, to second-order – “observing systems”, to third-order cybernetics – “self-developing poly-subject (reflexive-active) environments”. And also on the ascent from the paradigm “subject – object” to the paradigm “subject – subject” and then, in third-order cybernetics, to the paradigm of “subject – metasubject (self-developing poly-subject environment)”. Third-order cybernetics has its own specifics and also defines a paradigm (framework construction) that includes first and second order cybernetic paradigms, similar to post-non-classical scientific rationality.
On the basis of post-non-classical scientific rationality it became possible to integrate ideas and concepts of humanitarian studies: ideas about the noosphere (V. Vernadsky), the concept of society as a social system (N. Luhman), activity and subject-activity approaches (A. Leontiev, L. Vygotsky, S. Rubinshtein, et al.), contributions of Russian methodologists (G. Shchedrovitsky, et al.), interdisciplinary ideas of the formation of social cybernetics (S. Umpleby), sociohumanitarian analysis of the experience of developing automated systems (V. Lepskiy), and others.
Discussion points
Foundations and models of socially-oriented types of cybernetics (S. Umpleby, V. Lepskiy, R. Vallée, S. Bozicnik & M. Mulej, T. Ivanuša and others).
Civilization aspects of self-developing poly-subject environments (third-order cybernetics).
Philosophical and methodological aspects of third-order cybernetics.
Third-order cybernetics is an ontological integrator of first and second order cybernetics.
The problem of complexity is third-order cybernetics.
Reflexive processes in third-order cybernetics.
Ethical aspects of third-order cybernetics.
Social Responsibility in Third Order Cybernetics.
Public participation in self-developing poly-subject environments
Organization of hybrid (subject, digital, physical) environments in third-order cybernetics.
Socio-humanitarian ergonomics of self-developing poly-subject environments.
In almost 60 articles this book reviews the current state of second-order cybernetics and investigates which new research methods second-order cybernetics can offer to tackle wicked problems in science and in society. The contributions explore its application to both scientific fields (such as mathematics, psychology and consciousness research) and non-scientific ones (such as design theory and theater science). The book uses a pluralistic, multifaceted approach to discuss these applications: Each main article is accompanied by several commentaries and author responses, which together allow the reader to discover further perspectives than in the original article alone. This procedure shows that second-order cybernetics is already on its way to becoming an idea shared by many researchers in a variety of disciplines.
Much to the surprise and delight of the co-editors, this special issue of Emergence: Complexity & Organization on complexity and storytelling appears to mark more a beginning than an ending. For, while the publication of any journal is the end of a discrete project, what we are learning from it suggests the opening moves in a game of exploration pursuing a fascinating question: Are the studies of storytelling, in its widest sense, and of complex human systems largely the same thing? At first, that seemed an obvious overstatement. Yet, in the process of developing this special issue, both of us have concluded that it is a question that is, at least, worth exploring. In this way, we offer you this special issue as an introduction to the possibility that the dynamics that arise as people tell stories, to themselves as well as to others, and then enact those stories, create the dynamic human systems – families and neighborhoods; workgroups, organizations, and economies – that Ralph Stacey’s (2001) conception of complex responsive processes seems to deny.
Some readers may say that this exploration is hardly new. In fact, nearly 30 years ago, Louis R. Pondy’s essay “Beyond open system models of organization,” included as a classic complexity article in this issue (see pp. 119-137), lays out the challenge to launch into just such an exploration as the co-editors believe this issue represents. Basing his argument on Boulding’s nine levels of system complexity, Pondy insists that organizational theorists are locked into analysis based on the lower levels of complexity. Given the then-current understanding of organizations, analysts should think of them less as ‘input-output’ machines and more as ‘language-using, sensemaking cultures’. What is needed, as a result, is “radical methodological departures [such as] ethnographic techniques more suitable for studying meaning and belief systems.” The theme articles in this issue play with a variety of such departures.
Moreover, mostly over the last five years, a significant amount of work has been compiled applying complexity and storytelling to organizations, answering Pondy’s challenge after only a quarter century. Already, three practitioners – Carl Weick (1995), Dave Snowden (see Kurtz & Snowden, 2003), and David Boje (2001) – have developed sophisticated approaches to this study. What makes this issue of E:CO new and exciting is an explosion of interest in this developing area of study. Previously, the intersection of complexity and storytelling studies had been applied largely to organizations. However, among the more than 40 proposals we received were abstracts whose subject ranged from economics and law to disaster control, healthcare, and oriental literature. As a result, we began to suspect that this evolving hybrid field could suggest a powerful approach to the application of complexity thinking to all human systems. Nor are we the first to suggest this. One contributor to this issue, anthropologist Michael Agar, has observed elsewhere (Agar, 2005), that the most effective methodology to complexity-based social studies is ethnography.
In some ways, it seems odd that the intersection between complexity and storytelling has been so little examined. For one thing, the two studies have grown on remarkably parallel tracks for the last 15 years or so. During this time, both studies have been adapted from their origins – complexity in the natural sciences and narrative/storytelling in literature – and applied increasingly to organizations, but in a somewhat limited way. Complexity studies of organizations have been largely limited to considering organizations as (narratively) coherent entities in market ecosystems, ignoring what complexity thinking suggests about the dynamics of organizations as ecosystems for the people working in them. Some work on organizations as ecosystems has begun to appear in, for example, the work of Brenda Dervin, et al. (2003) or Ken Baskin (2005b). Similarly, the vast majority of the work on narrative in organizations has explored its function on the level of the organization and in its function for managers. It’s only in recent years, as writers such as Weick, Snowden and Boje have applied the double lens of complexity and storytelling, that attention has begun to focus also on how people within organizations use narrative and storytelling quite differently. Here, a thaw of sorts is occurring, as those studying the field move from narrative, with its implications as a complete linear-construction (with beginning, middle and end), to storytelling, with its suggestion that some stories are emergent attempts to formulate and negotiate the understandings held as finished in narrative study.
In addition to these historical similarities, the two studies (story-emergence and complexity) seem an almost ideal fit for each other. On one hand, some writers on storytelling are beginning to recognize it as an emergent phenomenon, sensitive to initial states, that groups negotiate in their interactions. On the other, some writers about complex human systems are beginning to recognize that storytelling drives the human equivalent of attractors at several levels – personality, group dynamics, and culture. As a result, the principles of complexity and storytelling come together as a series of strands that, like a rope, when woven together, form a more powerful tool than either alone.
Given all that, it seems only fitting that the co-editors of this issue approach this intersection of studies from opposite directions. David Boje (2001) came to it through his study of storytelling organizations. In his studies, he has focused on the difference between ‘antenarrative’, the preliminary stories people tell as they begin to understand what might be happening around them, and the more fixed (whole, linear) narratives, which are explanations of what people believe actually happened. Along with this view of storytelling, Boje (1995) had developed the idea of the organization as ‘Tamara’, a house with many rooms in which people in different rooms simultaneously tell different stories about the same events, experienced from their differing points of view, networking with one another to make sense of the divergent storylines. Much of the dynamics of any organization, he suggests, arises in the negotiation that occur as people enact these different stories about common events in distributed locations.
On the other hand, Ken Baskin approached this intersection from his work in applying complexity thinking to organizations. His 2001 research study on workgroup cultures in three American hospitals, funded by ISCE, brought him to the conclusion that the stories people tell, to themselves as well as others, create the human equivalent of attractors – personality in the individual, group dynamics, and culture in organizations and other larger entities (2005a). His most recent work (2005b) suggests that, in addition to being coherent units existing in market ecosystems, organizations can be examined as ecosystems of storytelling groups, a concept with much in common with Boje’s Tamara.
When we first issued the call for abstracts on complexity and storytelling, we had no idea that so many people had begun thinking about the function of storytelling and complexity in the various fields in which they worked. We quickly discovered that interweaving the principles of these areas of study was proving absolutely as illuminating as we had suspected from our own work. The nine topical articles published in this issue will give the reader an idea of the variety and excitement of thought among those combining the insights of complexity thinking and storytelling:
Theodore Taptiklis’s “After managerialism,” for instance, contrasts managerialism’s tendency to reduce complexity with the approach supported by this journal, among others, to confront the complexity of contemporary markets. He examines his work with organizations to record and share the narrative experience of professionals in order to foster emergence and creativity.
In “Narrative processes in organizational discourse,” John Luhman discusses organizational discourse as a complex system that includes three processes – storying coercion, story weaving, and story betting, the last of which reflects Boje’s antenarrative theory. For him, narratives provide a “field of choices in which meaning takes place.” In organizations managed as complex systems, these choices can create the rich diversity from which innovation emerges.
Michael Agar’s essay, “Telling it like you think it might be,” explores a methodology for analyzing organizational storytelling. At a time when so many organizations are trying to transform management style from the traditional mechanical model to a more complex one, Agar offers a way of measuring the degree of complexity recognized in any organization’s operations, through examining five elements of the storytelling.
Taking a different tack in “The use of narrative to understand and respond to complexity,” Larry Browning and Thierry Boudés compare two of the major models for using “narrative as a sensemaking response to complexity.” In examining David Snowden’s Cynefin model and that of Carl Weick, Browning and Boudés conclude that, in spite of the many differences in these models, they are remarkably similar, especially in their emphasis on widespread participation and “management by exclusion.”
In “Wanted for breaking and entering organizational systems in complexity,” Adrian Carr and Cheryl Lapp take a Freudian approach to the function of narrative in organizations transforming from a traditional model to a more complex one. Introducing the principles of complexity into such an organization, they note, demands that people in the organization co-create stories that cannot help but cause anxiety. It is through the pain created in the destruction of old certainties, which the authors insist people cling to as an expression of Freud’s ‘Thanatos’, that the creative energies of ‘Eros’ emerge.
Doug Smith’s “Order (for free) in the court” examines the legal system as a complex system that has evolved as a result of what he has called “full-contract storytelling.” Rather than the traditional view that law is a system governed by rules, Smith insists that it depends on a self-reinforcing cycle of learning and retelling stories in law school and then anticipating and countering the stories of others in practice. In court lawyers use stories to reduce the complexity of life in order to win judges and juries to their clients’ points of view. Ironically, this central role of storytelling in the legal system remains unacknowledged.
Similarly, Michelle Shumate, Alison Bryant and Peter Monge argue, in “Storytelling and globalization,” that networked global organizations engage in “narrative netwar” in order to affect the ideological landscape. Using the Direct Action network’s protest of the World Trade Organization’s 1999 meeting in Seattle as an example, they explore how people in both networks use narrative to simplify an issue as complex as global trade in order to persuade people to support their positions. The world is much more complex than any one story can communicate; by reducing that complexity with narrative, they can make their cases, suggesting that those narratives are the reality.
Finally, Check Teck Foo’s essay, “Three kingdoms, sense making and complexity theory,” examines the famous Chinese novel, Romance of three kingdoms, as a narrative about the phase transition between the Han and Jin dynasties. Rather than a monolithic narrative, the story is presented as a collection of short stories with interlocking characters, whose interactions eventually result in the reemergence of orderly government. As a novel about social phase transition, he notes, this work offers insights into how today’s leaders and approach the chaotic developments of our own period.
If, in fact, this intersection between the study of complexity and of storytelling is as powerful as the co-editors suspect, an enormous amount of work remains. Those exploring it are only beginning to develop methodologies and a vocabulary.
We would like to offer a bold conclusion, one that is an answer to Boulding (1968), as well as Pondy’s (1976) challenge to system/complexity theory. We think that the difference between coherence-narrative and the more emergence-storytelling theories is the dawn of the ‘Third Cybernetics’ of dynamic complexity. Boulding made it clear that for systems theory to theorize and study higher orders of complexity, we need to differentiate between sign-representations (e.g., narratives as the ‘mirror’ of experience). First and Second Cybernetics has been dominated by master-narratives, each with a particular metaphorization: level 1 (frameworks of narrative types); level 2 (mechanistic narrative); level 3 (thermostat-control narrative); level 4 (cell of the ‘open system’); and level 5 (tree as ‘organic’ narrative). First cybernetics is the mechanistic-narrative of deviation-counteraction through the input-output-feedback sign-comparison model of communication. Second cybernetics is the open (cell) system narrative of deviation-counteracting (comparing narratives of the environment, systemically-organizing more variety to process them).
We think the articles point to a Third Cybernetics, where what Boulding calls image (managed in story, level 6), symbol (self-reflexion in story, level 7), societal discourse (social organization shaped by story, a domain of discourse, level 8), and transcendental (stories of unknowable and knowable, level 9). For Pondy, these upper levels are where language, story, and symbol, exceed the theory of ‘open system’ modeling. The problem is that narrative (conceived as linear metaphorization), does not come to grips with the needs of Third Order Cybernetics[1].
References
Agar, M. (2005). “We have met the other and we’re all nonlinear: Ethnography as a nonlinear dynamic system,” Complexity, ISSN 1076-2787, 10(2): 16-24.
Baskin, K. (2005a). “Storytelling and the complex epistemology of organizations,” in K. A. Richardson (ed.), Managing organizational complexity: Philosophy, theory, application, Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, ISBN 1593113188, pp. 331-344.
Baskin, K. (2005b). “Complexity, stories and knowing,” Emergence: Complexity & Organization, ISSN 1521-3250, 7(2): 32-40.
Boje, D. M. (2001). Narrative methods for organizational and communication research, London, UK: Sage Publications, ISBN 0761965874.
Boje, D. M. (1995). “Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as ‘Tamara-land’,” Academy of Management Journal, ISSN 0001-4273, 38(4): 997-1035, http://cbae.nmsu.edu/∼dboje/papers/DisneyTamaraland.html.
Boulding, K. (1968). “General systems theory: The skeleton of science,” in Walter Buckley (ed.), Modern systems research for the behavioral scientist, Chicago: Adeline, ISBN 0202300110, pp. 3-10. More recently reprinted in K. A. Richardson, J. A. Goldstein, P. M. Allen and D. Snowden (eds.) (2004). E:CO Annual Volume 6, Mansfield, MA: ISCE Publishing, ISBN 0976681404, pp. 252-264.
Dervin, B., Foreman-Wernet, L. and Lauterback, Eric (eds.) (2003). Sense-making methodology reader: Selected writings of Brenda Dervin, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, ISBN 1572735090.
Kurtz, C. F. and Snowden, D. J. (2003). “The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world,” IBM Systems Journal, ISSN 0018-8670, 42(3): 462-483.
Pondy, L. R. (1976). “Beyond open systems models of organization,” Annual meeting of the Academy of Management, August 12, reprinted in this issue of E:CO, pp. 122-139.
Stacey, R.D. (2001). Complex responsive processes in organizations, London, UK: Routledge, ISBN 0415249198.
Weick, K. E. (1995), Sensemaking in organizations, London, UK: Sage Publications, ISBN 080397177X.
Fourth Order Cybernetics considers what happens when a system redefines itself.
It focuses on the integration of a system within its larger, co-defining context.
* The 4th Order system is contextualised, embedded and integrated into the context
* It can thereby become representative for the integrated context.
* It therefore operates at two levels simultaneously.
* It is no longer a system, but a meta-system.
* It operates both as a system in its context, and as a system that is part of the context.
* It thereby has the capacity to integrate and disintegrate the contact between both.
* It is an active, interactive, reactive and ideally representative agent in/for/with/of that context.
* This requires a different level of description: not in relationship to the system, but to the relationship between systems.
* The Interface is now the system of reference, instead of the system.
* This relationship is the basis of the interaction.
* The transformation is the basis of the processing.
* The integration is the basis of integrity.
* The significant feature of the meta-system is its duality.
* The essence is the same, but the relevance brings inversion.
* The metasystem is an object; the meta-system is a subject.
* Whereas a system can normally be described, a meta-system can only be experienced
* The ‘pillars’ in this transition are the relationships (Second Order) and the interactions (Third Order).
* Fourth Order Design would integrate all activities in an inverted, contextualised form
* It would be embedded in its context and responsible in, and for, its actions
* The system would act as meta-system and design would act as meta-design.
* This represents the level of self-awareness.
* It is where the system reflects upon itself and steers itself (i.e. is autopoietic).
* These attributes facilitate self-regeneration, thus self-healing.
* They can therefore be managed to enable a healing process.
may help to explain the complexity of this.
Viewpoints which Matter 